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170
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIL
this states the Probandum;--the meaning is that they should have one and the same object. -The Probabs is stated thus :-Being such I notions as belong to a Coqniser who is connected with one and the setme Chain, such as that of a single person like Dēradatta. The mere character of being 1-notion is present in the I-xolions of other persons also; hence if the Probans had been stated in that form, it would be Inconclusive'; hence in order to avoid that contingency, the Probans has been stated as qualified by the qualification of
pertaining to a Cognisor connected with one and the same Chain! Like any single Cognition ',--this is the Corroborative Instance; it means like any single intended Cognition among these same I-notions', -(240)
With the next Text, the Author proceeds with the Answer to the abovestated doctrine of the Miman saka :
TEXT (241).
IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED - Ir Intelligence IS HELD TO BE eternal and one, TEEN, COGNITION ALSO SHOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS OF THE SAME
CHARACTER.-(241)
COMMENTARY. If Intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then Cognition also-which has no form other than that of Intelligence, should have to be regarded as eternal and one. This however cannot be desirable for you; as it would be contrary to your doctrine. For instance, the author of your Bhasya (Shabara) has declared [under Súlra 1. 1. 5, page 9, line 17. Bib. Indica Edition) that 'Cognition, being momentary, cannot be present at the time of another Cognition! Jaimini also has asserted (under Sü. 1. 1. 5) that Perception is that Cogni. tion of nan which is produced on the contact of an existing thing'; and if Cognition were eternal, there could be no production' of it.
It would also involve self-contradition on the part of Kumarila himself: He has declared for instance that 'It does not remain for a single moment, nor does it even appear in the form of wrong cognition whereby it could operate later on towards the apprehending of its object, like the Sense-organs and the like ' Shlokavīrika, Pratyakşa-Sutra, 55).
Further, if Cognition were held to be only one, this would be contrary to the doctrine of Six Means and Forms of Cognition'.-It would also be contrary to Perception also, as Cognitions are clearly perceived to be liable to appearance and disappearance in the course of the thinking of things with constant imposition of variations.--(241)
Not perceiving all these incongruities and self-contradiction, Kumarila declares as follows:
