Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 83

TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER II.
It has been asserted (by the Naiyāyika, under Text 48 above) that ** Atoms supply the corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity (in support of the reasoning that the World must have an Intelligent Cause, because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts 'l".
The Author proceeds to show in the following Text that the said Instance per Dissimilarity is one from which the character of the Probandum is not excluded
TEXTS (78-79).
THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE REGARDED BY US AS MERE AGGRECATES OF ATOMS; AND THE POTTER AND OTHER MEN WHO MAKE THOSE THINGS ARE ONLY MAKERS OF THE ATOMS; HENCE THE CHARACTER THAT YOU MEAN TO PROVE (1.B. YOUR PROBANDUM) IS NOT EXCLUDED (ABSENT) FROM THE ATOM WHICH HAS BEEN CITED (BY YOD) AS A CORROBORA
TIVE INSTANCE per Dissimilarity.-178-79)
COMMENTARY.
The 'Composite is going to be denied by us in detail (under Chapter 10): and it has already in a way been denied; hence (there being no such composito whole as the Jar) the Potter must be regarded as the maker of Atoms only; and thus the character to be proved that of being made by an Intelligent Maker,-is one that is not excluded from the Atoms, which have been cited as an Instance per dissimilarity; and thus the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity that has been cited (by the Theist, in support of his reasoning) is found to be open to the defect that the character of the Probandum is not absent from it and hence it cannot serve as an instance per dissimilarity].-(78-79)
The following might be urged "If what we had desired to prove were the particular phase of any character, then the corroborative Instance per Similarity cited by us in the form of the Jar) might have been open to the defect of being devoid of the character sought to be proved (Probandum); as it is however, what we are seeking to prove is only the general character of being produced by an Intelligent Cause'; and when that General thesis has been proved, then, by implication, God becomes proved as the Cause (Maker) of the Tree and other things. Potter, etc. cannot be the maker of these things, as they are of the Jar and such other things; because the General character is further specified by a particular characteristic. For instance, in the case of such things as the Tree and the like, it is not possible that there should be any other Maker; and the implication of this recognised fact is that, even without the specifio mention of a particular character (of the Maker), it is God alone that comes to be recognised as the Maker of these things."
The answer to this is supplied in the following Text: