Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 37

26
VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. Ì
by the universal ? The first alternative is out of the question because it is a permanent entity and an identical principle irrespective of the modes which come and go. So substance cannot be the previously unknown datum of subsequent cognitions. The second alternative is also not tenable because it is momentary and vanishes when the perceptual cognition takes place. It is not plausible that a percipient would perceive the two elements, substance and mode simultaneously, if they are two facts existing side by side. And even if they are related as substantive and adjective the knowledge of either of the two would take place antecedently and so the second cognition will be conversant with a fact previously known. Perception occurs on the sense-object-contact in the second moment but by that time the mode has disappeared. So it does not come within the purview of the cognition of uncognized fact because it is neither cognized before nor attained after. The two other alternatives, namely, mode-qualified-substance or substance-qualified-mode cannot be supposed to be the object of such cognition simply because the mode either as a substantive or an adjective is not amenable to second cognition. If the object of the second cognitton be supposed to be the universal common entity then it will be on a par with substance. As for the particular, if it is persistent and identical with substance it will not be amenable to the proposed definition. The other two alternatives are consequential and so cannot be expected to yield better results. Furthermore the qualification 'previously uncognized' cannot have reference to the experience of other people. Everything is cognized by an omniscient whose existence is admitted both by the Buddhist and the Jaina and also by theists who must assert that God is omniscient. Even a thing cognized for the first time by a person may have been cognized by other subjects. So the adjective cannot be understood in an absolute reference. If however it refers to a particular percipient, that also does not make it more intelligible, as has been shown by us immediately in the previous discussion.
The Mimāmsakas and the Vedantists have insisted on the inclusion of this adjective of valid cognition with a deeper purpose in view. The Mimamsakas regard the Vedic text as authoritative because it yields the knowledge of a fact which is not attainable by perception or inference. Heaven, hell or ultimate salvation are facts which are not accessible to perception or inference. It is on the evidence of scriptural texts that a man comes to know that performance of a meritorious act leads to heaven and commission of sinful acts leads to hell or that ultimate salvation is attainable by realization of the ultimate reality. It is for this reason the Vedas are regarded as