Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. t
instrumental condition of valid cognition? Siddhasena asserts that it is the cognition that is the instrument of proof. Both the condition of proof and proof as the result must be a cognitive act. Dharmakirti also asserts that it is cognition which is pramara qua act and qua instrument. It is the instrument of practical activity and is by itself a cognitive fact. Cognition necessarily means the revelation of an object, say water in a lake and the acts of bathing, drinking and the like are rather the consequences of this revelation. So if it is to be regarded as an instrument, it, that is, cognition, is the instrument of the practical behaviour following upon it. The condition of cognition such as the sense-organ or the sense-object-contact (sannikarṣa) is not regarded as pramana, though it is the antecedent condition. If a brute fact like sense or sense-object-contact be regarded as a pramara (act of proof or the result of proof), it may be shifted to the entire physical organism which makes the function of sense-organs possible. Accordingly these remote or immediate antecedents of congnition are not given the status of pramana which means primarily and principally the act of proof or revelation. Here the Jaina logicians differ from the Naiyayika, in unison with the Buddhist. Pramana (valid cognition) quà an act of revelation or an instrumental condition of practical activity must be cognition. This is stressed by the inclusion of 'cognition' (jana) in the definition.
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The next important ele nent in the definition is 'immune from -contradiction' (badhavarjita). A set of logicians makes verification (avisamvada) or to be precise, the want of incongruence and disharmony of the content with the object, the test of valid cognition. The successful behaviour resulting from cognition provides the confirmation of the validity of the cognition. But there are certain perceptions which though erroneous, do lead to the successful acquisition of the object considered to be envisaged by them and have been regarded as pramana. This is a misconception and as such is rebutted by the adjective 'immune from contradiction'. It is true that the cognition of a moving tree seen from a fast running train, steamer or motor car is not entirely unfounded in the sense that a person so inclined may move forward and perceive stationary tree. There is verification so far as the tree is concerned. Again such instances of doutt, for example, 'whether the object standing before is a man or a tree' is resolved by the perception of hands and feet which man and not to a settle the doubt as hands and feet can belong to a tree. But suppose that the person misperceives the foot for the hand, the cognition of the human being as the object of previous doubt is regarded as valid on account of its verifiability. So also perception of a stick immersed in water as bent while it is straight in fact is also susceptible of verification. So there is congruence of the cognition