Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 1
Vaiseșika school when there is fourfold contact viz. (i) the contact of the sense with the object, (ii) contact of the sense with the mind, (iiij contact of the mind with the knowing self, and (iv) the consequential contact with the cognition inherent in the subject. When the object to be known, e. g. cognition, pleasure, pain, volition and the like, is internally inherent in the subject, the first threefold contact will suffice. The most essential condition is that there must be contact of the mind with the self (that is attention). And as the mind is close to the self and competent to be in contact, the aforesaid contact takes place without hitch and this is the universal condition of all cognition. If the mind be not functioning or functioning elsewhere on another object, the cognition of the specific object wil take place. In the case of the first cognition the mind-soul-contact (atmamanaḥsamyoga) is present in full force. When the second cognition, supposed to take cognizance of the first one, occurs there must be soulmind-contact, which is the necessary condition of all mental events. If the first soul-mind-contact as the condition of the first cognition continues it will necessarily cognize the second cognition, beca use the cognition inheres in the self and the mind which is in conjunction with the self will automatically function on the former and so in every case the introspective cognition will be eo ipso cognized. But as this requiste condition is also present at the time of the occurrence of the first cognition, it is passing strange that the first cognition remains uncognized when it occurs and depends on the second cognition for proof of its existence. Cognition is competent to be perceived by the self and when the requisite condition viz. the soul-mind-object-contact is present in full, why should not the effect take place ? If on the other hand it is supposed that the first contact ceases and another such contact takes place to make the occurrence of the introspection possible, the result will be a fiasco. The second contact will take place in the following way. The occurrence of the mind-object-contact takes place in the first moment, the contact of the mind with the self occurs in the second and the contact of the former (the mind) with the cognition can take place in the third moment and thus complete the requisite condition. But as cognition and the like are momentary in the sense that they exist only for two moments and perish in the third moment as a matter of necessity, the first cognition will have ceased to exist when the introspective cognition arises. So introspection, even if it takes place in the third moment as supposed by the Nyāya-Vaiseșika school, will have no object. Thus the theory that the first cognition functions as an unknown entity and is proved by a second cognition falls to the ground.