Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 31

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VAISHALI INSTITUTE RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. I
is not a relation at all since the very conception of relation presupposes two terms and the supposed identity as a relation will only be tantamount to denial of relation as the other term is non est. Nor can the relation be one of absolute difference. According to the Jaina logician the relation is one of identity-cum-difference, It partakes of the dual character and the incompatibility alleged by the Idealist will hold good if identity and difference be absolute. The Jaina endorses non-absolutism and regards all relation as identity-cum-difference, which is enforced and confirmed by experience and as such cannot be rejected on a priori grounds. It is experience alone which can be the determinant of the nature of things conceived. One must submit to the final verdict of experience and not dictate terms. Things do not conform to the tastes and preferences of the knower. The knower cannot alter the nature of things, otherwise a inan might contend that the blue should be perceived as white. It has been pointed out that the incompatibility of identity and difference is a deduction of the absolutist who regards them as absolutely different and mutually inconsistent. But the non-absolutist maintains that difference and identity are not necessarily incongruous. In deference to experience one must accept that difference and identity are not encountered in experience. They are rather conceived on a priori and abstract considerations which exist only in the muddled imagination of the logical purist who does not condescend to take stock of the objects of experience. Like King Canute who ordered the waves of the English channel not to encroach on the coast and felt the humiliation of discomfiture when the sea refused to oblige him, the Idealist logician will meet with similar disappointment. In response to the challenge of the Idealist that no relation between the subject and the object can be trotted out, the Naiyāyika asserts that the subject-object relation is as ultimate as identity and differenee. The Naiyáyika and also Kumarila do not subscribe to the view that cognition and its object are perceived together and at the same time. But the Jaina believes in self-awareness of all cognitions and therefore do not seek shelter in the subterfuge. The Jaina philosopher endorses the contention of the Idealist that cognition and its object are perceived at the same time as a matter of universal coincidence. But this synchronism and togetherness of the two awarenesses do not entail their identity. Simultaneous awareness is found to occur in the awareness of light and that of the object, say jar. The light is the auxiliary condition of visual perception of the jar but nobody would assert that light and the jar are identical. So the argument of Dharmakīrti centred upon synchronism does not entail identity as a matter of necessity.