Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia
Publisher: Research Institute of Prakrit Jainology & Ahimsa Mujjaffarpur

Page 36

NATURE OF VALID COGNITION
25 with the object and its validity, though partial, cannot be denied. In pursuance of the pragmatic satisfaction of such experiences, verifiable cognition, whether fully authentic or partially authentic, was regarded as pramana (valid cognition). Dharmakirti had to incorporate the adiective 'non-erroneous' (abhranta) in the definition of valid perceptual cognition formulated by him. He differs from those logicians who pin their faith on verification by successful test as the criterion of valid cognition and accordingly excludes such cases from the purview of validity. Dharmottara and also Santaraksita in the Tattvasamgraha have offered this defence as the justification of incorporation of the adjective ‘non-erroneous' in the definition.
Dharmakîrti and his commentators also make verification a plausible test of validity, but they insist that the verification must be total and relate to all the attributes perceived in the cognition As a moving tree is not perceived on verification but a stationary tree, the previous cognition of the moving tree, whatever may be its cause-swift locomotion or nervous disturbance due to a blow or wound--must be rejected as erroneous. But the qualifying epithet 'non-erroneous' is an absolutely uncalled for innovation. It is a negative expression and negation is called in request to combat possible erroneous affirmation. Dharmakīrti proposes to define authentic cognition (samyag jñāna) which is classified under two heads viz. perception and inference. It follows from the procedure that perception must be an authentic cognition and this alone is sufficient to preclude the disputed instances of verifiable cognition as they are erroneous. An erroneous cognition is error, and irrespective of its practical consequences, cannot be confounded with authentic cognition. This will be clear from our exposition of a subsequent verse of Siddhasena.
Siddhasena has not incorporated the adjective 'cognition of a previously uncognized fact' (anadhigat artham) in the definition as has been done in a supplementary clause by Dharmkīrti in the Pramāņavartika, and the Mimāmsakas. Siddharşi discusses the logical necessity of this supplementary qualification of valid cognition. What is the nature of the uncognized object ? Is it (i) substance, or (ii) mode, or (iii) substance qualified by mode, or (iv) mode qualified by substance, or (v) the universal, or (vi) the particular, or (vii) the universal qualified by the particular or (viii) the particular qualified
1. Nyayavatāra, 6. 2. pramānam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitih / avisamvādanam...
..................... // Pramānavārtika, 1. 3 ajñātārth aprakāso vā .........Pramāņavārtika, I. 7.
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