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E A. Solomon
not sufficiently develop in Vedäatic circles till the time of the GaudapadaKarika and the Yogavaşistha. Earlier, perhaps, the Vedäatic thinkers were struggling with some form of 'bhedabheda (Unity-in diversity) or Visiṣṭādvaita (Qualified Non-dualism) as can be seen from some references in Sankaracarya's commentaries (e. g. Brahmusūtra-Sankara-Bhasya, II 1.14) and from what Ramanujacarya says about his Pūrväcäryas,
Among the Buddhists, the Vijñanavadin: came forward to say that the external world need not be hypostatised merely to account for our know. ledge of it and for our empirical dealings. The fact that all this is possible in a dream and that there is 'sahopalambhu' or simultaneous awareness of cognitions and their objects, can vindicate our saying that the external world is nothing but our various conceptions appearing as if they were outside. This tendency of vijääna to differentiate and diversify itself as the object and its apprehension is due to an innate tendency or flaw, which was referred to by the terms 'abhutaparikalpa', vikalpa, vitathavikalpabhyasa-vāsanā, etc.
The Suayavadins, and of course the Tattvopaplavavadins, attacked the same problem from a different angle. We try to know the things of the world on the strength of our means of knowledge or pramānas, but our conceptions or definitions of the pramānas, as also of the things of the world are faulty; the faults of atmafraya, anyonyafraya, etc. can be detected in each of the definitions that are prevalent, including the Buddhist ones. That is to say, each thing as we now it, is sāpekṣa; its conception is dependent on the conception of something else, and to it is devoid of its own nature, it is 'niḥsvabhava'. We cannot vouchsafe for the existence of anything, not even of the vijñāna of the Vijñāpavadins and even Buddha as we understand him. The Madhyamikas or the Sünyavadins obviously did not, or could not affirm the existence of some Real Principle, though there is every reason to believe that they did not deny its Reality. Only it could not fall within the scope of any of the empirical means of proof.
This stand of the Vijñanavadins and the Madhyamikas seems to have appealed to some of the Vedantins. So also the Buddhist view which regarded samavaya (inherence), dharma-dharmibhāva, avayavavayavibhāva, etc. as but mental constructions, the reality being the svalaksana, the thing in itself. The Vedaatias, as said above, were finding it difficult to accept the Ultimate Reality as eternally unchanging, pure and devoid of differentiation and at the same time to accept it as the cause that evolved in the form of the world with all its diversity.
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