Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 65

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IL
of several substances, being coloured' and so forth-and all these conditions are absent in Air and other things, as has been declared in the following passage--"Perception follows from Largeness, Presence of several Substances and Presence of Colour; the Atom is imperceptible because it contains no other substances; Air is imperceptible because it is devoid of the presence of Colour ;-the term 'Sanskura' stands for subsistence, presence in composition ; -And the Diad (Two-Atom-Compound) and other things are imperceptible because of the absence of largeness."
Now, in this argument, if the Probandum to be proved were stated in the general (unqualified) form that Things perceptible by two sense-organs and those imperceptible are produced by intelligent causes', then it would be superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties, in regard to such things as the Jar and the like, over which there is no dispute at all. It would involve the fallacy of contradicting one's own doctrine', because the Naiyāyika does not admit sich imperceptible things as the Atom, Akasha, and the like to be produced by an Intelligent Cause', and also because these latter are eternal (hence not produced at all), the said assertion would involve that contradiction of a perceived (well-recognised) fact. It is for the purpose of avoiding all these difficulties that the qualifying term 'under dispute' has been added : the term 'Tipratipatti' standing for different opinions, and that which forms the subject of diverse opinions is said to be the matter under dispute.-With this qualification. what become the subject' of the argument are only the Body, Sense-organs, the various Regions and so forth; and what is asserted does not apply to the Atom and such other things.
Similarly, if the Probandon (to be proved) wero stated in the form that the things under disputo are produced by a Cause', then the argument would be futile-proving what is already accepted by both parties. In order to avoid this, the qualification has been added in the form produced by an intelligent Canse'. This argument, the stated, cannot be futile as addressed to the Särikhya, as there is no Intelligence Buddhi) for the Sankhya apart from Primordial Matter, and certainly a thing cannot be produced by itself.
* Arrangement of component parts ' ;-the-arrangement',-.e. conjunc. tion in the form of aggregation', -of the parts that go to make up the Things; by this the Tluings in question are characterised - differentiated; consequently they must be as asserted. Mere characterisation by conponents' would incinde the universals Cow and the like (which also are held to be consisted of components in the shape of the individual animals) and thus rencier the Reason too wide'; hence the qualification its own components'; what the universal Cow and the rest are differentiated by is the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Substance,-not by the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Cow itself.
The 'Intelligent Cause' thus proved is God.
It is this proof that has been stated in these two Tects. The compound Svārambhaka, etc. is to be analysed as meaning that which has for ita Vishēşına-differentia—the peculiar, characteristic - arrangement, disposi. tion of its own component parts'. This indicates the invariable con.