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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER 1.
other hand, if what is sought to be proved is that there is an intelligent Cause, which produces an effect of certain finite dimensions, and acte according to its potencies', -then the Reason adduced becomes invalidated by 'inconclusiveness'; as even in the absence of an intelligent actor, there is nothing incongruous in the production of a particular effect with welldefined dimensions determined by the potencies of its own Cause. Further, it is not right to regard Primordial Matter as intelligent, as it is, ex hypothesi, *insentient', and 'intelligence' is synonymous with 'sentience'.
Further, if by means of the Reason Because Activity is due to Potency, it is meant to prove the existence of a mere Cause possessed of potencies not different (from those just needed for the particular effect), then it is superfluous, proving what is already adınitted by both parties. If, on the other hand, the Cause meant to be proved is some one Eternal Cause possessed of distinct and diverse potencies, ---then the Reason becomes invalidated by inconclusiveness':-Further, as concomitance with any such Reason is not cognised anywhere, the Reason becomes invalidated as being "Unknown' and 'Inadmissible' also; because as a matter, nowhere has any activity of the Cause towards the producing of an Effect been found to have been due to extraneous and additional potencies; as all potencies subsist in the essence of the tlung itself.
Another reason put forward by the Sänkhya (in Karikā 15) is—" Because of the merging of the whole world" -This Reason is absolutely unknown, Inadmissible'. No such 'merging of things is known of, all things being liable to such absolute destruction as leave behind no traces at all. If there were such' merging, it would come about either on the disappearance of the previons condition of the thing concerned, or without such disappearance. If it comes on the disappearance of the previous condition, then it involves the absolute destruction (without leaving any traces) (which the Sankhya does not admit). If, on the other hand, it comes without the said disappearance, then there can be no merging' at all, because no'merging' is possible for any entity so long as it retains its own utrammelled essence. Otherwise there would be endless incongruities. Hence the stalement because of the merging of the whole world' involves a self-contradiction.
Thus, even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter, the diversity relating to the Effect,-in the shape of its being 'finite and the rest,—and the differentiation also into Cause and Effect-become explic. able, on the basis of the diversity of potencies. And this means that the reasons set forth by the Sankhya are all'inconclusive '.
The phrase and other things' is meant to include the argument of the Sarikhya)" Because all activity is due to Potency".
Or, the particle 'api', 'even',-in the phrase even in the absence, etc. etc.',-may be meant to be restrictive; hence the meaning comes to be this :-It is only when there is no Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter that there can be diversity in the Effect due to the diverse potencies of the Cause; and also because it is only thus that the relation of Cause and Effect would be possible ;-hence the Reasons put forward (by the Sankhya) are
contradictory. For instance, if Primordial Matter were the Cause of the * Manifest, then the whole universe, as being (ex hypothesi) of the same
