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VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
only if connected with an action not established by other means; while if connected with an ordinary action they have a secondary, implied, meaning only!
Perception reveals to us non-differenood
substance only. We have so far shown that in the case of a conflict between Scripture and Perception and the other instruments of knowledge, Scripture is of greater force. The fact, however, is that no such conflict is observed to exist, since Perception itself gives rise to the apprehension of a non-differenced Brahman whose nature is pure Being.But how can it be said that Perception, which has for its object things of various kinds—and accordingly expresses itself in judgments such as 'Here is a jar,'*There is a piece of cloth'-causes the apprehension of mere Being? If there were no apprehension of difference, all cognitions would have one and the same object, and therefore would give rise to one judgment only—as takes place when one unbroken perceptional cognition is continued for some time.—True. We therefore have to enquire in what way,
1 The theory here referred to is held by some of the Mimâmsakas. The imperative forms of the verb have their primary meaning, i.e. the power of originating action, only in Vedic sentences which enjoin the performance of certain actions for the bringing about of certain ends: no other means of knowledge but the Veda informing us that such ends can be accomplished by such actions. Nobody, e. g. would offer a soma sacrifice in order to obtain the heavenly world, were he not told by the Veda to do so. In ordinary life, on the other hand, no imperative possesses this entirely unique originative force, since any action which may be performed in consequence of a command may be prompted by other motives as well : it is, in technical Indian language, established already, apart from the command, by other means of knowledge. The man who, e. g. is told to milk a cow might have proceeded to do so, apart from the command, for reasons of his own. Imperatives in ordinary speech are therefore held not to have their primary meaning, and this conclusion is extended, somewhat unwarrantably one should say, to all the words entering into an imperative clause.
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