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152
VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
a fine of one hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the prohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Brahmana' (Pa. Mi. SQ. III, 4, 17).
We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words depending on their connexion with *things to be done, since this is not even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your thing to be done' (karya). You understand by 'karya' that which follows on the existence of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action (according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment depending on activity; for it is this which' moves to action.Nor can it be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is 'agreeable' (anukula) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand; is not what is agreeable 'to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable (pratikala), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable : absence of pain means that a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve of undertaking it.-Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by action as that to which action is
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