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VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time other than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time, but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self is.-Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions ; as a matter of fact the cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.-But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally unmodified !-Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c., producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect ; for such agency is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.-Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong
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