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556
VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action-the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ, and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i.e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.'
38. And on account of the absence of samadhi.
If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that final state of meditation, called samadhi, which is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from Prakriti, and this is a conception which Prakriti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form.The Self alone, therefore, is the agent.-But this would imply that the activity of the Self is never at resti-Of this difficulty the next Satra disposes.
39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.
The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and other implements ready at hand, works or does not work just as he pleases. If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non-intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoyment. Here terminates the adhikarana of the agent.'
40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture.
Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it depend on the highest Self?—It is free; for if it were dependent on the highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be unmeaning. For commandments can be addressed to such
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