Book Title: Satapatha Bramhana Part 05
Author(s): Julius Eggeling
Publisher: Oxford

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Page 1838
________________ 630 VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS. injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots—such as u påsîta 'he should meditate,' vidyât 'he should know.' The and the rest' of the Sútra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the circumstances mentioned in the Parva Mîma msa-sätras (II, 4, 9). Owing to all these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the same vidyà is recognised in other såkhas also. In the Khandogya (V, 12, 2) as well as in the Vågasaneyaka we meet with one and the same injunction (viz.' He should meditate on Vaisvanara '). The form (character, rupa) of the meditations also is the same for the form of a cognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases the same, viz. Vaisvanara. The name of the two vidyas also is the same, viz. the knowledge of Vaisvånara. And both vidyâs are declared to have the same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish the identity of vidyâs even in different såkhas.—The next Sutra refers to the reasons set forth for his view by the Parvapakshin and refutes them. 2. If it be said (that the vidyâs are not one) on account of difference, we deny this, since even in one (vidya there may be repetition). If it be said that there is no oneness of vidya, because the fact of the same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we reply that even in one and the same vidyâ some matter may be repeated without any change, and under a new heading in a different chapter); if, namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising person is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and hence separation of the two vidyas. But where the cognising persons are different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different såkhås), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does not imply difference of matter enjoined.—The next Satra Digitized by Digitized by Google

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