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II ADHYÅVA, 2 PÂDA, 17.
501
The Satras at first dispose of the theory of those who acknowledge the real existence of external things. Their opinion is as follows. The atoms of earth which possess the qualities of colour, taste, touch and smell ; the atoms of water which possess the qualities of colour, taste and touch; the atoms of fire which possess the qualities of colour and touch ; and the atoms of air which possess the quality of touch only, combine so as to constitute earth, water, fire and air ; and out of the latter there originate the aggregates called bodies, sense-organs, and objects of sense-organs. And that flow of ideas, which assumes the form of the imagination of an apprehending agent abiding within the body, is what constitutes the so-called Self. On the agencies enumerated there rests the entire empiric world.On this view the Sutra remarks, ' Even on the aggregate with its two causes, there is non-establishment of that.' That aggregate which consists of earth and the other elements and of which the atoms are the cause; and that further aggregate which consists of bodies, sense-organs and objects, and of which the elements are the cause-on neither of these two aggregates with their twofold causes can there be proved establishment of that, i. e. can the origination of that aggregate which we call the world be rationally established. If the atoms as well as earth and the other elements are held to have a momentary existence only, when, we ask, do the atoms which perish within a moment, and the elements, move towards combination, and when do they combine ? and when do they become the objects of states of consciousness ? and when do they become the abodes of the activities of appropriation, avoidance and so on (on the part of agents) ? and what is the cognising Self? and with what objects does it enter into contact through the sense-organs? and which cognising Self cognises which objects, and at what time? and which Self proceeds to appropriate which objects, and at what time? For the sentient subject has perished, and the object of sensation has perished ; and the cognising subject has perished, and the object cognised has perished. And how can one subject cognise what has been appre
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