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II ADHYAVA, 2 PADA, 19.
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account of (their) not being the causes of aggregation.' This cannot rationally be assumed, because avidya, and so on, cannot be operative causes with regard to the aggregation of earth and the other elements and elemental things.. For avidya, which consists in the view of permanency and so on, belonging to what is non-permanent, and desire, aversion and the rest, which are originated by avidya, cannot constitute the causes of (other) momentary things entering into aggregation; not any more than the mistaken idea of shell-silver is the cause of the aggregation of things such as shells. Moreover, on the Bauddha doctrine, he who views a momentary thing as permanent himself perishes at the same moment; who then is the subject in whom the socalled samskaras, i. e. desire, aversion, and so on, originate? Those who do not acknowledge one permanent substance constituting the abode of the samskäras have no right to assume the continuance of the samskåras.
19. And on account of the cessation of the preceding one on the origination of the subsequent one.
For the following reason also the origination of the world cannot be accounted for on the view of the momentariness of all existence. At the time when the subsequent momentary existence originates, the preceding momentary existence has passed away, and it cannot therefore stand in a causal relation towards the subsequent one. For if nonexistence had causal power, anything might originate at any time at any place. -Let it then be said that what constitutes a cause is nothing else but existence in a previous moment.—But, if this were so, the previous momentary existence of a jar, let us say, would be the cause of all things whatever that would be met with in this threefold world in the subsequent moment-cows, buffaloes, horses, chairs, stones, &c. 1-Let us then say that a thing existing in a previous moment is the cause only of those things, existing in the subsequent moment, which belong to the same species. But from this again it would follow that one jar existing in the previous moment would be the cause of all jars, to be met with in any place, existing in
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