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II ADHYAYA, 2 PÂDA, 24.
507
forth in definite alternatives. For whether we define Space as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, or as their mutual non-existence, or as their. absolute non-existence-on none of these alternatives we attain the proper idea of Space. If, in the first place, we define it as the antecedent and subsequent non-existence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as the idea of Space can thus not be connected with earth and other things existing at the present moment, the whole world is without Space.
If, in the second place, we define it as the mutual nonexistence of earth, and so on, it will follow that, as such mutual non-existence inheres in the things only which stand towards each other in the relation of mutual nonexistence, there is no perception of Space in the intervals between those things (while as a matter of fact there is). And, in the third place, absolute non-existence of earth, and so on, cannot of course be admitted. And as nonexistence (abhava) is clearly conceived as a special state of something actually existing, Space even if admitted to be of the nature of abhava, would not on that account be a futile non-entity (something 'tukkha' or 'pirupåkhya ).
24. And on account of recognition.
We return to the proof of the, previously mooted, permanence of things. The 'anusmriti' of the Satra means cognition of what was previously perceived, i.e. recognition. It is a fact that all things which were perceived in the past may be recognised, such recognition expressing itself in the form 'this is just that (I knew before).' Nor must you say that this is a mere erroneous assumption of oneness due to the fact of the thing now perceived being similar to the thing perceived before, as in the case of the flame (where a succession of flames continually produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame); for you do not admit that there is one permanent knowing subject that could have that erroneous idea. What one person has perceived, another cannot judge to be the same as, or similar to, what he is perceiving himself. If therefore you hold that there is an erroneous
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