________________
II ADHYAYA, 2 PÂDA, 15.
499
• The samaväya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive at the unacceptable .conclusion that the world is eternal.
14. And on account of the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse (takes place); as it is observed. . From the view that the atoms of four kinds-viz. of earth 'or water or fire or air-possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts—and this is the reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms, viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.—Let it then, in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not possess .colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the next Satra refers.
15. And as there are objections in both cases.
A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sutra. Objections thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable.
Kk 2
Digitized by
Digitized by Google
