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II ADHYAYA, I PÂDA, 15.
455
(which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into contact with) an effect (vikara), i e, a particular make or configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, and a special name (nâmadheya), viz. pitcher, and so on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name. Hence jars and other things of clay are clay (mrittika), i. c. are of the substance of clay, only; this only is true (satyam), i. e. known through authoritative means of proof; only (eva), because the effects are not known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore, such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it assumes different configurations ; just as we observe that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of life-youth, old age, &c.—which he has reached. The fact of our saying "the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by the Purvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from the cause ; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity
1 The meaning of the four words constituting the clause therefore would be, On account of speech (i.e. for the sake of the accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water, which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name ; i. e. for the sake of, &c., clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.' The Commentary remarks that .arambhanam' cannot be taken in the sense of upå dâna; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only; and on the parinâma doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by Brahman.
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