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II ADHYÂYA, I PÂDA, 15.
447
either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastikaornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect.And the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work.
We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the nonconsciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures and pains whatever) is due to the plurality of the Egos, which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs; for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (ahamkara), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the
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