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VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
Let us then define avidyâ as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things. Mâyâ then, as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of avidyâ!-But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidyâ; and if, on the other hand, Mâyâ which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be permanently connected with Brahman's nature. Well, if it were so, what harm would there be ?-The harm would be that such a view implies the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts inculcating nonduality such as 'For where there is duality as it were, &c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see, and whom should he see?''-But those texts set forth the Real; Mâyâ on the other hand is nonreal, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real conflict with the texts!-Brahman, we reply, has for its essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or affected with, unreal Mâyâ, without avidyâ. Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real Mâyâ be to Brahman ?-Brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls!-But of what use should such delusion be to Brahman ?-It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!-But of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?-Do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?-The cases are not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play! -The arguments set forth previously also prove the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Mâyâ.
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