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II ADHYAYA, I PÂDA, 12.
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are fictitiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakriti which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakriti. Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakriti or some change in Prakriti? or does it mean some change in the soul?Not the latter; for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change. Nor again a change in Prakriti; for changes in Prakriti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And if, finally, the nearness of Prakriti means no more than its existence, it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakriti exists always). The Sânkhya is thus unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special refutation of the Sankhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)
11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.
The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhana must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kanâda, Akshapâda, Gina, Kapila and Patangali respectively are all mutually contradictory.
12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different way; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got rid of.
Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which
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