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VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
the Purvapakshin said as to everything being known through the cognition of the one individual soul, since all individual souls are of the same type-this also cannot be upheld; for as long as there is a knowledge of the soul only and not also of the world of non-sentient things, there is no knowledge of everything. And when the text enumerates different things ('this Brahman class, this Kshatra class,' &c.), and then concludes 'all this is that Self' where the 'this' denotes the entire Universe of animate and inanimate beings as known through Perception, Inference, and so on-universal unity such as declared here is possible only through a highest Self which is the Self of all. It is not, on the other hand, possible that what the word 'this' denotes, i. e. the whole world of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, should be one with the personal soul as long as it remains what it is, whether connected with or disassociated from non-sentient matter. In the same spirit the passage, 'All things abandon him who views all things elsewhere than in the Self,' finds fault with him who views anything apart from the universal Self. The qualities also which in the earlier Maitreyîbrâhmana (II, 4, 12) are predicated of the being under discussion, viz. greatness, endlessness, unlimitedness, cannot belong to any one else but the highest Self. That Self therefore is the topic of the Brahmana.
We further demur to our antagonist's maintaining that the entire Brahmana treats of the individual soul because that soul is at the outset represented as the object of enquiry, this being inferred from its connexion with husband, wife, wealth, &c. For if the clause 'for the love (literally, for the desire) of the Self' refers to the individual Self, we cannot help connecting (as, in fact, we must do in any case) that Self with the Self referred to in the subsequent clause, 'the Self indeed is to be seen,' &c.; the connexion having to be conceived in that way that the information given in the former clause somehow subserves the cognition of the Self enjoined in the latter clause. 'For the desire of the Self' would then mean for the attainment of the objects desired by the Self.' But if it
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