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34
VEDANTA-SUTRAS.
C
it shines forth (prakâsate) through its own being. While it exists, consciousness-differing therein from jars and the like is never observed not to shine forth, and it cannot therefore be held to depend, in its shining forth, on something else.-You (who object to the above reasoning) perhaps hold the following view:-even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object only which shines fortha fact expressed in sentences such as: the jar is perceived. When a person forms the judgment 'This is a jar,' he is not at the time conscious of a consciousness which is not an object and is not of a definite character. Hence the existence of consciousness is the reason which brings about the shining forth' of jars and other objects, and thus has a similar office as the approximation of the object to the eye or the other organs of sense (which is another condition of perceptive consciousness). After this the existence of consciousness is inferred on the ground that the shining forth of the object is (not permanent, but) occasional only1. And should this argumentation be objected to on the ground of its implying that consciousness-which is essentially of the nature of intelligence-is something nonintelligent like material things, we ask you to define this negation of non-intelligence (which you declare to be characteristic of consciousness). Have we, perhaps, to understand by it the invariable concomitance of existence and shining forth? If so, we point out that this invariable concomitance is also found in the case of pleasure and similar affections; for when pleasure and so on exist at all, they never are non-perceived (i. e. they exist in so far only as we are conscious of them). It is thus clear that we have no consciousness of consciousness itself-just as the tip of a finger, although touching other things, is incapable of touching itself.
All this reasoning, we reply, is entirely spun out of your own fancy, without any due consideration of the power of consciousness. The fact is, that in perceiving colour and
Being not permanent but occasional, it is an effect only, and as such must have a cause.
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