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VEDÂNTA-SOTRAS.
propriate. It in fact amounts to the doctrine-only expressed in somewhat different words—that final release is the annihilation of the Self. The 'I' is not a mere attribute of the Self so that even after its destruction the essential nature of the Self might persist—as it persists on the cessation of ignorance; but it constitutes the very nature of the Self. Such judgments as 'I know,' Knowledge has arisen in me,' show, on the other hand, that we are conscious of knowledge as a mere attribute of the SelfMoreover, a man who suffering pain, mental or of other kind—whether such pain be real or due to error only
-puts himself in relation to pain—'I am suffering pain'naturally begins to reflect how he may once for all free himself from all these manifold afflictions and enjoy a state of untroubled ease; the desire of final release thus having arisen in him he at once sets to work to accomplish it. If, on the other hand, he were to realise that the effect of such activity would be the loss of personal existence, he surely would turn away as soon as somebody began to tell him about 'release. And the result of this would be that, in the absence of willing and qualified pupils, the whole scriptural teaching as to final release would lose its authoritative character.—Nor must you maintain against this that even in the state of release there persists pure consciousness; for this by no means improves your case. No sensible person exerts himself under the influence of the idea that after he himself has perished there will remain some entity termed 'pure light!'-What constitutes the 'inward' Self thus is the 'I,' the knowing subject.
This 'inward' Self shines forth in the state of final release also as an 'I'; for it appears to itself. The general principle is that whatever being appears to itself appears as an 'I'; both parties in the present dispute establish the existence of the transmigrating Self on such appearance. On the contrary, whatever does not appear as an 'I,' does not appear to itself; as jars and the like. Now the emancipated Self does thus appear to itself, and therefore it appears as an 'I.' Nor does this appearance as an 'I' imply in any way that the released Self is subject to
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