Sahrdayaloka Part 02

Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 99

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA indication. This position will not suffer even if the objection of the logicians be accepted. It might be named as suggestiveness or inferential probans or by any other name. Whatever the name be given, the fact remains that there is no dispute between the objector and the siddhāntin. For this something else is admitted by both as a special power over and above the normally accepted powers of denotation and indication. But the fact is that suggestiveness is not identical with inferential probans and all the apprehension of suggested idea is not identical with inferential knowledge : "tad hi vyañjakarvam lingatvam astu, anyad vā. sarvathā prasiddhaśābda-prakāra-vilaksanarvam, śabda-vyāpāra-visayarvam ca tasyásti iti násti āvayor-vivādaḥ na punar ayam paramārtho yad-vyañjakatvam lingatvam eva, sarvatra vyangya-pratītiśca lingapratītir eva iti." (vịtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 218, ibid)
Mahima's objection is that there is no power of word except abhidhā or denotation and whatever meaning follows is only through a loose-inference which he calls kāvyánumiti. He even takes the indicated sense or laksyártha as anumeya or inferred. But then he has to accept that this process of inference has to be based on words, and is not identical with the normal inference of fire from perceiving smoke through naked eyes. It is to distinguish between the two that he calls this as "kāvyánumiti" and the other "tarkánumiti", at the same time freeing the former from the rigorous limitations or rules of the latter. It is to distinguish and defend this stand of Mahim, that Dr. Rewaprasad observes in a personal letter to us, dt. 24-11-01 after returning from Canada, that “jo dosa diye hain, un se anumānakā nahin, anumāna-gata-prāmānatā-kā khandana sambhava hai, jiskī kāvyamen āvaśyakatā hi nahīn." i.e. “The faults (that are perceived by Mammata and others in Mahima's thinking) do not refute the process of inference, or the fact of inference, but only its acceptability or, validity, or reliability, which is not at all expected here.” But our argument still holds good, even against Revaprasad jee that the very fact that Mahimā calls it as "kāvyánumiti" - proves that this ‘anumiti' is related with poetic word, i.e. it is a word-power and is other than denotation or indication. Thus Anandavardhana, to us, looks irrefutable. He proceeds as follows :
The objector has indeed made a clever use of the siddhantin's words in support of his position. The objector remarked that the speaker's intention is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state of an inferential probans. To this Anandavardhana, the Siddhāntin, has the following to say. - The scope of words is two-fold, (i) inferable and (ii) denotative. Of these the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker's intention, and again, is two-fold viz. (i) the
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