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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
777 shelter of this try to make out that poetic words, not being redundant like the talks of an insane person, have a 'kārya', a goal viz. that of creating bliss and that the poetic activity ends only in the realization of this ecstatic joy - niratiśaya sukhā"svāda-and therefore a word-power in poetry extends upto this good being served. To this Visvanātha has the following rebuff :
"tatra prastavyam - kim idam tatparatvam nāma, tad-artharvam vā, tātparyavíttyā tad-bodhakatvam vā ? ādye na vivādah, vyangyatvépi tad-arthatā-anapāyāt. dvitīye tu-keyam tātparyā”khyā vșttiḥ ? abhitánvayavādibhirangīkstā, tad anyā vā ? ādye dattam eva uttaram. dvitīye tu nāma-mātre vivādah. tanmatépi turīya-vrttisiddeh.”
Viśvanātha asks the objector as to what does he mean by 'tat-partva' ? - i.e. by "used to serve that objective ?” Is it "tad-arthatva" - i.e. should tatparatva be taken to mean 'having that objective or that meaning ?', or does it mean apprehending that sense through tātparya vstti or purport? If by 'tatparatva' is meant "having that sense” i.e. tad-arthatva then even by vyañjan, we can arrive at 'that sense'. So, the first alternative is beyond dispute. As for the second, Viśvanātha asks the objector about his concept of purport or tātparyavrtti. If the tātparya of the opponent is the same as that of the abhihitánvayavādins then it is ruled out, for it has been observed that this tātparya is capable of rendering only the correlated sense of words in a sentence i.e. it yields only the bare sentence-sense which is the sum total of its individual componants. But if by tātparva is meant somethings beyond this. - and here Visvanātha has Dhanika's tātparya in mind - then it is only another name given to vyañjanā and the quarrel patters out into only a quarrel of nomenclature, because even in this case a fourth power of words stands accepted.
Now having discarded the tātparya of Dhanika, Viśvanātha further argues for the recognition of vyañjanā, as follows. The objector may say that let there be a simultaneous apprehension through tātparya or purport of both the vibhāvā"dis and rasā"di. The answer is “No." The simple reason is that a cause-effect-relation is accpted between these two apprehensions and therefore prima facie simultaneity between the two stands automatically rejected. Had these two apprehensions been simultaneous like two horns of a bull how can there be a cause-effect-relation which stands on paurvá-parya-bhāva i.e. of the state of cause being earlier and effect being later ?
Viśvanātha further says that in case of such instances of laksana as 'gangāyām ghosah', the indication ends on apprehension of the meaning of a
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