Sahrdayaloka Part 02

Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/006909/1

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
[ Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism]
[Vol. I, Part 2]
L. D. Series : 142
General Editor Jitendra B. Shah
TAPASVI NANDI
स्वतीय
Foruta
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA [ Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism ]
[Vol. I, Part-2]
L. D. Series : 142
General Editor Jitendra B. Shah
TAPASVI NANDI
Halo
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009

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L. D. Series : 142
SAHRDAYĀLOKA [ Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism ]
[Vol. I, Part-2]
TAPASVI NANDI
Published by Jitendra B. Shah
Director L.D.Institute of Indology
Ahmedabad
First Edition : 2005
ISBN 81 - 85857-24-5
Price : 650/
Typesetting Swaminarayan Mudranalaya Press
Shahibaug, Ahmedabad.
Printer Navprabhat Printing Press Gheekanta Road, Ahmedabad
Tel. 25508631

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Publisher's Note
We feel pleasure to place before the learned "SAHRDAYĀLOKA" OR “Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism" - (Vol. I) by Prof. Tapasvi Nandi. The author hardly requires any introduction to the learned working in the area of Sanskrit Alamkārarśāstra or Literary Aesthetics. The work attempts to cover the basic thought - currents prevalent in Sanskrit Literary criticism, trying to unearth the origin and development of each topic beginning with the "Definition and scope of poetry, Sanskrit semantics, the theories of Dhvani, Rasa etc.” The author has taken care to record and accept the views of his predecessors in his area of research and has very gratefully acknowledged the honourable acceptance of their views and has also tried to discuss modestly differences of opinion if any, at various places. The whole work presents the material in an historical, critical and comparative perspective. We feel sure that the learned will appreciate his efforts in an unbiased way. Prof. Nandi's observations on Dhvani and Rasa deserve special mention as he has made a special effort to explain how these thought currents which form a special contribution of Indian Literary Aesthetics are relevant even to-day and how they can be applied to the most modern patterns of literature world over, including absurd poetry and absurd theatre as well.
The author also proposes to bring out Vol. II covering the area of literary criticism that is not discussed in the present volume, of course, god willing.
We are thankful to Prof. Nandi for agreeing with us to publish the present work. We are also thankful to the Swaminarayan press, and all our colleagues
seeing this work through. Hope this work will star and will fulfil a gap left out by earlier experts. It may be noted that for the sake of convenience, this work is presented in three parts such as, Part I - chs. I-VII (pp. 1-575); Part II - chs. VIII-XIII (pp. 576-1195) and Part III - chs. XIV - XVIII (pp. 1196-1843), with select Bibliography (pp. 1844-1850) appearing at the end of Part III. The Publisher's note, the author's preface - Namaskaromi, contents, detailed contents and abbriviations appear in all the three parts.
Jitendra Shah
L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad.
Jain Education Interational

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“Namaskaromi...."
Salutations to the Divine ! Salutations to my three Mahā-gurus; Salutations to my parents, Salutations to all the sources
consulted by me And, Salutations to all of you, who are all all sparks of the Divine !
"Aum pūrņam adaḥ, pūrņam idam pārņāt pūrņam udacyate pūrṇasya pūrņam ādāya
pūrņam evā'va śisyate.” "That (Source, which has been drawn upon by me is respectable and) is perfect,
This (Work, which is presented before you in this respectable shape) is perfect.
Perfect (material-; ideas, inspiration) has been drawn from perfect (respectable, reliable source). After drawing upon perfect (material) from perfect (and respectable source), only the perfect is left behind (before you)."
This, in short, is the story of my spiritual endeavour that started on 7th Aug. 2000 A.D. and reached its completion on 20th July, 2003 A.D.
The great yogin said, “In the stillness of the night, the eternal speaks.” And yes; I do not know when, in the stillness of the night, my eyes kept wide open staring in the darkness around me, and when these thought-currents sneaked into my inner consciousness from various sources-first like light ripples of the quiet and dignified flow of the sacred Gangā, and then like the mighty billows of the stormy Atlantic, dashing against the shores, washing them clean. They settled into my mind and then sank deep into it. I do not know when my eyes were closed and

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I was overpowered by sleep, as if embraced by the Divine Grace ! I feel floating in the wide stream, rich in currents and cross-currents, whirls and pulls; deep, full fathom five; quiet and dignified. I feel dragged and dragged, up and down, and then I slip towards the bottom, like in the womb of the mother earth, with a hundred thousand daffodils, red and pink, green, blue, white, violet and golden - on top of the surface !
So, as suggested in the beginning, I have accepted, with gratitude, of course after verifying with the original, the material, - line by line, paragraph by paragraph, at times, - from the works of my predecessors, who I thought are most reliable, and for whom I have tremendous respect and love in my heart, - from their works, dealing with the topics of word and meaning as discussed by the ancients - the Mimāmsakas, the Naiyāyikas and above all the great Vaiyākaranas, - the "prathame hi vidvāmsah" as Anandavardhana would call them. I take these works as starting points, and as absolutely relaible sources and they are authored by great scholars such as Dr. P. C. Chakrawarty, Prof. Devasthali and Prof. Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, Dr. Sri P. Ramchandrudu and some others. At every step, wherever I have sought inspiration and help from these master works, I have clearly indicated my indebtedness.
My work has grown both in size and dignity due to this, like the sacred flow of the Gangā growing vaster and vaster with the waters from the innumerable springs, rivulets and rivers mixing with the main stream; and shooting out from the bosom of the great Nagádhirāja Himalaya. Those who have undertaken the "caturdhāma yātrā" are a witness to this. By accepting everything from various springs the Gangā has carved out its own identity, sanctity and dignity. Same is the case with this work. I owe a lot to the great modern rsi-trayi-i.e. Dr. P. V. Kane, Dr. S. K. De and Dr. V. Raghavan, in particular, who has shaped my views on Bhoja. But it may also be noted that, without showing disrespect, I have ventured to dispute their results, and this happens quite often with Dr. Raghavan, when I feel, on verifying with the original words of Bhoja, that I am on firmer ground. This, the discreet will find out for himself, and there is no doubt about it. But this does not minimize their greatness and my adoration for their lotus-feet. They are the great thinkers spreading light and bearing the torch of Indian Literary Aestetics for the modern scholars, both in east and west alike.
Over and above this, I owe everything, - i.e. beginning from my initiation into this ancient lore of Sahitya-śāstra to whatever I have done till day, in serving its

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cause, to my great gurus - the three of them, the 'guru-śikhi-trays of professors R. C. Parikh, R. B. Athavale, and Dr. V. M. Kulkarni and especially Dr. Kulkarni; for it is he who even to-day, at the age of 85+ yrs., inspires me, guides me and blesses me and in my moments of personal despondency fills me with warmth. love, guidance and inspiration.
I am also indebted to the works of some of my senior contemporaries and to most of them personally also when I have met them, such as Dr. Rama Rañjan Mukherjee, Dr. Mukund Madhava Sharma, Dr. Pratap Bandopadhyāya, Prof. Dr. Satyavrata Shastri, Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi and my most respected and learned friends such as Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. Kamalesh Dutta Tripathi, the late Prof. Ramcandra Dwivedi (Jaipur), the late Prof. Biswanath Bhattacharya (Shantiniketan), the late Prof. K. Krishnamoorty, Prof. N. P. Unni, Prof. Dr. K. K. Chaturvedi, and prof. Dr. S. D. Joshi, and some very brilliant young friends such as Prof. Dr. Sarojaben Bhate, Dr. C. Ramchandran, Prof. Dr. V. N. Jha, Dr. G. C. Tripathi, Dr. Radhavallabh Tripathi, Prof. M. M. Agrawal Dr. Goparaju, Rama, Dr. Jagannātha Pathak, and the rest. I have met all these dignitaries personally and I stand benifitted. I also will show my respect for Prof. Sri. Ramchandrudu for his great work on Jagannātha. True, my Guru Prof. Athavale taught me some portion of the great R. G., and his work on Pundit Jagannātha is monumental.
So, I am made of all these stalwarts. But kindly note that with all this I remain myself, i.e. I have carefully carved out and preserved my identity. If at all I have accepted their ideas and views as sacred mantra, it is because I feel convinced about the same. I feel convinced first about their reliability and integrity, and then their output; their great reputation apart. Believe me, and I am honest, that I have practically verified every source in the original, before putting the stamp of my humble acceptance of their thoughts and writing. It is never a blind acceptance. In the words of Rājasekhara - "tad etad svīkaranam, na tu haraṇam.” I have accepted them, for I have found them acceptable, like the great Vāgdevatávatāra Mammaţa or the great Kalikāla-Sarvajña ācārya Hemacandra accepting the dictates of Abhinavaguptapādācārya, or like the latter himself accepting the ruling of his seniors when he says :
"ürdhvo'rdhvam āruhya yad artha-tattvam dhīḥ paśyati, śrāntim avedayanti, phalam tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānā viveka-sopāna-paramparāņām.”

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However, the discreet will find out that my acceptance ends with the field covering the ancient literature laying down the thoughts of the Mimāmsakas, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiyākaranas. With our entry into the wide and open field of Alamkāraśāstra proper, i.e. with the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and down to Jagannātha, of course including Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata, I have tried to project some original line of thinking that may prove to be of great
he adhikarins. This is a modest claim but a sure one. I have accepted ideas and also drafting from Gnoli, Masson, Patwardhan, K. Krishnamoothy, and the rest, but with a touch of my own original contribution. I feel I am on absolutely sure and safe ground when I travel through this area of alamkāra-Šāstra proper, convering nearly two thousand years of creative thinking. My work will surely guide the adhikārī aspirant who wants to have a glimpse of the greatness of the Indian ācāryas, who have left behind their foot-prints on the sands of literary aesthetics. It may be noted that I have presented the rasa theory in a new perspective, and believe me, this is what I claim for sure, - a perspective which acknowledges the catholicity of rasa theory as it seems to serve the cause even of what they term 'absurd theatre' or 'absurd poetry'. I am sure the discerning will take note of all this and try to evaluate this work in an unbiased way. At the same time may I remind the learned of the words of Jayanta who said, “kutósti nútanam vastu ?”. or of the words quoted as above of Abhinavagupta suggesting that all fresh results follow the achievements of the earlier masters, i.e. after climbing the 'viveka-sopāna-paramparā' one gets into something fresh. So, I invite the sensitive and thoughtful adhikārins to have a soft corner for me and extend their helping hand. The great Mahimă observes : (Vyakti-viveka) -
"yuktóyam ātmasadņśān prati me prayatno nā'sty eva taj jagati, sarva-manoharam yat, kecij jvalanti, vikasanty, apare nimīlanty
anye yad abhyudayabhāji jagat-pradīpe." The discerning are requested to read every line, before pronouncing a judgement.... I wish that only those, through whose arteries and veins alamkāraśāstra flows, should venture to review this work. No lesser soul should attempt it. So, we humbly say -
"adya pratanyate'smābhiḥ vidusām prītaye mudā astādaśa'dhikariņi mīmāmsā kāvya-vartmani.”

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This forms only the first volume of my "Sahṛdayā"loka" or "Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism." The proposed second volume will try to study the concepts of guna, doṣa, alamkāra, lakṣaṇa, aucitya, rīti, vṛtti, kaviśikṣā and some modern writers on Sanskrit poetics, such as Dr. Rewaprasadjee etc.
I sincerely thank the publishers and Shri. Dr. Jitendra Shah the Director, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, for seeing this work through. I also thank his collegues, and also Principal Kanjibhai Patel for kindly co-operating with us. The press Shri Swaminārāyaṇa Mudrana Mandir, of course deserves full praise and thanks for doing its job so carefully.
-
I also thank, Smt. Harsha Nandi, my wife, Smt. Chinmayee M. Rali, my beloved daughter, M. Pharm., Dr. Mayur S. Rali, M.D., D.G.O., my son-in-law, and our two grandsons Parth who studies medicine, and Mit, doing physiotherapy bearing with me through all the inconveniences caused due to my sadhana, and providing love and inspiration through out the course of these three years when this work was carried out. I also thank the Divine, and our Sadguru Raja-yogi Shri Narendrajee for his blessings and who has also suggested that even after this polite achievement, I have to travel further, through the woods, dark, deep and lovely, before I rest and lay down my pen. Aum mã Aum. iti Śivam...
19 Aug. 2004
Asopālava,
4, Professors' Colony,
Navrangpura,
Ahmedabad-380009. (Gujarat State) India.

-
TAPASVI NANDI

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Contents
Ch. No.
Title
Page No.
1-125
126-203 204-229
“Definition and scope of poetry.” (Introduction p. 1-12) Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra; Śabdavịttis; recognised in the works of earlier alamkārika-s such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, Vāmana Udbhata and Rudrata [i.e. Ānandavardhana's pūrvā"cārya-s] ‘Pratīyamāna artha'
IV
or
230-248
VII
249-368 369-453 454-575 576-709 710-778
Implicit sense, as seen in the earlier ālamkārika-s such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc. Śabda-vịttis, the nature of; “Abhidhā” Tātparya Laksaņā Vyañjanā Vyañjana-virodha or Opposition to suggestive power Classification of Poetry (form - oriented) Classification of Poetry (contd.) (criticism oriented;) dhvani, guṇībhūta-vyangya, citra; or uttama, madhyama, avara, etc.
779-967
968-1041

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Ch. No.
XII
XIII
XIV
XV
XVI.
XVII
XVIII
Title
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja
and others and
Guṇībhūta-vyangya-kāvya
and citra-kavya
Dhvani and other thought
currents such as guna, alamkāra, samghatanā,
rīti, vṛtti, etc.
and also
Dhvani-Virodha.
The Concept of 'Rasa', as seen in veda and ancient
literature and then in Bharata and earlier
alamkarikas from Bhamaha
to Rudrata
Concept of 'Rasa' as seen in Anandavardhana and
others posterior to him. Rasa-nispatti-vicāra
in
Abhinavagupta Rasa-nispatti-vicāra
in
Mammața, some others
and
Jagannatha.
Daśa-rupaka-vicāra Detailed Contents

Page No. 1042-1152
1153-1195
1196-1277
1278-1490
1491-1593
1594-1629
1630-1843

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Detailed Contents Ch. I Introduction, p. 1-12; Definition and scope of poetry, p. 12-14;
Bhāmaha, p. 14; Dandin, p. 24; Vāmana, p. 30; Udbhata, p. 36; Rudrata, p. 37; Anandavardhana and his followers, p. 39; Rājasekhara, p. 42; Kuntaka, p. 42; Ksemendra, p. 60; Bhoja, p. 60; Agnipurāna, p. 63; Mahimabhatta, p. 64; From Mammața to Viśvanātha, p. 81; Mammata, p. 81; Hemacandra, p. 86; Vāgbhata I, p. 86; Vāgbhata II, p. 87; Jayadeva, p. 87; Viśvanātha, p. 91; Vidyādhara, p. 88; Vidyānātha, p. 89; Keśava Miśra, p. 97; Jagannātha, p. 101; J.'s criticism of Mammata's definition of poetry, p. 109; J.on Viśvanātha's definition of poetry, p. 114, later challanges to J.'s definition of poet
ry, p. 115; Kāvya-hetu and Kāvya-prayojana, p. 119; Ch. II Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra or Powers of a word; general introduction, p.
126; ancient background, p. 129; word meaning relationship, p. 132; the vākya padīya, p. 134; Mimāmsakas, p. 137; artha-jñāna or determination of sabdārtha, p. 142; pravstti-nimitta of śabda, p. 146; Naiyāyikas, p. 148; how is sanketa apprehended, p. 148; Bhartphari, p. 150; word and its import, p. 153; the vaiyākaranas * patañjali *; mīmāmsakas; p. 157 different views as mentioned in the V.P., p. 164 Naiyāyikas; p. 164 BhartȚhari's V.P.; p. 165 Alamkārikas; p. 171 Etimologists; p. 175; Short Summary of total heritage; p. 175 Sabda-vrttis as seen in different schools of thought such as the vaiyākaranas, mīmāmsakas etc. p. 181; mimāmsakas; p. 192
naiyāyikas; p. 198 Navya-Naīyāyikas, p. 200 Ch. III. Bhāmaha; p. 205 Dandin p. 217 Vāmana; p. 220 Udbhata; p. 225
Rudrata p. 226 Ch. IV p. 230; Bhāmaha; p. 232 Dandin; p. 242 Vāmana, p. 247; Udbhata,
p. 247; Rudrata; p. 247 Ch. V General Introduction; p. 250 Abhidhā; p. 252 classification p. 252;
Jagannātha, Mahā-siddhāntin; p. 253; Bhoja p. 276; Mukula and others p. 285; Kuntaka; p. 300; Mahimā; p. 306, rethinking p. 332 Mammata p. 333 Mammata's definition of abhidhā p. 345;

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Hemacandra; p. 347; Jayadeva p. 349; Vidyadhara, p. 358, Vidyānātha, p. 358; Viśvanātha p. 359; Keśava, p. 359; Appayya
Dixit p. 360. Ch. Vi General Introduction, p. 369; Vākya, its import; p. 370; Vākya;
definition p. 371; Patañjali, p. 371; naiyāyikas p. 371; The grammarians p. 372; what is vākyartha ? p. 374; Mimāmsakas p. 377; constitution of a sentence, different views; p. 378; Naiyāyikas p. 381; nimitta of vākyártha p. 385; Prabhākara p. 391; ālamkārikas; p. 396 the nature and scope of tātparya-vrtti; p. 398 tātparyajñāna p. 409; anvitā'bhidhānavāda and abhihitā'nvayavāda p. 414; anvitābhidhānavāda p. 415; abhihitānvayavāda p. 421; tātparya p. 426; dhananjaya/dhanika p. 427; tātparya in Bhoja p.
433; Mammaţa and his followers p. 444; Ch. VII. three conditions p. 454; grammarians p. 455; Patañjali, Gautama
p. 458; mukhya, gauna, mīmāmsakas, p. 459; alamkārikas 482; Mukula 482; Kuntaka 484; Kumārila 485; types of laksanā 489; Mukula 492; Mammaţa 492; gauņi, compound words, sentencelaksana, Bharthari p. 503; Hemacandra p. 521; Bhoja p. 521; Jayadeva p. 526; Vidyādhara p. 531; Vidyānātha p. 534; Viśvanātha
p. 534; Keśava 539; Appayya p. 540; Jagannātha p. 550; Ch. VIII vedic sages p. 576; grammarians, mīnāmsakas, naiyāyikas, yāska
D. 577; dr. Saroja Bhate p. 578; Panini, patañjali p. 589, Bhartrhari, p. 591; Sphoțavāda and vyañjanā p. 599; vyañjanā as accepted by Anandavardhana and his followers p. 601; sources; veda p. 602; The Nirukta p. 618; Rk Prātiśākhya p. 620; Astādhyāyī p. 620; Mahābhāsya p. 621; germs of vyañjanā in Bhāsa, Ašvaghosa, Kālidāsa etc. p. 622; Ānandavardhana; (with Locana); p. 630; Mahimā p. 654; Anandavardhana p. 656; Mammața p. 658; abhidhāmūlā-vyañjanā, 659; Abhinavagupta; p. 680; Mammața p. 685; Hemacandra p. 687; Jayadeva p. 688; Vidyādhara p. 689; Keśava, p. 690; Vidyānātha p. 690; Viśvanātha p. 691; Appayya
p. 693; Jagannātha p. 694; Ch. IX. Abhinavagupta p. 711; Mammața p. 726; Mukula p. 748, Kuntaka
p. 752, Bhoja p. 752; Mahimā p. 752; Dhanika p. 753; Hemacandra p. 772; Vidyādhara p. 773; Vidyānātha p. 773; Viśvanātha p. 773;

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Detailed Contents Ch. X. Bhāmaha p. 780; Dandin p. 785; Vāmana p. 795; Rudrața p. 799;
Anandavardhana p. 811; Abhinavagupta p. 814; Bhoja p. 816; Bhoja nătaka etc., p. 818; nidarśanam p. 820; manthulli p. 821; manikulyā p. 822, kathā, khanda-kathā, upakathā, p. 822; běhatkathā, campū, p. 824; parva-bandha, kāņdabandha, p. 825; sargabandha, āśvāśaka-bandha, p. 826; sandhibandha, avaskandhakabandha, kāvya-śāstra, p. 827; kośa, p. 829; samhitā, sāhitya-prakāśa, p. 830; Abhinavabhārati p. 836; uparūpakas nātikā p. 834; Hemacandra p. 851, Nātyadarpana 852; Śāradātanaya, NLRK. 852, Vägbhata II, Singabhūpāla, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha Viśvanātha
p. 852; individually considered from Bhoja onwards 853. . Ch. XI p. 968; dhvani, dvanyaloka; locanakāra p. 975; dhvani-prabheda p.
984; table showing varieties of dhvani p. 988; vyañjaka-mukhena bhedāḥ, p. 999; alamkāras, rasavat etc. p. 1006; vyañjaka-mukhena bhedāḥ, 1009; prabandha as rasavyañjaka p. 1012; suggestivity of vịtti, rīti, p. 1014; varņas as suggestive of rasa p. 1015; padas - rasavyañjaka, p. 1015; rasa-virodhi, its parihāra p. 1016; virodhisamāveśa p. 1020; supremacy of rasa in poetry p. 1029; Mammata p. 1030; Hemacandra and Jayadeva p. 1031; Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha Viśvanātha, p. 1031; Jagannātha p. 1032; uttamottama,
etc. 1032; further classification of dhvani by J. p. 1032; Ch. XII. Dhvani in earlier alamkārikas, Bhāmaha and others p. 1043;
Kuntaka p. 1045; Bhoja p. 1091; Bhoja-Tātparya, p. 1111; gunībhūtavyangya and citra kāvya p. 1125; citra kāvya p. 1127; gunībhūta - vyangya, Anandavardhana 1127; Abhinavagupta's attitude 1133; Mammața madhyama kāvya, etc. p. 1133; Hemacandra, p. 1137; Viśvanātha p. 1138; Jagannātha, four-fold scheme p. 1139; Jayadeva p. 1141; Vidyādhara; Vidyānātha; Keśava; citra-kavya p. 1143; Anandavardhana and others p. 1144; Mammața p. 1149; Vidyānātha, p. 1149; Viśvanātha p. 1150;
Keśava p. 1151; Appayya Dīkşita p. 1151; Jagannātha p. 1152 Ch. XIII. dhvani and alamkāra p. 1154; samghatanā p. 1156; rīti, vrtti, p.
1163; Locana, p. 1165; Mammaţa p. 1166; Hemacandra p. 1172; Jayadeva p. 1173; Vidyadhara, p. 1174; Vidyānātha p. 1174; Viśvanātha p. 1175; Jagannātha p. 1176; Opposition to dhvnikāra's

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[xxii) supremacy, p. 1178; Vimarsinī, opponents of dhvani p. 1178;
Locana p. 1180; refutation, dhvani-twofold- p. 1192; Ch. XIV Rasa in RV. p. 1196; Rasa in Yv. p. 1199; Rasa in Sāmaveda p.
1199; Rasa in AV p. 1200; Amara, Hemacandra on word 'rasa'; p. 1202; Rasa,various meanings in vedic literature, conclusion p. 1203; NS. I. 7; rasān ātharvaņād p. 1207; Hymns of AV.; love lyrics p. p. 1217; Rasa in the Upanişads p. 1219; Rasa in the Nirukta; 'Rasa' in Bịhaddevatā p. 1221; Rasa in Pāṇini and Patañjali p. 1221; Rasa in Ašvaghosa, Bhāsa, Kālidāsa, p. 1224; Rasa in Bharata Muni, NS. p. 1240; Bharata on Bhāvas p. 1248; Bhāmaha p. 1256; Dandin p.
1262; Vāmana p. 1267; Udbhața p. 1268; Rudrața p. 1271; Ch. XIV *; Rasa in Anandavardhana p. 1278; asam’aksyakrama-vyangya (=
rasā"di dhvani) with reference to varņa etc. p. 1285; and samghatanā; types p. 1285; prabandha-suggestive of rasa; p. 1286; rasā”di-dhvani suggested by case-terminations, etc., p. 1287; obstacles in rasa-vyañjanā; p. 1288; rasa as aesthetic relish for all art-critics p. 1290; virodhi-rasa-vyavasthā; opposite sentiments p. 1291; overcoming opposition between two rasas p. 1293; other concepts, vịtti, etc. and rasa p. 1294; alamkāra, guna, dosa and rasa 1298; Mukula and rasa p. 1300; Kuntaka p. 1302; Dhananjaya and Dhanika p. 1310; Mahimabhatta p. 1310; Bhoja p. 1317; Agnipurāna p. 1330; Mammata p. 1334; Hemacandra p. 1339; Vāgbhata I p. 1340; Vāgbhasa II, p. 1341; Jayadeva p. 1341; Vidyādhara p. 1342; Vidyānātha p. 1343; Viśvanātha II p. 1348; Bhānudatta p. 1363; Keśava Miśra p. 1364; Jagannātha p. 1367; Rasa in works on dramaturgy; Daśrupaka; p. 1373; Nātya darpana; Rāmacandra and Gunacandra; 1388; Bhāva-prakāśana, p. 1401; Śāradātanaya; bhāva p. 1402; śāradātanaya on rasa; p. 1426; Nāțaka-laksana ratna kosa; Sāgaranandin p. 1459; Rasārņava
sudhākara of Singabhūpāla p. 1465; Bhāva and rasa in Rs. 1465. Ch. XV. rasa-sūtra p. 1492; Lollata 1493; Lollata's view; Locana; refutation of
Lollata by śri. Sankuka; as read in Locana; in Abh. p. 1500; Sri. Sankukas views on rasa-nispatti, Abh. p. 1502; Tota Abh. on Sankuka's view p. 1507; sāmkhya view in Abh. p. 1516; śankuka's view in

Page #17

Locana p. 1516; Bhattanāyaka's view in Abh. and then in Locana; p. 1518; Abhinavagupta's view on rasa-nispatti; p. 1527; seven obstacles; rasa-vighnas; Abh.; p. 1542; Explanation of rasa-sūtra by Abhinavagupta p. 1554; Locana; rasa-nispatti p. 1563; All rasas, blissgiving p. 1578; śānta rasa p. 1578; catholicity of rasa-theory p. p.
1583; Ch.XVII rasa-nispatti-vicāra; Mammața to Jagannātha *; Mammata p. 1594;
Jagannātha p. 1601; Ch. XVIII Nāțaka 1632; Dasarūpaka p. 1646; Itivștta p. 1652; artha-praksti
s p. 1654; five avasths p. 1658; Sandhis and Sandhyangs p. 1661; artho'paksepakas p. 1666; sandhis and sandhangas, further discussion p. 1670; Nātya-darpana p. 1676; Bhāvaprakāśana *; NLRK. p. 1682; Sāhityadarpana *; Rasārnava Sudhakara p. 1696; Sandhyantaras p. 1702; Comparative and critical study of sandhi-s and sandhyanga-s p. 1705; Dr. V. M. Kulkarni's view; sixty four sandhyangas p. 1714; conclusions concerning sandhyangas p. 1736; Bhoja p. 1749; A comparative and critical table of sandhyangas p. 1749; Types of drama; nāțaka p. 1795; five special types of drama in Bāva prakāśana 1800; Prakarana p. 1807; Samavakāra p. 1811; īhāmțga p. 1821; Dima 1825; Vyāyoga p. 1828; Utsrstikā’nka; p. 1830; prahasana p. 1831; Bhāna p. 1834; Vithī p. 1836;

Page #18

Abbreviations
AVM.
A-bh
AG.
A-se.
A.
Bha
B. P.
B.
Bho.
DR. · Da.
Dha Dhv. Dhv. L. H. (or. H. C.)
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
Abhidhāvrtta-Mātrkā of Mukula. Abhinavabhārati Abhinavagupta Alamkāra-sekhara-keśava; Anandavardhana Bhāmaha Bhāva Prakāśana Bharata Bhoja Daśa-rūpakaDandin Dhananjaya - Dhanika Dhvanyāloka. Dhvanyaloka-Locana-Abhinavagupta's. Hemacandra. Jagannātha K. Krishnamoorthy, Prof. Kávyā'lamkāra, Bhāmaha. Kāvyā’lamkāra-Sūtra-vịtti-Vāmana's Kävyā'nuśāsana, Hemacandra. Kāvyā"darśa-Dandin Kävya Prakāśa. KumārilaKuntaka, Mimamsā-Sūtra.
K. Kris. Kā. Kā.Sū.Vs. Ka-śā
KD.
K. P.
Ku.
R.
Mi-Sū.

Page #19

Mbh. M.
M.
NLRK. N. S.
PR. RS.
R. G.
Śà
Śr.Pra. Ś.B.
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
Mahābhāsya Mahimabhatta; Mammața. Nāțaka-Laksana-Ratna-Koșa Nātyaśāstra, Bharata; Panini Punditarāja-Jagannāth. Rasā'rnavasudhākara. Rasa-Gangadhara Śāradātanaya Śrngāra-Prakāśa; Bhoja Śingabhūpāla Sāgaranandin Sā-Sāyana (in vedic context) Sāhityadarpana-Viśvaanātha Sanskrit Poetics, S. K. De. Sarasvati-Kanthā”- bharana. Vägbhata II Vātsyāyana Vakrokti Jivita; Kuntaka Visvanātha Vyakti-Viveka
Sā
Sā
S-D. SP. S.K.Ā. Vāg. Vātsyā V.J.
V.
Vya.V.

Page #20

SAHRDAYĀLOKA [Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism]
Part-II
In part 1 of this work, topics such as definition and scope of poetry and śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra, have been discussed in a thread-bare analysis. It may be noted that the topic of definition has been considered in its under connotation and thus while dealing with the ancients such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and the rest, an attempt is made to inclụde not only direct references to the definitions attempted by these masters as such, but a closer look at all characteristics covered up in defining individual types such as the sarga-bandha etc. are also taken into consideration, thus leading us to a wider, richer and comparatively more critical concept of poetry as imagined by the masters. Similarly all functions of the poetic word such as abhidhā or the direct power of expression and laksanā or Indication etc. are approached in a broader and more critical view-point touching also in between the topic of 'pratīyamāna' or implicit sense as seen by pre-Anandavardhana literary critics.
With vyañjanā or the power of suggestion part II continues its investigation onwards in the realm of thought-currents in the field of literary criticism in ancient India.

Page #21

Chapter VIII Vyañjanā'
"Vyañjanā' or suggestion as a word-power, over and above the powers of expression (abhidhā) and indication (laksaņā) was promulgated and established, first, so for as available written documents are concerned, by Ananda the context of kāvya or literature. We have seen how Bhāmaha, and other earlier ālamkārikas have taken care of the implicit sense - 'pratīyamāna artha' in their own way without going into the details concerning the topic of śabda-vittis in a formal way. Anandavardhana as a literary critic could not abstain from a theoretical treatment of vyañjanā, though of course he also did not make an attempt to define various sabda-vsttis as done by later ālamkārikas such as Mammata and the rest. Anandavardhana is clear that his theory of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa is modelled on the thinking of the great grammarians, the first among the learned. Abhinavagupta strongly supports him and so also Mammata and the rest. But before looking into Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammața and others, we will to try to trace the origin of the concept of vyañjanā in earlier literature beginning with the the vedas. Clear references to 'rasa' in the aesthetic sense are also availabl
ture, but for the concept of vyañjana we have to strive harder to locate clear references.
The Vedic sages, being poets - 'rși-kavi' - had grasped the fact that the face meaning of a given utterance is only a part of its total meaning. People attempting to analyse the literal meaning only are likely to miss the real significance of A beautiful hymn from the Rgveda reads as - (8/2/23/4) -
“utá cvaḥ pásyan na dadarśá vácamutá tvaḥ snván na srnoty enám, utó tvasmai tanvam visasre jáyéva patya uśatī suvásáḥ.”

Page #22

Vyañjanā
577 Durga comments : "artha-parijñānakalā hi vāg ity abhiprāyaḥ. Another hymn also lauds the collection of meaning - (R.G. 8/2/24/4)
"utá tvam sakhyé sthirapītam āhur náinam hinvanty ápi vājineșu, ádhenvā carati māyáyaisá
vācam susruvám aphalám apuspām.” Durga has - artham vācaḥ puspaphalam āha. etc. These hymns are read in Nirukta also, and therefore Durga is referred to. There is yet another hymn (R.G. X. 71.2), wherein it is observed -
"saktum iva titaunā punanto yatra dhīrā manasā vācam akrata. atrā sakhāyā sakhyāni jānate
bhadraiņām lakṣmir nihitādhi vāci.” "Winnowing away the chaff from the grain” the poets select their words. Only men of equal scholarship and literary taste can fully appreciate their poems.
Thus the vedic poet is aware of the inner significance of language.
Coming to the grammarians, Mīmāmsakas and Naivāvikas it may be observed that they were concerned only with the scientific use of language and certainly not the emotive use of it. Hence, it is natural that we do not come across any clear reference to or appreciation of the vangya or suggested sense. We will quote from Dr. Saroja Bhate who observes in her paper on, "vyañjanā as reflected in the formal structure of language” (Ref. “Glimpses of Ancient Indian Poetics”, pp. 91-96, Edited by Sudhakar Pandey and V. N. Jha, - Shri. Garib Dass Oriental Series, No. 166, Sri Sadguru Publications, A division of Indian Book Centre - Delhi-India) - certain facts.
But prior to this, let us see what Yāska has to say about vyañjanā or dyotana.
Talking about upasargas Yāska observes : (Nirukta I. i) “na nirbaddhāḥ upasargā arthān nirāhur iti śākatayano, nāmā”khyātayos tu karmópasamyogadyotakā bhavanty, uccāvacāḥ padárthā bhavantīti gārgyas tad ya eșu padárthaḥ prāhur ime, tan nāmárthayor artha-vikaraṇam.”

Page #23

578
SAHRDAYĀLOKA Yaska's position as to the nature of upasargas may be debated but what is of supreme importance here is that he quotes sākatāyana who is his predecessor, and who maintains that upasargas (are meaningless), being unable to convey meaning separately or independently taken as word-units. Sākatayana therefore observes that they are only 'dyotakas' - i.e. revealers or say manifestors or manifesting agency only, of the relation of nāma and ākhyāta with a special meaning. They are like torches that reveal a relation, without having any meaning of their own. Now this dyotakatva' or power to manifest something is with the nipātas, according to Śākatāyana. It is to be debated - whether this 'dyotakatva' can be equated with the 'vyañjana' or manifestation of sphoța of the grammarians or, with the dyotana/ vyañjana i.e. suggestion of the ālamkārikas. We know that Anandavardhana was clear that vyañjanā as a word-power is seen in kāvya, but vyañjanā goes even beyond kāvya and is more than a word-power and is seen even in gestures, musical notes having no dictionary meaning, in colours with reference to the art of painting, in mudrās of dance, and in fact in all art-forms other than literature. Vyañjanā as a word-power is seen, as is accepted by Anandavardhana in our normal use of language in the work-a-day world also. Thus, 'dyotakarva' of Śākațāyana could be equivalent to the vyañjakatva of sphota, as well as to the more liberal meaning of suggestion, given to it by Anandavardhana. Thus, we may not be very far, off the target, if we observe, that roots of vyañjanā are as old as Śākațāyana, who was earlier than Yāska, and perhaps as old as the, not so clear acceptance of the same, by the vedic poets, who knew that Vāk is gifted with an inner meaning revealed only to the 'adhikärin'.
Now, again we will proceed with Dr. Saroja Bhāte's observation (pp. 93-95, ibid) - "The point to be noted in this connection is that it is implied by all the rhetoricians that the dhvani is purely subjective or intuitive. It flashes in the heart of the reader as soon as he reads a particular sentence, word or a word-element. The question, that arises therefore is, do all readers comprehend the same 'dhvani' from a certain linguistic expression ? Or does it change from reader to reader ? Even if it is admitted that it is only the sahrdayas, the connoisseurs that have the ability to grasp the suggested meaning, do all the asthetes agree in their understanding of the same 'dhvani' from an expression ?
Generally they do not. The suggested meaning is thus a purely subjective matter. Two readers may not read the same meaning between the lines of poetry. And more subjective is the appreciation of a literary piece, the less theoretical it

Page #24

Vyañjanā
579
turns out to be. This leads to the lack of uniformity, precision and accaracy that is essential to make a system a formal science. It is precisely for this inconsistant and obscure character of the 'dhvani' that the naiyāyikas 'logicians', like Jayantabhasta vehemently attacked the dhvani theory and rejected vyañjanā as a separate function.
[foot-note : No. 8. pp. 96 - reads - The Nyāyamañjarī ed. K. S. Varadacharya, Mysore, 1969, p. 129.
"etena śabda-sāmarthya-mahimnā so'pi vāritaḥ, yam anyaḥ panditam manyaḥ
prapede kañcana-dhvanim.”] This aspect of the doctrine of dhvani and vyañjanā seems to lead poetics away from a formal science. It tends to be more intuitive than theoretical.
One therefore wonders if some kind of uniformity can be brought about in the literary evaluation, based on dhvani, of a piece of poetry. Apparently diverse emotive and attitudinal meanings cannot be tied down to any linguistic factors, although some of them have been found to be associated with accent and intonation. .
More than two thousand years ago, Pānini, the foremost grammarian of sanskrit, analysed the Sanskrit language and successfully handled the suggested meaning at the level of the structure of language. In his astādhyāyī he showed at least in 200 rules that many emotive and attitudinal meanings were relevant to the form of language. The attitudinal meaning is associated not only with intonation and accent, but also with different linguistic elements such as suffixes, prefixes and even augments. A few illustrations will make the point clear.
The preposition 'api' in the expression 'api stuyad vșsalam' - 'he may praise even an outcaste', conveys disgust in the mind of the speaker, according to p. I. 4.96.*
*[Foot-note : 9, p. 96 ibid read -
P. I. 4.96 : 'apiḥ padártha-sambhāvanānvaya-sarga-garhā-samuccayeșu.' - 'Api' is called when it conveys the meaning of a word, - possibility, permission, censure or collection.')
- When, however, disgust is not intended the speaker says, 'apiştuyād vrsalam', ‘one may praise an outcaste.'*
*
.

Page #25

580
SAHRDAYĀLOKA *[Foot-note 10, p. 96 - reads -
Here 'S' in the beginning of the form 'stuyād' changes into ş because it is preceded by 'api' which is an 'upasarga' and not a 'karma-pravacanīya'.] - Thus the status of 'api' and the consequent phonological change (s - $) are directly connected with the emotive meaning suggested by its use.
Impatience or urgency is conveyed by the křt suffix Namul according to p. 3.4.52.*
*[Foot-note no. 11, pp. 96, reads
p. 3.4.52, 'apādāne parīpsāyām' - 'the suffix Nam UL is added after a root preceded by an 'apādāna' (a word in the ablative) when impatience is to be conveyed.] - The illustration given in the commentaries is, 'sayyótthāyam dhāvati' - '(he) runs straight away from the bed.' The undertone is that he is so impatient that he does not care even to dress up after getting out of the bed and runs towards something. If no hurry or impatience is to be conveyed, the expression would be, 'sayyāyā utthāya dhāvati', '(he) runs after having got up from the bed.'
The feeling of appreciation is transmitted through secondary suffixes. The suffix ‘rūpa' added after the word Vaiyakarana' in the form, Vaiyakaranarūpaḥ', 'a praiseworthy grammarian', conveys the speaker's appreciation of the grammarian.*
(* Foot-note 12, pp. 96, reads -
p. 5.3.66 - 'prašamsāyām rūpam'. 'The suffix rūpap is added after a stem to convey appreciation.') - If there is no appreciation, the speaker uses the form, 'vaiyākaraṇaḥ', 'grammarian'.
These are just a few of the many examples available in Pāṇini's grammar. These illustrations show how minutely Pāṇini has observed the nuances and their correspondence with the formal structure of Sanskrit language. He has linked many other feelings such as anger, jealousy, love, hatred, insult, etc. with diverse linguistic elements such as primary and secondary suffixes. His treatment of quite a large number of word formations which are linked with the 'dvani' indicates that the emotive and attitudinal meanings can be formalised at least to a certain extent. Thus vyañjanā which often expresses speaker's intention or presupposition towards an object or a situation, plays a crucial role in the derivational system of Pāņini. It is incorporated in the formal analysis of the sanskrit language. In this structural approach the suggested meaning of linguistic expression is fixed and does not vary from listener to listener. The

Page #26

'Vyañjanā'
vyañjana theory developed by the poeticians fails to explain this correlation between the linguistic forms and the emotive meanings, which is clearly pointed out by Panini's grammar.
581
The question that emerges from the foregoing observations is, can the dhvani language of the poets, which is deliberately rendered ambiguous to create a charming effect, be put to a uniform objective analysis, at least to a certain extent, as Panini did? Is it possible to bring about uniformity in the comprehension of dhvani by all readers by establishing correlation between emotive meanings and the formal structure of the language? Can such formalization render poetics more theoretical than intuitive? Is it really expected to be so ?
One has to admit that the structural approach to vyañjanā has its limitations. The meaning of poetry is not a fixed thing and is open to interpretations. The true sahṛdayas, people of taste, always consider that poetry the best which, like a veiled beauty, conceals its grace and charm and allows the asthetes to discover it in their own way. The intuitive communication cannot be fastened to the rules of grammar. Nevertheless, a preliminary claim can be made on the basis of the observations made above that linguistic analysis carried in the Pāṇinian way may provide some insights for the exploration of dhvani and bring about uniformity at least on the initial level in the applied criticism related to Sanskrit Poetry."
This rather long quotation from Dr. Bhate proves many points. (i) That Pāņini is not totally averse to vyañjana (ii) Dr. Bhate has observed that Panini goes to accept vyañjana at the ground level, i.e. in common parlance. We may name it as "rūḍha vyañjana" as is the case with 'rūḍha lakṣaṇā' seen in the language of daily usage.
From this we have to take a leap further. As is the case of local usage, so also in case of poetic usage we can imagine Panini's approval, of course silent, as he had no business to include this aspect for he was dealing only with the limited goal of providing a structure for a scientific use of language. As was the case with the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāmsakas, and we should not care for voices of a Jayant Bhatta here, even grammarians, and here Pānini in particular, were dealing with only the scientific use of language and not with total use of language and therefore this context did not allow Panini to go all out for vyañjanā. As to Dr. Bhate's observation of non-unanimity among asthetes concerning the emotive meaning of dhvani of a given line of poetry, we may say that actually all vyañjanās, like the anekárthas of a word with multiple sense,

Page #27

582
SAHRDAYĀLOKA prop up simultaneously and it is due to the limitation of an individual asthete that he does not grasp a particular suggested sense which others have grasped. Thus an objective evaluation of emotive meaning may not logically fail us, given all conditions being satisfied simultaneously. In the famous illustration, viz. "gatóstam arkaḥ” Mammața explains how various suggested senses are grasped by various agents. But this is because of individual limitations. Thus, in a way, we can attempt a uniform objective analysis in case of vyañjanā also. This is another way of approaching this problem. Or, this non-unanimity may be taken as a bhūṣaṇa and not a dūṣaṇa of poetic language.
It may also be noted that if Dr. Bhate wants to suggest that a scientific approach to language is the only thing which should happen to men who are a thinking animal, and if she feels that it was this approach only that was acceptable to Pāṇini, Patañjali and the rest of thinkers, then we feel she is off the mark. But hopefully she does not mean it. She only attempts to point out to the limitations of poetic use of language, when put to test by scientific principles. Actually this scientific approach in our estimation, is considered only so far as the various disciplines - śāstras-are concerned. Even the grammarians, Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas perhaps know it. Otherwise the famous saying viz.
"tarkeșu karkasadhiyaḥ
vayam eva nā’nye, kāvyeșu kolamadhiyah
vayam eva nā'nye.” would not have been floated and no Bhāmaha or Vāmana would have ever thought of contemplating how vyākarana and nyāya (= kāvyanyāna) operate in a special way in the realm of poetry. We may quote in our support from Dr. Rajā (pp. 280. Indian theories of Meaning, Ed. '69 Adyar Madras), who quotes J. Borough (pp. 176, Some Indian Theories of Meaning) : “Most philosophic discussions of meaning confine themselves to a relatively small protion of language behaviour, namely, statements which describe or report a state of affairs- the propositions of the natural sciences, or, more generally, such statements as are traditionally handled by logic.” We may add that this observation pertains only to the use of language in śāstras i.e. scientific use of language, or, language in popular usage, but that does not negate the possibility of the thinkers concerned, of accepting the emotive use of language in the field of poetry i.e. literature proper. We also do not

Page #28

Viri
Vyañjana'
583 agree with a remark from Bertrand Russel quoted by Dr. Raja, who observes : (pp. 282, ibid) ... (even) 'music may be considered as a form of language in which emotion is divorced from information.” (Human knowledge, its scope and limits, p. 73). No asthete of ancient India will accept Russell's observation when he takes music as a form of language. When we talk of language, we accept that the word used in a language, has a primary meaning, a dictionary meaning, an expressed sense. Then it may have an indicated and/or suggested meaning. But, music has 'word' meaning 'sound', - 'dhvani' of the grammarians - conveying only an emotive or suggested meaning and it certainly does not have a primary expressed sense. If we talk of 'language of music, we can talk of 'language of dance, painting, schulpture, architectural edifice, etc. also. But here the word 'language' is used only in a metaphorical sense.
So, returning to Pānini, Patañjali and Bhartrhari, we strongly advocate our position that they were not only not unaware of the fact of vyañjanā, even in the scientific use of language, they also were inclined to respect the same in local usage and poetic use of language as well. The following discussion will support our observation.
In the Mbh. (= Mahābhāsya) we have noted elsewhere clear references to abhidh, and gunavrtti. Clear references to vyañjanā, without naming the same, are also seen as will be discussed below. This will strengthen our observation as above that because such great minds as Yāska, Pāṇini; Patañjali, Jaimini, Śabara, Gotama, Kanāda and the ancient thinkers belonging to the Jaina and Bauddha darśanas, had no direct business to deal with poetic or emotive use of language in their works on various disciplines, they abstain from making any direct allusion to either vyañjanā or vyangyártha. But this should not be interpreted as either their complete ignorance of, or absolute non-acceptance of vyañjanā with reference to the usages in ordinary parlance or in poetry of their times. Pānini, we know, on the authority of Anandavardhana, was a great poet also who had composed even mahākāvyas. Now, such a great mind, who revels both in kāvya and śāstra alike, cannot be absolutely ignorant of, or at logger heads with the poetic use of language, involving vyañjanā. They do not allude to or discuss vyañjanā, it is safer to conject, because they had no business to do it in their śāstra works. There are clear references in the Mbh., which almost go to prove that Patañjali, and therefore Pāṇini also, knew and accepted vyañjanā, so far as emotive use of language was concerned with reference to poetry. We may hold that all such reference where

Page #29

584
SAHRDAYĀLOKA terms such as 'gamayati', 'gamayaraḥ', 'adhi-gamayati', 'adhi-gamyate', 'gamaka', 'gamakatva', etc. are used in the Mbh. do not take us anywhere near vyañjanā, because all these usages are in the sense of, "is understood" - only. Nowhere, we have the sense of 'is suggested'.
But clear references to the concept of what we know as vyañjană could be read
at, -
(i) "abhivyakta” - at Pā. 8.2.46; M.bh. pp. 407, (Ref. to Keilhom edn.) line 21 · as in - "nirdeśād eva idam abhivyaktam dīrgnasya grahaņam”; the term abhivyaktam', has a clear bearing on the sense, viz. 'is suggested'
(ii) vyañjanam : Similarly, at Pā. 8.2.48, M.bh. on Vārttika 3, pp. 408, 409 we read - añjer añjanam, añjanam ca prakāśanam. anktéksini ity ucyate yat tat sitam cā’sitam caitat prakāśayati. tathā’ñjer vyañjanam, vyañjanam ca prakāśanam. yat tat snehena, madureņa ca jadīkştānām indrīyāņām svasmin ātmani vyavasthāpanam, sa rāgas, tad vyañjanam. anvartham khalvapi nirvacanam. vya yate anena iti vyanjanam.
This is a clear reference to vyañjana or vyañjanā meaning 'suggestion'. . (iii) 'vyakti' or 'vyakta' in the sense of manifestation is seen as below :
'vyakti' at Pā. I. i. 57, line 26; pp. 145 M.bh. and at Pā. I. 2.52 line 23, pp. 228, M.bh.; etc.
There are also numerous references such as 'vyakta' at pā. I. i. 27 13/14 line p. 86; I. i. 57 line, Page 145; i. 65 11/171; I. iii. 1; 8/256; I. iii. 48; 10/10 283; I. iv. 110; 2/358; II. i. 1; 24/26; 362; II. ii. 19; 15/417; II. iv. 77; 13/415; III. i. 26; 24/32; IV. iv. 67; 2/356; VIII i. 51; 10/377; VIII 2.48; 13/13/408; etc.
All these references carry the sense of manifestation which could be suggestion. or which could not be suggestion.
(iv) But clearest references to vyañjanā can be read ih usages of dyut, in verbal forms such as “dyotyate", "dyotita", and "dyotya”. They are as under :
"dyotyate” - at Pā. II. iii. 20; 11/13/14 page 453 The sūtra is : “yenángavikāraḥ" - M.bh. has - angāt vikstāt trtīyā vaktavyā tenaiva ced vikāreņa angi dyotata iti vaktavyam... yenā’vayavena samudāyo'ngi dyotate tasmin bhavitavyam na caitenávayavena samudāyo dyotyate."
The sense of “is suggested" is very clear in this passage and this is a pure allusion to vyañjanā.

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585
'Vyañjana'
"dyotya" - we have 'dyotya' at Pa. II. i. 10; 19/379; III. i. 7; 2/13 & III. i. 125;
13/88.
The references read as - 'dyotya' - Pā. III. i 10; 19/379 - "ayathājātīyake dyotye". På. III. i. 7; 2/13 "ina yo viseṣa upadhir vópādīyate, dyotye tasmin tena bhavitavyam." Pa. III. i. 125; 13/88 is "ahosvid avaśyate dyotya iti. Then we have vārttika, such as -
·
"avaśyaka upapada iti ced dyotya upasamkhyānam." (i)
The M.bh. reads "avaśyaka upapada iti; ced dyotya upasamkhyānam kartavyam, lātavyam, pāvyam astu tarhi dyotye.
Then we have värttika - 2
-
"dyotya iti cet svara-samāsa'nupapattiḥ" - M.bh. reads 'dyotya' iti cet samāsā'nupapattiḥ." Here the sense is of suggestion.
Again, we have the usage of the word 'rasa' in a very very clear aesthetic sense of the term as in ‘rasika' at Pā. V. ii. 95: 21/394. The sutra reads as - - "rasádibhyaś ca". Rasa in the sense of physical taste such as the salty (i.e. lavana) etc. is of course seen here. But on Varttika - "rasádibhyaḥ punar vacanam anya-nivṛttyartham" (1), the M.bh. has "rasádibhyaḥ punar vacanam kriyate'nyeṣām matvarthīyānām pratisedhártham. matub eva yathā syādyénye matvarthiyāḥ, prapnuvanti te mā bhuvan iti. naitad asti prayojanam. dṛsyante hy anye rasádibhyo matvarthiyāḥ, rasiko naṭaḥ, urvaṣī vai rūpiņī apsarasām, sparsiko vayur iti."
-
'rasa' in 'rasiko natah' has a clear reference to the aesthetic fact, which is collected by vyañjana in poetry.
Thus Panini as explained by Patanjali, and therefore both of them, were aware of vyañjanā as a sabda-vṛtti, though they had no business to discuss it with reference to the śastra of grammar.

We know on the authority of Anandavardhana and his followers, Abhinayagupta and Mammata and the rest, that they have derived ispiration for the Dhvanivāda from the sphotavāda of the grammarians. We will therefore involve ourselves here to examine the concepts of sphota and dhvani as held by the grammarians first, and then as applied to the theory of vyañjana-dhvani-rasa by the ālamkarikas. We will also consider as to how far the writers on poetics are exactly indebted to the Vaiyakaraṇas in upholding their theory of vyañjana and dhvani.
The discussion that follows will take further care of Patanjali and then Bhartṛhari to evolve any further positive observation in this respect. The

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586
SAHRDAYĀLOKA grammarians are held in very high esteem by the alamkārikas. Ānandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 13 observed : "sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ' iti vidvad upajñeyam uktih; na tu yathā-katañcit pravstteti pratipādyate. prathame hi vidvāmsaḥ vaiyākaranāḥ, vyākaranamülatvāt sarva-vidyānam. te ca śrüyamāneșu varneșu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti. tathaivā'nyais tanmatánusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ, kāvyatatrvártha-darsibhiḥ vācya-vācaka-sammiśraḥ, śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadesyo vyañjakatva-sāmyāddhvanir ity uktah.”
"The expression, 'is designated by the learned', brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it has not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The formost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies. They indeed refer to articulate letters by the term 'DHVANI' or 'suggester'. In the same way, since the element of suggestion is common (to both), not only the word and its meaning, but its essential verbal power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, has been given the same designation, viz. DHVANI by other learned men whose insight into the fundamental truth about poetry is profound and who are followers of principles laid down by grammarians.” (Trans. K. Kri. pp. 27, 29, ibid)
On this, Abhinavagupta in his Locana, elaborates with apt quotations from Bhartphari. He observes : (pp. 75, 76, Edn. Nandi) śrüyamāņeşv iti. śrotraśaskulīm santānena āgatā antyāḥ śabdāḥ śrūyante iti prakriyāyām sabdajāḥ śabdāḥ śrūyamāņā iti uktam. teşām ghanțánuranana-rūpatvam tāvad asti, te ca dhvaniśabdena uktāḥ. yathā āha, bhagavān bhartȚhariḥ -
“yaḥ samyoga-vibhāgābhyām karañair upajanyate, sa sphoțaḥ, śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ
dhvanayónyair udāhstāḥ.” - iti. evam ghantā-nirhāda-sthānīyo'nukaraņā”tmópalakṣito vyangyópyartho dhvanir iti vyavahstaḥ. tathā śrūyamāņā ye varņāḥ nāda-śabda-vācyā antya-buddhinirgrāhya-sphoțábhivyañjakās te dhvaniśabdena uktāḥ. yathā'ha bhagavān sa eva -
“pratyayair anupākhyātair (anupākhyeyaih) grahaņānuguņais tathā, dhvani-prakāśite śabde svarūpam avadhāryate." - iti.

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'Vyañjanā'
587 tena vyañjakau śabdārthāv apīha dhvaniśabdena uktau. kañca varņeșu tāvanmātra-parimāņeșvapi satsu. yathoktam -
"alpīyasā’pi yatnena
śabdam ucсāritam matiḥ, yadi vā naiva grhņāti
varņam vā sakalam sphuram.” - iti. teșu tāvatsv eva śrūyamāņeșu vaktur yo'nyo dệta-vilambitā”di-vrtti-bhedā”tmā prasiddhād uccāraṇavyāpārād abhyadhikaḥ sa dhvanir uktaḥ. yad āha, sa eva -
"sabdasyordhvam abhivyakteḥ vịttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ, dhvanayaḥ sam-upohante
sphotā”tmā tair na bhidyate." - iti. asmābhir api - prasiddhebhyaḥ śabda-vyāpārebhyaḥ abhidhā-tātparya-lakṣaṇārūpebhyótirikto vyāpāro dhvanir ity uktah. evam catuṣkam api dhvaniḥ, tad yogāc ca samastam api kāvyam dhvanih. tena vyatirekā’-vyatiraka-vyapadeśo’pi na na yuktaḥ. vācya-vācaka-sammiśrah iti. vācya-vācaka-sahitaḥ, sammiśra iti madhyamapadalopī samāsaḥ. "gām aśvam purusam paśum” iti-vat samuccayo'tra ca-kāreņa vinā’pi. tena vācyo'pi dhvanih, vācakópi śabdo dhvanih, dvayor api vyañjakatvam dhvanati' iti krtvā. sammiśryate vibhāvānubhāva-samvalanayā iti vyangyo’pi dhvanih, dhvanyata iti krtvā. sabdanam sabdaḥ, śabda-vyāpāraḥ, na cā'sāv abhidhā”dirūpah, api tv ātmabhūtah, so'pi dhvananam dhvaniḥ, kāvyam iti vyapadeśyaś ca yórthaḥ sópi dhvanih. ukta-prakāra-dhvani-cațuștaya-mayatvāt. ata eva sādhāraṇa-hetum āha-"vyañjakatva-sāmyād" iti. vyangya-vyañjakabhāvaḥ sarveșu pakseșu sāmānya-rūpaḥ sādhāraṇa ity arthaḥ.”
(Trans.) 'śrūyamānesu' means those which are heard. We hear, in our ears, last sounds that reach us through a stream of chained sounds. In that process "words or sounds born of sounds (i.e. last sounds) are heard. The hearning (of these words) is like this resonance of a bell. This is clear. They are designated by the word dhvani'. As is said by Bhagavān Bhartshari -
"That which is caused by conjunction and disjunction (= samyoga/vibhāga), is sphoța; words (or sounds) born of words (or sounds) are termed 'dhvani' by others.”

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588
SAHRDAYĀLOKA Thus vyangyártha or suggested sense characterised by resonance in the fashion of the ringing of a bell is also termed 'dhvani'. In the same way the letters that are being heard, and are termed as nāda - i.e. sound, are termed dhvani as they are suggesters of the sphoța which is collected by the hearing of the last letter (antyabuddhi-nirgrāhya). The same Bhagavān Bhartrhari has stated -
"In a word, by the terminations, that can not be described and that are conducive to the apprehension of (sphota), which are revealed by sound, the form of (sphota) is determined." Thus the vyañjaka i.e. suggester word and meaning are
lso termed 'dhvani'; eventhough the letters are of that much duration (or measure) only. As is said,
"Buddhi - i.e. intelligence either does not catch the word, articulated by very little effort, or apprehends the whole of a letter in its manifested form. In the same letters that are being heard, the speaker's special effort - different from the effort known to all, and which is qualified by difference (in pronunciation) such as fast and slow,- (this special effort of the speaker) is termed 'dhvani'. As is stated by him
"After the manifestation of a word, no difference is brought about in the soul (i.e. original nature) called sphota, even when vaikrta-dhvanis bring about difference in vrtti.”
By us also, the function (vyāpāra) (called vyañjanā) other than the all accepted abhidhā, tātparya and laksanā, is termed 'dhvani'. Thus all these four are termed dhvani'. By association with these, the whole of a poem is also termed 'dhvani'. Thus, the mention of difference and also non-difference (as in "kāvyasya ātma dhvanih ityā"dau bheda-vyapadeśaḥ, kāvya-višeṣaḥ sa dhvanir ityā”dau abhedavyapadeśaḥ ca ity arthaḥ - bālapriyā p. 35) is not irrelevant. 'vācyavācakasammiśrah' is a madhyama-pada-lopī-samāsa. Without any mention of 'ca-kāra', the assemblage (samuccaya) takes place as in case of the expression - "gām aśvam purusam, pašum”. So, vācya (= expressed sense) is 'dhvani' and vācaka sabda - i.e. expressive word is also termed 'dhvani'; on the etymology of “dhvanati iti dhvanih" - that which makes sound is dhvani.' To produce noise (sabdanam) is termed 'sabda'. This means the 'function' of a word. This is not of the form of abhidhā and the rest. But it is of the form of itself. This is also termed 'dhvani' on account of dhvanana' - i.e. suggestion. As all these four (word, meaning, the function and t suggested sense) reside in a poem, it is also termed 'dhvani'. So, the common factor (to all these) is 'suggestivity'; the function of suggestion is common to all these. This is the crux of our saying.

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'Vyañjanā
589 Mammața also echoes this in his K.P.
One thing that emerges clearly from this discussion is that the term 'dhvani’ was first used by the grammarians in a peculiar sense (i.e. of 'sound' only), and the Klamkārikas applied it to their principle of poetry by extending its connotation.
We now turn once again to Patañjali to decypher the concept of dhvanivyañjanā-as held by the grammarians. In the Paśpasāhnika we come across the following observation : "When one says 'gauh' what is sabda ? Is it the object which has dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc. ? 'No', he says, “it is called 'dravya’ (i.e. substance). Is it then its gesture, movement, or winking ?” 'No', he says, 'it is called 'kriyā' or action.” Is it then the whiteness, blueness, browneness, or greyness ?”. 'No', he says, “it is called 'guna' or colour.” Is it then the sum total of the qualities like 'sattā', (i.e. being which always exists even when the individuals are broken or destroyed) ?” “No”, he says, “It is called, "āksti' i.e. figure. Then, what is sabda ? sabda is that on the manifestation of which, the correct knowledge of the object which has dewlap, tail, hump, hoof, horns, etc. is produced; or the sound which has a decisive meaning is said to be 'sabda' in the world... Hence 'dhvani' is 'śabda': (“athavā pratīta-paryāyako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ucyate... tasmad dhvaniḥ śabdah”). -
When a word like 'gauh' is pronounced, the following concepts appear in the mind of the hearer; - the individuality cow, her action, her qualities, genus cow, the shape of the cow, and also the word made up of gʻ'au' and 'h'- the visarga. The hearer wants to make out the exact connotation. Individuality cow, her qualities, etc. are seen by the eyes and the word 'gauh' is heard by the ears. So, it is absurd to take this for the exact connotation. But since the relation of śabda and artha, guna and guņin, kriyā and kriyāvān - is that of identity according to the grammarians, as there is a rule viz. - 'tad-abhinnā'bhinnasya tad-abhinnatvam' - it is quite natural to think so. The Mahābhāsyakāra says that the akrti, guna, etc. are not the true connotations of the sabda, but the true connotation is sphoța - (the eternal word), which when manifested, enables the hearer to have a clear knowledge of the object cow.
The ālamkārikas equate this manifestation with suggestion of vyañjanā vyāpāra. Whether they are right in doing so is open to debate.

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590
SAHRDAYĀLOKA The Sanskrit grammarians hold that the sabda is not the sound-units that we hear, but it is manifested in the mind after the whole word is pronounced. It may be noted that according to sanskrit grammarians, sabda is of four phases viz. parā, paśyantī, madhyamā and vaikharī. Śabda Brahman, when manifested at the mūlā”dhāra or the sacral plexus, it is called parā vāk; when manifested at the naval, it is paśyanti, at the heart, madhyamā and Vaikhari is that phase which is manifested out of the vocal organs as the articulated sound. (M.bh. I. i. 1 & V.P. 144; etc.) In the IXth āhnika, Patañjali discusses the tapara-sūtra (pā. I. i. 70) There are
be examined : (i) Is 'tat-kālasya' a correct expression or not? and (ii) Is this sūtra an apūrva-vidhi or a niyama-vidhi ? While discussing the latter point the auother talks about sphoța and dhvani. At the end of some technical discussion, it is stated :
"evam tarhi sphoțaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabda-gunaḥ.” If so, sphoța is the word and dhvani i.e. sound is its quality.
katham ? how ? bhery äghātavat. Like the beater of a drum. - tad yathā bhery āghāto bherīm āhatya kaścid vimšati padāni gacchati, kaścid trimśat, kaścit caturviņśat.
This may be illustrated as follows - One beater of drum goes twenty steps at the time when the sound by beating the drum lasts, another thirty steps, and still other forty steps. Beating is the same. The increase is due to the sound production by beating - It is observed -
“dhvanih sphoțaś ca śabdānām dhvanis tu khalu laksayet, alpo mahīyāmś ca, keşāņcit
ubhayam tat-svabhāvataḥ.” With reference to śabdas there are dhvani and sphoța. Of them dhvani alone is cognisable to the sense of hearing. It is short, it is long, and it is by nature both (long and short), at the hands of some.
Thus in Patañjali dhvani' is sound only, the word that is pronounced. Sphoța is revealed through this dhvani or sound, and it is sabda in the real sense of the term, which is united with meaning.

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Vyañjanā
591 Bhartshari -
We come across a fuller treatment of dhvani and sphoța in the Vākyapadīya I.
It may be noted that we discuss ‘dhvani' in the grammarians here only because it is relevant to the origin of vyañjanā also and as Abhinavagupta has explained, for the ālamkārikas the term 'dhvani' covers the concept of vyañjanā also as the etymology - "dhvanyate anena” is broad enough to cover the 'vyāpāra' called vyañjanā. Abhinavagupta has observed in his Locana on Dhv. I. 13 that : tena vācyópi dhvaniḥ vācakópi śabdo dhvaniḥ, dvayor api vyañjakatvam 'dhvanati' iti krtvā. sammiśryate vibhāvánu-bhāva-samvalanayā iti vyangyópi dvanih, dhvanyate iti krtvā. śabdanam śabdaḥ, sabda-vyāpāraḥ, na cásāv abhidhā”dirūpaḥ, api tvā”tmabhūtaḥ, sópi dhvananam dhvaniḥ, kāvyam iti vyapdeśyaś ca yórthaḥ sópi dhvaniḥ. ukta-prakāra-dhvani-catuștamayatvāt.”
Earlier (on Dhv. I. 13) Abhinavagupta had noted that : “asmābhir api prasiddhebhyah sabda-vyāpārebhyaḥ abhidhā-tātparya-laksanā-rūpebhyah atirikto vyāpāro dhvanir ity uktaḥ. evam catuṣkam api dhvaniāḥ....” etc.
Thus understanding of what grammarians meant by dhvani is quite relevant here. .
So, according to the grammarians, śabda and artha are both identical. Bhartshari, in an interesting discussion, anticipates an objection to the following effect :
Whatever is sabda is artha and whatever is artha is sabda. Then naturally the question arises, as to why do we not come across the same achievement by śabda as that by artha ? If, e.g., the word 'madhu' and the artha-object-madhu be identical, we should have been able to have the taste of honey by just pronouncing the word. But that is not the case. We should get a burn while speaking, 'agniḥ, i.e. 'fire'. But it does not happen like that.
To this, the Vaiyākaraṇas would say that, there is no external meaning as such of any word, but all things external reside in a particular way in our heart i.e. ‘antahkarana'. It is this ‘āksti' which is known as 'jāti-“ākrtir jāti-pada-vācyā'; this 'āksti' is the real meaning of a word. This is known as 'bauddhártha'. Both śabda and artha reside in the mind and thus we achieve their identity. In this respect, the grammarians come very close to the Vedāntins. The non-dualistic vedantins regard the external world as a mere appearance. By knowing Brahma, the delusion is

Page #37

rejecting the ka
592
SAHRDAYĀLOKA removed in such a way, that the world seen without melts away in the fashion of a dream. All the objects in the world are seen as different from one another. But they all become one in Brahman. If we go on accepting the 'kārana-sattā' by
ing the kārya, we will realise this identity. Thus we come to the element called earth, by removing the forms such as stone, iron, etc. Thus by rejecting the kāryatattva, we will come to the fundamental kārana-tattva called Brahman. In the same way, in the heart this same Brahmatattva (i.e. the śabda Brahman) is known as parā-vānī. Just as all the objects such as ghata, pata, etc. are one and identical, in the same way, the sabda-tattvas in form of 'ka', 'kha', 'ga', etc. do not have separate forms. Thus the sanskrit grammarians state that śabda has four phases, as observed already in Patañjali, viz. parā, paśyantī, madhyamā, and vaikharī. Sabda-brahma when manifested at the naval is paśyantī, at heart madhyamā, and vaikharī is that which is manifested at the level of vocal organs, as the articulated sound. The M.bh. reads the following to this effect -
"catvarī vāk parimitā padāni
tūrīyam vāco manusyāḥ vadnati..." Thus, when the sound-unit with the help of sthāna and prayatna, is manifested as separate 'ka', 'kha', etc., it is known as vaikhari. The word manifested with th help of sthāna, prayatna and vāyu-samyoga is called 'dhvani' by the grammarians. So, the sabda is analysed into two parts, - (i) The sphota or the artha bhāga and (ii) dhvani which is vāyu-samyoga"tmaka or characterised by contact with air. Sphota is void of difference. It is supposed to be non-different, one, etc., and is free from any upādhi. Dhvani is having difference. is many, and is of the nature of effect, etc. It is because of this that dhvani produced by different people seems to be different. Hence, we get difference in dhvani when produced by a newly married girl, or by a hero, or others. But there is no difference to be seen in the sabda
led sphota. At the same time, this sphota is manifested through dhvani
Dhvani thus, though not intrinsically connected with artha, alone causes artha to get manifested. Thus when there is a gathering of a large number of people, e.g. at a fair, we hear some noise, but no meaning flows from that, people say, "what a big noise is made ?” The idea is, as the world, jagat, by anirvacana khyāti, is the vivarta of Brahma, in the same way, all vārmaya and its vācyártha are the vivarta of śabda-brahma. Hence, dhvani is that word which suggests the śabda-Brahma, called sphoța. There is difference to be seen in dhvani but not in

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593
"Vyañjanā' sphoța. Just as the soul remains unaffected by the qualities of the body such as fatness and the like, or just as the face is seen as though different when reflected in different objects such as oil, sword, etc., in the same way, though there is aupādhika-dhvani-bheda or difference in dhvani due to upadhis or external factors, sphoța is just one and identical. The point is that the grammarians take dhvani or word as the vyañjaka of sphoța. Thus according to them, dhvani may be difined as "dhvanatīti dhvanih”, i.e. it sounds, gives expression to sphoța, i.e. it rings, reverberates, suggests sphoța.
The writers on poetics extended the connotation of the word dhvani. They took the quality of dhvanitva, and included all that was related to this in dhvani. Thus, rīti, vrtci, guna, alamkāra, sabda, pada, padāmía, varna, vākya-racanā, kāvya, vyāpāra, etc. all this is placed in the fold of dhvani. When one meaning suggests another, it is also called a vyañjaka or a suggester. This suggester may be both the conventional meaning (i.e. vācya) and/or the indicated sense (laksyártha). Or, it may even be a vyangyártha, i.e. suggested sense, giving rise to a further suggested sense. Having regard to a karma-sādhana-vyutpatti of dhvani, even the mea that is suggested - vyajyamāna-artha' - is also called dhvani. And this becomes three-fold, such as vastu-dhvani, alamkāra-dhvani and rasā"di-dhvani. By bhāvasādhana-vyutpatti, the term dhvani would refer to the process of vyañjanā i.e. suggestion itself. Finally, the whole collection, called kāvya is also included in the comprehensive fold of dhvani. (See Locana on Dhv. I. 13, quoted above).
When it is said that the grammarians mean by dhvani those sound-units which become the object of hearing, the idea is that the word reaches the ear through krama-paramparā i.e. sequence, and the last sound-unit i.e. antima śabda-is caught by the ear. Thus, it is only the sabdaja-śabda that is heard by us. This is explained on the analogy of ghanță-nāda or the ringing of a bell. Bharthari puts it as follows - “yaḥ samyoga-vibhāgābhyām” ... etc. (as quoted in Locana on Dhv. I. 13). In view of the popular belief regarding both plurality and order (i.e. krama) of śabda, he makes his position absolutely clear by suggesting that no question of order such as priority and posteriority and that of plurality can be logically raised in relation to sphota which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he observes, that passes through successive stages in case of articulation and appears to be either long or short, in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. So, it is particularly due to varying modulations of voice, as caused by local apparatus, that 'ka' sound seams to be difference from 'kha' sound, and the like.

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594
SAHRDAYĀLOKA But sphoța remains unaffected. Thus the Sun, a fixed body, seems to be quivering when reflected in an agitated pool of water :
“pratibimbam yathányatra sthitam toya-kriyāvaśāt,
tat-pravṛttim ivā’nveti, sa dharmaḥ sphoța-nādayoh.” (V.P.I. 49) Order and difference, pertaining to sound, are falsely attributed to sphoța. The dual aspects of sabda as observed already imply that śabda has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection -
"grāhyatvam grāhakatvam ca dve saktau tejaso yathā, tathaiva sarva-sabdānām
ete prthag avasthite.” - V.P.I. 55. The grammarians maintain that there are two different aspects of words, viz. ‘kārya' or the popular form and 'nitya' or the permanent form. The former is usually produced by the exercise of the vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, and the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. Sphota is to be identified with the latter aspect of speech.
The three views regarding the cognition of sound and sphoța are (i) sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the positive instrument whereby sphoța is comprehended. (ii) After having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, sphota is capable of being heard, and (iii) sound acts upon the organ concerned and serves to manifest sphoța.
Bhartrhari supports the third view. Sound serves as an outer garment of sphota. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable in itself, sphoța reveals its existence through the medium of sound.
Sound and sphota are intimately related. As to how sound and sphota, that are related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartrhari refers to four different views. Some hold that sphota is recognised as identical with sound, just as crystal looks red when in contact with japā-kusuma : Observes Punyarāja, on V.P. I. 82 - "yathā japā-kasuma-rūpánuşaktam eva sphaţikā"dīnām grahanam, tathā dhvanirūpánuşakta eva sphoțas tad avibhāgena upalabhyate, iti keşām cin-matam..." . Others say that sound (though not cognisable by itself) is indicative of sphota. Still others maintain that the exact nature of sphoța is too subtle to be determined and it is sound only that comes under comprehension; and finally, according to some, sphota is really manifested

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595 but is indistinct and unintelligible on account of distance from where it is evolved.
While referring to the identellectual process involved in the comprehension of śabda, Bhartshari holds that the cognition of sabda practically follows from the last sound, together with the impression made by the preceding ones. We may try to understand this, 'varnóccāra-prakriyā' or the process of pronouncing the sound units.
There are three options as to the nature of a word - (i) The word is not eternal, i.e. it is 'a-nitya'. The words are created and destroyed. They have a jāti or a class, in keeping with other objects. This view is held by the Nyāya-vaiśesika systems. (ii) Varnas or sound units are nitya or permanent and are the cause of sabda. These letters have a relation with meaning and this relation is called sakti. This view is held by the Mimāmsā, Vedanta, Sāmkhya and Yoga schools. (iii) Third is the opinion of Sphotavāda or the akhandatāvāda of the grammarians. The grammarians believe in the identity and indivisibility of letters. On account of the contact of air and the like, the varnas or sound-units are manifested as different. These manifested letters are known as 'nāda'. They suggest the sphoța which is collected by antimabuddhi i.e. final cognition. As suggested above, Patanjali has already made this thing clear, when he talks of the four forms of vāk, such as parā, paśyanti, etc. These are four stages through which sphota (= nāda-bindu) receives manifestation. Both parā and paśyantī are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by the sense-organ. Parā resides in the mūlā"dhāra or the sacral plexus in the form of a motionless bindu :
"parā-vān mūlacakrasthā paśyanti nābhi-samsthitā, hțdisthā madhyamā jñeyā
vaikhari kantha-deśa-gā.” Paśyanti comes up to the naval region pushed up by the internal wind. Of the four forms, it is madhyamā that indicates sphoța. All these are more or less mysterious in nature. Vaikhari is the popular form and it is what is uttered by the vocal organ, and is capable of being heard by others. It is again held that nāda is simultaneously produced by madhyama and vaikharī, but there is a lot of difference between the two :
"yugapadena madhyamā-vaikharībhyām nāda utpadyate.” (mañjūṣā). - The nāda produced by the madhyamā is slightly cognised by us either at the time of counting japa, or when the ears are shut up. - “madhyamā nādasya karņapidhāne japā”dau ca, sūksmatara-vāyu-vyangyā - (mañjūsā). This nāda, manifested by madhyamā is what we precisely know by the name of Sphoța. It

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
stands for Brahman and is eternal, one, without division, etc. According to this view, it is one and the same indivisible sphota, that is represented by varņa, pada, and vākya, in the same way as one and the same face appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword, and looking glass, or as a piece of stone, taking reflection from red, or blue flowers, seems to be either red or blue : “yathā ca mukhe, maņi-krpāņa-darpaņa-vyañjakópādhivaśāt dairghyavartulatvā”dibhānam, tadvat.” The difference between 'ka' and 'ga' is not on account of the diversity of sphoța, but points to the peculiarities of sound that serves to manitest sphoța. : "vyañjaka-dhvani-gatam 'ka'tva-'ga'-tvā”dikam sphote bhāsate.” - The unity and indivisibility of sphoța are brought about by its comparision with the sky and consciousness, which though one and not admitting of fractions, are said to have such attributive difference as ghatākāśa, mathākāśa, and jīva, iśvara, etc. respectively. Thus, those who take pada and vākya to be similarly indivisible units, say as follows : "just as letters are devoid of parts, so too, no letters are comprehended in padas. :
“pade na varņā vidyante varņeșvavayavā iva. vākyāt padānām ānantyam
praviveko na kaścana." - V.P. I. 77. Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility of both pada and vākya, it is the last letter that indicates sphoța, and each precedding letter serves to make for a cognition of the inteded sense - "pada-vākyayos tu sakhandatva-pakṣé antimavarnavyangya-sphoța eka eva. pūrva-pūrva-varņas tu tātparyagrāhakaḥ” (Mañjūsā).
Taking into consideration the difference between madhyamā and Vaikharī, sound can be divided into two, viz. original or eternal (i.e. inexhaustible) and artificial (i.e. derived) or momentary. - "dhvanis tu dvividhah - prāksto vaikstaś ca.
"sphoțasya grahane hetuḥ
prāksto dhvanir isyate, vịttibhede nimittatvam
vaikstaḥ pratipadyate.” (V.P. I. 77) The natural sound only, which is generated by madhyamă, suggests sphoța. The unnatural - ("a-prāksta-dhvani") sound is so termed because it rises from prakrta dhvani and undergoes an amount of modification in the form of long and short sound. Sphoța which is essentially one and beyond any modification is not in the

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597 least effected by the quick utterance of sound which practically refers to Vaikrta dhvani. Another point that should be noted down is that it is sphoța alone, as is evident from its derivative meaning, that is really associated with the expressiveness of sound (sphutati arthaḥ asmād iti sphotah). For the sake of convenience alone, we regard word as having meaning. A closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that sphota alone is finally the significant element of speech. Moreover, Bhartrhari holds that sphota is practically one and the same but it is only the indicator of sphota viz. sound that differs :
sphoțe vyañjaka-dhvani-gatakatvā”dibhānāt 'ka’kāro buddhaḥ, ityaupādhiko bhedavyavahāraḥ.” - Mañjūṣā.
How is spota manifested ? The answer is that it is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by preceding letters - “pūrva-pūrva-dhvany-utpăditā’bhivyakti-janitasamskāra-paramparā-parinako'ntyabuddhi-nirgrāhya ity arthah”-kaiyata. - And it is evidently an intellectual operation which enables us to retain recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter alone. “Manifested by sound”, implies that sphoța, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under the cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation.
Thus sphota is regarded as 'antima-buddhi-nirgrāhya'. There is a rule that sabda, buddhi and karma are "dvi-ksana-sthāyi” (i.e. they last for two moments). They come into existence in the first moment, exist in the second, and die out in the third. For example, we may take the word 'ghata'. There are four letters in it, viz. 'gh', 'a', 'y' and 'a' First 'gh' is created. It continues to stay in the second moment. In this very moment, 'a' is created. In the third moment ‘gh' is destroyed but 'a' continues to exist and comes into existence. Now, when y continues in the next moment the last 'a' comes into existence. In the sixth moment, the last a also disappears. Now for those who regard letters to be eternal, 'utpatti' means ‘abhivyakti'. So the whole word 'ghața' - the varņa-samghāta or the collection of letters never comes into existence at a single given moment. Then how is the meaning collected ? The answer is that though varņa i.e. sound-unit-is destroyed, it gives rise to some samskāra or impression. This samskāra or impression stays on and is united with the next letter. Thus the assemblage of samskāras unites with the last 'a' and we get the word 'ghata'. This happens in case of 'yajñādikarya' - i.e. sacrificial rite - which gives rise to the fruit in form of heaven i.e. svarga. Sphota also is 'antima-varna-grāhya' - in this very sense.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The gist of the above discussion is that external and indivisible sphoța is manifested in the form of letters through dhvani or sound.
So, dhvani is two-fold, prākṣta or natural and vaiksta or unnatural as already observed. The prākṣta-dhvani is qualified by the qualities such as 'ka-tva', 'hrasvatva', 'ady udātrātva', etc. Even though sphoța is self-manifested, it is as though obstructed by the accumulated vāyusamyoga or, contact with air. By removing this obstruction, the prākṣta-dhvani manifests sphoța. This manifested sphota is different from the dhvani and so sphota is said to be one, eternal, all-pervading and manifested by different dhvanis and it gives meaning when it becomes 'antyabuddhi-nirgrāhya' - i.e. when collected at the last moment. This prākşta-dhvani is the same as varņas i.e. sound-units and sphoța is never manifested unless through them. Vaikrta-dhvani has a different function. It creates vrtti-bheda e.g. drtavilambita-ādi, in the letters gathered by prākrta-dhvani. Thus even if there is vaikrta-dhvani-bheda, we have no prākrta-dhvani-bheda. So, we get the uniformity in form i.e. ekarūpatā of ākāra and the like.
Thus, the term 'dhvani’ is used in three different ways :
(i) 'Dhvani' is used for 'sabda-ja-sabda' of the Naiyāyikas. On the basis of this, the alamkārikas call ‘vyangyártha' to be dhvani, the sādharmya being ‘pratīyamānatva' or 'utpădyatva'.
(ii) According to Vaiyakaranas, sphoța is 'vyangya' or suggested and prākstadhvani is vyañjaka or suggester. Dhvani is thus “vyañjaka”. On the basis of this, the ālamkārikas call the 'vyañjaka sabdárthau' to be dhvani.
(iii) And the vaikta-dhvanis make for vịtti-bheda. Hence the vyañjakatvavyāpāra is termed as dhvani.
So, for the grammarians, the relation between sphoța and dhvani is that of vyangya-vyañjaka.
We have also noted that the grammarians use dhvani to mean (i) 'nada-matra i.e. 'sound' only, and (ii) śabda or word. Soghața' the dhvani which is just sound - ‘nāda-mātra' by itself, has no relation with the object 'ghata' i.e. a pot, which is seen, touched etc. - i.e. which is 'sparsa-kşama'. The sound 'ghata' is something quite different from the object 'ghata' which can be seen, touched, etc. still, it should be noted very carefully that the sound 'ghata' indicates something, which it is not, i.e. which is other then itself, viz. the ‘object' ghata. This idea of one thing indicating something else, which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing

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599 characteristic of dhvani. So, in all cases of expression, where one thing indicates something which it is not, it is, so to say, taken as a case of dhvani. It is this mode of expression, both to be found in ordinary conversation as well as in poetic use of language, that in sanskrit tradition, is studied as a particular linguistic mode of expression, here vyañjanā. Therefore, dhvani is that which suggests something other than itself, and which is known to be separate from itself, and by this common point of suggestion, - vyañjakatva-sāmyāt-the vyāpāra, i.e. 'function' is also called 'dhvani'. According to the Vaiyākaranas, the world is artha-rūpa i.e. of the form of meaning, and is derived from sphoța, the sabda-brahma. In the like fashion, we derive the ghatártha from the word ghata.
This dhvani is identified with word in our day to day affairs. So kāvya is also termed as dhvanikāvya. Every sound is suggestive of the sabda-brahma, which is sphota-rūpa. The artha of this sabda-brahma is world. The whole process is as follows - dhvani-sabda, sabda-brahma, - i.e. sphoța, and vivartita artha. Here we may note that even in the process of gathering the conventional meaning from the word, an element of suggestion or vyañjanā is involved. Vyañjanā is that process by which something not manifested becomes manifested. Dhvani or sabda first suggests sphoța and as sphoța is eternally connected with the meaning, we derive meaning from dhvani. Morover, it may be noted that vyañjanā is that process of manifestation through which something already existing is manifested. Vyañjanā does not create new objects.
Sphoțavāda and Vyañjanā - we will be able to make a note of certain marked parallelisms between the sphotavāda of the grammarians on the one hand and the vyañjanāvāda on the other. The points of comparision are as below :
(i) As observed earlier, for the grammarians, dhvani is explained as, dhvanati iti dhvanih'. Dhvani is so termed because it sounds or rings or reverberates sphota, i.e. suggests it. The word ghara, for example, is used for the object-artha-ghata, which is seen, touched etc. This idea of one thing indicating something else, which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing charecteristic of dhvani. So, all cases of expression, where one thing expresses something which it is not, becomes, so to say, the distinguishing characteristic of dhvani. The writers on poetics extend this connotation of the word dhvani. Taking the quality of dhvanitva' into consideration, they include all that was related to this in dhvani. Thus, guna, alamkāra, rīti, vștti, pada, padāmsa, varņa, vākyártha, - all these become vyañjaka, i.e. suggestive of the vyangya.

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600
SAHŞDAYĀLOKA (ii) In the philosophy of the grammarians the sound 'ghata’ for example, does not give the meaning directly. It does so through sphoța which in its turn is suggested by the sound ghata. Thus what we ordinarily call meaning is arrived at by an indirect process. For the ālamkārikas, the process of vyangyártha-grahana is not direct but indirect. We arrive at the suggested sense either through abhidhā or through laksaņā.
(iii) The grammarians believe in vākya-sphota. They do not accept the separate existence of padas, i.e. individual words, and much less of letters or varnas. But common experience of ordinary people misleads many to believe that the meaning is derived from individual words or padas and thus through letters or varņas. The Mimāmsakas accept this position. It seems, however, that here ordinary people, and so also the Mīmāmsakas, do not seem to pierce the veil of delusion and mistake the nature of condition for the nature of the contents. The nature of the condition is multiplicity of letters; the nature of the contents is the unity of word, the vākya-sphoța.
- Similar is the case with some ālamkārikas; abhidhā and laksaņā form the nature of condition and vyañjanā or dhvani is the nature of the contents. Those who fail to distinguish between ends and means, seem to confuse abhidh, and laksaņā with vyañjanā.
(iv) To put it otherwise, for the grammarians the letters may be taken just as what we may call the object of knowledge, i.e. jñānasya visayaḥ, while the wordwhole is jñānasya phalam, the result or the fruit of knowledge. For the ālamkārikas also, abhidh, and laksana can be equated with jnanasya visayah, while vyanjana may be taken as jñānasya phalam. These two are never ever to be confused.
(v) The grammarians believe in vākya-sphoța. So, they would avoid the contingency faced by the padavādin, viz. that of recognising parts even of letters or varnas. Similarly, those ālamkārikas who want to arrive at vyangyártha with the help of laksanā, will have to go for a second laksanā, and a third, and a fourth ad infinitum, involving further and further prayojanas.
(vi) Sphoța is a distinct entity by itself, not to be identified with dhvani i.e. the sound of a word. The vyangyártha is also a separate entity, not to be confused with abhidhártha or laksyártha.
(vii) For the grammarians, there is a krama, a sequence, in the process of gathering meaning from a word. From word to sphoța and from there to meaning - this is the sequence. In the same way, with the alamkārikas also, there is a sequence, perceptible or imperceptible, between vācyártha and vyangyártha.

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601 (viii) It is non-discrimination that makes for the acceptance of letters for the word-whole. In the same way, it is non-descrimination that results in our recognising vyañjanā as either 'abhidhā' or 'bhakti'.
(ix) For the Vaiyākarañas, there is a gradual and clearer revelation of the sphota. Each sound-unit reveals the whole of sphota and not a portion of it. The revelation gets clearer and clearer by each succeeding sound-unit. The sphota revelation is a gradual process and the mind acquires progressively greater and greater aptitude for receiving further glimpses. With the utterance of the last sound-unit the process comes to a close. By itself, there is neither qualitative not quantitative difference in word-essence, but there may be difference in its grasping by the mind. Thus the degrees of difference are purely subjective and not objective.
For the alamkārikas also, the gathering of vyangyártha is a gradual revelation in the sense that it comes only after the apprehension of either abhidhártha, and/ or lakṣyártha as the case may be.
The writers on alamkāra i.e. literary aesthetics, are also partly indebted to other darśanas such as the sāmkhya, vedanta, and saiva-darśanas, for their concept of vyañjanā. Vyañjanā for these literary critics manifests, i.e. it brings to light that which is not present before us. The Dhvanyāloka suggests the analogy of 'ghatapradīpa-nyaya' to explain the fact of expressed and implicit senses.
But we will have to point out to a very very basic difference also between the sphoța-vāda and vyañjanāvāda. It is clear that sphoța for the grammarians is one and eternal and it pre-exists. Vyangyártha, or say, rasa, for the dhvanivādins does not pre-exist before the realisation of vibhāvā"dis. We will make this point clearer when we discuss the problem of rasa later. In short the abhivyakti of the darśanikas and the abhivyakti' of the dhvanivādins are not one and the same thing, for 'rasa' is said to be 'tātkālika' and not 'pūrva-siddha'.
Now we will proceed to consider vyañjanā as accepted by Anandavardhana and his followers. As for Bhāmaha and others who preceded Ānandavardhana, we have discussed earlier in a separate chapter their attitude towards vyañjanā when we discussed the topic of 'sabda-vsttis in earlier ālamkārikas'. Dhvanyāloka is first available written document that talks of vyañjanā systematically, though of course, traces of vyañjana were seen, not only in Bhāmaha and other ancients but even in the Nātyaśāstra of Bharata, and even in the vedas prior to him. We have seen Yaska's attitude towards vyañjana and it will be interesting to try to read the origin of the concept of vyañjanā in the ancient literature of the vedas and then through
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602
SAHRDAYĀLOKA Bharata we will come to the Dhvanyāloka and his followers. Among the posterior writers vyañjana was challenged by many but this voice of dissent was crushed by the powerful juggernaut rolled by Abhinavagupta, Mammața, Hemacnadra and Viśvanātha. We will discuss vyañjanā-virodha in a separate chapter. For the present we begin with the vedas.
It may be noted in the beginning that we picked up discussing Yāska, Pāṇini, Patañjali and Bhartrhari prior to dealing with the still ancient literature, because we knew that with them we were on a more solid ground and that their acquaintance with vyañjană was closer and surer. As for the vedic literature, it is all, 'of the air airy. Certainly there is no mentioning of vyañjana there, but we have use of different forms of the roots Vañj, vi+ vanj, and root vdhvan and the word dhvani in the vedas. The shades of meaning as seen in these occurrences could have started inspiring theorists to think about the word-power that is vyañjanā. Thus, we may hold the vedas to be a very very distant "gangotrī” - from where the vyañjanā-gangā could have descended as a thought-current to the planes of alamkāra-śāstra. We will try to cover as many occurrences as possible. First of all we will take up the Ķgveda - "ankte" - Rv. I. 124.8. is -
"svásā svásre jyáyasyai yo'nimāraigápaityasyāḥ praticáksyeva, vyucchántī raśmībhiḥ sū’yasyāñjyankte samanagā' iva vráh.”
Sāyaṇa explains - añji vyañjakam tejah, yad vā añji vyaktam jagat, ankte, anakti, prakāśayati. i.e. anoints, brings into light, displays, causes to appear, reveals; Griffith explains it as, 'decks'. Rv. V. i. 3:
“yádīm gaṇasya raśanámájīgah, śucir ankte śūcibhirgóbhir agnih, áddákşiņā yujyate vājayántyut
tānāmūrdhvó adhayajjuhū’bhiḥ.” Sāyaṇa - ankte = vyanakti, viśvam jagat = anoints; Griffith - "is anointed.” Rv. VIII. 29.1
"babhrúreko viņunaḥ sūnáro
yúvāñjyankte hiranyáyam,... Sāyaṇa-añji, abhivyajyate, prakāśyate anena ity añji ābharaṇam.
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603 abhivyaktisādhanam kundala-mukutā”dikam svaśarīram. ankte abhivyañjayati. = adorns, causes to appear, brings to light, reveals, displays, decks; Griffith - decks'.
"anakti" Rv. I. 153.2 :
"prastatirvām dháma na práyuktiráyāmi mitrā-varuņā suvrktiḥ, anákti yád vám vidathesu hótā
sumnám vām surir vrsaņāvi’yaksan.” Sāyaṇa-anakti = vyañjayati, = manifests; displays, brings into light, reveals; Griffith - "decks”. Rv. IV. 6.3.
yatá sujūrņi' rāti'ni ghrtácī, pradaksni’ddevátātimurāṇaḥ, údu svárurnavajā nākrāḥ paśvó anakti súthitaḥ sumékah." Sāyaṇa - anakti = gacchati; yad vā, sudhitaḥ svasureva udu utkrstah paśvaḥ paśūn anakti.
svaruņā paśum anakti iti śruteh, = anoints; Griffith - 'anoints'. Ry. X. 68.2 -
"sam góbhirņāngirasó nákşamāņo bhágaivédaryamánam nināya, jáne mitró na dámpati anakti
bịhaspate vājáyāsúmrivājau.” Sāyana - anakti = samgamayati, = brings together, unites; This seems to be an unusual meaning; may be metaphorical; Griffith - 'decks'. "añjate” : Rv. I. 92.1.
“etá u tyá uşásaḥ ketumakrata pūrve árdhe rájaso bhānúmañjate. nișkrnvāná áyudhānīva dhrsnávaḥ práti gāvórusīryante mātaraḥ.”
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604
SAHRDAYĀLOKA Sāyaṇa - bhānam prakāśam añjate = vyaktīkurvanti, = displays, causes to appear, brings into light, manifests, reveals;
Griffith - spread (shining light) i.e. causes to appear, display, reveal. Rv. I. 151.8 :
“yuvám yajñaiḥ prathamá góbhirañjata rutāvānā mánaso ná práyuktiņu, bháranti vām mánmanā giródịpyatā
mānasā revádāśāthe.” Sāyana - añjate = vyañjayanti yajamānāh, = display, cause to appear; Griffith - deck'.
· Rv. VIII. 72.9.
pári tridháturadhvaram jūrnīreti návīyasī mádhvā hótāro añjate. Sāyaṇa-añjate = ajyante = samskriyanta ity arthaḥ, = anoint, adorn; Griffith - 'deck'.
Rv. IX. 102.7 -
samīciné abhi tmánā yahvī stásya mātárā,
tanvāná yajñámānuşágyádañjate. Sāyana-añjate, somam miśrayanti, tadā svayam abhigacchanti. = mix; (i.e. anoint). Griffith - 'adorn'.
Rv. IX. 86 43 -
“añjáte vyañjate sámañjate krátum rihanti mádhunābyañjate, sindhor ucсhvāsé patayantam uksánam hiranyapāvāḥ paśúmāsu gộbhộate”, Sāyaṇa-añjate (gobhiḥ); anoint; vyañjate - vividham añjanti; and madhunā gavyena, abhyañjate = well anoint; Griffith - 'balm'. (= anoint);
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Vyañjanā' añjanti - Rv. I. 95.6 :
"ubhé bhadré joşayete ná mene gávo na vaśrá iva ūpa tasthur évaiḥ, sá dáksaņām dáksapatirbabhūvāñjánti yām
daksinató havi'rbhiḥ.” Sāyana-añjanti = ardrikurvanti; tarpayanti, (i.e. anoint), Griffith - 'balm'.
Ry. III. 8.1 -
añjánti tvámadhvaré devayánto vánaspate mádhunā daivyena, yadūrdhvástisthā dráviņehá dhattādyádvā kşáyo mātúrasyā upasthe.” Sāyaṇa-añjanti = tvayi ghệtam siñcanti ity arthaḥ; (i.e. they anoint)
Griffith - 'anoint. Rv. III. 14.3 -
“drávatām ta usásā vājayanti ágne vátyasya pratyābhirácchā, oátsīmañjánti pūrvyám havi'rbhirā vandhúreva tasthaturdurone.” Sāyaṇa-añjanti = siñcanti=anoint (and adorn),
Griffith - 'adorn'. Rv. V. 3.2
tvámaryamá bhavasi yátkanínām náma svadhāvangúhyam bibharși, añjánti mitvám śudhitam na gobhir yáddámpati sámanasā krņóși.” Sāyaṇa - go-vikāraiḥ kṣīrādibhiḥ añjanti = anoint; Griffith, 'balm';

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Rv. V. 43.7.
"añánti yám pratháyanto ná vipra vapā’vantam nāgninā tápantaḥ. pitúrna putrá upási prestha ā dharmó agni'mộtayannasādi.” - Sāyana-añjanti = anoint,
Griffith - 'deck'. Rv. IX. 109.20 -
añjántyenam mádhvo rasénendrāya vrsna indum mádāya, sāyaṇa-añjanti = samyojayanti, = (mix, i.e. anoint);
Griffith. - 'balm' (= anoint). - andhve - Rv. X. 100.10 -
“ūrjam gāvo yávase pivo attana stasya yā’h. sádane kóśe andhve,
tanū’revá tanvo bhesajámā sarvátātimáditim vrnīmahe.” Sāyaṇa-andhve = vyañjayatha, = cause to appear; manifest, display; Griffith - "are balmed”.
ajmaḥ - Rv. IX. 45.3
Griffith - 'balm.'
angdhi - Ry. X. 156.3
"ágne sthūrám rayim bhara prthúm gómantamaśvi'nam,
angdhi' kham vartáyā paņi'm." Sāyaṇa-angdhi = vrstyudakaiḥ sinca = anoint; Griffith - oil, (i.e. anoint), anajyāt - Rv. X. 31.4 .
“ni'tyas'cākanyāt svápatirdámūnā yásmā u deváh savitā' jajana,
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607 bhágo vā góbhiraryamémanajyātsó asmai cáruśchadayad utá syāt.” Sāyaṇa-anajyāt = vyaktikuryāt = to cause to appear; reveal, manifest,
Griffith - 'may appear to him'. anajan - Rv. III. 19.5 -
yattvā hótāramanájanmiyédhe nişādáyanto yajáthāya devāḥ, sá tvám no agnévitéśa bodhyádhi śrávāmsi dhehi matsanūșu.” Sāyaṇa - anajan; grtā”hutibhir aukșan = anointed;
Griffith - anoint. ānaje - Rv. I. 102.1.
imám te dhiyam prā bhare maho mahīmasya stotré dhişáņā yátta ānaje, támutsavé ca prasavé ca sāsahi’mi’ndram devā'saḥ śávasāmadanná nuo. Sāyana - ānaje = aktā samsistāsit = anoint;
and adds - añju vyakti-mrakṣaṇagatișuRv. VIII 63.1.
śá pūrvyó mahánām venáḥ stubhirānaje, yasya dvárā mánuspită devéşu dhiya ānajé.
Sāyaṇa, ānaje=āgacchati; or prāpa, ānajih praptikarmā; ajyate - Rv. VIII. 20.8
“góbhirvāņó ajyate sóbharīņām ráthe kóșe hiranyáye, góbandhavaḥ sujātásaḥ işe bhujé mahánto naḥ spárgse nú.” Sāyaṇa-ajyate, vyajyate, pratīkriyate=revealed; Griffith - 'balmed'.
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608
SAHŞDAYĀLOKA Rv. VIII. 51.9 -
yasyā yám viśváryo dásaḥ śevadhipā ari'”, tiráścidaryé rúšame páviravi tūbhyetsó ajyate rayih.” Sāyaṇa - ajyate = prakṣipyate, (vālakhilyabhāsya);
Griffith - 'is brought off. 'ajyate' at Rv. IX. 32.3.
Sāyaṇa, ajyate = sicyate, or snigdhīkriyate = anointed;
Griffith - 'annointed'. Rv. IX. 76.2, Rv. X. 118.3 -
Sāyaṇa, - ajyate - sicyate = anointed; Griffith - 'balms'. Sāyaṇa-ajyate gobhih = anointed
Griffith - 'balmed'. ajyase - Rv. III. 40.6 -
girvanaḥ pāhi naḥ sutám madhordhárabhirajyase, indra tvādātamídyáśaḥ. Sāyaṇa-ajyase-siryase; “(you) are anointed.”
Griffith - "art bedewed” (i.e. anointed). Rv. IX. 66.9 -
mrjánti tvā samagrúvóvyo jirā'vadhi śvāni, rebhó yadajyáse váne - Sāyaṇa-ajyase aktaḥ sikto bhavati-anoint; Griffith - 'deck thee'. also at Rv. IX. 85.5; Sāyana, - ajyase = sikto bhavasi; anointed;
Griffith - 'balmed' with milk. also at Rv. IX. 78.2 sāyana-ajyase = preryase Griffith - 'balmed'. aktaḥ, aktā, aktah, occur at Rv. IV. 3.10; sāyana-sikto bhavati, 'sprinkled with oil, - Griffith.
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609 VI. 4.6 - Sāyaṇa, sams'istah; Griffith - 'decked. VI. 5.6 - Sāyaṇa - samsiktaḥ, 'decked with brightness' - Griffith; IX. 96.22 - sāyaṇa - siktaḥ; Griffith - 'decked'. aktam - a“, Rv. II. 3.4. Sāyaṇa, ājyena aktam, Griffith - 'bedewed with’; IV. 27.5. - Sāyaṇa, siktam; Griffith- 'filled with a shining liquid”; IX. 74.8. - Sāyaṇa, samprktam; ‘shining, milk anointed', Griffith X. 177.1 - Sāyaṇa - vyaktam; abhivyaktam, 'adorned with’, Griffith. ajyamānaḥ - occurs at, Rv. IX. 97.35; Sāyaṇa-gobhiḥ sicyamānaḥ; ‘is purified', Griffith; X. 31.9. - Sāyana, vyajyamānaḥ, vyaktībhavan; = caused to appear, revealed, displayed; Griffith - 'balmed'; ajyamāna - occurs at, Rv. X. 31.10; Sāyaṇa, ‘niścīyamānaretaskā. añjat, añjan, at Rv. I. 92.5. añjan, añjanti, Sāyaṇa; = display, Griffith 'deck'. In the yajurveda -
anaktu - occurs of VI. 2, XXVII. 12, XXXVII, 11; añjantu - at, XXIII. 8; anaje - XXXIII. 29; ānañja - VIII. 30, ajyate - XXXIII. 82, aktam-II. 16; añjat - XXIX. 1; 2; and samañjan occurs at XX. 37 - anaktu - yv. VI. 2 -
"agreņirasi svāveśa unnetrņāmetasya vittādadhi tva, sthāsyati devastvā avitā, madhvānaktu supippalābhyastvausadhibhyah" - dhyāmagreņasprkņa āntariksam madhenäprāḥ prthivīmupareņādrmhiḥ.” Uvata-anaktu = mraksayantu, i.e. ‘anoint
Yv. XXVII. 12 - tanūnápadásuro visvávedā devódevésu devāh, pathó anaktu madhvā grténa.
anaktu = anoint, uvata; Yv. XXXVII. 11, yamáya tvā makháya tvā súryasya tvā tápase, devástvā savitá mádhvānaktu. prthivyāḥ samspr’śaspāhi arcirasi soci'rasi tapósi.
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA madhva anantu=anoint, Uvața; limpatu-, Mahīdhara; añjantu - Yv. XXIII. 8.
vásavastvāñjantu gāyatréņa cchándasā rudrástvañjantu traistubhena cchándasā ditya stvāñjayantu jāgátena cchándasā bhūrbhuvah svártāji3ñcchāci3nyavye gávye etádánnamatta devā etádannamaddhi prajāpate.
añjantu = anoint; snigdham kurvantu-anoint - Mahidhara. ānaje - occurs at, Yv. XXXII 29 and is Rv. I. 102.1; ānañja -, at Yv. VIII. 30
“purudasmóvísurūpa índurantármahimá náñjdhīraḥ, ekapadīm dvipadīm tripadīm catuspadīm astāpadīm bhávaņánu prathantām sváhā.” ānañja - añjater vyaktīkaraṇārthasyaitad rūpam. = vyaktikaroti, (Uvața); = brings into light, displays, causes to appear, etc. ete.
ajyate - Yv. XXXII. 82. It is the same as Rv. VIII. 51.9
Uvata observes : ajyate, dhātūnām anekárthatvāt añjir dānárthaḥ, vikaranavyatyayasca, anakti dadāti rayim, dhanam.
aktam - Yv. II. 16
vásubhyastvā rudrebhyastvā“dityébhyastvā sámjānātham dyāvāprthivī mitrā várunau tvā vrstyāvatām,
vyantuváyóktam ri’hāņā marútām prsatīr gaccha vaśá prśņirbhūtvá divam gaccha táto no véstīmávaha.
cakṣuśpā agnési cákṣsurme pāhi. aktam - drutam eva (uvata). samañjan - Yv. XX. 37 "narāśámsaḥ práti śūro mimānastánūnápāt prátiyajñásya dhāma,
góbhirvapā’vānmádhunā samañjan hiranyai śchandrī yajati prácetāḥ.” samañjan = anointing;
añjan - Yv. XXIX 1 & 2,
añjana = vyaktīkurvan (Uvața) = revealing, displaying; and añjana = samañjan = anointing, grtena (Uvata);
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611 In the Sāmaveda we have, ajyase - I. 195; añjate - I. 564; II. 1121, 964; 1755 vyajyate - I. 564; samāñjate - I. 564, ajyate - Il-770, 1099, 1609; añjānaḥ - II. 1080, 1209; Now - Sv. I. 195 is Rv. III. 40.6 I. 564 = Rv. IX. 86.43 II.1121 = Rv. IX. 10.3 II. 1755 = Rv. I. 92.1; II. 770 = Rv. IX. 32.3. Sv. II. 1099 is sam vatsa iva mātņbhirindurhinvāno ajyate. devāvirmado matibhiḥ pariskstaḥ. ajyate = 'is sent' - Griffith. The root may be aj or añj. Sv. II. 1609 is Rv. VIII. 51.9 Sv. II. 1080 is,
“punāno vāre pavamāno avyaye vrso acakridadvane devānām soma pavamāna nișkstam gobhirañjāno arsasi.” añjānaḥ = 'balmed with’; Griffith;
i.e. anointed; . Now 'we may examine the occurrences in the AV. (= Atharva-veda). anakti - Av. V. 27.2 devo deveșu devah patho anakti madhvā ghrtena = anoints, - Whitney; añjate - Av. XVIII 3.18, is Rv. IX. 86.43; anajmi - Av. IV. 14.6 "ajámanajmi páyasā ghệténa divyám payasám suparņám bịhántam, téna gemma sukrtásya lokám svárārohanto abhi nā’kamuttamám.” anajmi = abhidhārayāmi, Sāyaṇa; = anoint - Whitney; anaktu - Av. V. 28.3; "tráyaḥ pósastrivŕti śrayantāmanáktu pūșá páyasā ghrténa, ánnasya bhūmá pūrușasya bhūmá bhūmā paśūnám tá ihá śrayantām.” anaktu = anoint; - Whitney;

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA añjantu - occurs at Av. XVIII. 3.10, & III. 22.2. Av. III. 22.2 - is "mitráśca váruņascendro rudráśca cetatu, deváso viśvádhāyasasté māñjantu várcasā.” añjantu = aktam āślistam kurvantu; Sāyaṇa; = anoint; Whitney; Av. XVIII. 3.10-2, is várcasā māmpitáraḥ somyáso áñjantu devá mádhunā ghrténa, cákșușe mā pratarám tārayanto jaráse mā jaradastim vardhantu. añjantu = anoint, Whitney; anktam - Av. VI. 69.2 & IX. 1.19 Av. VI. 69.2 is - "áśvinā sāraghéņa mā madhunānktam śubhaspati, yáthā bhárgasvatīm vácamāvádāni jánām dnu.” anktam = abhișiñcatam, Sāyana; = anoint, Whitney; Av. IX. 1.19 is the same as above. We read herein “varcasvatīm” for “bhargasvatīm.”. Thus, the root Vañj seems to carry principally the meaning - (i) to anoint, and in consequence thereof,
(ii) 'to shine'. Its use with the prefix 'vi' is in the sense of 'to shine forth', 'to glitter', etc. The idea seems to be to enhance the glitter of something by application of some ingredient.
Grassman, Roth, and Bothlingk also have Vañj in the following senses; - (i) to anoint, to rub the ointment, to embalm; (salben) - (ii) to emit, (sputzen); (iii) to shine, to glitter; (glanzend); (iv) to shine forth (erscheinem); (v) to decorate (schmücken); (vi) to embelish; to attire, dress (zürüstn). “Vi +Vañj” - we come across different forms of the root vi+vañj in the vedas.
We will first take up the Rgveda. We may take note of the fact that vi+vanj occurs more frequently in what are known as later mandalas of the Rv. we will try
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613 to study all these references carefully and will try to find its sense or senses in their various occurrences.
'vyajyante' : occurs at Rv. I. 64.4 - "citrairañjibhirvapușe vyañjate vákṣaḥsu rukám ádhi yetire śubhé, amseșveşām ni'mimộkşur çstáyaḥ sākám jajñire svadháyā divó náraḥ." vyañjate = vyaktam kurvanti, alamkurvantītyarthaḥ, Sāyaṇa;
i.e. bring to light, cause to appear, display, reveal, decorate, and añjibhiḥ is explained by Sāyana as “rūpābhi-vyañjana-samarthaihābharanaih" Griffith explains as, "they deck"; 'añjibhiḥ' as 'glittering ornaments'.
Rv. VII. 79.2 vyañjate divó antesvaktū’nviśona yuktă uşáso yatante, sám te gå vastáma á vartayanti jyotiryacchanti savitéva bāhu. Sāyaṇa explains as 'vyaktikurvanti'. i.e. cause to appear, reveal, etc. Griffith - 'paint' (= anoint) Rv. IX 86.43 is the same as seen above.(see añjate); Sāyaṇa-añjate = vividham añjanti, and samañjate = samyag añjanti; = anoint, well anoint; Griffith - 'balm' - (i.e. anoint). vyajyate - Rv. X. 85.28; “nīlalohitam bhavati krtyásaktir vyajyate, édhante sayā jñātayaḥ pátirbandhésa badhyate." vyajyate = tyajyate, Sāyaṇa; = driven off, Griffith;
The root here is Vvi+aj and not Vvi+añj. It should be noted that this is the same as Av. XIV 1.26.
Whitney observes that the root is Vvi+aj. Rv. IX. 71.7 : reads as, "párā vyakto aruşó diváḥ kavivřsā triprsthó anavista gá abhi, sahásraņītiryátiḥ parāyáti rebhóna pūrviruşáso vi rājati."
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Sāyaṇa observes vasatīvaribhirvisese-nāktaḥ siktaḥ san."
i.e. clearly manifested, displayed, or well anointed; Griffith'shines'. vyaktam at Rv. X. 14.9, X. 127.7;
Rv. X. 14.9
ápeta vita víca sarpatátósmā etám pitáro lokámakran, áhobhiradbhíraktúbhirvyaktam yamó dadātyavasanamasmai.”
Sāyaṇa- vyaktam
samgatam;
= accompanied with, (i.e.) adorned with, Griffith 'adorned with'.
Rv. X. 127.7 -
úpa mā pépiśattámaḥ krsnám vyaktamasthita, ūṣa ṛṇéva yātaya.
Sāyaṇa observes: vyaktam viseṣeņa svabhāsā sarvasyāñjakam spaṣṭarūpam vā; i.e. that which well anoints everything with its own light, or that which is clearly manifested.
SAHṚDAYALOKA "somaḥ vyaktaḥ vispastadhārāyuktaḥ yad vā
=
Griffith (that which) decks, (i.e. adorns); 'vyaktā' occurs at Rv. VII. 77.3 -, VIII. 56.4, and X. 86.5 -
Rv. VII. 77.3 - is,
“devắnām cắksuh subhágā váhanti śvetám náyanti sudrśikamáśvam,
-
usá adarsi raśmibhirvyaktā citrámaghā viśvamanu-prábhūtā.”
Sāyaṇa does not wait to explain 'vyaktā', but it means here, 'clearly, manifested'.
-
Griffith (that which) 'shines apparent' i.e. 'clearly shines'.
Rv. VIII. 56.6 - is,

"tátro ápi prāṇīyata pūtákratāyai vyaktā, áśvānā minná yūthyām.”
There is no Sāyaṇa-bhāṣya on this. We get Välakhilya-sūkta-bhāṣya which explains it as, 'vividham gantā, nānāpradeśeṣu pracalan.'
Rv. X. 86.5 - is
priyá taṣṭāni me kapirvyaktā vyadūduṣat,
śiro nvasya rāviṣam ná sugám duskṛte bhuvam viśvasmād indra uttaraḥ."
vyaktānyājyai.
Sāyaṇa explains as vyaktā viseṣeṇāktāni, i.e. well adorned;
=

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615 Griffith - vyakta = beauteous things, (i.e. well adorned).
vyaktāḥ - occurs at Rv. VII. 56.1, which is - ‘kā’ im vyaktā náraḥ sanīlā rudrásya máryā ádhā sváśvāḥ.”
Sāyaṇa - kāntiyuktāḥ, i.e. beautiful; 'lustrous', 'radiant'; Griffith - 'radiant. 'vyaktam' occurs at Rv. X. 85.21, which is - udīrsvátah pátvatī hye3şā viśvāvasum namasā girbhirīle, anyámiccha pitrsádam vyaktām sásáte bhāgó janúšā tásya viddhi.” Sāyaṇa explains as - vyaktām anūdheti parisgutām vigatāñjanām vā. i.e. 'clearly manifested'; or that whose añjana is removed. Griffith - 'fair' (i.e. beautiful). vyñjata - occurs at Rv. VIII. 7.25, which is - “vidyúdhastā abhi’dyavaḥ siprāḥ śīrşánhiranyáiḥ, s'ubhrá vyañjata s'riyé."
Sāyaṇa - vyañjata vyañjayanti, vyaktīkurvanti, dhārayantīty arthāḥ, i.e. - 'display'; 'bear';
Griffith - 'deck.
We have seen as many as thirteen occurrences in which we come across different forms of the root vi+vanj in the Rv. These thirteen occurrences from the Rv. bear the general sense of opening up something hidden and bringing it to light, embellishing, decorating, adorning and the like.
Thus we can say that the root vi+Vañj in the Rv. has these two connected meanings (i) revealing, (ii) adorning.
The Yajurveda has, 'vyaktah' at XIX. 87, and 'vyaktam' at XXXV. 1. Yv. XIX. 87 reads as - kumbhó vanisthúrjanitá śácībhiryásminnágre yónyam gárbho antáḥ, plas'i'rvyaktaḥ s'atádhāra útso duhé ná kumbhaí svadhám pitřbhyaḥ.”
Uvața explains, vyaktaḥ = spastaḥ, i.e. - clearly manifested or displayed; Mahīdhara has vyaktaḥ = spastaḥ.
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Yv. XXXV - 1, is - apetó yantu panayósumnā devapīyávah,
asyá lokáḥ sutávataḥ dyubhiráhobhiraktubhir vyaktám yamó dadārvavasánamasmai.”
The second half is almost identical with Rv. X. 14.9. b, and Uvața has vyaktam = spaștīkstam, clearly displayed, = manifested.
Mahīdhara also has a similar explanation. Sāmaveda (= SV.) has,
'vyañjate' at SV. I. 564, which is Rv. IX. 86.43, and ‘vyaktāḥ’, at Sv. I. 433, which is the same as Rv. VII. 56.1.
Atharvaveda (= AV.) has,
vyañjate' at Av. XVIII. 3.18 which is the same as Rv. IX 68.43; Whitney explains it as, 'they anoint out (vi); . 'vyajyate' - at Av. XIV. 1.26 = Rv. X 85.28 Whitney explains - it from the root vi+aj and not vi+añj.
‘vyaktam- occurs at Av. XVIII. 1.55, which is Rv. X. 14.9, and vyaktā at AV. XX - 126.5.
Thus we see that the Av. has here practically everything borrowed from the Rv.
The survey of the occurrences of the root vi+Vañi in the vedas shows two connected meanings: viz. to bring out something hidden by applying or enhancing something, to bringten, to embellish, to decorate, to adorn.
Thus putting together the result of our survey, we get - (i) to deck, to adorn, as in Rv. I. 64.4. (Sāyaṇa and Griffith), Rv. X. 14.9. (sāyaṇa and griffith) Av. XVIII. 1.55., Whitney. (i) to manitest clearly; display; cause to appear, as in Rv. I. 64.4 . (Sāyana), Rv. VII. 79.2. (Sāyaṇa), Rv. VII. 77.5 (Sāyana), Rv. IX. 77.7. (Sāyaṇa) & Griffith), Rv. X. 85.21 (Sāyana),

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617 Yv. XIX. 87 (Uvata & Mahīdhara), Yv. XXXV. 1, (Uvața & Mahīdhara), Rv. X. 14.9. (Sāyana) Av. XVIII. 1.55. (iii) to paint (i.e. to anoint), (Griffith) as in Rv. VII. 79.2; (iv) to balm (i.e. to anoint) (Griffith) Rv. IX. 86.43 SV. I. 564; (v) to anoint, as in Rv. IX. 86.43 (Sāyaṇa) Av. XVIII. 3.18 (Sāyana) and also whitney Rv. X. 86.5 (Sāyana). (vi) to shine forth; - Rv. VII. 77.3 (Griffith),
(vii) 'beautiful, (vyaktā), Griffith, as in Rv. X. 86.5, and also ‘kāntiyuktāh' according to Sāyana, at Ry. VII. 56.1.: 'radiant - Griffith; Rv. VII. 56.1. and also SV. I. 433 (Griffith) 'fair' - Rv. X. 55.21, (Griffith).
We may also note the occurrences of the root Vahvan or the word 'dhvani' in the vedas as under:
We come across, 'adhvanīt' - at Rv. VIII 6.13, 'adhvānayat' at Rv. VI. 18.10, dhvanayīt' at Rv. I. 162.15, and 'dhvani', 'dhvanayaḥ', at Av. V. 20.7. Rv. VIII. 6.13. is, “yádasya manyúrádhvanīd vivịtám parvasó ruján, apáḥ samudrám airayat.” Sāyaṇa - stanayitnulakṣaṇam śabdam akarot; Griffith - 'thundered'. Rv. VI. 18.10 is, agni'rna suskam vánamindra heti rakśo ni dhakṣayanaśánirná bhīmá, gambhīráya şşváyā yó rurójádhvānayad duritá dambháyaccha.” Sāyaṇa - yuddhe garjanalakṣaṇam sabdam karoti.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Rv. I. 162.15.
má tvāgni'rdhvanayiddhūmá gandhir Sāyaṇa - 'to make noise'. mókhā, etc. Griffith - 'make thee cracle'.
Av. V. 20.7 is antareme nabhasī ghoso astu prthak te dhvanayo santu sībham, = 'let there be noise; Whitney.
Thus the root Vahvan and the word 'dhyani' carry the sense of 'to make noise' and 'noise respectively.
The occurrences of the root vi+ Vañj in different forms might have proved to be a remote source of inspiration for the theory of 'vyañjanā' in times to come: first in the vaiyākaranas and other darśanas and then in the alamkāraśāstra.
Now, we will examine the occurrences of Vañi, and vit Vañi in the Nighantu and the Nirukta, (cir. 700 B.C. to. 300 B.C.), and then in Rk-prātiśākhya, Astādhyāvi of Panini (Cir. 300. B.C.), and the Mahābhāsya of Patañjali (Cir. 150. B.C.) (The last two sources are looked into earlier in this chapter but here we will once again look into the same to establish the correlation with our earlier observations) -
The Nighanțu has no word like 'vyañjana', nor any other form of the roots Vanj and vi+ Vañj.
The Nirukta - (Cir. 700 B.C. to 500 B.C.) :- In the Nirukta we come across certain occurrences of Vañj in different forms, wherein it seems to carry the sense of 'to anoint. We have thus, 'añjate' at Nirukta 12.7., and it is the same as Rv. I. 92.1.
añjan - at 3.20, (i.e. Rv. I. 92.5), añjanti - at 8.18 (i.e. Rv. III. 8.1).
and also, 'ankte', vyakte, vyaktatare (Ch. I); akṣiṇī ‘kasmāt, ankteḥ, ...etc. in the sense of 'clearly manifested'.
and also, 'anakti' at 8.10. Yāska explains - 'uşāsānaktā.'
He observes : ușă vyākhyātā. nakteti rātrīnāma; anakti bhūtānyavaśyāyena, api vā naktā avyaktavarņā, tayoreșá bhavati.
anakti = anoints,
avyaktavarņā = not of distinct colour; (i.e. having no clearly manifested colour).

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619 vi+Vañj is seen in the sense of 'manifestation'.
We have P.P. of vi+ Vañj, in vyaktavācah, at 11.29, in the sense of distinct speech. (vi+Vañj = to manifest clearly). We read - "devīm vācam ajanayanta devāḥ, tām sarvarūpāḥ paśavo vayanti. vyaktavācaścāvyaktavācaḥ ca.”
At 7.13, we come across the word 'vyañjanainātram' in the sense of 'mere indication? We read -
'iti imā devatā anukrāntāḥ-sūktabhājaḥ, havirbhājaḥ, rgbhājaśca, bhūyisthāḥ, kaścinnipātabhājāḥ, - atha uta abhidhānaiḥ samyujya haviścodayanti, indrāya vstraghne, indrāya amhomuce, iti. tāny api eke samāmananti, bhūyāmsi tu samāmnānāt, yattu samvijñānabhūtam syāt prādhānyastuti tat samāmane. - atha uta karmabhiḥrsih devatāḥ stauti vstrahā purandaraḥ iti. tāny apieke samamananti, bhūyāmsi tu samamnānāt. vyañjanamātram tu tat tasyabhidhanasya bhavati, yathā brāhmaṇāya bubhukṣitāya odanam dehi, snātāya anulepanam, pipāsate pānīyam, iti. (Nirukta 7.13).
Laxman Sarup (pp. 120) translates as -
"Moreover, a seer praises deities with regard to their activities, as (Indra) the vộtra-slayer, or the city-destroyer, and so on. Some make a list of these also, but they are too numerous to be collected together in a list. These epithets are mere indications of (a particular aspect of the proper) appellations, just as 'give food to a Brahmana, who is hungry, or unguents to one who has taken a bath, or water to one who is thirsty.” (Incidentally here we may also note efforts in the direction of abhidhana-kosa i.e. laxicons. And applying perfumes after a bath also may be noted from the point of view of a social scientist).
that the above is a very interesting occurrence. "Vyañjana' here
indicator'. This seems to be the earliest occurrence of 'vyañjana' in the sense of 'indication'. In a similar sense, we have noted earlier an occurrence, wherein we find another root viz. Vdyut. In Ch. I. Yāska cites the opinion of Gārgya who holds that upasargas are not meaningful by themselves, but they serve to suggest or indicate the relation of nāma and ākhyāta, with a special meaning. Gārgya observes : "na nirbaddhāḥ upasargāḥ arthān nirāhuḥ. nāmā”khyātayos tu karmopasamyoga-dyotakāḥ bhavanti.”
Thus, it seems, as already observed by us earlier, Yāska comes very near to the power of 'dyotana', or 'suggestion of words, though, he does not mention it by name. We know that in the kāvyaśāstra, the word 'dyotana' is used as an equivalent of vyañjana'. 'Vyañjana' in the sense of 'indication' in Yaska, as noted above, is also
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA an important occurrence of vi+ Vañj. We do not come across any occurrence of dhvan, or Vdhvani' in either the Nighantu or the Nirukta of Yāska.
We will now turn to the Rk-prātiśākhya, Aștādhyāyī of Pānini (Cir. 300 B.C.), and the Mahābhāșya of Patañjali (Cir. 150 B.C.), again to supplement our observations done in the earlier part of this chapter where we had sought help from some observations of Dr. Saroja Bhate. This is to supplement the same further.
In the Ķk-prātisakhya, it may be noted at the outset, we do not come across words such as vyañjanā, dhvani, etc. The word 'vyañjana', howover, in the technical sense of a 'consonant' occurs at several places. -
The Rk-prātiśākhya has. 'vyañjana' at - XVIII (patala) 32 (Sūtra;) (and, at sūtra 42, 43) vyañjanam - I. 5; 22; II. 8; VI. 14; vyañjanasya - XIV. 15; vyañjanāt - XIV. 47; XVIII. 44; vyañjanānām - XIV. 16; vyañjanāni - I. 6.23; IV.1; XVIII. 33; vyañjane - VII. 1. vyañjanena - III. 17; vyañjaneșu - VIII. 48; vyañjana-samgamam - XVIII. 40; vyañjana-sannipātaḥ - I. 37; vyañjanodayam - VII. 33; vyañjanodayāt - VI. 46. All these carry the sense of a 'consonant. In the Aştādhyāyī of Pāņini. (Cir. 300. B.C.) We get
vyañjana, occurs at II. i. 34; IV. iv. 26, and II. iv. 12. In the last two occurrences it is seen in the sense of a 'consonant'. At II. i. 34, we have, 'vyañjanair upasikte which is explained as - "dadhnā upasiktam dādhikam', - Anything that is used to enhance the relish of a principal object of eating is called a 'vyañjana', e.g. curd, in the case of rice.
Thus 'vyañjana' is that which serves to enhance the relish. We come across the same use of the term 'vyañjana', in the Nātya śāstra of Bharata wherein the Muni

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621 cites the analogy of șāļavādi-rasa (Ch. VI. Nā. śā). This can have an important bearing on the vyañjanāvāda of the ālamkārikas, wherein, vibhāva, anubhāva, etc., cause to enhance the sthāyin to the capacity of rasa.
It should also be mentioned that Pāṇini does not mention 'dhvani', nor does he refer to sphotavāda. He does mention one, "sphotāyana', without referring to the theory of sphota (Ref. Pā. VI. i. 121). We, also come across the word 'vyakta', meaning 'distinct', 'clear', - in the sūtra I. 3.48, e.g. - 'vyaktavācām samuccārane'. Also at I. ii. 51, we read, 'vyaktivacanah', and at VI. i. 123, we have 'avan sphotāyanasya'. These occurrences have no direct or indirect bearing on the theory of vyañjanā or dhvani. Some important references where Dr. Bhate has suggested that Pānini has directly touched vyañjanā, and we have called the same as "rudhavyañjanā”, have been noted earlier in this chapter. They form a bridge between grammar and sāhitya śāstra.
In the Mahābhāşya of Patañjali (Cir. 150. B.C.), - we come across many occurrences of different forms of the roots Vañj and vi+ Vañj, and also of the words vyañjana, sphoța etc. We have recorded earlier some of these that seem to have a direct bearing on the theory of vyañjanā of the alamkārikas. But we supplement our effort hear by citing some more references as under.
We find 'vyajyante' at Pā. VIII. i. 70, line 15, pp. 381. The reference reads as - ihápi tarhi mandrasādhanā kriyángā vyajyate. - The context is that in the illustration, “mandrair indra haribhir yāhi mayiruromabhiḥ” the word 'mandra' being not an indicative of 'gati' or 'action', does not get an anudārta svara. While discussing this particular illustration, the author says that here also, a particular action - kriyā - which has 'mandra' for its kāraka is suggested by the upasarga 'ān'. Thus we get 'vyajyate' in the sense of 'suggestion'.
We find 'vyajyante' at pā. I. 3.1 line 19-20, pp. 258; the author says that without 'kriyā' or 'action', the kālās such as bhūta, vartamāna, etc. are not suggesteda vi+Vañj occurs in the sense of 'suggestion' here. : “athavā nántarena kriyām bhūtabhavisyad-vartamānāh kālāh vyajyante" - and also, "astyādibhiścā'pi bhūta-bhavisyad-vartamānāḥ kālāḥ vyajyante”; at pā. I. iii. 1; 19, 20/258 also carries the sense of suggestion.
Again at Pā. III, i. 67 14/57 we read · "tinabhihitena bhāvena kālapurusopagrahā abhivyajyante krd-abhihitena punar na vyajyante." We have 'vyajyante in the sense of 'suggestion'. The author says that the meaning of 'bhāva' or 'action' is suggested by both 'tin' and 'krdanta'. But there is some difference in

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA these two. Whatever is suggested by krd-anta is in the form of a 'dravya', while by 'tin', kāla, purusa and upagraha (i.e. parasmai or ātmane), are suggested.
Moreover, at Pā. VIII. ii. 48; 23/23/408, we have, "añjer añjanam; añjanam ca prakāśanam; tathā añjer vyañjanam, vyañjanam ca prakāśanam. The context is that when Vañj is in the sense of 'prakāśana', we do not change 'ta' into ‘na', in case of a P.P.P. Thus, we get Vañj in the sense of 'prakāśana’. Later on he says that Vaño is also seen in the same sense - "añcitah gacchati” - means, “prakaśayati ātmānam iti gamyate.” In our popular usage, ‘añcitaḥ gacchati' means, “being alert he goes”, i.e. 'samāhito bhūtvā gacchati'. The author here uses terms such as, 'iti gamyate', and this usage brings us very close to the vyañjanā-vāda.
Thus we see that Vañj, Vañc, and vi+ Vañj are all used in the sense of ‘prakāśana' i.e. 'manifestation', or revealing, or bringing something into light, or displaying something etc.
Vyañjana' occurs normally in its technical sense of a consonant, but at Pā. VIII. ii. 48; 24/24/408, however, we get it in the sense of 'prakāśana', as noted above. Thus, Vañj and vi+Vañj, seem to occur in the same senses as in the earlier literature. Vi+Vañj in the sense of suggestion is also noted as at Mbh. VIII. i. 70; 15/381; or Mbh. I. iii. 1; 19/20/258, etc., as noted above.
This ends our investigation in the fields of grammar and philosophic literature of the ancient times, to find the roots of the theory of wañiana-dhvani-of the alamkārikas and the results are positive. The thought-current of vyañjanā-dhvani was very much present even in the earliest vedic literature also, and even a theory of vyañjanā is clearly traced in early grammatical and philosophical literature and we are happy to note that Anandavardhana is very right when he observes that dhvani' was 'samāmnāta-purvah'.
We will now try to trace the germs of vyañjanā-dhvani even in the works of earlier literary masters such as Bhāsa (Cir. 300 A.D.), Aśvaghosa (Cir. 100 A.D.) and Kālidāsa (Cir. 400 A.D. - if not 1st cen B.C.) Our investigation in the works of these literary artists is motivated by the fact that it is always great literature which gives birth to great literary cannons and it is great criticism which in its turn influences the shaping of literature that follows. So, perhaps the works of these poets might have an indirect influence in the shaping of literary criticism. That Bhāsa was a name to remember with respect even for Kālidāsa is clear from the latter's reference to Bhāsa in his Malavikāgnimitram. It is one thing whether the so called Trivendrum plays are from this same Bhāsa or not, and frankly speaking

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623 after reading more and more from our learned friend Dr. N. P. Unni, our faith concerning Bhāsa's authorship of all the thirteen Trivendrum plays has disappeared, but we have quoted here some passages from plays concerning which our faith has not completely evaporated
As noted earlier, we have traced the earlier occurrences of the words connected with vyañjanā-dhvani-theory in the vedic literature. We do not claim that the vedic poets had a conscious recognition of this theory in their minds. But we do find germs of this theory in their use of certain terms. This is enough to trace something. We also tried to link ancient grammatical and philosophical thinking with this theory and the findings were more positive and encouraging. Now we turn to ancient classical literature as represented in the works of earlier poets such as Bhāsa, Aśuaghosa and Kalidāsa. Perhaps we will tred on more solid grounds in our efforts to trace the origin of the thought-current of vyañjanā-dhvani. That Kālidāsa clearly mentions in his Vikramorvasiya, a Bharata who staged a play with eight rasas and instructed the divine damsels in its performance, clearly suggests that even before Kālidāsa there was literature concerning literary aesthetics. He observes : “muninā bharatena yah prayogah, bhavatīsv asta rasāśrayo niyuktah...” etc. This
not necessarily mean that Kālidāsa refers to whatever is available as 'nātyaśāstra' of Bharata, to-day. It may or it may not be. But one thing is certain that literature and literary or art-criticism influence each other in turn and make. for advancement in either. So, our effort to find traces of vyañjan.-dhvani theory in the works of the earlier poets is thus certainly justified. It may be noted that as for Bharata's Nātya-śāstra as now available, and its connection with vyañjanāvāda, we will have a separate detailed discussion at a suitable place later, when we wil discuss the origin and development of the concept of “rasa”. For the present we will keep off from Bharata's Nātya-śāstra as is available to us in its present form.
That criticism follows literature does not require proof. That practice precedes theory and is in turn guided by theory is well proved in the history of literature and art, world over. So, before we proceed with Bharata or Bhāmaha, let us take note of the usage of vyañjanā, rasa, etc. in earlier classical literature, be it, please note, either conscious or even unconscious. For the present we begin with Bhāsa, who is mentioned by Kālidāsa, and here too with some of his so called plays that are included in the thirteen Trivendrum plays.
Bhāsa - In the so called thirteen Trivendrum plays ascribed to Bhāsa, we come across words like, 'vyaktam', 'vyaktih', 'su-vyaktam', 'vyaktīkrtam', etc. in the sense of 'clearly manifested'. We also come across terms such as, 'sūcayati',

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ‘sūcayitavyaḥ, 'sūcayanti', etc. in the sense of 'indicating' or 'suggesting'. As noted earlier we have no absolute faith in the authenticity of all these plays, and even when we choose to accept some from Bhāsa's pen, following Dr. Unni's observations, we have reservations about their present form; i.e. we feel that even the so called authentic or near-authentic plays are stage-adaptations and are not in their original form as drafted by Bhāsa. However, as a prima facie view, we go along with these plays as Bhāsa's creations.
To begin with, in the Svapnavāsavadattam, we have the following: sarpavyakti-at Svapna. V & vyaktam - svapna V. 7; VI 14,
In the Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa, we have 'vyaktam' atmahite kşamam' - (Act. I, Introduction); and also -
Yau. - "vyaktikstam a-sāmarthyam..." etc. and, "vyaktam balam...” etc. Then, kāñcukīyaḥ - 'suvyaktam...' (Act. II) rāja - vyaktam... (Act II). & yau. - "vyaktam bharatarohako..." etc. (Act. IV) The Avimāraka has - kauñjāyanaḥ - vyakta-hima-mūrtiḥ... etc. (Act. I) Avimārakaḥ - vyaktam svayam viņām vādayati - (Act. III). The Cārudatta has - Nāyakaḥ - sarvathā suvyaktam gītam (Act. III) and also, - Sajjalakaḥ - dīpa-prabhā-vyaktīkstam drśyate (Act. III) - The Pratimānāțaka has - Rāmaḥ - "suvyaktam prabhavāmīti...” etc. (Act. I. 11)
and also, Bharataḥ - “bahumāna-vyākṣiptenamanasā suvyaktam návadhāritam... (Act. III).
The Abhișekanāțaka has - Angadaḥ - "vyaktam utsrjya deham”, etc. (II. 25); and also, Rāvaṇaḥ - "vyaktam indrajitā...” (V. 10) and also, “Rāmaḥ - vyaktam daiva-gatim... etc. (VI. 34)
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625 The Dūtavākya has - Duryodhanaḥ-suvyaktam prāpta eva keśavaḥ. and also, sudarśanaḥ-avyaktādir acintyātmā etc. The Dūta-ghatotkaca has - Dhstarāștraḥ - 'suvyaktam nihatam'. etc. I. 26 and, 'suvyaktam dhanuși...' I. 28. The Pañcarātra has - Bhīşmaḥ - "suvyaktam bāhuśālinaḥ..." I. 50, and also, Bịhannalā - 'yena suvyakta-kārinā...' II. 65 The Madhyama has - Bhīmaḥ - suvyaktam rākṣasījo... I. 26, The Urubhanga has -
trtīyaḥ-vyaktīkrtā dinakarograkaraiḥ... and also, Aśvatthāmā. – vyaktam norjita eva. I. 21 (I. 58d)
The Bālacarita has - vasudevaḥ - vyaktam ghosa-samīpe... etc. However, the most noteworthy passages are as follows:
In the second act of Avimāraka, the prince is sitting all alone, lost in the thoughts of Kurangi. Meanwhile, two maid servants of Kurangī arrive there with some message. The dialogue proceeds as follows -
Dhātrī - ārya ! kim cintyate ?
Avimārakaḥ - Bhavati, śāstram cintyate. Dhā. - kim nāmaitad śāstram vivikte chintyate ?
Avi. - Bhavati ! yogaśāstram cintyate.
Dhā. - (sa-smitam) - pratigrhītam mangala-vacanam. yoga-śāstram eva bhavatu.
Avi. - (ātmagatam) - ko nu khalu vākyārthaḥ ? anyad apy abhilāşavaśād anyathā samkalpayāmi ! (prakāśam) - kim abhipretam bhavatyāḥ ?
Dhā. - yogam icchantyāv āgate svaḥ. anumata āryeņa yogaḥ, iti nanu nisthitam kāryam asmākam rājakule vivikta avakāśe. tatrāpi kópi jano'dhikataram yogam cintayann asti. tena saha tatraiva äryeņa sustha yogavidhānam cintyatām iti.
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This passage leaves no doubt that the author is not only conversant with the abhipreta' artha, or implied sense, but also seems to be conversant with the verbal function of vyañjanā. Of course, Prof. Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi will argue here in favour of kāvyánumiti. - In the Cārudatta, act II, we have the following dialogue :
Ganikā - samvāhaka āryaḥ. sukumārā kalā śikṣitā āryeņa. Samvāhakaḥ - kaleti śikṣitā. ājīvikā idānīm samvịttā. Ganikā - nirveda-sūcakam iva vacanam āryasya; tatas tatah ! Thus a sentence becomes sūcaka - suggestor of a 'bhāva' called 'nirveda'.
Again, in the act III we have - Brāhmani - ha dhik ! (niskrāntā). vidūsakah - eșā vācā duḥkham rakṣitvā aśrubhiḥ sūcayitvā gatā. bhoh, idam! .
Here also tears - aśru - an anubhāva, become suggestive of the feeling of unspoken grief.
Again, in the act I, we have-Gaņikā - (prāvārakam gļhītvā sa-harşam) - "an-udāsīnam yauvanam asya patavāsa-gandhaḥ sūcayati.”
The fragrance is said to reveal that his youth is 'an-udāsīna' i.e. not indifferent to the joys of life. Though of course, we may be prompted to consider here a rasadosa where we have 'vyangyasya kathanam' i.e. where the suggested sense is almost given away by a plain statement. Or, we may read 'anumiti' here.
In the Pratimānātaka, act V, we have Rāmah - ... 'aye imani khalu pratyagrābhișiktāni vřksa-mülāni, adurgatām maithilīm sūcayanti. tathā hi... etc.
Here, one fact, viz. that Sītā has not moved away much farther, is said to be suggested by yet another fact viz. that the roots of trees that are seen to be recently sprinkled. But here again, we may read the process of reasoning or inference on
of the hero. The word 'dhvani' occurs in the usual sense of 'sound' only. We may now turn to Aśvaghosa.
Asvaghosa (Cir. 100 A.D.) : It may be observed that the Saundarananda has vi+ Vañj at II. 38; XIII 41; and XVIII. 11; and the Buddhacarita has vi+ Vañj at IV. 58; IV. 84; IX. 64; XII. 18; XII. 22; XII. 40; XVI. 73; and XVI. 130; and 'dhvani' at IV. 51; V. 80; VIII. 72.
Buddha-carita IX. 64, XII. 18, XII. 22; and XII. 40 have 'vyakta' and 'a-vyakta' having a philosophical connotation of the manifest' and 'the unmanifest'. Saundarananda II. 38 and XIII. 41 have vi+ Vañj in the sense of 'to indicate', 'to manifest clearly. Buddha-Carita XVI 130 has vi+ Vañj in the sense of 'to the letter i.e. clearly as opposed to 'artha' or 'spirit'.

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627 Saundarananda XVIII. 11 reads as -
“maitri-stanīm vyañjana-cāru-sāsnām saddharma-dugdhām pratibhāna-śộngām, tavásmi gām sādhu nipīya tịptaḥ
trseva gām uttama-vatsa tịptah.” Here, the word 'vyañjana', is in the sense of alamkāra or a source of decor as perhaps in the Nātya-śāstra where Bharata describes a recipi rich by 'vyañjana' sprinkled on the same.
At Buddha-carita XVI. 73, we have 'vyañjana' in the same sense. It reads as - "sarva-klesábhividdhānām kleśa-salya-samuddharaḥ, sarva-laksaņa-sampannaḥ sarva-vyañjana-manditaḥ.”
Vi+Vañs in the sense of 'to manifest clearly' or 'to suggest occurs at Buddhacarita IV. 84.
"upapannam idam vākyam sauhārda-vyañjakam tvayi. atra ca tvā’numesyāmi yatra mā dusthu manyase.”
Here again, a 'vākya' is said to be 'sauhārda-vyañjakam', i.e. suggestive of friendship. The sentence i.e. a group of words, suggests the bhāva of 'sauhārda'. It may be noted that this passage is specially interesting and useful from the point of view of our investigation.
The occurrence of the word 'vyañjana' meaning embellishment is also noteworthy in the passages quoted as above. We know that in Vamana the term ‘alamkāra' has two senses viz. (i) that of 'saundarya' i.e. beauty in general and (ii) that of a figure of speech. It is not unlikely that the word vyañjana had also a sense similar to alamkāra or a beautifying agent and also the sense of suggestion. The first sense of alamkāra seems to have gone out of usage but the second sense seems to have prevailed in later poetics.
We also come across some occurrences of 'dhvani' in the sense of 'sound' only in the present sources. This can not have any bearing on the theory of vyañjanā-dhvani.
Kālidāsa : (Cir. 400 A.D.) -
In Kalidāsa, we come across vi+Vañj in its different grammatical forms as seen below :
Kumāra. II. 11, V. 62; VI. 23; VI. 51; VII. 91; VIII. 37; VIII. 71; and IX. 6;

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Meghadūta has - vi+Vañj at VS. 12; 29; & 55 (pūrva-megha.) and at 21 (uttaramedha).
Raghu. - I 10; IV. 68; V. 16; VI. 12; VII. 58; XI. 41; XIII. 12; XIV. 26; XVI. 23; XVII. 40; XIX. 30; XIX. 41.
Vi+Vañj seems to occur in the sense of 'to manifest. In the Abhi. śā. somewhere in act V and at VII. 8; VII. 17 we read vi+Vañj. Vahvan or 'dhvani' occurs at ķtusamhāra - V. 10 (prāvrd-varṇanam), V. 15 (prāvrd-varṇanam) & V. 21 (prāvrd-varṇanam) Kumāra sambhava - I. 56; VIII. 24; VIII. 71; XI. 36; 38; XIV. 27, 39, 45. Meghadūta (pūrva) VS. 42, 56 & (Uttara) VS. 3, 36. Raghuvamsa - II. 72; IV. 73; VI. 56, VII. 41, and XVI. 13. We will discuss some noteworthy occurences :
All the occurrences of vi+Vañj in the Kumāra. except at II. 11, are in the sense of 'to manifest', 'to display', 'to bring to light', etc. At II. 11, we have 'vyakta' and 'vyaktetara' having the philosophical connotation of 'the manifest' and the 'unmanifest'. But, Kumāra VII. 91 is more interesting. It reads as -
"tau sandhișu vyañjita-vrtti-bhedam
rasántaresu pratibaddha-rāgam, apaśyatām apsarasām muhūrtam
prayogam ādyam lalitángahāram.” Here, we have 'vyañjita' in the sense of 'manifested', 'revealed', 'suggested. There is also mentioning of (pañca) samdhis, vịttis and rasas. This suggests an advanced stage of literary and dramatic criticism.
In the Megha. (pūrva) V. 12, we have 'sneha-vyakti' i.e. suggestion or manifestation of love : “snehavyaktiś ciravirahajām”. Megha. 29 (purva) is very interesting and it reads as -
"venībhūta-pratanu-salilá-sāvatītasya sindhohpānducchāyā tataruhataru-bhramsibhirjīrņa-parṇaḥ, saubhāgyamte subhaga virahāvasthayā vyañjayanti kārśyam yena tyajati vidhinā sa tvayaivópapādyah.”
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629 That the nāyaka-nāvikā-bhāva is suggested here is clear. Mallinátha exp fully. vyañjayantī is explained as 'prakāśayantī, i.e. 'suggesting'. The river Nirvindhyā is said to suggest, by her condition in separation, the good fortune of the cloud, the lover. This is, an instance of vipralambhaśrngāra and could well have an important bearing on the theory of vyañjanā in sāhitya-śāstra, wherein something else is suggested with the help of something else.
In the Raghu. also, very often, vi+Vañj in various grammatical forms appears in the sense of manifestation. But Raghu. XIII. 12 and XIV. 26 are more interesting. They read as below : Raghu. XIII. 12 -
"velānilāya prasștā bhujangā vahormi-visphūrjathu-nirviśesāḥ, sūryāmśa-samparka-samțddha-rāgair
vyajyanta ete manibhiḥ phanasthaih.” Mallinātha explains 'vyajyante' as 'unmīyante'; i.e. ‘are suggested'. Raghu. XIV. 26 reads as -
athádhika-snigdha-vilocanena mukhena sītā śarapāndureņa, ānandayitrī parimeturāsīd
anaksara-vyañjita-dohadena." "anaksara-vyañjita” is explained by Mallinātha as "avāg-vyāpāram yathā bhavati tathā vyañjitam.” This is a clear reference to vyañjanā.
In all the three plays, vi+Vañj seems to carry the sense of 'to manifest'.
Thus we have observed that in Bhāsa, Ašvaghosa and Kalidāsa, we come across certain occurrences of vi+ Vañj in the sense of 'to suggest', that might have paved the way to the formation of the theory of vyañjanā in sanskrit poetics, or if it was already formed and not recorded in any known document, it is adhered to by these ancient literary masters.
We will now pick up the known available documents beginning with the Dhyanyāloka and the Locana on the same. We will also take the opportunity to discuss the views of Agnipurana later in this chapter and we are of the firm opinion that this purana was later than Bhoja as the rasa-dhvani thinking in the alamkāra portion of this purana is clearly under Bhoja's influence.

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SAHŞDAYĀLOKA It may be noted that Anandavardhana, a great protegonist of the vyañjanādhvani-rasa theory, does not attempt to define either vyañjanā or rasa in his Dhvanyāloka, but the whole of his work is permeated by discussion of vyañjanā or the power of suggestion, and vyangyártha or the suggested sense, termed dhvani when adjudged to be the principal source of charm in poetry and such poetry is also termed dhvani-kāvya.
Prof. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy writes (pp. XXVIII - Introduction to his Dhv. Edn. *74, Dharwar): "Anandavardhana is the first writer in Indian poetics to attempt an enquiry into semantics. As a preliminary to his exposition of the essence of poetry, he distinguishes between the two well-known usages of language, viz. use of language outside poetry on the one hand and the unique usage exclusive to poetry on the other. The first referential usage is a gift of convention and is well within the reach of everyone who knows the language. The second is the indirect use of language wherein the meaning may be either metaphorical or implicit. Anandavardhana notes that meaning at this second level too is not very far from the first or conventional level. The first level of meaning is characterised as vācyártha and the second as bhākta. Poetry too starts from these two levels of meaning only. But it does not stop there as in common parlance or scientific discourse. It uses them as a jumping-off ground to convey an enirely new meaning which is different not only in degree but often in kind also. This third meaning which is unique and exclusive to poetry is alone characterised as the essence of poetry. And it has its parallels in fine arts like music.
Combining in himself the triple rare attainments of poetic genius, impeccable scholarship, and immaculate literary taste, Anandavardhana succeeded not only in laying his finger on 'rasa' as the soul of poetry, but also in offering a scientific explanation of it as Dhvani. The theory was so formulated that it could assimilate the essence of all the traditional aesthetic categories while emphasising the claims of rasa."
Anandavardhana begins his exposition with a solemn declaration that 'dhvani' - or suggestion is the soul of poetry though of course he admits the opposition to this theory. For this reason he wants to define and explain the same elaborately This he does in the course of the whole of his work. But he begins modestly. He observes : "tatra dhvaner eva laksayitum ārabdhasya bhūmikām racayitum idam ucyate - "yórthah sahrdayaślāghyah..." etc. Dhv. I. 2. He observes that, the following is meant to serve as a ground work for the theory of suggestion which has been taken up for detailed study.
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That meaning which wins the admiration of refined critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The 'explicit' and the 'implicit' are regarded as its two aspects." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 7, ibid).
Anandavardhana is very clear that poetic meaning, which is charming and is admired by men of taste is both the expressed i.e. vācya and the implicit i.e. pratīyamāna. It may be noted very carefully that Ananda does not rule out the charm at the expressed level. On the otherhand it seems to be his humble opinion that whatever is poetry's area has got to be charming, be it the level of the expressed only. He does not rule out the charm of expression in poetry, though of course his preference lies with the un-expressed or the implicit meaning. Poetry has to be charming, whatever the level be. But he has a bias towards the unexpressed - the implicit the pratīyamāna. He observes - (Dhv. I. iv): "pratīyamānam punar anyad eva..." etc. "But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of firstrate poets it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of the striking external constituents even as charm in ladies." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 7, ibid). Anandavardhana then explains how the expressed and the implicit differ in nature with a number of poetic illustrations. The implicit which is three-fold appears as bare statement or idea, of course basically poetic, i.e. vastu, figures of speech or turns of expression i.e. alamkāras, and as rasă"di or emotive stuff, or, aesthetic delight in general-this third variety is available only at the suggested level. This actually is more basic than the the other two varieties of implicit sense. This is seen illustrated in the Rāmāyaṇa of Valmiki. This implicit sense is not within the grasp of only those who have excelled in the science of grammar but is felt only by those who are conversant with the essence of poetry, the true significance of poetry.
Anandavardhana then i.e. after establishing the existence of the implicit sense as distinct from the expressed, demonstrates the over-riding superiority of that implicit meaning over the expressed. He observes that the prime activity of a firstrate poet should be directed in scrutinising that meaning, i.e. the implicit sense, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it "yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau tau śabdárthau mahākaveḥ." (Dhv. I. 8b).
Without defining or even attempting to define vyañjanā or the suggestive power that yields the implicit sense, he again glorifies the importance of the power of expression of a poetic word. Thus he refers to both vyañjana and abhidha in the same breath. He observes: "alokárthī yathā dīpa-śikhāyām yatnavāñjanaḥ, tadupāyatayā, tad vad arthe vācye tad-ādṛtaḥ." (Dhv. I. 9) - "Just as a man interested in perceiving objects (in the dark) directs his efforts towards securing a lamp since

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it is a means to realise his end, so also does one who is ultimately interested in the suggested meaning proceed by first evincing interest in the conventional meaning." (Trans. K.Kris. PP. 17, ibid)
He establishes that vacyártha i.e. the conventioned expressed sense collected at the level of abhidha, being instrumental in arriving at the implicit sense, resulting from the operation of the suggestive power i.e. vyañjanā, is equally important for both the poet pratipādaka kavi, and also the reader i.e. pratipādya. True, vācyavācaka-bhāva, i.e. abhidhā is basic to poetry and even a poet having his ultimate interest in suggestion, has to pay respect to it, but the ultimate goal for a first-rate poet is suggested sense according to Anandavardhana. Or, we may say Anandavardhana's criticism has a bias for the suggested sense and suggestivity of poetic words. This perhaps was not wholly acceptable to Kuntaka, and there were others in Mahima and Dhanika who rose against the theory of vyañjanā. This we will see later. But Anandavardhana with this introduction proceeds to define what he calls 'Dhvani' or principal suggested sense and also 'Dhvani kavya', or variety of poetry with the charm of suggested sense principally. He gives a definition at Dhv. I. 13. which covers both 'dhvani' and 'dhvani-kāvya' alike, though with all his tilt towards this suggestion-oriented-criticism, he never shows enthusiasm to brand 'Dhvanikavya' as 'uttama' as done by Mammata and the rest. He proceeds to discuss this variety of poetry throughout the course of his second chapter and right upto Dhv. III. 33, wherein he successfully assimilates, or better say shows the culmination or merger of all other prevailing thought-currents into his all-pervasive theory of dhvani. The essence, for him, of great poetry, is rasa-dhvani and all other factors subserve this prime object of delineation of rasa i.e. aesthetic pleasure in poetry. Even the expressed sense and the expressive word (vācya-vācaka) has to be an instrument in the suggestion of rasa. Actually he declares that, the main task of a great poet is the proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of rasa-realisation which is necessarily experienced at the level of suggestivity and never at the level of expression or abhidha. He observes:
-

"vācyānām vācakānām ca yad aucityena yojanam, rasā"diviṣayeṇaitat
karma mukhyam mahākaveḥ." (Dhv. I. 32)
He observes: "The main business of a first-rate poet is none other than the proper marshalling of both contents, i.e. plots, and expressions used in setting them

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633 forth, in the direction of sentiments etc. In other words the main function of the poet lies only in making one sentiment principal throughout the poem and in employing both words and senses only in such a way that the sentiment is suggested clearly.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 189, ibid)
He proceeds to suggest that this course is observed even by Bharata when he talked of vrttis i.e. modes. Ānandavardhana here meets with some objections. Before proceeding to consider this, he establishes that between 'rasádi' (vyangya/ dhvani) and plots - itivrttā"di - etc. in poetry, there is jīva-śarīra-vyavahāra i.e. lifebody relation and not guna-guni-vyavahāra or the relation of quality-substance. He rejects the plea that rasā”dis may be taken as some speciality such as preciousness in diamonds discernible only to experts. He says that in this case, there will be another difficulty. For, if it were correct, just as the preciousness in diamonds of quality as not being different from the very nature of their being diamonds, so also rasádis would have to be discerned as not being different from the nature of the expressed situations, emotional responses, etc. But it is not so. No one gets the idea that the setting, the emotional responses and passing moods are themselves rasā"dis. The apprehension of the setting, etc. is only an invariable condition of all apprehension of rasā”dis etc. So, we may imagine a cause-effect relation to exist between these two apprehensions. So, there is bound to be some temporal sequentiality also between the two. But this sequentiality is not perceptible as it is very minute. Thus, observes Anandavardhana, that it is mentioned that rasādis are suggested only through undiscerned sequentiality : "ata eva ca vibhāvā"di-pratītyavinābhāvini rasā"dīnam pratitir iti tat-pratītyoh kārya-kārana-bhāvena vyavasthānāt kramovasyambhāvī. sa tu lāghavān na prakāśata iti "alaksyakramā eva santo vyangyā rasā"dayah" iti uktam. Dhv. Vrtti. III. 33. He establishes this point forcefully and suggests that even in musical notes, the sequence, though not noticed, still remains between the hearing of notes and experiencing of various feelings. He observes :"yesam api svarupa-pratiti-nimittam vyañjakatvam yatha
teşām api svarūpapratiter vyangya-pratiteś ca niyamabhāvi kramah. tat tu sabdasya kriyā-paurvāparyam ananya-sādhya-tat-phala-ghatanāsv āśubhāvinīsu vācyena avirodhini abhidheyántara-vilaksaņe, rasā"dau na pratīyate. kvacit tu lakṣayate eva, yathā anuranana-rūpa-vyangya-pratītiņu.” (Vștti, Dhv. III. 33) - “But even there we do have, invariably, temporal sequentiality between the apprehension of the nature of sounds and the apprehension of suggested sentiments. But this temporal sequentiality in the two functions of sounds cannot be noticed when sentiments are suggested; because sentiments are neither opposed

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to the expressed sense nor appear as similar to the other senses; they are not capable of being conveyed by aught else and all their accessories work together with lightening quickness.
But in some contexts, the sequentiality is noticeable also; instances where we find apprehension of resonance-like suggestion may be cited as examples.". (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 193-5, ibid)
This sequence is noticeable even in the variety of dhvani called 'a-vivakṣitavācya' or wherein the expressed sense is not intended.
Thus, for Anandavardhana there is a sequence between the expressed and the suggested sense in all varieties of dhvani.
Now Anandavardhana tackles the mahā-pūrva-pakṣa i.e. the main objection against suggestivity. It is here that we can underline his concept of vyañjanā, though of course, no definition is attempted even here. The objection reads as follows.
- tad evam vyañjaka-mukhena dhvani-prakāreṣu nirupiteṣu kaścid bruyat-kim idam vyañjakatvam nama ? vyangyártha-prakāśanam hi vyañjakatvam. tad vyañjakatvam cárthasya vyañjaka-siddhy adhinam; vyangyápekṣaya ca vyañjakatvasiddhiḥ iti samśrayād a-vyavasthānam. nanu vācya-vyatiriktasya vyañjakatvasya siddhiḥ prāg eva pratipāditā, tat siddhy adhīnā ca vyañjakatva-siddhir iti kaḥ paryanuyogāvasaraḥ ?
satyam eva etat; prāg ukta-yuktibhir vācya-vyatiriktasya vastunaḥ siddhiḥ kṛtā; satv artho vyangyatayaiva kasmād vyapadiśyate ? yatra ca pradhanyena avasthanam tatra vācyatayā eva asau vyapadestum yuktaḥ. tatparatvāt vākyasya. ataś ca tatprakāśino vākyasya vācakatvam eva vyāpāraḥ. kim tasya vyāpārántarakalpanayā ?
tasmāt tātparya-viṣayo yórthaḥ sa tavan mukhyatayā vācyaḥ. yā tv antarā tathāvidhe viṣaye vācyántarapratītiḥ sā tatpratīter upāyamātram padártha-pratitir vākyártha-pratīteḥ." (Vṛtti., Dhv. III. 33. pp. 196-198, Edn. K. Kris., ibid), (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 197, ibid)
"Some might object as follows to our procedure of dividing suggestion into various kinds from the stand-point of suggestiveness - "what is this suggestiveness? The power of conveying the implied sense need not be designated by the name "suggestiveness" at all. The existence of the suggested sense is dependent upon the existence of the suggestive word, so also the existence of the suggestive word is dependent upon the existence of the suggested sense. As the definition thus moves in a vicious circle, nothing definite will have been established about either."

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635 We would put them a counter-question : When we have already established the existence of suggested sense as distinct from the expressed (by other arguments), what scope for objection is there if suggestiveness were made to follow from the existence of the suggested ?
The objector might argue as follows: 'It is true that the existence of the suggested sense as distinct from the expressed has been established by arguments already given. But why should that sense be called by the name “suggested” alone? It is right that we should designate it as 'expressed' itself, wherever it happens to be primarily important, since it is primarily intended to be conveyed by the sentence as a whole. Thus the sentence which conveys that sense has only one function and that is denotation. What is the use of attributing a new function to it ? Thus the sense which happens to be the main purport of a sentence can only be primarily "expressed”. Apprehension of other senses from the sentence prior to the apprehension of word-meaning is only a means to the knowledge of sentence. purport."
Now onwards Ānandavardhana clearly and logically establishes the difference between abhidhā and vyañjana, between laksanā and vyañjanā, the inevitableness of accepting vyañjanā even for the Mimāmsakas and also the Naiyāyikas by exposition of the nature and scope of vyañjanā. He begins with abhidhā.
Abhidhā and vyañjanā are not identical. The nature and scope of either are different. Anandavardhana continues as follows. He says, let us first take an
nere a word conveys another meaning after having conveyed its primary meaning i.e. vācyártha, earlier. Anandavardhana asks if there is any difference or no difference between the two functions of the word, viz. the denotation of primary meaning and the implication of another sense. The view that there is no difference between the two is simply not acceptable; for says he - "yasmāt tau vyāpārau bhinnavisayau bhinna-rūpau ca pratiyete eva" - i.e. the two functions clearly depict a difference between them from the point of view of both nature and scope. To illustrate - the scope of the function of denotation in a word is confined to its primary sense, while the scope of the function of implication includes a sense other than the primary sense : tathā hi vācakarva-laksaņo vyāpāraḥ śabdasya svārtha-visayah, gamakatva-laksanastv arthántara-visayah”, - It is not possible to deny that the expressed sense is 'its own' sense of a word, while the implied sense is, 'one belonging to another.' - na ca sva-para-vyav vyangyayor apahnotum śakyah, ekasya sambandhitvena pratipatteḥ, aparasya sambandhi-sambandhitvena.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33. pp. 198. Edn. K. Kris.),

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Anandavardhana further says that it is not possible to deny that the expressed is 'its own' sense of a word, while the implied is 'one belonging to another.' The apprehension of the implied will be remotely related to the word through the medium of the expressed sense. While the vācyártha or the expressed sense is directly related to the word, the implied sense is related to that which in its turn is related to the word since it is implied by the power of the expressed sense. If the implied sense too were directly related to the word, then there would be no need at all for referring to it as another sense. - "yadi ca sva-sambandhitvam sākšād tasya syāt tadā arthántaratva-vyavahāra eva na syāt.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, ibid; p. 198). Thus the difference in scope between the two functions is clear
Anandavardhana says that : "rūpabhedópi prasiddha eva” - i.e. their difference in nature too is obvious. The function of denotation itself cannot be the same as the function of implication since we find suggestiveness of sentiments etc. even in words of music. It is well known too that gestures etc., which are not even sounds, possess the function of suggesting specific ideas. In the illustration viz. : vridãyogan nata-vadanayā etc. i.e. 'with her face bent down', etc., the specific gesture (of sideglance) of the heroine has been described by the great poet in a way suggestive of
que charm. Since the scope and natures of the two functions are thus quite different, it is clear that the denotative function of words and the implying function of words are quite different from each other - "tasmāt bhinnavisayatvāt bhinnarūparvāc ca svārthábhidhāyitvam arthántarávagamahetutvam ca śabdasya yat. tayoh spasta eva bhedah.” (vrtti, pp. 198, ibid) -
višeșaś cen na tarhi idānīm avagamanasya abhidheya-sāmarthyā”kṣiptasya arthántarasya vācyatva-vyapadeśyatā. (vrtti, ibid, p. 198) - "When the separate individuality of the two functions is accepted, it will not be possible to give designation of “the expressed”, to that other meaning which is only implied by the power of the expressed sense." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 200, 201, ibid) Anandavardhana however accepts, and this is very important assertion, that the
sense too comes within the powers of words. - 'śabda-vyāpăra-gocaratvam tu tasya asmābhir isyata eva” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33. pp. 200, ibid). "tat tu vyangyatvena na vācyatvena". This clear acceptance of vyañjanā is a signal to the opponents of vyañjanā, especially the logicians who subsume all sense other than the expressed under inference, yes, poetic inference. But Anandavardhana says in clear terms that - "prasiddhábhidhānántara-sambandhayogyatvena ca tasyárthántarasya pratīteḥ śabdántareņa svārthābhidhāyin, yad visayīkaranam tatra prakāśanoktir eva yuktā.” - "If a word which is capable of denoting only its primary meaning

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Vyañjana' directly, is also seen actually conveying another meaning, directly denoted not by this word but by some other word only, then we would be right in regarding it as an instance of suggestiveness of word.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 201, ibid).
Thus if the word 'gangā which has its power of expression limited to convey to the sense of the stream of the gangā only, conveys the sense of coolness and purity i.e. śaitya and pāvanatva, which concepts can be conveyed directly i.e. expressedly only by the particular words viz. 'śaitya' and 'pāvanatva' - then we have to accept that the word 'ganga' conveys these senses only through the power of suggestiveness i.e. vyañjanā, which is other than vācakatva or abhidhā.
The Locana on this observes : (pp. 418, 419, edn. with Bālapriyā, Kashi, skt. series, Varanasi, 1940) : “nanu gītā”dau mā bhūd vācakatvam, iha tu arthántare śabdasya vācakatvam eva ucyate; kim hi tad vācakatvam samkocyata ity āśankya āha - "prasiddheti” - śabdántarena tasya arthántarasya yad visayîkaranam tatra prakāśanoktir eva yuktā, na vācakarvoktiḥ śabdasya, nápi vācyatvoktir arthasya tatra yuktā; vācakatvam hi samaya-vaśād a-vyavadhānená pratipādakatvam, yathā tasyaiva sabdasya svārthe; tad āha - 'svārthábhidhāyinā' iti. vācyatvam hi samaya-balena nirvyavadhānam pratipadyatvam yathā tasyaiva arthasya śabdántaram prati, tad āha - "prasiddha" iti. prasiddhena vācakatayā abhidhānántarena yah sambandho vācyatvam tad eva tatra vā yad yogyatvam tena upalaksitasya. na ca evam vidham vācakatvam artham prati śabdasya asti, nápi tam śabdam prati tasyárthasya uktarūpam vācyatvam. yadi násti tarki katham tasya vișayīkaranam uktam ity āśankya āha - pratīter iti. atha ca pratīyate sórtho, na ca vācya-vācaka-vyāpāreņa iti vilaksana eva asau vyāpāra iti
yāvat.”
At I.. 10. Dhv. Anandavardhana had advocated padártha-vākyártha-nyāya between the expressed sense and the suggested sense. That was only to emphasise the instrumentality of the expressed sense in bringing about the suggested sense. The analogy otherwise was not sound because when sentence-sense dawns upon our mind, the individual word-sense is effaced. This is not so in case of the expressed and the suggested sense. The expressed sense does not get terminated when the suggested sense flashes forth. So, Anandavardhana says that we should not accept the 'padártha-vākyártha-nyāya' between the two, but actually “ghatapradīpa-nyāya" should be accepted here. Just as when a torch is held, a jar which was wrapped up in darkness is manifested and both the torch or lamp and the object jar continue to exist simultaneously, similarly when the suggested sense is manifested, the expressed sense, like a lamp, continues to manifest itself also side
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA by side; the Dhvanikāra observes : "na ca padártha-vākyártha-nyāyo vācyavyangyayoh. yataḥ pudártha-pratītiḥ asatyā eva iti kaiścid vidvadbhiḥ āsthitam. yaiḥ api asatyarvam asyāḥ na abhyupeyate, tair vākyártha-padárthayor ghara-tadupādānakāraņa-nyāyóbhy upagantavyaḥ. tathā hi ghate nispanne tad upādānakāranānām na prthag upālambhah, tathaiva vākye tad arthe vā prat arthānām; teşām tadā vibhaktatayopalambhe vākyártha-buddhir eva dūrībhavet. na tu eșa vācya-vangyayor nyāyaḥ. na hi vyangye pratīyamñne vācyabuddhir dūrībhavati, vācyávabhāsávinābhāvena tasya prakāśanāt. tasmad ghatapradīpanyāyas tayoh; yathaiva hi pradīpa-dvāreņa ghaça-pratītāv utpannāyām na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate, tadvad vyangya-pratītau vācyávabhāsaḥ. yat tu prathamodyote yathā padártha-dvāreņa’ ity ady uktam tad upāyatva-mātrāt sāmya-vivakṣayā.” (Vịtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 200, ibid)
"The analogy of word-import and sentence-purport too does not quite apply to the expressed and suggested senses, since in the opinion of some philosophers, the very apprehension of sense from individual words is unreal. Even those who do not hold that it is unreal will have to agree that the analogy of the relation between the pot and its material cause will explain better the relation between sentence-purport and word-import. Just as the material causes of a pot cannot be recognised separately after the pot has come into being, so also word and its sense are not recognised separately after the sentence and its purport have been apprehended as a whole. If they could be recognised separately, the very apprehension of the whole sentence-purport would have to be driven away to a distance. But this principle does not hold good with reference to the expressed and suggested senses. When the suggested sense is apprehended, the expressed sense is not driven away to a distance since the apprehension of the suggested is inseparably occasioned by the apprehension of the expressed. Hence the analogy of the pot and the lamp would fit them best. Just as the light of the lamp will not recede as soon as the perception of the pot is brought home to the observer, so also, the expressed sense will continue to shine out even after the apprehension of the suggested sense has been achieved. In the light of these considerations, it should be understood that the remark made in the first flash - "Just as the purport of a sentence..." etc. (No. I. 10) - aims only at pointing out the similarity between the two in respect of their being means to some other and (and that the analogy) is not intended to be pursued to the last detail.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 201, ibid)
The Locana further elaborates the point as below : "nanu evam ma bhüd vācaka-Śaktis tathápi tātparya-śaktir bhavisyati iti āśankya āha - na ca iti. kaiścid
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639 iti vaiyākaranaiḥ, yair api iti bhatta-prabhṛtibhiḥ. tam eva nyāyam vyācaste - yathā híti. tad upadana-kāranānām iti. samavāvi-käranāni kapālāni anayoktya nirūpitāni. saugata-kāpālikamate tu yady apy upādātavya-ghara-kāle upādānānām na sattā ekatra kṣaṇasthāyitvena, paratra tirobhūtatvena, tathā’pi prthak-tayā nāsty upālambha ity amse drstāntaḥ. dūrībhaved iti. arthaikarvasya abhāvād iti bhāvah."
Locanakāra explains the argument as below. It was explained earlier that for the senses of coolness and purity to be derived from the word 'ganga', we will have to accept a function over and above the power of expression. But even if a power other than ‘abhidha' is accepted, the question still remains that why should we designate this other power by the name of vyañjanā ? As for the apprehension of the sentence-sence which is different from word-sense and which is not obiterated by the same, we accept tātparya-vrtti i.e. sentence-purport, in the same way this sentence-power, i.e. tātparya-vrtti will cause to apprehend this sense of coolness and purity. So, it is futile to imagine a separate power called suggestiveness or vyañjanā.
To this it can be said that here the 'padártha-vākyártha-nyāya' is not applicable. We know that only the abhihitánvayavādin-mīmāmsakas accept the tātparya-vștti. Even the anvitábhidhānavādin mīmāmsakas do not approve of it. The Vaiyākaranas take the apprehension of word-sense as totally false i.e. mithyā, for they believe only in akhanda sphoța, thus taking the concepts of varna, pada etc. as illusory only. So, for them, when the hypothesis of pada and padārtha is unacceptable, how can, following the same, be vyañjanā taken as useless by including it in tātparya ? Some others do not accept this mithyātva vāda of the grammarians and hold that the hypothesis of pada-padártha is not false but true. But for them also this point will be explained differently. For them vākya-vākyártha stand as kārya - i.e. effect and pada-padártha stand fo kāraṇa i.e. cause. Here ‘kāraṇa' is to be taken as upādāna-kārana i.e. material cause, i.e. samavāyi-kārana. Now as for cause-effect relation there is a general rule that, of course the apprehension of a samavāyi-kārana precedes an effect, but it disappears when the effect follows or comes into existence. Both are not co-existant at a given moment. As the two halves of separate mud does not continue to exist when an actual pot takes shape, same is the case here. The pada-padártha-apprehension disappears when there is cognition of vākyavākyártha-(buddhi). If the pada-padártha-apprehension continues then how can vākya-vākyártha-bodha take shape at all ? For, in that case it will be futile to
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA designate it as vākya-vākyártha. So, we will have to admit that as with causeeffect relation, vākya-vākyártha-bodha takes shape only when the former, i.e. pada-padártha-bodha melts away. This explanation follows the mīmāmsakaideology
The Bauddhas believe in momentary existence of things, i.e. they are ksanikatāvādins. For them every object goes on changing from moment to moment. So, this being the case, in the moment of effect being generated, the existence of samavāyicause can never be accepted. Similarly for the samkhyas and the kāpālikas also at the moment of 'kāryotpatti' - i.e. effect taking shape, the kārana-sattā or the existence of cause-material disappears. Thus when effect is apprehended the apprehension of cause has ended beforehand.
The idea is that, whether we accept padártha-kalpanā as false, following the grammarians, or whether we accept cause-effect-relation and hold that the cause disappears when the effect takes place, or accept the buddhist view of momentariness and accept the unavailability of cause at the moment when effect comes into existence, or following the kāpālikas believe the disappearance of cause into effect, one thing is certain that, even if we follow any principle mentioned above, padártha-bodha cannot continue when vākyártha-bodha arrives. As against this both vācya or expressed and the vyangya i.e. suggested continue to co-exist. We know that the apprehension of the expressed sense is not terminated when the suggested sense is also apprehended. On the contrary it is a speciality of the suggested that the earlier apprehension of the expressed continues even in the time of the apprehension of the suggested. So, the padártha-vākyártha analogy cannot be made applicable to vācya vyangya-apprehension. But pradīpa-ghata analogy will work here. The lamp gets lighted first by itself and then illumines the substance such as jar etc., and while doing so it continues to shine by itself also. Similarly the expressed sense comes into existence first and while continuing to exist manifests the suggested sense also. The apprehension of the expressed sense is not terminated when that of the suggested sense dawns. Both are simultaneously apprehended. Thus if we accept after grammarians that the pada-padártha hypothesis is illusory, or accept kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva like the Mimāmsakas, or accept the momentariness following the Bauddhas, or like kāpālikas accept the non-continuence of kārana after kāryotpatti, we cannot arrive at the simultaneous apprehension of the expressed and the suggested senses. Thus, pada-padártha-analogy is inapplicable here. So, it is safe to accept vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāva between the two apprehensions. So, the analogy of pada-padártha-nyāya cited at Dhv. I. 10, only
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means that the vācyártha is instumental only - upāyamātra - in bringing about the vyangyártha. No further similarity is meant here.
Now the Locana discusses a fresh point. The objector says that when you recommend ghața-pradīpa-nyāya for the two apprehensions of the primary and the suggested senses, you accept simutaneity with regard to both of them. Now in this case the very ‘vākyatā' of the sentence will disappear. For, ācāryas have laid down that a sentence is that group of words which is having a single sense at a given moment. The Jaimini-sūtra lays down that, "arthaikatvād ekam vākyam, sākānkşam ced, vibhāge syāt.” It means that if a sentence is cut or divided into parts, each of its part i.e. pada, will be having expectancy of one another = sākānksam., but when taken together it has a single sense. If it is asked as to what will be the situation in case of words that have paronomasia - i.e. in case of 'ślista pada', the reply is that even if more than one sense is derived from a statement in case of paronomasia, the sentence is said to have only a single sense, for one sense is established - i.e. ekarūpatā is accepted - by fusion of the two senses. This is explained in the following way. Suppose a word with a multiple-sense is pronounced. Now senses more them one follow from one and the same word and in case of each meaning being grasped the convention - sanketa-smarana is remembered each time. Now the point to be considered is how do we derive all the conventional meanings from one and the some word. Do we arrive at these senses one by one or do we get all the senses at a time, i.e. simultaneously? We cannot arrive at the senses one by one in order because the activity of the word cannot proceed by stops and gaps and this is an accepted rule - The abhidhā vyāpāra is terminated after giving a single sense. Once it is over it cannot be revived. Nor can we accept a simultaneous apprehension of all senses at a time for remembering of convention is a condition which has to be there for arriving at a given expressed sense. Thus all senses remaining present in human intellect simultaneously is also ruled out. Thus from either way, the hypothesis of difference in meaning does not stand. The word is neither heard again and again, nor is remembered again and again. So, the question of its multiplicity of senses does not arise at all. So, the definition of a sentence, viz. that it can have a single sense remains protected. Now, in this case, the objector asks, if a set of words, i.e. a sentence, is said to have one expressed sense and another suggested sense, where will the accepted definition as said above stand ? Thus, the accepted definition will have to be sacrificed and that is not a welcome situation.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA To this, the siddhāntin's answer is that the expressed and the suggested senses are to be taken as principal and subordinate. Thus, the definition of a sentence having a single sense will not be vitiated. At times the suggested sense with be principal, at other times the expressed will be principal. When the suggested sense is principal, it is termed 'dhvani', and is termed 'guni-bhāta-vyangya' when the expressed sense predominates. So, the net outcome of this discussion is that even if the word is suggested-sense-oriented i.e. is vyañgya-paraka, and even if it be taken as 'vācya' only following the (false interpretation of the) dictum ‘yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ', then also, vyangyártha is not rendered out of place by abhidhā-vștti but we will have to postulate vyañjanā-výtti for the same.
Anandavardhana further argues that in instances where the suggested is not intended as principal, the objector will not be able to regard it even as expressed, since the word does not intend it at all. This also adds support to the conclusion that there is some definite scope for suggested sense of words. And where it happens to be intended as principal, why should its existence be gainsaid ? - “yatrā'pi tasya prādhānyam tatra'pi kim iti tasya svarūpam apahnūyate ?" (Vịtti, ibid, pp. 202). Hence suggestiveness is positively different from denotation. Another reason which supports the same conclusion is this - Denotation is based upon words only, while suggestiveness is based not only upon words but also upon senses; since suggestiveness, as already shown, relates to words as well as senses : "evam tāvad vācakatvād anyad eva vyañjakatvam; itaś ca vācakatvad vyañjakatvasya anyatvam, yad vācakatvam sabdaikā”śrayam itarat tu śabdā"śrayam arthā”śrayam ca, śabdárthayor dvayor api vyañjakatvasya pratipāditatvāt.” (Vịtti, pp. 202, ibid).
Anandavardhana now proceeds to establish that vyañjanā and gunavrtti i.e. amukhyā-vrtti are also different from each other from the point of consideration of nature and scope i.e. svarūpa and visaya.
It may be noted that Anandavardhana reserves the word mukhyā for abhidhā, while what normally is termed two-fold lakṣaṇā i.e. suddhā and gauņī by followers of Mammața, is termed 'gunavṛtti' by him. 'Gunavrtti thus is a-mukhyā i.e. notabhidhā' for him and is said to be two-fold i.e. through upacara i.e. guna-sāmya and lakṣaṇā i.e. one which is ordinarily taken as śuddhā by followers of Mammața.
Locana puts it this way - "evam vişayabhedāt svarūpabhedāt kāraṇabhedāc ca vācakatvāt mukhyāt prakāśakatvasya bhedam pratipādya ubhayatvā’viśeșāt tarhi
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643 vyañjakatva-gaunatvayoh ko bheda ity āśankya amukhyād api pratipadayitum āhagunavșttir api. - etc......
The point is, those features that are marked in suggestiveness are also seen in gauni-vrtti also. In the former both sabda and artha stand as aśraya and so is the case with gunavrtti also. Then what is the difference between the two ? This problem is discussed here.
It may be noted that laksaņā is two-fold viz., suddhā and gauni and Anandavardhana uses the terms laksana and upacara for the same respectively as noted above. For both these varieties taken together, the term is 'guna-vrtti' or apradhāna-vrtti or a-mukhyā-vrtti. Now this gunavrtti of either variety rests both on word and sense. But even in this case it can not be said to be identical with suggestiveness for there is difference from the point of view of both nature and scope. Svarūpa-bheda is explained as follows. :-Gunavrtti is so termed because the function of the word operating there is subordinate. First there is rtha-bodha i.e. collection of the expressed sense. Then on account of lack of apprehension of speaker's intention, i.e. because of tātparya-anupapatti, the expressed sense is contradicted i.e. there is vācyártha-bādha. Thus the word becomes skhald-gati i.e. the expressed sense becomes incompatible, and another sense through some relation is brought in place of the expressed sense. Hence it is called gunavștti or laksanā, or a-mukhya-vyāpāra. On the other hand no one can say that the suggested sense is necessarily subordinate. On account of camatkāra-paryavasāna, rasa, vastu or alamkāra when suggested are never subordinate. Lakşaņā is always a-mukhyą and vyangyártha is principal. Vyañjanā is not necessarily bādha-sāpeksa, while guņavstti is necessarily bādha-sāpekṣa.
Anandavardhana points out another svarūpabheda betweed gunavștti and vyañjakatva. He observes : "ayam ca anyaḥ svarūpabhedaḥ - yad guņavsttir amukhyatvena vyavasthitam vācakatvam eva ucyate. vyañjakatvam tu vācakatvād atyantam vibhinnam eva.” - The idea is there is another difference in nature between the two. Indication is practically denotation itself, with this difference that it is a subordinate verbal function. While, suggestion, on the other hand is proved to be quite different from denotation. A further difference between the two is this. When another sense is conveyed by a sense through indication, argues Anandavardhana, the first sense merges itself with the second and becomes one with it, as for example in the statement, "There is hamlet on the Gangā.” But when one sense conveys another through suggestion, the first retains its individuality
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA while conveying the other, just like a lamp. The instance here is, "līlākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa pārvatī." If the name indication were to be given to such instances also where one sense conveys another sense without losing its importance or identity, then it would be tantamount to saying that indication itself is the primary verbal function. For, it is generally observed that any given sentence possesses the power of conveying a purport over and above the expressed sense of individual words.
Thus there is three-fold distinction underlined between guņavrtti and vyañjanā. (i) In vyañjanā the word is never skhalad-gati, while in gunavrţti there is skhaladgatitva of a word. (ii) In vyañjanā samketa is never utilized while lakṣaṇā i.e. gunavịtti is necessarily sakyártha-bodha-sāpekşiņi i.e. it necessarily stands in need of sakyártha-jñāna. (iii) Vyañjanā gives vyangyártha along with the sakyártha i.e.
y sense, while in laksana the apprehension of laksyartha is not separately cognized but is seen with the sakyártha - upalaksaniyárthā”tmanā parinata eva - i.e. both are not independently cognised.
Anandavardhana further observes : “nanu tvat-pakşe’pi yadā’rtho vyangyatrayam prakāśayati tadā sabdasya kīděśo vyāpāraḥ ? ucyate - prakaraņādy avacchinnaśabda-vašena eva arthasya tathāvidham vyañjakatvam iti śabdasya tatrópayogah katham apahnūyate.” (pp. 204, vịtti, ibid).
"The following question may be put to us - well, even granting the truth of what you say, what is the precise verbal function involved when a sense conveys the three-fold suggested content ?' Here is our reply - the sense therein acquires the said suggestiveness only because of the words aided by context etc. Hence how can anyone deny the use of words in such suggestion ? (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 285, ibid)
After thus explaining the svarūpa-bheda between guņavstti and vyañjanā Anandavardhana now proceeds to explain vişaya-bheda i.e. difference in scope, between these two. He observes : visayabhedo'pi gunavrtti-vyañjakarvayoh spasta eva.” (vrtti, ibid, pp. 204). The difference in scope between indication and suggestiveness is also clear. The scope of vyañjakatva i.e. suggestiveness is threefold viz. (i) rasā”dayaḥ i.e. sentiments etc., (ii) specific figures of speech or turns of expression, and (iii) suggested ideas or matter. Of these three, none will or can say that the apprehension of rasā”dis is identical with indication. The same is true of the suggested figures also. So, far as the third variety, i.e. suggested idea is concerned, that alone is suggested therein which is especially intended to be conveyed by the poet by a process other than the denotation, when he finds that the
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645 beauty he wants to furnish to the idea or matter on hand cannot be achieved by means of denotation itself : "vastu cārutva-pratītaye sva-sabda-anabhidheyatvena yat pratipadayitum isyate tad vyangyam.” (Vrtti, PV. 204, ibid). - All this cannot be included in the scope of indication since we can see several examples of indication based merely on convention or usage - "prasiddhy anurodhābhyām api gaunānām śabdānām prayoga-darśanāt” - (pp. 204, vrtti). This has been already explained. If at all there is any element of beauty seen in indication, it will be entirely due to association with suggestive element therein. Hence indication and suggestiveness are widely different from each other. The truth is that suggestiveness not only differs from denotation on one hand and indication on the other; on the contrary it is actually based upon each of them also : “vācakatva-guņavstti-vilaksanasya’pi ca tasya tad-ubhayā”śrayatvena vyavasthānam.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33. pp. 206, ibid) - The Locana on this reads - “na kevalam pūrvókto hetukalāpo yāvat tad ubhayāśrayatvena mukhyópacārā”śrayatvena yad vyavasthānam tad api vācakaguņavstti-vilakṣaṇasya eva iti vyāpti-ghatanam."
Anandavardhana further elaborates this subtle observation, as follows. - At times suggestiveness rests on denotation, e.g. in cases of vivakṣitánya-paravācya-dhvani i.e. suggestion with intended but further extending expressed sense. In case of suggestion with unintended expressed sense, i.e. avivaksitavācya dhvani, it rests on indication. In order to support this resting on both these powers, i.e. expression and indication, basically two-fold suggested sense was explained in the beginning i.e. in the first chapter of the Dhv. itself. As suggestiveness is assisted by both vācakatva and guņavstti, it is impossible to identify it with either of them - "tad ubhayā”śritatvāc ca tad ekarūpatvam tasya na śaktyate vaktum.” (vștti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 206, ibid) - As it at times seeks assistance from indication, it cannot be identified with denotation alone, and as it is supported by denotation at times, it cannot be identical with indication alone. Thus it cannot be comprehended by either as it partakes of the characteristics of both - "na ca ubhaya-dharmatvenaiva tad ekaika-rūpam na bhavati” (vrtti, pp. 206, ibid). Over and above this, it has the characteristic of sound only - sabda-dharma. Which is devoid of both verbal powers of denotation and indication - "yad vācakatva-laksaņā”di-rūpa-rahita-śabda-dharmatvenā'pi.” (vrtti, pp. 206, ibid). Thus the sounds of music do possess suggestiveness with reference to rasā”di, but they are never associated with either the power of expression or indication.

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
Again, as we can see suggestiveness in instances which are not even sounds (as in case of gestures etc.), it is wrong to consider it as a form of verbal functions such as denotation, etc. Though suggestiveness is thus different from the well-known functions, i.e. expression and indication of words, yet if it should be regarded as another form of verbal function itself, why should it not be regarded as a form of word itself?
Thus, concludes Anandavardhana, there are three-fold functions of words viz. (i) denotation, (ii) indication and (iii) suggestiveness. When in case of the third the suggested sense is principal, it is termed 'dhvani', which is basically laid down as two-fold such as (i) a-vivakṣitánya-para-vacya-dhvani i.e. that with un-intended expressed sense, and (ii) vivakṣitányapara-vacya-dhvani or that with intended expressed sense. These two have been elaborately treated also.
It may be noted that Anandavardhana has used the term 'prakaratva' in the sense of 'dharma' only, in the remark viz. "yadi ca vācakatva-lakṣaṇā"dīnām sabda-prakārāṇām prasiddha-prakāra-vilakṣaṇatve'pi vyañjakatvam prakāratvena parikalpyate, tad cchabdasya eva prakāratvena kasman na parikalpyate ?" (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 206, ibid). Thus vyañjanā also, like abhidhā and lakṣaṇā is a 'dharma' of sound i.e. word or-sabda. But the Locanakāra has taken 'prakāra' in 'śabda-prakārāṇām' as meaning 'dharma', and in 'prakāratvena' as meaning 'bheda' or variety. Thus the explanation advanced by Locana here is as follows : "On the strength of many pramāņas, or proofs, the distinction of vyañjanā from both abhidha and lakṣaṇā is established. It has also been shown that vyañjanā also is a function of word like abhidha and lakṣaṇā. It has been also further pointed out that vyañjanā seeks support at times of abhidha or at times of lakṣaṇā. With all this if the objector believes in identity of vyañjana with abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, and if he insists on taking vyañjanā as a synonym for abhidha then he should have no objection in holding sabda and vyañjanā to be identical and taking sabda and vyañjanā also as synonyms. One can cherish any desire without control. But the fact is that, vyañjakatva is proved to be absolutely different from all these. And if one's desire or personal belief is allowed to run riot, any system will topple. Normally we infer fire from smoke on a mountain. But if such a riot of personal belief is allowed to run amuck then one will argue that the smoke is not because of fire but is due to something else! Locana reads vyañjakatvanm vācakatvam iti yadi paryāyau kalpyete, icchāyāḥ avyāhatatvāt. vyañjakatvasya tu viviktam svarūpam darśitam, tad-viṣayántare katham

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647 viparyastām ? evam hi parvatagato dhūmónagnijópi syād iti bhāvah." (on vịtti, Dhv. III. 33).
There is still further objection projected. It is like this. - It is true that there is no element of indication in vivaksitā-'nyapara-vacyadhvani. For, it is not possible to think of indication where a second meaning is apprehended over and above the apprehension of the expressed sense. But in the case of two-fold indication viz. when the primary meaning is entirely concealed as in case of 'agnir mi and (ii) when the primary meaning is partly retained as in case of 'gangāyām ghosah', - the primary meaning is not intended in full. In case of both these varieties, with unintended primary sense, how will you distinguish between indication and suggestion, "a-vivaksita-vācyas tu dhvaner gunavrtti-dvaya-rūpatā laksyata eva yataḥ”(vṛtti, pp. 208, ibid). The idea is that indication and suggestion cannot be separated in case of the arthántara-samkramita-vācya-dva atyanta-tiraskrta-vācya-dhvani.
To this Anandavardhana's reply is that, "ayam api na dosah”. The reason is that (both the varieties of) avivaksitavācya-dhvani, of course, operate through the passage of indication, but because of this, the two should not be taken as identical. Thus here, the suggestion might operate in the wake of indication, but it does not assume the form of indication. Gunavrtti or indication can be shown to proceed even completely devoid of suggested context - "gunavrttir hi vyañjakatva-śünya'pi drśyate" (vrtti, pp. 208, ibid). While suggestiveness can not function without suggested content which is a source of beauty. This has been already explained. The first type of indication, viz. metaphorical attribution of identity, takes its stand in the characteristics of the expressed sense, e.g. "agnir mānavakah", wherein Māṇavaka is said to be fire because of his extremely short temper. Similarly the face of a heroine is said to be moon itself, because of its pleasing nature. The second form of indication, viz. secondary sense - laksaņā-rūpā gunavsttiḥ, - also is possible if there is just a connection with the secondarily indicated sense, though there is no apprehension of suggested content full of beauty; e.g. in 'mañcāḥ krośanti' - "the cots make noise".
It is true, in some cases, indication becomes a source of the apprehension of the suggested content full of beauty, but this beauty is caused entirely due to its touch of suggestiveness, as in case of denotation. In case where we have a treatment of improbable events, e.g. in 'suvarna-puspām prthivim..." etc., the treatment justified only in view of the apprehension of suggested beauty; and so it is
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reasonable to hold that we should regard them as instances of suggestion only, though indication might just be present therein. Thus in both the varieties of suggestion with unintended expressed sense, i.e. avivakṣitavācya - we will find indication tinged with a colouring of suggestiveness, which will not appear identical with indication, but will appear quite separate from it and bringing delight to the men of refined taste.
Anandavardhana further says that the indisputable fact is that the suggestive power of words follows only in the wake of wellknown convention: "api ca vañjakatvalakṣaṇo yaḥ śabdárthayor dharmaḥ sa prasiddha-sambandhanurodhi iti na kasyacid vimativiṣayatām arhati.” (vṛtti, pp. 210, ibid) The suggestive power of words follows the track of the well-known conventional relation of word and meaning, which is given the designation of denoter-denoted relationship - (vācyavācaka-bhāva). But it becomes tainted by its association with other adventitious circumstances "samagryantara-sambandhād aupadhikaḥ pravartate." That is where suggestiveness differs from denotation. The denotation vācakatva-of every word is constant - 'niyata ātmā', because right from childhood when one picks up language, the meaning of each word remains quite the same, i.e. unchanged throughtout one's life. But the suggestiveness of words is not constant 'sa tu aniyataḥ', aupādhikatvāt." Its apprehension takes place only when all circumstances such as context etc. combine to convey the same. It can be argued : What is the use of examining the nature of such adventitious concept ? - "nanu yadi aniyataḥ, tat kim tasya svarūpaparīkṣayā?' - The answer is that there is no defect in this naisa doṣaḥ. The adventitiousness is seen only from the point of view of the 'sabdā"tma' (i.e. its being the soul of word), not in its own province. The Locana observes: "aniyatatvād yathāruci kalpyeta, pārmārthikam rūpam násti iti; na ca a-vastunaḥ parīkṣā upapadyate iti-bhāvaḥ. śabdā"tmanīti sanketā"spade pada-svarūpamātra ity arthaḥ." The idea is that in saying that vācya-vācaka-bhāva is 'niyata' or fixed and vyangya-vañjaka-bhāva is a-niyata or 'not fixed', the idea is only this much that as in case of abhidha there is a fixed conventional meaning of a given word, in the same way in vyañjanā, there is no fixed conventional vyangyártha of a given word. This uncertainty or a-niyatatva is with reference to the śabda-ātmā i.e. with reference to a given word taken in centre. But this uncertainty does not prevail so far as its own independent province is concerned. Vyangyártha or suggested sense is fixed in its own area. The idea is that vyangyártha is divided into three types such as vastu or idea, alamkāra, or a figure of speech and rasa"di or emotive stuff. Now the area of all
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649 these three varieties is individually absolutely fixed and it is a no-nonsense matter in which we should direct our thoughts. To understand that vyañjakarva is aniyata or un-fixed with reference to śabda"tma but fixed in its own area, an illustration is given by Anandavardhana who observes : “lingatva-nyāyaś ca asya vyañjaka-bhāvasya laksyate, yathā lingatvam āśrayeșu a-niyatávabhāsam, icchā”dhīnatvāt; sva-vișaya-a-vyabhicāri ca. tathā eva idam yathā darśitam vyañjakatvam. sabdā"tmani a-niyatatvād eva ca tasya vācakatva-prakāratā na sakyā kalpayitum. yadi hi vācakatva-prakāratā tasya bhavet tacchabdā”tmani niyatatā'pi syād vācakatva-vat." (vrtti on Dhv. III. 33, pp. 210, 212, ibid). "The analogy of probans in an inference is well applicable to suggestiveness. Since inference is dependent upon one's desire, when there is no such desire to info a person's part, the existence of the quality of probans in anything is far from constant from the man's point of view of the probandum. Suggestiveness is also exactly like this. Though from the standpoint of word, it might be inconstant, one should not rush to the conclusion that it is a variety of denotation. If it were really a variety of denotation, it too should have been as constant as denotation itself, in respect of a word." (Trans. K.Kra. pp. 210, 212, ibid.
The net outcome of this discussion is that just as 'linga' i.e. probans is not 'notconstant in its own 'sādhya' - or that which is to be inferred or proved, the probandum; in the same way the sphere of vyañjanā is also constant in itself. But as the inference of 'sādhya' through 'linga' is not a universal matter, i.e. as it is not 'sārva-kālika', in the same way, the apprehension of vyañjanā is also "āupādhika" i.e. adventitious. When you apprehend the upādhis, the vyangyártha is also apprehended, but in the absence of these upādhis, the suggested sense also is not apprehended. Thus with 'sabd-ātma' i.e. a particular word in centre, its expressive power is fixed, but its suggestivity is not fixed. It is for this reason that we cannot equate vyañjakatva with vācakatva, for in that case the former would be only a variety of the latter.
Ānandavardhana now trains his guns on the Mimāmsakas and then on the Naiyāyikas. He proves to the satisfaction of all that when you are dealing with poetry, even the Mimamsakas and Naiyāyikas have got to accept the power of suggestiveness or vyañjakatva.
Anandavardhana first turns to the Mimāmsakas. He observes : "sa ca tathāvidha aupādhika dharmaḥ śabdānām autpattika-sabdártha-sambandhavādinā vākya-tattva-vidā pauruşā’pauruseyayor vākyárthayor visesam abhidadhatā
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA niyamena abhyupagantavyaḥ, tad anabhyupagame hi tasya śabdártha-sambandhanityatve sati, api, a-pauruseya-pauraseyayor vākyayor artha-pratipādane nirvišeșatvam syāt.” (pp. 212, ibid)
The idea is this. A Mimāmsaka will have to accept perforce the conclusion that words have an adventitious power of the nature of suggestiveness. For a Mimāmsaka believes in the theory that not only there is a natural and eternal relation between word and its sense, but also that there is a difference between sentences uttered by men and those revealed in the vedas. If the Mimāmsaka is averse to accepting this adventitions power of words, the outcome will be that human uttarance and divine revealation would be treated as on par, since the relation of word and sense is accepted to be eternal in both the cases. But when he accepts this adventitious power, he can easily count for the possible falsity of human utterances. For, though one might hold that the relation between sentences and their purport is eternal, there will also be scope left to attribute falsity and such other adventitious drawbacks such as delusion due to the fleeting desires of the speaker.
Effects opposite to the nature of objects are marked at times due to contact with adventitions circumstances though their original nature is not completely lost on that account. "drśyate hi bhāvānām aparityakta-svabhāvānām api samagry-antarasampāta-sampaditaupādhika-vyāpārántarānām viruddha-kriyatvam.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 212, ibid).
Anandavardhana explains that even the cool-rayed moon and such other cool objects which reduce the heat of the entire universe by their refreshing coolness, are seen to cause intense pain to onlookers who are afflicted by the burning pangs of separation from their beloveds. One who likes, therefore, to uphold the doctrine that the relation of word to its meaning is natural or eternal, will have to accept obviously some adventitious element at least, which belongs to words and which is distinct from denotation, if he should properly explain the falsity of human utterances. And this cannot be anything other than suggestiveness, which is the same as the communication of what is suggested. All human utterances primarily communicate the intention of the speaker - "pauruseyāni ca vākyāni prādhānyena purusábhiprāyam eva pyakāśayanti.” (vịtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 214, ibid) That intention is suggested but not denoted, since the relation of vācya-vācaka-or denoter-denoted does not apply at all to intention and the word - "sa ca vyangya eva, na tu abhidheyaḥ, tena saha abhidhānasya vācya-vācaka-bhāva-lakṣaṇasambandhābhāvāt.” (pp. 214, ibid, vrtti, Dhv. III. 33).

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The objector may argue that at this rate all sentence in the world have to be taken as suggestive as all sentences have suggestiveness with reference to the intention of a particular speaker. This objection is true in a way. The fact remains that suggestiveness has to be accepted with reference to the individual speaker's intention. But this sort of suggestion does not differ from denotation itself - "tat tu vācakatvāt na bhidyate, vyangyam hi tatra nāntarīyakatayā vyavasthitam, na tu vivaksitatvena" (vștti, Dhv. III. 33) The suggested and the expressed are almost chemically mixed up with each other in all sentences in ordinary parlour and suggestion here is not intended as exclusively important. If it were exclusively intended then only the suggested content is entitled to receive the stamp of dhvani' : “yasya tu vivaksitatvena vyangyasya sthitiḥ tad vyañjakatvam dhvanivyavahārasya prayojakam." So, only that suggested element, which is intended to be conveyed principally, alone is termed dhvani' and whatever is suggested by way of the speaker's intention is not so termed as it is unlimited. Thus Anandavardhana concludes that : "tathā darśita-bheda-traya-rūpam tātparyeņa dyotyamānam abhiprāya-rūpam anabhiprāyarūpam ca sarvam eva dhvani-vyavahārasya prayojakam iti yathokta-vyañjakatva -višese dhvani-laksane na ativyāptir na ca avyāptih. tasmād vākya-tattvavidām matena tävad vyañjakatvalaksano śābdo vyāpāro na virodhī pratyutā’nuguņa eva laksyate.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 214, ibid) - "Hence the conclusion is established that whether it be of the nature of speaker's intention or not, if the three-fold suggested content should be principally manifest, it will provide sufficient ground for the designation of suggestion. This definition of suggestion which takes into account suggestiveness as explained above cannot be tainted by the fallacies of 'too wide' or 'too narrow'. Thus the verbal power of suggestiveness will be found to be in agreement with the views of the experts on the theory of sentences (i.e. Mimāmsakas) far from conflicting with their doctrine.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 215, ibid).
Anandavardhana, turning towards the grammarians observes that so far as the system of grammar is concerned, the question whether the theory of suggestion is compatible with that system or not, does not arise at all, because this very expression dhvani/suggestion' is inspired by the system of grammar, i.e. the term dhvani' has been borrowed by the dhvani-vādins from the grammarians who maintain that sound in its eternal form of 'sphota' is identical with ultimate reality itself (and this is always suggested and never expressed). - "pariniścitanirapabhramśa-sabda-brahmaņām vipaścitām matam āśrityaiva pravsttóyam
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA dhvanivyavahāra iti taiḥ saha kim virodhā'virodhau cintyete.” (vịtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 214, ibid). On this see also Locana : “evam mīmāmsakānām nā’tra vimatir yuktā iti pradarśya vaiyākaraṇānām naivā’tra sā’stīti darśayati. "pariniścita.” iti. paritaḥ niścitam pramāņena sthāpitam nirapabhramsam galita-bheda-prapañcatayā avidyā-samskāra-rahitam śabdā”khyam prakāśa-parāmarśa-svabhāvam brahma vyāpakatvena bịhad-viseșa-śakti-nirbharatyā ca bệmhitam viśva-nirmāņaśaktīśvaratvāc ca bộmhanam ‘yair iti', etad uktam bhavati - vaiyākaraṇās tāvad brahmapade nā’nyat kiñcid icchanti, tatra kā kathā vācakatva-vyañjakatvayoh; avidyāpade tu tair api vyāpārántaram abhyupagatam eva. etac ca prathamodyote vitatya nirūpitam.”
Now onwards, Anandavardhana turns his attention towards the Naiyāyikas, or logicians, who seem to be the main opponents or 'pradhāna-malla'. Ananadavardhana observes that so far as the logicians are concerned they cannot have any difference of opinion with reference to suggestiveness i.e. vyañjakatva, though of course, there may be difference of opinion so far as the relationship between word and meaning is concerned. They may hold it either as conventional or man-made. But for vyañjakatva they should not have any difference, for they also admit that suggestiveness is within our experience and that it is seen not only in meaning but also in words. So, their view needs no refutation : "vācakatve hi tārkikāņām vipratipattayaḥ pravartantām, kim idam svābhāvikam sabdānām ahosvit samayikam ity adyah. vyañjakatve tu tat-prstha-bhā sādhārane loka-prasiddha evā'nugamyamāne ko vimatīnām avasarah ?" (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 214, 216, ibid). The logicians do hold divergent views as far as vācakatva or denotation is concerned as to whether this is a natural power or man-made. But as far as suggestiveness or vyañjakatva is concerned, which follows the power of expression or denotation, and which is found to be present even in other places where denotation is not found, and whose experience is almost universal, the logicians cannot have difference of opinion. Objects of common and doubtless perception such as, 'This is black', or 'This is sweet', do not inspire any conflicting views in the minds of the logicians. When one logician perceives an object as black and calls it to be so, and when there is apparently no association of contradictory circumstances, another logician does not come forward and challange him with the words that, “No, this is not black, but it is yellow.” In the same way, suggestiveness is found by experience to exist in words, which are denotative, or in sounds of
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653 music that are not denotative, or in gestures and so forth, which are not even words/sounds. No one can deny the same, i.e. no one can deny the existence of suggestiveness which is a matter of common experience : "alaukike hy arthe tārkikāņām vimatayo nikhilāḥ pravartante, na tu laukike. na hi nīla-madhurā”diş vaśesa-lokendriya-gocare bādhārahite tattve parasparam vipratipannā dịśyante. na hi bādhārahitam nīlam nīlam iti bruvan apareņa pratișidhyate naitannīlam pītam etaditi. tathaiva vyañjakatvam vācakānām śabdānām a-vācakānām ca gitadhvanīnām a-sabda-rūpāņām ca cestā"dīnām yat-sarvesām anubhava-siddham eva tat kena apahnūyate ?" (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 216, ibid).
Anandavardhana says that only somebody who would choose to be a butt of ridicule, would dare challange vyañjakatva.
To this the logicians have the following to say. The objection runs as follows : It is true to say that in all the cases quoted above, one does experience the element of implicit sense. There is no doubt about it. But in fact this suggestiveness is none other than implication and this implication is the same as the state of inferential probans - The apprehension of the suggested idea is thus not different but identical with the inferential knowledge of the probandum. Thus if we put it in other words, the relation of suggester-suggested is none other than the relation of probansprobandum. There is also another reason to support this. The Siddhāntin had himself explained just now that words possess suggestiveness directed to the speaker's intention, and it is our conviction that the speaker's intention is only inferable. - "atha brūyāt, - asti atisandhānávasaraḥ, vyañjakatvam śabdānām gamakatvam, tac ca lingatvam ataś ca vyangya-pratītir lingi-pratītir eva iti lingalingi-bhāva eva, teşām vyangyavyañjakabhāvo náparaḥ kaścit. ataś ca etad avaśyam eva boddhavyam yasmād vaktrabhiprāyápekṣayā vyañjakatvam idānīm eva tvayā pratipāditam vaktr abhiprāyaś ca anumeya-rūpa eva.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 216, ibid). - Locana reads - "vyañjakatvam nápahnūyate, tat tu atiriktam na bhavati, api tu linga-lingi-bhāva eváyam-idānīm eva jaiminīyamatopaksepe.”
It is clear that in this mahā-pūrva-paksa Mahimā's view is foreshadowed. It is surprising that though Mahimā had read the Dhvanyāloka so carefully he refused to accept the arguments as laid down by Anandavardhana in this portion, where he successfully silences the logicians.
Anandavardhana observes that even if the alleged view is true there is nothing to lose for him, for his sole intention was to establish the fact that suggestiveness is a verbal power, over and above two other powers such as denotation and

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA indication. This position will not suffer even if the objection of the logicians be accepted. It might be named as suggestiveness or inferential probans or by any other name. Whatever the name be given, the fact remains that there is no dispute between the objector and the siddhāntin. For this something else is admitted by both as a special power over and above the normally accepted powers of denotation and indication. But the fact is that suggestiveness is not identical with inferential probans and all the apprehension of suggested idea is not identical with inferential knowledge : "tad hi vyañjakarvam lingatvam astu, anyad vā. sarvathā prasiddhaśābda-prakāra-vilaksanarvam, śabda-vyāpāra-visayarvam ca tasyásti iti násti āvayor-vivādaḥ na punar ayam paramārtho yad-vyañjakatvam lingatvam eva, sarvatra vyangya-pratītiśca lingapratītir eva iti." (vịtti, Dhv. III. 33, pp. 218, ibid)
Mahima's objection is that there is no power of word except abhidhā or denotation and whatever meaning follows is only through a loose-inference which he calls kāvyánumiti. He even takes the indicated sense or laksyártha as anumeya or inferred. But then he has to accept that this process of inference has to be based on words, and is not identical with the normal inference of fire from perceiving smoke through naked eyes. It is to distinguish between the two that he calls this as "kāvyánumiti" and the other "tarkánumiti", at the same time freeing the former from the rigorous limitations or rules of the latter. It is to distinguish and defend this stand of Mahim, that Dr. Rewaprasad observes in a personal letter to us, dt. 24-11-01 after returning from Canada, that “jo dosa diye hain, un se anumānakā nahin, anumāna-gata-prāmānatā-kā khandana sambhava hai, jiskī kāvyamen āvaśyakatā hi nahīn." i.e. “The faults (that are perceived by Mammata and others in Mahima's thinking) do not refute the process of inference, or the fact of inference, but only its acceptability or, validity, or reliability, which is not at all expected here.” But our argument still holds good, even against Revaprasad jee that the very fact that Mahimā calls it as "kāvyánumiti" - proves that this ‘anumiti' is related with poetic word, i.e. it is a word-power and is other than denotation or indication. Thus Anandavardhana, to us, looks irrefutable. He proceeds as follows :
The objector has indeed made a clever use of the siddhantin's words in support of his position. The objector remarked that the speaker's intention is certainly implied and added that such implication is the same as the state of an inferential probans. To this Anandavardhana, the Siddhāntin, has the following to say. - The scope of words is two-fold, (i) inferable and (ii) denotative. Of these the inferable is always of the nature of the speaker's intention, and again, is two-fold viz. (i) the
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655 desire to utter words for their own sake, and (ii) the desire to convey meaning through words. Between these, the first type of speaker's intention does not play any part in verbal discourse. It only establishes that the speaker is a living animal different from a non-living-object. But the second type of speaker's intention plays part of a proximate cause in verbal discourse though it is rendered rather remote due to several other intervening factors between the utterance of the word and the apperance of the word and the apprehension of its meaning. Both these types of speaker's intention are inferable from words :
"dvividho hivisayah sabdānam. anumeyaḥ, pratipădyaśca. tatrā’numeyo vivaksā-laksanah, vivaksāca sabda-svarūpa-prakāśanecchā, śabdena arthaprakāśanecchā ca iti dviprakārā. tatrā”dyā na sabda-vyavahārángam. sa hi prānitva-mātra-pratipatti-phalā. divtīyā tu sabda-višeşávadhāraná-vasita-vyavahitā’pi śabda-karana-vyavahāra-nibandhanam. te tu dve api anumeyo visayaḥ śabdānām. pratipădyastu prayoktur artha-pratipādana-samīhā-visayīkrtórthah” - sa ca dvividhah vācyo vyangyaśca. “But the denotative scope of words relates to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meaning. It is also two-fold (1) The expressed and (2) the suggested. The speaker may use words with a view to conveying his meaning directly by means of them (and then we have the expressed meaning), or he may use words which do not directly convey his meaning, with a view to achieving some purpose (and then we have suggested meaning). Both these aspects of the denotative scope of words are far from appearing as probandum of any inference based on words. On the other hand, the relationship between word and such denotative content is one other than inference, whether it be a conventional or an unconventional relationship. It is only the aspect of intention on the part of the speaker to employ words or meaningful words that is inferable, and not the meaning itself conveyed by his words. If it were true that the meaning itself could form the probandum of an inference having words for its probans, there should be no scope for doubts at all whether any meaning is right or wrong. For instance, when the probandum viz. fire, is inferred from the probans, viz. smoke, there is indeed no room for any doubt about the existence of fire. Since the suggested meaning is conveyed by the power of the expressed itself, it, too, is related to the word just as the expressed meaning is related to the word. Directness or remoteness is not the differentiating condition of a relationship. That suggestiveness is related to denotation has been already shown. The conclusion is thus indisputable that words will have the state of an inferential probans only while implying the intention of the speaker and that the meanings themselves which are

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA signified by the words are due to the verbal power of denotation and not inference. Now we may take instances of meanings which are suggested by a word. These
nature of intention and may not be as well. Can we say that all such meanings are conveyed by the power of denotation alone in words ? Or should we postulate some other function ? It has been already shown that the power of denotation alone cannot explain the suggested meaning. Hence we will have to admit another function and that function itself is called suggestiveness by us. The nature of suggestiveness is not co-extensive with the nature of an inferential probans, since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is absent. Just as the denoted content of words is not identical with the probandum of an inference, so also the suggested content is not identical with it. Contrariwise, that which becomes the object of an inferred probandum as shown above, does not constitute what is denoted, but constitutes only an adventitious attribute of what is denoted. If the denoted meaning too were to be inferable as probandum, there could be no occasion at all for any differences of opinion regarding it in the world. But such differences are within our common knowledge and this has also been explained already." (Trans. K.Kris., Dhv. pp. 219, 221, 223, ibid).
To quote Anandavardhana's words, we read : "sa ca dvividhaḥ, vācyo vyangyaśca. prayoktā hi kadācit sva-sabdenā'rtham prakāśayitum samīhate kadācit-sva-sabdā’nabhidheyatvena prayojanápeksayā kayācit. sa tu dvividho'pi pratipădyo visayaḥ śabdānām na lingitayā svarūpeņa prakāśate, api tu kstrimeņā’kstrimeņa vā sambandhántareņa. vivaksā-visayarvam hi tasyárthasya sabdair lingitaya pratīyate, na tu svarūpam. yadi hi lingataya vyāpāraḥ syāt tacchabdárthe samyan-mithyā"di-vivādā eva na pravarteran dhūmā”di-lingánumitánumeyántaravat. vyangyaścártho vācyasāmarthyā”kşiptatayā vācyavacchabdasya sambandhi bhavaty eva. sāksād-asāksād-bhavo hi sambandhasyā'prayojakaḥ. vācya-vācaka-bhāvā"śrayatvam ca vyañjakatvasya prāg eva darśitam. tasmād vaktrabhiprāya-rūpa eva vyangye lingatayā sabdānām vyāpārah. tad-visayikrte tu pratipadyatayā. tasminnabhiprāya-rūpe-anabhiprāyarūpe ca vācakatvenaiva vyāpāraḥ sambandhántareņa vā. na tāvad vācakarvena yathoktam prāk. sambandhántarena vyañjakatvam eva. na ca vyañjakatvam lingatvarūpam eva, alokādişu anyathā drsţatvāt. tasmāt pratipādyo visayaḥ śabdānām na lingitvena sambandhi vācyavat. yo hi lingitvena teşām sambandhi yathā darśito visayaḥ sa na vācyatvena pratīyate, api tu upādhitvena. pratipādyasya ca visayasya lingitve tadvişayāņām vipratipattīnām laukikair eva kriyāņām abhāvaḥ prasajyeta iti. etac ca uktam eva.” (pp. 220, 222, vștti, Dhv. III-33, ibid)
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657 Anandavardhana further observes that at times even the expressed meaning is tested by instruments of knowledge such as direct perception etc. But this does not come in the way of its being a meaning collected through verbal power of denotation. Same is the case with suggested sense also. As a matter of fact the question of logical truth or falsity with reference to the suggested sense is totally out of point and futile. So the question of applying instruments of knowledge (pramāņa-parīksā) is in itself ridiculous. So, concludes Anandavardhana - "tasmāl lingi-pratītir eva sarvatra vyangya-pratītir iti na śakyate vaktum." - It is not possible to identify the apprehension of the suggested sense, with that of the inferred probandum in every case. Though of course, it is equally true that the aspect of implicit sense in words in form of the speaker's intention, is inferable, and that it can also pass under the name of suggestion, but it can never be given the designation of 'dhvani'/poetic suggestion of words.
Thus Anandavardhana establishes vyañjanā as a separate power over and above abhidh, and laksanā, and also confirms that so far as poetry is concerned, the Mimāmsakas, and the Naivāvikas will stand to gain if they accept the same, and accept they must. The grammarians have supplied the original inspiration for vyañjana and dhvani and therefore Anandavardhana holds that there is no basic divide between the vyañjanā/dhvanivādins and grammarians. After thus successfully establishing vyañjanā/dhvani doctrine firmly, he declares :
“vimativișayo ya āsīnmanīşiņām satatam avidita-satattvaḥ, dhvani-sañjitaḥ prakāraḥ
kävyasya vyañjitaḥ sóyam.” "The variety of poetry designated as suggestion, which had become a source of controversy for long, because its real nature had eluded even persons of the best intellect, has now been explained.” (Trans. K. Kris.)
Thus Anandavardhana, without making any attempt to define vyañjanā, is the first known alamkārika who takes pains to establish vyañjanā as a separate and independent power over and above abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā. Thus vyañjanā is a turīyā vịtti, the designation given to it by the great Abhinavaguptapāda in his Locana on the Dhv. It may be noted that even Abhinavagupta has not attempted a clean definition and classification of vyañjanā, but under Dhv. I. iv, he has tried to defend and establish vyañjanā and has silenced vyañjanā/dhvani-virodha, which

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also reverberates through the works of greatācāryas such as Mammata, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, and Viśvanātha, to mention some few. We will deal with vyañjanā/dhvani-virodha in a separate chapter but for the present we will look into the efforts of acāryas beginning with Mammata who have tried to define and classify vyañjana and later dhvani also. For the present we will engage ourselves with discussion concerning vyañjanā only. We once again take note of the fact that neither the great ālamkārikas beginning with Bhāmaha to Rudrața have tried to give a systematic exposition of sabdavṛttis, nor the illustrious immediate followers of Anandavardhana such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahimā, Bhoja and Dhanika have done anything with reference to vyañjanā, except perhaps subsuming or opposing the same. It falls to the lot of Mammata, the follower of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta to attempt definition and classification of the concept of vyañjanā. He has done it both in his sabda-vyāpāra-vicāra a small independent treatise on sabda-vșttis and in his Kāvyaprakāśa also. We will now proceed to what Mammața has to say.
Mammata - In the Sabda-vyāpāravicāra we read the same words verbatim that are read in the K.P. So we will stick to the K.P. for Mammata's concept of vyañjanā. Again, the classification as seen in the K.P. III is also missing in the former.
After dealing with laksanā Mammata proceeds with vyañjanā. He has suggested that laksanā which is six-fold is again three-fold from the angle of the prayojana which is suggested. It is either without suggested sense, or with a concealed suggested sense, or with a non-concealed suggested sense : "a-vyangyā gūdha'gūdha-vyangyā ca." The abode of that laksaņā is said to be the indicative word : tad-bhur läksanikah sabdah. But there in the indicative word, the function is in the form of suggestion : tatra vyāpāro vyañjanā”tmakaḥ.
Now, Mammața seems to attempt a definition of vyañjanā. He observes (K.P. I. 14bcd & 15 ab.)
"tatra vyāpāro vyañjanā”tmakaḥ, yasya pratītim adhātum lakṣaṇā samupāsyate - 14 phale śabdaika-gamyétra vyañjanānnáparā kriyā.” This of course is a semblance of a definition.
Jhalkikar (pp. 58) has the following observation -
vācaka-lākṣaṇikau sabdau lakṣayitvā vyañjanā-mukhena vyañjakam sabdam laksayitum vyañjanā-svarūpam āha. 'tatra' - ity ādinā.
Then he observes that, or it may be said that, to define vyañjaka word, to silence the arguments of the objector concerning the 'upādhi'-adjunct of the suggestive
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659 word, i.e. vyañjanā, Mammața starts with the word 'tatra'- etc. Jhalkikar proceeds to observe : tatra pāvanatvā"di-prayojane vişaye vyāpāraḥ śabdasya vịttih, vyañjanā”tmakaḥ, vyañjana-svarūpaḥ iti ţikākārāḥ.
"atha vyañjaka-sabda-laksaņāya vyañjanā nirūpanīyā. sā ca dvedhā. śabdanisthā’rtha-nisthā ca. tatra antyā sabda-lakṣaṇe anupayukte agre (= ttīyollāse) vivecanīyā. adyā tu dvedhā. abhidhāmūlā laksaņā-mūlā ca. tatra yady api abhidhāyāḥ prāthamyād upajīvyatvāc ca tanmūlā prathamam nirūpayitum ucitā, tathā'pi suprasiddhatvāt laksanāyāh prakrtatvāc ca tanmūlā eva prathamam nirūpayati tatrety ādinā. tatra lākṣaṇike śabde vyāpāro vyangya-prakāśānukūlah” - iti pradīpakāraḥ.
Thus Mammața seems to begin with lakṣaṇāmālā vyañjanā first. But as observed earlier this can not be taken as a general definition of vyañjanā, though there is a semblance even of a general definition. It is said here that, there, i.e. in the lāksanika or indicative word, the function is in the form of vyañjanā or suggestion. The reason is, that in respect of the outcome, i.e. motive or fruit, observes Mammata, which is known from the indicative word alone, and for whose apprehension the indication is resorted to, there is no other power of function except suggestion. We have observed that Mammata does not attempt a general definition of vyañjanā but starts his treatment of vyañjanā with lakṣaṇāmālā vyañjanā. We will see later that Viśvanātha in his Sāhitya-darpana attempts the definition of vyanjanā and as in case of laksanā, so in case of vyanjanā also, h attemps a more scientific and minute classification of vyañjanā. We will examine this later. We have seen in the quotation from Jhalkikar's commentary that Pradīpa cites two reasons for Mammata's treatment of laksanā mūla first. The reasons are that (i) laksanā is the matter in hand, because Mammata is actually dealing with the topic of laksaņā here, and prayojana is explained to be two fold. viz. gudha and a-ghūdha. Again (ii) laksanā-mülā vyañjanā is more well-known than the other viz. abhidhāmūlā. Again the thread is picked up as a natural corollary to the topic of prayojanavati laksana and prayojana in an indicative word is conveyed through vyañjanā, i.e. laksanā-mülā vyañjanā in this case.
As seen above in kārikā 14, he observes that the abode of that laksaņā is the lākṣaṇika or indicative word. tadbhus tadāśrayaḥ "The abode of that means the support of that. We have seen above that in II. 14.b, the author says that there, i.e. in indicative word, the function is in the form of suggestion. If it be asked 'why?', the answer is - (14 cd; 15 ab.). "In respect of the motive which is known from the indicative word alone, and for whose apprehension the indication (i.e. laksanā) is

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA resorted to, there is no other function except suggestion.” Mammata explains in the vștti, that when a word is used indicatively, with the intention to convey a certain motive there its apprehension is not from any other ground but from that word
And in such a case there is no other function except suggestion. The words viz., “yasya pratītim adhātum..... vyañjanān nā’parā kriyā” (14 cd, 15 ab.) thus give the definition of laksaņāmūlā vyañjanā. As Prof. Gajendragadkar explains, the definition is given in a somewhat ‘fighting mood', with the object of proving the necessity of vyañjanā for understanding the purpose of lakṣaṇā. When we resort to laksaņā, e.g. in 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ', we do so with the specific purpose of conveying something special-prayojana-pipadayisayā-and that special purpose is to convey the sense of coolness and holiness etc. that prevail in the hamlet : yasya śītatvapāvanatvā”dirūpasya phalasya pratītim jñānam ādhātum, janayitum. In the words of Mammața - “prayojana-pipādayisayā yatra yatra lakṣaņā-sabda-prayogah, tatra, nányatas tatpratītiḥ, api tu tasmād eva śabdāt. na cā’tra vyañjanād ștényo vyāpāraḥ - i.e. when a word is used indicatively with the intention to convey a certain purpose, there its apprehension is not from any other ground, but from that word alone. And in such a case, there is no other function than suggestion. Mammața here used the words “phale śabdaikagamye", with a specific purpose to suggest that the purpose in form of the qualities of coolness and holiness prevailing in the hamlet, is arrived at only through the lāksanika word alone, i.e. here through the word “gangāyām". The idea is that here the suggestiveness is based on laksanā i.e. it is rooted in lāksaņika word and certainly the suggested idea is not arrived at with the help of anything else but the power of word alone which operates here through indicative word. The suggested purpose is not apprehended through any other means of knowledge such as anumāna or inference which operates through the circumstances of vyāpti-smộti, and the like : The Pradīpa observes : “tat phalam tasmād eva sabdad gamyate, na tu pramāņántarāt. vyāpti-smộtyāder anapeksanāt. So, Mammața asserts that here there is no other pramāna, nor any other function of the word accept, vyanjana - "atra vyanjanannāparā kriya”. By 'na apara kriya is meant, 'na anyā vrtcih, abhidhā-rūpā laksanā-rūpā vā'. Read Jhalakikar (pp. 58, ibid) in this context - "yasya' ity ādinā arthā”-pattirūpa-pramāṇam pradarśitam. atra laksaņā iti padam laksanayā lākṣanika śabda-param. 'laksanayā sabdaprayogah' iti vrtti-grantha-sva-rasāt. tathā ca yasya śaitya-pāvanatvā”di-rūpaphalasya pratītim anubhavarūpām ādhātum janayitum lakṣaṇā, lākṣanikaḥ śabdaḥ samupāsyate āśrīyate, satyapi vācaka-śabde tam vihāya adriyate ity arthaḥ. śabdaika-gamye lākṣaṇika-sabda-mātra-gamye (na tu anumānā”di-gamye) atra

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661 tasmin phale, (śaitya-pāvanatvā”di-prayojana-visaye) vyañjanāt vyañjanam vihāya, (vyañjanām vinā) aparā kriyā anyo vyāpāro na ityarthah. kimtu vyañjanā”tmaka eva vyāpāraḥ iti bhāvaḥ. atra “sabdaika” ity ekapadena anumānā”di-vyudāsaḥ. 'sabdasya sambhrta-sāmagrikatvād anumānasya vyāptyādi-pratisandhānā”di vilambena vilambitatvāt na anumānagamyam prayojanam. kiñca tathā sati gangā"dyartham eva lingam sat śaityā"dikam anumāpayati iti svīkāryam. na ca taţe gangārvam siddham. tatpada-prayoga-visayatve ca na vyāpti-grāhakam pramā asti. tat katham asya lingatā. katham vā gangādharmasya śaityā”des taţe bādhāvadhāraņāt sādhyatā. katham vā śaityā"dāv ekasya avacchedakasya abhāvāt sādhyatávacchedakaikyam. tāvatām višeşaņānām ekadā’nupasthiter na samūhālambanānumitiḥ. vyañjanāyām ca bādhāder apratibandhakarvāt ‘atyantā’saty api hy arthe jñānam śabdaḥ karoti hi’ iti nyāyāt vyangyatávacchedakánupasthitā’pi pānaka-rasa-nyāyena vyangya-bodhakatvāc ca na kāpy anupapattih. kim ca. vyāptyādi-prati-samdhānasya aniyatatvāt śaityā”dibodhasya ca niyatarvāt na anumityā vyañjanā’nyathāsiddhiḥ iti bhāvaḥ.” - iti narasimha-manīņā-vistarastu pañcamollāse drastavyaḥ.
Viśvanātha has a clearer definition of vyañjanā and its varieties which we will pick up later.
It has been observed that neither abhidhā nor lakṣaṇā conveys the prayojana for which laksanā is resorted to. Mammata now establishes this with cogent arguments. He observes : tathā hi,
“nābhidhā samayábhāvāt” (II. 15 c.) gangāyām ghoşa ityā”dau ye pāvanatvā”dayo dharmāḥ tatā”dau pratīyante na tatra gangā"diśabdāḥ samketitāḥ.” - i.e. “It is not denotation, on account of the absence of convention.” The words Gang, and the like have no convention with reference to those properties, like holiness etc., which as are apprehended as belonging to the bank and the like in cases such as, "A hamlet on the Ganga". The Sampradāya-prakāśinī (pp. 39, edn. Dwivedi) explains - “nanu katham nā’parā kriya ity ata āha nā"bhidhetyadi. Samayah samketah. tad abhāvam vi darśayati-gangyām ity ādi. dharmāḥ mukhyártha-samavāyinaḥ. na hi pāvanatvā”disrotodharmāņām tata-gatatvena pratipattau gangā"diśabdāḥ samketitāḥ.” The idea is that the purpose of laksanā in 'gangāyām ghosah' is the properties of holiness and others, which are understood as belonging to the bank. These properties cannot be expressed by abhidhā, because no convention of the word 'ganga' has been made with reference to those qualities. What is meant is that the conventional meaning of the word 'ganga' is the stream of that river and not the properties such as
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA holiness and others. Therefore abhidhā cannot express these qualities. Mammata at K.P. II. 15d observes : "hervābhāvān na laksanā." - mukhyártha-badh hetuh." i.e. Nor is it indication for want of the three fold) cause. The cause means the triad beginning with incompatibility of the primary sense.” Laksanā cannot convey the prayojana. What is meant is this that, in 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, abhidhā gives the meaning of stream. This meaning is unsuitable and so laksaņā is resorted to and it indicates the sense of bank. This laksanā is 'prayojanavati and the prayojana or purpose is "pāvanatvā"dayo dharmāḥ." How is this prayojana arrived at ? To this question one may say that after the indicated sense viz. 'gangā tate ghosah', a second laksaņā should be resorted to and it should be supposed to indicate the sense viz. the apprehension of the properties of holiness and coolness. But Mammața holds that this is not possible, as resorting to second laksana will invoke mukhyártha-bādha etc. i.e. hetu. As there is no 'hetu' present here, there cannot be laksaņā. The word 'hervābhāva' is a collective singular. It stands for the three conditions viz. mukhyártha-bādha, tadyoga and rūļhi-prayojanányatarat. Jħalkikar (p. 59, ibid) observes : “nanu prayojana-pratipādane abhidhā'dir eva kalpito vyāpāróstu, kim vyañjanayā ity ata āha-nábhidheti; na śatkir ityarthaḥ. pāvanatvādi-pratipādane iti sesaḥ. samayábhāvād iti. samketábhāvād ityarthaḥ gangā"dipadasya śaitya-pāvanatvā”dau samketábhāvād iti yāvat. 'śaktir atiriktaḥ padárthah. tadgrāhakah sanketa iti na sadhyāviseso hetor iti bodhyam.' iti udyote spastam. uktam idam 'sa mukhyórthaḥ' iti 11 sūtre. "hetu-sādhyayoḥ sāmānādhikaranyábhāvād anumity anupapattir ato vyācaste 'gangāyām'ity ādi. tathā ca pāvanatvádikam prayojanam na gangā-padábhidhāpratipadyam gangapada-niștha-samketa-visayatvād ity evánumānam iti bhāvaḥ” it narasimhamanīsāyām spastam.
In K.P. II. 16, Mammata further observes that the indicated sense is not the primary one; neither is there lack of compatibility i.e. bādha, nor any connection with the fruit; there is no motive herein; and the word (gangā) does not fail in its expressive power.
"lakṣyam na mukhyam, nápy atra bādho
yogaḥ phalena no; na prayojanam etasmin, na ca sabdaḥ
skhald-gatiḥ.” (K.P. II. 16) In the vștti Mammața further elaborates the argument thus. - Just as the word Gangā indicates bank because it is incompatible in its primary sense of) the
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663 stream, so also if it were incompatible with reference to the bank also, then it would further indicate the purpose. But the bank is not the primary meaning of the word 'gangā', nor is there any incompatibility, and there is no connection of the bank, which is the indicated sense of the word 'gangā', with the holiness, coolness, etc., which are to be further indicated. Nor is there any purpose with reference to the purpose which is supposed to be indicated. Besides, the word Gangā, unlike the word bank, is not unable to convey the purpose. The sampradāya-prakāśini observes : "(pp. 40, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid)” - tam eva hervabhāvam vitatya darśayati - 'laksyam na mukhyam’ity ādi. mukhyártha-sambandhaḥ prayojanam skhald-gatitvam ca iti iyati laksanāyām yā sāmagrī sā vākya-pañcakena paripāryā nirastā.
tad etad vyācaste-yathā gangā-sabda ity adinā. prayojane hi laksye tatasya mukhyárthavam bādhaś ca nyāyyaḥ na ca tad ubhayam api sambhavati. samāyábhāvāt na mukhyárthatā ghosádhikaranatya-sambhavān na bad gangā-sabdábhidheyatvena abhimatasya sroto-dharmaiḥ pāvanatvā”dibhir laksyasammatais sambandhaḥ. nā’pi prayojanántaram prayojanatvena sambhavati. nā’pi gangā-sabdasya taţa iva pāvanatv ādau skhald-gatitvam, svārtha-samavāyitvāt. ittham na laksaņāyāḥ śankánkurasyā’py avakāśaḥ. Mammața further observes : (K.P. II. 17 ab.) -
“evam apy anavasthā syād
yā mūla-ksaya-kāriņī.” evam api, prayojanam cel laksyatetat prayojanántareņa, tad api prayojanántarena, iti prakrtápratītikrd anavasthā bhavet.” The sampradāyaprakāśini on this 'has - (pp. 40, 41, ibid) : atha’pi ced abhyupagamyeta, tadā prathamalaksanāyā mūlocchedi durantam dosántaram āpated ity āha - 'evam api' iti. prakrtāpratītikrd iti mūlaksaye tyasya vivrtiḥ. prakstalaksaņāyā jñaptipratibandha-kāriny anavasthā prasajet. utpatti-jñaptyor anyatarapratibandhakatvábhāve hi na anavasthādoṣaḥ, yathā-bījānkurā”dau.”
Mammața thus argues that even in this way there would be ad infinitum which will strike at the very root.
“Even in this way", means if the purpose were to be indicated it would be indicated by another purpose, that too by yet another purpose, and thus would result a 'regressus ad infinitum', causing the non-apprehension of the matter in hand.
Mammata further meets with an objection such as, the bank as possessed of

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the qualities, such as holiness, is itself indicated by the word Gangā; and the purpose for such indication is the cognition of an additional meaning than what is obtained by saying - 'A hamlet on the bank of the Gangā', thus the indication is in the qualified object. Then what is the need of suggestion ?".
"nanu pāvanatvā"di-dharma-yuktam eva tatam laksyate. gangāyās tate ghosa ity atódhikasya arthasya pratipattiś ca prayojanam iti viśişte laksaņā. tat kim vyañjanā, iti āha." To this the author replies -
"prayojanena sahitam laksaniyam na yujyate.” (17cd) kuta iti āha -
"jñānasya visayo hyayaḥ phalam anyad udāhstam.” (II. 18 ab) The idea is that the indicated sense, qualified by the purpose is not proper to be admitted because, the object of cognition is indeed different, and the result is declared to be different. Mammata observes that the object of perception etc. is a blue and the like. But the result is revelation or consciousness. Thus there is no indication with reference to the qualified object. The Sampradāyaprakāśinī has this remark (pp. 42, ibid) : “prayojana-sahitasya taţā’der laksyatvā’bhyupagamo na yukta ity arthaḥ, and also read - "guņena guņī laksyate, bāhyendriya-gocaratvarūpa-viśesa-prathanāya, ghatā”dir iti. phalam jñāna-prayojanam, prakațatā samvittir vā iti vikalpo vyavatişthate. bhārtā”dayo hi prakațībhāva-laksanam jñeyadharmam jñāna-phalam āhuḥ. vaiseșikā”dayas tu samvitti-rūpam jñātr-dharmam. samvittir anu-vyavasāyaḥ. ghața-jñānam jānāmi ity ādi jñāna-visayam jñānam, iti yāvat. prakațatā eva astu jñānaphalam, samvittir vā, na tu phalavișayayoḥ sarvathā tādātmyam upapadyata iti nişkarşaḥ.”
In the above discussion we have noticed Mammața's words in the vștti under II. 16 that: “nā’pi gangā-sabdaḥ tatam iva prayojanam pratipādayitum samarthah.” meaning, “Besides the word Gangā, unlike the word bank, is not unable to convey the purpose." Here commentators notice the reading 'samarthah' for 'a-samarthah'. With 'samarthah', the vștti is explained as, “yathā ganga-śabdaḥ mukhyártha-bādhādikam apeksya eva taţam pratipādayitum samarthaḥ, tathā prayojanam pratipādayitum samartho na iti punar api vyatirekena drstāntah. ayam bhāvah-gangā śabdah tatam prayojanam ca pratipādayati. param asti bhedaḥ etayor dvayoḥ pratipādane. taţa-pratipādane gangā-śabdasya mukhyárthabādhā"di-hetu-trayasya asti apeksā. na tādrśī apekṣā prayojana-pratipādane. yatkāraṇam gangā-sabdah prayojanam vyañjanayā pratipādayati."
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665 As for the words "evam api anavasthā syāt yā mūlaksaya-kāriņi” - also note “anavasthā avasthāyāḥ sthairyasya antavattvasya abhāvaḥ. upapādya-upapādakayor a-viśrāntiḥ ity arthaḥ. upapādyam prathamam prayojanam. upapādakam dvitīyam prayojanam. punar api upapādyam dvitīyam prayojanam, upapādakam tộtīyam prayojanam. ity anena kramena prayojana-parmparāyā anantatvam.”
'mūlakṣayakāriņī means mūlasya prathama-prayojanasya kşayaḥ nāśaḥ anavabodhaḥ ity arthaḥ, tasya kāriņī, utpādayitri. The anavasthā or endless series of purposes would produce non-apprehension of the first purpose. ‘mūlaksayakāriņi is paraphrased by 'praksta-a-pratīti-krt.', which means, 'prakstam yat prathama-prayojanam tasya a-pratitih anavabodhah, tām kartoti iti." There is another kind of 'anavasthā', which is based on 'bijankura-nyāya'. That 'anavasthā is not regarded as a fault. 'mūlaksaya-kāriņi' excludes that 'anavasthā'. The udyota reads : 'etena bījā”nkurádivad anavasthā na dūsanam iti apāstam. 'mūlaksayakarīm cāhur anavasthām hi dūsanam' ity ukteh. At K.P. II. 18 bcd. Mammata observes :
viśiste laksaņā naivam
višeşāḥ syus tu lakṣite. "There is no indication with reference to the qualified object. But there would be (found) qualities in the indicated object.” He observes in the vṛtti - "tațā”dau višeşāḥ pāvanatvā”dayaḥ. te ca abhidhā-laksaņā-tātparyebhyo vyāpārántarena gamyāḥ. tac ca vyañjana-dhvananā”di-sabda-vācyam-avaśyam esitavyam. evam laksaņāmālam vyañjakatvam uktam." This means that the qualities of holiness etc. which are found in the bank etc., are apprehended by some other function than denotation, purport and indcation. And that (function) which is designated by the terms suggestion, reverberation, and illumination, and the like, must necessarily be admitted. Thus has been explained the suggestiveness based on indication
Before we end this part of the discussion it will be interesting to read Prof. Gajendragadkar's observations (pp. 318-22). On 'prayojanena-sahitam lakṣanīyam na yujyate' etc., he observes : This contains Mammața's reply to the view of the visista-lakṣaņā-vādin. A laksyártha or an indicated sense (lakṣaṇīyam) such as 'tata', qualified (sahita = visista) by the purpose such as the properties, holines others, (prayojanena = pāvanatvādinā), is not proper, that is, it is not proper to hold that a laksanā indicates a sense (= laksaniyam) qualified by purpose. This amounts to saying that it is not proper to regard “pāvanatvā"di-visista-taţa" as the lakşyártha. Hence it follows that 'viśista-lakṣaṇā' is not proper.
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA We must here note that the word 'prayojana' has been used in two senses. In the passage “nanu visiste lakṣaṇā', which explains the view of the visista-lakṣaṇāvādin, the purpose is declared to be 'adhikasya arthasya (= pāvanatvā”deh) pratipattiḥ; i.e. pāvanatvā”di-pratipattiḥ. On the other hand, in Mammața's reply to the viśista-laksaņā-vādin contained in the kārikā-“prayojanena sahitam laksaniyam na yujyate", prayojana means “pāvanatvā”di’. These two senses of prayojana must further be explained in somewhat technical terms in order to enable a student to grasp accurately the two interpretations which the kārikā-viz. "jñānasya viņayo hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhstam” yields.
The prayojana viz. pāvanatvā”di-pratipattiḥ is laksyártha-jñāna-janya (= laksyárthasya pāvanatvā"diviśista-tațasya jñānena janya. laksyárthe pāvánatvā"diviśista-tate jñāte sati pāvanatvā”di pratipattiḥ jāyate.) i.e. produced by, or arising from, the knowledge or cognition of the indicated sense viz. the bank as qualified by the properties, holiness and others. For, when we know the laksyártha viz. pāvanatvā”di-viśista-taţa, we obtain the cognition of 'pāvanatvā”di'. Thus the prayojana pāvanatvā”di-pratipattiḥ is laksyártha-jñāna-janya, which is abbreviated into jñāna-janya, or ‘janya'.
On the other hand, the prayojana pāvanatvā”di is laksyártha-janya-jñānapratīti-visaya (= laksyárthasya pāvanatvā”di višista-tațasya jñānena janyā yā pāvanatvā”di-pratītiḥ, tasyāḥ visayaḥ, arthāt pāvanatvā”dir eva.) i.e. the object of cognition (viz. pāvanatvā”di-pratītiḥ), which is produced by the knowledge of the indicated sense, (= laksyárthasya pāvanatvā”di-viśistasya tatasya jñānena janyā). When we know the laksyártha viz. the bank as qualified by the properties, holiness and others, we get the cognition of those properties. The object of this cognition is naturally those properties themselves. So the prayojana, is 'laksyártha-janya-pratīti-visaya', which is shortened into 'jñāna-janya-pratitiviṣayā', or 'janya-pratīti-visaya' or jñāpya."
Prof. Ganjendragadkar also takes great pains to explain the cryptic remark, viz. “jñānasya visayo hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhstam.” He observes (pp. 318, ibid) - This kārikā has given quite an amount of trouble to interpreters, whose expectations have very often served to canfuse the student rather than to enlighten him. This is because the logical connection between the two interpretations, which this line is intended to convey according as 'phala' and 'prayojana' (Mammața uses
se two words as synonyms) is understood in one or the other of the two senses given above, is not properly grasped.

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667 This line contains Mammata's reason why visista-laksanā can not be admitted. It enunciates a general rule or proposition and thereby it is suggested that if viśistalaksaņā were accepted, this proposition would be violated. Therefore, viśistalaksanā should not be admitted.
Before we proceed to see what this general proposition is, certain other matters must be explained.
'jñāna' in the kārikā stands for 'pramāņa'. So, when 'jñānasya' is paraphrased by 'pratyaksā"deḥ, ādi refers to anumāna, upamāna and sabda. Note - 'tāni ca pramāṇāni catvāri. tathā ca nyāyasūtram. pratyakşánumānópamāna-sabdāḥ pramāṇāni. iti' Tarkabhāṣā, section 14. We are here not concerned with pratyakşa, anumāna and upamāna, but only with sabda. For, when we understand from 'gangāyām ghosah' the sense of the hamlet situated on the bank of the Ganges, which (bank) is characterized by the properties, holiness and others, it is really a case of 'āpta-vākya’. For, there is no question here of our going to the Ganges and seeing with our own eyes the hamlet on its bank. Mammata, however, illustrates the general proposition, which is applicable to all the four pramāņas, by adducing an example of pratyakşa.
When we cognize a blue thing such as a ‘nīla-kamala', we obtain 'nīla-vastujñāna'. The fruit of this cognition can be viewed from two points of view, viz. objective and subjective. Objectively the fruit of the cognition is that the blue thing that we have cognized has obtained 'jñātatā' or 'known-ness' or 'prakațatā' or manifestness. It now differs from other blue things, because while it possesses 'jñātatā' the others do not, i.e. while it is known, the others are not. Jñātatā or prakațatā, which is thus produced in a thing, when it is known, is a vastu-darma. This is the view of the Bhātta-Mimāmakas or the followers of Kumārila Bhatta. Read - "ghatā"di-visaye jñāne jāte 'mayā jñātóyam ghataḥ' iti ghațasya jñātatā nāma kaścid dharmo jātaḥ iti anumīyate. sa ca jñānāt pūrvam a-jātatvāt jñāne jāte ca jñātatvāt, anvaya-vyatirekābhyām jñānena janyate iti avadhāryate.” - Tarkabhasā, Section 42.
Subjectively, the fruit of the above cognition is the consciousness in the form, "aham nīla-vastu jānāmi”, that arises in us when we cognise the blue thing. It is this consciousness in us that distinguishes the known blue thing from others that are not known. Mammata distinguishes this consciousness by the term 'samvittih' or self-consciousness. It is termed 'anu-vyavasāyah' or after-operation or after
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA consciousness. 'Samvitti' or 'anuvyavasāya' is an ‘ātma-dharma'. This is the view of the Prābhākara Mīmāmsakas or the followers of Prabhākarabhatta and the Naiyāyikas.
In ‘aham nīlam jānāmi' jñāna-visaya or vişaya is nīla-vastu, and jñāna-phala or phala is either 'prakațatā' or 'samvittih'. Here it will be seen that jñāna-visaya is different from 'jñāna-phala'. “nīlam aham jñnāmi iti atra 'jñāna-phalam'. “nīlam aham jānāmi iti atra jñāna-visaya-jñāna-phalayor bhedah pratīyate. - Then again, it may also be said that here visaya and phala are both different from 'jñāna’ ‘atra jñāna-visayayor bhedah jñāna-phalayoś ca bhedah pratīyete.” There are really two senses which the line under explanation yields.
We can now proceed to see what general propositions “jñānasya... udāhstam" lays down, i.e. what its two interpretations are and how they are logically connected.
(1) According to the first interpretation the general proposition here laid down is
"jñāna-visayāt jñāna-phalam anyat" e.g. jñānavisayah = nīla-vastu, jñānaphalam = prakatatā (or jñātata) or samvittih (this) in the illustration jānāmi”.
Applying the general proposition to the present case of viếista-laksanā, where we first understand prayojana in the sense in which it occurs in the kārikā, “prayojanena sahitam...”, i.e. in the sense of 'janya-pratīti-visaya' or 'jñāpya viz. pāvanatvā"di, we get the following -
jñānam = pāvanatvā”di-viśista-taţa-jñānam; jñāna-visayaḥ=pāvanátvā”diviśișța-tataḥ; jñāna-phalam : pāvanatvā”di.
Here we find that jñāna-visaya and jñāna-phala are not different. For jñānavisaya., viz. pāvanatvā”di-viśista-taţa includes 'pāvanatvā"di', in accordance with the general rule that the viśista includes the viśesaņa. Thus, as the general proposition 'jñāna-visayāt jñāna-phalam anyat' is here violated, we cannot admit viśista-laksaņā.
An objection from the visista-laksaņā-vādin (may be raised as follows) : In the above application of the general proposition to the present case, jñāna-phala is taken to be pāvanatvā"di i.e. jñāna-phala is understood to be jñāna-janyapratiti-visaya or jñāpya. In his vịtti on this line Mammaţa points out that the phala is prakațatā or samvitti. This phala is prakațatā or samvitti. This phala is

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669 not jñāna-janya-pratīti-visaya, but jñāna-janya. For, both 'prakatatā' and 'samvittih', are produced by nīla-vastu-jñāna. This means that 'phala' in 'jñānasya viņayó hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhstam' is intended by Mammața to be taken as jñāna-janya and not as 'jñāna-janya-pratītivişaya'. Pāvanatvā"di is not jñāna-janya-pratitivisaya'. Pāvanatvā"di is not jñāna-janya, because the properties are not produced by pāvanatvā”di-visaya', because it is the object of pratīti viz. pāvanatvā”di-pratīti, which is produced by jñāna viz. pāvanatvā”diviśista-taţa-jñāna. The jñāna-janya-prayojana or phala in this case is 'pāvanatvā”di-pratipattiḥ', or 'pāvanatvā”di-jñānam', because we obtain the knowledge pāvanatvā"di from the jñāna i.e. from 'pāvanatvā”di-viśista-tata jñāna'. Prayojana in this sense occurs in ‘adhikasya arthasya pratipattiś ca prayojanam'. With this jñāna-janya-phala we get the following:
jñānam = pāvanatvā"di-visista-taţa-jñānam; jñānavisayaḥ = pāvanatvā"diviśista-tatah; jñāna-phalam = pāvanatvā”dijñānam.
Here we find that jñāna-visaya and jñāna-phala are different. For, while jñānavisaya is a dravya, or substance, jñāna-phala is jñāna, which is a 'guna'. So, the general proposition 'jñāna-visayāt jñāna-phalam anyat is not violated and hence there is no objection to admit viếista-lakṣaṇā.
The answer from Mammața (could be as follows) - If taking your clue from the vịtti you want to understand 'phala' as 'jñāna-janya', we also desire to interpret the line in a different way.
(2) We now say that the general proposition which the line lays down is 'jñānāt visayaḥ, anyaḥ, jñānāt phalam ca anyat.'
What is thus established here is the distinction of visaya from jñāna (jñānavisayayor bhedah) and the distinction of phala from jñāna jñāna-phalayor bhedah). This is the second interpretaion of the line under discussion. This double distinction is found true in the case of 'nīlam aham jānāmi', thus -
jñānam = nīla-jñānam vişayah = nīlam phalam = prakațatā or samvitti.
Here as nīlam (= vișayah) and prakațatā or samvittiḥ (phalam) are different from nīla-jñānam, the general proposition which lays down jñāna-visayayor bhedaḥ and jñāna-phalayor bhedaḥ is satisfied.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Now according to the second interpretation of phala' the present case yields the following:
jñānam = pāvanatvā”di-viśisța-tata-jñānam vişayaḥ = pāvanatvā”di-viśişța-taţaḥ,
phalam = pāvanatvā"di-jñānam Here, we note that while visaya is different from jñāna, phala is not. For phala (= pāvanatvā”di-jñānam) is really included in jñāna (= pāvanatvā”di-viśista-tatajñānam), according to the rule which says that 'visista-jñāna (e.g. dandi-jñāna) includes visesana-jñāna (e.g. danda-jñāna). Therefore, that part of the general proposition which says that there should be jñāna-phalayor-bhedah is violated in viếista-laksaņā. Consequently, viśista-lakṣaṇā cannot be accepted.
It will thus be seen that the line "jñānasya visayo hy anyaḥ phalam anyad udāhstam”, yields two interpretations, which have reference to the two senses in which Mammata uses the word prayojana. Both the interpretations serve to show in their respective sphere that visista-lakṣaṇā is not possible. This is exactly the purpose for which the line under discussion is intended. Therefore, there can be no question as to which is more natural, or more correct interpretation. Both are evidently intended, whether natural or unnatural, in as much as Mammata uses the word 'prayojana' in two different senses. That he should have thus used ‘prayojana' with different senses and at places so near each other is an indication of his loose writing.” [We beg to differ with Prof. Gajendragadkar. Actually this clever use of prayojana'
silences all opposition and takes out air from any argument.] (Prof. Gajendragadkar to his satisfaction, however goes on pointing the loose use of ‘prayojana' and 'phala' by Mammața at other places in the K.P. as under] -
“Such loose use of prayojana or phala is found in other places also. Thus prayojana or phala in the sense of 'laksyártha-jñāna-janya' or 'jñānajanya' or 'janya' occurs in the following passages : (i) 'teşām śaitya-pāvanatvā”dīnām dharmāņām
nām tathā pratipādanā”tmanah prayojanacca" vrtti, on II. 9; (ii) "atra gauna-bhedayor bhede'pi tādrūpya-pratitih sarvathaivā'bhedávagamasca prayojanam”, - vștti, II. 12 abc., (iii) adhikasya arhasya pratipattiśca prayojanam”, vrtti, II. 17 ab;
(iv) phalam tu prakatatā samvittir vā. vștti, II. 18 ab. (Ref.s to kārikās follow Dr. R. C. Dwivedi's Edn.)

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Prayojana or Phala in the sense of 'jñāna-janya-pratīti-viṣaya', or janya-pratītiviṣaya or jñāpya is met with in (i) prati-pipādayiṣita-prayojana-sampratyayaḥ; vṛtti, II. 10; (ii) śuddha-bhedayos tu anya-vailakṣaṇyena a-vyabhicāreņa ca kāryakāritvā”di; vṛtti., K.P. II. 12 abc.; (iii) "prayojanam hi vyañjana-vyāpāra-gamyameva.', vṛtti. II. 13 ab; (iv) phale śabdaika-gamyétra, karikā, II. 15.a; (v) prayojanaprati-pipadayiṣaya yatra lakṣaṇaya sabda-prayogah-vṛtti, on II. 15a; (vi) yogaḥ phalena no; kārikā, II. 16. b; (vii) tadā prayojanam lakṣayet, vṛtti on II. 16.b; R. C. Dwivedi has 'tat' for 'tada'. (viii) na'pi prayojane lakṣye kiñcit prayojanam nápi ganga-sabdas-tatam-iva prayojanam pratipādayitum a-samarthaḥ, vṛtti, II. 16b; (ix) evam api iti prayojanam cet lakṣyate, vṛtti, on II. 17 ab; Dwivedi does not read 'iti' after 'api'. (10) 'prayojanena sahitam lakṣaṇīyam na yujyate' - kārikā II. 17. cd."
This long quotation from Prof. Gajendragadkar explains Mammata's position on vyañjana at the same time points out some looseness in the style of Mammata. We will proceed with the K.P. as follows - The K.P. concludes that thus, there is no indication with reference to the qualified object.
671
"visiṣte lakṣaṇā naivam” (II. 18.C). Here 'viśiste lakṣaṇā' should mean that a lakṣaṇā which indicates an object qualified by 'prayojana' viz. "pāvanatvā❞diviśista-tata", i.e. a 'visista-lakṣaṇā' is not possible. 'evam' means in this manner, i.e. because, as has been explained, a visista-lakṣaṇā involves violation of the general proposition as laid down in "jñānasya... phalam anyad udāhṛtam".
Mammața adds in II. 18d, "viseṣāḥ syus tu lakṣite" - i.e. "But properties or qualities would be found in the indicated object." The idea is that the qualities of holiness etc., which are found in the indicated sense, i.e. bank, are apprehended by some other function than denotation, purport, and indication. And that function which is designated by the terms Suggestion, Reverberation, and Illumination, and the like, must necessarily be admitted. Thus Mammața ends his treatment of suggestiveness based on indication. The words read in the K.P. are: (vṛtti, on K.P. II. 18d) - "taṭā"dau viseṣaḥ pāvanatvā"dayaḥ. te ca abhidhā-lakṣaṇā-tātparyebhyaḥ vyāpārāntareṇa gamyāḥ. tacca vyañjana-dhvanana"di-sabda-vacyam avaśyam esitavyam. evam lakṣaṇā-mūlam vyañjakatvam uktam."
The sampradaya-prakāśinī (pp. 42, ibid) reads as "viseṣaḥ syur iti. lakṣaṇāyām hi dvidhā prayojana-sampratyayaḥ. yadā dharmiņā dharmyantaram lakṣyate tada mukhyártha-dharmāḥ lakṣya-gatatvena caturtha-kakṣyāyām pratītāḥ prayojanam bhaveyuḥ, tadā phala-viṣayayor bhedāt viśiste lakṣaṇā iti sanka'pi nóditā, iti. yadā tu mukhyártha-dharmeņa a-mukhyártha-dharmo lakṣyate,

-

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA tadā prayojanatvena dharmántaram na bhavatīti tasyaiva sātiśayatva-pratītiḥ prayojanam. tadápi na višiște lakṣaṇā, sātiśayatva pratīter api caturtha-kaksyaikagocaratvād iti."
It may be noted that the function viz. vyañjanā is known by three terms such as 'vyañjanam' (= suggestion), dhvananam' (= reverberation), and 'dyotanam' (= illumination). Other terms that are also used are noted as avagamana (= implication), pratyāyana (= apprehension) and prakāśana (= manifestation). It may be interesting to note that though this third or fourth (= turīyā vịtti) function is generally known as 'vyañjanā', (and though symmetrically 'vyañjanā', naturally better corresponds with ‘abhidhā' and 'laksaņā), Mammața does not seem to have used the term 'vyañjana' even once. He seems to prefer vyañjanam' as read in, vyāpāro vyañjanā"tmakah' (perhaps here we may read vyañjanā for vyañjana); 'vyañjanānnáparā kriyā', 'vyañjanād rte'nyo vyāpārah', 'tat kim vyañjanena', ‘añjanam vyañjanam eva vyāpāraḥ', and also 'tad-yukto vyañjana-yukto'.
It may again be noted here that in 'laksaņā-mūla-vyañjana' by 'lakṣaṇā' is meant 'prayojanavatī laksaņā’. For only such a variety of laksaņā has a purpose for understanding which vyañjanā is resorted to. The udyota points out that 'laksaņāmūlatvam' means 'lakṣaṇānvaya-vyatirekánuvidhāyitvam' i.e. lakṣaṇā-mulavyañjanā follows the presence and absence of (prayojanavati) laksaņā. Wherever prayojanavati laksaņā is present, 'laksaņā-mula-vyañjana' is also present. Wherever the former is absent, the latter is also absent. It may be noted that in the second variety that we will go to consider, viz. 'abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā', this particular sense is not seen. Thus, in ‘abhidhā-mula-vyañjanā, the expression, 'abhidhā-mūla' does not mean "abhidhā'nvaya-vyatirekā'nuvidhāyitvam". For, we know that abhidha-mula-vyañjanā is not necessarily present where 'abhidhā' is present Abhidhā is present in every vācaka-word i.e. in all denotative words. But every 'vācaka' is not necessarily a 'vyañjaka'.
Mammața now starts dealing with the second variety of vyañjanā, viz. abhidhāmūla-vyañjanā. After first giving Mammata's view in full on this, we will look into
lso as found in Locana, The Rasagangādhara and also in Appayya's writing. First we will see what Mammata has to say. It may be noted that normally the followers, such as Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and others choose to follow Mammata's lead, but Jagannatha, and also Appayya have different ideas, having the source of their thought-current read in one of the three views as read in the Locana.
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673 Mammața observes :
"abhidhāmālam āha - "anekárthasya śabdasya vācakatve niyantrite,
samyogā”dyair a-vācyártha-dhi-krd-vyāprtir añjanam.” i.e. "When expressive power of the homonymous word is restricted to (one meaning) by conjunction etc., then the function that causes the apprehension of a non-expressed meaning is suggestion."
Mammața here quotes from the Vākyapadīya of Bhartshari, two kārikās (V.P. II. 317-318) which read as -
"samyogo viprayogaś ca sāhacaryam virodhitā
arthaḥ prakaranam lingam śabdasyā’nyasya sannidhiḥ, sāmarthyam auciti deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarā”dayaḥ’
śabdárthasyánavacchede viśeșa-smộti-hetavaḥ.” "Conjunction, disjunction, association, antagonism, motive, context, characteristic, proximity of another word, efficacy, propriety, place, time, gender, accent and the like-are the causes of the recollection (i.e. apprehension of a particular meaning, when there is no determination of the meaning of a word.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 45, ibid)
Mammata illustrates in his vrtti as follows. In 'Hari with conch-shell and discuss, and Hari without the conch-shell and discuss', (the word Hari is restricted) to Acyuta (by means of samyoga and viprayoga). In 'Rāma and Lakşmaņa' (the meaning is restricted) to the sons of Daśaratha (due to sāhacarya). In, 'their behaviour is as between Rāma and Arjuna' (the meaning is limited) to the sons of Bhrgu and Kệtavīrya (due to antagonism). In 'Be devoted to sthānu, for the destruction of worldly existence', (the meaning, by means of motive i.e. artha, is restricted) to śiva. In 'Deva knows all, (the meaning of 'Deva', by context) (is restricted) to 'the sense of 'you'.” In “Makaradhvaja - (one who has shark for his banner) is angry”, (the meaning, by the sign of 'makara' is restricted) to the God of love. In, “Of God, the enemy of cities”, (the word god, through proximity - śabdasya anyasya sannidhiḥ' refers) to Śiva. In 'the cuckoo intoxicated by ‘madhu' (through sāmarthya, 'madhu' means) the 'spring'. In, “May the 'mukha' of the beloved protect you", (the meaning of 'mukha', through auciti, is restricted) to propitiousness (or favourableness). In, “Here shines Parameśvara”, ('Parameśvara' has its meaning restricted, through, deśa i.e. place in form of capital) to king. In

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'Citrabhānu shines' (the word citrabhānu has its meaning restricted) to the Sun during the day and to the fire by night (through 'time', or kālah). (Due to gender, linga, the meaning of) ‘mitra' is restricted to 'suhrd' i.e. friend (in neuter gender) and to sun (in masculine gender of the word). In 'Indra-śatruh' and the like the accent does not produce as it does in the veda, the apprehension of a particular sense in poetry. By the use of ādi (in the phrase 'svarā”dayah'), gestures etc., as illustrated in the verse given below, are included. He observes : "ittham samyogā"dibhir arthántará”-bhidhāyakatve niväritépy anekárthasya śabdasya yat kvacid arthántara-pratipādanam tatra na abhidhā, niyamanāt tasyāḥ, na ca lakṣaṇā mukhyártha-bādhā”dyabhāvāt, api tu añjanam vyañjanam eva vyāpāraḥ. yathā, "bhadrā”tmano." etc. - "When by conjunction etc. the power to signify another sense has been prevented and if still at places a word, having more than one meaning, conveys another sense, there is no denotation on account of its being restricted. There is no indication either owing to the absence of incompatibility of the primary meaning etc. But it is 'añjana' i.e. vyañjana' or suggestion which alone operates.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi - pp. 47, ibid).
Mammața also observes that a word possessed of the power of suggestiveness is called the suggestive word - "tad yukto vyañjakaḥ śabdaḥ.” - II. 20. a. At II. 20. bcd Mammața observes :
“yat sórthántarayuk tathā, arthópi vyañjakas tatra sahakāritayā mataḥ.” .
“Since that (word) is so (i.e. suggestive) when connected with another sense (i.e. either expressed or indicated sense) the (other) sense also is considered to be suggestive owing to its co-operation therein.” (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 47, ibid).
We have seen that Mammața has, so far, dealt with vācaka, lāksaņika and vyañjaka words, vācya, laksya and vyangya senses, and abhidhā, lakṣaņā and śābdi-vyañjanā.
Vyañjanā is divided into śābdī and ārthī. But it may be argued that this division is not reasonable. Sabda and artha are inseparably connected together. So, it is not proper to separate them and make them the basis of two types of vyañjanā viz. śābdi and arthī. The verse, viz. bhadrā"tmano. etc. which illustrates abhidhā-mula vyañjanā, is an example of dhvani-kāvya. Now a kävya is made up of "sabdárthau". If the words in the particular verse, viz. bhadrā”tmano. etc. are regarded as 'vyañjaka' or suggestive, what about the senses therein ? Are they not suggestive ? If so, there is no point in dividing vyañjanā into śābdi and arthi. Again, in 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ', which is an illustration of laksaņā-mula-vyañjanā, the word
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Such objections are met with by Mammața in the kārikā II. 20, as quoted above. Mammața observes that a word (sah = śabdah) is said to be suggestive (tathā = vyañjakah), when it is "arthántara-yuk” i.e., "connected with another sense". Now this expression viz. “arthántarayuk”, has two senses, according as it refers to the vyañjaka word in abhidhă-mūla-vyañjanā and in lakṣaṇā-mūla-vyañjanā. In abhidhā-mūla-vyañjană a word becomes suggestive, when it is ‘arthántarayuk’ in the sense of vācyártha-yuk (= anyaḥ, vyangyárthad anyaḥ arthaḥ, arthántaram, vācyárthah ity arthah, tena yuk, yuktah). For example, in the verse, 'bhadrā"tmano.', 'kara' is suggestive of the trunk. But it is so suggestive, wher joined with the vācyártha, i.e. hand. What is meant is that 'kara' suggests the trunk only after it has expressed the hand. Thus, here the vācyártha-hand-is also suggestive. Similarly, in the other variety, viz. laksaņā-mula-vyañjanā, a word is suggestive, when it is ‘arthántara-yuk', in the sense - 'laksyártha-yuk’. E.g. in 'gangāyām ghoṣaḥ, 'gangā' is suggestive of pāvanatvā”di. But this suggestion is made only after the lakṣyártha i.e. 'taţa' is indicated. So, the laksyārtha taţa is also suggestive. Thus, in abhidhāmūla-vyañjanā, arthántara means vācyártha and in laksaņāmūla-vyañjanā, it signifies laksyártha. The sāhitya-cūļāmaņi observes : "arthántarayuk abhidheyena laksyena vā yathócitena kenacid arthena yukto bhūtvā, tathā vyañjako bhavati.” The Sampradāya-prakāśini has - atha yena nayena śabdo vyañjakas tenaiva nayenā’rthópi ity āha - ‘yat sórthántarayug iti'. yathā hi arthấntara-yogitvācchabdo vyañjakas tathā’rthópi tad-yogitvād vyañjaka ity arthaḥ. nanu ubhayasya api vyañjakatve sabda-śakti-mūlóyam artha-sakti-mūlóyam iti katham vyavasthā ity ata äha-"tatra sahakāritayā mata” iti. yataḥ śabdād arthād vā prāmukhyena vyañjana-vyāpāra-pratītih, dhvanis tanmūla iti vyapadiśyate. pradhānena hi vyapadeśā bhavanti. tad itarat tu tatra sahakārīti upapannā eva vyavasthā iti bhāvah.”
We had observed earlier that Mammata explains abhidhā-mula-vyañjanā in such cases where the vācyártha being restricted to a particular sense with the help of such factors as samyogā”di, in case of a word having multiple sense, the other sense is arrived at with the help of vyañjanā alone. This view is accepted by majority of alamkārikas of the dhvani school. But there are differences also as we had suggested above. We will go into further discussion as below.
We know that a poet very often uses such words as may have a multiple sense. He tries to achieve beauty in poetry by the application of this device. In case of the
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA use of such words having a multiple sense, one particular sense is fixed as 'prākaranika artha' or the contextual sense. When this primary meaning is once collected, the other sense, if any, springs up, or is negated. How this happens is a problem which touches both psychology and semantics. As an illustration, we may cite the words of Bāna in the Harsacarita, wherein he describes the advent of summar or 'grişma' in the following words -
"tatra kusuma-samaya-yugam upasamharan... mahākālah.” Words such as 'mahākāla' and the like are used here to convey a multiple sense. The poet tries to imagine some similarity between the summer season and Lord Siva on the strength of the common quality such as ferociousness (= bhișanatā). He has not described this similarity in clear terms, but has only suggested it. Thus poetic beauty in this illustration is manifested through upamā-dhvani or the suggestion of simile. This suggestion or dhvani here is based on such word as, 'mahākāla', and the like; and hence is termed as, 'sabda-sakti-müla-dhvani', i.e. suggestion based on the power of word.
The problem of sabda-sakti-mula-dhvani or suggestion based on the power of the word is discussed by alamkarikas right from the time of such earlier ones as Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and the like. With this is correlated the problem as to how the sense, other than the primary one, in case of a word having a multiple sense, is derived. Thus, when in case of a word having its sense been fixed through abhidhā, or the power of expression, yet another sense (the a-prākaranika i.e. non-contextual sense) flashes upon the mind; is this apprehension of the non contextual sense arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word, or not? We come across two distinct lines of thinking with reference to this problem. The first is the line of thinking as adopted by Mammața and his followers who explain the appearance of the non-contextual sense through the agency of vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word. Jagannātha and also Appayya, hold that the non-contextual sense is also collected through abhidhā or the power of expression itself. We have noted this view of Jagannātha in the chapter on abhidhā. According to him, vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word has a separate field to operate in. When the yaugikártha or the meaning derived through etymological explanation comes up on the surface once again, after first having been defeated by the primary sense, or abhidhártha, it becomes an object of vyañjanā, or the suggestive power of word, according to Jagannātha.
The roots of both these lines of thinking are to be found in the discussion on the nature and scope of śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, or suggestion based on the power
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of word, as seen in Anandavardhana (i.e. Dhvanyaloka) and in Abhinavagupta (i.e. in Locana on the Dhv.).
Anandavardhana, in Dhv. II. 2 observes that the soul of suggestion, 'with meant expressed sense (i.e. vivakṣitábhidheya) is two-fold, (i) of 'unnoticeable sequence' (i.e. asamlakṣya-krama) and (ii) of 'noticeable sequence'. (i.e. samlaksya-krama). This samlaksya-krama-dhvani or suggestion with noticeable sequence is further sub-divided into (i) śabda-śakti-mula, or 'that which is based on the power of word, and (ii) artha-śakti-mula or, 'that which is based on the power of sense.' (Dhv. II. 20). In Dhv. II. 21, the author observes that with the acceptance of sabda-śaktimula-dhvani, or suggestion based on the power of word, the scope of the figure, 'double entendre' or śleṣa would not be completely robbed off. For both operate in separate fields. The author says -
"Only that instance wherein is present a figure that is not expressed directly by any word, but conveyed solely by the suggestive power of the word itself, should be regarded as suggestion based on the power of word."
For, only a figure which is conveyed by the power of the word is intended by us to form an instance of suggestion based on the power of the word and not that all ideas so convyed are instances of this suggestion. If two ideas are manifested (simultaneously) as a result of the power of word, we have only an instance of double entendre. Thus Anandavardhana distinguishes clearly between the scope of śabda-śakti-müla-dhvani or suggestion based on the power of word, and that of śleṣa, or double entendre. He then tries to suggest that in fact, Bhaṭṭa Udbhata has pointed out that the name double entendre can apply to such instances too wherein we get the idea of another figure through the particular figure present there. And, in view of this, one might again doubt whether suggestion based upon the power of word (i.e. sabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani) can be left with any independent scope at all. To remove such a doubt, the word 'suggestive' has been used in the text. So, the idea is All instances wherein, through the power of sound, only an expressed figure is conveyed by another expressed figure, should be brought under the province of double entendre. But such instances where a new figure which appears thus to be quite different from an expressed one, will come under the scope of suggestion based upon the power of word... Even a suggested figure will not become an instance of resonance like suggestion based on the power of word, if it also gets expressed at the same time by other expressions. In such instances, we will find only expressed figure like evasive speech (vakrokti). He observes: (vṛtti, Dhv. II. 21) (pp. 72, ibid): tad ayam arthaḥ yatra śabda-śaktyā sākṣād
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alamkārántaram vācyam sat pratibhāsate sa sarvaḥ śleṣa-viṣayaḥ; yatra tu śabdaśaktyā sāmarthyā"kṣiptam vācya-vyatiriktam vyangyam eva alamkārántaram prakāśate sa dhvaner viṣayaḥ.... sa ca ākṣipto'lamkāro yatra punaḥ sabdántarena bhihita-svarūpas tatra na sabdaśakty udbhavanuraṇanarūpa-vyangyadhvani-vyavahāraḥ. tatra vakrokty ādi-vacyálamkara-vyavahāra eva."
678
After thus explaining the nature and scope of sabda-śakti-müla-dhvani or suggestion based on the power of word, and furnishing a clear-cut definition Anandavardhana supplies illustrations, such as, "atrántare kusuma-samaya-yugam upasamharan... mahākālah", and, "unnataḥ prollasad dhāraḥ... etc.".
Anandavardhana adds: "In all these examples, an extrancous meaning is conveyed by the power of the word and in order that the two meanings might not appear as entirely disconnected, we will have to postulate the relation of the standard of comparison and the object compared as existing between the two since there is justification also for doing so. Thus the double entendre we see here is not grounded on words only, as is the case when it happens to be an expressed figure only. But it is a figure suggested by the special suggestive power of the word. Thus the examples of double entendre and resonance-like suggestion are entirely different from one another. He says: "eṣu udaharaṇeṣu śabda-śaktyā prakāśamāne sati a-prākaraṇike'rthántare vakyasya a-sambanddharthá-bhidhayitvam mā prasānkṣid ity aprākaraṇika-prakaranikárthayor upamano-pameyabhāvaḥ kalpayitavyaḥ samarthyād ity artha"-kṣiptóyam śleṣo, na śabdópārūḍha iti vibhinnam eva śleṣā'nusvänopama-vyangyasya dhvaner viṣayaḥ." (Vṛtti, Dhv. II. 21, pp. 78, ibid)
Anandavardhana further observes that other figures such as virodha or paradox, vyatireka or poetic contrast etc. are also possible in the suggestion based on the power of word or sabda-śakti-mula-dhvani.
The following points emerge from Anandavardhana's presentation :
(i) He seems to accept only the suggested figure as the object of this variety of dhvani or suggestion. He does not accept the possibility of vastu-dhvani or suggestion of an idea in this variety of dhvani. This observation on his part can be disputed as we know that Mammata does accept the case of vastu-dhvani also, as part of sabda-śakti-mula-dhvani.
(ii) Anandavardhana here does not involve himself in the discussion of a topic which seems to be naturally correlated with the topic on hand, and is therefore unfailingly discussed by later writers. This is the topic concerning the collection of

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Vyañjanā an additional sense in case of word having multiple sense, when its expressed sense i.e. vācyártha is restricted to one sense, i.e. the primary sense having been determined by abhidhā or the power of expression, through operation of such factors as samyoga or conjunction, viprayoga, or disjunction, prakarana or context and the like. We have observed above that Mammata treats this collection of an extra sense as a case of abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā.
(iii) A third point to be noted is also very interesting. Out of the illustrations supplied by Anandavardhana, the first one is most note-worthy. Thus, in the illustration viz. "antrántare kusuma-samaya-yugam...” etc. what actually happens is that the etymological sense seems to emerge out forcibly on the surface after defeating the conventional sense. The word 'mahākāla' has the conventional sense i.e. rūdhyartha, of Lord Śiva. The meaning of “the terrible time” is arrived at through the agency of etymology (i.e. yogabala, yaugika). The other two illustrations are not sufficiently clear when examined from this point of view. Though of course in the illustration viz. unnataḥ prollasad dhārah..." etc. also, if we take the word 'payodhara', then even here, the other meaning of 'a cloud, seems to follow on the strength of etymology.
Before we pass over to Abhinavagupta, we will try to consider the second point as noted above. We have seen that Anandavardhana does not treat the question, viz. as to how we arrive at the apprehension of the non-contextual sense, in case of a word with multiple sense. But at Dhv. II. 31, the author observes : “Having thus explained the varieties of suggestion, the following is said in order to distinguish between suggestion and its semblance... It will be pointed out in the sequal that examples like the above illustrate subordinate suggested poetry, (i.e. guni-bhūtavyangya). But, on the other hand, resonance like suggestion is present in instances where, even after determining all the implications of the expressed sense in view of the context and so forth, we find that the expressed appears only as subsidiary to the suggested :
“yatra tu prakaraņā”di-pratipattyā nirdhārita-viśeso vācyórthaḥ punaḥ pratīyamānángatvena eva avabhāsate sosyaiva anurananarūpa-vyangyasya dhvaner mārgaḥ.” (vrtti, Dhv. II. 31, pp. 102, ibid). On this Abhinavagupta observes : “prakaranam ādir yasya śabdántara-sannidhāna-sāmarthya-lingā"des tad avagamād eva yatrárthaḥ niścita-samasta-svabhāvah.” (pp. 187, Edn. Dr. Nandi),
Herein, we may find a reference to the fact of the expressed sense or vācyártha
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA being determined by factors such as ‘prakaraṇa' or context and the like; but the question as to how the non-contextual sense is conveyed, is not touched at all.
Abhinavagupta discusses the illustration viz. "atrántare kusuma-samayayugam” etc., as given by Anandavardhana as an instance of suggestion based on the power of word. Here he gives his own views along with three other views on the question as to how the non-contextual sense is collected in case of a word having multiple sense, after its expressed sense is fixed by factors such as conjunction, or samyoga, disjunction, or viprayoga, etc. He discusses whether this non-contextual sense is gathered by vyañjanā or the power of suggestion or not. We have noticed the view of Mammata in this case and he seems to favour vyañjanā here giving rise to abhidhā-mūla-śābdī-vyañjanā. .
In order to explain the above quoted instance the Locanakāra observes : “In this illustration, the words such as 'mahā-kāla' and the like, whose power of expression is limited through the context (= prastāva) of the description of the season, and therefore who defy the dictum viz. 'avayavaprasiddheḥ samudāya-prasiddhiḥ baliyasī, i.e. the conventional sense is stronger than the etymological sense, - have their goal achieved by conveying this very sense (i.e. with reference to the season.) After this, the other sense is derived through suggestion based on the power of word, i.e. sabda-sakti-müla-dhvani."
Thus it is clear that according to Abhinavagupta, in the illustration cited above, the etymological sense - y kártha-defies the conventional sense, and is itself apprehended through suggestion based on the power of word. Locana reads as : "evam śleşálamkārasya vișayam avasthāpya dhvaner āha, 'yatra tv iti'. kusumasamayā”tmakam yad yugam māsa-dvayam tad-upasamharan. dhavalāni hrdyāni
i āpanā yena tādřk phulla-mallikānām hāso vikāsah sitimā yatra. phullamallikā-eva dhavaláttahāsósya iti tu vyākyāne 'jalada-bhujagajamity etat tulyam etat syāt. mahān ścā’sau dina-dairghya-durita-vāha-yogāt kālaḥ samayaḥ, atra stuvarṇana-prastāva-niyantritábhidhāśaktayaḥ ata eva avayava-prasiddheḥ samudāyaprasiddhir balīyasi iti nyāyam apākurvanto mahākāla-prabhrtayaḥ śabdāḥ etam evā’rtham abhidhāya krta-krtyā eva. tad anantaram arthāvagatir dhvananavyāpārād eva, śabda-śakti-mūlatvād. (pp. 154, Edn., Dr. Nandi).
It may be noted that the above discussion follows the illustration viz. atrántare, and the like. So, it becomes clear that according to Abhinavagupta, only in such instances alone, i.e. instances wherein the etymological sense - yaugikártha - emerges once more on the surface by defeating the conventional sense

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681 rūdhyartha; vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word operates. We will go to observe later in due course that Jagannātha also holds this view. Abhinavagupta does not say that in all cases of words having a multiple sense, the additional noncontextual sense is conveyed through vyañjanā or the suggestive power, as held by Mammața and his illustrious followers. Probably Mammața goes astray in interpreting Abhinavagupta's words, or he consciously begs to differ from his master. We will try to corroborate our observation by examining the other views as put forth by Abhinavagupta.
Abhinavagupta cites the view of somebody else who tries to explain how the additional non-contextual sense is collected in a poem, when a word having a multiple sense has its primary sense fixed through the agency of context and the like. He observes : (pp. 154, Locana, Dhv. II. 21, Edn. Dr. Nandi) : "atra kecin manyante - yata eteșām sabdānām pūrvam arthántare abhidhántaram drstam tatas tathāvidhérthántare drsta-tad-abhidhā-śakter eva pratipattu niyantritábhidhāśaktikebhya etebhya pratipattir dhvanana-vyāpārād-eva iti śabda-sakti-mūlakatvam vyangyarvam ca iti a-viruddham iti."
"Here, some are of the opinion that these words had their second power of expression observed with reference to the other meaning by somebody. So for him, who might have seen this abhidhā or power of expression with reference to some other meaning, these words, now with their power of expression delimited to a certain sense alone, convey the meaning through the suggestive power alone. Thus the fact of being based on the power of word (sabda-sakti-mülakatva) is not opposed to suggestive power (i.e. vyañjanā)."
We may try to elaborate the idea as below. When we use a particular word in a particular sense, - the word whose power of expression (abhidhā) with reference to another sense is already noted by us earlier, - the other sense is already in our mind in the form of a latent impression when we use the word in a particular sense at some time. In such cases, abhidhā or the power of expression becomes limited to a particular sense through the agency of context, and the like. So, it becomes clear that the poet or writer wants to convey that particular sense there. After this, through the force of latent impressions, an additional non-contextual sense dawns upon our mind in case of words having a multiple sense. This additional sense obviously cannot be the primary sense or abhidheyártha which is already determined through factors such as context i.e. prakarana and the like. So, this additional sense can be explained only through suggestion. It is termed sabda-śaktimūla because of the word being one having a multiple sense, and it is also called
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA dhvani', as it is gathered through suggestion. Here, there is no contradiction between its being 'sabda-sakti-mūla' and its being 'dhvani' simultaneously. It seems that Mammața follows this view. But for Abhinavagupta it does not seem to be acceptable as he uses the words such as : "atra kecin manyante". It seems Mammața has failed to notice the illustration viz. "atrántare..." and the like, carefully, with reference to which Abhinavagupta has earlier cited his views. So, Mammata seems to have confused Abhinavagupta's view with this view which on the authority of the Locanakāra himself is, owned by 'some others' i.e. 'kecin manyante'. Jagannātha in his discussion, cites a prima facie view which seems to be one held by Mammața. Or, perhaps Mammața knowingly begs to differ from Abhinavagupta. Thus, it becomes clear that for Abhinavagupta, who seems to follow the hint dropped by Anandavardhana as noticed by us earlier, vyañjanā or suggestive power of word seems to operate only when the etymological sense (i.e. yaugikártha) comes up in the forefront after defeating the conventional sense, i.e. ‘rūļhyartha'. On the other hand, Mammața as we have noted above seems to accept abhidhā-mūlā-śabdi-vyañjanā in case of gathering of every non-contextual sense, in case of a word having a multiple sense, whose primary sense is already determined by operation of such factors as context and the like.
Abhinavagupta further discusses other views as below : "anye tu - sā abhidhaiva dvitīyā artha-samarthyam grīşmasya bhişana-devatā-višeșa-sādřśyā”tmakam sahakāritvena yato'valambyate tato dhvanana-vyāpāra-rūpoʻcyate' iti.
"Others hold that it is a second power of expression - abhidhā. This (second power of expression) is called suggestion (dhvanana-vyāpāra-rūpa), because it takes recourse to the meaning of similarity, between the summar season and the terrible God, as an accessory (sahakāri).” (pp. 154, ibid)
The purport of this view may be put as follows : In fact, all the functions such as expression or abhidhā and the like, have 'conveying of sense' as their prime concern. These powers get different lebels on the strength of difference in accessories. Thus abhidhā or expression is one which depen upon convention or samketa. Laksaņā or indication is one that resorts to mukhyártha-bādha or the contradiction of primary sense, and the like, as its basis.
Vyañjanā or suggestive power is one that operates on the strength of context and the like to arrive at the desired sense (i.e. prayojana). In the illustration quoted above, what is in fact abhidhā or expression only, is termed vyañjanā or suggestion on the strength of the difference in accessories, in form of similarity with the terrible God such as Siva. We may also note in passing that Kuntaka also considers
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683 laksyártha, dyotitártha and vyangyártha to be just abhidhártha, on the same analogy.
cording to this view, the non-contextual sense is gathered through abhidhā or expression itself, which is termed differently on account of difference in accessories.
Abhinavagupta quotes the third view which is as follows : “According to some, both in sabda-ślesa or double entendre based on word and artha-ślesa, or that based on sense, another word is brought in; in the former, there is a clear distinction between the two words, and in the latter another word is imagined of the difference in meaning. This bringing in of another sense occurs, at times, through the power of expression or abhidhā, as when an answer is given to two questions simultaneously, e.g. 'sveto dhavati' (i.e. the white one runs, or dog runs from this place to that - śvā ito dhāvati) or as when an answer is furnished by the question itself. In all these cases, we have an expressed figure. i.e. vācyálamkāratā (i.e. such cases are instances of double entendre or ślesa). But, where another word is brought about, through the medium of the power of suggestion only, there, though the second meaning is collected on the strength of the seco be taken as implied only (for the second word by itself is gathered by virtue of the suggestive power only) - eke tu, “sabda-śleşe tāvad bhede sati śabdasya, arthaślesépi saktibhedāt sabda-bheda iti darśane dvitīyaḥ śabdas tatra ānīyate. sa ca kadācid abhidhā-vyāpārāt, yathóbhayóttaradānāya 'sveto dhāvatī · iti, praśnottarā"dau vā, tatra vācyálamkāratā, yatra tu dhvanana-vyāpārād eva śabda ānītaḥ, tatra śabdántara-balād api tad arthántaram pratipannam pratīyamānamūlatvāt pratīyamānam eva yuktam." iti. (Locana, pp. 154, ibid) -
We may analyse this view as follows : śabdaślesa or double entendre based on word occurs when there is difference in words. In artha-slesa also we have to accept difference in words on the strength of the maxim viz. that we have difference in words on account of difference in function i.e. Śakti-bheda. Now, at times, in such cases, the other word is dragged in through the power of expression or abhidhā as when two questions are asked viz. (i) who runs from here ? and (ii) the substance that runs possesses which colour? - and the answer is furnished : "sveto dhāvati", which comes as a reply to both the questions. Abhidhā or expression also operates, when a reply is furnished by the question itself, e.g. when a question is placed in the mouth of a cave (i.e. dari') asking, 'say, who am I?” - and the reply given is, "how is it that you do not recognise that which is already
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA spoken, and how is it that you harass like this? The second sense being ‘ka' and 'tha' that are spoken are to be cancelled, and the rest forms the reply : (ka-thamuktam na jānāsi kadarthayasi yat sakhe). In all these cases, only the expressed figure, called double entendre, operates.
But, when vyañjanā or the suggestive power is involved in bringing in the other word itself, then the other sense, though it follows directly from the other word and therefore should be termed as expressed only, is to be termed as suggested, because of the word itself being brought in through suggestion power.
Abhinavagupta discusses one more view which is as follows : Others hold that the other function, operating on the strength of the accessory in the form of meaning, referred to in the second view, is nothing else but a second power of expression (i.e. abhidhā) alone, which is brought back to life through (the in form of meaning). So, the second sense is only expressed, and not suggested. On gathering this second sense, the comparision between the two senses flashes forth; and this comparision (i.e. rūpaņā) is not brought about by another word, but through suggestive power alone. As we cannot imagine abhidhā or expression of any variety here, only suggestive power or vyañjanā-vyāpāra is acceptable (in this case). So, it is quite justifiable to call it 'alamkāra-dhvani' or suggestion of a figure : "itare tu, - dvitīya-paksa-vyākhyāne yad artha-sāmarthyam tena dvitīyāabhidhaiva prati-prasūyate, tataś ca dvitīyo'rthó bhidhīyata eva, na dhvanyate; tad anantaram tu tasya dvitīyárthasya pratipannasya prathamárthena prākaraṇikena yā rūpanā, sā tāvad bhavaty eva, na cā'nyatah sabdad iti, să dhvanana-vyāpārāt. tatra abhidhā-śakteḥ kasyāścid apy anāśankanīyatvāt. tasyāñ ca dvitīyā śabdaśaktir mūlam. tayā vinā rūpaņāyāḥ anutthānāt. ata eva alamkāra-dhvanir ayam iti yuktam." (pp. 156, ibid).
The purport of the fourth view seems to be that while considering the second view, it was suggested that abhidhā or expression itself, being based on the accessory in the form of meaning, is a suggestive operation (i.e. dhvananavyāpāra). Here, it is stated that in fact this second power is not at all the suggestive power. It should be directly lebelled as abhidhā or the power of expression only. Thus, the gathering of the non-contextual sense, in case of a word having a multiple sense, with its primary sense already determined through factors such as context and the like, is done through abhidhā or the power of expression itself. But the sense of comparision between the two is brought about through suggestion. Thus, alamkāra-dhvani or the suggestion of a figure takes
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Now, if we put together this fourth view, and the view held by Abhinavagupta himself, we will reach the position taken by Jagannātha. He has discussed the question elaborately. But before we move on to Jagannātha, we will move on presently with Mammata, who is the author on hand, and his foll
As observed earlier. Mammata considers vyañjanā or the suggestive power of word as two-fold, i.e. one based on word, or sābdī, and the other rooted in sense, or arthi. We have noted above under what conditions śābdī vyañjanā operates. As for, śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani, Mammața, unlike Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, accepts the possibility of a suggested idea i.e. vastu also, and not a suggested figure only, as done by the former. Thus, he seems to expand the scope of 'sabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani'.
As for ārthī vyañjanā, or suggestion based on meaning, Mammața observes the following in the beginning of ullāsa III. K.P. He observes that the meanings of these words have already been mentioned, which are three viz. expressed, indicated and suggested. Now the suggestiveness-vyañjakatā-of these three meanings is explained by Mammața, who observes : kīdṛśīty āha -
"vaktp-boddhavya-kākūnām vākya-vācyánya-sannidheḥ. prastāva-deśa-kālā”der vaišistyāt pratibhājuşām, yárthasyányártha-dhi-hetur
vyāpāro vyaktir eva sā.” III. 22. “Of what nature is it? To this the author replies - (21 cd. 22).
The function of the (three-fold) meaning, which, on account of the speciality of (i) the speaker, (ii) the person addressed, (iii) the intonation, (iv) the sentence, (v) the expressed sense, (vi) the presence of another (vii) occasion (viii) place, (ix) time and the like, causes the awareness of another meaning to persons endowed with poetic faculty, is nothing but suggestion.
The person addressed means one who is communicated with. Intonation means modulation of voice. Occasion means context. "Of the meaning - arthasya" means

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of the nature of the expressed, the indicated and the suggested." - (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 51, ibid)
Mammata supplies illustrations for all these. Jhalkikar (pp. 72, 73) observes : "atra vaisiṣtyād iti pañcamyarthaḥ sahakāritva-rupam hetutvam. tac ca tad abhāve vyañjanā'nudayad bodhyam. evam ca vaktrādi-vailakṣanya-hetukä yā pratibhānaśālinām anyárthadhiḥ taddhetu-vyāpāratvam asyāḥ svarūpam iti bodhyam iti udyote spaṣṭam. pratibhājuṣām iti anena jaḍā"dīnām vyudāsaḥ. tathā ca uktam, "sa-vāsanānām nāṭyā”dau rasasyā'nubhavo bhavet. nirvāsanās tu rangántar veśma-kuḍyā'ṣma-sannibhāḥ." iti. arthasya ity anena śabda-vyañjanānirāsaḥ eva-kāreņa abhidhā-lakṣaṇā"dīnām nirāsaḥ samketā"dy abhāvena nábhidhā ity uktam prāk (II. 15.C) anumānā"dikam tv agre nirasiṣyate. vaktrādīnām ca samkare yasya udbhaṭatā (prādhānyam) tanmūlako vyavahāraḥ."
It may be observed in passing that eventhough arthī vyañjanā is three-fold as it is based either on abhidhártha or lakṣyártha or vyangyártha, the illustrations supplied by Mammata follow the factors that give rise to the suggested sense. They are, so to say, of the mixed type, as abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā, lakṣaṇā-mūlavyañjanā and vyañjanā-mūla-vyañjana are not separately pointed out.
Mammata, at the end of ullasa III observes :
"śabda-pramāṇa-vedyórtho
vyanakty arthántaram yataḥ,
arthasya vyañjakatve tat
śabdasya sahakāritā." (III. 23) (pp. 56, ibid).
“śabdeti, na hi pramāṇántara-vedyo. vyañjakaḥ.”
"Since a meaning, cognised through the means of a word, suggests another meaning, there is co-operation of the word in the suggestiveness of the meaning." (The expression) śabda etc., means a meaning cognized through any other means is not suggestive.
This remark is very important as it rules out inference of fire through smoke as being dubbed as identical with vyañjanā, for smoke is no word. In vyañjanā the instrumentality of word, so far as poetry is concerned, is a must. Hence, we call it a process of suggestion i.e. we name it as vyañjanā as against inference or reasoning. Thus, Mahima's position does not seem to be sound. Inference arises from a 'linga' which is not a 'sabda' of poetry. Jhalkikar observes (pp. 81, ibid): tatha ca artho śabda-sāhāyyam apekṣate, evam sabdopy artha-sahāyyam apekṣate

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iti śabdártha-yugala-rūpa-kāvyasya vyañjakatvam nirbādham iti bhāva iti udyotasudhāsāgarayoḥ spastam."
The Sampradayaprakāśinī also supports vyañjana and rules out other pramāņas such as pratyakṣā"di i.e. direct perception and the like from the sphere of vyañjanā. By 'adi' obviously inference, etc. are meant "yo hy ayam artho dhvanati sa hi sabdaika-pramāṇakaḥ, na punaḥ pratyākṣā"di-pramāṇakaḥ. ataḥ śabdasya sahakāritvam. pramāṇántara-vedyasya arthasya laukikatvād vyañjakatvam prasiddham."
a
Thus it is clear that aestheticians are normally of the opinion that whatever results from art - i.e. rasa is a-laukika, and 'art' being the medium, here poetic art, the outcome is branded as "suggested" i.e. 'vyañjita'. This function, exclusive to art is called 'vyañjana', only to distinguish it from other pramāṇas in loka, or worka-day world, as they give rise to 'laukika' or worldly apprehension. It is precisely for this that Anandavardhana and his followers have named it as vyañjanā-vyāpāra which is a-laukika, i.e. not worldly, but exclusive to art of any form only.
Hemacandra in his kāvyánuśāsana follows Mammața, and under kā. śā. I. 20 speaks of the four sabda-vṛttis. He observes :
"mukhyā"dyās tac chaktayaḥ". I. 20. pp. 58 mukhyā-gaunī-lakṣaṇāvyañjakatva-rūpāḥ śaktayo vyāpārā, mukhyā"dīnām śabdānām."
He tries to furnish the definition of vyañjanā as -
"tat sakty upajanita-arthávagama-pavitrita-pratipatṛ-pratibha-sahāyā'rthadyotana-śaktir vyañjakatvam."
Vyañjakatva or suggestive power is that power which suggests a meaning, through the agency of the meaning born of that power (i.e. abhidhā, gauṇī, and lakṣaṇā) and due to the strength of pratibha i.e. poetic imagination or genius of the person to whom everything is communicated (i.e. pratipatta).
Hemacandra observes that he has not mentioned the tatparya-sakti and the tātparyártha (i.e. purport) as they are considered only with reference to a 'vakya' i.e. sentence and therefore do not strictly go with 'a word' or 'sabda'. Hemacandra, though does not specifically indulge in classification of vyañjana, but implies twofold classification when he says: "vaktrādi-vaiśiṣṭyād arthasya api vyañjakatvam.”
i.e. 'artha' is also suggestive through the speciality of the speaker and the like. By 'api' be accepts śabdasya vyañjakatvam. Thus both śabdi and arthi vyañjanās are accepted by Hemacandra, following Mammața. He also presents illustrations

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA of the speciality of the speaker etc. in like fashion. But he goes a step further and gives specific illustrations of abhidhā-mūla-vyañjanā and laksanā-mula-vyañjanā. We know that Mammata had not done this though of course he knows about it. Mammața had simply stated that “In this way suggestiveness of the indicated and the suggested sense should also be illustrated." "anena krameņa lakşya-vyangyayoś ca vyañjakatvam udāhāryam." Hemacandra fills in the gap left out by Mammaţa and gives illustrations of a-mukhyasya (arthasya) (vyañjakatvam), and vyangyasya (vyañjakatvam) also. It may be observed that by 'a-mukhya' he seems to cover both gauni-mülā and laksaņā-mūlā vyañjanā. But his illustration viz. sāhenti sahi. etc. covers only laksaņā. So, we may say that his acceptance and projection of gauni as a separate word power other then laksanā is not justifiable otherwise at every step, even in classification of dhvani he should have given separate illustrations for both.
We will now move to Jayadeva, who has compared the three powers of a word to the Gangā having three streams - "tripathagā gangā." The 'gambhīra-pravāha' is vyañjanā. The Ramā commentary observes :
"sakya-laksyántara-pratīty uttara-pratīti-janakatvam gambhīratvam.".
Thus by gambhīratva or depth (of meaning) is meant that apprehension which follows the śakya i.e. expressive and laksya i.e. indicative apprehensions. Obviously for Jayadeva thus vyañjanā is based either on abhidhā or laksaņā. He tries to furnish a definition of vyañjanā as -
"sāmmukhyam vidadhānāyāḥ
sphuţam arthántare giraḥ, katākṣa iva lolāksyāḥ
vyāpāro vyañjanā”tmakah." (Candrāloka, VII. 2.) This perhaps is not a scientific definition of vyañjanā but is only a metaphorical description of the same. It means -
Just as a heroine, to draw the attention of the hero casts a side-glance clear in its meaning, in the same way the poet's muse presented before a sensitive person resorts to a power that presents a meaning other than the expressed, indicated or of the form of purport. This power is the suggestive power of a word. Trilokīnātha Dwivedi explains in his sanskrit commentary (pp. 332, ibid) : "nāyakasya sāmmukhyam sammukhatām vidadhānāyāḥ dhārayantyāḥ, nāyaka-sāmmukham gatāyāḥ lolāksyāḥ capala-nayanāyāḥ tasyāḥ arthántare pranaya-rūpa-vyāpāre
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689 prerayantyāḥ katākṣaḥ sankoca-calanā”tmako netrayoḥ vyāpāro bhavati, katāksenaiva nāyikā nāyakam prati svábhipretam prastauti, tathaiva giro vānyāḥ, samyogā"dibhiḥ ekasmin prākaranike arthe abhidhāyām niyantritāyām arthántare pratīti-visayatām gateşu a-prākaraṇikeșv api artheșu sahrdayānām sāmmukhyam vidadhānāyāh sahrdayān prerayantyäh kavivāco vyañjanā"tmako vyāpāro bhavati.”
Clearly, Dr. Dwivedi tries to read Mammața in Jayadeva.
The Paurņamāsī also (pp. 234, 235) has a similar approach - "vyañjanāsvarūpam āha granthakāraḥ-sphuţam spastam arthántare vācya-laksyártha-bhinne sāmmukhyam pratītim. vācya-laksyártha-bhinnártha pratīti-visayatām iti yāvat. vişayatvam saptamyarthaḥ vidadhānāyāḥ giraḥ kurvataḥ śabdasya. pumsi sāmmukhyam abhilasam kurvantyāh lolāksyāh cañcaláksyāh katāksa iva netraviksepa iti. vyañjanaiva ātmā, svarūpam yasya tādņśo vyāpāro bhavati. ... The Paurnamāsī goes on quoting from Asādhara Bhatta, and Laghumañjusā, and gives a three-fold classification as vyañjanā based on abhidhā, laksaņā or vyañjanā. Illustrations given are based on both K.P. and the S.D. of Viśvanātha. Jayadeva then proceeds to classify dhvani and leaves vyañjanā at VII. 2. only.
In Ramā tikā Vaidyanāthajee observes that 'rasa' is apprehended through vyañjanā alone and hence Jayadeva has treated it in the beginning. He observes that vyañjanā is a samskāra-viśeşa born of the poetic inclination-pratibhā-(of the poet and the reader), and also born of the knowledge of the speciality of the speaker etc. It has, a prasiddha - i.e. known or a-prasiddha i.e. unknown meaning as its object. This power of word does not stand in need of such mukhyártha-bādha etc. and yields a meaning which is either connected (i.e. sambaddha) or not directly connected (i.e. a-sambaddha) with the primary sense. All this is not directly stated by Jayadeva but obviously the commentators try to read Mammața's ideas in Jayadeva and may be they are not off the target.
Vidyadhara in his Ekāvalī does not give a separate treatment to vyañjanā but while noting the nature of word-and meaning he passes some remarks. Here he has discussed the case of a word having multiple sense, but whose expressed sense is decided by factors such as samyoga"di i.e. conjunction and the like. He explains on Ekāvali II. 13, how vyañjanā vyāpāra differs from abhidhā, laksanā and tātparya. The whole discussion is based on the kavyaprakāśa of Mammata Vidyādhara observes :
"sabdam vyañjakam āhur vyāpāro vyañjanam bhaved yasya.” II. 13 ab. vyañjana-vyāpāravān sabdo vyañjakah, atra ca arthasya api sahakāritvam. vācyo laksyo vyangyas tesām artho yathā kramam vedyaḥ.” (II. 13. cd).
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA kāvyaprakaśakārena punar esām arthànām api vyañjakatvam uktam. yathā - "vaktr-boddhavya-käkūnām ..." - Vidyadhara thus follows the K.P. Mallinātha in the Taralā ţikā has given everthything that is left out by Mammața in the text.
Keśava Miśra has also followed the Kashmere tradition, in the third Marici i.e. chapter of his Alamkāra-sekhara (Edn. N.S. '26) (Bombay). He observes (III. i)
padānām vṛttayas tisrah vicitra-sahakāriņām svabhāva-vaicitrya-juşam
vyañjanā’rtha-traye’pi ca. He further observes : "tisro vịttayaḥ padānām bhavanti, śaktir laksaņā vyañjanā ca iti. ... ttīyā vịttir vyañjanā, yathā--niḥśesacyuta.' . atra adhamapadena rantum gatā'sīti vyajyate. - All this follows Mammata. Keśava also does not attempt any definition of vyañjanā. He has a remark in between : "nanu ‘ravir astam gataḥ' ity ādau tāny eva padāni katham śrotrņām vicitra-budhir utpādayanti ity ata āha - "vicitra-sahakāriņām”. Here he enumerates the factors such as context, - prakarana - and the like. He says : 'tad eva hi padam sva-rasa-samabhivyāhāraprakarana-tātparya-jñānā”dirūpa-sahakāri-bhedāt tat tad dhiyam utpādayati, danda iva gavābhyājana-gatau.”
He also discusses vyañjanā based on ādi and anta of a single pada, suggesting that all this was possible because of the inherent beautiful nature of 'padas' - "svabhāva-vaicitryajuşām”. He further observes, citing illustrations that 'sakya' i.e. expressed sense, 'laksya' i.e. indicated sense and even 'vyangya' i.e. suggested sense - all these three - can be suggestors i.e. vyañjakas. All this is done in keeping with Mammața.
Prior to this, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha also follow the lead of Mammața.
Vidyānātha in his Pratāpa-rudra-yaśobhūșaņa, kāvya-prakarana (pp. 38) accepts vyañjanā as a power of word and observes :
“anviteșu padártheșu vākyárthopaskārártham arthántara-visayaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ vyañjanā-vrttih." - i.e. vyañjanā is that power of word which gives meaning - arthāntara-which imparts beauty to the sentence-sense, meanings (in a sentence) are correlated." This he says is three-fold viz. (i) that based on sabda, (ii) that based on artha and (iii) that, based on both word and meaning - i.e. sabdárthóbhaya-sakti-mūlā. He illustrates them.
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691 Kumāraswāmī, the commentator of Vidyānātha furnishes details in his Ratnāpaņa, following Mammața. He observes : (pp. 38, ibid, Edn. Madras, 1914 A.D.)
vyañjanāvịtter lakṣaṇam āha : - anviteşv iti. padártheșu padair abhihiteșu. anviteșu ākānksā"divivaśān mithaḥ sambaddheșu satsu. samanvaya-śaktyā vākyárthe pratīta ityarthaḥ. yad vā, artha-prakaraņā”dinā prākaranikárthaparyavasitesvity arthah. etena abhidhā-nvaya-śaktyoh sati sambhave laksanāyās ca anantarabhāvi vyañjanā-vyāpāra iti sūcitam. lakṣaṇā tu samanvaya-saktisamarpitánvaya-vidhurīkarana-dhurīņatvāt anvaya-śakty-anantara-bhāviny eva ity avocauḥ abhinavaguptácārya-pādāḥ,
vākyárthasya kavya-śarīra-bhūtasya upaskārártham sobhártham vyangyarahitasya kāvyasya an-ātmaka-śarīravad acārutvād iti bhāvaḥ. vācya-laksyābhyām anyórthántaram vyangyam, tad-visayaḥ śabda-vyāpāraḥ, atra śabda-grahaņam arthasya api upa-lakṣaṇártham. ajñātárthasya śabdasya viśistasya sabdaanabhidheyasya cárthasya vyañjakarva-yogāt ubhaya-vyāpāratvábhyupagamāt. kim tu, sabdártha-sakti-mūlayor yathāyogam ekasya prādhānyam itarasya sahakāritvam, ubhaya-sakti-mūle’pi tat tad ambayor evam eva vibhāgo drastavyaḥ.
vyañjanā-vittim vibhajate; să trividhéti. atra anekárthasya śabdasya arthaprakaraņā"dibhir a-prakrtártha-vācakatve nivārite’pi tat-pratītir yat prasāda-labdhā sā śabda-śakti-mūlā. vaktr-boddhavyā”di-vaśāt sahrdayānām arthántara-pratītihetur vācyádyartha-vyāpārórtha-śaktimālā. ubaya-sambandhe tu ubhaya-śaktimālā iti vivekah.
Viśvanātha, in his Sāhityadarpaņa (I. 12 cd, 13) tries to define vyañjanā as - (12 cd) “viratāsv abhidhādyāsu yayā'rtho bodhyate parah." i.e. (vyañjanā is that power of a word) by which, when the power of expression (i.e. abhidhā) and the like are over, a (further) meaning is apprehended.
(I. 13 ab) - That power of word is called vyañjanā, and it is of both word and sense etc."
In his vịtti here, Viśvanātha observes : 'sabda-buddhi-karmaņām viramya vyāpārábhāvah' iti nayena, abhidhā-lakṣaņā-tātparyā”khyāsu tisssu vịttisu, svam svam artham bodhayitvā upaksīņāsu, yayā aparo-nyortho bodhyate, sā, sabdasya, arthasya, praksti-pratyayā"desca, śaktir vyañjana-dhvanana-gamana-pratyāyanā"di vyapadeśa-visayā vyañjanā nāma.'
Thus vyañjanā rests on both word and sense and also on parts of a word. All this follows what Anandavardhana and Mammața have clarified and illustrated to the point.
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Viśvanātha proceeds to give classification in S.D.I. 13 cd as - "abhidhā-laksanā. mūlā sabdasya vyañjanā dvidhā.”
He follows Mammața when he observes that abhidhā-mūlā vyañjanā occurs, when a word having a multiple sense has its expressed sense fixed with reference to one meaning by factors such as samyoga or conjunction etc. and yet over and above this ascertained primary sense, another (= non-contextual) meaning props up. Visvanātha quotes the two famous kārikas also as read in Mammata, and illustrates all factors such as 'samyoga' etc. accordingly.
He has some interesting discussion concerning "svarā"dayah”. Viśvanātha is also of the opinion, following Mammața that 'svara' etc. are considered only so far as veda is concerned and not with reference to kāvya or poetry and therefore it is
illustrated. Says he : (vrtti, S.D. II. 13) - "svaras tu veda eva višesa-pratīti-krn na kāvya iti tasya visayo na udāhstah.”
But then he considers an objection here. The objector holds that even in kāvya 'svara' in form of ‘kāku' i.e. intonation makes for a special apprehension. Following Bharata Muni's observation, concerning 'pātha' i.e. recitation, these (i.e. svarā"di) make for special apprehension of rasas such as the śộngāra and the like. So, says the objector, it would have been better if illustration was supplied to this effect.
To this Viśvanātha says that the objection cannot be sustained because svaras, either in form of 'kāku' or 'udātta' and the like, make for the apprehension of a special form of the suggested sense only. They do not make for the apprehension of a special sense other than the expressed as in case of a word having a multiple sense, which is a matter under discussion. For, if in case of words having multiple sense (anekártha) due to absence of delimiting factors such as context and the like, if some restriction is found due to svara, then in such cases there will arise a contingency of non-acceptance of ślesa or double entendra. It is precisely for this that someone (= Mammața) has observed, “kāvyamārge svaro na ganyate." By 'ādayah', he adds, the gestures by hand etc. are meant.
Viśvanātha's original words are : "idam ca képy asahamānāḥ āhuḥ - 'svarópi kākv adirūpaḥ kāvye višeşa-pratīti-krd eva. udātrā"di-rūpópi muneh pāțhokta-diśā śộngārā”di-rasa-visesa-pratīti-kļd eva' iti tadvișaye udāharaṇam ucitam eva, iti, - tanna; tathā hi, svarāḥ kākv ādayaḥ, udāttā”dayo vā vyangya-rūpam eva visesam pratyāyanti, na khalu prakrtóktam anekárthasya śabdasya ekártha-niyantranarūpam višeşam. kiñca yadi yatra kvacid anekártha-sabdānām prakaraņā”diniyamábhāvād-aniyantritayor apy arthayor anurūpa-svara-vaśenai-katra-niyamanam

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693 vācyam, tada tathāvidha-sthale ślesā-'nangīkāra-prasangah; na ca tathā, at eva āhuh, ślesanirūpana-prastāve - "kāvya-mārge svaro na ganyate' iti ca nayah, iti alam upajīvyānām mānyānām vyākhyānesu katāksa-niksepeņa.”
He then illustrates abhidhāmūlā vyañjanā, as in, "durgālanghita.” etc. For laksaņāmülā vyañjanā, Viśvanātha observes (S.D. II. 15)
"laksanopāsyate yasya krte, tattu prayojanam, yayā pratyāyyate să syād
vyañjanā lakṣaṇā”srayā.” i.e. laksaņā-mülā-vyañjanā is that by which the prayojana or object, for which indication is resorted to, is collected. The stock illustration cited is "gangāyām ghosah”.
After thus dealing with the sābdi-vyañjanā Visvanātha takes care of the arthi variety in a like fashion as done by Mammața. At S.D. II. 16 he cites the same factors such as vakts, boddhavya, etc. which are instrumental in giving shape to this variety of vyañjanā. He cites appropriate illustrations. Then he says that the vyanjana - arthi here - is again three-fold on account of the sense being threefold such as vācya, laksya and vyangya, (S.D. II. 17 ab). Following Mammața he also observes that both in sabdi and arthi the co-operation of both artha and śabda respectively is very much there. Here ends Viśvanātha's treatment of vyañjanā in which he has chosen to follow the lead of Mammața, who is his ‘upajivya' and 'mānya'.
As for. Appayya Dixita, we may say that his vrtti-vārttika is available only upto his treatment of laksanā, so his full concept of vyañjanā can not be traced but as he was a dhvanivādin, we can say for sure that he supported vyañjanā as an independent and supreme sabda-vyāpāra. His ideas concerning Mammata's concept of śābdi-vyañjană are noted by us in his treatment of abhidhā, wherein he rejects the view of those who hold that in case of a word having a multiple sense with its expressed meaning fixed by such factors as samyoga i.e. conjunction etc., the other meaning is apprehended through vyañjanā. No, says he. He is not inclined to take vyañjanā at all these places. This view was voiced by Abhinavagupta in his Locana as noticed by us earlier and is supported by Jagannātha as we will go to see now. In the Locana with reference to sabda-sakti-mūla-dhvani Abhinavagupta had cited different views out of which one line of thought was accepted by Mammața, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha etc., while a different line of thought was
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accepted perhaps by Anandavardhana himself, then Ācārya Abhinavagupta also and later certainly by Appayya and Jagannātha. We will pick up Jagannātha now in due course, which we had left mid-way earlier. But we may take note of the fact before hand that, though Jagannātha has come down heavily on Appayya at a number of places, he has also followed the latter's line of thought, though not confessed expressedly. This, the case of śābdīvyañjanā, and sabda-śakti-müladhvani is an instance in point that may be revealed in the following discussion.
Jagannātha - As observed earlier, Mammata holds that śabda-sakti-mūladhvani or the suggestion based on the power of word is possible when a word having a multiple sense has its non-contextual sense gathered through vyañjanā or suggestive power.
Now, as to whether the additional non-contextual sense (i.e. a-prākaranikártha) of a word having a multiple sense is collected through vyañjanā or suggestivity or not, Jagannātha first cites the prima facie view as below:
Some people are of the opinion that the knowledge of convention (i.e. samketajñāna) resides identically in all senses of a word having a multiple sense. So, people understand all the meanings of a word having a multiple sense, identically. They do not take any of the senses as either inevitable or not. Thus, when men hear words having a multiple sense, immediately on hearing them, they are reminded of all senses at a time. Then, the problem arises as to what is the exact intention or import of the speaker ? Or, what is the exact meaning meant to be conveyed by the speaker when he uses a particular word. Thus doubt arises as to the exact import of the speaker. This doubt is removed with the help of the context and the like. The hearer considers the context and the like - prakaranā”di - and tries to arrive at the sense intended by the speaker. Say, for instance, someone says, “surabhi-māmsam bhakşayati”. Now, the word 'surabhi' has a multiple sense. It gives the meanings of a cow, and also, 'fragrant, simultaneously. Resorting to context and the like, the hearer comes to the conclusion that the speaker intends to convey the second sense, viz., 'fragrant.
Thus, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the knowledge of import (i.e. tātparya-jñāna) is arrived at on the consideration of the element of context and the like, and by that, expression i.e. abhidhā becomes limited to one particular sense. After gathering the individual meaning of separate words, - padajñāna - with the help of the knowledge of import, - tātparya-jñāna-, the correlated sense - anvaya-jñāna-follows. So, at the time of the first gathering of the word-sense i.e. pada-jñāna, all the senses of a word having a multiple sense pop up simultaneously.
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695 But when the knowledge of the import (tātparya-jñāna) dawns, with the help of the contexts and the like, only one meaning is rememebered. So, it should be accepted that the sense of a word having a multiple sense, is presented twice; once when all the senses pop up simultaneously, and once more when only one sense out of many, is remembered.
Now, the question is why the second time also, all the senses do not come to mind, as happens when we hear the word for the first time? How is it that the second apprehension consists of just one sense alone ? In order to explain this fact, we will have to accept the determination of the import i.e. tātparya-nirnaya-arising out of the knowledge of the context and the like - prakaraņā"di ,, as a restrictive factor - i.e. pratibandhaka tattva; - or else, the verbal apprehension or śābda-bodha also will tend to be with reference to the multiple sense. Only on account of this the ancients such as Bhartrhari have stated that · "anavacchede visesasmrtihetavah”. Jagannātha explains : "anavacchede tatparya-samdehe, višesasmrtih ekártha-mātra-visayā-smrtih." i.e. by 'anavacchede' is meant the doubt regarding the exact import of a word. Višeşasmrti' means the memory with reference to one single sense only. Thus, when there is doubt regarding the intention of the speaker, the context and the like (i.e. samyogā”di) bring about viseșa-smrti i.e. ekárthamātra-visayā smrtiḥ, i.e. memory with reference to a single sense only.
Now, the problem that arises is as follows. In the case of 'surabhi-māmsam' the abhidhā or expression has been restricted to the sense of 'fragrant. But the husband of the sister, i.e. brother in law, is in a position to cut a joke at his wife's brother. So, when he says that, you are eating surabhi-māmsam', the other meaning of the term viz. 'beef comes in through vyañjanā or suggestive power alone, in the absence of a cow. - itthañ ca, surabhi-māmsam bhakşayati ity āder vākyāj jāyamānā dvitīyā pratītir gavādy upasthiter abhāvāt katham syād iti tad upasthity artham vyañjanā-vyāpāro'bhyupeyaḥ” (R.G. pp. 2, ibid).
It cannot be urged here that a word having a multiple sense has many powers of expression (abhidha) and that once the contextual (i.e. prākaranika) sense is settled through one power of expression, (i.e. abhidhā), the other senses are arrived at through other powers of expression (= other abhidhās). The reason is that the knowledge of context and the like, that is taken as a restrictive factor (= pratibandhaka) in the case of other senses, will continue even here, i.e. at the time of the second abhidhā also. For, if we do not accept the knowledge of context (i.e. prakaranā"di-jñāna) as restrictive (i.e. pratibandhaka), then the non-contextual
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sense (= a-prākaranikártha) will also stand to follow along with the knowledge of the contextual sense (i.e. prākaranika-jñāna). So, no need for a second abhidhā or second power of expression will arise. It is needless to suggest that the restrictive factor loses its force, once it is utilized. In fact, till the restriction lasts, the act of limiting continues. And, in fact, to imagine a second power of expression is itself unwarranted. This restriction also, does not obstruct the gathering of the second sense, through vyañjanā or suggestive power. For, vyañjanā or suggestive power is resorted to in the case of expression such as "surabhi-māmsam" and the like, only to bring in the non-contextual sense alone. If the restrictive factor (i.e. pratibandhaka) can restrict even this gathering of the non-contextual sense through suggestive power or vyañjanā, then wherein lies the importance of vyañjanā or suggestive power ? The operation of the suggestive power will itself become meaningless. So, the restrictive factor (pratibandhaka) operates only with reference to the deriving of the second sense through abhidhā or the power of expression alone, and not through vyañjanā or suggestive power also. Or, it may be thus stated, that if the restrictive factor (pratibandhaka) has the capacity to restrict the gathering of a non-contextual sense in any case, then vyañjanā or suggestive power should be deemed as potent to stimulate the existence of the noncontextual sense in all cases - (vyakti-jñānasya uttejakatva-kalpanād vā). Then only such knowledge of context and the like will be taken as restrictive, which is qualified by the absence of a stimulant in the form of suggestive power of vyañjanā. So, when the suggestive power or vyañjanā dawns, i.e. when the absence of suggestive power is over, the restriction that rests solely on the absence of suggestive power will itself disappear, and then who will be able to re flashing forth of the non-contextual sense ? It is because of this that Mammata has said, “anekárthasya śabdasya..." etc. (K.P. II. 19). After this Jagannātha proceeds to discuss the next view.
Others do not accept the view stated above. Though, even according to this second view, the second non-contextual sense is collected through vyañjanā or suggestive power only, we find brevity i.e. lāghava i.e. absence of cumbrousness, observed in this view, to a cetain extent. This view holds that in 'śābda-bodha' or verbal apprehension of a word having a multiple sense, the determination of import (i.e. tātparya-nirnaya) should inevitably be taken as the cause. So, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, eventhough many senses tend to follow, the gathering of import (tātparya-jñāna) being done through context and the
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697 like, the correlation of only that sense will be apprehended with reference to which, the import has been determined (i.e. tātparya-niscaya); no other sense will be apprehended. Thus even though many senses are presented in the beginning, correlation takes place only with reference to a single sense, with reference to which import has been determined. If we proceed with this line of thinking, we will not have to accept the position that in case of a word having a multiple sense, memory with reference only to a single sense persists; or that the occurrence of the second sense is retarded : "apare tu āhuḥ-nānárthaśabdaja-śābda-buddhau tātparya-nirnaya-hetutāyā avaśya-kalpyatvāt prathamam nānártha-śabdād anekárthopasthānépi prakaraņā”dibhis tātparya-nirnaya-herubhir utpādite tasmin yatra tātparya-nirnayaḥ tasyaiva arthasya anvaya-buddhir jāyate, nányasya iti saranau āśritāyām naika-mātra-gocara-smrty apekṣā, nā’py arthopasthāna-pratibandhakatva-kalpanam.” (R.G. pp. 2, ibid)
Even from the point of view of this second view-point, vyañjanā or suggestive power is inevitable. When import-determination (i.e. tātparyanirnaya) is taken as the cause of verbal apprehension, (śābda-bodha), in instances such as, 'surabhi-māmsam bhaksayati', and the like, the hearer gathers through the knowledge of the context that the speaker intends 'fragrant meat, and that the term, 'surabhi-māmsam', is used for that only. After this sort of determination of the intention of the speaker, verbal apprehension with reference to the intended sense alone is done through abhidhā or the power of expression, and not with reference to the non-contextual beef. But, however through practical experience, it is gathered that the sense of beef is also apprehended through that very word viz. 'surabhi-māmsam' alone. Now, in order to explain this apprehension, which other means is possible, except vyañjanā or suggestive power ? Thus, even from the second method of verbal apprehension also, the non-contextual sense is collected, in case of a word having multiple sense, through suggestive power i.e. vyañjanā alone : "evam ca prāg upadarśita-nānártha-sthale, prakaraņā"dijñānā”dhīna-tātparya-nirnayāt prākaraṇikártha-śābdabuddhau jātāyām a-tātparyavişayā’pi śābda-buddhis tasmād eva śabdāj jāyamānā, kasya vyāpārasya sādhyatām avalambatām ste vyañjanāt ?” (R.G.)
Abhidhā or the power of expression fails in this case, because importdetermination is the cause with reference to the sense apprehended through abhidhā or the power of expression but not with reference to the apprehension of the sense through vyañjanā or suggestive power. So, the non-contextual sense, in
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the case of a word having a multiple sense, is arrived at only through suggestive power alone. The apprehension born of abhidhā or the power of expression, stands in need of the knowledge of import. While, the apprehension based on the suggestive power-vyañjanā - does not always stand in need of the same.
So, this second view-point also welcomes suggestive power, or vyañjanā. According to this view, the Hari-kārikā viz. "samyogo viprayogas' ca." etc., and Mammaṭa's kārikā, viz. “anekárthasya sabdasya." etc. are adequately explained in the following way:
According to the prima-facie view, the element, viz. 'viseṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ', becomes meaningful only from the point of the first view-point: It is so, because in it a second memory is accepted with reference to the contextual sense alone. Even the element of 'vācakatva-niyantrana', or the restriction of the power of expression, as stated by Mammața, also will be adequately explained only when viewed from the first view-point, because in it the method of restricting the memory of the noncontextual sense, with the help of restriction in the form of the knowledge of the context and the like, has been accepted. Now, from this second view-point, the above quoted element of the Hari-kārikā as well as that of Mammaṭa's kārikā, will become meaningless, because, not only that in it, is not accepted the fact of a second memory in form of a single sense alone, but also the importance of the pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva or the relation of the restriction and the restricted, is not accepted.
This prima-facie view is refuted as below: In the said Harikārikā, the word 'smṛti' should not be taken as meaning 'memory' i.e. smarana, but as 'ascertainment' i.e. 'niścaya'. Thus, viseṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ would mean 'the hetus or causes that bring about ascertainment of the import i.e. tatparya-nirṇaya, with reference to the particular i.e. 'viseṣa-viṣayaka'. This element does not become redundant in the second view-point, because even gathering of import through context and the like, is accepted. When Mammața speaks of the limitation of the expressed sense, what he means is that when through the knowledge of the context and the like, the import is determined regarding a single sense, the power of expression which is capable of conveying a multiple sense, becomes favourably inclined to the state of a verbal apprehension with reference to a single sense alone. This explanation also fits in with the second view-point, because the verbal apprehension born of the power of expression, is said to be in respect of a single sense alone. So, according to the second view, the element viz. 'a-vacyárthadhi', in Mammaṭa's kārikā, would mean 'a-tātparyārtha', i.e. 'that meaning which

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699 is not intended.' And this is exactly so, because in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the non-contextual sense which is suggested only, never becomes an object of import.
The objector advances a further objection : The ‘pada-jñāna' or apprehension of the word is held to be a cause even with reference to an apprehension through suggestive power as in case of an apprehension through expression. Now, when this apprehension of a word exists, or continues, how according to the second view, can there be an apprehension of the non-contextual sense through vyañjanā or suggestive power ?
The reply is given as follows : According to the second view, first of all the word is apprehended through hearing; then the meaning of the particular word follows; then there is ascertainment of the import; then follows the verbal apprehension of the contextual sense arrived at through the power of expression; and the last step is the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through the suggestive power. Now the point is that the knowledge of the word - pada-jñāna-lasts for the first two moments and dies out in the third moment when the import is determined (i.e tātparya-nirņaya). Thus when pada-jñāna or the apprehension of the word does not continue even in the moment after the collection of the contextual sense, what to talk of its being present in the moment when there is apprehension through suggestive power (vyañjanä-janya-bodha) ? So, how can the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through suggestive power follow ? The reply is that, when there is apprehension through suggestive power in the third moment, importgathering is not done directly in the same moment. But, we find the function of import-gathering in the form of apprehension through primary sense, in the second moment, and this function continues even in the third moment. Through this relation, import-ascertainment (i.e. tātparya-nirnaya) will also continue in the third moment and the difficulty mentioned above will not occur.
Others hold that in verbal apprehension, like the limiting agent of the primary sense, the word also manifests itself as a qualifier of that sense; hence the apprehension of the primary sense itself is the knowledge of the word
It is for this reason that Bhartshari had stated : “na sósti pratyayo loke...” etc., i.e. there is no apprehension of meaning whatsoever in this world, which is not backed up by a word.
Practically, all the apprehensions of meaning are intermixed with the element of word. So, apprehension of the sense caused by the primary function - abhidhā

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janya-, which occurs prior to the apprehension due to suggestive power, - vyañjanājanya-bodha-, is itself of the form of pada-jñāna or apprehension of the word. Still others feel that by the repetition of the word having a multiple sense, apprehension of word-pada-jñāna will follow. So, the second view, which according to Jagannātha follows the Dhvanikāra, holds that in the case of a word having a multiple sense, there is resonance-like suggestion based on the power of word (i.e. śabda-śakti-mülaka-anu-rananīya vyangya). It is termed as 'one based on the power of word' or śabda-śakti-mūla, because the words used do not allow any alteration (i.e. a-parivștti-saha). This view is held by Mammața, the follower of
a : "tad ittham nānártha-sthale anukaraniyam vyañjanam sabda-saktimūlam, sabdasya parivrtty-a-sahatvāt, iti dhvani-kārānuyāyino varnayanti.” (R.G.)
Jagannātha does not accept the two views as stated above. He refutes both of these and establishes his own view. The first view is refuted as follows :
In the first view, it is stated that in the case of a word having a multiple sense, in order to get the apprehension of the contextual sense, what is required is only the existence of the contextual sense. So, eventhough for the first time all the senses pop up, we accept the presence of the contextual sense alone at the second time. But in reality, it does not seem to be like this. The objector wants to prove that there can be correlation only with reference to the contextual sense alone and not the non-contextual sense also. This very purpose of the objector, is served only by accepting as the cause, the import determination, based on the knowledge of the context and the like, with reference to verbal apprehension caused by a word having a multiple sense. Thus, import determination, tātparya-nirna knowledge of the context and the like, will cause only the apprehension of the contextual sense, and not of the non-contextual sense. So, for that, there is no necessity to recognise the second presentation with reference to the contextual sense alone. Further, even if the second presentation - upasthiti - be accepted, then also, how could one say that it would be in respect of a single sense alone - 'ekártha-mātra-visayaka' ? Because, when the material in form of pada-jñāna or knowledge of the word which causes the apprehension of the multiple sense is already present, how is it that such an apprehension of a multiple sense does not follow ? So, in view of this, even if we accept the second presentation, even then, the apprehension of the multiple sense can be avoided only when importdetermination is held to be the cause with reference to verbal apprehension (śābdabodha), caused by the word having a multiple sense. Thus, all talk about the second presentation, is baseless.
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701 Further, it cannot be stated that, in case of a word having a multiple sense, import-determination is not a cause in respect of the apprehension of the correlation of the non-contextual sense; i.e. the second recollection of sense is with reference to the contextual sense alone, and therefore, apprehension of the correlation anvaya-bodha-with reference to the non-contextual sense does not follow : and that when in the case of the recollection of the second sense, eventhough the material in form of the knowledge of the word-pada-jñāna-is there, the non-contextual sense does not become its object, the secret is that the knowledge of the context and the like, or the import-determination based on it, acts as an obstructive factor (prati-bandhaka) in respect of the recollection of the noncontextual sense. This cannot be held, because when impression born of experience, and all the material that causes that impression exists, it is difficult to understand how the particular recollection does not take place. This means that when at the time of gathering the primary sense (sakti-jñāna), both contextual and non-contextual senses are at once known, and when impressions caused by them persist in the mind, then, even in the presence of the stimulant in the form of padajñāna or knowledge of the word, how is it that only one sense, and not all the senses, follows ? Thus, all that the objector talks about the obstructive factor - 'pratibandhaka' and the like, fails to impress us : “na ca prakaranā”di-jñānam, tadadhīna-tātparya-jñānam vā parárthópasthāne pratibandhakam iti śakyam vaktum. saņskāra-tad-udbodhakayoḥ sattve, smộteḥ pratibandhasya kvā’py a-dsstatvāt.” (R.G. II. pp. 334, edn. Athavale).
Further, it is meaningless to say that this relation of the obstruction and the obstructed (pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva) is imagined only in the case of the recollection in regard to the occurrence of a multiple sense alone, and that it is not applicable to any other case. Such a talk is baseless and it goes against our practical experience. It disagrees with practical experience in the sense that leaving apart persons who do not have the full knowledge of the multiple sense in the particular case, in the case of those who have the full knowledge of all the meanings in the case of a multiple sense, (e.g. in the case of 'payo ramaṇīyam), and whose impressions of that are firm, when the words viz. 'payo ramanīyam' are utterred, both the senses, viz. those with reference to water or milk, come to t is supported by practical experience. The hearer, who knows the context explains to the new comer that the speaker's intention is here in respect of milk and not water. So, if in reality, the knowledge of the context stops the gathering of the noncontextual sense in case of word having multiple sense, then how can the hearer,
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA in the absence of the knowledge of the non-contextual sense, forbid the new-comer from taking the other sense with reference to water ? Thus, the apprehension of the non-contextual sense cannot be negated. Thus, the knowledge of the context and the like, cannot be taken as an obstructive factor (i.e. pratibandhaka), with regard to the non-contextual sense.
Having thus refuted the first view, Jagannātha takes up the refutation of the second view. According to this view, with the help of the knowledge of context and the like, the import of the speaker is ascertained as being in respect of the contextual sense. Through this cause in the form of the import-ascertainment, the apprehension of correlation of the expressed sense, takes place with regard to the contextual sense alone, and the apprehension of the non-contextual sense which follows, is through suggestive power (i.e. vyañjanā). Now, the point is whether vyañjanā or suggestive power is accepted at all places where the non-contextual sense is to be gathered in case of a word having a multiple sense, or at some places only. The first alternative is not acceptable, for if at all places the apprehension of the non-contextual sense is ascertained through suggestive power, it will be futile to accept import-ascertainment to be responsible for the apprehension of the correlation of the expressed sense in the case of a word having a multiple sense. It cannot be taken as a cause only in the apprehension of the expressed sense, and not with reference to the apprehension through vyañjanā or suggestive power. For, if once the apprehension of the non-contextual sense is accepted, then what harm is there if we accept it as caused through abhidhā or the power of expression ? So, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, if the non-contextual sense is intended at all places, then, whether it is collected through the power of expression (abhidhā) or through the power of suggestion (vyañjanā), makes no difference : "atātparyártha-bodhasya sārvatrikatve tasya śakti-jātāyām api bādhakábhāvāt.” (pp. 334, ibid, R.G. II).
The objector's view may be put as follows : In the case of a word having a multiple sense, after the meaning is presented the verbal apprehension is done with reference to the contextual sense alone and not the non-contextual sense, the import-ascertainment being done with reference to the same i.e. the contextual sense. This is supported by normal experience. To abide by this observation, only import-ascertainment is to be taken as the cause in respect of the apprehension through expression (abhidhā) in case of a word having multiple sense. Or else, verbal apprehension with reference to the non-contextual sense also will tend to follow along with that of the contextual sense, from the very beginning. Once the
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703 import-ascertainment takes place, even the verbal apprehension of the noncontextual sense is welcome, it being supported by practical experience. So, the cause, viz. import - ascertainment has apprehension of the expressed sense (abhidhā) as its result, and not the apprehension through vyañjanā or suggestive power. So, if the apprehension of all the senses, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, be held to follow through the cause in the form of importascertainment, then the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through the suggestive power, done later, will also possibly not follow. And even this is a matter of experience. So, it is better to hold import-ascertainment as the cause in respect of apprehension through the expressed sense alone. It is not advisable to accept import-ascertainment as the cause, even in respect of the unexpressed sense, because it is a matter of experience that through the power of expression, the noncontextual sense, which is not the import, is not gathered.
Jagannātha refutes this objection as follows :
It is not a happy situation that the objector is obsessed with the view that abhidhā or the power of expression can give the contextual sense alone, and not the non-contextual sense also. For, as in the instance of poetry with double entendre-such as, “sóvyād işta-bhujanga. ..." etc., wherein both the senses are derived through the power of expression (abhidhā) alone, in the same way, there is nothing which restricts us from gathering both the contextual and the noncontextual senses with the help of abhidhā or the power of expression, in the case of a word with multiple sense. : mā evam; sóvyād ista-bhujanga-hāra-valayas tvām sarvado madhavaḥ ity ādau śleșa-kavya iva prakrtépi prakstā-prakrtayor arthayor bodhasya svīkāre badhakábhāvāt.” (pp. 335, ibid, R.G. II.) - To say that, in the said instance of double entedre, both the senses are contextual, while it is not so in this case (i.e. dārstāntika), and therefore, import-ascertainment is done in respect of only one sense, i.e. the contextual alone, and it is advisable to hold that only contextual sense is gathered through the power of expression (abhidhā) - is not proper. For, the mentioning of an instance of double entendre is only meant to convey that when the simultaneous apprehension of senses throu expression is possible, it should be possible here also in case of a word having multiple sense, whose primary sense has been fixed by context such as conjunction and the like. In the case of double entendre, both the meanings are simultaneously the object of import-ascertainment, while here only one sense becomes an object; but the difference in these two cases would arise only if import-ascertainment itself is held to be the cause of apprehension through the power of expression. But in fact,
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA this is not the case, i.e. import-ascertainment cannot be deemed as the cause of apprehension through expression. Thus, being contextual or non-contextual is not a factor of serious concern causing difference. Both can be simultaneously, directly expressed : "tātparya-jnana-karanatāyā eva a-siddhatvena yugapad artha-dvaya bodhá-nupapattivācoyukter aramanīyatvāt. tādņśa-jñāna-hetutā-siddhau tu sakyeta api ittham vaktum.” (R.G. II. pp. 335, ibid)
If it is asked, viz. what then, is the use of the knowledge of import ? - then, the answer is - it is useful in determining the facts such as, "this particular word is proper with reference to this particular sense, and that this particular sense alone is the authentic sense of this particular word.” This becomes helpful in (pravstti) activity or (nivrtti) i.e. cessation from the same, when in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the hearer is baffled as to the activity or cessation by the fact of so many senses coming up at a time, import-ascertainment comes to his rescue and the hearer is activated exactly as desired by the speaker : "tarhi tātparya-jñānasya kutrópayogah iti cet, asminn arthe ayam sabdaḥ pramānam ayam arthaḥ pramāņavedya ity ādi-nirņaye pravṛtty ādyupayoginī iti gļhāņa.” (pp. 335, ibid)
In the case of a word having a multiple sense, at least, at times, there is scope for suggestive power or vyañjanā, though not always. Jagannātha discusses this point as below:
There is no reason why suggestive power should operate only at certain places and not at all places. It cannot be said that, a particular word is used by the speaker to convey the suggested sense, and that this type of apprehension of the speaker's intention itself proves the occasional occurrence (kvācitkatā) of suggestive power; because, when we do not hold at all the apprehension of import as the cause of apprehension of the suggested sense, then how can the above be acceptable to us? Even if you wish, you cannot take the knowledge of the import to be the cause in respect of the apprehension through suggestive power. For, this sort of a causeeffect relationship is faulty on account of the fault of vyatireka or logical discontinuance, and therefore it is impossible or asambhava. The idea is that a meaning eventhough not intended by the speaker, follows through vyañjanā or suggestive power e.g. in instances such as “prasasāra śanair vāyuḥ vināśe tanvi te tadā" - and the like, the sense of passing of the wind that goes down-wards in the body (i.e. apāna-vāyu), as well as the sense of the death of the heroine, is gathered through suggestive power, by all aesthetes. So, it is held that in such instances, there is a fault called obscenity (i.e. aślīlatā). Now, can we accept the import of the poet with reference to such a sense ? Of course not !: "nā'pi dvitīyah, hetor abhāvāt. vyangyártha-visayaka-kavi-tātparya-jñānam, tathā iti cet, na. vyakti-ja-bodhe,
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tātparya-jñāna-kāraṇatāyās tvayā'nabhyupagamāt; yatra'ślīlam dosas tatra aprākaraṇīkérthe sakalánubhava-siddhe, kavi-tātparyasya virahāt taj-jñānasya tādṛśa-buddhi-hetutāyā vyabhicāra-dūṣitatvāt ca." (R.G. II. pp. 335, ibid).
It cannot be held that the intelligence of the hearer is the cause in respect of the occasional occurrence of suggestive power or vyañjanā. It is necessary to hold that, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the intelligence of the hearer, apprehends even the non-contextual sense through the power of expression alone. In its absence, the restricted power of expression will ever remain so. : "atha śrotuḥ śakti-viśeşo vyakter ullāse hetuḥ, sa ca phala-balāt camatkārīṇye-várthe vyaktim ullāsayati na a-camatkāriņi, iti siddham vyañjanollāsasya kvācitkvam iti cet: na. hanta evam sa niyantrita-śakter eva ullāsakóstv iti kṛtam nanártha-sthale vyaktikalpanayā." (pp. 335, R.G. II., ibid)
Jagannatha thus accepts the apprehension of the non-contextual sense, in the case of a word having a multiple sense, through the power of expression (i.e. abhidhā) alone. He says that, in the case of a hearer who has not forgotten the other (i.e. non-contextual) sense, both the senses will follow in instances, such as, "ullāsya kāla-karavāla. ..." etc. For one, who has forgotten the expression with reference to the other sense, even suggestive power will fail to help 'kiñ ca, "ullāsya kala-karawala-mahámbuvaham", ity ādi nanártha-vyañjakasthale agṛhīta-dvitiyártha-śaktikasya gṛhīta-vismṛta-dvitīyártha-śaktikasya vā pumsah sarvathaiva vyañjanaya dvitiyártha-bodhá-'nudayat tatra tayā tadāpattis tava durvārā' (pp. 335, R.G. II, ibid)
Further, it cannot be held that suggestive power (i.e. vyañjanā) takes place with reference to only that word, the primary sense of which is gathered by the hearer. For, in that case, the instances such as: nihseṣa-cyuta-candana. etc., and the like, the suggested sense of dalliance will not follow, because nobody has known the power of expression with reference to the sense of dalliance in the case of the word, 'adhama'. However, if the objector insists upon the fact that there is the knowledge of the meaning of dalliance through abhidhā or expression in the case of the word viz. ‘adhama', then the siddhantin says that in that case the meaning of dalliance will be collected through the power of expression itself and to imagine vyañjanā or suggestive power in this respect, will be useless.
Jagannatha holds that 'gaurava-dosa' or, the fault of cumbrousness would occur if the apprehension of the expressed sense is held to be the cause of the occurrence of suggestive power. It has been already proved that the apprehension of the non-contextual sense is done through the knowledge of the expressed sense,

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA which is held to be the cause of the occurrence of suggestive power by the pri facie view. The idea of restriction (to the contextual sense alone) has already been discarded earlier. Jagannātha explains this on the analogy of - 'tad hetor eva tad astu, kim tat-kalpanayā’ - i.e. when an effect is explained by the cause, why imagine an additional cause in between ? Thus, Jagannātha repudiates the idea of the apprehension of the non-contextual sense through suggestive-power, based on the apprehension of the expressed sense. He accepts the apprehension of the noncontextual sense through the power of expression (sakti) itself : na ca nānárthavyañjana-sthale eva evamjātīyakaḥ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ kalpyate, tatra ca śakter niyantritatvena, tad-grahasyā'prayojakatayā vyakti-kalpanaucityād iti vācyam; navīna-karya-kāraṇabhāva-kalpane gaurava-prasangāt. niyantraṇasya pūrvam eva dūsitatvena tad hetor eva iti nyāyávatārāc ca.” (pp. 335, 6, R.G. II, ibid).
The objector puts forth one more argument to defend his position. He says that the view of the siddhāntin viz. that even the gathering of the non-contextual sense is also through expression alone (i.e. abhidhā) can be accepted only under certain circumstances. As for example, when the non-contextual sense is totally sublated or contradicted (bādhita) as in the case of : 'jaiminīyam alam dhatte rasanāyām. ..." etc., and the like; how can it be arrived at through abhidhā or the power of expression ? The ascertainment of contradiction (bādha-niscaya) in the form of its being characterized by its absence (tad-abhāva-vattā), acts as a restriction (pratibandhaka) in the knowledge of its being characterised by the same (tadvattājñāna). In this case, abhidhā or the power of expression will not serve the purpose as in instances like - vahninā siñcati - i.e. he sprinkles with fire. While, vyañjanā or suggestive power can apprehend even the sense which is contradicted (bādhitártha). So, at least in such instances, the siddhāntin will have to take recourse to suggestive power : “atha astu aprākaranikópy arthaḥ śaktivedyaḥ - eva anvaya-dhi-gocaraḥ; paramtu yatra na bādhitaḥ syāt. yatra tu bādhitas tatra "jaiminīyam alam dhatte rasanāyām ayam dvijaḥ” ity ādau, jugupsitórtho, 'vahninā siñcati' ity adau vahni-karana-seka iva a-bodhopahata eva syāt. bādha-niścayasya tad-vattā-jñānam prati pratibandhakatāyāḥ sarvajana-siddhatvāt. vyaktes tu badhitártha-bodhakatvam dharmi-grāhaka-māna-siddham iti vyakti-vādinām adosa iti.” (pp. 336, R.G. II, ibid)
Jagannātha refutes this by advancing proper arguments. He says that in the instances such as “gām avatīrṇā satyam sarasvatiyam patañjali-vyājār”, or "saudhānām nagarasyā’sya milanty arkeņa maulayaḥ”, etc. the abhidhártha or the expressed sense, though contradicted, i.e. bādhita, is yet apprehended. Here also,

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707 this same analogy is applicable. The case of a word having a multiple sense, should be treated on a par. If we do not accept this, then we will have to accept vyañjanā or suggestive power in case of practically all the figures wherein the direct sense is mostly contradicted. On the other hand, general opinion is that the alamkāras or figures are expressed only, and not suggested.
Jagannātha, at the end of the discussion declares that, “tasmāt nānárthasya aprākaraṇike’rthe vyañjanā iti prācām siddhāntaḥ śithila eva.” (pp. 336, ibid) yet, he seems to accept one point made by the ancients, and it is that the comparision between the contextual and the non-contextual is always suggested : mā evam; 'gām avatīrṇā satyam sarasvatiyam patañjali-vyājāt', "saudhānām nagarasyā’sya mīlanty arkeņa maulayah', ity adau vācyárthánvayópapādanāyā’nusaranīyena yatnena nānártha-sthalépi bādhitártha-bodhasyópapattiḥ syāt, anyathā prāyaśaḥ sarveșy apyalamkāreșu vācyártha-bodhópapattaye vyañjanängīkaranīyā syāt. (pp. 336 - ibid, R.G. II).
Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta have also accepted this. Jagannātha clarifies his position as to when exactly suggestive power operates, in the words viz.evam api yoga-rūdhisthale rūdhi-jñānena yogā’paharaṇasya sakala-tantra-siddhatayā, rūdhy anadhi-karaṇasya yogārthā”lingitasya arthántarasya vyaktim vinā patītir durupapādā (pp. 347, R.G. II, ibid). - i.e. when through one and the same yoga-rūdha' word, when once the rūdhyartha or conventional sense is gathered, we have a later apprehension of the yogártha i.e. etymological sense, also. This is not done through abhidhā or the power of direct expression, because in that apprehension, the yoga-śakti or the power of etymology which acts as an accessory has been already once contradicted by the force of convention - rūdhi-sakti. So, in the absence of any other alternative, we will have to resort to suggestive power, in order to explain this later apprehension of the etymological sense. This is the field for the suggestion based on the power of word, i.e. sabda-sakti-mūla-dhvani, e.g. -
"abalānām śriyam hștvā vārivāhaiḥ sahā'niśam, tișthanti capalāḥ yatra sa kālaḥ sam upā”gataḥ.” So, observes Jagannātha"yogarūdhasya śabdasya yoge rūdhyā niyantrite,
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dhiyam yoga-spṛśórthasya
yā sūte vyañjanaiva sā." (pp. 348, ibid)
He accepts both the varieties viz. alamkara-dhvani or the suggestion of figure, and vastudhvani i.e. the suggestion of an idea in the case of sabda-śakti-muladhvani or suggestion based on word. He does not accept suggestive power or vyañjana in order to derive non-contextual sense in case of a word having a multiple sense but as noted above, he accepts vyañjanā or suggestive power only when there is later apprhension, of the etymological sense which was once suppressed by the conventional sense.
SAHṚDAYALOKA
To conclude, we may observe that Anandavardhana has not discussed the problem of how the non-contextual sense in case of a word having multiple sense with its primary sense fixed by factors such as conjunction and the like, is collected. But from one of his illustrations, as observed earlier, it becomes clear that probably Anandavardhana favours the line accepted by Jagannatha and accepts vyañjanā or suggestive power, when etymological sense-yaugikártha - comes once more to the foreground, after defeating the conventional sense. He accepts that in case of suggestion based on the power of word or sabda-śakti-müla-dhvani, the comparision between the contextual and the non-contextual senses is derived through vyañjana or the suggestive power of word. Further, he accepts only the alamkara-dhvani or the suggestion of a figure as a variety of sabda-śakti-muladhvani or suggestion based on the power of word. He does not welcome the case of vastu-dhvani or suggestion of an idea as a variety in this case.
Abhinavagupta also accepts all this, as he follows Anandavardhana. He has also cited different views as to how a non-contextual sense of a word having multiple sense, is collected. One of these views is accepted by Mammața, Hemacandra, Vidyadhara and Viśvanatha. Another line of thought gains ground with Appayya and Jagannatha.
Mammata also accepts vastu-dhvani or suggestion of an idea in case of sabdaśakti-mula-dhvani and thus expands its scope which is supported even by Appayya and Jagannatha.
Appayya and Jagannatha accept śābdī-abhidha-mula-vyañjanā only in cases where yaugikártha, once defeated by the vācyártha, fixed by samyoga"di in case of a word having a multiple sense, once again is preferred. This is the scope of abhidha-mula-śābdī-vyañjanā for Appayya and Jagannatha.

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709 Thus, vyañjanā supported by Anandavardhana as an independent sabda-śakti in his Dhvanyaloka, the first available written document on this topic, passes through several phases and is finally established by Mammaţa, following the lead of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and also by his illustrious supporters beginning with ācārya Hemacandra, down to Appayya Dixit and Jagannātha, the latter two of course differing from Mammata with reference to abhidhāmula-ārthivyañjana. We have seen how challanges came from Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahima and Dhananjaya and Dhanika in a way. We will discuss the challanges to vyañjanā in the following chapter. These challanges in a way cover the challanges to the concept of dhvani in general also.
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Chapter IX Vyañjana-virodha
or, opposition to suggestive power
We have observed in the earlier chapter that Anandavardhana establishes vyañjanā as an independent word-power by distinguishing it first from abhidha and then lakṣaṇā. He also sees to it how vyañjana is at the root of the thinking of the grammarians and that the Mimāmsakas have to accept vyañjanā in worldly context to safeguard their own theoretical position. The author of the Dhvanyaloka also goes to establish how the Naiyāyikas can not afford to challange the concept of vyañjanā. Thus, in a way Anandavardhana has started giving a thought to, and silencing the opposition to vyañjanā. But it is more in the Locana of Abhinavagupta that we come across a more pronounced opposition to suggestive power and therefore also a greater effort to silence, the same. We have seen that the dārśanikas, Mimāmsakas, Vaiyākaraṇas and Naiyāyikas had no business to deal with vyañjanā in their śastric context and therefore no vyañjana-virodha raises its head in their works. But while dealing with the worldly use of language in the ordinary parlance, as well as in the poetic use of language, there was a scope of difference concerning the acceptance and operation of this fourth-turīya-power of word, i.e. vyañjana-vṛtti. We have seen how certain alamkarikas as Mukula and Mahima later challange this concept of vyañjanā and subsume it under abhidhā/ lakṣaṇā and anumiti. There could have been some forgotten alamkarikas also who might have taken recourse to the śastrit position held by various dārśanikas and without caring to imagine the possible response to the poetic use of language, must have tried to oppose the fact of vyañjanā in poetry, i.e. kāvya. It is such imagined opposition which is being taken care of, scrutinized and ultimately rejected by the Locanakāra, i.e. Abhinavagupta, especially under Dhv. I. iv. The whole thing is placed more methodically later by Mammata and his followers such as Hemacnadra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and most effectively by Viśvanatha. We will
-

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711 look into this very carefully as follows : Abhinavagupta : Under Dhy. I. iv. commenting on the illustration of
māna i.e. implicit sense, such as "bhrama, dharmika.” - etc. the Locanakāra establishes vyañjanā as a separate and independent word power, after silencing all possible opposition. He deals with various possible objections, the first being the "abhihitánvaya-vādins” - or Mimāmsakas who follow the lead of Kumārila Bhatta and accept a tātparyā-vṛtti and tātparyártha i.e. 'purport' and 'import' respectively. The objection raised by the abhihitánvayavādins, or tātparya-vādins reads as follows: (pp. 26, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid) :
"nanu tātparya-śaktir a-paryavasitā vivaksayā dịpta-dhārmika-tad-ādipadárthánanvaya-rūpa-mukhyártha-bādha-balena virodha-nimittayā viparītalaksanayā ca vākyárthībhūta-niședha-pratītim abhihitánvaya-dịśā karotīti śabdaśakti-mūla eva sórthaḥ. evam anenoktam iti hi vyavahāraḥ. tan na vācyátiriktónyórthaḥ iti."
i.e. "Here (= in this illustration, the tātparya sakti or purport is not terminated in form of import of the speaker. (i.e. the intention of the speaker is not fulfilled). There is ‘mukhyártha-bādha' i.e. contradiction of primary meaning in case of words such as 'drpta', 'dhārmika' and 'tat', etc., on account of the speakers intention. Thus viparīta-laksaņā on the strength of virodha occurs here and the sense of negation follows as sentence-sense, which is according to the abhihitánvaya-vāda. Thus the meaning is sabda-śakti-mülaka. The normal course of behaviour takes the form of, "Thus, he said." So, there is no meaning (such as suggested) over and above the expressed sense." The idea can be elaborated as follows : It can be said here that the termination of tātparya-sakti is not in bhramana-vidhi - i.e. the positive sense of free movement. Words are used in such a form that free movement is not at all intended. (i) 'Dhārmika' here means you are a pious person, a holy man and how can you ever face a lion physically ? (ii) In ‘tena dịpta-simhena', the pronoun ‘tena' means that there is no doubt of the existence of lion. Its existence is well-known and even you, a holy man, must have heard about the same. (iii) drpta' means that the lion is no ordinary animal, but is very ferocious and dangerous. Thus due to the usage of these special words, there is opposition to free movement. Thus following the lead of abhihitánvaya-vāda, through viparīta-lakṣaṇā or indication based on contradiction, the sense tends to yield a negative sense. Thus, the sense of negation is derived through śabda-śakti i.e. word-power itself. In normal usage it is always said, “He said this, or he spoke thus.” Nobody says, “He suggested this.” Thus, here also the ultimate sense is not different from the expressed sense.
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Abhinavagupta does not accept this : We know that in the abhihitánvayavāda, we have abhidhā yielding the individual word-sense, in a given sentence. Then on account of expectancy-ākāńksā, compatibility i.e. yogyatā and sannidhi or proximity the words form a sentence and word-senses give a sentence-sense. The abhidhā-výtti or the word-power of expression by itself does not give the sentencesense, or vākyártha. This is so because if otherwise, we arrive at ānantya-dosa. Abhidhā has the power to yield word-meaning on the strength of sanketa or convention. There cannot be convention with referenc to a whole sentence, for if abhidhā is accepted with reference to a sentence then we will have to accept innumerable powers. Thus the contingency-dosa-of 'ānantya' or accepting innumerable powers follows. Again if we accept abhidhā with reference to a given sentence, then, in case of common words found in another sentence having a different abhidhā, we will have to accept convention to the same effect. Thus, there will be 'vyabhicāra-dosa'. Thus, if we accept different convention with two different sentences as “gām ānaya” and “gām naya”, there will be anantya-dosa. If we accept 'sanketa' only with reference to the first sentence, then we will have to let go this principle viz. that, 'only that meaning is congnised with reference to which, a convention is fixed.' This is vyabhicāra or niyamā’tikramana. Thus, it has to be accepted that through abhidhā-sakti only a word-meaning is apprehended. The sentence-meaning is never apprehended through the agency of abhidhā-sakti. We will have to accept tātparya-sakti or purport to collect what we call a 'sentencesense'. In a statement such as "gām ānaya”. the word 'gām' means 'a cow', and by 'ānaya' is meant, “bring", i.e. the process of bringing i.e. 'ānayanā’nukūlavyāpārah'. In the word 'gām' there is no meaning of "ānayanánukūla-vyāpāranirūpita-karmatva". So, this sense is the meaning of a whole sentence and the power of a sentence is termed tātparya-vrtti, which yields the sentence-sense. It is stated, "sāmānyāni anyathā-siddhe visesam gamayanti hi." i.e. when an individual meaning can not be apprehended by other means, the general meaning itself yields the individual meaning.' Thus, according to the abhihitánvayavādins two functions viz. abhidhā and tātparya become instrumental in bringing about the sentencesense. When the tātparya-vịtti is over, a third power called laksaņā or indication is also imagined. After the sentence-sense is collected, if the intention of the speaker is not conveyed, - i.e. in case of 'tātparyā’nupapatti', the primary meaning is contradicted and another meaning connected with it (sambaddha) is apprehended. This third stage is called laksaņā or indication. Thus in abhihitánvayavāda there are three stages viz. abhidhā, tātparya and laksaņā. Abhidhā gives the individual word
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713 meaning, tātparya-vștti gives the correlated (anvita) sentence-sense, through ākānkā'di factors. If there is some difficulty in these factors, the senter not follow. Then, given fulfilment of the conditions of laksaņā, such as mukhyártha-bādha etc., lakṣaṇā follows, e.g. in statements such as "gangāyām ghosah”, “simhaḥ ayam bālah", etc. But, says Abhinavagupta, in the illustration on hand viz. "bhrama dhārmika." etc., there is no contradiction in correlation; i.e. the ‘anvaya' is not 'bādhita', and hence there is no scope for what the objector calls, "viparita-laksanā.” or indication based on contradiction. There is neither mukhyártha-bādha nor viparīta-laksaņā.
Abhinavagupta says that even if some how we accept contradiction of primary sense, then also it does not happen at the second stage : “bhavatu vā asau. tathā'pi dvitiya-sthāna-samkrāntā tāvad asau na bhavati.” The position is this. Laksanā is imagined to be there (i.e. its 'kalpanā' is done) when there is contradiction of primary sense. This happens when there is sense of opposition i.e. virodha, which could be two-fold. The virodha can occur with reference to the inherent quality of words used (i.e. svātmani) or with reference to the correlation (i.e. anvaya). The present statement is that, "the dog is killed by a lion. So, you can move freely." Here too there is no inherent contradiction of words used. So, we have to accept it with reference to the anvaya i.e. co-rrelation. But correlation is never contradicted before its being apprehended. Now the apprehension of correlation is never brought about by abhidhā or primary function, which is consumed only in giving the primary individual word-sense. Thus it cannot proceed intermitantly. So, correlation has to be apprehended by what we called purport i.e. tātparya-vrtti alone. The idea is that even in case of a laksanā, such as in statement as 'simhóyam batuh' - the anvaya or correlation between 'simha' and 'batu' is first established by ākānksā, the form of which is the apprehension of the identity between 'simha' and 'batu'. After this correlation is once established, then only there is apprehension of contradiction : “na ca a-pratipanne anvaye virodha-pratītiḥ. pratipattiśca anvayasya na abhidhā-śaktyā; tasyāḥ padártha-pratīti-upakṣitāyā viramya vyāpārábhāvāt, iti tātparya-śaktyā eva anvaya-pratipattiḥ.” (pp. 26, ibid).
The objector says that if you accept correlation in places of contradiction then in statements like, "angulyagre kavivara-satam", you will have to accept correlation i.e. anvaya. The answer to this is that when 'sā”kānksatva' and 'padárthopasthiti' are present what stops us from ‘anvaya' being apprehended even here ? In words having no expectancy - i.e. nirākānksa - there is no correlation-anvaya-as in case of 'daśa dādimāni, şad apūpāḥ, dandam, ajājnām...' etc. The illustration is read in

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the Mahābhāsya. There is no anvaya of these padas merely by they being read together - i.e. by sankalana-mātra. But in case of our illustration, 'anvaya' is bound to take place. But in such cases as 'simho batuh', inspite of anvaya, the sentence is rendered false - i.e. a-pramāņika, by pratyakşa-pramāņa or direct perception. If it is asked that in that case, will a statement such as, "simho batuh" be fal answer is that such statements are of course contradicted by pratyakşa-pramāna, i.e. direct perception, but laksaņā comes to the help and saves the situation, and the falsity of the statement is removed.
The objector now says, “In case of prayojanavati laksanā” i.e. indication with motive, you accept vyañjanā in the apprehension of motive. This happens in case of "simho batuh" where the exceptional bravery of the child is apprehended through suggestivity. Now, if you accept 'dhvanana' suggestion, which is the soul of poetry - "Kāvya-ātma', then you have to accept such statements as “simho basuh” also as poetry because of the presence of suggestion.
The answer is that soul is omni-present. That way it is present in a pot also. But how is it that we do not take a pot as a living being ? In the same way though suggestion is present, 'simho batuh' is not poetry. If the objector says that soul is said to be present in a body having hands, feet etc., i.e. where special parts of a body are seen, then we also say that "kāvya' is said to be there which has a body of word and sense properly decorated by gunas or excellences and alamkāras i.e. figures of speech etc. and with such a body and suggestion as soul, we use the term poetry : gunālankāra-aucitya-sundara-sabdartha-sarirasya sati dhvanana"khya'tman kāvya-rūpatā-vyavahāraḥ.” (Locana, pp. 28, ibid). Thus, as in case of the soul being omni-present, on account of absence of consciousness, the soul does not become a useless entity in case of a pot, in the same way even in the presence of suggestivity, in the absence of poetry, the soul called dhvanna does not become useless. “na ca ātmanósāratā kācid iti samānam.” (pp. 28, Locana, ibid). observes Abhinavagupta.
So, now what remains to be discussed is whether dhvani' can be said to be covered in the third stage called laksanā or not? The short answer to this is that 'bhakti' or 'laksaņā' rests with the third stage, while dhvanana-vāpāra rests in the fourth stage : "na ca evam bhaktir eva dhvaniḥ; bhaktir hi lakṣaṇā vyāpāras tộtīyakaksyā-niveśī. caturthyām tu kaksyāyām dhvanana-vyāpāraḥ.” (pp. 28, ibid). "surely, metaphorical expression or logical implication is not suggestion. The former is indication resting in the third stage. The suggestive function rests in the
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715 fourth stage.” The supporters of indication accept that laksaņā or indication occurs when three conditions are fulfilled. Here mukhyártha-bādhā i.e. contradiction of primary sense depends on means of knowledge such as direct perception and the like. Even what is called 'nimitta' is also collected through other means of knowledge. But in case of "gangāyām ghosah” the extreme sanctity of the hamlet, its extreme coolness, etc. which are qualities in form of motive - i.e. prayojana - can not be conveyed by other words and this prayojana is also not apprehended by other means of knowledge, but is apprehended through the efficacy of word itself. So, it cannot be said that there is no use of word element : yat tu idam ghosasya atipavitratva-śītalatva-sevyatvā"dikam prayojanam, a-śabdántara-vācyam, pramāņántara-apratipannam, bator vā parākramátiśaya-śālitvam, tatra śabdasya na tāvan na vyāpārah.” (Locana, pp. 28, ibid) : Abhinavagupta clearly implies that the motive is collected only through the instumentality of word alone, and not through any other means of knowledge i.e. smrti, anumiti, etc., as done later by Mahimā and others.
Abhinavagupta elaborates his argument as follows - In laksanā, the first condition is contradiction of the primary sense i.e. mukhyártha-bādha. Now this beocmes clear with the help of direct perception or pratyakşa, the other condition is 'sakyártha-sambandha'. i.e. relation with the primary sense. These relations are manifold such as samipya i.e. closeness, sādrśya i.e. similarity etc. This relation isalso supported by direct perception or such other means of knowledge. The third condition of prayojanavati laksaņā or indication based on motive, is apprehension of motive - 'prayojana-pratipatti'. In the sentence 'gangāyām ghosah', the extreme holiness of the village and its coolness, and its being habitable make for the prayojana br motive. So also in the sentence viz. “simho batuh”, the great valour of the child is the motive. Abhinavagupta argues that you cannot say that the apprehension of this motive is not through the agency of the power of word-tatra śabdasya na tāvan na vyāpārah. For, if you do not accept the power of word as a means to the realisation of motive in these cases, then you have to admit either inference i.e. anumāna or smrti i.e. recollection or memory as a means of knowledge.
In case of an anumāna or inference, the procedure will be like this - The bank, i.e. the bank of the Gangā is having qualities of extreme holiness, purity etc., as it is close to the Gangā. The vyāpti - i.e. invariable concomitance will be like this - "whatever is close to the Gangā is pure, holy, as are the ascetics near the Gangā.” But this vyāpti is not all-pervasive (i.e. it is a-vyāpta), as we find skulls, bones etc.

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also scattered near the Gangā and they are not accepted as holy. Thus there is "an anaikántikatā hetu-dosa” i.e. logical fallacy of being unsteady, or variable. (i.e. the fallacy of undistributed middle) - The inference therefore will be a-prāmānika i.e. invalid. In the same way in 'simho batuh' the inference will proceed as, “This child is gifted with the qualities of a lion, because he is named as such (i.e. he is called simha). Whatever is named by the term lion - (yo yo simha-sabda-vācyaḥ), is gifted with the of qualities of a lion, as is a real lion. The boy is as such, therefore he is gifted with the qualities of a lion. But this inference carries the fallacy of being 'svarūpā'siddha' - i.e. contradicted by its own external form or appearance. (i.e. a sort of non-proof). The batu or child is a 'paksa' and 'simha-sabda-vācyatā' is a hetu Now for an inference to be valid, the 'hetu' must be residing in 'paksa' and it should not be contradicted by other means of knowledge such as direct perception and the like. But here the calling of a human child by the name of a lion is contradicted by direct perception. So, the inference is invalid.
Now, in both these cases, we may form a different vyāpti such as, "wherever there is usage of metaphorical or indicative words, there is necessarily the yoga or presence of the qualities represented by such words. Well, the 'sādhya-siddhi' or realisation of intended motive is possible, but for this vyāpti, some other 'pramāna' has to be pointed out. For vyāpti is formed only on actual seeing of a number of
Now, in the new vyāpti imagined as above, there is no pointing out of a similar illustration in its support. Thus, in both these cases, observes Abhinavagupta, there can not be apprehension of purpose through inference. He observes : "tathā hi, tat-sāmīpyāt taddharmatvánumānam anaikántikam, simhaśabda-vācyatvam ca bator asiddham. atha yatra yatra evam-sabda-prayogah, tatra tad-dharma-yoga iti anumānam, tasyā'pi vyāpti-grahakäle maulikam pramāņántaram vācyam; na ca asti.” (pp. 28, Locana, Edn. Dr. Nandi).
Abhinavagupta then proceeds to suggest that there is no chance for smrti i.e. recollection also, in these instances. For, recollection is possible in a case where we have experienced the same happening earlier. Again, here there is no rule as such that merely by the usage of certain words we have recollection of the qualities of the thing expressed by the same word. This means that we do not recollect the qualities of holiness etc. simply by the use of words such as "Gangā' and the like. Again there can be qualities and qualities. How is it that we will be reminded only of such qualities as are expected to be conveyed by the speaker ? Thus, we may be reminded, if at all, of the quality of fearfulness or farociousness when we use the term 'simha' and not just the quality of bravery. Thus the apprehention of motive :
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717 in such instances can neither be arrived at through inference nor recollection - “na ca smrtir iyam, an-anubhūte tad a-yogāt, niyamā'pratipatter vaktur etat vivaksitam ity adhyavasāyábhāva-prasangāc ca, iti asti tāvad atra sabdasya eva vyāpāraḥ.”
Abhinavagupta categorically says that in the apprehension of the motive there cannot be the agency of either inference or recollection but it can be the result only of the power of word alone, and it has to be vyañjanā.
It may be noted that Abhinavagupta while rejecting the case of inference, takes into account the 'śāstrīya' form of anumiti, i.e. he rejects the case of 'tarkánumiti'. But we have seen that Mahimā says that here we have what we may say, a case of ‘kāvyánumiti' and not 'tarkánumiti'. He pooh-poohes the efforts of those who are seeking the shelter of tarkánumiti here. For him, even in ordinary parlance there is a sort of inference, working at popular level, which is not absolutely scientific. When a child arrives late after playing in the evening and when, for example he sees the shoes of his father, he realises through popular inference that his father has arrived.Or, when we hear a sort of noise in the water tap, we know through inferencial process of the popular brand, that water will soon flow through the tap; or through a special sound, we imagine that a compartment of a train is either joined or disjoined from the other one. These are popular instances of inference. So also in poetry, “tatraiva rantum eva gatā’si” is apprehended through what Mahimā calls “kāvyánumiti” which is a loose form of anumiti accepted in our practical life at every stage. Dr. Rawaprasadjee is a staunch supporter of this kāyyanumiti. The only point is that whether we accept this “loose anumāna” or call it by some other name such as 'tātparva' of Dhananjaya or 'vyañjana' of Anandavardhana. The fact is that there is 'sabda' involved and hence it has to be a sabda-vāpāra as pointed out by Abhinavagupta in case of poetry or any use of language. Of course, when we hear a sound from the water-tap, or when we see the shoes of a father, or when we hear a noise of joining or disjoining of a compartment, we may or, even may not, accept the case of a loose anumāna, but in case of poetry which is the province of a use of word, a meaningful word by a poet, we have to name it differently such as vyañjanā to distinguish it from tarkánumiti, or pratyakşa, or smrti, etc. Even kävyánumiti is certainly not tarkánumiti or scientific inference of the logicians. So, it is just a quarrel over naming. The rose, is a rose, is a rose and will smell as sweet; call it by any other name ! So, for the present, and on our part, we will choose to travel with Abhinavagupta and call is vyañjanā, a word-power.
Abhinavagupta observes in favour of vyañjanā as follows : "asti tāvad atra śabdasyaiva vyāpāraḥ. vyāpāraś ca nábhidhā”tmā, samayábhāvāt, na tātparyā”tmā,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA tasya anvaya-pratītāv eva parikṣayāt, na lakşaņā”tmā, uktād eva hetoh, skhalitagatitvā'bhāvād; tatrā’pi hi skhaladgatitve, punar mukhyártha-bādho, nimittam prayojanam ity anavasthā iti nāma krtam, tad-vyasanamātram. tasmād abhidhā tātparya-fakşaņā-vyatiriktas' caturthósau vyāpāro dhvanana-dyotana-vyañjanaprayāyana-avagamanā"di sódara-vyapadeśa-nirūpito-'bhyupagantavyah'. (Locana, pp. 28, ibid)
In this famous passage, Abhinavagupta declares that the apprehension of prayojana is only through word-power. And that word-power is not abhidhā or the power of expression, nor it is tātparya, for it is over only at the stage of correlation (i.e. at the stage of giving a correlated meaning of words in a single sentence), nor laksaņā, due to reasons suggested as above. Again the words do not fail here in their expressive power, (i.e. there is no skhalad-gatitva, while deriving the suggested sense of holiness etc. from the word 'gangāyām', as is the case in deriving the indicated sense). For, if we accept failure of expressive sense in this case, then mukhyárthabādha, nimitta, and prayojana will have to be imagined again and again, and again, and thus there will be 'anavasthā' i.e. total confusion. So, when one postulates laksita-laksanā here, it is a wild goose chase only. So, this is the fourth power of word, totally different from abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā, and is termed by synonyms such as dhvanana, dyotana, vyañjana, pratyāyana, avagamana, etc."
Abhinavagupta thus precludes the case of ālamkārikas such as Mukula and perhaps also Kuntaka, who project a wider concept of abhidhā embracing in its fold, vyañjanā, and also the case of the likes of Dhananjaya and Dhanika w a broader concept of tātparya, beyond just a sentence-power of presenting a correlated sense, and also of Mahimā who argues for a loose inference taking shape in poetry. When you play a game, there are rules of a game and you have to abide by the same. Abhinava therefore insists that the normally all-acceptable concepts of abhidhā, laksanā, tātparya and anumiti are not wide enough to cover suggested sense arrived at by the word-power called vyañjanā. He quotes in his support a kārikā from the Dhvanyāloka, (I. 17) such as :
“mukhyām vșttim parityajya guņa-víttyártha-darśanam, yad-uddiśya phalam, tatra
śabdo naiva skhalad-gatiḥ.” i.e. “If one gives up the primary denotative power of a word and understands a sense (secondary, conveyed by it), through its indicative power, it is because of
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719 a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all, (as it moves falteringly when indicating a meaning secondary).” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 33, ibid).
So, observes Abhinavagupta, - (pp. 28, 30, Locana, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid) : tena samayápeksā vācyávagamana-saktir abhidhāśaktih. tad-anyathā-anupap sahāyā’rthávabodhana-śaktis tātparya-saktiḥ. mukhyártha-bādhā"di-sahakāry apeksártha-pratibhāsana-śaktir laksanā-saktiḥ. tac-chakti-trayópajanitā’rthávagamamūla-jāta-tat-pratibhāsa-pavitrita-pratipatr-pratibhā-sahāyā’rtha-dyotana-śaktir dhvanana-vyāpārah; sa ca prāg-vșttam vyāpāra-trayam nyak-kurvan, pradhānabhūtaḥ, kāvyātmā’iti āśayena niședha-pramukhatayā ca, prayojanavisayo’pi niședha-visaya ity uktam.
Abhidhā is the power of expression which yields primary meaning on the basis of convention. Laksaņā is that power which yields meaning on the basis of
adha. i.e. contradiction of primary sense etc. Tātparya sakti or purport is one which yields correlated meaning not derived through the power of expression. This is a sentence-power yielding the sentence-sense. The fourth power is called vyañjanā. There is a meaning different from meanings arrived at through abhidhā, tātparya and laksaņā. By repeated connection with this meaning, the pratibhā or genius or imagination of those who resort to this becomes sanctified: Thus a vrtti which renders the imagination pure is termed vyañjanā or suggestion. This word-power renders the other three as subservient and installs itself as principal. Then it is termed 'Dhvani', which is the soul of poetry. In the illustration viz. “bhrama dhārmika." etc., negation is the indicated sense of positive instruction, such as “bhrama", i.e. move about. The motive is to protect the place, of secret meeting, which is arrived at through vyañjanā or suggestive power. So, the objector raises a question that here, how is it that the aloka-kāra i.e. Ānandavardhana said that the pratiśedha-rūpa meaning i.e. the sense of negation is arrived at through suggestive power? The answer is that this sense of negation is principal and only through its agency the protection of the place of meeting is suggested. Therefore 'nised ha' is said to be the meaning. But, Abhinavagupta says that this solution is suggested only in case we accept laksana in the illustration concerned. In fact here in this specific illustration such as 'bhrama dhārmika', etc. there is no scope for laksanā at all as the conditions of indication or laksaņā are not fulfilled here. There is no contradiction of the primary sense. The primary sense is neither totally discarded (atyanta-tiraskṛta) i.e. not completely lost, nor merged into another sense - i.e. arthántara

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA samkramita, here. This verse is a case of artha-sakti-mūla-dhvani, where there is no scope for lakṣaṇā.
Again there is something further. In all sorts of knowledge, some ancillary factors are expected to operate. E.g. in direct perception or pratyaksa, the contact of sense-organs with the object (indriyártha-sannikarsa) is expected. The direct perception is either sa-vikalpa or nir-vikalpa. The indriyártha sannikarsa is expected in both the cases and this is said to be six-fold in the Vaiśesika darśana. In the same way, in anumiti or inference, vyāpti-smrti and paksa-dharmatā serve as causes. Those who consider sabda-sakti i.e. word-power as derived through anumiti-i.e. inference, for them when a word is used to convey a meaning, there has to be vyāpti-smarana and the like, to call the process by the name of 'anumiti'. The process will proceed like this : A speaker wants to convey this meaning, because he has used this particular word. Wherever this word is used invariably this particular meaning is intended to be conveyed. It is so here. Therefore here also this particular meaning is intended to be conveyed. In the same way in 'upamāna' means of knowledge, sādrśya-jñāna or knowledge of similarity etc. serves as condition. So also, in śābda-pramāņa, in case of abhidhā, the knowledge of convention - i.e. samketa-jñāna, and tātparya-vrtti serve as condition, in case of laksaņā, sakyárthabādha etc. serve as condition and in case of vyañjanā certain factors such as enumerated by Mammața, viz. vaktr-vaisistya, boddhr-vaiśistya or speciality of the speaker etc. serve as conditions.
Thus according to the Locanakāra, for abhihitánvayavāda there is no escape from vyañjanā to convey the intention of the speaker. Now Abhinavagupta takes up anvitábhidhānavāda and proves to his satisfaction that even for this way of thinking, vyañjanā has to be recognised as an independent sabda-vștti..
Anvitábhidhānavāda and Vyañjanā.
Before we proceed with the presentation in Locana, we may note that later ālamkārikas beginning with Mammata have based their line of argument only on this portion of the Locana, which reads, to begin with, as follows : (pp. 30, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid) :
“yópy anvitábhidhānavādī, “yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdártha", iti hțdaye grhītvā śaravad abhidhāvyāpāram eva dirgha-dīrgham icchati, tasya yadi dirgho vyāpāras tad ekósāv iti kutaḥ ? bhinna-visayarvāt. athā'py anekósau tad-visaya-sahakāribhedād a-sajātīya eva yuktaḥ. sajātīye ca kārye viramya vyāpāraḥ śabd-karmabuddhy ādīnām padárthavidbhiḥ nişiddhaḥ. a-sajātīye ca asman naya eva.”
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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
"The Anvitábhidhānavādī takes the dictum, viz. "whatever is intended to be expressed by the word, that is the meaning of the word", (literally) to his heart and expects the function of a word to last longer and longer like an arrow. To him our question is, “if the function is long (and longer), how can it be a single function; for the scope (i.e. object) is non-identical. If you accept that it is (not a single function, but it is) many, then with the consideration of its object and accessories, it has to be non-identical (with one another). If the function is said to be identical, then the function will not continue after once it is over as the function of a word, idea and activity, does not continue further once its object is realized. This is the opinion of those who know about the word-meaning (i.e. Naiyāyikas and the rest). If you accept this longer and still longer function to be (many and therefore) nonidentical, then our principle (of vyañjanā as a separate, independent and fourth word power) stands."
Before we discuss the refutation of anvitábhidhānavāda by Abhinavagupta, we may take note of the fact that Mammata, and therefore practically all of his followers, - have treated anvitábhidhāna-vāda, and dirghadīrghatara-vyāpāra-vāda as independent views of opponents. Of course, the latter are also a section of the former but both are treated and refuted separately. Abhinavagupta has taken them to be identical because in fact the latter are only a section of the former. Mammatą, of course, has tried to dig deeper.
Abhinavagupta proceeds as follows : The anvitábhidhānavādins cite two principles such as, “yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa sabdárthah”, and “sóyam īsor iva dīrghadīrghatara vyāpārah", and include vyañjanā in the scope of abhidhā itself. Some experts explain this to be the view held by Lollata's followers. We do not know, but we have seen that later Mukula tries to cover up vyañjanā under abhidhā. For these theorists the word-power extends further and further. Like a shaft, dischared by a mighty person, cuts through the armour of the enemy, pierces his limbs and takes away his breath, similarly, a word used by a great poet, through its power called abhidhā i.e. expression, gives the expressed meaning, then the anvita-artha i.e. the correlated meaning, and also gives the suggested sense. The idea is that after giving the primary sense, the word-power does not rest till it yields the final intended sense. So, that is considered to be the real meaning of a word, with which the speaker's intention is concerned.
To this, the Locanakāra asks that when the objector talks of this longer and still longer word-power yielding different senses in its course, is this power one or many? How can we take them as one and identical ? For, in fact their object
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA changes from stage to stage. There is thus visaya-bheda and there is sahakāri-bheda also noticed. [In abhidhā samketa-grahana is the sahakārin, in laksaņā it is mukhyártha-bādhā'di-traya, and in vyañjanā it is speciality of the speaker etc. i.e. vaktr-adi-vaisistya.] Now, in view of this, the powers concerned will have to be taken as non-indentical or different. For, those who know the secret of word and sense have formed a principle that, “sabda-buddhi-karmaņām viramya vyāpārā’bhāvah” - i.e. word, idea and activity do not continue after once having stopped on achieving their goal, so far as one and identical vyāpāra i.e. function is concerned. Once you (i.e. the objector) accept difference or non-identity in case of functions, our position, that different word-powers yield different meanings, is vindicated.
The objector does not give up easily. He observes that by this dārgha-dīrghatara vyapara, what is meant is that what you call as vyangyartha residing in the fourth stage, is grasped very fast and immediately by the sentence. Then our answer is (i.e. the Siddhāntin's position is) that when no convention is fixed with reference to the same (i.e. the suggested sense), how can it be immediately or directly apprehended ?
To this, the objector would say - well, the sakyártha i.e. the expressed sense is a ‘nimitta' i.e. 'cause', in the apprehension of the vyangyártha or the suggested sense. Thus vyangyárth is said to be, "naimittika" and vācyártha is "nimitta”. When the naimittika i.e. resultant suggested sense is immediately cognized, later when critically scrutinized, the sakyártha i.e. expressed sense is also apprehended. Samketa-graha i.e. fixing of convention is done with reference to the sakyártha i.e. expressed sense, which is a nimitta - i.e. cause in the vyangyárthabodha. Thus naimittika-vyangyártha is also derived on the same basis.
Abhinavagupta passes a sarcastic remark in reply to this. "paśyata śrotriyasya ukti-kauśalam” - "see, the expertise of the Mimāmsaka, with reference to the (art of) speaking !" . The meaning that is cognized at the end is said to be apprehended first and the direct meaning (which aught to come first is placed later and it) follows (the last one) and again is said to be the cause. Thus for the Mimāmsaka, his fatherhood is first with reference to his grand son and then with reference to his own son ! The Locanakāra observes : "atha yósau caturthakaksā-nivistórthah, sa eva jhatiti-vākyenā'bhidhīyata, ity evam vidham dirghadīrghatvam vivaksitam, tarhi tatra samketā'karanāt katham sākśāt prat nimittesu samketah, naimittikastu asau arthas samketā'napeksa eva, iti cet, paśyata śrotriyasya ukti-kauśalam yo hy asau paryanta-kaksā-bhāgy arthaḥ, prathamam pratīti-patham avatīrṇaḥ, tasya paścāttanāḥ padárthávagamāḥ
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nimittabhāvam gacchanti iti nūnam mīmamsakasya prapautram prati naimittikam abhimatam." (pp. 30, Edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid)
Abhinavagupta further elaborates as follows. He observes that the objector can contend this much here, that samketa-grahana or convention was formed earlier. After that on listening to a sentence, we apprehend the sentence-sense. Thus nimitta-naimittika-bhāva takes shape between word-sense (i.e. the expressed sense), and the suggested sense. But in this case, argues the Locanakāra, which process will the objector resort to in apprehending the suggested sense ? There is no convention formed with reference to the suggested sense, so how can the objector say that the suggested sense is apprehended through abhidhā or the power of expression ? Again, the next point is that in the opinion of the objector himself, the samketa-grahana with reference to an individual word-sense is itself not possible because you, the anvitábhidhānavādins, hold expressive power only with reference to the ‘anvita' or correlated sense. If the objector says that yes, convention is of course formed with reference to the correlated sense alone, but by avāpaudvāpa i.e. removal and substitution, this fixing of convention - samketa-grahana is with reference to a word only, then Abhinavagupta's submission is that even in this case a meaning related to the particular - i.e. višesa-artha-will necessarily be cognized still later (because the mīmāmsakas believe in jāti-visayaka Thus, the anvitábhidhānavādins also will have to resort to the tātparya-vrtti or purport, and thus your principle will be negated.
To this, the objector may submit that, whether nimitta-naimittika bhāva is established between padártha and vyangyártha, but one thing is certain that the moment a sentence is spoken, import i.e. 'tātparyártha' is apprehended, and how can anyone reject this ? To this, Abhinavagupta says that we do not negate this fact that vyangyártha in form of the intention of the speaker is immediately apprehended : atra ucyate - drstaiva jhațiti tātparyártha-pratipattih. kim atra kurmaḥ, iti. tad idam vayam api na năngīkurmaḥ.” (pp. 30, ibid). He quotes from Anandavardhana Kārikā (Dhv.) I. 12 - viz. "tadvat sacetasām." etc. “So also that suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of perceptive critics, when they turn away from literal meaning." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 19, ibid).
But the Locanakāra adds that this does not mean that in the truth-perceiving minds of the perceptive critics, the suggested sense flashes forth even without the apprehension of the primary sense. There is always this possibility of a sequence of first the dawning of the literal sense and then the flashing of the suggested sense.
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA But these cultured critics have read, tasted and enjoyed poetry so often, that due to practice formed by the repeated reading of poetic works, the sequence betwee primary meaning and the suggested meaning is as it were not cognized, even though it is very much there as an undeniable fact. For an expert logician, the moment he sees smoke, he infers fire immediately and eventhough the steps, such as vyāptismarana and the like, are very much there in his inference they are as it were not noticed. Thus, even if a sequence is not cognized, it has to be very much there and therefore the nimitta-naimittika-bhāva between the primary and the suggested senses stands.
It may be noted that the Kāvyaprakāśakāra i.e. Mammața takes even these nimitta-vādins, who are part of anvitābhidhānavādins, also as a separate group of objectors. Mammata digs deeper and attempts a thread-bare analysis at every stage, of course, following the lead of Abhinavagupta. We will examine the same in due course. · Abhinavagupta sums up his treatment of vyañjanā-virodha by as it were, patching up the differences if any, with the grammarians. He observes : "yépi avibhaktam sphotam, vākyam, tad-artham cāhuḥ, tair apy a-vidyā-pada-patitaiḥ, sarvā iyam anusaraṇīyā prakriyā. tad uttirņatve tu sarvam parameśvarā”hvayam brahma ity asmac chāstrakāreņa na na viditam tattvālokam grantham viracayatā ity āstām." (pp. 30, edn. Dr. Nandi, ibid) - "Even those who speak of un-divided sphota, (whole) sentence and its meaning (without parts), have to accept all this (our) line of thinking, while dealing at the ordinary parlour (i.e. at the popular level where avidyā i.e. nescience prevails). Having crossed this level of ordinary parlour (in which
vidyā prevails), everything is brahma, one with the Highest Godhead, - and this fact was not unknown to our śāstrakāra (i.e. Anandavardhana) (= our theorist) who (also) drafted the work called "Tattvāloka”. So, let this be left here only."
Even for the grammarians the acceptance of pada-praksti-pratyaya etc. i.e. diversity of words and sentences and their meanings - has to be accepted at worldly context and once this scheme is accepted the variety of vācvártha, tātparvártha. laksyártha and vyangyártha, also has to be accepted even by the grammarians and so for them acceptance of vyañjanā as a fourth independent word-power, becomes a necessity. So, even for these akhandatāvādins, language at popular level is divided into letters, words, word-meanings, and sentences and sentence-meanings and even words are divided into roots and stems. This fact of language stays for ever at the level of worldly usage; concludes Abhinavagupta.
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725 It has been thus successfully established by Abhinavagupta that vyañjanā as a fourth and independent word-power has to be accepted. Vyañjanā cannot be rejected by taking recourse to the other accepted sabda-vịttis such as abhidhā, or laksaņā or even tātparya which is a vākya-vrtti for some. Even anumāna or inference, a means of knowledge along with pratyakṣa or direct perception, can not serve the cause of vyañjanā. Even akhandatāvāda of the vedantins and grammarians is not a substitute for vyañjanā. Vyañjanā cannot be discarded even with the help of other means of knowledge. In, say for example, pratyaksapramāņa or direct perception, the organs of senses become instruments and the knowledge arrived at by the sannikarsa or contact of sense organs with the objects of knowledge is termed pratyaksa-jñāna. In the particular illustration viz. "bhrama dhārmika”, etc., the lion is not present on the spot and so the direct cāksuşa-pratyaksa i.e. directly seeing the lion with physical eyes - is not possible. The heroine also can not say to the holy man that, “O sir, please do not go for a stroll on the bank of the Godāvarī as there will be a disturbance in our lovesports." So, here, it is not a case of śravana-pratyaksa i.e. direct per hearing also. In the means of knowledge called 'upamāna' i.e. similarity, the base of knowledge is similarity or comparision, which has no scope here. So, the object of the Nāyikā's utterance can not be served through upamāna-pramāna. The apprehension of rasa - aesthetic pleasure, or suggested idea i.e. vastu vyangya of suggested figure, i.e. alamkāra-vyangya, can never take place through arthāpatti, i.e. implication, or presumption, or inference based on circumstances. Arthāpatti takes place only where the fartha' is not self-sufficient, as in devadattaḥ divā na bhunkte, tasmādrātribhojanam.” Here the fatness of Devadatta is not justified by his taking no food at all by day. But in case of rasaexperience, the sentence-sense does not stand unjustified, or un-supported, i.e. it is not that it can not hold on its own without any apprehension of rasa or dhvani or other variety. Thus vyañjanā cannot be wished away by arthāpatti. Nor, is the apprehension of rasā"di a matter of imagination, i.e. rasā"di-pratīti is not kālpanika or illusory. For all men of taste, may not undergo rasa-experience if it. were not a real fact but only an imaginary thing. Thus, in the present illustration, viz. bhrama-dharmika, etc., resorting to vyañjanā is a must to collect the special meaning called the vyangyártha.
Abhinavagupta rejects Bhatta Nāyaka's observation here. The latter observes that in the specific illustration viz. “bhrama dhārmika.” etc., actually what happens is like this. "Here in this verse, special adjective such as ‘uddhata' i.e. drpta fierce
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA is used with the lion. The person concerned is addressed as a 'dhārmika' i.e. a holyman, a religious man. On the strength of these two words, there is apprehension of the 'bhayānaka-rasa’. Through this there is an apprehension of 'nişedha' i.e. negation. For, without knowing the person's tendency of either being a brave person or a timid one, the ascertainment of negation only is not at all possible. So, only the strength of a meaning - 'kevalam artha-sāmarthyam' - can not be the cause of the apprehension of negation.” To this Abhinavagupta's reply is as follows : Even we also do not contend that without knowing the speciality of the speaker and the listener, and without realising the power of suggestion of a word, the apprehension of the suggested sense is possible. On the contrary; we hold that only the genius - pratibhā-of the cultured person-sahrdaya-is taken as the decider in case of vyañjanā - "pratipattr-pratibhā-sahakaritvam hy asmābhir dyotanasya prānatvena uktam." (pp. 32, ibid). We do not object to the apprehension of bhayānaka rasa in the illustration concerned. But this horrible condition can inspire fear only in the heart of the dharmika person concerned. We can expect fear to rise to the status of bhayānaka-rasa, only if it is tasted by all men of taste. The relish of rasa is possible only when it is tasted. Even Bhatta-Nāyaka does not accept that rasa can be tasted by simply naming it. Thus, it is only suggested and even for the person who enjoys it, the enjoyment is not personal or limited, but is of an unlimited nature and the enjoyer is not equal personally to the timid religious person. Here practically ends Abhinavagupta's defence of vyañjanā.
It is clear that such greats as Mammața and the rest accepted the lead of Abhinavagupta in dealing with vyañjanā-virodha. We will now move on to what Mammata has to say, and we have already observed that Mammata has tried to dig deeper and has tried to lay the whole topic threadbare.
Mammata -
Actually, while dealing with what he calls 'guni-bhūta-vyangya' or poetry of subordinated suggestion, Mammata picks up the topic of refuting the vyañjanā and trying to establish vyañjanā and vyangyártha as independent entities by fresh arguments.
In the beginning of Ch. V of his Kavya-prakāśa Mammaţa cleanly enumerates, explains and illustrates eight-fold gunībhūta-vyangya-kavya and observes that the varieties of these (eight kinds of subordinated suggestion) should be understood, as far as applicable, in the manner of the former case i.e. of the suggestive-dhvanipoetry, which for him is “uttama” kāvya, and the guṇībhūta-vyangya being the
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727 “madhyama” variety. He observes : (K.P. V. 46 cd) :
eșām bhedā yathāyogam veditavyāś ca pūrvavat.” - 46 cd. yathāyogam iti,
"vyajyante vastumātrena...” (Dhv. II. 2a). iti dhvanikārokta-diśā vastumātrena yatra alamkāro vyajyate, na tatra gunibhūta-vyangyatvam.” Thus for Dhvanikāra, suggestion of an alamkāra by vastu or idea never gives a gunībhūta-vyangya kāvya.
Mammata observes that innumerable varieties and sub-varieties can be thought out in case of this variety i.e. gunībhūta-vyangya-kavya also, by considering the possibilities of intermingled and collected varieties (yogah samsrsti-samkaraih). By natural permutation-anyonya-yogāt-the number of its varieties would be very large.
With this Mammața banks upon the following observation :
"samkalanena punar asya dhvaneḥ trayo bhedāḥ, vyangyasya tri-rūpatvāt.” (vrtti, K.P. v. 47)
“However, in brief, there are three kinds of this Dhvani (suggestive poetry) on account of the suggested sense being of three types (i.e. vastu, alamkāra and rasa)." Mammata takes the opportunity to explain that 'rasa'-dhvani is necessarily suggested only-vyangya eva-while the other two varieties can be an object of direct expression also.
Mammața proceeds to explain how vyangyártha/vyañjanā are inevitable in different types of dhvani.
In both the varieties of dhvani based on laksaņā, i.e. in arthántara-samkramitavācya, and atyanta-tirasksta-vācya varieties of dhvani, lakṣaṇā or indication is itself not possible without consideration of 'vastu-vyangya' i.e. suggestion of an idea. Thus, vyañjanā has to be there in these varieties.
In case of sabda-sakti-mūla-dhvani i.e. suggestion based on the force of words, the denotation (i.e. abhidhā) being restricted (as it can not proceed after it has yielded its contextual meaning), any other idea, which cannot be the denoted one, as well as the upamā and other figures, are undoubtedly suggested.
In case of artha-sakti-mula-dhvani also, owing to the inapplicability of the convention in a particular individual, it is the word-meanings of universal character, being mutually co-ordinated by the force of expectancy, compatibility and juxta-position (of words), that give rise to the meaning of a sentence which is particular and different from the meaning of individual words. How can the suggested sense, based on the power of meaning, can be spoken of as
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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
denoted according to this theory of Abhihitánvaya (held by Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāmsā ?
The words in the K.P. read as: "artha-śakti-mule viseṣe samketaḥ kartum na yujyate, iti sāmānyarūpāṇām padárthānām ākānkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā-vaśāt parasparam samsarge yatra a-padártho višeṣa-rupo vākyárthaḥ, tatra abhihitánvaye kā vārtā vyangyasya abhidheyatāyām ?" (vṛtti on K.P. v. 47)
So, here Mammața picks up the abhihitánvayavādins first :
For these Mimāmsakas who follow the lead of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa 'samketa' or convention is not done with reference to a particular individual to avoid the blemishes of 'anantya' and 'vyabhicara', but is accepted with reference to 'sāmānya' or universal. For them the 'väkyártha' in form of a viseṣa or 'special' or 'particular' is also not arrived at by abhidha, but by a separate power called tatparya. Now, when their abhidhã does not reach at collection of particular sense, and also the sentence-sense, what to talk of vyangyártha or suggested sense which comes still later. So, for them vyañjana has to be accepted to arrive at the suggested sense, their abhidha being consumed in giving universal padártha, and tātparya being exhausted in giving vakyártha only! Jhalkikar puts it as: (pp. 219, ibid): "yanmate vācyárthabodha-viṣayīkṛtam api samsargam śakyopasthāpana-parikṣīņa-śaktir abhidhā návabhāsayati iti tadartham tatparya-vṛttir avalambyate, tanmate vacyártha-bodhottara-kālikāyām vyangyopasthitau naiva abhidhā-prabhāva iti kimu vaktavyam iti. tatsarvam uktam pradipódyoteṣu - "artha-śakti-mule api evam angīkartavyam. yataḥ padebhyaḥ prathamam padártha-smṛtiḥ, atha padárthaviśeṣāṇām anvaya-viśeṣa-rupasya pratyayaḥ, tato vyangyapratītir iti tṛtīyakakṣāyām kutó 'bhidhāyāḥ prasaraṇam ? dvitīya-kakṣāyām eva tad-anapekṣaṇāt. yatóbhihitānvaya-vāde aśakya eva anvayaḥ, ākānkṣā”di-vaśena pratīyate. śabdabuddhi-karmaṇām viramya vyāpārábhāva iti ca sarva-siddham", iti pradīpaḥ.
The Sampradaya-prakāśinī observes (pp. 158, Edn. Dwivedi R.C., ibid): "viseṣa-rupatvāt padárthátirikto vākyártho yatrábhyupagatas tatra abhihitánvaye vākyárthánantara-kakṣyābhāvino vyangyasya vācyatāyām vārtā eva kā, yāvatā dvitiya-kakṣyāpātī vākyárthópyanabhidheya, iti upālambha-niskarṣaḥ."
The crux of the discussion is that when for the abhihitānvayavādins, their abhidha is powerless to travel even upto the sentence-sense, for which they have to invoke a separate power called tātparya, what to talk of covering vyangyārtha or suggested sense which follows even the sentence-sense? So, for them acceptance of vyañjanā to collect the suggested sense, is a must.

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Now Mammata turns his guns towards the other section of the Mimāmsakas. known as “anvitābhidhānavādins”.
Mammața holds that even for the anvitábhidhānavādins, acceptance of vyañjanā for collecting the suggested sense, is unavoidable. He first begins with the fuller explanation of the anvitábhidhāna view-point. He observes :
And some others expound (the process of denotation) as follows :
"The word, the elderly men, and the object denoted are directly perceived here, (i.e. in the process of learning) by a child." "The listners understanding of it is deduced (by the child) through inference and action. The two-fold power (of the word to denote and of the object to be thus denoted by that particular word) is cognised by presumption based on 'otherwise inexplicability. Thus the relationship (between word and its meaning) is known through three means of cognition (i.e. perception, inference and presumption).”
According to what is stated above when a sentence, such as 'Devadatta, bring the cow', is uttered by an elderly man, the younger man is seen to bring from one place to another an object with the dew-lap etc., the child then infers from this action that such and such meaning has been understood by the younger man from such a sentence. Thereupon, the child makes out the denotative relationship between the above sentence and its meaning as one indivisible whole, and thus thechild himself comprehends its meaning. Later on when sentences such as, "Caitra, bring the cow : “Devadatta, bring the horse”; “Devadatta, take away the cow”, are used, he makes out a particular meaning from a particular word on the basis of positive and negative considerations. From this it follows that a sentence alone, that makes a man act or refrain from it, is fit for being used. Hence, the denotative convention is apprehended from the connected words occurring in sentence only with the meanings of words (generally) connected with one another. To conclude, only the correlated meanings of words are the meaning of a sentence; it is not that there is correlation of (unconnected) word-meanings.
Though the individual words, found to be used in other sentences, are regarded to be the same by recognitive apprehension (i.e. pratyabhijñā-balena) and thus convention of the word-meaning is found as connected with the other words (i.e. the denotative convention is comprehended as connected with particular wordmeaning), yet, that particular form itself is comprehended as qualified by generic character because the inter-mixed word-meanings are of the said i.e. of particular and not generic character. (Since the particular and the generic cannot be divided
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the comprehension of the particular form is not without the apprehension of its generic character). This is the view of the theorists of correlated denotation (anvitábhidhāna-vāda)." (vitti, K.P. V. 47, pp. 158, 160, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi; Trans. by Prof. R. C. Dwivedi).
Mammața after carefully explaining the view of the anvitábhidhānavādins, explains how for them also in poetry, what is termed as suggested sense can be comprehended only through the agency of vyañjanā i.e. the power of suggestion alone. We will try to elaborate the argument as follows: In Prabhākara's anvitábhidhānavāda, though through abhidhā directly the co-rrelated - anvitameaning is conveyed and hence there is no need to project 'tātparya' sakti, but even for this view abhidhā yields a correlated meaning only in a univesal-sāmánya-form. There is no trace of a meaning with reference to perticularity because one and the same word is used with a number of other words in different forms.
If convention, argue these theorists, is accepted with reference to a particular meaning or object, it will not get correlated with other particular meanings. As in case of abhihitánvayavāda, so also here, if convention is held with reference to, an individual object the contingencies of 'ānantya' and 'vyabhicāra’ will walk in. Thus even anvitábhidhāna-vāda allows samketa only with reference to a general meaning.
But the fact is that a sentence sense is of the form of correlation of particular meanings, so for that this vākyártha also cannot be arrived at through abhidhā, technically. Now, when their abhidhā cannot reach directly the particular vākyártha i.e. viseșa-rūpa-vākyártha, then how can we expect that their abhidhā will go as far as vyangyártha which is ‘ati-višesabhūta' or which is of an extremely particular nature ! So, even from the point of view of anvitábhidhānavāda, in the illustration viz. “niḥśesa-cyuta.” etc., the apprehension of the positive -vidhirūpa-suggested sense, derived from the expressed negation, has to be explained through vyañjanā or suggestive function only. Thus for anvitábhidhānavāda, to explain the apprehension of the suggested sense, acceptance of vyañjanā is a must. But before explaining this inevitability of accepting vyañjanā even for the anvitábhidhānavādins, Mammața starts the argument by first explaining the full implication of this view theoretically with the words, “ity anvitábhidhānavādinah”. The presentation can be understood in two parts. The first part completes with the words - "iti viśiştā eva padárthāḥ vākyárthaḥ, na tu padárthānām vaišistyam.” The second part starts after that. In the first half it is explained that only a meaning concerning generality
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Vyañjana-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
731
sāmānya is arrived at by individual words. It ends with "viśista eva padárthāḥ väkyárthaḥ", where 'visiṣṭaḥ' means 'anvaya-visiṣṭaḥ' i.e. 'correlated wordmeanings' form a vakyártha, through abhidha. This is broadly the position of this view. After that "na tu padárthānām vaiśistyam" - is a note, which explains that, we have not to understand that 'first an-anvita i.e. not-correlated-individual wordmeanings are presented and then their 'anvaya' i.e. co-rrelation follows."
This note is to denounce the abhihitánvaya-vāda. Then follows the suble analysis of the anvitábhidhana-vāda, which ends with the word, "ity anvitábhidhāna-vādinaḥ." ." The main point that even this view has to accept vyañjanā to apprehend the so called suggested sense, begins with the words "teṣām api mate...".
Mammata starts to explain this view with two kārikās, viz. śabdavṛddhábhidheyāmśca. etc., taking us to the conclusion that convention is made with reference to the correlated sentence-sense only. Now, as to, "this particular sense has to be collected from this particular word", normally the following means are suggested such as:
śaktigraham vyākaraṇopamānakośā"pta-vākyād vyavahārataś ca. vākyasya seṣād vivṛter vadanti
sannidhyataḥ siddha-padasya vṛddhāḥ."
i.e. According to the seniors, convention is maid with the help of the following sources such as - vyākaraṇa, i.e. grammar, upamana or similar object, kośa i.e. a lexicon, apta-vākya i.e. the instruction by a reliable person, vyavahāra i.e. worldly usage, vakyaśeṣa or, the remainder of a sentence, vivṛti i.e. vyākhyā i.e. explanation, and by proximity with a word whose meaning is known - i.e. siddha-pada. Out of all these vyavahāra i.e. popular usage is the principal source. While in all other means we stand in need of the actual usage and collection of meaning to understand 'śakti-graha', these are reserved for elderly people. But for children, 'vyavahara' or local usage is the ultimate source to understand the conventional sense. The child at an early age collects convention with reference to a particular word yielding a particular sense only through actual practice by his seniors, such as uttma-vṛddhas and the madhyama-vṛddhas. Here the former stand for those who issue instructions and the latter stand for those who carry our the instructions; as in case of the sentences, "gām ānaya, gām badhāna, aśvam anaya", etc. etc. The child first cases the whole meaning of a whole sentence and later is enlightened as

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA to the specific meaning of individual words. We have seen about how different means of knowledge such as pratyaksa or direct-perception, anumāna or inference, and arthāpatti or presumption are involved in the simple act of collecting the expressed sense only. This is done is an effortless and natural way for a child. Mammața uses terms such as (i) samanya, (ii) sāmānya-viśesa and (iii) ati-viśesameaning "correlated in a general form”, then, “karmatvā”dirūpena-anvitatva”, and "vyakti-rūpeṇa anvitatva”. The vyañjanāvādins argue that if we accept anvitábhidhānavāda, samketa takes us only to "anvita-artha" in form of a "sāmanya” only. But this is not enough. For example you want a pot. Now in place of “ghatam ānaya” if it is said, “vastu ānaya”, - this will not serve the purpose. Only a word 'ghata' which has a visesa-rūpa has to be used. Thus samketa with reference to "sāmānya-rūpena anvita”, will not do.
If it is argued that on the strength of the maxim, “nirvisesam na sāmānyam”, we will arrive at a “sāmānya-viśesa” i.e. a višesa qualified by a sāmānya, then to this the answer is that here the convention is with reference to a 'sāmānya-višesa' qualified by 'karmatva' or objectivity. Thus in "gām ānaya”, the word 'gām' is an object - karmabhūtasāmānya-višesa. Thus the word 'ānaya' gets correlated with this karma-bhūta-sāmānya-viseșa, which is 'gām'. 'gām’ is called 'sāmānya-višeşa', because ‘ānaya' is correlated with it. But here too the 'anvaya' is with 'karmatva’ staying in a 'sāmānya' form. As the 'sa-karmaka' word 'ānaya' is in need of a karma/object, 'gām' gets correlated with it in form of a 'karma' i.e. object. Here, ‘gām', 'aśvam' etc. though having a particular form or viseșa-rūpa, are correlated only through 'karmatva' which is of the sāmānya type. Hence, Mammața here uses the term 'sāmānya-visesa' to distinguish it from ‘sāmānya'. Thus the terms 'sāmānya' and “sāmānya-viśesa” are explained.
The third term used by Mammata is “ati-višesa”. By this is meant the individual cow or horse. Gotva, aśvatva are the 'sāmānya', karmatva is the sāmānya-visesa, and individual cow or horse - is the ati-višesa-meaning. This meaning is derived in practice from the statement. But theoretically this meaning cannot follow for the fear of anantya and vyabhicāra. So, when the ati-visesa meaning re samketita, vācyártha will be impossible. This 'ati-viśesa' meaning will have to be collected by a power beyond abhidhā. This means that even the anvitábhidhāna view will have to go for an additional power called either tātparya or any other name. Now, when, argues Mammața, even for the apprehension of a simple sentence-sense an additional word-power will be required, it is senseless to suggest that abhidhā will be able to deliver the suggested meaning !

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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
733 So, Mammata observes that the whole argument boils down to this much that whether you go for abhihitánvayavāda or opt for the anvitábhidhānavāda, even the ‘ati-viśesa-rūpa vākyártha' is not apprehended by abhidhā, so what to talk of collecting what is termed the vyangyártha or suggested sense which comes still later ? He observes :
"ananvitórthóbhihitánvaye, padárthántara-mātreņánvitastvanvitábhidhāne, anvita-viśesas tu a-vācya eva, ity ubhayanaye’pi apadártha eva vākyárthaḥ.” i.e. “The meaning is not correlated according to the theory of 'the connection of the expressed (i.e. abhihitánvaya-vāda), and according, to the theory of 'connected meaning' (anvitábhidhāna), it is correlated to the other meaning generically but the correlated particular (meaning) is never denoted, hence in both the above theories the sense of a sentence cannot be taken as the object of direct denotation by a word.” The sampradāya-prakāśini here takes 'vākyártha' as suggested meaning - “vākyárthaḥ vyangyárthā”tmakaḥ.” (pp. 162, ibid). Jhalkikar explains 'vākyárthah' as 'samsargaḥ'. He observes (pp. 224, ibid): "ayam bhāvaḥ.- vastutvena vastupadavācyópi ghato yathā ghațatvena tad avācyaḥ, tathā apara-padárthánvitā” nayanatvena (abhihitánvayavāde kevalena ānayanatvena) ānaya-pada-vācyam api gavā”nayanam, gavā”nayanatvena tad a-vācyam eva ity asamketite gamye prāthamika-bodha-visayīkrte api nā'bhidhāvyāpāra itinitarām eva anantara-bhāvini vyangya-bodhe abhidhā-virāma, iti vivarañe spastam."
We had observed that Abhinavagupta had considered the view of the nimittavădins as part of the Mimāmsaka view. Mammata, on the other hand, takes up this view of “nimitta-vādins” separately.
We know that the Mimāmsakas hold veda as the only authority and therefore veda is normally equated as 'prabhu' i.e. master, and in the vedic injunction only abhidhā has scope. Even laksanā in which there is deviation is a dosa for the Mimāmsakas and so far as the śāstra or discipline in concerned, vyañjanā has not even a ghost of a chance for any consideration. So, Mukula, a great Mimāmsaka probably, in his work establishes only abhidhā as a sole power of word and laksanā is treated by him only as an extension of abhidhā, but never as an independent wordpower. So, here Mammața, after considering the abhihitánvayavāda and anvitábhidhānavāda and explaining their necessity to accept vyañjanā, now picks up the views of yet another section of the anvitábhidhānavādin-mīmāmsakas, - who hold that, “naimittikánusāreņa nimittāni kalpyante.” Let us first see how he puts it :
"yad apy ucyate - ‘naimittikánusāreņa nimittāni kalpyante” iti, tatra nimittatvam kārakatvam jñāpakatvam vā. śabdasya prakāśakatvān na kārakatvam. jñapakatvam tu a-jñātasya katham ? jñātatvam ca sanketena eva. sa ca anvita

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA mātre. evañ ca, nimittasya niyata-nimittatvam yāvan na niścitam, tāvān naimittikasya pratītir eva katham iti “naimittikā'nusāreņa nimittāni kalpyante" iti a-vicāritā'bhidhānam." -
"It is also said that "causes are ascertained on the bases of their effects." (To this we reply) that to be a cause is either to be a generative (kāraka) or to be an indicator (jñāpaka). The word on account of its being illuminator, cannot be of the
generative. And how can it be an indicator of the unknown ? Knownness comes from the denotative convention only, which pertains to the correlated only. Therefore, so long as a cause is not determined to be precisely a cause, how can the cognition of the effect (i.e. meaning) arise from it (i.e. the word) ? Hence the view that, "the causes are ascertained on the basis of the effect, (i.e. meaning)", is a thoughtless statement."
The Sampradāya-prakāśins observes : (pp. 164, ibid) : “uktena prakāreņa vyangyártha-pratītau, nimittatvena abhyupagatasya śabdasya nimittatvam eva yāvan niyatatayā na niścitam, tāvad, “naimittikánusāreņa nimittāni kalpyante" ity etad a-vicăritábhidhānam.
The idea is as follows : This view holds that what the supporters of vyañjanā call vyangyártha is also derived through the instrumentality of words alone. Beyond 'sabda' there is no other 'nimitta' i.e. cause for the vyangyártha. Hence 'word' is the only 'cause'. To this, Mammața says that 'nimitta' or 'cause can be two-fold only, i.e. it can be either a 'kāraka' nimitta i.e. a generative cause or a 'jñāpaka' nimitta, i.e. indicative cause. Now a word cannot be a generative cause but it can only be an indicator i.e. 'jñāpaka'. But its being an indicator i.e. 'ñāpaka' i.e. its 'jñāpakatva' depends on its being known. It should be known that such and such a word carries convention with reference to such and such a meaning. Thus the bodhya-bodhaka-bhāva between a suggested meaning and a word would rest only if the particular word's convention with reference to a particular suggested sense is known to and accepted by all, through its power of expression or abhidhā. But it is known that abhidhā in case of a word gives only a particular conventional sense only which does not go to cover the suggested sense. So, even the jnapakatvarūpa-nimittatva of a word with reference to a given suggested sense will not be possible here for according to the nimittavādin the abhidhā gives only a sāmānyarūpa artha, i.e. meaning pertaining to generality alone, and that too in a correlated form only. So, the point is that a word, which the objector holds as a ‘nimitta' for vyangyártha has no fixed (niścayena) (i.e. conventional) relation with the same, i.e. the vyangyártha, thus the apprehension of the latter in form of 'naimittiki pratīti' will not follow at all! When for the objector the abhidhā is powerless even to travel
Jain Education Interational

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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
735 to a meaning concerning particularity, then, without convention, how can it yield the suggested sense ? So, for this nimittavādin also, acceptance of vyañjanā is unavoidable, says Mammața. And to say that "naimittikánusāreņa nimittāni kalpyante” is foolhardy.
Jhalkikar (pp. 225, ibid) observes : "ayam bhāvaḥ. itara-vyavahāradarśanenaiva vyutpannasya losthā”dy anvitánayana-vyavahāram kadā’py adrstavatópi 'lostham ānaya' iti vākyād bodha-sthale losthā”dy anvitánayanā"der višeșasyópasthāpakántarábhāvena śabdādevopasthitir vācyā. tathā ca tatra sanketa-grahe sabdāt tadupasthitih. śabdāc ca tad upasthitau sanketagraha ity anyonyā”śrayah syāt. na ca vyañjanā'pi tādvad durgrahā iti vācyam. abhidhā laksaņā vā jñātaivópayogini iti satyam. dharmi-grāhaka-māna-siddhā vyañjanā tu ajñāta eva bodhikā. na cátiprasangaḥ. vaktrādi-vaiśistyápekṣaṇāt. phalavatrvena tathaiva kalpanād iti dik. tasmāt “naimittikánusāreņa nimittāni kalpyante” ity avicāritábhidhānamiti" iti udyota-sudhāsāgarayoḥ spastam."
Jhalkikar further adds - "ayam atra siddhānta-sāraḥ. vyangyópasthitau sabdasya jñāpakarva-rūpam nimittatvam asmābhir api sammatam. tatra násmākam vivādah paramtu vyañjanāyāḥ asvikāre tanna sambhavati. śabdasyárthanimittatvam vyāpārasāpekşam eva niyatam. yathā vācyártha-laksyárthayor abhidhālakṣaṇe vyāpārau tathā ihā’pi kópi vyāpāróvaśyam angīkāryaḥ. anyathā hi śabdasya nimittatva"niscayena naimittiko vyangyártha ity eva bhavad abhimatópi na siddhyati. yadi tu vyāpāram vinā’pi sabdasya nimittatvam syāt tadā abhidhālaksanépi datta-jalāñjali syātām ity asmābhir ucyate ity abhiprāyam a-buddhvā abhidhānam avicāra-vijpmbhitam eva iti vivaraņe’pi spastam."
We had seen earlier that Abhinavagupta has taken this nimittavādin also along with anvitábhidhāna-vāda and he is not unjustified in it. But Mammața has taken it as a separate group of objectors eventhough broadly falling in the company of the anvitábhidhānavāda as even this objector believes in abhidhā giving a correlated meaning concerning generality only. Same is the case with the dirghatara-vyāpāravādins, who are taken as a separate group by Mammata, though actually forming only a section of the mimāmsakas as suggested by Abhinavagupta. It may be noted that Jhalkikara suggests that this view was postulated by Mimāmsakas such as Lollaţa and the like, who chose to follow the abhihitánvayavāda.
We do not know whether we are justified in associating Lollata's name with this view and also with abhihitánvayavāda. In the Abhinayabhāratī also the views of Lollata are quoted and discussed at a number of places but we have no conclusive evidence to suggest that Lollata, if at all a mīmāmsaka, belonged positively to the
Jain Education Interational

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA group of the abhihitánvayavādins. But for the sake of convenience we will get along with Jhalkikar. and Pandit Viśveśvara following him, and consider Lollata to be an abhihitánvavavādin supporting the dirgha-dirghatara-vyāpāra.
It may be noted, before we proceed to discuss what Mammata has to say, that among the known commentaries it is only kävya-pradīpa which labels this view as, "bharta-matopajivinah” (pp. 1300, edn. Nāga-publishers, '98, Delhi), and then the Sudhāsāgara clearly states, “bhasta-lollaţā”dy abhimatam pakşam” (pp. 1301, ibid). Then we have Madhumati observing, "bhattalollaţă”dyabhimatam matam āśankate...” (pp. 1298, ibid). The Bālacittānurañjanī has, “eka-deśyantara-matam”, (pp. 1294, ibid), the Darpana has, “tad ekadeśántarāņām”, (pp. 1296), the Sahityacūdāmani has "athā'tra kecit tātparyam avalambya pratyavatisthante" (pp. 1296), the Sampradāyaprakāśini has (pp. 1297, ibid) : 'ekadeśyantaramatam'; Vistārikā offers no comment on this issue, while Sārabodhinī (pp. 1299, ibid) has, "matántaram avatārayati". The Sāradīpikā of Gunaratnagani (edn. K.P. with Sāradīpikā, Dr. T. S. Nandi, pub. Guj. Uni., Ahd. '76); pp. 246 (Vol. I) also calls it, "eka-desi-matam”. Only Sudhāsāgara and Madhumati candidly come out and associate this view with Bhatta Lollata and Jhalkikar seems to follow them. But for the time being we will choose to keep our fingures crossed.
Mammaţa puts the whole thing as follows :
(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 165, 167, ibid) : There are others who say : "The function (of the word or denotation), like that of an arrow, lasts for long" - and "whatever is intended to be expressed by the word, that is the meaning of the word;" accordingly the positive sense itself is the denoted meaning here - (i.e. in the verse, The slope of your breasts has its sandal completely washed off etc.). They (who have advanced the above view) also do not understand its real import, they are foolish in that they indulge in the argument of purport (i.e. the theory that whatever is intended to be expressed by the word is its meaning). To make it explicit : accomplished thing and what is to be accomplished are mentioned together, the accomplished is meant to subserve the one which is to be accomplished. Thus, the substantive meanings, on their being correlated to the verb-meaning, acquire the character of what is to be accomplished, on account of their being related to their own action which helps the principal action. Thus following the maxim of burning
that alone is predicated which has not been already accomplished. For example, when the walking about of the preists is established through other injunction in a case like, “the priests with red-turbans are walking about”, the wearing of red turbans alone becomes the object of injunction (i.e. Redness alone of the turban is enjoined upon by this sentence - foot note, pp. 167, ibid)

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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
737 In cases like "He offers libation of curd", the offering of the libation being (known as) accomplished elsewhere, the means alone is prescribed here. Sometimes the injunction applies to two things and still in other cases the injunction applies to three things. For example, in cases like, "weave the red garment", it may be the injunction for one or two or three.
Thus whatever is prescribed there alone is the purport (of the word), therefore the purport relates to the given word only, and not to what is merely implied. If it were so, then in cases like "the former runs”, the purport could be related to the sense of the latter also. - "tataśca yad eva vidheyam, tatraiva tātparyam, ity upāttasyaiva śabdasya arthe tātparyam, na tu pratīta-mātre. evam hi 'pūrvo dhāvati' ity ādāv aparā”dy arthépi kvacit tātparyam syāt.' (pp. 166, vịtti, K.P. V, ibid).
Mammața refutes the views of those who want to do away with vyañjanā and invest abhidhā, with a longer and longer efficacy of yielding the padártha, then vākyártha and then the vyangyártha or intended sense also. These opponents take recourse to the Mimāmsā principle viz. "yatparah sabdah sa sabdárthah." - i.e. 'a word-meaning is that for which it is used'. Mammata says that these foolish Mimāmsakas do not understand the meaning of their own discipline. The real purport of this statement is that a word means only that for which it is used and when one thing is already prescribed it is not repeated, if any, comes with the use of a new word, the meaning of which is the newer intention of the speaker for this fresh injunction. At times one, or two or three things can be newly enjoined and for each newly enjoined item, a fresh word, meaning exactly the same thing, is used in a fresh injunction. This is the real purport of the words, "yatparah sabdah sa sabdárthah”. Mammața.explains the position by seeking illustrations from vedic ritual as well as commen practice. He also quotes the maxim, 'bhūta-bhavya-samuccārane bhūtam bhavyāya upadiśyate”, to bring home his point. It is very clear that, compared to · Abhinavagupta, Mammața has dug deeper and presented the whole matter with absolute clarity. (The translation of the original passages is by Prof. R. C. Dwivedi).
Mammata then, perhaps turns his guns towards his immediate predecessors, Dhananjaya and Dhanika, who come up with the advocacy of tātparya-vrtti and rejected vyañjanā. It may be said here that Dhananjaya-Dhanikas' tātparya-seems to be something else than the normal tātparya of the Mimāmsakas. For the Mimāņsakas 'tātparya' was only a vākya-vrtti, yielding a sentence-sense, as against the abhidhā which was only a pada-vítti and yielded only the padártha or individual word-sense. The correlated sentence of all words in a sentence was apprehended by a vākyártha-vịtti called 'tātparya', for the abhihitánvayavādins. But for Bhoja

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA and then for Dhañjaya and Dhanika tātparya went further. Whatever was intended to be conveyed by a speaker by the use of words, or partial use of words, was covered up by tātparya. Actually this tātparya, as Visvanātha discloses, is only a new name for vyañjanā. It is not the theoretically accepted tātparya of the Mimāmsakas. So, when Mammaţa rejects tātparya, he rejects something not exactly intended by the opponents. As in case of 'anumiti' also, with reference to Mahimā, this ‘tātparya' is not the same traditionally accepted tātparya in Mimāmsā discipline. It is broader and therefore, perhaps only a new name of vyañjanā.
Actually in rejecting the earlier view, Mammața had suggested that 'tātparya' or purport can be with reference to the word actually used a fresh, in a newer injunction. But the objector here says tātparya can be with reference to an-upātta word or unspoken word also as in case of "visam bhunksva". The Sudhāsagara, Sārabodhinī, Sampradāyaprakāśinī, Sāhitya-cūdāmaņi and other commentaries make this thing clear. The Sāhitya-cudāmaņi observes (pp. 1305, Edn. Nāg publishes) - "nanu 'anupāttasyā’pi śabdasya arthe kvacit tātparyam paśyāmah” ... etc. No commentary makes a clear reference to the Dasarūpakávaloka of Dhanika which specifically discusses this in connection with the famous words where he declares : "tātparvam na tuladhrtam". (DR. Avaloka on IV. 36). Dhananjaya observes: "na ca apadárthasya vākyārthatvam nástīti vācyam - kāryaparyavasāyitvāt tātparya-sakteh." - But one thing should be considered. We go along with Dr. De and others (i.e. Dr. Kane) when we take both Dhananjaya and Dhanika as predecessors of Mammata. In that case for sure, Mammața discusses the illustration viz. "visam bhaksaya" etc. after Dhanika's Avaloka. But as no commentator worth the salt mentions Dhanika here could it be that Mammata could have just continued his discussion connerning “vat-parah sabdah sa śabdārthah” and refuted some imagined objector's view who might have supported the case of "anupāttasyā'pi śabdasya arthe kvacit tātparyam” ? May be then. following Mammata once again Dhanika took up the same illustration of a tātparva-vrtti with a broader connotation ? We are not clear about this and leave it to the discerning experts. For the present we will proceed with Mammata : (Trans. R.C.D., pp. 167, 169; ibid) :
"It is also stated that, 'eat the poison, but do not eat at his house', - here the purport is that "you should not eat in his house"; hence this alone is the meaning of the sentence. To this we reply - Here the conjunctive particle 'ca' (= and) is meant for the unity of the (two) sentences.

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Vyañjana-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
739
Since there is no relation of the principal and subordinate between the two sentences having independent verbs ('eat' and 'do not eat' because the first verb gives the positive command and the other negative, these two verbs cannot be principal and subordinate) the sentence asking for taking the poison should be imagined to be subordinate by making it derivative (i.e. instead of 'eat', or 'bhunksva', the word should be taken here as a derivative, 'eating' or 'bhakṣaṇa'. The former sentence is thus made subordinate to the second sentence. The meaning of the two sentences taken together would be that): "Eating in the house of this man is worse than eating poison, therefore, you should never eat in the house of this man." It follows from this that the import is in the meaning of a given (word) only."
Mammata further presents fresh argument in defence of vyañjana when he observes that if, on hearing a word, any meaning obtained were under only denotative function 'sabdaśruter anantaram yāvān arthaḥ avagamyate, tāvati śabdasya abhidhā eva vyāpāraḥ...', then why not joy and despair and the like be taken as directly expressed meanings respectively in cases of such utterances as, “O Brahmaṇa, a son is born to you", or "your unmarried daughter is pregnant?" etc... Why even to admit lakṣaṇā or indication at all-kasmac ca lakṣaṇā? For in cases of indicated meaning also the apprehension could be accomplished by the farreaching function of direct expression "dirgha-dirgha-abhidhā-vyāpāreṇaiva pratīti-siddheḥ." We know that for deciding the exact meaning of an injunction in case a conflict is noticeable between one and another injunction, the Mimāmā has given a six-fold scheme such as śṛti, or Direct declaration, linga i.e. indicative power, vakya or syntactical connection, prakarana or context, sthāna or position and samākhyā or the name, and these have each preceding factor stronger than the immediate next. The Sampradaya-prakāśinī explains it as : tad etat paradaurbalyam katham utpadyatām, paradurbalatve hetur yórtha-viprakarṣaḥ, maheṣuvad dirgha-dirghe tavásminnabhidhāvyāpāre jīvati, tasyaivā'sambhavāt. The idea is that these factors which go to prove the higher and lower authority of various injunctions conflicting with one another would be of no use because even from the lowest placed type the meaning of the highest placed variety will be derived on the strength of digha-dīrgha-tara-vyāpāra theory. Thus, Mammata triumphantly declares - iti anvitábhidhānavāde'pi vidher api siddham vyangyatvam, i.e. even according to the theory of 'connected meaning', also the affirmation (i.e. tatraiva rantum eva gata'si iti) (in the verse, 'the slope of your breasts has its sandal completely washed off, etc.) must be regarded being of the nature of suggested.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
Mammaţa, as observed earlier has not only drawn from both Abhinavagupta and Anandavardhana, but has placed all arguments very systematically and has also added some fresh arguments of his own in view of the tough opposition to vyañjanā advanced by the great opponents such as Mahimā, even Bhoja to an extent, and the Mālava-school also represented by Dhananjaya and Dhanika. Of course, Dhanika, as we tried to put above, could be posterior to Mammaţa. But this is an unsupported conjecture based on only internal evidences. We will look into this later after first convering the full discussion as presented by Mammaţa.
It is interesting to note that the Sampradāya-prakāśinī tries to distinguish between the mīmāmsakas, and the literary critics who seem to follow the lead of the mīmāmsakas. Śrī-Vidyācakravartin passes a remark (pp. 1341, ibid) - such as : "iyatā sandarbheņa sāhitya-sarani-pariśīlana-parāņmukhatayā paśu-prāyāḥ śuska-mīmāmsavaḥ pratyavatişthamānāḥ niskāsitāḥ. samprati tu ye anvitábhidhānadarśanánusāriņaḥ sāhitya-saranim anupravistāh sacetanammanyah tān prati sannahyate. The mīmāmsakas were dry as dust and therefore paśu-prāyāalmost beasts for total lack of sensitivity, while the literary critics who follow their lead at least have cultivated some sensitivity and those who consider themselves as 'those with conscience' - 'sacetanam-manyāh' - the pseudo-sensitive lot. Of course, other commentaries such as the Viveka of Sridhara, the Kavyādarśa, and the Bālacittānurañjani take the opponents here only as anvitábhidhānavādins Jhalkikar also takes them to be the same, but perhaps the remarks of Śrī-Vidyācakravartin are directed towards Dhananjaya-Dhanika and the like.
So, Mammata proceeds to demolish the opposition to vyañjanā as follows : "And again, why should the inverted order or 'kuru rucim', appearing in a poem, be regarded as a piece of blemish ? Here the indecent meaning is not connected with meanings of other words so it should remain un-denoted (according to those who admit only one power of word, abhidhā) and thus there will be no reason to avoid such expression." Srividyā-Cakravartin observes : (pp. 169, Edn. Dwivedi) : “kuru rucim” iti pade yadi vyatyayena kāvyántara-vartini syātām tadā dustatā yā iyam aślāatva-laksaņā sammatā, sā anvitánábhyupagame katham vā upapadyatām? na hi pada yor anayor antyā”dy aksara-sannikarsa-mātrād ābhāsamāno laukiko grāmyórthórthántarena anvitaḥ śabdártha eva bhavati. tataḥ a-śabdárthasya dosatve ati-prasaktiḥ syād ityevamā”dy apari-tyājyam syāt. ayam anvitábhidhānadarśana-āśrayane doso bhavatām."
Mammata further observes: "And if the reality of the suggester and the suggested, as distinct from the reality of the expressive and the expressed is not

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741 accepted, then the classification of grammatical mistake (i.e. a-sādhurva-dosa) and the like into parmanent poetic blemish and that of harshness (= kastatva) etc. into impermanent poetic blemish would be rendered unjustifiable." (Trans. pp. 171, edn. Dwivedi, ibid). The idea is that literary critics have accepted certain poetic blemishes as all-time blemishes, and others as only occasional. This classification argues Mammata, stands justified only if it stands on the basis of the recognition of vyangya-vañjakabhāva. Mammata observes that this classification of blemishes into permanent and impermanent is not unjustified as it shines distinctly to every body. If the reality of the suggester and the suggested is accepted as distinct from the reality of the expressive and the expressed, the suggested meaning being manifold, some meaning alone may be regarded as appropriate in a certain case, and thus the system of classification would be quite justified.” (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 171, ibid).
The Sampradāya-prakāśini observes that when a grammarian is a speaker, such usages as involving harsh letters or consonants e.g. "varvasti." will not make for the blemish of śrtikaturva or kastatva even in a poem, but will be on the contrary taken as an excellence : "yo hi "varvastih” ity ädyā”tmakaḥ kaşțarvā"di-dosaḥ sa vaiyākaraņā"dau vaktari tavā’pi gunatvena sammataḥ, anyathā dosarvena. sóyam vibhāgo vāyavācaka-bhāva-mātrā”śrayaņe na upapadyate tasya sarvasya ekarūpatvāt; tad atireki-vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāvā-"śra-yane tu śrutikațutvam api prakriyā-mātra-vyavasthitasya vaiyākaransya varākasya na kāka-kalpatām āviskaroti, pratyuta guna eva iti vibhāgo'yam upapadyata eva.” (p. 170, ibid).
Mammața further observes that in such poetic illustrations as, "dvayam gatam." etc. - i.e. "Both these have now become pitiable due to their desire for association with the Holder of the begging bowl.” (i.e. kapalin, or Siva), why should the words as 'kapālin' - or 'the Holder of the begging bowl, and the like, be regarded as poetically appropriate ? And again, the denoted meaning is one and the same for all cognisers so why 'kapālin' is taken as more poetically charged in comparison to 'pinākin' or "wielder of the pināka bow" ?
The denoted meaning or vācyártha is one and uniform for all cognisers in illustrations such as, 'gato' stam arkah" - i.e. "The sun has set." But the suggested sense, argues Mammata, in such expressions, varies and becomes manifold by accessory conditions, such as, the particular context, the speaker, the person addressed and the like. Innumerable suggested senses arise in different situations from one and the same expression as, "gatóstam arkah", such as : This is the time

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA to invade the enemy; you should start to meet your lover; your lover is about to reach; we are going to stop our work; let us begin the twilight rite; do not go very far; bring the cows to their shed; there is now no heat; let us pack up the merchandise; the lover has not come even to-day."
There is distinction between the vācya and the vyangya in point of character e.g. in nihsesa-cyuta. etc. the expressed is of negative nature and the suggested is of positive character. In verses such as, “mātsaryam utsāya." etc., the expressed sense poses doubt, while the suggested is of the nature of definiteness in the choice between the śānta and the śộngāra-rasa.
In poetic illustrations such as, “katham avanipa darpo..." etc., the expressed meaning is of the nature of reproach i.e. nindā, and the suggested is of the nature of praise i.e. stuti -
The vācya and the vyangya are distinct in point of time also, because of antecedence and sequence of the cognition; in point of media : The word is the medium (for the expressed), while the word, its part, its meaning, letters, and their peculiar composition are the media for the suggested in form of instumentality i.e. nimitta; the expressed is known by the knowledge of grammar, while the suggested is known with its help, as also with the help of context, and other auxiliary conditions and with transparency of discriminative intellect; in point of effect : the expressed produces a mere comprehension in one who knows the meaning of words, while the suggested produces charm in men of taste alone; in point of number as it has been shown in the instance, "gatóstam arkaḥ”.
In instances such as, “kassa vā ņa hoi...." etc. there is difference in point of person addressed because the expressed relates to the companion of the speak sakhī, the suggested relates to her husband, her lover, the onlooker etc.
Mammața concludes that even when being distinct on so many points, if the expressed and the suggested are taken as one, there could never be any difference even between the blue, and the not-blue and the like. It is said, “The apprehension of the opposite attributes and the difference of cause, this, in fact, constitutes difference or the ground of difference." - uktam hi - ayam eva hi bhedo bheda-hetur vā yad-viruddha-dharmádhyāsah kārana-bhedas ca."
We know that Mammața has systematically arranged all arguments scattered in the Dhvanyāloka and the Locana, and has also added a few to silence the vyañjana-virodha as seen in the successors of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta.

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743 Mammața further states that the expressive words require the object of denotation but the suggestive ones do not require that. The idea is that in laksanāmūla-dhvani of the atyanta-tiraskệta-vācya, the primary sense is totally discarded and therefore not required at all.
In illustrations of gunībhūta-vyangya such as vāṇīra-kudan” etc. i.e. in illustrations of subordinate suggestion such as 'on hearing the twitter of birds on the vetasa-bower..." etc., where the expressed sense having delivered the suggested meaning rests within itself - 'vācyam svarūpa eva yatra viśrāmyati’ - even unintended meaning, not denoted by words, appears in our range of cognition. Under what function of words would such a meaning be included ?
The objector may argue, says Mammața, that, in instances such as, “rāmósmi sarvam sahe", "rāmena priya-jīvitena." etc. even the indicated (i.e. laksya) artha also becomes manifold, and the cause of a particular nomenclature, its composition is also based on both words and their meanings, and requires the help of the context and the like (as in case of the suggested or vyangya artha), so, why should we admit this new kind of meaning, namely the suggested meaning ? The reply to this is - "lakṣaniyasya arthasya nānātve api anekártha-sabdábhidheyavat niyatatvam eva.” - i.e. Even though indicated sense is manifold, yet just like the denoted meaning of homonymous words, its number is definite (and limited). -
Moreover, a meaning (under indication, which has no definite relation with the primary sense, cannot be indicated. But the suggested one, due to the context and other individual conditions, (i) may have a definite relation, (ii) may not have a definite relation or (iii) may be only related to what is directly related (to the expressed sense). - "pratīyamānas tu prakaranádi-viseșa-vašena niyata-sambandhaḥ, a-niyata-sambandhaḥ, sambaddha-sambandhaśca dyotyate.”
There is no mukhyártha-bādha i.e. the expressed sense is not contradicted in instances of vivakṣitányapara vācya-dhvani, such as “attā ettha şimajjai.” etc. So, how can there be indication or laksană at all ? And again, it has already been shown that in laksaņā also, the suggestion has to be resorted to, to arrive at the prayojana or intention of the speaker. Just as denotation-vācakatva-rests on convention, indication-laksanā-rests on mukhyártha-bādha etc. - i.e. the three conditions. It is therefore described as an extention - literally 'tail' - 'pucchabhūtā of abhidhā or expression.
Mammața in an immaculate fashion sums up what Anandavardhana had stated while establishing vyañjanā as an independent power of word, other than

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SAHRDAYALOKA abhidhā, laksaņā and even tātparya. He says - (pp. 178, edn. Dwivedi, ibid) :
"na ca laksaņā”tmakam eva dhvananam, tad anugamena tasya darśanāt. na ca tad anugatam eva, abhidhávalambanena api tasya bhāvāt. na ca ubhayánusār yeva, a-vācaka-varnánusāreņa api tasya drsteh - na ca śabdánusāryeva, a-śabdā”tmakanetra-tribhāgávalokanā"di-tātparya-laksaņā”tmaka-vyāpāra-trayátivarti vyañjanadhvananā”di paryāyo vyāpāro'pahnavanīya eva." - i.e. "And the suggestion is not verily of the nature of indication, because it i.e. suggestion) is seen to follow that (i.e. indication). Nor does it invariably follow that (i.e. indication), because it may arise on the basis of denotation also. Nor again does it invariably follow both (i.e. denotation and indication), because it is seen on the basis of inexpressive letters also. The suggestion is not based on words (as also on letters and syllables) either, because it is known to be related to the side-long glance and the like, which are non-verbal in their character. Thus the function, which has many synonyms such as suggestion, reverberation, and which is beyond the three functions of the nature of Denotation, Import, and Indication, cannot be denied.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid) -
It may be noted that the synonym 'dhvanana' as used by the dhvanivādins for vyañjana could mean more than it appears at the upper level. We had above discussed the point and we will also go to elaborate still further while dealing with Mahimā, that such sounds as thundering of clouds carries a meaning of on coming rains. Now the anumiti-vādin may argue that this again is an instance of laukika-anumāna or "loose inference". But this thing is perhaps rejected by Ānandavardhana and his followers by taking 'dhvanana' as meaning suggestion. There is no ‘anumāna' here, be it loose as taken by the opponent, but surely there is suggestion. In the same way in various media, such as colour in the art of painting, gestures in dance, acting in drama, musical notes in music, carving in sculpture and the like, we have to read vyañjanā and not loose 'anumiti'. The joining or disjoining of a railway compartment, the peculiar sound of arriving or disappearing of the flow of water in a water tap, the sound of a vehicle, or of the walking and foot-steps of a dear one or an animal-all these are therefore suggestors and certainly there is no scope for inference which is a dry exercise in intellect. Abhinavagupta squarely puts it as : "laukikánumāne tu kā rasatā ?". So, this may be taken as the final triumph of vyañjanā over anumiti. - Yes, even loose inference !
We may again place the point squarely. The dragon of anumitivāda had raised its head much earlier than even Anandavardhana. Even Bhāmaha contended with it when he dealt with "kavya-nyāya". The author of the Dhvanyaloka was very

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745 specific when he explained that the province of anumiti and that of word are distinct from each other. When the former ends, the latter starts. It can be understood as follows. Supposing you are in a place, the language of which land is not known to you. Suddenly you hear someone talking to you loudly or rudely or in a polite tone. You do not understand the meaning of a language foreign to you. But you can infer something. That someone has an intention to convey something is understood by you through inference. But what exactly he wants to convey can be understood only, if through an interpreter you come to know the meaning of spoken words. Thus, to get at the meaning you have to have an understanding of the convention of a particular word of that language with reference to a particular meaning. Thus Anandavardhana has made this absolutely clear that the anumeva visaya' of words and the 'pratipadva visaya' of words are different. When someone speaks, you may infer that he is a santient being and that through his language, known or unknown to you, he wants to convey something. Thus the intention to convey through use of words on his part, is a matter of inference. But actually whatever is conveyed through use of words is the denotative aspect. : "pratipădyas tu prayoktur artha-pratipādana-samīhā-visayîkrtā'rthah" - i.e. "The denotative scope of words relates to meaning itself which happens to be the aim of the speaker's intention to convey meaning." Nothing can be clearer than this. So, after Bhāmaha's effort to pacify the anumitivādins, Sankuka or the likes of him or his predecessors must have once again raised the bogie of inference and Anandavardhana directed his efforts to pacify these voices by partly accepting and wholly explaining as to where anumiti should end. But the voice was not silenced for ever and perhaps it had a tendency to take shape like the phoenix from ashes.
Hence Abhinavagupta also had to tackle it very carefully. In presenting Sankuka's views and in its refutation by his teachers, the author of Abhinavabhārati makes a plea that, "laukikánumāne tu kā rasatā" - what aesthetics can be derived from “popular” anumāna or inference at worldly parlour ? It seems he refers to two categories here. One is the scientific i.e. śāstriya or tarka-anumāna which is rejected out right. Later even Mahimā, the avowed supporter of inference, also concedes that 'tarkánumiti' or scientific inference is never sought after by the anumitivādins. But he evolves a third category called kāvyánumiti', over and above the tarkánumiti and the laukikánumāna as suggested earlier. Anandavardhana rejected the tarkánumāna of the tārkikas or logicians, but tried to accomodate some element of it in what he called, "anumeyo visayaḥ śabdānām". Abhinavagupta went a step further and accepted that “rasánubhava' or aesthetic

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA experience is possible only in case of such sensitive aesthetes who are experts in worldly inference - "tatra loka-vyavahāre kārya-kārana-sahacārā"tmaka-lingadarśane sthāyyā”tmaka-cittavștty anumānábhyāsa-pāțavād..." - i.e. the aesthete or the man of taste has to be fully armed with expertise in inference at local level. In short he has to be an expert in the art of infering the feelings of others at the worldly level.
Mammata almost echoes these words when he says: (K.P. IV) : "loke pramadā”dibhiḥ kāraņā”dibhiḥ sthāyyanumāne abhyāsa-pāțava-vatām...” i.e. “In common life, the men of taste are possessed of proficiency, by repeated observation in inferring the basic emotion through women and the like, i.e: through causes, etc.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 69, ibid). But beyond this the vyañjanāvādins cannot concede. Mahimā having seen this much comes up with a third type of anumiti over and above the 'tarkánumiti' and 'laukikánumāna', and it is what he terms kāvyánumiti. If laukikanumāna is having no 'rasatā', this poetic inference is all full of rasa.' Dr. Rewaprasad, the greatest modern exponent of kavyanumiti also says that when Mammata and his followers refute 'anumāna' in illustrations such as "bhrama dhārmika. ..." etc., they refute the process of inference, but not the fact of inference. Even Mahimā shielded his kāvyánumiti by saying that this, what he calls a poetic inference, is beyond the scrutiny of perfectionists - 'saryāsatyavicārana' or examination concerning its validity or otherwise is an object of laughter ! This effort is misdirected and therefore looks like a crude joke!
But our humble submission is that if you use the term 'anumiti' and remove all its basic qualities, then you may call it by any other name. Why insist on such ar inference which is beyond an examination of its validity or otherwise ? Actually inference is an intellectual process and art-experience or kalanubhūti or rasánubhūti transcends even intellect. It covers intellect, volition and also imagination and goes beyond all these - atytisthad dasángulam. Art experience is like the three and a half strides of Visnu in form of Vāmana-virāt. To label this rasa experience by names such as perception, or inference or presumption or any worldly or śāstrīya means of knowledge is to devalue it. It is precisely for this reason that Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta and the thought-current represented by them choose to call it 'vyangya' or suggested and make it an object of the power of suggestion. Thus, vyañjana, dhvanana, prayāyana, avagamana are synonyms acceptable to the supporters of vyañjanā/dhvani/rasa. Thus perhaps the war is won by vyanjanāvādins though at times the anumitivādins stole some advantage in small battles.

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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
747 Mammața, while winding up his discussion on vyañjanā observes, like Anandavardhana, that, "others (= the grammatico-philosophers) have held that it is the sentence-meaning alone which, grasped through a single indivisible cognition, is the expressed sense (vācya), and it is the sentence alone that is expressive (vācaka). But these (theorists) also, when descending down to the realm of practical reality (avidyā), must make the assumption of the word and the wordmeaning; so that even according to their view, the idea of affirmation and the like, in the instances such as cited above (i.e. the slopes of your breasts have its sandal completely washed off, etc.), should necessarily be considered as the suggested.” (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 181, ibid). Thus even the grammarians have to accept vyañjanā.
Mammata, at the end of his discussion on vyañjanā tackles the anumitivādins. He first presents the arguments of the logicians and then refutes the same. He observes : (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 181, 183, ibid) :
"It may be urged (by the logicians that what is not connected with the expressed is not suggested, because in that case there would be contingency of cognition of any meaning from any word. Thus, the relation being essential, the state of being the suggester and the suggested is, undoubtedly, not possible in the absence of a definite relation, therefore, on account of invariable concomittance (between the expressed i.e. suggester, and the suggested) and due to the existence in the definite subject, characterised by mark, the suggestiveness turns out to be of the character of inference, which is the cognition of the subject, characterised by the threefold mark.” To explain the same, in the illustration viz. bhrama dharmika. etc., Mammata observes that in this particular illustration, the roaming about in the house, which is enjoined upon due to removal of the dog, leads to inference of not roaming about because of the presence of the lion on the banks of Godāvarī. Every case of the coward's roaming about is a case preceeding from the knowledge of disappearance of the cause of fear. But on the banks of the Godāvarī there is the presence of the lion; so what is found is contrary to what is invariably concomitant.
This is what an anumitivādin would present in support of his theory of anumāna. But Mammata and a host of his followers find fault with this process of reasoning as follows. He observes that even a coward, by the order of his preceptor or the master, or due to love for his beloved, or by some such cause, roams about even when the cause of fear is present; hence the probans (= hetu) is nonconclusive (= anaikāntiko), i.e. literally it is not unfailing in its association with the 'sādhya' or probandum. Even though afraid of the dog, he may not, being brave,

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SAHŞDAYALOKA fear the lion, hence the probans is diverse (= viruddha) also. The presence of the lion on the banks of the Godāvari is not ascertained either by perception or by inference but merely from the words of a woman. Again, there is no validity of her words as they might not be related to fact, hence the probans is unestablished also. Then how, such a defective probans can prove the existence of the probandum ?
Mammața goes on to explain that in case of the illustration viz. nihśesa-cyutacandana.” etc. also the marks that are mentioned as going with a bath in a stepwell” could be due to some other reasons also, such as love-sport etc. So, the marks - i.e. probans - are descrepant.
For those who support vyañjanā, on the other hand, such marks with the aid of the word 'wretch', are described as suggestive. Again, here when the wretchedness is not established by valid reason. (na pramāņa-pratipannam), how can there be inference ?
Thus, to his satisfaction Mammata puts a final nail in the cofin wherein the body of anumiti rests.
But we may say that all this exercise on the part of Mammata and his followers to nail anumiti is futile as Mahimā or any of his predecessor that might be, has never suggested that what they call ‘kāvyánumiti' is 'tarkánumiti'. As Dr. Rewaprasad observes, here there is refutation of the relaiability of anumiti, or the validity of inference, but not of the fact of inference. True, but our argument is that with all looseness why stick to the name of "anumiti" ? To be vary candid, we do not find 'anumiti' in colours, or musical notes, or gestures or any other medium of a given fine art, yes; not even a 'loose' or 'artistic' anumiti. So, why not accept a wider term called 'vyañjana' in place of a 'laukika' or 'kävyamaya' anumāna ? We may therefore hold that by this the final victory of vyañjanā and defeat of anumiti is absolutely established. Vyañjanā is so wide as to accept in its fold a meaning that may be related (= sambaddha), or un-related (= a-sambaddha) or related with the related (= sambaddha-sambaddha).
Mammata had a numer of vyañjanā virodhins before him. In the course of our discussion of Mammața's views, we had suggested that even after the able establishment of vyañjanā by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we had voices of descent. Thus as seen in the earlier chapter Mukula, prior to Abhinavagupta tried to put even laksaņā and also vyañjanadhvani under abhidhā. In his Laghuvștti, a commentary on Udbara's kāvyálamkāra-sāra-samgraha, Pratīhārendurāja, who also is held as a predecessor of Abhinavagupta, pays a great

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749 tribute to his guru, Mukula in the words :
"mīmāmsā-sāra-meghāt, pada-jaladhi-vidhos tarka-māņikya-kośāt, sāhitya-śrī-murārer budha-kusuma-madhoh śauri-pādábja-bhrúgāt, śrutvā saujanya-sindhor dvija-vara-mukulāt kīrti-vallyālavālāt,
kāvyálamkāra-sāre laghu-vivstim adhāt kaunkaņaḥ śríndurājaḥ.” On his A.V.M. - 11 and 12a, Mukula writes : (pp. 66, Edn. Dr. Rewaprasad, Varanasi, '73) ... "etac ca sarvam bahu-vaktavyatvād iha na nirūpyate laksaņāmārgávagāhitvam tu dhvaneh sahrdayair nūtanatayo-pavarnitasya vidyata iti diśam unmīlayitum idam atra uktam. etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśágrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam, na tu jħagity evā’sūyitavyam iti alam ati-prasangena."
“All this requires great elaboration and hence is not discussed here fully. We have said only this much, only to point to the fact that what some men of taste have laid down afresh, as dhvani, is contained only in the province of laksaņā (which thus covers vyañjanā also in its fold). The learned with their razor-sharp intellect have to expound this (secret). They should not discard (our point) (as trash) immediately, through prejudice.”
We may point out exactly where Mukula has rejected the views of Anandavardhana. For example, the latter has taken rasa as 'vyangya' or suggested and principal. Mukula has laid down the apprehension of rasa through "āksepa" which may mean either laksanā, or arthāpatti i.e. presumption, and anumana, or inference. Mammaţa and others take 'āksepa' in the sense of 'implicit sense' also and therefore 'vyañjanā' also. Mukula takes ‘āksepa' only as laksaņā i.e. indication, and arthāpatti i.e. presumption.
We know that for Anandavardhana, 'rasa' falls into that section of 'dhvani' which is abhidhāmūla or vivakşitányapara-vācya. Now, there is no scope of laksaņā into this variety, which goes with what is termed, "a-vivakṣita-vācya-dhvani”. But for Mukula, even in vivaksitánya-para-vācya also there is scope of laksaņā and he illustrates it by, “mahati samare satrughnas tvam”.
For Anandavardhana, arthántara-samkramita-vācyatva was not admissible in what we term as 'laksana-laksaņā'. But Mukula holds that in the illustration viz. "gangāyām ghosah”, the vācyártha in form of gangātva, terminates (= samkrānta) in the meaning of 'tata' (i.e. tatarūpa-artha). Of course Anandavardhana also did not say that the vācyártha here is "atyanta-tiraskrta” or wholly abandoned, but at the same time he does not clearly name it as, "arthántara-samkramita” also.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Anandavardhana took 'guņas' or excellences as qualities of rasa; Mukula keeps quiet over this as he discusses only abhidhā in his work.
Anandavardhana, over and above abhidhā accepts ‘guņa-vștti' and vyañjanā as word-powers; Mukula on the other hand accepts only abhidhā which is broad enough to cover laksanā also in its fold, while vyañjanā for him does not exist at all. Even laksaņā is an extension of abhidhā and it has no independent existence. While for the Mimāmsakas 'gunavrtti' and laksana were not identical, for Anandavardhana they are identical. Mukula also places both gunavrtti and laksaņā under a single title i.e. laksanā, which again is not independent of abhidhā, of which these two are subvarieties.
Mammata had to face this music of Mukula also and also of Mukula's pupil, Pratīhārendurāja. He also has no faith in vyañjanā and passes a remark, following his teacher Mukula, (pp. 100, N.S. Edn. 1928) · "evam etad vyañjakatvam paryāyoktā”dişv antar bhāvitam. etac ceha bahuvaktavyattvān na vaitatyena prapancitam. kuśágrīya-buddhinam hi dinmātra eva upadiśyate sati buddhi-valli
am āsādayati.” On pp. 58, (under ‘rasavat', in varga IV) he observes : “rasānām bhāvānām ca kāvya-sobhátiśayahetutvāt kim kāvyálamkāratvam uta kävya-jīvitatvam iti na tāvad vicāryate grantha-gauravabhayāt. rasa-bhāva-svarūpam cátra na vivecitam a-prakstatvād bahu-vaktavyarvāc ca. He does not name vyañjanā and by avagamana-vyāpāra purhaps he wants to take anumiti or arthāpatti. So, 'paryāyokta' is defined by Udbhasa as : (pp. 60, ibid) -
"paryāyoktam yad anyena prakāreņā”bhidhīyate, vācya-vācaka-vrttibhyam
śūnyenā’vagamanātmanā.” Pratīhārendurāja here explains :
vācakasya abhidhāyakasya sva-sabdasya vịttir vyāpāro vācyártha-pratyāyanam. vācyasya tu abhidheyasya vyāpāro vācyántareņa saha ākāńkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatāmāhātmyāt samsarga-gamanam. evamvidhaś ca yo vācya-vācakayor vyāpāras tam antareņa api prakārántareņa artha-sāmartyā”tmanā avagama-svabhāvena yad avagamyate tatparyāyeņa sva-kanthā'nabhihitam api sántareņa śabda-vyāpāreņa avagamyamānatvāt paryāyoktam vastu. tena ca sva-samślesa-vasena kāvyárthólamkriyate."

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Let us make this clear. What Pratīhārendurāja wants us to believe is that Udbhața accepts paryāyokta as an alamkara wherein something is abhidhiyate - i.e. 'conveyed' differently, by resorting to a vyāpāra known as 'avagamana' which is vācya-vācaka-vṛtti-śūnya i.e. which is different 'antarena' from what we call vācaka-vṛtti, explained by Pratihārendurāja as 'vacyártha-pratyāyana' i.e. apprehension of primary meaning which is the function of a 'vācaka' i.e. expressive word. It is also different from vācya-vṛtti i.e. the function of the direct-meaning. For him this function of the expressed meaning - 'vacyasya abhidheyasya vāpāra' is its correlation with other word-meanings in a sentence and this arriving at the correlated meaning is brought about by expectancy (= ākänkṣa), proximity (= sannidhi) and appropriateness (= yogyatā). Thus, 'samsarga-gamanam' or 'arriving at a correlated meaning or vakyártha' is termed as vācya-vṛtti i.e. function of a meaning, against yielding väcyártha itself which is a vācaka-vṛtti or śabdavṛtti. Now, 'avagamana' is different from both these. It is yielding a sense by a different device in which the directly expressive word is not used - 'sva-kanthaanabhihita'. It is 'santara'-vyāpāra. Now we know that Mammața has called lakṣaṇā a "sántarártha-nistha-sabda-vyāpāra." So, perhaps like Mukula, Pratihārendurāja here tries to cover up 'avagamana' vyāpāra by lakṣaṇā. Or, it could be even 'anumiti' as the illustration given by him, viz. "yena lambālakah." etc.may suggest. He observes: "atra lambálakatva"dayaḥ kārya-rūpatvāt kāraṇabhūtam gajāsura-vadham vācya-vācaka-vyāpāra-a-spṛṣṭam api gamayanti." This means that this inferring of cause from effect is 'avagamana'. Whatever it is. It is either lakṣaṇā, or anumiti but certainly not tātparya i.e. purport, which is termed vācya-vṛtti here, nor abhidha, a 'vācaka-vṛtti', and not 'vyañjana' which is not at all alluded to. Mammata had to face the music of all this, Mukula being the most important opponent as Mammata's śabda-vyāpāra-vicara was modelled on, and of course directed against the Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātṛkā of the former.
We know that 'dhvani' in the vyakaraṇa discipline has relevance only upto the vaikharī vāc. But Anandavardhana used it with reference to the pratīyamāna or implicit sense as well. Mammața of course followed Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta in accepting "vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa”. But in between we have vyañjanā-dhvani-antarbhāva/virodha as seen in Mukula, Pratīhārendurāja, and to an extent in Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika. Abhinavagupta and Mammața use the word 'dhvanana' also as a synonym for 'vyañjana'. Mammața used the word 'dhvani' only for vaikhari-vāk in his Śabda

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA vyāpāra-vicāra, and used the term 'vyangya' for 'pratīyamāna' meaning. But he also used the term 'dhvanana' for vyañjanā also.
Mukula's abhidhā is a power which reaches upto the last intended meaning. Perhaps it is identical with the tātparya of the Mimāmsakas and also supported by
ka in his Avaloka on the Daśa-rūpaka. Of course the tātparya of the Mimāmsakas went only upto the actual word-upātta-sabda-mentioned in an injunction, while Dhanika's tātparya covered even the sense of such words that were not at all mentioned in a given statement. Thus, when Mammata denounced the dirgha-dīrhatara-vyāpāra, it was aimed against Dhanika who arrived at the qualities of coolness and holiness through tātparya only. Mammata had to contend with all this.
Kuntaka, we know talks of vicitrā abhidhā'. Now this vicitra abhidhā' is nothing but poetic expression. Actually Kuntaka has not bothered to evolve any clear scheme of semantics and so for him anything charming and poetic, be it at the level of abhidhā, laksaņā or vyañjanā, is covered up by 'vicitrā-abhidhā'. - Bhoja presents abhidhā in different forms and in different contexts. But he does not take laksanā as different from abhidhā, or what he terms mukhyā. For Bhoja, abhidhā is a power that stays in a word and renders meaning. For Bhoja, this abhidhā has three functions viz. mukhya, gauna and laksanā”tmaka. His 'mukhya is the normal 'abhidhā' of the Kashmir school. But it may be noted that he should not be taken as an anti-vyañjanā-vādin, for in Ch. VII of his Śr. Pra, while treating 'vivaksā', he almost covers vyañjanā and certainly while treating tātparya and dhvani he just shakes hands with Anandavardhana. At least we should not dub him as an anti-dhvani-or anti-vyañjanā theorist.
We have carefully looked into Mahimā on an earlier occasion and that he was an avowed anti-dhvani, anti-vyañjanā theorist is borne out by the very title of his work viz. 'vyakti-viveka' wherein he clearly denounces vyañjanā. Mammata took special care to show logical falacies in Mahimā and prove that the latter's projection of 'anumiti' in place of vyañjana was a myth. Actually the very fact that Mahima calls it a special brand of inference, called “kāvyánumiti' and tries therely to take shelter under what may be termed as loose inference and therefo exposes the hollowness of his postulation. An ‘anumiti' is either an anumiti hundred percent. or no anumiti at all. It is safer to call it vyañjanā than oppose the concept of vyañjanā for the sake of it. It is nothing else but malice as was the case with Bhatta Näyaka, who postulated what he called 'bhāvakatva' and 'bhojakarva' or

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753 bhogīkarana, - the two functions in place of one, the vyañjanā. Abhinavagupta in his Abhinavabhārati has refuted these two functions which are partly only abhidhā and partly vyañjanā in a new name. To postulate two powers in place of one in itself was tentamount to go for 'gaurava-dosa'. Actually Bhatta Nayaka's bhāvakatva was equivalent to accepting gunas and alamkāras which operated at vācya-vācaka-bhāva level, and his bhojakatva had no identity of its own to differ from the age-old concept of vyañjanā. Thus, as in case of Bhatta Nāyaka, so also with Mahimā, it was malice and malice alone which prompted him to oppose vyañjanā. Perhaps Mahimā is conscious of his malicious intentions, and also of the over zealous activity on his part when he says :
"iha sampratipattitónyathā vā dhvanikārasya vaco-vivecanam naḥ, niyatam yaśase prapatsyate yan
mahatām samstava eva gauravāya." - I. 2 and also,
"sahasā yaśóbhisartum samudyatā’drsta-darpaņā mama dhiḥ, sválamkāra-vikalpa-prakalpane
vetti katham iva a-vadyam.” I. 3. Perhaps same is the case with Dhanika, the commentator of Dhananjaya.
The Daśarūpaka cancells ‘nirveda' as a sthāyin and therefore rejects śānta-rasa at DR. IV. 36. Where it it is observed :
“nirvedā”dir a-tādrūpyād a-sthāyī, svadate katham vairasyāya eva tat-poșas tenástau sthāyino matāḥ.”
When 'nirveda' can not stand the onslaught of favourable and unfavourable feelings and emotions, it can not be admitted as a sthāyin and therefore, observes the Avaloka on it, the śānta-rasa also does not deserve a recognition - "tato rasatvam api na teşām ucyate, ato a-sthāyitvād eva etesam a-rasatā."
Then, the Avaloka embarks upon a basic discussion as to what then can be the relation of rasas etc. with kāvya or poetry (and also nātya/drama)?
"kah punar eteşām kāvyena api sambandhaḥ ?" - First of all he presents the view of the Dhvanivādins. Dhanika holds that the relation of bhāvas and rasas with kāvya cannot be of the type of vācya-vācaka i.e. expressed and expresser.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA - na tävad vācya-vācaka-bhāvah, sva-sabdair anā"veditarvāt.
- The rasádi are not mentioned through sva-sabda i.e. they are not conveyed by simple mentioning of their names. We do not hear such terms as śộngāra, or raty adi and the like in poetry charged with these particular emotions and feelings. So, we cannot accept direct expression of these śộngārā"di or ratyādi or of their full nourishment. - (tesām tat-pariposasya vā). Wherever such directly expressive terms such as raty ādi or śộngārā"di are used, there also the nouishment of an emotion is caused not by these terms only, but by the respective 'vibhāvā”dis' - i.e. determinants etc.
Here we may note that Dhanika seems to argue on the line of Dhvanikāra Anandavardhana. He presents it in form of a primā-facia view. On the same line of argument as advanced by the dhvanivadin Dhanika also rejects the case of laksya-lakşakabhāva between rasā"di and kāvya i.e. word and sense used in poetry.
Dhanika observes : nä'pi laksya-laksakabhāvah, i.e. the relation of indicator and indicated is also ruled out in case of rasā”di and kāvya. Poetry is neither laksaka, nor are rasā"di laksya. Perhaps here the reference is to Mukula who in his Abhidhāvịtta-mātřkā suggests that - "tātparyā-locana-samarthyāc ca vipralambhaśộngārasya āksepa iti upādānā”tmikā laksanā.” Thus suggesting that the collection of rasā"di is through laksanā.
Dhanika rejects laksaņā in the apprehension of rasā"di, because in laksaņā a term indicating a class is used to convey a particular sense, but in case of rasā"di this relation is not observed. So, there is no case for laksita-laksanā also. He observes : tat sämänyábhidhāyinas tu - laksakasya padasya a-prayogāt. The Avaloka observes that in rasa-realization there is no skhalad-gatitva of words expressing vibhāvā"dis such as nāyika and the like. As in 'gangāyām ghosah', so also in this case the words used are not powerless to convey what they want to. There is neither 'nimitta' i.e. relation, nor prayojana or objective in case of rasa"di as seen in cases of laksanā. Hence, there is no chance of even 'guna-vrtti' as seen in "simho mānavakah”. We may note that 'guna-vrtti' is used here in Avaloka, in keeping with the Mālava tradition seen in Bhoja, as meaning laksanā based on similarity and this was later fixed as gauņi-laksaņā in the Kāvya-prakāśa, though Anandavardhana has a wider connotation of gauņi meaning an 'a-mukhyavyāpāra'. We have noted above while dealing with laksanā-gaunī, that the Prābhākaras hold 'gauņi' as a separate vrtti or an independent word-power, while the Bhātra-Mimāņsakas and also later vyañjanāvādins such as Mammața, take gaunī as a sub-variety of laksaņā which is either upacāramiśrita or upacāra-a
dud.

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755 miśrita, i.e. based on identification (due to similarity) or not based on identification. We have noticed that Vidyānātha had observed that : "gauņa-vịttir api laksanā-prabheda eva. sambandhā'nupapatti mülakatvāt. yathā agnir mānavaka iti.” (pp. 33, Edn. S. Chandrasekhara Satrigal, Madras, 1914) - On this Kumāraswami observes : "gauna-vrtcir laksanāto bhinnā iti prābhākarāh. tadayuktam. tasyā laksanāyām eva antarbhāvāt.” (pp. 33, ibid)
Dhanika continues in the vein of the Dhvanikāra, and suggests that if the apprehension of rasā"di were to take place through direct expression (i.e. yadi vācyatvena rasa-pratipattiḥ syāt), then this apprehension should have occurred in case of even those who are not cultured and who are initiated only with reference to the province of direct-expression only - kevala-vācya-vācaka-bhāva-mātravyutpanna- cetasām api a-rasikānām rasā"svādo bhavet. But this is not the case.
So, the dhvanivādins suggest that for apprehension of rasa, etc. vyañjanā has to be accepted : "ataḥ kecid abhidhā-laksaņā-gaunībhyo vācyántara-parikalpitasaktibhyo vyatiriktam vyañjakatva-lakṣaṇam sabda-vyāpāram rasálamkāra-vastuvisayam icchanti." Dhanika gives a summary of the views of the Dhvanivādins who postulate a separate word-power called vyañjanā and cites three illustrations from the Dhvanyāloka in support of vyañjanā. "vivrnvatī śaila-sutā’pi” is an illustration of rasā”di apprehension, while "bhama dhammia...", and "lāvanya-kānti-- paripūrita." etc. are illustrations of vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani respectively.
Avaloka further observes that for the vyañjanāvādin, this apprehension of threefold suggestion of rasā”di, vastu, and alamkāra can not be the result of arthāpatti i.e. presumption. - "na ca asau arthāpatti-janyā, anupapadyamānárthápekşábhāvāt. - i.e. This is not a case of presumption, for there is no apeksā or expectancy of a part of meaning and hence it is not a case of 'arthāpatti'.
Nor is rasapratīti congruent with sentence-sense : nā’pi vākyárthatvam vyangyasya, for suggested sense is a matter of third stage of realization : "trtīyakaksā-visayatvāt”. First comes the vācyārtha, the second stage is that of sentencesense and the suggested falls in the third stage.
Here onwards, Dhanika's rejoinder to the vyañjanāvāda starts..
Before we start analysing Dhanika's view, it may be recalled that Mammata, while dealing with the dirgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāravādin's views, had contended that the purport of a sentence has to be found with reference to words actually used in a sentence and not with reference to words not read actually in a sentence. This was the exact meaning of the injunction 'yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa sabdárthah',
e.

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• SAHRDAYĀLOKA
according to Mammața. The author of the K.P. then explains that even in statements such as 'visam bhunksva', the purport is with reference to the words actually used in a sentence as, the 'ca' in the next statement viz. "mă ca asya grhe bhunkthāh", suggests that both these statements make for a compound sentence connected with the particle 'ca'. So, even in 'visam bhunksva' the idea of not taking food at the other person's house, which is the purport of saying, is also seen as meaning of words actually used in a sentence.
The general impression is that here Mammata has not only taken care of dirgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāravādin who believes that the purport of a sentence can be with reference to words not actually used in a statement, but also has refuted Dhanika's views, who has taken the same illustration as, “visam bhunksva", to support tātparya-vāda.
But our humble submission is that perhaps this Dhanika, who also was a son of a 'visnu' is later than Mammata and he wants to condemn Mammata's refutation of the theory that the purport of a sentence can not lie in words not actually used in a statement. Dhananjaya, the author of DR. was also a son of 'visnu' but this 'visnu' may not be the same as the father of Dhanika also. This means that Dhanika was a son of some Visnu who was other than Dhananjaya's father. Our hypothesis that this Dhanika is later than Mammata is borne out by the fact that in his argument he cites one more illustration as we will go to see, viz. "dvāram dvāram” which means ['please close, or open,] the door.” Actually the purport of the speaker is with reference to either 'open' or 'close', the meanings, for which no actual words are used. So, he wants to bring home a point that the purport of the speaker can rest with the meaning of words not actually used in a sentence. And Mammata has not discussed this illustration which has no usage of such conjunctive particles as 'ca' etc. as seen in case of "visam bhunksva, mā cā'sya gruhe bhunkthāh.” So, the point is clear that may be this Dhanika, the author of Avaloka, was posterior to Mammata and once again he tried to establish tātparyavāda while rejecting the vyañjanāvāda. We will now examine Dhanika's views in details :
The upholder of the view that vyañjanā is covered by tātparya places the following arguments before the dhvanivādin -
The tātparyavādin says let us examine the sentence viz. 'vişam bhunkṣva.' Now in this statement in the sense of word-meaning we have a positive instruction viz. "Eat or take poison". But the purport is in the sense of negation, viz. "Never take

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757 food at the place of this enemy.” So, this particular statement, viz. 'visam bhanksva' is to be taken as an illustration of such sentence-sense (= vākyārtha) which is of the form of purport (i.e. tātparya) realized at the third stage : “nanu ca trtīyakaksā-visayatvam a-śrūyamāņa-padārtha-tātparyeşu, 'viņam bhunksva' ityādi vākyeșu niședhártha-visayeșu pratiyata eva vākyárthasya."
If someone says that here the negative sense is not the direct sentence-sense, then this will be accepted even by the supporters of vyañjanā -, as for him dhvani i.e. suggested sense is different from the purport of a sentence: "na cātra vyañjakarvavādinā’pi vākyártharvam nesyate, tātparyād anyatvād dhvaneh.” So, even the vyañjanāvādin will accept that there is a particular sentence-sense here. which is 'tātparya'. In this illustration, we apprehend separate word-sense of the words 'visam' and 'bhunksva', at the first stage. In the second stage the sentence, through correlation, gives the contextual (= prakarana-sammata) sense. This contextual correlated sense only is to be taken as sentence-sense. In this particular illustration, the second stage does not end at the apprehension of "Take poison". Till the sentence is not rested fully i.e. is not viśrānta in the second stage, the question of third stage does not arise at all. The point is that the context does not rest only at the sense of "Eat poison”. As the positive sense-vidhirūpa artha - is not the full sentence sense, the expectancy of further sense is very much there. So, the seco stage does not end here but is set to rest only when the negation in form of sentencesense, viz. "do not eat at the enemy's house", is realized. So, the sense of negation is apprehended at the second stage only. So, when the second stage is not over, it is useless to accept the third stage in form of negation. Actually there is total absence of this so called third stage. For, when we take into account the context, we come to know, that the sentence is directed by a father to his own son. In the second stage when we apprehend the sentence-sense, we perceive that no father will wish that his son should take poison, and that here with the action 'bhunksva', the agent (viz. 'tvam) and the object (karma, visam) do not get properly correlated. For we know for certain that a father would never instruct his own son to take poison, but the real instruction pertains to the fact of not taking food at the place of an enemy. Thus, the full sentence-sense is only the object of the second stage only : "...svárthasya dvitiya-kaksyāyām a-viśrāntasya třtīya-kaksā-a-bhāvāt; saiva nişedha-kaksā. tatra dvitīya-kaksā-vidhau kriya-kāraka-samsarga-anupapatteḥ, prakaraṇāt pitari vaktari, putrasya visabhaksana-niyogábhāvāt.”
And the rule is that 'rasádi-vyangyā”rtha' always rests in the third stage. This is for certain. The apprehension of rasa never occurs at the second stage when

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA there is apprehension of vibhāvā"dis. In a sentence charged with rasa, we know that the sentence-sense rests at the apprehension of the vibhāva i.e. determinants etc. only. Thus vibhāvas etc being only the instrument to bring home rasaapprehension, they necessarily have to be the fore-runners of rasa-apprehension. In the second stage there can never be rasa-pratīti, along with the apprehension of the determinants etc. As such, it is said,
"a-pratistam a-viếrāntam svárthe, yat-paratām idam, vākyam vigāhate tatra nyāyyā tatparatā’sya sā.” yatra tu svártha-viśrāntam pratisthām tāvad āgatam, tat-prasarpati tatra syāt
sarvatra dhvaninā sthitih." Dhanika quotes these two kārikās on behlaf of the vyañjanāvādin objector who refuses to include vyañjanā-dhvani in tātparya. The meaning is as follows -
When a sentence is not stable (a-pratisthita) and when it does not rest (aviśrānta) in its own sense, it is said to be 'tat-paraka' i.e. 'that-sense-oriented', in which (yat-paratā) it indulges. This is the nyāyyā or right position.
But when a sentence is resting in its own sense (i.e. svártha-viśrānta), and has attained stability, i.e. when the sentence-sense is fully apprehended, the further sense is called 'dhvani'.
So, with reference to these two karikās, it is clear that with the sentence-sense in form of the meaning of determinants etc. (= vibhāvā”di), having attained full rest (= viśrānta), the rasa-apprehension which follows has to be taken as a suggested sense and not as a sentence-sense. In case of idea (i.e. vastu), and a figure of speech (i.e. alamkāra), the story is different as they can be, at places suggested, or at other places even directly expressed through abhidha. But rasa is necessarily only suggested. In the case of suggested idea and figure, dhvani will be there only if they are principally suggested; for in other case of there being either equal status, or the vācyártha being comparatively more prominant, it will be a case of the gunībhūtavyangya-type of poetry. For, the Dhvanikāra himself has said, “yatrárthaḥ śabdo vā..." etc. (Dhanika here quotes the Dhv. I. 13). Dhanika further explains that

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759 guņībhūta-vyangya is seen as in case of the illustration viz. "upodha-rāgena”, etc. He also further explains, after Anandavardhana the main divisions of dhvani such as vivaksita-vācya and a-vivaksita-vācya, etc. and their subvarieties also.
After establishing the prima-facie view or pūrva-paksa in form of the vyañjanādhvani-vādin. Dhanika attempts its refutation under DR. IV. 37, which reads as -
"vācyā prakaraņā”dibhyo buddhisthā vā yathā kriyā vākyárthaḥ, kārakair yuktā,
sthāyī-bhāvas tathetariah.” (DR. IV. 37) "Just as the action, along with the kārakas (= agent, etc.) concerned, whether stated directly or grasped mentally is the real sentence-sense, in the same way the permanent emotion (i.e. sthāyi bhāva), accompanied by others (i.e. vibhāvādis) makes for a sentence-sense.”
Avaloka explains this kārikā as follows :
"yathā laukika-vākyesu, śrūyamāņa-kriyeșu "gām abhyāja” ity adişu, aśrūyamāna-kriyeșu ca, "dvāram dvāram" ity adişu, sva-sabdópādānāt prakaranā"divaśāt buddhi-sannivesini kriyaiva kārakópacitā, kāvyeșv api kvacit sva-sabdópādānāt “prītyai navodhā priyā”, ity evam adau, kvacit ca prakaranā”divaśāt,
bhihita-vibhāvādy avinābhāvād vā, sāksāt bhāvaka-cetasi viparivartamāno ratyādih stāyī, sva-sva-vibhāvā-nubhāva-vyabhicāribhis tat-tacchabdópanītaih, samskāra-paramparayā param praudhim ānīyamāno raty ādir vākyárthaḥ."
"As in the sentences used in daily usage with verb or action expressly stated such as "take away a cow", etc., or in sentences where activity is not heard (i.e. where words expressing action are not directly used), such as “the door,... the door”, etc., either (respectively) by the acceptance of the expressive word, or through context, the activity which is mentally understood and which is accompanied by other kārakas (such as agent-kartā, object-karma) etc., (is the real sentence-sense); in the same way, even in poetry (i.e. poetic statements), at times by direct mentioning through expressive words as in case of “prītyai navodhā priyā” (i.e. the newly married girl is liked due to love), where the word directly expressive of the feeling of love such as 'prītyai' is used, or in cases when through context and through vibhāvā"dis which are necessarily directly stated, the stāyin or prmanent emotion such as 'rati' and the like · which is always present in the mind of the cultured person, which is enhanced through mental impressions brought about in
niyatábhibito

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In Avaloka, Dhanika further observes that -
"na ca a-padárthasya vākyártharvam nā'stīti vācyam-kārya-paryavasāyitvāt tātparya-śakteh. tathā hi-pauruseyam a-pauruseyam vākyam sarvam kārya-param, a-tatparatve anupādeyatvād unmattā"di-vākya-vat. kāvya-sabdānām ca anvayavyatirekābhyām niratiśaya-sukhā"svāda-vyatirekena pratipadya-pratipādakayoh pravstti-visayayoh prayojanántara-anupalabdheḥ svā”nandodbhūtir eva kāryatvena avadhāryate; tad udbhūti-nimittatvam ca, vibhāvā"di-samsrstasya sthāyina eva avagamyate, ato vākyasya abhidhānaśaktis tena tena rasena ākrsyamāṇā tat tat svārthā’pekṣita-avāntara-vibhāvā”di-pratipādana-dvārā sva-paryavasāyitām ānīyate, tatra vibhāvā"dayah padā”rtha-sthānīyāḥ, tat-samsęsto ratyādir vākyárthaḥ. tad etat kāvya-vākyam yadīyam, tāv imau padártha-vākyárthau.” Dhanika argues that it can not be held that something which is not a word-meaning, i.e. which does not flow as a meaning from a word (directly stated), cannot he held as a sentencesense. Thus the objector can not say that we cannot take something as a sentencesense, when certains words are actually not heard in a given sentence (= aśrūyamāna-padas). Thus, the objector cannot say that in the specific illustration viz. "bhrama dhārmika." etc. the meaning pertaining to negation, i.e. "mā bhrama" cannot be taken as a sentence-sense, as the latter is only the sum-total or correlated sense of the word-senses of words actually found used and therefore heard clearly in a given sentence. This view of the objector cannot be sustained and therefore 'rasa' or aesthetic relish which is not of the form of a word-sense, does not cease to be the sentence-sense. For, the termination of tātparya sakti or purport extends upto the realisation of the 'prayojana' or purpose.
As the abhidhā or power of expression, argues Dhanika, has the word-sense as its sādhya or intended purpose, and just as laksanā or indication has laksyártha or indicated sense as its 'sādhya' or object to be proved or established tātparyasakti or purport has the object or intention i.e. kārya of the speaker as its goal. The tāparya
kes for the establishment of the speaker's intention. Thus tātparya will extend to that limit till the speaker's intention is realized.
Now, before we proceed with Dhanika's argument along with the lines of Dhananjaya, it should be made absolutely clear that the very concept of tātparya as seen here in the DR., and the concept of tātparya available in the traditional Mimāmsā school of the Bhattas and also therefore acceptable to the Kashmir school of thought of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata and his followers

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761 differ in their nature and scope. The traditionally accepted concept of tātparya-sakti is that it is a sentence-power that yields the sentence-meaning i.e. the purely correlated word-senses of a given sentence. But the tātparya of DhananjayaDhanika extends beyond this and ends only after realizing the full intention of the speaker. Thus, the latter takes into account also such factors as context, - such as the speciality of the speaker, or hearer, or time, place etc. etc. Now these are factors which are responsible for what the kashmere school of literary aesthetics takes as suggestors - vyañjakas - leading to the postulation of a turīyā vrtti or a fourth power called vyañjanā which emanates, not only from words of a given sentence, but also from parts of words, and takes into its orb in even a sentence, a par a composition i.e. prakarana, or even a whole composition giving rise to prabandha-vyañjanā or prabandha-dhvani. Thus, we will go to observe with Viśvanātha that Dhanika's tātparya is nothing else but vyañjanā and Anandavardhana deserves greater credit for he has given a perfectly cut-out system of word-meaning and word-powers based on visayabheda and svarūpa-bheda i.e. difference in scope and nature. Dhanika's tātparya is both the normal tātparya of the Bhātta-school, and also the extended tātparva branded as vyañjanā by others. This confusion, perhaps deliberate. continues in Bhoia also who takes both as almost identical when he declares : ‘tātparvam eva vacasi dhvanir eva kāwe', with the only difference that on one hand he admits the extended tātparya of DhanjayaDhanika at the ordinarry worldly level of communication, but calls it dhvani' when seen in the poetic or beautiful i.e. a-laukika.context. With this clear perspective we will continue with Dhanika's further arguments as follows:
So, we saw above that Dhanika has an extended tātparya which terminate when the speaker's goal, kārya-or intention is fully grasped from the given context. So, tātparya's field covers that area for Dhanika, which falls under the full realization of the speaker's intention or object or kārya. If the speaker's object is the sense of negation such as “mā bhrama" i.e. "do not move around", then the tātparya operates upto that limit when this negation is realized even from a positive assertion such as “bhrama" i.e. “move around”. Dhanika argues that in the worldly context, a statement, be it either from the Vedas or used at an ordinary parlour, is used only to bring about a purpose or object i.e. kārya : "paurașeyam apauraseyam sarvam kārya-param", asserts Dhanika. Realization of t purpose is the objective - laksya of any sentence used any where. If a sentence is used without any purpose, it will be equivalent to the talk of an insane person. Thus it will be useless from the worldly point of view. It will fail the hearer in

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making him apprehend any sense from it. The utterance with no purpose in mind, will be meaningless sound for the listener. It will not be a sentence that conveys this or that particular sense. Thus, argues Dhanika, it is clear that any statement be it from the veda or used at ordinary parlour, has to be purpose-oriented, i.e. it has to be "karya-paraka".
Coming to the field of poetry, Dhanika observes that words in poetry make for the apprehension of vibhāvā"di i.e. determinants and the like, which in their turn lead to the apprehension of rasa. Thus, the words in poetry are related to the meaning in form of vibhāvā❞di through anvaya-vyatireka-sambandha i.e. through the positive and negative relation. If in poetry words that are capable of mentioning the vibhāvā"dis are used, we will have the apprehension of vibhāvā"dis accordingly. If they are not used, we will have no apprehension to this effect. Thus only the words actually used in poetry make for the apprehension of the vibhāvādis. But, it may be noted that a mere use of vibhāvā"dis does not make for the supreme bliss experienced through poetry. This supreme bliss - "nirtiśaya"nanda" is resulted through 'rasa' i.e. relish only, which is the objective of these vibhāvā"dis. Thus 'svā"nandodbhūti' or realisation of supreme bliss is the 'karya' i.e. purpose or objective of words in poetry that lay down proper vibhāvā"dis. 'Rasa' is the ultimate 'pratipadya' or goal of a kavya-vākya. When we take stock of a given piece of poetry, the words actually used in it, the vibhāvā"dis narrated through these words, etc. and the consideration of the sthayin and rasa - all this leads to the supreme goal - kārya of poetry viz. the experience of highest joy by the reader or listener in form of a man of cultivated taste: "sva"nandodbhutir eva kāryatvena avadhāryate." This supreme bliss is caused only by a sthayin accompanied by proper vibhāvā❞dis or determinants etc. Thus, observes Dhanika, we see that the power of conveying sense i.e. denotation, (i.e. tātparya here), gets active or operates, being dragged by the pratipadya rasa i.e. by the object of apprehension of rasa. The karya-rūpa rasa, i.e. aesthetic pleasure which is the ultimate goal or result i.e. kārya of poetic activity, causes that power i.e. tätparya to operate. Thus the sentence-sense results from tātparya-śakti which stands in need of such agents as vibhāvā"dis for conveying 'rasa'. Through the delineation of these determinants etc. i.e. vibhāvā"dis rasarealisation results. In this process of rasa-realisation, vibhāvā”"dis make for the wordsense of the words used in poetry, and the meaning in form of rati etc., correlated with these vibhāvā"dis is the vākyártha of kavya. Thus Dhanika asserts : "tatra vibhāvā"dayaḥ padā"rtha-sthānīyāḥ, tat-samsṛsto ratyādir vākyárthaḥ." Thus in a kavya-vākya, or sentence in form of poetry, the vibhāvā"dis make for padártha or
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word-sense, and the sthāyin in form of ratyadi makes for the sentence-sense. It is clear therefore, that the apprehension of rasa is not of the nature of suggestion but is only of the form of sentence-sense which falls under the scope of tātparya or purport and certainly not vyañjanā or the so called power of suggestion.
Dhanika further observes that the objector can not hold that on listening to music we do experience joy through vācya-vācaka-bhāva. But these 'gitā"di' i.e. musical notes are not the expressor; nor the joy, the expressed. Same can be projected in case of poetry and the resultant bliss, i.e. rasa which is of the form of bliss beyond comparision. Thus with reference to poetry and rasa there is no vācyavācaka-sambandha or relation of expressed and expressor. This position advanced by the objector is not acceptable to Dhanika. He holds that the illustration of musical notes and the resultant joy is not applicable in form of poetry. For, we see that through poetry one and all do not experience bliss. Bliss is experienced only by those cultured ones who have the full grasp of the vibhāvā"dis or determinants and the like. This bliss is experienced only by the cultured whose conscience is coloured - bhāvita, i.e. who are accompanied by the 'bhāvanā' of the particular ratyādi. such blessed sa-hrdayas experience bliss or rasa, of a particular variety, on hearing the poetic words. It is clear therefore that this rasa-realisation or experience of bliss or aesthetic pleasure occurs only in case of men of cultivated taste and it does not occur in case of those who are bereft of the knowledge of vibhāvā"dis and who are bereft of the 'bhāvanā' or say, impressions, of particular ratyādi bhāvas. Thus rasaexperience does not occur in case of 'a-rasikas', or the non-cultured.
Before we proceed to understand Dhanika's line of throught, it may be stated that even he is conscious of Anandavardhana's wider concept of vyañjanā which traverses not only the field of poetic art, but takes in its fold all art-forms. He therefore carefully keeps the illustration of musical notes out of the field of discussion, for his tātparya cannot travel to the musical art where sound-dhvaniwithout expressed sense or vācyārtha makes for rasa-experience. In fact all other art-forms with their particular medium make for rasa-experience and everywhere else we do not find word accompanied by sense as is the case of poetry. On the contrary there are art-forms such as dance, painting and the like, where 'dhvani' or sound has no scope at all. Dhanika perhaps is aware of the limitations of his tātparya which can operate only inthe field of poetry which has language i.e. word and sense as its medium. Dhanika's tātparya cannot travel to the realms of ākāra, ingita i.e. to the area of forms and signs which are covered by what we know as vyañjanā. With this limitation, Dhanika further argues as below.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Dhanika as seen above holds that the illustration of musical notes having no expressive power but having suggestive power does not suit poetry, for poetry causes bliss only with reference to the sa-hrdayas. But we may say that same is the case with reference to any art including music.
But Dhanika almost fanatically asserts that rasa is ‘vākyártha' and vibhāvā”divācaka-padas make for 'padártha'. These powers such as abhidhā and the like, i.e. also laksaņā and tātparya make for the apprehension of all words directly heard (śrūyamāņa) or not directly heard (= a-śrūyamāņa) in a given sentence. So, for him postulating a separate function called vyañjanā is of no use. This, Dhanika says, he has elaborately explained in his other work named "Kāvya-nirnaya”, which is for the present lost to us :
“na ca evam sati gitā’divat sukha-janakatve’pi vācya-vācaka-bhāvā’nupayogaḥ visista-vibhāvā"di-sāmagrīvidusām eva tathāvidha-ratya"di-bhāvanā-vatām eva svānandódbhūteḥ, tad anena atiprasango’pi nirastaḥ, īdņši ca vākyártha-nirūpaņe parikalpitā’bhidhā"di-śakti-vašena eva samasta-vākyárthávagateh, sáktyantaraparikalpanam prayāsaḥ, yathā avocāma kāvyanirnaye - In his, now not available work called 'kavya-nirnava'. Dhanika observes that -
"tātparyā’natirekãcca vyañjanīyasya na dhvanih, kim uktam syād a-śrutárthatātparye’nyokti-rūpiņi ? - 1 visam bhaksaya pūrvo yaś caivam para-sutā"dişu, prasajyate pradhānatvād dhvanitvam kena vāryate ? - 2 dhvaniś cet svártha-viśrantam vākyam arthántarā”śrayam, tat paratvam tv aviśrāntau, tan na viśrānty asambhavāt. - 3 etāvaty eva viśrāntis tātparyasy eti kim krtam,

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765 yāvat-kārya-prasāritvāt tātparyam na tulā-dhịtam. - 4 bhrama dhārmika viśrabdham iti bhrami-krtā”spadam, nirvyāvștti katham vākyam nişedham upasarpati. - 5 pratipădyasya viśrāntir apekṣā-pūraņād yadi, vaktur vivakṣitā’prāpter a-viśrāntir na vā katham ? - 6 pauruṣeyasya vākyasya vivaksā-paratantratā, vaktrábhipreta-tātparyam
ataḥ kāvyasya yujyate. - 7 ato no rasā"dīnam kāvyena saha vyangya-vyañjaka, bhāvah; kim tarhi? bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandhaḥ. kāvyam hi bhāvakam, bhāvyā rasā”dayaḥ. te hi svato bhavanta eva, bhāvakeșu visista-vibhāvā”di-matā kāvyena bhāvyante."
So, Dhanika explains citing seven kārikās from his now not available work called "Kavya-nirnya", that there is no need to postulate a special word-power called vyañjanā as 'tātparya' does everything expected of the former. We have quoted these kārikās in full. Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 present the vyañjanāvādin's primafacie view, while karikās 4, 6 and 7 present the siddhanta view of Dhanika. This can be elaborated as under :
In the first kārikā the vyañjanāvādin suggests that his opponent (i.e. the tātparyavādin, who is ‘siddhāntin' here) holds that as the implicit sense i.e. pratīyamāna sense or suggested sense i.e. vyañjanīya artha is covered up under tātparya or purport, there is no need to postulate the word-function called suggestion nor the entity called 'Dhvani' or principally suggested sense. But the vyañjanāvādin (i.e. prima-facie here) asks the tātparyavādin (kārika view 1, cd) that in such cases where the speaker's import is not directly heard, i.e. where in a piece of poetry the tātparya is not directly stated, but still due to ‘anyokti' i.e. concealed statement the implicit sense is suggested through vyañjanā, in such cases

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA how can purport or tātparya be accepted with reference to the word-sense not directly heard ? For example in a verse like “kas tvam bhoh ? kathayāmi daivahatakam mām viddhi śākhotakam...” etc., the poet actually describes the dispair or detachment (i.e. nirveda) of a tree named sākhotaka. Now actually this dispair can be the poet's feeling and not that of a tree as it is not capable of possessing this sensitivity. This vyangyártha in form of the poet's dispair cannot be included in the purport or tātparya of the poetic utterance. As vyañjanā or suggestive power is here expected, naturally dhvani or suggested sense also stands proved by the acceptance of the former.
The vyañjanāvādin further argues (= kārikā 2) that in such utterances as, “Eat poison", directed towards a son or a friend, the positive meaning of actually taking poison does not suit the context and therefore, "to take food at an enemy's house is worse than taking poision", is a meaning derived through vyañjanā alone. [We know that Mammața has argued differently], How can you reject dhvanitva' in apprehension of the latter sense ?
In the third kārikā the view of the vyañjanāvādin covers first three parts i.e. a, b&c of the kārika and the fourth i.e. 'd' part belongs to Dhanika. So, we have the vyañjanāvādin's words first, such as :
"dhvaniś cet svártha-viśrāntam vākyam arthántarā"śrayam,
tat-paratvam tv-aviśrāntau.” i.e. 'dhvani' is said to be there when a sentence having complete sense in itself, conveys some (extra)other sense also. If it is a-viśrānta, i.e. if it does not rest in the sense it conveys, then tātparya will extend upto its limit where it will rest completely.
But Dhanika replies, "tan na", it is not so. For no sentence can reach rest before it conveys fully what is ultimately intended by the speaker. 'Viśranti' or 'rest' takes palce on realisation of 'kāvya-prayojana' alone. In the next i.e. IVth kārikā also, Dhanika's siddhanta paksa continues. In the Vth kārikå again we have the primafacie view of the Dhvani-vyañjanā-vādin which is silenced in kārikās VI & VII giving Dhanika's Siddhānta.
In the IVth Kārikā Dhanika goes 'ga ga' over tātparya and declares : “That tātparya or purport is rested only in this much and that it cannot travel beyond

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this, is a myth ! who has decided this? In fact tātparya or purport travels till that end when the final intention is realized. Thus it extends till the intention travels further and further and rests only when the intention is served. Actually 'tātparya' or purport is a power which is not balanced in a weighing maschine. It is not held in a balance." Thus the vyangyártha of the purvapakṣin is covered up by our tatparya.
But once again in Kärikā no. V, the Dhvanivadin argues that in the particular illustration viz. bhrama dharmika. etc., the sentence-sense coveys the positive act of free movement by the holy man. The Nayikā asks the person concerned to "moov at will, freely." Thus the purport is a positive injunction. There is no word used to negate this movement. So, the sense of negation is not identical with the purport or tatparya of this sentence. For us, this sense other than tatparya is suggested sense or vyangyártha, apprehended through the power of suggestion or vyañjanā.
To this Dhanika replies in kārikās VI & VII. His argument proceeds as below. Dhanika says that if rest or viśranti of intended sense is said to be only when the intention is fulfilled, then in that case, in the absense of the apprehension of the speaker's intention, why should we not say that this is the case of incompletion or a case where there is "absence of rest" -a-viśranti ?
Actually, kārikā VII suggests that a human utterance, pauruşeya-vākya, is dependent upon the intention of the speaker: "pauruṣeyasya vākyasya vivakṣāparatantrată." So, it is absolutely advisable that a poetic statement has its purport in the sense of the speaker's intention alone. As in ordinary parlance so also in poetry, a sentence for its comptetion or rest, is dependent upon the intention of the speaker and the sentence rests only when the speaker's intention is fully realized.
Therefore, concludes Dhanika, rasă"di are not related with poetry through the relation of suggestor and suggested. What then can it be? Dhanika's answer is that between rasă"di and kāvya there is "bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha". i.e. the relation of revelation and revealed - or the relation between emotive function (bhāvakatva) and emotive stuff realised (bhavya).
Poetry is revelator and rasas are revealed. Therefore rasa is born of its own in the heart or consciousness of a man of taste, and is revealed through the agency of poetry: "kavyam hi bhāvakam, bhāvyāḥ rasa"dayaḥ, te hi svato bhavanta eva

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA bhāvakesu visista-vibhāvā"di-matā kāvyena bhāvyante.” The poetry that reveals rasas should have been adorned with proper determinants, consequents and ancillary feelings.
Dhanika further argues that this bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha i.e. the relation of revealer and revealed between poetry and rasa should not be denied as it is not seen in other i.e. common worldly use of words. For even the Mimāmsakas have accepted this bhāvanā-vyāpāra in case of vedic injunctions such as “svarga kāmo yajeta" etc. We may take a note of the fact that Abhinavagupta while elaborating on the special apprehention - adhikā pratipattiḥ - to a man of taste or adhikārin i.e. the special person who deserves, had cited an illustration from vedic ritual and stated that on listening to such statements as "rātrīm āsata" or "tām agnau prādāt”, a special apprehension follows in case of an adhikārin and this special apprehension is not limited by such factors as time, space, person concerned etc. Perhaps Hemacandra also supporting this furnishes an illustration from popular or local context when he suggests that a devotee gets inspired to repeat a particular stotra on hearing the success in case of other person. He quotes in his viveka (pp. 98, Edn. Parikh & Kulkarni) the following verses :
"ārogyam āptavān śāmbaḥ stutvā devam aharpatim, syād arthávagatiḥ pūrvam ity ādi vacane yathā. tataścópātta-kālā”dinyakkāreņópajāyate, pratipattur mansy evam pratipattir na samsayaḥ. yaḥ ko'pi bhāskaram statuti sa sarvo'py agado bhavet tasmād aham api staumi
roga-nirmuktaye ravim.” evam kāvyā”tmakād api śabdāt sahrdayasya adhikā asti pratipattiḥ.”

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769 Dhanika also seems to have been inspired by Abhinavagupta's remarks as explained above. He observes : “na cā’nyatra sabdántareşu bhāvya-bhāvakasambandha-abhāvāt kāvya-śabdesvapi tathā bhāvyam iti vācyam · bhāvanākriyāvādibhihs tathā angīkstarvāt. kiñ ca mā cányatra tathā'stu, anvayavyatirekābhyam iha tathā avagamāt -
In poetry where rasa-bhāvaka-words are used we experience rasa, and when it is not so, we do not experience rasa. Thus, there is a positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka) relation between poetry and apprehension of rasa.
Dhanika here quotes the famous words of Bharata N.S. VI. 34a), which read as -
“bhāvábhinaya-sambandhān bhāvayanti rasān imān, yasmāt tasmād amī bhāvā,
vijñeyā nātya-yokt;bhiḥ." Dhanika, after thus rejecting vyañjanā to his satisfaction further argues :
The objector may raise the following objection, says Dhanika. (objection) : This (special) bhāvya-bhāvaka-sambandha or relation of the revealer and the revealed is not seen between word and meaning elsewhere. Words in poetry are also like words used in daily usage, so there should be absence of bhāvya-bhāvakasambandha between words and rasā"di in case of poetry also.
To this Dhanika's reply is that this 'bhāvanā' relation is also recognised by the ancient Mīmāmsakas. The bhāvya-bhāvaka-relation is accepted thereby. We know that Bhatta Nāyaka also supported this bhāvya-bhāvaka-relation between rasā"di and kāvya. Abhinavagupta also seeks support for vyañjanā-sādhārani-karana-from Mimāmsā. The Mimāņsakas resort to bhāvanā kriyā with reference to sacrificial ritual and the result such as obtaining heaven i.e. svargā"di-phala. Yāgā”dikriyā is bhāvaka and svargā”di-phala is bhāvya. Thus the postulation of bhāvya-bhāvakasambandha between rasādi and kāvya-śabda is supported by Mimāmsā darśana. But this special relation here is exclusive to poetic use of word-sense only. This bhāvya-bhāvaka relation is not seen in daily usage. This observation is supported by positive and negative arguments i.e. anvaya-vyatireka, only in case of kāvya and rasā"di. If in poetry there is absence of rasā”di-bhāvaka-padas, then there will be

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no bhāvanā or carvaņā of rasa, and this is vyatireka argument. If there are rasā"dibhāvaka-padas in poetry there will be rasa-bhāvanā or relish. This is anvaya or positve argument. Dhanika quotes from the NS. - of Bharata to support his thesis of bhāvya-bhāvaka relation between rasā"di and poetry. "The knowers of dramatic art, know these as bhāvas (i.e. feelings, emotions etc. i.e. revealers) (i.e. determinants), as they (i.e. bhāvas) reveal (= bhāvayanti) the rasas i.e. aesthetic pleasure (or sentiments etc.), as connected with the bhāvas (or emotions as depicted by words in poetry) (or) as connected with acting.”
Dhanika further establishes bhāvya-bhāvaka-relation in place of vyañjanā as follows :
"katham punar agļhīta-sambandhebhyaḥ padebhyaḥ sthāyyā”di-pratipattir iti cet, - loke tathāvidha-cestā-yukta-strīpumsā"dişu ratyādý avinābhāvadarśanād ihā’pi tathopanibandhe sati raty adyavinā-bhūta-cestādi-pratipādaka-sabdaśravaņād abhidheyā’vinābhāvena lākṣaṇiki ratyādi-pratītiḥ yathā ca kāvyasya sabhāvakatvam tathā agre vaksyāmah.”
Dhanika observes : The objector may raise an objection here. It proceeds like this : The words used in poetry have no direct relation with ratyādi bhāvas, as between them there is no direct relation or vācya-vācaka-bhāva based on samketa or convention. So, in the absence of samketa how can words in poetry i.e. kāvyaśabda make us apprehend rasā”di ? The reply from Siddhāntin i.e. Dhanika follows like this - In our day to-day world, we perceive directly people making love etc. and we apprehend that these lovers are in love. This is done through direct perception of love-making, an activity which, through avinābhāva relation i.e. through invariable concomittance makes us apprehend the rati-bhāva or śộngāra in case of the love-making couple. In the same way when love-making activity is directly mentioned through words in poetry we apprehend śrngārarasa i.e. ratyädi-bhāva promoting the activity actually directly described by words in poetry. Thus on listening or reading such poetic words we apprehend the bhāvas behind the activity actually described, i.e. through vācya-cestānirūpana. The ratyā"di-bhāva-pratīti is thus lākṣanikī or secondary in case of kāvya-sabda, describing rati-ceștā. How the vācyártha of poetry reveals i.e. makes for the bhāvanā of rasa will be explained by Dhanañjaya and Dhanika later in due course.

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771 It is observed by Dhanañjaya (DR. IV. 38, 39, etc.) that rasa is so called because it is tasted - svādyatvāt - like physical tastes available in food. But this taste of aesthetic pleasure or relish i.e. rasa is possible in case of the men of taste (rasika, sahrdaya) only and not in case of the anukārya or object of imitation such as Rāma, Sītā, etc. i.e. the characters described in poetry or presented in drama on the stage. If rasa is accepted with reference to 'anukārya' such as Dusyanta and the like, then the sāmājikas will not have a taste of rasa, but, on the contrary they will feel lajjā or shame, irsyā i.e. jealousy etc. as in ordinary life. Thus argues Dhananjaya, the rasa-experience should be accepted only in case of the sāmājikas or the cultured men of taste and not in case of nāyaka i.e. hero etc., the anukāryas.
Dhanika observes that of course, the nāyakā"di such as Rāma, or Dusyanta etc., being object of description by words, are believed to be as it were present, though actually they are not present. This sort of apprehension is welcome to both the poet and the sāmājika, in view of rasa-experience. But though this illusory apprehension of the hero being actually present is with reference to the poet and the sāmājika, the fact is that from the point of rasa-experience they i.e. Rāma, Dusyanta, etc. - the anukāryas, are incapable of it. Poetry is not written by the poet for Rāma's rasánubhūti, but only to delight the man of taste or sa-hỉdaya : Thus the description of Rāma etc., as though they are present, is only in form of vibhāva i.e. determinant which makes for rasa-apprehension of the sāmājika.
If, in case it is accepted that, the anukārya such as Rāma and the like also experience śrngāra, then as in real life the outlookers, looking at love-making in public, will either feel disgusted, or jealous, or angry etc. as the case may be. A man of low culture will even feel like running away with a beautiful heroine. All sort of carnal physical expressions could follow. So, rasa-experience in case of the anukārya is ruled out.
Dhanika also flatly discards, - and here comes the vyañjanā-virodha-the case of rasa being vyangya or suggested. Perhaps taking a plea from the Hşdayadarpaņa of Bhatta Nāyaka, Dhanika also argues that rasa can not be held to be vyangya or suggested for in that case rasa has to be an entity like a ghata or pot that pre-exists in a dark room before it is revealed through light. The pūrva-sattā of rasa is not acceptable for we do not taste it prior to the curtains being raised on a stage or poetry being read.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Dhanika reads : evam ca sati, rasānām vyañjakatvam apāstam, anyato labdhasattākam vastu anyenā’pi vyajyate, pradīpena iva ghatā"di; na tu tadānīm eva abhivyañjakatvábhimatairāpāsya-svabhāvam. bhāvyante ca vibhāvā”dibhiḥ prekșakeșu rasā iti aveditam eva."
That rasas are only revealed (bhāvyante) with the help of vibhāvā"di is acceptable to Dhanañjaya and Dhanika who categorically reject the case of vyañjanā.
But we will go to observe when we will discuss the nature of rasa-experience in a separate chapter, that both Bhatta Nāyaka and Dhanañjaya-Dhanika who reject the case of vyañjanā in both drama and literature, have taken a mistaken view of vyañjanā. Their understanding of vyañjanā or suggestivity is faulty. Actually this vyañjanā or suggestivity is not absolutely identical with the darśanika abhivyakti or manifestation as explained in various disciplines such as grammar and darśanas or philosophy: vyañjanā is not abhivvakti' of the śāstras as kāvyánumiti is not anumiti of the tarka-śāstra, or as Dhanika's tātparya also is also not the same as tātparya of the Mimāmsakas. Virtually these - vyañjanā, kāvyánumiti or Dhanika's tātparya-are names exclusive to art i.e. it is “sui generis”. It has nothing to do with ordinary worldly existence or also with the various disciplines of philosophy. Thus all 'vyañjanā-virodha' based on this argument as advanced by Dhanika, Mahimā, or Bhatta Nāyaka or any for that matter, fall flat as they refuse to accept this very special feature of vyañjanā, which is above any laukika pramāņa as Abhinavagupta explains.
We will go to see how, on the lines advocated by Abhinavagupta and Mammata, their followers such as Hemacandra, Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha discuss the views of the vyañjanā virodhins and reject the same.
Hemacandra in his Kāvānuśāsana and Viveka on the same, discusses this topic at length after Abhinavagupta and Mammata. At K.śā. I. 20, Hemacandra talks of the powers of words such as mukhyā or abhidhā and the like. Here he mentions abhidhā, gaunī, lakṣaņā and vyañjanā as four word-powers, while tātparya he reserves as a vākya-visayā sakti. At Kā. Sā. I. 21, he defines vyañjakarvam as - "vaktrādi-vaišistyād arthasya’pi vyañjakatvam", and in Alamkāracūdāmaņi. i.e. gloss in the text on his sūtras he illustrates the varieties such as vaktr-višeşāt, pratipādya-višeşāt, etc. There is no special discussion on the

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773 nature of vyañjanā or opposition to it in either the text portion or even in Viveka commentary thereon.
But actually in Viveka under Kā. Šā. I. 19 which attempts to define dhvani, we come across a full discussion of the views of the objection (pūrva-paksa) against vyañjanā and its rejection. Hemacandra has reproduced not only the arguments but also actual words of Mammaţa and has silenced all vyañjanā-virodha in like fashion. (pp. 47-53, viveka, Edn. Parikh, Kulkarni, ibid). Hemacandra rejects the views of Abhihitávvvayavādins, Anvitábhidhānavādins, Nimittavādins Dirghadīrghatara-vyāpāravādins, tātparya-vādins, and anumitivādins following Mammata. He even establishes vyañjanā also in like manner after Mammața.
Vidyadhara does not discuss vyañjanā-virodha when he talks of vyañjana in the second unmesa of his Ekavali, but while discussing the nature of rasa in the third unmesa he observes that rasa is not abhidheya i.e. object of abhidhā or direct statement : ayam ca svapne'pi pariharati' vācyatām (pp. 89, Edn. Trivedi). The arguments advanced follow Anandavardhana and Mammata. Then he rejects tātparya : "uta yadi tātparya-gocaratām avatarati rasa iti bhavan manasi niviśate, tadapi na vicāra-cāru. rasasya abhidheyatvā'nadhikaranatvād abhihite ca tātparyasya pragalbhanāt.” He further argues following Mammața and citing the same illustration as “lohitosniņā ștvijaḥ pracaranti”, etc., that tātparya has no scope here. All this thinking is similar to that of the lead given by Abhinavagupta and Mammața. In a similar vein he rejects the case of lakṣaņā : atha yadi lakṣaniyo rasas tadapi na ksodaksamam" (pp. 90, ibid). He accepts vyañjana in case of rasa. He further discusses the nature of rasa after the kashmir school and this we will pick up in our chapter on rasa later.
The Taralā-țīkā discusses vyañjanā at length and accepts all the views as advanced by Mammața in favour of vyañjanā.
Vidyānātha also has nothing special to offer. We will therefore turn to Viśvanātha for a fuller examination of demolishing anti-vyañjanā views. In the third pariccheda of his Sāhityadarpana, Viśvanātha (S.D. III. 2.3), while discussing the nature of rasa observes :
"sattvodrekad akhandasvaprakāśānanda-cinmayah, vedyantara-sparsa-sūnyo brahmā"svāda-sahodarah” (III. 2 S.D.)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA lokottara-camatkara-prāṇaḥ kaiścit pramātņbhiḥ svā"kāravad-abhinnatvena
ayam āsvādyate rasaḥ." (S.D. III. 3) In the výtti he further observes : "yady api 'svādaḥ kāvyártha-sambhedād atmānanda-samudbhavaḥity uktadiśā rasasya āsvāda-anatiriktatvam, tathā’pi ‘rasaḥ svādyate' iti kālpanikam bhedam urarikrtya, karma-kartari vā prayogah.
Thus Viśvanātha holds rasa not as an object of aesthetic apprehension, but as identical with such aesthetic apprehension or relish, and suggests that all talks such as “I enjoyed rasa, or I tasted rasa", as only metaphorical. .
Now he meets with an objection such as : "nanu etāvatā rasasya a-jñeyatvam uktam bhavati. vyañjanāyāś ca jñāna-višeşatvād dvayor aikyam āpatitam. tataś ca -
"sva-jñānenányadhīhetuḥ siddhe’rthe vyañjako mataḥ, yathā dīpo'nyathābhāve
ko viseșo'sya kārakāt ?” iti uktadiśā ghața-pradīpavat vyangya-vyañjakayoḥ pārthakyam eva iti katham rasasya vyangyatā iti cet - satyam uktam” - etc.
The objection is as follows : Rasa is said to be relish (= āsvāda) itself, and not something āsvādya i.e. object of relish. Whatever expression talks about its being tasted or its being an object of relish, is only metaphorical.
Now, if the above is true, the objection is that in that case rasa will have to be accepted as something beyond apprehension. It will not be 'jñeya' but will be 'jñāna' itself. Jñāna or apprehension is something different from its object such as ghața or pot. Thus rasa which is itself of the form of āsvāda and prakāśa cannot be an object of the same. In that vein, apprehension caused by vyañjanā or suggestion and rasa will tend to be identical because any apprehension caused by vyañjanā is only of the form of knowledge itself and as observed already rasa is said to be a form of apprehension or knowledge itself and not its object. Thus rasa will tend to be indentical with vyañjanā. It will not be an object of apprehension caused by vyañjanā.

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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
775 Thus, observes the objector, rasa will not be an object of the apprehension caused by vyañjanā. In that case how can the siddhāntin call rasa to be 'vangy or 'suggested', i.e. an object of apprehension caused by the power of suggestivity ? The objector says : "nanu etāvatā rasasya ajñeyatvam uktam bhavati. vyañjanāyāś ca jñāna-vićeşatvāt dvayor aikyam āpatitam. tataś ca.
"sva-jñānena anya-dhīhetuḥ siddhérthe vyañjako mataḥ, yathā dīpo'nyathābhāve;
ko viśeso'sya kārakāt.” ity ukta-diśā ghaça-pradīpavat vyangya-vyañjakayoḥ pārthakyam eva iti katham rasasya vyangyatā, iti cet... satyam uktam
The objector suggests that rasa cannot be vyangya i.e. vyañjanā-grahya. For 'vyañjaka' or suggestor is that which causes something else to be cognized by first itself getting cognized, as is a lamp with reference to a pot. Vyangyavañjaka-bhāva holds good when two entities are different from and not identical with each other. If it is not so, how shall we distinguish, a jñāpakacaụse or revealer from a 'kāraka' cause i.e. an actual cause which creates something else?
To this Viśvanātha's reply is that this is well said. But the process of relishsvādanā”khyah vyāpărah - is said to be different from krti and jñapti i.e. ordinary causation and manifestation. It is just to distinguish it from abhidhā and the rest that we have said that 'rasas are suggested'. After all some name was to be given. So, this vyañjanā is not equivalent to manifestation i.e. abhivyakti of the śāstras. This is special to art - sui generis
In the Vth pariccheda of his Sāhityadarpaņa, Viśvanātha has established vyañjanā as an independent word-power refuting all objections against the same.
At S.D. V. 1, he says - "atha keyam abhinavā vyañjanā nāma vṛttir ity ucyate -
"vșttīnām viśranter abhidhā-tātparya-laksanākhyānām, angīkāryā turyā vịttir bodhe rasā"dīnām.” (S.D. V. i)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "When the functioning of word-powers such as abhidhā (or expression), tātparya (or purport), and laksana (or indication) are over, a fourth vrtti i.e. word power has to be accepted for the apprehension of rasā”di i.e. aesthetic relish.”
Viśvanātha goes to observe further that as abhidhā or the power of expression is exhausted on yielding only the conventional sense, it has no power to further apprehend the suggested idea (= vastu), figure of speech (= alamkāra) and aesthetic relish (rasā"di). Rasa"di or aesthetic relish is not the conventional sense of a word. For the direct expression of determinants etc. (i.e. vibhāvā"di-vācakapada) can not be held as the direct expression of rasā"di, as both are not said to be identical. On the contrary when there is direct expression of rasā"di by such words as śrngara etc. which name a particular rasa, it is considered to be a blemish. When for example it is stated that, “This is śrngāra-rasa”, there is no apprehension of the rasa because rasa is said to be self-evident and of the nature of bliss (sva-prakāśā"nanda-svarūpāt).
Visvanātha then proceeds to explain that tātparya or purport as advocated by che abhihitánvayavādins gets exhausted only in giving a correlated sentence-sense. It cannot deliver the suggested sense. Some people have suggested the abhidhā function to proceed on and on - "dirgha-dirghatara", but it cannot be accepted.
Visvanātha also quotes Dhanika who advocates tātparya and sarcastically observes that tātparya is not something held in a balance i.e. na tulādhrtam.
Both these opponents, i.e. the dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāravādin and also the tātparyavādin can be silenced by only one argument viz.
"sabda-buddhi-karmaņām
viramya, vyāpārábhávaḥ.” - i.e. word, sense or intelligence and action once exhausted cannot travel further."
This is Viśvanātha's reply to both the objectors. For, argues Viśvanātha, if abhid can travel further and further, i.e. if it is held to be dirgha-dīrghatara, why accept even laksana ? But to this it can be said that for alamkārikas such as Mukula, laksanā is only a part of abhidhā and that it is not cognised as a separate word-power. Viśvanātha says that if we accept a dīrgha-dīrghatara-abhidhā, then why should we not hold that in such expressions as, “O brāhmana, a son is born to you", or "O brāhmaṇa, your unmarried daughter is pregnant” as expressive of joy or sorrow ?
Visvanātha also takes care, in fashion of Mammata, of the view of those who quote the Mimāmsā doctrine viz. “yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdárthah" and under the

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777 shelter of this try to make out that poetic words, not being redundant like the talks of an insane person, have a 'kārya', a goal viz. that of creating bliss and that the poetic activity ends only in the realization of this ecstatic joy - niratiśaya sukhā"svāda-and therefore a word-power in poetry extends upto this good being served. To this Visvanātha has the following rebuff :
"tatra prastavyam - kim idam tatparatvam nāma, tad-artharvam vā, tātparyavíttyā tad-bodhakatvam vā ? ādye na vivādah, vyangyatvépi tad-arthatā-anapāyāt. dvitīye tu-keyam tātparyā”khyā vșttiḥ ? abhitánvayavādibhirangīkstā, tad anyā vā ? ādye dattam eva uttaram. dvitīye tu nāma-mātre vivādah. tanmatépi turīya-vrttisiddeh.”
Viśvanātha asks the objector as to what does he mean by 'tat-partva' ? - i.e. by "used to serve that objective ?” Is it "tad-arthatva" - i.e. should tatparatva be taken to mean 'having that objective or that meaning ?', or does it mean apprehending that sense through tātparya vstti or purport? If by 'tatparatva' is meant "having that sense” i.e. tad-arthatva then even by vyañjan, we can arrive at 'that sense'. So, the first alternative is beyond dispute. As for the second, Viśvanātha asks the objector about his concept of purport or tātparyavrtti. If the tātparya of the opponent is the same as that of the abhihitánvayavādins then it is ruled out, for it has been observed that this tātparya is capable of rendering only the correlated sense of words in a sentence i.e. it yields only the bare sentence-sense which is the sum total of its individual componants. But if by tātparva is meant somethings beyond this. - and here Visvanātha has Dhanika's tātparya in mind - then it is only another name given to vyañjanā and the quarrel patters out into only a quarrel of nomenclature, because even in this case a fourth power of words stands accepted.
Now having discarded the tātparya of Dhanika, Viśvanātha further argues for the recognition of vyañjanā, as follows. The objector may say that let there be a simultaneous apprehension through tātparya or purport of both the vibhāvā"dis and rasā"di. The answer is “No." The simple reason is that a cause-effect-relation is accpted between these two apprehensions and therefore prima facie simultaneity between the two stands automatically rejected. Had these two apprehensions been simultaneous like two horns of a bull how can there be a cause-effect-relation which stands on paurvá-parya-bhāva i.e. of the state of cause being earlier and effect being later ?
Viśvanātha further says that in case of such instances of laksana as 'gangāyām ghosah', the indication ends on apprehension of the meaning of a

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SAHķDAYĀLOKA bank, and thus how can indication deliver the suggested sense in form of coolness and purity ? Thus, acceptance of a fourth power - an independent vyañjanā-vștti is beyond dispute.
Viśvanātha then proceeds to distinguish vyangya or suggested sense (S.D. V. 2) from the expressed sense on the basis of boddhr, svarūpa, etc. - the factors which tend to give different meanings.
Viśvanātha observes that as the meaning in form of rasā"di is not pre-existent (prāg-a-sattvät), its apprehension can not be arrived at either through abhidhā or laksaņā, and as the apprehension of rasā”di does not stand in need of contradiction of the primary sense in all cases, laksaņā has no chance at all. Lakşaņā has anupapatti - non-apprehension of primary sense-as a pre-condition.
Visvanātha rejects the arguments of those who want to take the prayojana such as coolness and the like as indicated. For if we resort to laksaņā here, we will stand in need of another prayojana and thus ad infinitum. Even prayojanavati laksanā is also ruled out for the simultaneous apprehension of visaya and prayojana is not possible. Mammata has ably explained this and Viśvanātha follows Mammața here. Visvanātha rules out inference also in the apprehension of rasa (S.D. V. 4) and holds that smrti i.e. remembrance is also out of question. He comes down hard on Mahima's anumiti and rejects the same taking a number of illustrations. He candidly declares :
"tad evam anubhava-siddhasya tat-tad-rasā"di-lakṣaṇasyā'rthasya asakyápalāpatayā tat-tad-chabdádyanvaya-vyatireka-anuvidhāyitayā ca, anumānā”dipramāņa-a-vedyatayā ca, abhidhā”di-vrtti-traya-abodhyatayā ca turīyā vịttir upāsyā eva iti siddham. iyam ca vyāptyā"dy anusamdhānam vina'pi bhavati ity akhilam nirmalam."
Thus Visvanatha meets with all vyañjanā-virodha in a very systematic way and perhaps his is the last nail - and very emphatic too - in the coffin wherein lies - and for ever-any vyañjanā-virodha whatsoever. We feel that Dr. Revaprasādjee should have no reservations in this case for as in case of Dhanika's tātparya, so in case in the kāvyánumiti of Mahimā supported by this learned modern alamkārika, we find only acceptance of vyañjanā in a new garb.

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Chapter X Classification of Poetry
(form-oriented)
Literary aesthetes have attempted the classification of poetry i.e. Kāvya i.e. literature in general, both from the point of view of form and content, and also from the point of view of its literary evaluation i.e. criticism. The first, we will term as 'formal or external, which of course takes care of content also, and the second will be placed under criticism-oriented classification such as from the point of view of the suggested meaning i.e. roughly speaking 'dhvani', or from the angle of vakratā, and the like.
It may be noted at the outset that the types of poetic composition as illustrated by the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata, - the so called 'itihāsā' variety are out of question here. For the later Mahākāvyas or kathā and ākhyāyikā could hardly be taken as portions of these two epics which are a class by themselves. Actually not only the content of these two epics but their divisions in kandas and parvans and sub-divisions also inspired various types of literature that was written by such greats as Kālidāsa and the like. Actually various forms of performing art beginning with drama proper i.e. nātaka and such other forms that were meant for both actual presentation on the stage and also for reading as 'prabandhas' or longer compositions, are also included by critics as forms of poetry such as drsya-kavya We will have to take care of all these types of composition which were drsya and śravya. It is perhaps Hemacandra, who was of course influenced by Bhoja, who attemps a most scientific classification of poetry by first bisecting it as preksya and śravya i.e. poetry to be viewed as represented on the stage and poetry to be heard (and read). But we will come to Hemacandra much later but as is the case with other thought-currents so also here, we will begin with Bhāmaha, Dandin, etc. the earlier ālamkārikas and will go down to Viśvanātha. It may be observed in the beginning that the earliest documentary evidence available is the Natya-śāstra of Bharata that treats of the varieties of drama i.e. rūpaka and the sub-varieties or upa-rupakas also. But as Bharata's work concerns itself directly with dramaturgy we will consider the same only when we deal with drsya type of poetry i.e. that

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
variety which is to be presented and visualized on the stage. We will first concern ourselves with what Hemacandra calls śravya type of poetry i.e. literature meant for reading and hearing only.
We are treating this topic of classification of poetry in sequence to the consideration of definition of poetry as word and sense and then after consideration of the nature of word and sense, powers of word etc. So, after broadly understanding the nature of literature as understood by Sanskrit critics, we go for the classification or consideration of types of compositions.
We have observed earlier that this classification is attempted from the point of view of literary criticism also and has resulted into poetry as classified into dhvani, gunībhūtavyangya and citra, or as one with vakrokti as its life-force etc. Thus thought-currents concerning dhvani, vakratā, etc. and the other allied topics such as guna, dosa, alamkāra, vakrokti, rīti, aucitya etc. will be taken up in due course. But prior to that, after classification of poetry, we will also have to discuss the topic concerning the types of heroes, heroines, their friends and enemies, their helpers, servants etc. also. In short we will also have to deal with the topic concerning the nature and varieties of various characters in literature both dramatic and poetic. Works on dramaturgy such as those of Bharata and others modelled on these such as the Daśa-rūpaka, Nārya-darpana and portions from Hemacandra's or Viśvanāthas works, deal with these topics. We will take into account all this as and when the context arises. We will begin with the classification of poetry first.
Earlier ālamkārikas such as Bhāmaha to Rudrata have the following forms to offer.
Bhāmaha in his Kāvyālamkāra (I. 16) attempts the definition of poetry and goes on to suggest that poetry is basically two-fold, i.e. prose and verse - gadyam padyam ca. We may observe to begin with that Bhāmaha has attempted classification from four angles such as - (i) external form viz. prose and verse. This angle is basically an attempt in the direction of supplying a basically formal classification. Thus we have two basic forms such as gadya i.e. prose and padya i.e. verse i.e. metrical composition. (ii) Now there is second angle which we may call the linguistic angle. So, from this linguistic angle, which also is basically a formal approach, we have kāvya divided into sanskrta, prakrta and apabhramśa. This may be termed linguistic classification but, this can also be both prose and verse. Thus we arrive at six basic formal types of poetry. From the point of view of contents i.e. (iii) varnya-vastu, again poetry can be classified into four sub-varieties such as (a) vịtta' i.e. poetry dealing with historical theme describing the story or history of past

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781 kings or gods of the purāņas. (b) 'utpădya vastu' - i.e. poetry dealing with imaginative theme as against the historical or paurāņika or mythical theme. This variety has imaginatively created stories as its descriptive stuff. (c) poetry dealing with various kalās or fine arts as its subject-matter and (d) poetry having topics of various disciplines as its subject matter i.e. śāstrā"śraya-kāvya. Bhāmaha does not provide illustrations but we can imagine that the śāstrā”śraya variety could have included such works as are later illustrated by Bhatti-kāvya dealing with vyākaranaśāstra and Dvyāśraya-kāvyas of Ācārya Hemacandra. These are types of poetry dealing with various disciplines and systems of philosophy. We do not know whether technical and scientific treatises were included under this variety for we have vast literature in form of law-book or smrtis, works on metres, pingala-śāstra, and works on vāstu-silpa etc. all composed in metre. Even works on alamkāra, drama, and even grammar were composed in metres and sūtra-style. Whether all this scientific literature was brought under the banner of śāstra-kāvya or not is not known but at least Bhoja in his very very wide concept of literature as word and sense of twelve types, brings everything under the banner of kavya. But we do not know the limits of Bhāmaha. The variety of poetry dealing with various fine arts or kalās is also not illustrated by Bhāmaha, But in general Bhāmaha's observation viz. “kalā-śāstra”śrayam ceti” could be taken as referring to poetic compositions such as Bhatçikāvya, Dvyāśrayakāvya, or Vidagdha-mukha-mandana etc. The poetic. compositions such as Vidagdhamukha-mandana can be taken as such which are viewed as citra-kāvyas which illustrate sabda-citras, prahelikās etc. This variety is termed citra-kavya from a different angle of classification which may be taken as criticism-oriented variety. It may be observed, that literary feats as prahelikā, are mentioned among the 64 kalās enumerated by Vātsyāyana in his kāma-sūtra 1. 111. 16. The (iv) fourth classification also is based on outward form, both prose and verse and includes such five types as sargabandha i.e. mahākāvya, abhineyártha i.e. drama, ākhyāyikā and kathā, the prose-romances, and a-nibaddha i.e. muktaka or stray verses. (pp. 202, 609)
Bhāmaha explains the sargabandha as a mahākāvya. The definition or description of this variety proceeds as -
“sargabandho mahākāvyam mahatām ca mahac ca yat, a-grāmya-sabdam arthyam ca sálamkāram sadāśrayam - (I. 19)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA mantra-dūta-prayāņā”jināyakábhyudayaiśca yat pañcabhiḥ sandhibhir yuktam nátivyākhyeyam rddhimat. I. 20 caturvargábhidhāne'pi bhūyasā'rthopadeśa kst, yuktam lokasvabhāvena
rasais ca sakalaih pethak. I. 21 The composition, arranged into sargas or chapters, is called imahākāvya which deals with the great-names (such as those of Vālmīki and Kālidāsa) (or, which is mahat or great among all great efforts of poets), and which is itself mahat i.e. vast in form. It is free from blemishes pertaining to word (and sense) and is rich with meaning (and is also free from blemishes concerning sense, such as a
ng sense such as 'apartha' and the like). It is rendered beautiful with alamkāras (.e. turns of expression, or figures of speech concerning word and sense), and is having a theme connected with a lofty person (sad-āśrayam) (This means that this composition is not vowen around the theme of a lowly person). It describes mantra i.e. political details, sending of emissary, march of an army, war, or fights, the victory of the hero, and is having the five junctures (such as mukha and the rest that are discussed by Bharata and others with reference to drama). It should avoid theoretical discussions of any sort to a larger proportion - nā'tivyākhyeyam. Long discussions tend to make the composition less attractive i.e. nīrasa. It is supposed to be 'rddhimat' i.e. rich in description of seasons, sunrise, sunset, night, moon-rise, marriages, love-sports, picking up of flowers, water-sports, birth of a son etc. etc. [rddhimat stu-sandhyārātri-candrodayā"dīnām vivāha-sambhoga-puspávacaya-krīdā-rati-putrajananā"dīnām ca varnanaiḥ pracuram - Tatacarya, pp. 10). This composition aims at the four-fold pursuits i.e. caturvarga viz. dharma, artha, kāma and mokşa. But principally it deals itself with artha : "bhūyas, artha-krt". By 'artha' is not meant activity concerning collection of wealth but Tatācārya explains it as "artho hitam”. i.e. it aims at solidarity both of individual and society. The most important characteristic of a big literary composition is that it is gifted with a subject or theme which concerns itself with normal life. : yuktam loka-svabhāvena. Nothing abnormal is to be attempted. All description should look normal and natural. It should be rich in all rasas or sentiments or, we may put it otherwise as follows. It should abound in situations that take care of all human emotions and feelings and

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783 should cater to different tastes. By 'prthak’ is meant "a-sankirna-vrttibhih". as explained by Tatacarya (pp. 10, ibid). He puts it as : "a-samkirna-vrttibhih ity arthah. ekatra yasya-kasya-cid ekasya prādhānyam itareşām angatvam ity avirodhena mitha upakāryopakāraka-bhāvena vinivesitaiḥ na tu punar ekatra eva sama-prādhānyena dvābhyām bahubhir vā vinivesitair iti." - i.e. it is to abound in different styles and dictions but these should be practiced in a way in which only one style dominates at a time and the rest should look subordinate. All styles should not be used having equal predominance at a time. The idea seems to be that the styles should vary with the moods and emotions depicted in a given situation. The total impression that emerges from this description/definition of the large composition is that it should treat such theme and in such a style that it caters to the taste of the cultured. The hero has to be kept in centre and his triumph over his enemies or opposing forces should be the central effect.
It may be noted that the concepts of samdhis or junctures and rasa or relish are central to dramaturgy also. But we cannot say on oath whether dramaturgy preceded literary criticism for eventhough the earliest available document is the Nātya-śāstra of Bharata which deals with the art of acting, it cannot be said that concepts in dramaturgy necessarily preceded the same in literary criticism because Bharata, at a number of places recommends the use of different devices such as guna or excellence, laksana or marks, alamkāra or figures of speech etc., in viewof "kāvya-rasa” i.e, with reference to the 'rasa' or aesthetic value prevailing in kāwa i.e. poetic composition. So, it is safe not to make bold statements, as is done by the great scholar such as G. T. Deshpande and others, suggesting that poetics or literary criticism was only an off-shoot of dramaturgy.
Having discussed the nature of a big literary composition in verse, Bhämaha picks up prose compositions such as ākhyāyikā and kathā (I. 25, and I. 28). But prior to this he also mentions, what he calls as compositions for representation on stage through acting - i.e. abhineyártha, and the varieties enumerated are 'nātaka', 'dvi-padi, 'samyā', 'vāsaka', 'skandhaka', etc. He leaves aside discussing the nature of these varieties that are meant for acting on the stage, with the words - "ukto'nyais tasya
tarah”- the varieties and sub-varieties of these compositions made for acting, are discussed by others (elsewhere). Obviously Bhāmaha seems to keep away from considering what may be called "drsya-kavya" i.e. poetry to be seen or represented on the stage, and suggests that others - may be Bharata and his likes - have discussed the same and he is in no mood to discuss the same. Perhaps he wants to keep away from dramaturgy though of course, drama also for him, is a variety of ‘kāvya'.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Bhāmaha picks up the thread and defines "ākhyāyikā' or a major prose composition, or a prose romance, at Kā. I. 25-27, in words:
"samskrtā’nākula-śravyaśabdártha-pada-vịttinā, gadyena yuktódātrárthā soc-chvāsā ākhyāyikā matā.” - I. 25 “vịttam ākhyāyate tasyām nāyakena sva-cestitam, vaktram cā’para-vaktram ca kāle bhāvy artha-samsi ca." - I. 26 : "kaver abhiprāyakrtair . ankanaiḥ kaiścid ankitā, kanyā-harana-sangrāma
vipralambhódayánvitā.” - I. 27 Thus an ākhyāyikā is a major prose composition cut into chapters called ucchvāsas having verses in their beginning composed in vaktra and/or aparavaktra metres, which go to suggest future happenings. This composition is written in sanskrit in a style which is not affected and which abounds in words and meanings having felicity of expression. The theme is lofty and the hero himself narrates his own story. The composition also carries certain marks special to the poet and the narration is full of incidents such as eloping a girl, fight, love in separation etc.
This form, viz. ākhyāyikā differs from kathā, also a major prose composition which has no parts or chapters in form of ucсhvāsas, with suggestive verses at the head written in vaktra or apara-vaktra metres. Kathā is written either in Sanskrit or in other language (= a-samkstā i.e. prāktā) and is also in apabhramba. (Kā I. 28) In Kathā the story of the hero is narrated by others and not by the hero himself. The idea is that how can a person who is nobly born would sing songs of his own valour and merits.
Anibaddha i.e. single unconnected verses include such minor compositions as individual gāthā, śloka and the like. Bhāmaha does not elaborate over this variety. But what is of utmost importance to Bhāmaha is that all types of compositions have to be necessarily accompanied by beautiful expression - “tat punaḥ

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yuktam vakra-svabhāvoktyā
sarvam eva etad iṣyate." (Kā. I. 30)
"Expression carrying beautiful features", Tatacarya explains as : "tad anibaddham punaḥ vakroktyā svabhāvóktyä ca yuktam eva bhavati." bhinnam dvidhā svabhāvóktir vakróktiś ca iti vanmayam." tad vakṣyate. yadi punar na vakróktiḥ syat, na vā svabhāvóktiḥ tan na kavyam. vārtā tu sā, yathā - "bhojanam dehi rajendra..."
We do not agree with Tatacarya's explanation. By 'sarvam eva' we mean all poetry, both major and minor types including. Bhāmaha wants all poetry, i.e. poetry worth its name, - be it a large composition or an individual verse to be adorned by an expression of the beautiful type - vakra-svabhāvasya-uktiḥ. The idea is that there is no charm in local expressions as seen in normal usage. A poetic expression has to be worth its name i.e. it should carry a stamp of its own charming nature, normally missing in worldly expressions of ordinary usage. Again, we believe that Bhāmaha (Kā. II. 93) does not seem to favour svabhāvókti as an artistic expression or alamkāra as again Tatacarya would expect us to believe. "The expression 'ke-cit' in "svabhāvóktir alamkāraḥ iti kecit pracakṣate" - suggest Bhamaha's disagreement with the views of others who take svabhāvokti as an alamkāra. Or at least, he does not show any enthusiasm for the same, even while giving a casual illustration at II. - 94, which describes the activity of a child trying to ward off cows from entering a field full of ready crops, all the time himself, shouting, waving a stick, crying and calling for help. So, "yuktam vakra-svabhāvóktyä" for Bhamaha is a condition necessary for any type of literature. Poetry in any variety, has to be charged with expression of beautiful qualities, i.e. it has to be beautiful.
785
Bhamaha's concept of true poetry is laid down in kārikās that follow, but these may not deter us here as we are concerned here only with the types of poetry. Or, perhaps, Bhāmaha suggests that poetry is divided into two such as vaidarbha and gauḍa. These are only styles and any form major or minor can be laid into either of these two. Bhamaha is open to both the styles, provided the basic characteristic of poetry being 'sa-vakrókti' i.e. poetry having inherent charm is seen. For Bhamaha, the alamkṛtiḥ or charm or beauty of language i.e. poetry or poetic language is the quality of "vakrábhidheya-śabdókti" - i.e. expression of beautiful sense and beautiful word. (Kā. I. 36)

-
Dandin begins with a three-fold classification of poetry such as 'padya' i.e. verse, 'gadya' or prose and miśra i.e. mixed, as against Bhamaha's basic two-fold

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classification. Padya i.e. verse has four padas or lines and is again either in vṛtta i.e. metres based on akṣara-yojanā such as mālinī, hariṇī, sragdhara and the like, or in 'jāti' i.e. such composition where mātrās of short and long letters are taken into consideration. K.D. I. 11 observes :
786
"padyam gadyam ca miśram ca tat tridhaiva vyavasthitam, padyam catuspadi tac ca vṛttam jātir iti dvidhā." (I. 11)
The prabha commentary (pp. 13, B.O.R.I. Edn. Poona, '70) explains that the emphasis - "eva-kara" is to rule out any other variety. "evam tri prakarakam eva tad vyavasthitam prācīna-sūribhir nirūpitam. evakāro bhedántara-vyavacchedárthaḥ." Prabha further observes caturṇām padānām samāhāraś catuṣpadī. dvigor iti sūtreņa ādantatvāt ņip. pada-catusṭayā"tmakam padyam ity arthaḥ. dvi-tri-padaparimitānām cchandasām vedeṣv eva darśanāc catuṣpadīti kathanam laukikavṛttánurodhena iti kecit. anye tu catuspadity upalakṣaṇam etat. tena pañca-ṣatpādānām vṛttānām api samgrahaḥ. tac ca padyam vṛttam jātir iti dvi-prakārakam. akṣara-samkhyātam vṛttam, mātrā-samkhyātā jātiḥ. tad uktam
tatra
cchandomañjaryām
padyam catuspadi tac ca vṛttam jātir iti dvidhā,
vṛttam akṣara-samkhyātam
jātir mātrākṛtā bhavet." - iti.
tatra
sama'rdha-sama-viṣamāņi vṛttāni krameņa sragdhara-puspitāgrāvaitālīyā"dīni. ārya-gītīty ādayo jātayaś ca."
Dandin observes that in cchandoviciti - i.e. such works viz. cchandaḥ sastra as laid down by Pingala-muni, as explained in Prabha (pp. 14, ibid), the fuller discussion is available.
Dandin is more logical and cancels the fifth class in the fourth set as given by Bhāmaha viz. anibaddha or stray verse. Danḍin observes that these, viz. the stray verse and its smaller or bigger collection are forms derived from sargabandha i.e. Mahākāvya and therefore need not be separately mentioned. Thus K.D. I. 13 says:

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787 “muktakam kulakam koşaḥ samghāta iti tādņśaḥ, sarga-bandhāmśa-rūpatvād
anuktah padya-vistaraḥ.” But we may say that though as a unit or form muktaka and the like figure as portions of a bigger composition, they could have been separately mentioned. As independently also, such as the subhāșita and the like, they have their own identity. We will go to observe later that the Agnipurāna and the Sāhitya-darpaņa of Viśvanātha define or describe these minor compositions. The Agnipurāņa (337/36) suggests that a 'muktaka' is an individual verse capable of causing camatkāra or poetic effect :
"muktakam śloka ekaikaś
camatkāra-kşamah satām.” and the S.D. VI. 314-315 read as -
"dvābhyām tu yugmakam sandānitakam tribhir isyate, kalāpakam caturbhis ca
pañcabhiḥ kulakam matam.” We may say that these small groups of two, three, four of five individual verses have a common subject of narration and they may form part of a 'sarga' of a mahākāvya, or, even a laghukāvya, but they can be independent of them, i.e. even out of a mahākāvya or, a larger composition as well. “Kosa' is said to be a 'koşa' i.e. collection of individual verses having no expectancy of one another, “koṣaḥ śloka-samūhaḥ syād anyonya'napeksaka" iti. Samghāta is defined as,
“yatra kavir ekam artham vịttena ekena varņayati kāvye, samghātaḥ sa nigadito
vȚndāvana-meghadūtā”dih.” Prabhā quotes Harinātha who in a separate commentary (on K.D. ?) gives the definitions of these varieties as (pp. 15, ibid):
“ţikāntare harināthena pradarsitāni laksaņāni yathā - anyā’napeksa ekaślokanibandho muktakam. aneka-padyenaika-kriyanvitena eka-vākyártha-kathanam

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SAHŞDAYĀLOKA kulakam. a-samhatárthānām eka-kaver anekakavīnām vā nibandhaḥ kośaḥ. yathā āryā-sapta-śatítyā”dih. kalpita-vastukah eka-cchando-nirvyūdhaḥ samghāto meghadūtā"di." The Prabhā observes that these verse-groups are but portions of a mahākāvya. The first two viz. muktaka and kulaka (K.D. I. 13) are direct portions of a mahākāvya while the latter two are to be found out if they are incorporated in a mahākāvya. They are to be identified in view of their definitions - But we have observed that these verse-groups or minor forms can have independent existence out of a mahākāvya also and can have their separate identity also. They could be parts of a major composition as well. Kāvyādarśa (I.) kārikās 14-22 define Mahākāvya or a major composition in verse. The characteristics are almost common to those enumerated by Bhāmaha with some more details. Before we go through the same it may be observed with Dr. S. K. De that these features which appear as part of the so-called definition of a mahākāvya actually deal with accidents rather than with essentials. We further observe that before Bhāmaha and Dandin laying down definitions, some brilliant illustrations such as the compositions of Kālidāsa, Ašvaghosa, and Bharavi and some others not known to us were present. These literary critics tried to find out the features that earned these compositions tremendous popularity as well as poetic excellence. They tried to underline some common features observed in actual practice by the e masters. The sum total of these features was laid down as definition of a mahākavya or any other type of poetic composition either verse or pros may be. It is in view of this that, we will go to observe that Dandin at the end says that even if some of these features enumerated by us are not found in a given composition they do not cease to be a mahākāvya etc. Thus the accidental presence of these features was apparent to earlier critics also.
Dandin observes (K.D. I. 14) that mahākavya is a major composition divided in 'sargas' or chapters : sargabandho mahākāvyam. In its beginning is a blessing, i.e. āśīrvāda, or a salutation (to a personal deity) i.e. namas-kriyā, or it may just start straight away with direct narration of the story. Vastu-nirdeśa is explained by prabhā (pp. 16, ibid) as direct naming of the hero or metaphorically that of somebody connected with the hero. Or, 'vastu' is portion of narration which is referred to either directly or through suggestion. “vastu-nirdeśaḥ, vasati prastutavșttānto'smin iti vastu, kathānāyakaḥ laksanayā aparópi tar-sambandhi pradhānapuruṣaḥ. tasya nirdeśaḥ nāmóccāraṇa-pūrvaka upanyāsaḥ. athavā vastu, varnyakathābhāgah tasya nirdeśah. sāksād, vyañjanayā vā sūcanam. etat trayānām

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789 madhye kenā’py ekena sargabandhasya prārambho vidhīyate ity arthaḥ. (Prabhā, pp. 16, on K.D. I. 14).
The theme of a mahākāvya is dependent on either itihāsa. (such as the Mahābhārata; “itihäso bhāratam, upalakṣaṇam; prabhā, pp. 16, ibid Prabhā also says : tena rāmāyaṇā"di kāvyānām purāņānām ca samgrahah) - i.e. dependent on historical or semihistorical source or it could be an independent theme also. But it has to have a lofty theme - sadāśrayam. This was observed by Bhāmaha also. The theme is either dependent on historical sources or not. But it has to be a real story and not merely imagined. Prabhā observes : itarad vā, itihāsā"dişu a-vidyamānam kathānakam upajīvya nibaddham. kimtu sadāśrayam. sat satya-bhūto vrttānta āśraya adhāro yasya tat. anena kalpitasya vastuno mahākāvye varnanīyatayā svīkāre nisedhah sūcitah. athavā sat satpurusah aśrayo yasya. tena buddhacaritā"dīnām aśvaghosā"dibhih pranītānām samgraha iti kecit." (pp. 17, ibid on K.D. I. 15). But we feel that if by 'sad-asrayam' we include the possibility of a lofty and yet imaginary theme, the definition will tend to be wider in its scope and will include such poetic compositions as “The Paradise lost”, and, “The Paradise Regained" by Milten and such other master poets also. The theme should rest on the four objectives of life such as dharma, artha etc., the hero should be an intelligent person from a lofty lineage and a noble one. It should abound in. descriptions of city, ocean, mountain, seasons, sun, moon, with their rise and setting, gardens, water-sports, drinking bouts, love-sports etc. etc. The incidents of narration should describe situations of love in separation, wedding, birth of a prince, political meetings, sending of an emissary, fights, the rise of the hero, etc. (K.D. I. 15-17). Dandin gives by far greater details as compared to Bhāmaha. It may also suggest a more developed stage of literary criticism. But as both Bhāmaha and Dandin had before them a great literature by way of illustration, written by such masters as Kālidāsa, Bhāravi and the rest, these definitions are modelled on them. If either in Bhāmaha or in Dandin we come across any criticism of ideas found in the other, that may not prove priority or posteriority of either. but they should be taken to point to different traditions accepted by either. That these definitions as given by Bhāmaha and Dandin could also have a shaping influence on later poets also cannot be disputed.
Thus it is obvious that poets prior to Bhāmaha and Dandin, while creating excellent poetry must be leaning more towards descriptions of external and accidental items. Dandin also observes, like Bhāmaha, that this major type of

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composition i.e. a mahākāvya should be:
alamkṛtam a-samkṣitaptam
rasa-bhāva-nirantaram, sargair anati-vistīrṇaiḥ śravya-vṛttaiḥ susamdhibhiḥ. (I. 18)
sarvatra bhinna-vṛttāntair
upetam loka-rañjanam,
kāvyam kalpāntara-sthāyi
jāyate sad-alamkṛti." (I. 19)
This means that the mahākāvya should abound in various figures of speech (and such other devices), should be of a large proportion, or that it should be decorated, (alamkṛtam) by descriptions of cities, seasons etc. as noted above, in abudance. It should be rich in narration of emotions and feelings that are object of relish. The sargas should be of reasonable length i.e. containing verses in a reasonable number. The metres should be pleasing to the ear. This means that they should be in keeping with the rules laid down in works on metrics such as suvṛttatilaka and the rest. In short, the metrical composition should not be technically faulty and should be having excellences such as mādhurya. The mahākāvyas should also be graced by pleasing junctures (= susamdhibhiḥ yuktam). Also, the idea is that end of the earlier sarga should be well-knit with the beginning of the next, as observed in the S.D. VI. 321 viz. "sargánte bhavi-sargasya kathāyāḥ sūcanam bhavet." The Prabha observes that by some 'samdhi' is explained as connection of vovels and consonants also. This also should be pleasing to ears and should not sound harsh. Read Prabhā (pp. 22, ibid, on K.D. I. 18):

SAHṚDAYALOKA
"kecit tu samdhi-padam aj-jhal - samdhi-param vyākhyāyanti. tena -
"urvy asav atra tarvālī
marvante carv avasthitiḥ,
nātrarju yujyate gantum
śiro namaya tan-manāk." - ityādi śruti-katu-samdhi-parihāraḥ kriyate."
End of a sarga has to be drafted in a metre other then the one attempted in the whole of the sarga. Normally one metre is followed in a sarga, but Prabha observes that at times in a single sarga a poet attempts different metres also, as in the fourth sarga of Śiśupālavadha or the fifth sarga in Kirātárjunīya.

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791 Such a composition lives for ages and it is necessarily decorated by poetic devices such as figures of speech both of word and sense. We may add that other devices such as excellences, styles and dictions, etc. are also covered by, “sadalamkrti". All these should promote the central effect i.e. rasa or relish, i.e. aesthetic delight. The composition may not have all these features, i.e. it may have only some of these, and yet it does not cease to be a mahākāvya.
After describing the major or minor compositions in verse, Dandin banks upon prose-compositions. But before that he observes that in verse-compositions there are two styles of narration. At times the poet refers to the high qualities of the hero and describes the humiliation of his enemies by such a hero. This is a naturally beautiful method adopted by poets. But at times, even such description pleases the men of taste, in which first the lineage, adventure, learning or culture of the enemy is described and the victory of the hero over such a qualified enemy is described.
Dandin starts with the discussion of prose compositions with kā. I. 23 which reads as -
"a pādah pada-santāno gadyam, ākhyāyikā kathā, iti tasya prabhedau dvau
tayor ākhyāyikā kila...” (K.D. I. 23) Prose is collection of padas or words nor arranged in a pāda'. By 'pāda' here is meant, according to Prabhā (pp. 25, ibid) : pādo gana-mātrā-nibaddho gadyaturīyāmśas tacchünyah apādah.” That writing which does not follow the dictates of 'gana' such as ya-gana, ma-gana etc., and 'mātrā' such as one-mātrā in short vovel, two in a long vovel etc. - is 'gadya' or prose. Pada-santānah means 'sup-tin-antapada-cayah - i.e. collection of words giving verbs, nouns etc. The prose writing is classified into two such as kathā and ākhyāyikā. Dandin seens to mention these two types simply because they were prevalent in literature but in fact he does not seem to have any faith in the distinction resorted to. For Dandin, whether the hero himself narrates his own story or somebody else does it, is of no telling effect. As in an ākhyāyikā, so also in a kathā, Dandin feels that we may come across poems written in vaktra and aparavaktra metres and also a division into ucchvāsas. So, for Dandin both kathā and ākhyāyikā are two names of a single type. : tat kathā'khyāyikety ekā jätiḥ samjñā-dvayánkitā." All other types of prose writing, for Dandin, are included in either of these two (K.D. I. 28a). It is possible that Dandin represents a tradition of literary criticism which was less honoured by Bhāmaha and vice versa. Dandin observes that even in prose writing of either variety we have

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the same theme as is read in sargabandha, i.e. we also read elopement of a girl, fights, love in separation, etc. even here. (K.D. I. 29) -
"kanyaharaṇa-samgrāmavipralambhódayā"dayaḥ sargabandha-samā eva
naite vaiśeṣikā guṇāḥ." -
These discriptions are not exclusive to verse-compositions only. They can be part of major compositions both in prose and verse. Even the special marks woven by a poet in a mahākāvya such as the word 'śrī in Śiśupālavadha, or 'lakṣmi' in Kirātārjunīya, etc. could be found in major prose works also, according to Dandin, who suggests that for the masters any special mark can serve as a means to achieve their goal.
K.D. I. 31 observes :
"miśrāņi nāṭakā❞dīni teṣam anyatra vistaraḥ, gadya-padya-mayī kācic
campur ity abhidhiyate."
Thus like Bhamaha, Daṇḍin also avoids discussion concerning nataka etc. which are 'miśra' for Daşdḍin and 'abhineyártha' for Bhāmaha. It may be noted that Dandin looks at nāṭaka etc. perhaps from the angle of the style of writing which is both prose and verse, while Bhamaha has looked at them from the angle of their being enacted on the stage. Dandin refers to another form of mixted type such as 'campu', which of course is not to be enacted on the stage. Dandin then observes (K.D. I. 32):
"tadetam vānmayam bhūyaḥ samskṛtam, prākṛtam tathā,

apabhramśaś ca miśram ca
ity ahuraryāś caturvidham." -
Literature as a whole could be written in Sanskrita, Prākṛta, Apabhramsa and a mixture of all three. When written in sanskrit a major verse writing is called sarga-bandha, skandhaka is in prākṛta and osara in apabhramśa. Dandin says that sanskrta is God's language, while prākṛta is three-fold such as tad-bhava, tat-sama and deśī. For him (K.D. I. 34) mahārāṣtrī is the best prākṛta dialect. 'Setubandha' is written in this dialect. Śauraseni, gauḍī, lați and such other dialects (such as

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793 māgadhi, avantijā, prācyā, according-to prabhā, pp. 34, ibid) come under Apabhramśa. From the point of view of sastra, says Dandin, anything else Sanskrit is termed 'apabhramśa'. Sargabandha etc. (by 'etc. are meant khandakavya or minor compositions, : prabhā, pp. 35, ibid), are in Sanskrit. Skandhaka is also the name of a metre. A composition in this metre has to be in Prākta language. The upa-rūpaka called sattaka adds Prabhā (pp. 36, ibid) is also woven in Prāksta. Osara is also a special metre. Anything attempted in this metre has to be in Apabhramśa. The chapter or pariccheda in such a composition is called ‘kadava’. The Prabhā (pp. 37, ibid) observes : tad ukram tīkántare
"apabhramśa-nibandhésmin sargāḥ kadavakábhidhāh, tathápabhramśa-yogyāni
cchandāmsi vividhāni ca.” - iti. etad udāharaṇam karņa-parākramā"di iti prema-candra-śarmāṇaḥ.
Dandin (K.D. I. 38) holds that 'kathā' is written in all prāksta dialects and also in Sanskrta. By Kathā he seems to include 'ākhyāyikā' also. Kadambari is an instance of kathā written in Sanskrta, observes Prabhā. But Dandin himself notes Bịhatkathā written in bhūta-bhāsa i.e. paiśācī dialect, a variety of Prākṣta.
K.D. I. 39 observes that lāsya, cchalita and sampā are to be enacted on the stage. We know that Bhāmaha also refers to such varieties of literature that are to be enacted on the stage such as dvipadī, śampā, rāsaka, skandhaka etc. Actually these are taken as upa-rūpakas. The Prabhā (pp. 37, ibid) explains that lasya is a form of dance performed by ladies and it abounds in śrngara-rasa : "stri-jana krtam śộngāra-rasa-pradhānam nộtyam lāsyam.” Prabhā also quotes from Premacandra Tarkavāgiśa, and also from Hşdayamgamā to this effect. 'Chalita' is said to be a variety of dance performed by the males. Sampā is an item presented by instruments as part of pūrva-ranga. Prabhā explains : śampā pūrvarangántargato vādya-prayoga-viśeşaḥ. (pp. 38, ibid). Prabhā quotes Nāryaśāstra (v. 62) here. 'Salya' is a variant which is also explained by Prabhā. - “bhāle hastam samāveśya nrtyam šalyeti kīrtitam." Whatever that be, these are varieties of performing arts and are enacted on the stage but all these are taken as varieties of miśra-kāvya by Dandin, of course when viewed from the point of view of the written script. By fadi' Prabhā holds that such varieties of performing art as

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ‘tāndava', 'hallisaka', 'rāsa' etc. are included. We do not know whether Dandin knew all these varieties or not but certainly by 'ādi' he means some of them not mentioned by him. These varieties that go by the name of uparūpakas were known to Bhoja, Hemacandra, Rāmacandra and Guņacandra and the rest and some of them are counted in Bharata's N.S. and Abhinavabhārati as well.
Dandin says that all these viz. lāsya, chalita etc. are 'preksārtham' - i.e. to be viewed, while the rest as counted earlier such as prose and verse compositions both major and minor are only 'sravya', i.e. to be heard (and also 'read'), K.D. I.-39 observes :
"lāsya-cchalita-śampā”di prekşártham, itarat punah, śravyam eva, iti saiņā’pi
dvayī gatir udāhstā." Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkanthābharana (II. 152) makes a subtle distinction even between those art-forms which are to be viewed' only and also those that are represented on the stage through acting. The Prabhā (pp. 39, ibid) quotes from Bhoja :
"uktam bhojarājena sarasvati kanthābharaṇe "śravyam tat kāvyam āhur yan neksyate nábhinīyate, śrotrayor eva, sukhadam
bhavet tad api şad-vidham.” (II. 152) So, 'śravya' is that which is 'neither viewed nor represented (through acting).'
It is clear from the types enumerated by Dandin that a number of art-forms, - both only written' i.e. "only to be heard-pāthya”, and also ‘drśya - i.e. to be viewed and also represented through acting on the stage', - had emerged by the time Dandin wrote. Actually these art-forms are seen even in Bharata, of course the names given to them may differ. All this suggests a rich history of documents both written and presented on the stage both through dance and acting. The richness and vastness of this literature prior to Bhāmaha, Dandin and even Bharata are unfathomable. Unfortunately much of it is lost for us for the present at least. Artforms in literature and drama suggest a highty cultured and educated society that lived in India at least before nearly two thousand years, or even earlier.

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795 Vāmana deals with the topic of types of literature in brief. At Kā. Sū. vị (= K.S.V.) I. iii. 21 he classifies literature into two i.e. gadya or prose and padya or verse. He observes in the vrtti that 'gadya' or prose is mentioned first as it is both difficult to grasp and also difficult to create : "gadyasya pūrva-nirdeso durlaksyavišesatvena durbandhatvāt." He quotes a saying that verily, prose is the touch-stone
.". "gadvam kavīnām nikasam vadanti.” Prose, Vāmana suggests is threefold such as "gadyam vrtta-gandhi, cūrnam, utkalikā prāyam ca." (K.S.V. I. iii. 22). The Kāmadhenu commentary on Vāmana explains this as : "vrtta-gandhi kvacid bhāge vștta-cchāyánukāri. cūrņa-padena upacārād vyasta-pada-samāhāro laksyate. tena vyasta-pada-bahulam cūrņam. utkalikāprāyam iti - utkalikā utkanthā. "utkanthotkalike same” ity amaraḥ, utkalikāyāḥ prayogabāhulyam yasmin tad utkalikāprāyam gadyam. yasmin śrūyamāne śrotrņām utkanthā bahulā bhavatī-ty arthaḥ. kalikāśabdótra laksanayā ruharuhikāyām vartate. ullasantī kalikām ruharuhikām praiti prāpnoti iti utkalikāprāyam. yatra pada-samdarbha-paripāti kāndopakānda-samroha-śālinī kalikeva ullasati tad-utkalikāprāyam.” (pp. 38, Edn. Chowkhamba SKT. St. Varanasi, 1971, Bechan Jhal.
This means that 'yrtta-gandhi' prose is that which, in portions, carries passages that could be identified as this or that metre used in verse-formation. This could be said to be lyrical prose with sonorous effect or musical effect. Next is 'cūrna' or one. which is plain writing not abounding in compounds. 'utkalikāprāya' is explained by Kamadhenu in a quiver way. It suggests that 'utkalika' is the same as utkanthā or longing. Such prose writing which abounds in delineation of human longing, such by which the listener's utkanthā or longing is aroused or promoted is said to be ‘utkalikāprāġa'. This amounts perhaps to sentimental writing or such writing as arouses feelings and emotions ending in rasa-experience. Kāmadhenu suggests that by laksanā or indication utkalikā stands for 'ruharuhika' i.e. horripilation. We may say that this is also an 'anubhāva' - consequent, caused due to rasa-camatkāra. When a style of writing - "pada-sandarbha-paripāļi” - shines forth like a branch flowering in all its part, it is said to be utkalikāprāya. But, we may say that this explanation of Kamadhenu is not convincing for we except something other than 'cūrņa' in this third type. It should mean such writing which abounds in long and longer compounds, or one having rising billows and billows of long compounds as is seen in some parts of Kādambarī and such other works. Actually the Prabhā ţikā (pp. 25, ibid) refers to the Sāhityadarpana VI. 330, 331 which gives a four-fold division of prose writing such as · muktaka, vsttagandhi, utkalikāprāya and

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA cūrnaka. The first is without a compound. The second is having portions of metrical formation vowen into it. The illustration is : “vịttagandhi yathā mama samara-kandūla-nibida-bhuja-danda-kundalīksta-kodanda-śiñjini-tankārójjāgaritavairi-nagara.” Viśvanātha observes that in this illustration in the portion viz. "kundalīksta-kodanda”, we have a portion of anustubh metre, again in samarakandūla, etc. we have the same, if the first two letters are removed. 'Utkalikāprāya' is one which abounds in long compounds as illustrated in 'anisa-vishmara-nisidasara-visara-vidalita-samara-parigada-pavara-para-bala.” (Skt. = aniśa-visșmaraniśitasara-visara-vidalita-samara-parigata-pravara-para-balah."). The Chando Manjari also defines utkalikā as - bhaved utkalikāprāyam samāsā”dhyam drąháksaram - Cūrņaka' is having small compounds as in 'gunaratna-sagara', 'jagadeka-nagara', etc. Thus, Viśvanātha has classified prose-writing on the basis of presence or total absence of short or long compounds. This sounds logical. Kāmadhenu's explanation of utkalikā does not appeal to us, because any type of writing, be it with or without compound can generate emotions or utkanthā or ruha-ruhikā and thus there will be overlapping in types. Actually Vāmana himself contradicts Kāmadhenu's observations when he observes :
"padya-bhāga-vad vrtta-gandhi” - (I. iii. 23) i.e. vịtta-gandhi is that which contains portions of metrical formation, as in 'pātāla-tālu-tala-vāsisu danavesu", wherein we can read portion of vasanta-tilaka metre.
In I. iii. 24, Vāmana says, “anāviddha-lalita-padam cūrņam” - 'anāviddhāni adirgha-samāsāni lalitāni an-uddhatāni padani yasmin - i.e. such formation as having un-involved formation i.e. smooth and without long compounds and not harsh letters makes for 'cūrna' variety.
Then, at I. iii. 25, Vāmana gives the 'utkalikāpraya' as 'viparītam utkalikāprāyam', and explains it as : "āviddhóddhata-padam' 'with involved and harsh construction.' 'yathā-kulisa-śikhara-khara-nakhara-pracanda-capețā-pāțitamatta-mātanga-kumbha-sthala-galan-mada-cchatā’-cchurita-cāru-kesara-bhārabhāsura-mukhe kesariņi. This involves a long and arduous compound. Thus Kāmadhenu's explanation is contradicted by Vāmana himself and we feel we are right in taking 'utkalikāprāya' as such prose as abounds in long, and longer compounds.
'Padya' i.e. verse is divided by Vāmana in many types. "padyam aneka-bhedam”. (I. iii. 26). It is subdivided into sama, ardha-sama, visama etc. By 'adi', Kamadhenu explains that such metres as depend on mātrā, such as vaitālīya, āryā, etc. are meant.

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797 The Kāmadhenu quotes verses from Bhāmaha (?, we do not find these in Bhāmaha) - such as -
samam ardhasamam vșttam visamam ca tridhā matam, anghrayo yasya catvāras tulya-laksana-lakṣitāḥ. tacchandaḥ śāstra-tattvajñāḥ sama-vșttam pracakşate prathamánghri samo yasya tļtīyaścaraņo bhavet dvitīyasturyavad vșttam tadardhasamam ucyate. yasya pada-catuske’pi lakṣma-bhinnam parasparam
tadāhur-visamam vịttam chandaḥ śāstra viśāradāḥ.” Vāmana then further divides both gadya and padya into two such as a-nibaddha and nibaddha i.e. one with a smaller expanse or one seen in a small unit, the minor type, and the other, the major type or one seen in longer expanse.
But once again in the Kāmadhenu, we have a note : muktaka-lakṣaṇam uktam Bhāmahena -
"prathamam muktakā"dīnām rju-laksanam ucyate, yad eva gāmbhīryaudāryaśaurya-nītim atisprśā. bhaven muktakam ekena
dvikam dvābhyām, trikam tribhiḥ.” Now once again, we do not find these words in the available Kāvvālamkāra editions of Bhāmaha. We do not know if a larger version of the same was available to Gopendra Tripurhara (or Tippa) Bhūpāla or to anyone else earlier.
Vāmana observes (I. iii. 28) that these two varieties i.e. minor and major of both gadya/prose and padya/verse are to be mastered in sequence. This means that after having mastered the minor variety one has to work for the major one, like after preparing a garland first one prepares the crest-garland. But Vāmana does not

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA prefer composition of single verses or minor type only; for he observes : “nā’nibaddham cakāsti ekatejaḥ paramāņur iva" (I. iii. 29) - Like a single spark, a minor composition does not shine forth. He gives a verse in support, which reads as -
"a-sankalita-rūpāņām kāvyānām nā'sti cārutā, na pratyekam prakāśante
taijasāḥ paramāņavaḥ.” i.e. Poetry of minor forms is not charming. Individual sparks (from fire) do not shine forth (brilliantly).
But Vāmana has preference for certain types even when major compositions (= nibaddha kāvya) are presented. He observes : (I. iii. 30).
"sandarbheșu daśarūpakam śreyaḥ.”
i.e. - even in major compositions the ten types of rūpakas i.e. drama etc. - are the best. He says:
sandarbheșu prabandheșu daśarūpakam nāțakā”di śreyaḥ. Here 'śreyaḥ' means "atiśayena prasiddham”.
If it is asked why this preference for nāțaka and the like, then the answer is (I. iii. 31)
“tadd hi citram citra-patavad-višesa-sākalyāt.” - i.e. as the daśa-rupaka is associated with special features, it is like a picture of many colours. The commentary explains that :
"višeşāņām bhāsābhedā"di-rūpāņām kathā”khyāyikā”dinām mahākāvyabhedānām asmād eva vastu-vinyāsa-kalpanam iti prakārántareņā'pi śreyatvam asya pratipādayitum āha -
tato'nyabheda-klrptih - I. iii. 32 This argument of Vāmana is not convincing as we cannot imagine that other forms of descriptive literature originated from drama - "daśa-rūpakasya eva hi idam sarvam vilasitam." Vāmana holds that citing definitions of kathā, ākhyāyikā, and mahākāvya will not prove to be iteresting and so he cancels the same. It has to be collected from other sources. But at the same time he does not exert even to define daśa-rūpaka which according to him is the source of all other literary art-forms, both prose and verse, major and minor types including.
ta

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799
With this note ends what is termed as 'śārīra' adhikaraṇa in the KSV. of Vamana. Thus, we see that Vamana was perhaps satisfied by the definitions of all types of literature that which was to be enacted on the stage or was meant for hearing or reading only - given by his predecessors such as Bharata, Bhāmaha and the like.
Rudrata, in the XVIth chapter of his Kāvyálamkāra discusses various forms of literature. He wants the poets to write compositions to persue the four-fold goal such as dharma, artha, etc. in a style juicy because of rasa. He observes :
"jagati caturvarga iti khyātir dharmártha-kāma-mokṣāṇām,
samyak tan abhidadhyād
rasa-sammiśran prabandheṣu." (Kā. XVI-1)
(Edn. Cowkhamba Vidya Bhavan, Varanasi, '66, Sri R. Shukla)
Rudrata further states (XVI-2) that compositions are two fold such as versecompositions and prose-compositions viz. kathā and ākhyāyikā, with original or (historical) or non-original theme, both major and minor in size. - Rudrața XVI-2 reads:
"santi dvidhā prabandhāḥ kavya-kathā-"khyāyikā"dayaḥ kāvye, utpādyánutpādyā
mahallaghutvena bhūyo'pi."
Bhāmaha also had a two-fold division such as one having a plot with an old i.e. historical story or with story created newly by the poet. As noted above again, from the point of view of scope and size poetic creations are major or minor i.e. - 'mahat' or 'laghu'. Rudrața also expects that even nayaka or hero could be a poet's imagination only (XVI-3b). Namisādhu notes that here Tilakamañjarī and Bāņa's Kādambari could serve as illustrations where the hero is either imagined or from some other source.
The 'anutpadya' - i.e. not created newly by the poet is one, wherein the whole of the composition has its theme borrowed from history or its part, but the poet narrates it in his own expression. Namisādhu explains as (on Rudrața, XVI. 4) pañjaram iti. teṣu kathā"di-madhye te'nutpadyaḥ, yeṣām pañjaram kathāśarīram akhilam sarvam itihāsā"di-prasiddham rāmāyaṇā"di-kathā-prasiddham kaviḥ svavācā paripurayet. vaded ity arthaḥ. yatha arjuna-carite. athavā tad ekadeśam vā,

·

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itihāsā"dy ekadeśam vā svavācā yatra paripurayet tad api anutpādyam. yathā kirātárjunīyam kavyam.
'Arjunacarita' mentioned by Namisādhu is supposed to be Anandavardhana's
creation.
In XVI. 5, 6 Rudrața says that major compositions are those that have a larger scope-vitateṣu-and therein all the four pursuits of life such as dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa are clearly treated (abhidhīyate), and the poet presents all the rasas as well as all the 'kavyasthānas'. By 'kāvyasthāna's are meant such activities as picking up of flowers, water-sports etc. accoding to Namisādhu ("kāvyasthānāni puspoccaya - jalakrīḍā"dīni bhanyate", pp. 415, ibid, on Rudrata, XVI. 5)
The minor compositions are those with a narrower canvass and they have only one of the four pursuits of life delineated in them. Again all the rasas are not there but only some of them ('a-samagrā'nekarasāḥ'), or there may be minor compositions having only one fully developped single rasa -
In major/minor compositions based on known historical theme, the poet starts narration only with a salutation, observes Namisādhu, as the theme requires no special introduction it being known to all. te meghadūtā"dayo laghavaḥ. mahāntastu śiśupālā"dayaḥ. atha anutpādyeṣu purāṇā"di-krameņa eva itivṛttanibandhaḥ, kevalam tatra kaviḥ svavāca caturvarga-rasa-kāvyasthāna-varṇanam namaskāra-pūrvakam karotīti na tadviṣaya-nibandhópadeśo jāyate.
ye punar utpādyās tatra katham nibandha ity anupadistam, na jñāyate iti tannibandha-kramo'padeśam āha. (Namisādhu, pp. 416, ibid).
Before we continue with this, it may be noted that Rudrata is careful at every juncture that a poetic creation has to be charged with rasa or rasas. This means that it has to be a successful creation causing aesthetic delight.
Actually in Kārikās XVI. 7-19 Rudrața discusses the type called Mahākāvya with 'utpadya' i.e. original theme. He says that in this variety. The poet has to give a description of a beautiful city to begin with and this has to be followed by the eulogy of the lineage of the hero, in the same -
"tatrótpādye pūrvam sannagarivaranam mahākāvye, kurvīta, tad anu tasyām nayaka-vamśa-prasamsam ca." (XVI. 7)

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801 This is to be followed by the description of the hero gifted with three powers, uch as those of mantra or, power of good counsel, i.e. polity, prabhu i.e. the power of eminence, authority and strength and kosa i.e. treasure. Even 'utsāhaśakti' is counted here which makes for the power of energy. The hero has to have attachment for the three pursuits of life (i.e. trivarga-sakta). He is expected to be adorned by all excellences or guņas, has to be dear to the subject and is one desirous of conquering (vijigisu) the enemy -
"tatra trivarga-saktam samiddha-sakti-trayam ca sarvagunam, rakta-samasta-prakrtim
vijigişum nāyakam nyaset.” (XVI. 8). The poet has to indulge into description of seasons such as the autumn and the like. With reference to the hero it is stated that he is protecting his kingdom according to the set accepted procedure, and observes the accepted royal behaviour also. Rudrata observes (XVI. 10) that for the hero who observes dharma etc. for one's own sake or for his friends, an enemy of high lineage and one who is meritorious has also to be described. The poet (XVI. 11) also indulges in describing the speech and mind spurred by anger, of his hero who in his court listens to the doings of an enemy either through his own spy, or through the agency of the enemy's emissary. Then (XVI. 12) having discussed with his advisors of and deciding upon the vulnerability of enemy through infliction, the hero should stage a march (over the enemy) or send a messanger who can put things through effective talk -
"sammantrya samam sacivaiḥ niścitya ca danda-sādhyatām śatroḥ, tam dāpayet prayānam
dūtam vā presayen mukharam.” (XVI. 12) In case the nāyaka decides to march, the poet should describe (XVI. 13) the absence of uneasiness of the subject (nāgarika-aksobha), the countryside, mountains, rivers, forests and grooves, lakes, dry land, oceans, islands and different worlds, camping of the hero, sports of young people, sunset and evening twilight, darkness and evening twilight, darkness and moon-rise etc. (XVI. 14). He should also describe the night and the gathering of youngsters (yūnām samājam), music, drinking bouts, love-sports and such other things on occasions and thus should expand the story or theme. (XVI. 15).

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The poet should also describe the opponent of the hero in like fashion advancing without thinking towards the hero, the poet may describe the besieging of the (enemy's) city also. The poet should describe messages to soldiers suggesting that they have to fight in the morning and suggesting also their death (in the fight) and therefore invitations to drinking bouts with ladies by night. XVI. 18 says that in the end the poet should describe the rise of the hero after facing great difficulty and fighting of both (i.e. the hero and his enemy and their armies) causing wonder and forming a plan or a military array, after making all preparations :
"sannahya krta-vyūham sa-vismayam yudhyamanayor ubhayo krcchreņa sādhu kuryād
abhyudayam nāyakasya ante.” (XVI. 18) Rudrața suggests (XVI. 19) that the construction of this major poem has to be one in chapters called 'sargas', with properly related junctures on account of their inter-relation.
It seems Rudrata gives greater details concerning accidential events to be woven in the main theme of a mahākāvya with original story. Perhaps he had a vaster literature and also a number of alamkāra-granthas before him to seek guidance from
Then Rudrața turns to kathā, or mahā-kathā. The (XVI. 20) concepts seem to be modelled on available famous compositions of Bana and others. Rudrata observes that in a major prose composition, i.e. in a mahākathā, the poet pays homage to his personal deities and preceptors in the beginning in some verses and then describes, as an author, his own lineage and himself in brief :
"ślokair mahākathāyām istān devān gurūn namaskrtya, samksepena nijam kulam
abhidadhyāt svam ca kartặtayā.” (XVI. 20) By 'ca' after 'svam', observes Namisādhu, (pp. 419, ibid) the untold details are covered. "svam ca iti 'ca'kāro'nukta-samuccaye. tena sujana-khala-stuti-nindā"dikam ca abhidaddhyād iti sūcyate." It is thereby suggested that such matter as praise of people of merit, and censure of the evil-minded etc. should be woven by the poet.

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Rudrata (XVI. 21) wants the poet to start the kathā with descriptions of cities and the like in prose with light consonants arranged in alliteration or (XVI-22), he may weave a sub-plot in the beginning and come down soon to the main theme. Both the themes should have a light and natural connection - "laghutāvatsamdhānam." Namisādhu illustrates this by naming Kādambarī. Or (XVI-23), the poet may go for a katha in Sanskrit in which the object is in form of winning a bride and the narration is charged with all the subtlties of śộngāra - "samyagvinyasta - Sakala - śrngārām”. This can be done through the medium of language - i.e. prāksta etc., which is other than sanskrit (= anyena) and which is rendered in verse (= a-gadyena). Namisādhu says that the poet could use prose also in other languages and Rudrața accepts this by adding 'ca' in the main kärikä-(agadyena ca anyena). "anyena prākstā"di-bhāşántarena tv agadyena gāthābhiḥ prabhūtam kuryāt.” Thus there was no rigid rule regarding language, or metrical or prose forms, in kathā.
Rudrata (XVI. 24) then discusses the ākhyāyikā form in which also he expects the poet to make the beginning with salutations to preceptors or deities and also with other characteristics observed as in kathā but only after first introducing earlier poets also :
"pūrva-vad eva namaskstadeva-gurur nótsahet sthiteși eșu, kávyam kartum iti
kavīñ samsed ākhyāyikāyām tu.” Naturally Rudrata must have looked into the practice followed by Bāna and others and he must have a number of works on literary criticism also before him.
Then (XVI.-25) the poet should point out some immediate cause of his creation such as his devotion to his king or insistence for singing the merits of others or such other cause. This narration of his motivation should be done in a lucid way - ‘aklistam abhidadhyāt.' Rudraça has kept Bāņa for his inspiration and hence he expects kavi-praśamsă in verse, story completely and necessarily in prose, suggestive aparavaktra verse or verses in other metres also, and divisions into chapters called ucchvāsas.
Rudrata expects that the poet should draft ākhyāyikā in prose only, as is the case with kathā. He has to introduce his own lineage as well as himself also not in verse, that means in prose only. (XVI. 26). Like sargas in a mahākāvya he has

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA to arrage the material in chapters called ucchvāsas having two āryās at the beginning of each chapter. The āryās should be well-knit and expressive of normal information.
Rudrața (XVI.-28, 29) further observes that on the occasion of voicing any doubt concerning past or future time, the poet has to arrange for recitation (by some agency) in form of either one or two of devices such as anyokti,samāsókti or ślesókti, to remove any doubt i.e. to establish something finally. This recitation should suit the context. The poet has to frame poems in āryā, apara-vaktra or puśpitāgrā metre, or even mālinī metre that may suit the theme, also could be used (XVI. 30) :
"tatra cchandah kuryād āryā’para-vaktra-puśpitāgrāņām,
anyan mālinā-prāyam.” (XVI. 30) • Rudrața observes that in those three forms (i.e. (mahā)kathā, ākhyāyikā and mahākāvya), subordinate themes and narrations of opposite nature but necessarily purposeful and well-knit with the main theme and story, also could be woven by a poet :
"sábhiprayam kiñcid viruddham iva vastu sat-prasangena, antaḥ kathāśca kuryāt
trişv api esu prabandheșu.” (XVI. 31) In all these major art-forms, both in verse and prose, Rudrața well-comes a complex nature of theme and story decorated even by sub-plots having an opposite colouring and nature. But the whole should create an impression of total unity of purpose. Thus loss of kingdom of the hero, till kingship is regained by him, or under the pretext of an ascetic such theme as deals with pursuit of liberation or moksa, could be delineated by the poet (Rudrata, XVI. 32).
Rudrata then turns his attention towards minor compositions. He observes (XVI.-33) that in a minor (verse) composition or in a khanda-kathā i.e. a minor prose composition, the hero is to be pictured as a happy go lucky man who comes to grief. Other characters such as a brahmin, or a (royal) servant or a businessperson, etc. should also be painted quite often.

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805 "kuryād kșudre kāvye, khanda-kathāyām ca, nãyakam sushinam, āpad-gatam ca bhūyo
dvija-sevaka-sārthavāhādim.” (XVI. 33) Rudrata wants that in such compositions the principal emotive context should be that of tragic or of love in separation-due to journey -
"atra rasam karuņam vā
kuryād athavā pravāsa-śộngāram.” Or, the theme portrayed (XVI.-34 ab) could be that of the first or fresh love of the hero with the hero's rise delineated at the end. This means the end has to be happy.
"prathamánurāgam athavā
punar ante nāyakábhyudayam.” (XVI. 34-cd). Rudrata is very clear that all these various features which have been enumerated with reference to minor or major works in both verse and prose cover only those which have an invented theme and not those having historical theme, for in the latter the narration has to follow the original source and this instruction does not touch them.
“naitad anutpädyeșu tu, tatra hy abhidhīyate yathāvȚttam, alpesu mahatsu ca vā
tadvisayo nā’yam upadeśah.” (XVI.-35) This means that Rudrata is not prepared to give liberty to such creative works as have historical or semi-historical theme. But we feel that here Rudrata adopts a rather narrow outlook for his near and immediate followers such as Anandavardhana and Kuntaka seem to be more liberal when they allow such changes even in a historical theme that promote rasa. For them rasa-ananugunasthiti, i.e. such situations which go to thwart the process of rasánubhūti, have to be either omitted or altered.
In XVI. 2. Rudrata used such words as - "kathā”khyāyikā"dayaḥ." Namisādhu recounts this in the beginning of XVI. 36 and observes that now Rudraţa proceeds to discuss that which was implied by "ādi." . "atha kāvyā”khyāyikā”daya ity atra ādi-grahaņa-samgļhītam darśayitum äha -

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Rudrata (XVI.-36) observes:
"anyad varṇaka-mātram prasasti-kulakā"di-nāṭakā"dy anyat, kavyam tad bahubhāṣam
vicitram anyatra ca'bhihitam."
"Only for discriptive purpose such (sub) varieties of verse formation as prasasti, kulaka etc. (are enumerated). Nāṭaka etc. (i.e. the rūpakas) are different forms of kavya as they are (written) in many languages and a lot of other beautiful features are acknowledged with them. They are discussed in other sources (on dramaturgy). Rudrața also mentions prasasti, not taken note of by his predecessors. Prasasti is a eulogy on kings and also contains praises of deities. These are said to be varied or beautiful in nature and in various languages also. Nātakas also have many sources of beauty and have many languages spoken by different characters.
Namisādhu elaborates over Rudrata's observation in the following way :
"anyad iti. sugamam na varam. tatra yasyām īśvara-kula-varṇanam yaśórtham kriyate sā prasastiḥ. yatra ca pañcā"dinam caturdaśántānām slokānām vākyárthaḥ parisamapyate tat kulakam. 'ādi'grahaṇād ekasmin chandasi vākya-samāptau muktakam, dvayoḥ sandānitakam. trișu viśeṣakam, caturşu kalāpakam. tathā muktakānām eva praghaṭṭakópanibandhaḥ paryāya-yogaḥ koṣaḥ. tathā bahūnām chandasām ekavākyatve, tad vākyānām ca samūhávasthāne parikathā. bhūyo'pyāhanāṭakányad iti. atra bharatady abhihitam. nāṭakā"dīty atra ādi-śabdāt nāṭakaprakaraṇa-ihāmṛga-samavakāra-bhāṇa-vyāyoga-dima-vithi,-prahasană"disamgrahaḥ. tad bahubhāṣam ca, bahvībhiḥ bhāṣābhir nibadhyate. vicitram ca. nānā-samdhi-samdhyanga-abhinayā”di yuktatvāt.
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Namisādhu is pleaced by Dr. De in roughly 1059 A.D. Thus he was almost a contemporary of Mammata and therefore surely posterior to Anandavardhana and Bhoja. So, perhaps in explaining various minor art-forms in verse such as kulaka etc. Namisādhu was influenced by Bhoja and for sure by earlier writers such as Bhamaha, Dandin Anandavardhana, Abhinvagupta and the rest. We will now see what Namisādhu has to explain -
Prasasti is explained as one in which 'īśvara-kula-varṇana' is presented. By 'iśvara' Namisādhu perhaps means the king i.e., master, and 'kula' is his clan. Poets were given to glorify their masters who took care of their proteges. Or, perhaps 'iśvara' may mean 'god' and then 'kula' does not become clear. 'Kulaka' is a cluster

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807 of verses from five to fourteen that carry a sentence-sense, i.e. they together deal with a single topic of description. By 'di', Namisādhu covers up such cases as of a single verse in a given metre called a muktaka, and two of them make for a sandānitaka, three a visesaka, and four verses make for a 'kalāpaka'. From five to fourteen centred round a single subject as seen above, was a 'kulaka'. We know that Anandavardhana has also in some context as we will go to see after Rudrata, has mentioned some of these types. But Namisādhu wants us that Rudrata also knew them and there is no reson to deny this assertion. Actually a group of verses describing a single topic, say the body of a deity or a given charater as read in the greater epics or the earlier Mahākāvyas, was nothing new for a discerning reader or critic. Namisādhu further states that these individual verses when collected together are said to be a 'koşa'. Parikathā is perhaps one which is so covers up from all sides (= pari) some topics. So, when many verses are placed together they make for a 'parikathā'. Namisādhu explains that when Rudrata says, "nāțakā”dy anyat" - he seems to refer to what Bharata has laid down. By 'ādi' in ‘nāțakā"di', such types of rūpakas as 'prakarana', 'Thāmrga', 'samavakāra', 'bhāņa', vyāyoga', dima', 'vīthi, 'prahasana' and the rest are to be taken. These are written with the help of many languages or dilects. They are charming also as they are adorned by a variety of samdhis i.e. junctures, samdhangas or parts of junctures, (four-fold) acting etc.
One thing is certain that literary critics from Bhāmaha to Rudrata and even later, include the dramatic compositions under literature or kāvya, perhaps because they all have to have a written script. Actually Bharata also is favourably inclined to this idea and he discusses such topics as guna, dosa, alamkāras and laksanas only from the angle of they being devices that make for the charm in poetic compositions, of course 'dosa' harms the same. But we should also note that for the discerning in India a drama was primarily composed for presentation on the stage and thus, though being a literary art as well, had its own identity with acting as its special mark or 'linga'. It is therefore that excepting some later alamkarikas as Hemacandra and Viśvanātha, other literary critics avoided discussing this variety of what is termed as "drśya kāvya".
After dealing with defining a number of types of literature, Rudrața tries to impart some practical instructions to poets suggesting what they should not do. This is perhaps to make the writing look more sensible and acceptable. Perhaps we may say that one can read the beginning of a topic called kavi-samava or poetic convention or kavi-śiksā or training of a poet here in a wider sense.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA We know that this topic flowers in Rājaśakhara and then in Hemacandra and we have a number of special manuals written on such topics that are connected with successful writing. Even when Bhāmaha denounces the imitation in case of dūta-kävyas or devices like artificial elephant in Vatsarāja episode, or use of only some grammatical usages in poetry or some verbs limited to certain senses only even if they carry other dictionary meanings, etc., this could be taken as topics directly or indirecly connected with poetic conventions or, kavi-siksa sense only. This is seen in Vamana also and Rudrata also gives some golden advice to poets. Thus, Rudrata suggests :
“kula-śailā’mbunidhīnām na brūyāl langhanam manusyena, . ātmīyayā eva saktyä
sapta-dvipávani-kramanam. (XVI. 37) The poet should not describe crossing of kula-parvatas i.e. principal mountains, by a mortal being. The kula-parvatas are said to be seven such as -
"mahendro malayaḥ sahyaḥ śuktimān yakşa-parvataḥ, vindhyaś ca pāriyātraś ca
saptaite kula-parvatāḥ." A normal human being crossing such huge mountains on his own sounds stupid and Rudrata is not prepared to tolerate anything stupid even in the realm of poetry which is full of fancy and imagination. It is again foolish for the poet to describe such feats by a human being as moving on his own on the whole of earth having seven dvipas or islands. We know that a dvīpa is a division of the terrestrial world and the numbers of these dvīpas vary according to different authorities. They are four, seven, nine or thirteen and are all situated round the mountain Meru, like petals of a lotus flower, and each being separated from the other by a distinct ocean. In Naisadhacarita I. 5 the dvīpas are said to be eighteen but seven appears to be the usual number. Raghu I. 65, and Sākuntala VII. 33 have seven. The central one is Jambudvipa under which is included Bharatakhanda i.e. India.
Rudrața XVI. 38 has something further. But to introduce this kārikā, Namisādhu has the following remark - "nanu bharata-hanumat-prabhrtīnām sarvam etat cchrūyate, tataś ca teşām tathā'nyasyapi bhavisyatīti ko dosa ity aha.”

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809 Namisādhu suggests that someone may argue that well, all this (= crossing of kula-parvatas or sapta-dvīpā-avani etc.) is said to have taken place with reference to Bharata, Hanumat etc., and so, as in case of these, so also in case of any other also this can be narrated and what harm is there ? - To this, Rudrata XVI. 38 says :
"ye’pi langhitavanto bharataprāyā kulācalā’mbunidhin, teşām surā"di-mukhyaiḥ
sangādāsan vimānāni.” That Bharata and the rest (i.e. Hanumān etc.) crossed the kula-mountains and oceans by themselves was a feat carried out by them as they had vimānas or heavenly cars or air-crafts or divine vehicles due to their company of the principal deities going with them. Namisādhu explains that by 'ādi' in 'surā”dimukhyaiḥ', is meant : “siddha-vidyādhara-kinnara-gandharvā"di-samgrahah."Rudrața thus seems to be a critic given to a rationalistic approach like Bhāmaha, a rare intellectual not to toterate all non-sense painted by poets. Here we have an opportunity to probe in the mind of Rudrata who seems to be bold enough even to refuse the legend of a Hanuman crossing an ocean by a physical jump and seems to suggest a rational explanation of even a Hanuman accomplishing his superhuman feat with the help of some sort of an air-craft or a vehicle. That could travel through air made available to him through some scientist, here called a divine agency.
Namisādhu further raises a possible objection such as : (pp. 436, ibid, Rudrata, XVI. 39) “nanu ca sattya-cittā”di-hīnarvan manusyānām katham sura”dibhih saha sango’pi ity āha - i.e. “The objector may argue that a normal human being is not gifted with a conscience full of sattva i.e. pure quality and in its absence how can he have contact with any divine agency ?" To this the answer is (Rudrata - XVI. 39)
śaktiś ca na jātv eşām a-surā”di-vadhe’dhikā, surā”dibhyah, āsīt te hi sahāyā
nīyante sma amaraiḥ samiti." The answer is, true, these individuals (who have superhuman feats to their credit) did not have power great enough to kill the demons, but they were helped by divine agencies and were led in the battles virtually by the immortals."

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The idea is that Rudrata, the rationalist refuses to accept any superhuman power in case of normal human beings. But some of those, who have a pure heart, and thus, perhaps like Arjuna, choose to be instruments in the hands of the will Divine, by total surrender, accomplish such feats through Divine grace. For, Rudrața wants us to believe that these humans do not fight nor conquer wars against the titanic evil forces, but they become the chosen instruments in the hands of the Divine and accomplish the impossible. So, such feats, Rudrata advises the poets, are not to be described with reference to normal human heroes, for this would look foolish. We know that Anandavardhana, without naming Rudrata talks about the same thing while dealing with theme of bigger compositions and Rămacandra and Gunacandra do mention such exceptional cases of Satavāhana and the like. These remarkable feats are to be described not in case of all heroes in common.
Rudrața also asks poets not to describe such conditions as poverty, disease, old age, miseries caused due to extreme cold or heat, and all that is causing disgust or -aversion leading to bībhatsa (rasa) or the disgusting sentiment outside Bhāratavarșa, perhaps meaning the context of the planet called earth.
Namisādhu says that Rudrața explains as to why in regions beyond earth such as ilāvstta and the like, such things as poverty, disease etc. are not to be described. It is so because in other regions beyond earth there is land studded with gold and jewels, where whatever is intended is easily achievable, and the life-span of beings is of lakhs of years i.e. of hundred thousand years free from old age. Rudrata, an intellectual curbing supernatural feats being described with normal human heroes, falls to this sort of belief which accepts the existence of regions beyond earth where people live happily for a hundred thousand years enjoying youth for ever!
But, this also forms part of the poetic convention acceptable to Rudrata, whose basic approach is that of a rationalist but who is also inclined to accept something beyond earth and something beyond the capacity and imagination of ordinary humans, when it comes to be covered by the realm of divine grace and divine agency! Thus, perhaps in Rudrața we find a combination of a rational mind and also a mystic who rises beyond the limits and scope of rationality.
Thus we see that among the ancients, it is only Rudrața who mentions praśasti, i.e. eulogy on kings and praises of deities. These are said to be in various languages and beautiful and varied in nature as noted above. We will go to see that in later Alamkāra works this panegyric appears with a number of sub-divisions.

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811 We also took notice of such minor-types as muktaka, sandānitaka, kalāpaka, kośa and parikatha mentioned by Namisādhu who believes that Rudrata means these by "ādi.”, though not actually counted by Rudrata, but read in Anandavardhana with reference to the discussion on samghatanā. Anandavardhana, (Dhv. III. 7) observes :
visayāśrayam apy anyad aucityam tām niyacchati, kavya-prabhedāśrayatah
sthitā bhedavati hi sā. (Dhv. III. 7) i.e. “Another consideration which governs the usage of texture is its decorum with regard to the literary medium adopted. Texture thus becomes different in different forms of literature.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 129, ibid)
He further observes in the aloka that : vaktp-vācya-gataucitye saty api visaya"śrayam anyad aucityam samghatanam niyacchati. yatah kavyasya prabhedāh - muktakam samskrta prākrtā pabhramśa-nibaddham, sandānitaka viśeşaka-kalāpaka-kulakāni, paryāyabandhaḥ, parikathā, khandakathā-sakalakathe, sarga-bandho'bhineyártham ākhyāyikā-kathe ity evam ādayaḥ - tad āśrayeņā’pi samghatanā višeşavatī bhavati. tatra muktakeșu rasa-bandhábhinivesinaḥ kaves tad āśrayam aucityam. tac ca daríitam eva. anyatra kāmacārah.
muktakesu prabandheşv iva rasa-bandhā'bhinivesinaḥ kavayo drśyante. tathā hy amaruka-kaver muktakāh śrngāra-rasa-syandinah prabandhāyamānāḥ prasiddhā eva. sandānitakesu tu vikata-nibandhana-aucityān madhyama-samāsa-dīrghasamāse eva racane. prabandhāśrayeșu yathokta-prabandhaucityam evā’nusartavyam. paryāyabandhe punar asamāsa-madhama-samāse eva samghatane. kadācid aucityāśrayeņa dīrgha-samāsāyām api samghatanāyām parușā grāmyā ca vrttiḥ parihartavyā.parikathāyām kāmacāraḥ, tatra itivștta-mātrópanyāsena nā'tyantam rasabandhābhiniveśāt. khanda-kathā-sakala-kathayos tu prākrta-prasiddhayoḥ
bandhana bhūyastvād vrttyaucityam tu yathārasam anusartavyam sargabandhe tu rasa-tātparye yathārasam aucityam anyathā tu kāmacārah; dvayor api mārgayoḥ sargabandha-vidhāyinām darśanāt rasa-tātparyam sādhīyaḥ. abhineyárthe tu sarvathā rasanibandhebhiniveșaḥ kāryaḥ ākhyāyikā-kathayos tu gadya-nibandhana-bāhulye chandobandha-bhinna-prasthānatvād iha niyame hetuḥ a-kştapūrvo’pi manāk kriyate.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA etad yathoktam auityam eva tasyā niyāmakam, sarvatra gadya-bandhe’pi
cchando-niyama varjite. (Dhv. III. 8) - “In addition to decorum of speaker and the spoken, decorum of literary medium also governs the choice of texture. Literature in Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramsa has various forms such as 'pearls' (= muktakas, i.e. single stanzas forming a selfcontained unit) or run-on verses of two, three, four or more stanzas in the same
g a single unit, stanzas in one or more metres describing a single topic, diadectic stories in verse, full-fledged fiction in verse, short stories in verse, epics, dramatic works, historical novels in prose and romantic novels in prose. Texture becomes varied due to differences in their literary forms also. Of these, a poet who is intent on delineation of sentiment in pearls will be guided by the considerations of decorum relating to sentiment. This decorum has already been explained. In pearls where the poet has no such intent he is free to employ any texture he likes.
Poets are, however, mostly seen to be intent on delineating sentiment even in earls, as in full-fledged literary works. Thus the pearls of the poet Amaru are famous for their profusion in Erotic sentiment, and they are regarded as good as full-fledged works in point of charm. In run-on verses of two stanzas etc., affected and involved construction itself becomes proper, and therefore we will have textures of medium-sized and long compounds. But if these run-on verses occur as parts of another whole poem, then the decorum towards a whole poem, indicated already, will apply to it. In works dealing with a single theme, and containing verses in one or more metres, the textures to be employed should be only those without compounds and with medium-sized compounds. Sometimes though the texture of long compounds might occur in view of decorum of context, 'harsh' and 'pallid dictions will have to be avoided therein. But there is no such rule so far as diadectic stories in verse are concerned. The reason is that there will just be a narration of story and no intention of delineating sentiment. Full-fledged stories and short-stories in verse are common only in prakrit language and they abound in run-on verses upto more than five stanzas. Therefore, the use of texture with long compounds also will not be wrong in them. The decorum of diction should always be decided in view of the sentiments to be delineated. If an epic should be intent upon delineating sentiments, the decorum of sentiment will govern its use of texture. Otherwise, it is left to the free choice of the poet. We can see writers of epics who have composed works in both these ways; but of the two, the works that are intent upon sentiment

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813
should be regarded as superior. In dramatic works, anyway, there should be a sole intent of delineating sentiment. So far as historical novels (ākhyāyikā) and romantic novels [kathā] are concerned, they are found mostly in prose only and their method differs from that of metrical works. Since the ancients have not given any specific rules concerning these, we shall frame them here in brief -
"The considerations of decorum detailed above will also govern all prose works which are not governed by the rules of metre." (Dhv. III. 8)
Though prose works are not governed by rules of metre, the considerations of decorum mentioned above, viz. that of speaker, the spoken, and the literary medium, govern them." - (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 131-133, ibid)
It may be noted that though Anandavardhana has not defined various types. Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy through his translation has suggested the same. Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy while giving english equivalents seems to explain the forms on the authority of perhaps Abhinavagupta, or, Namisādhu. He takes muktakas as 'pearls', i.e. single stanzas. He takes sandānitaka, viśeṣaka, kalāpaka and kulaka as run-on verses of two, three, four or more stanzas, paryāyabandha as stanzas in one or more metres describing a single topic, diadectic stories in verse is 'parikatha', while sakala and khaṇḍa-kathās are full-fledged fiction in verse and short-stories in verse. Sargabandha is epic for Prof. Krishnamoorthy, and Kathā and ākhyāyikā are romantic novels and historical novels in prose. Samghaṭanā is texture of writing. Now, Abhinavagupta in his Locana on Dhv. III 6 does explain. these types. So, Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy has either relied on him or Namisādhu or perhaps Bhoja. Perhaps even Namisādhu relies on Bhoja, or even Abhinavagupta, for no other known alamkāra works preceding Namisādhu excepting the Locana attempt definitions of all types of poetry.
One more important point to be noted with Anandavardhana is that not only does he mention types of poetry based on their external form, but he also attemps to furnish what we may call criticism-based classification of poetry in which he mentions three types such as dhvani, guṇībhūta-vyangya and citra, based on the absolute prominance or subservience or near absence of what he called "pratīyamāna artha" or implicit sense. He of course is careful not to call these types as 'uttama', 'madhyama' and ‘avara' as suggested by Abhinavagupta and picked up by Mammata. Varieties and subvarieties of dhvani and guṇībhūtavyangya and citra are also seen in the Dhvanyaloka Locana and Mammața, which we will pick up while dealing with dhvani separately. But one thing is certain that Anandavardhana

Page #259

814
SAHRDAYĀLOKA launched upon a new perspective to classify poetry based on an internal measure and not just an external form. Now viewing from this criticism-based classification, even a muktaka or a single stanza as of Amaru Kavi, or a prabandha or major composition such as a mahākāvya like say Raghuvamsa or a Kathā or ākhyāyikā, the major prose compositions such as Kādambari and Harśacarita or even a nātaka such as Abhijñāna-sākuntala could fall under the class of 'dhvani-kāvya'. But for the present we will continue with the Kāvya-prabheda as seen in Anandavardhana's successors, though of course Abhinavagupta is primarily interested only in the varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani, gunībhūta-vyangya and citra.
As noted earlier, though Abhinavagupta is primarily interested in criticismbased classification, he does attempt to explain under Dhv. III. 6. (Locana) some of the types beginning from Muktaka onwards, based on external form only. He observes : (pp. 225, Edn. Nandi, Ahd. '97-'98) - muktakam iti - muktakam anyena anālingitam, tasya samjñāyām kam. - Abhinavagupta unlike Dandin is careful in observing that 'muktaka' is that single stanza which is totally independent i.e. not embraced or touched (through context) by any other stanza. Thus, for him a single verse independent in itself, but taken from a given 'sarga' of a mahākāvya and or such other type of poetry, is not to be designated as 'muktaka'. It is an independent unit, by itself, first and last : "tena svatantratayā pari-samāpta-nirakānksārtham api prabandha madhyavarti na muktakam ity ucyate." muktaksyaiva viśeşanam samskstety ädi. This does not tally with Dandin.
He explains 'sandānitaka' as a unit of two stanzas which give a complete sense : "dvābhyām kriyāsamāptau sandānitakam." Three stanzas forming a unit are 'višeşaka'. "tribhir viśeşakam", and four make for ‘kalāpaka' - 'caturbhiḥ kalāpakam'. 'pañca-prabhṛtibhiḥ kulakam.' - 'Five roll-on stanzas forming a unit make for a kulaka.'
'Paryāyabandha' is that group of stanzas which covers up a topic, such as one which describes for example the spring season (perhaps in Kumāra-sambhava). Locana observes : “iti kriyāsamāptikrtā bhedā dvandvena nirdistāh. aväntara-kriyā samāptāv api vasanta-varṇanā”dir eka-varṇanīyóddeśena pravsttaḥ paryāya-bandhah."
It may be observed that according to Locana, the four types viz. muktaka, sandānitaka, visesaka and kalāpaka are based on 'completion of one activity.' They are therefore mentioned by a dvandva compound. All these four varieties are available in all languages also. We will go to observe that Hemacandra also suggests that these four varieties are seen in all languages i.e. Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramśa with all their sub-varieties.

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Classification of Poetry
815 With 'paryāyabandha' are enumerated those types which are formed due to coming together of many sentences and therefore whose canvas is broader or larger. As noted above subordinate activities are led to completion and not just one activity as in the first four types. But all these activities have one goal such as, say the description of the spring season.
'Parikathā' is explained as : evam dharmā"di-puruśārtham uddiśya prakāravaicitryena ananta-vrttānta-varnana-prakārā-parikathā. Thus, parikathā is one in which one of the four chief pursuits of life such as dharma, artha, kāma and mokşa, is picked up and through prakāra vaicitrya i.e. variety in beautiful expression, a number of stories are glued together.
Khandakathā is narration of one part of a kathā, and it is termed khanda-kāvya as well. We will go to see that the Sāhityadarpanas defines khanda-kāvya as that which imitates one part of the kävya. Sakalakathā contains the description of many themes all of which extend upto the 'phala' i.e. the final objective or motivation. In the vṛtti both khanda-kathā and sakala-kathā are related through a dvandva compound. This is to suggest that these two sub-varieties were prevelant in Prakrit only, observes Abhinavagupta. Prior to these all the types that are enumerated beginning with muktaka, have no restriction to any particular language. .
Sargabandha, observes Locana, is of the form of a mahā-kävya; has one puruśārtha or pursuit of life as its phala or motivation, is only in Sanskrit and is - a big composition having for its description the whole theme i.e. the canvas covers the whole life as such
The type that is to be represented on the stage includes ten types of drama - daśa-rūpaka such as nātaka, prakarana, etc. It is written in many languages and has sub-varieties such as nātikā,trotaka, rāsaka, prakaranikā, etc. They are termed upa-rūpakas by later theorists. We will go to observe later that there are names as many as eighteen such as nātikā, trotaka, gosthi, sattaka, nātya-rāsaka, prasthāna, ullāpya, kāvva-prenkhana, rāsaka, samlāpaka, srī-gadita, silpaka, vilāsikā, durmallikā, prakaranī. halliśa and bhānikā. Viśvanātha discusses these. But some of them seen as early as in Bharata, Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. also, while Hemacandra and also Rāmacandra and Gunacandra discuss them following of course Bhoja. We will look into these later.
The ten types of major plays and all the sub-varieties such as nātikā and the rest are said to be “abhineyartha kävya” i.e. poetry to be enacted or represented on stage through acting. Many languages or dialects are used in these types. Some special characters are expected to speak in a special language or dilect and there are observations concerning these which are discussed in works on dramaturgy.

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816
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Locana talks of two major types of prose compositions such as the ākhyāyikā and katha. The former is arranged in chapters called ucchvāsas and contain verses in vaktra and apara-vaktra metres. The katha has none of these qualifications. The Agnipurāṇa gives five types of prose composition which have khaṇḍakathā, parikatha and kathānikā over and above the two enumerated above. The vṛttikāra Anandavardhana has used a dvandva compound for katha and akhyāyikā, to suggest that both these types are available in prose compositions. The use of 'adi' is to include a variety called 'campu'. The Locana quotes Dandin suggesting the form of Campu mixed with both prose and verse: "gadya-padyamayī kācic campur ity abhidhīyate." We may add that by 'adi' all newer and newer forms of literary writing i.e. kāvya or sahitya that are being practiced even to-day in various languages all over the world could be included. Thus absured theatre and absurd poetry also could be included by 'adi'.
Thus the Dhv. and the Locana name a number of types of major and minor compositions both in prose and verse. All these forms could be primarily subdivided into gadya, padya and abhineya. The types beginning from muktaka to sargabandha fall under padya i.e. verse formation. In these types the five beginning from muktaka to kulaka are not rich in story element (i.e. katha-tattva), or narration. So, types other than these are long narratives-while muktaka and the rest may be taken as śuddha-bhedas. We may arrange these types in a tabular form as under -
kāvya
śuddha (padya) (minor compositions in verse)
muktaka sandānitaka kalāpaka kulaka
prabandha (major) (compositions)
padya
(verse)

abhineya (to be enected)
paryayabandha parikathā khaṇḍakathā sakalakathā
sargabandha rūpakas
uparūpakas
kathā
äkhyāyika
Next to Anandavardhana. We have Bhoja who discusses literary forms in great details.
gadya (prose)

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Classification of Poetry
817 In the third chapter of his śộngāra prakāśa (= sp. pra), after discussing the topic of vākya and prakarana, Bhoja picks up ‘prabandha', which he defines as "vidhinised hávagatihetuḥ mahāvākyam prabandhah.” i.e. Prabandha or a major composition is a ‘mahāvākya' having injunction or negation as its objective. It is said to be three-fold viz. padya i.e. verse, gadya or prose and miśra i.e. a mixture of both verse and prose. Padya or verse is also three-fold viz. aksara-cchahdas - i.e. vedic verses, mātrā-cchandas and gana-cchandas. All these three are again each three-fold such as sama, ardha-sama and visama. Bhoja illustrates all these varieties (pp. 121, Edn. Josyer). He says that all these three types of verse are seen in mahākāvya, itihāsa, śruti, etc.
'gadya' or prose is defined as collection of words not arranged in a metr cchandah pada-santāno gadyam. This is three-fold viz. vrtta-gadhi, cūrnam and utkalikāprāyam. The first one is such which is sprinkled by verse formation-padyagandha-vad vrtta-gandhi. This we had seen in Vamana also. This is again three-fold such as sama-ardhasama-visama-bhedāt. In the same way mātrá-kşara-cchanda also can be traced in vștta-gandhi.
Curņa is explained as : (pp. 122, ibid) : anāviddha-lalita-padam cūrņam - It is that type of prose writing which has words that are not of involved construction and are charming. This again is three-fold viz. one having 'guru' letters to a greater extent i.e. gurubahulam, or laghu-bahulam and miśra having both guru and laghu equally divided.
Utkalikāprāya is : "a-lalitā”viddham” i.e. one having harsh letters and involved construction. This again is three-fold : “lalitáviddha-pada-vākya-bhedāt” i.e. one intercepted by lalita letters or by a-viddha i.e. non-involved pada, or by noninvolved vākya. Bhoja observes that all these varieties of prose are seen in ākhyāyikās, kathās and madhu-mallik, etc. : tad etat trividham ākhyāyikāsu, kathāsu, madhumallikā"dișu drśyante (pp. 122, ibid).
Miśra is defined as-gadya-padya-vyāyogo miśram (pp. 122, ibid). 'Mixed' has both verse and prose in it. It is three-fold such as padya-pradhāna or having a major portion in verse, gadya-pradhāna or having a major portion in prose and tulyarūpa or having both verse and prose in an equally balanced proportion. Padyapradhāna is again three-fold as due to sajātīya (padya), vijātīya (padya) and ubhābhyām (i.e. by both sajātīya and vijātīya padya. The first is seen as in itihāsa, subhāsita and koşa etc. the vijātīya is seen as in prasthāna, setubandhana, vivarana etc., and the third is as in Bharata's ten types or rūpakas.

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818
SAHṚDAYALOKA
gadya-pradhāna is also three-fold like-wise e.g. sajātiya (gadya) as in Pañcatantra, vijātīya as in Kātyāyana's or Pāṇini's prākṛta-lakṣaṇa etc., the third variety is seen as in the speech of mayūra, śuka, mārjāra etc. Tulya-rupa is again three-fold with sajātīya-vijātīya and both types of letters seen therein.
-
In the XIth prakāśa or chapter in the Śr. pra. Bhoja discusses various types of prabandhas or compositions. He gives two basic types of a prabandha or a major composition viz. prekṣya or that which is to be viewed (on the stage) and śravya or that which is to be heard (and read). He observes (pp. 461, ibid): "prabandhas' ca iha dvidhā: prekṣyaḥ, śravyaś ca. tayor abhineyaḥ prekṣyaḥ, i.e. that which is presented through acting is prekṣya. Each of it is of 24-types, the prekṣya is such as nāṭaka, etc. sa ca nāṭakā"dibhedac catur vimsati prakāro bhavati. He enumerates these types of plays such as nāṭakam, prakaraṇam, vyāyogaḥ, ihāmṛgaḥ, samavakāraḥ, ḍimam, utsṛṣṭikānkam, bhāṇam, prahasanam, vithi, and nāțikā, śrīgaditam, durmallikā, prasthānam, kāvyam, bhāṇakam, bhānikā, goṣṭhī, hallīsakam, nartanakam, prekṣaṇakam, natyam, and rāsakam. That which is not to be represented on the stage is 'sravya'. This again is 24-fold such as - ākhyāyikā, upākhyāna, ākhyāna, nidarśana, pravahlikā, mandhullikā, maṇikulyā, kathā, parikathā, khaṇḍa-kathā, upakathā, bṛhat-kathā, campūḥ, parva-bandhaḥ, kāṇdabandhaḥ, sarga-bandhaḥ, āśvāsabandhaḥ, sandhibandhaḥ, avaskandha-bandhaḥ, kavya-śāstram, śāstra-kāvyam, koṣaḥ, samghātaḥ, samhitā, and sahitya-prakāśa.
·
It may be noted that twelve kinds of preksya such as nātaka, prakarana, ihāmrga, vyāyoga, samavakāra, dima, utsṛstikānka, bhāṇa, prahasana, vīthi, and nātikā and sattaka fall under vākyárthábhinaya.
Padárthábhinaya is seen in the other 12 types such as śrīgadita, durmallikā. prasthāna, kāvya, bhāṇaka, bhānikā, gosthī, hallisaka, nartanaka, preksanaka, rāsaka, and natya-rāsaka.
All these each are defined and illustrated with mention of many rare and lost works. But Bhoja had an access to the same. On the first ten types of major preksva rūpakas, Bhoja cites the definitions as given by Bharata. He observes (pp. 465, Vol. II, ibid)

"iti daśarūpakam etad bharatā"cāryanusarato gaditam."

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Classification of Poetry
819
It may be noted that out of the 24 types of sravya i.e. 'an-abhineya' - or that which is not to be presented on the stage 13 types viz. upākhyāna, nidarśana,
vahlikā, manvullika, manikulvā, upakathā, brhatkathā, parvabandha, kandabandha, āśvāsaka-bandha, sandhi-bandha, samhitā and sāhitya-prakāśa - are newly enumerated. The others are known to us through earlier sources. So, we will try to get an idea of these new types of śravya-literature.
'Upākhyāna' is small narrative episode sandwiched between two bigger episodes : This is promoted to illustrate an idea and thereby to instruct somebody. The upākhyānas, sixteen in number as read in the Mahābhārata, narrating the account of Nala, Savitrī, etc. are the illustrations in point. Bhoja observes (pp. 469, Śr. Pra. Vol. II. ibid) -
nala-sāvitrī-sodaśarājópākhyānavat prabandhāntaḥ, anya-prabodhanártham
yad upākhyāti tad-upākhyānam. With reference to the upākhyāna itself, Bhoja describes ākhyāna' and observes that when an artist presents a theme along with acting, recitation and singing, it is said to be ākhyāna or ākhyānaka - (pp. 469, ibid)
“ākhyānaka-samjñām tallabhate yady abhinayan pathan gāyan, granthikaḥ ekaḥ kathayati
govinda-vad avahite sadasi.” The artist is called 'granthika'. This is illustrated by "govindā”khyāna”. In Gujarat the ākhyānas by Kavi Premananda are very famous. Such artists as Shri. Dharmikalāla (the Māna-bharta) keep this tradition alive even to-day. We will go to observe that Hemacandra also draws upon Bhoja in this respect and feeds us information about these rare types. Bhoja mentions as examples of mixed compositions in prose and verse the ākhyānas of Māra (= cupid), Sāmba (= Krsna's son), and Govinda. Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 620, ibid) : “Bhoja's description of this type makes this composition a variety of the Drśya class, involving as it does song and gesture. This is really a form of the Indian theatre. The granthika here is a narrator of the story and an actor and a musician. This is more or less a monologue and survives in the Kathaka dance of the North, in the kathā-kälaksepa of the south and in the Prabandha-Kutta of the Cäkyāras of Kerala.

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820
SAHRDAYĀLOKA There has been much controversy over the nature of the granthika mentioned along with saubhika, by Patañjali. Bhoja's Sr. Pra., elsewhere in the early chapters on grammatical chapters, mentions the Kathaka as the person involved in the expressions "kamsam ghātayati" and "balim bandhayati."
"tathā hi kathakaḥ 'kamsam ghātayati ity ukte kamsa-vadham ācasta iti pratīyate.” (p. 421, Vol. I. Šļ. Pra).
From the words "ākhyānaka-samjñām tat labhate" in Bhoja's definition of the Ākhyāna, one may doubt whether there was such an ākhyāna literature and whether the Ākhyāna was not the Upākhyānas found in epics themselves, sung and interpreted through gesture. But that there existed texts for Akhyāna by Granthikas, separate from and different in respect of form from the text of the upākhyānas in the epics is known from two evidences. Firstly, Bhoja refers to these three ākhyānas of Māra, Sāmba and Govinda as examples of compositions in prose and verse of an equal measure and of a varied nature in an earlier context (p. 232, Vol. I. see under "Akhyānas in the chapter on works and Authors Quoted in the Sr. Pra.). Secondly, the growth of prabandha literature in Kerala would point to the existence of a tradition of a special class of composition for Akhāna exposition.”
This rather long quotation from Dr. Rāghavan exerts to prove 'Ākhāna' literature as a type independent of the Upākhyānas in the epics. We agree to this and in support we refer, once again to our reference cited above, of a poet called Premānanda from Gujarat, famous for his 'Akhyānas', based on Nala-damayantikathā (or upākhyāna) etc., which are even to-day very popular when presented with music, singing, and eloquence by such great artists as Māņa-bhatta Dhārmikalaljee, who provides excellent performance on stage with the help of an empty “māņa” i.e. brass pot, with his figers with rings playing upon it.
'Nidarśana' - is defined by Bhoja (śr. Pra. XI, pp. 469, ibid) - as “niścīyate tiraścām a-tiraścām vā yatra cestābhiḥ, kāryam a-kāryam vā tannidarśanam pañcatantra"di.”
Pañcatantra and such other compositions are illustrations of nidarśana, wherein through activities of birds or other (i.e. animals, etc.), right activity or wrong one is decided. Thus, nidarśana is also a story but with a didactic purpose. It is a fable, an allegory or a parable. It may be noted however, that all nidarśanas are not animal stories. Persons who can be cited as examples of greatness are also created and described in nidarśanas to serve as models for teaching what is good or bad. Bhoja observes :

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Classification of Poetry
821 "dhūrta-vița-kuttanīmatamayūra-mārjārikā”di yalloke kāryákārya-nirūpaņa-rūpam
iha nidarśanam tad api.” Thus, Dhūrta-vita-samvāda, Kuttanīmata and also stories of a cat or a peacock etc. are also illustrations of nidarśana. Bhoja had mentioned examples of Pañcatantra, Mayūra, Mārjāra and Suka on an earlier occasion while illustrating mixed compositions in verse and prose. Dr. Raghavan suggests that here 'suka' may refer to 'śuka-saptati'. (pp. 620, ibid). Pravahlikā is explained by Bhoja (pp. 439, ibid) as,
"yatra dvayor vivāda(h), pradhānam adhikrtya, jāyate sadasi, sárdha-prākrta-racita
pravahlika-cețaka-prabhști." Bhoja is the first to point out this variety of śravya-kāvya. The illustration cited is “cețaka”, etc. It is supposed to be written partly in prākta : “sárdha-prākrtaracita.” It is perhaps a eulogy on a king or some other hero. This is done by a device of a discussion between two persons in an assembly - "sadasi; dvayor vivādah" and - is with reference to a principal character - 'pradhānam adhikrtya'. Hemacandra also refers to this variety: T a. Ch. III describes this type as a composition mixed with prose and verse and thus it seems to come closer to 'Camp Raghavan remarks, (pp. 621, ibid) - "The pravahlikā has a history going upto Vedic times; certain verses in the Atharva Veda (XX. 133) are given the name Pravahlikā in Aitareya (vi. 33), and Kausitakī, (* * * 7) Brahmaņas; see also śānkh. Śr. Sūtra, XII. 22; Khila V. 16. The Brhaddevatā (I. 35) gives it as the name of one class of mantras; and in these places, Pravahlikā has been taken as a riddle. (ft. n. see vedic Index, II. p. 40).” Dr. Raghavan has given some more interesting information in this context (pp. 622, 623, ibid) which could be read in his work. Manthulli [kā] : Bhoja observes - (pp. 469, ibid) :
ksudra-kathā manthullī yā iha mahārāștrabhāṣayā bhavati, gorocanena kāryā sā anangavatīva vā kavibhih.”

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822
SAHRDAYĀLOKA Then, he further observes :
yasyām upahāsaḥ syāt purohitámātya-tāpasā"dīnām, prārabdha-a-nirvāhe
sápi hi manthullikā bhavati." We will go to see that Hemacandra reads 'Matallikā'. In the quotations cited as above, Bhoja seems to record two different concepts of Manthulli, current in literary criticism. According to one view, it is a short story written in Mahārāśtri Prakrta and illustrations cited are 'Gorocanā' and 'Anangavati', now, only names to us. The second view regards Manthullikā to be a type with 'hāsya' or laughter as the dominant sentiment. In this the purohitas or (royal) dharma-gurus, amātyas or ministers, tāpasas or ascetics are made a butt of laughter as they do not complete an act they have started i.e. for, "prārabdha a-nirvāha." Bhoja does not cite any illustration for this, but the Śr. Pra. Vol. I. pp. 122 also refers to this as : "tad etad (gadyam) trividham api ākhyāyikāsu, kathāsu, madhụ-mallikādiņu (=. mattamallikāsu) dịśyate. We will go to see that Sāradātanaya takes this type as identical with an upa-rūpaka called 'durmallikā’. He actually places the verses of Bhoja concerning Manthulli under durmallikā. Maņikulyā is defined by Bhoja as :
“manikulyāyām jalam iva na laksyate yatra pūrvato vastu, paścāt prakāśate,
sā maņikulyā, matsya-hasitā’di.” So, this is a type in which actually the story or theme is not clear in the beginning but comes to light at a later stage as in “Matsya-hasita”. Actually no independent work under this title is known to the world of scholars, but in verses 16-28, in Lambhaka I, taranga V, of the Kathä-sarit-sāgara, there is a story at subordinate level which is termed "Matsya-hasita". The Sukasaptati has a longer story of the same motif of the laughter of the dead fish.
Parikathā, as seen above, was mentioned by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. The Locana's concept is placed by us as above. But Bhoja defines it as :

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823 “paryāyeņa bahūnām yatra pratiyoginām, kathākušalaiḥ, . śrüyante sūdravaj
jigīşubhiḥ parikathā sā tu.” (pp. 469, ibid) For Bhoja also this type is a series of stories told by expert story-tellers to overcome one another (in the art of story-telling). The illustration is "Sūdraka”. For Bhoja “paryāya' means “one by one”.
Bhoja is of the opinion that expert story-tellers vie with one another in narration of a story, each. Abhinavagupta says that on a given theme, one of the puruśārthas is narrated in parikathā, in diverse manner. ‘kathā' for Bhoja is :
"ya niyamita-gati-bhāṣā divyá-divyóbhayeti-vșttavatī, kādambariva lilāvativa
vā, sā kathā kathitā.” (pp. 469, ibid) The description of kathā almost follows Dandin. For Bhoja 'kathā' is having its 'gati' and 'bhāsā' fixed. This means that it is either in prose or verse and the language could be any. The character of either a divine or a-divya i.e. mortal is portrayed. Kādambari is an illustration of katha in Sanskrit and Lilāvati is one in Prakrta. As for Parikathā Bhoja does not suggest any particular language while Abhinavagupta also does not insist on any one language. Ratneśvara, on Sarasvatīkanthā”bharana (II. 6) notes that both khanda-kathā and Parikathā are necessarily in Prākta, and this could be Bhoja's idea also as in the XXVIIIth chapter of the Śr. Pra., the illustration cited from Śūdraka-kathā is, in prākrta.
'Khandakathā' is a short episode from a bigger work, as illustrated by 'Indumatī. Thus for Bhoja it is a portion of a story picked up from either the middle or the end portion of another larger work. Bhoja is not insistent on any particular language here. But for Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Ratneśvara khandakathā is in Prakrta only. Anandavardhana wants it to be in verse only, like sakalakathā. Bhoja does not allude to sakalakathā. 'Upakathā' for Bhoja is -
"yatrā”śritya kathántaram ati-prasiddham, nibadhyate kavibhiḥ,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA caritam vicitram anyat
sópakathā, citralekhā”di.” (pp. 469, ibid) When a poet portrays a beautiful character based on a very famous another kathā we get 'upakathā'. The illustration is "Citralekhā”. It is not clear whether Citralekhā is a separate composition or a chapter or a section of another work, notes Dr. Raghavan. But the way Bhoja has drafted the definition of upakathā, we carry an impression that it is supposed to be an independent type concentrating just on a sigle character portrayed in a famous larger work. This type seems to come closer to 'upākhyāna' as seen in the Mahābhārata.
Brhatkathā for Bhoja is an independent type of literature but both Bhāmaha and Dandin take it as identical with 'katha' only. For Bhoja Brhatkathā is divided into 'lambhas', has for its theme something extraordinary and is written in Paisāchi. The theme is on a very broad canvas. (mahā-visaya) :
"lambhánkitā'dbhutárthā piśāca-bhāṣāmayi mahā-visayā, naravāhanadattā"descaritam iva
bịhatkathā bhavati." (pp. 470, ibid) Bhoja seems to accept "adbhutártha", a feature from Dandin I. 38. Dandin names the chapters either as lambha or ucсhvāsa, but Bhoja has only "lambha”. 'Campū.' is defined by Bhoja as,
"ākhyāyikaiva sānkā socchvāsā divya-gadya-padya-mayi, sā, damayanti vāsavadatā”di
iha ucyate campūh.” Campū is in prose and verse and is the same as i.e. is like ākhyāyikā. Thus campū also has divisions into ucchvāsas and is having an ‘anka' or 'mark'. Perhaps this is like the 'śrī - mark in Māgha. Hemacandra supports this explanation : (pp. 366, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. Pub. L. D. Inst. of Indology, Jun. 2000) - gadyapadyamayi sáňkā sócchvāsā campūḥ. (Kā. śā. VIII. 9) : samskrtābhyām gadyapadyābhyām racitā, abhiprāyeņa yāny ankāni sva-nāmnā para-nāmnā vā kavih karoti, tair yuktā, ucсhvāsa-nibaddhā campūḥ.
yathā vāsavadattā, damayanti vā. Hemacandra also offers the same illustrations as Bhoja. Obviously he is under Bhoja's influence.

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825
Parva-bandha, for Bhoja is a very major work and is illustrated by the great Mahābhārata having divisions designated as 'parvans'. In such a work the topics of history are vowen in verse and in Sanskrit :
"yasmin itihāsárthās' cchandobhis samskstena badhyante, bahavaḥ, parvabandho bhavati,
mahābhārata-prabhștih.” It may be noted that literary critics call the Mahābhārata an 'itihāsa', but the Mahābhārata itself says that it is a kāvya. It contains a great number of stories.
“Kānda-bandha' - is for Bhoja, one which is divided into kāndas, and is a major work in verse. The illustration is the Rāmāyana. Actually Bhoja has given three independent types for three major works such as Brhatkathā, Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana. Bhoja observes :
“yatrétihāsam akhilam yathāsthitam caikam eva bhāsante, rsayas sa kāņda-bandho
Rāmāyaṇa-sannibho bhavati.” Dr. Raghavan (pp. 627, ibid) observes :
“Before taking leave of the kathā-varieties, we may take note of the information on this topic found in Jain works. The Jain writers mention quite a large number of kathās : the Vasudevahindī broadly classifies kathā into historical (carita) and the imaginative (kalpita) and each again as dealing in main either with a man or a woman (Lambha X, pp. 208-9, Bhavanagar, Edn.). The Kuvalayamālā of Uddyotanasūri classifies kathās by the Puruşárthas, Dharmakathā, Arthakathā, and sankīrna, giving each some sub-varieties; besides these, Uddyotana speaks of a fivefold classification, in which besides the Sakalakathā and Khandakathā met with elsewhere, we find three new classes, Ullāpakathā, Parihāsa-kathā and Varakathā, and calls his own work a Sańkirna-kathā combining features of all these. The Līlāvati which is a prāksta kathā in verse, gives a two-fold classification, on the basis of the characters being divine, human or mixed (Divya, Manusa, Divya Mānusa), and of the language, samsksta, Prāksta and Sankīrṇa (gāthā, 35, 36). In his Samarāditya kathā, Haribhadra mentions the classifications found in the Kuvalayamālā and Lītāvatī, and in the Niryukri on the Daśavaikālika (III. 194 ff), besides the Puruśártha varieties noted above a type called Vikathā is mentioned. (ft. n. 1, see A. N. Upadhye, Līlāvatī, Singhi, Jain Series, Notes, p. 328)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA We have to note here one point : While illustrating these three classes, the Brhatkathā, the Parvabandha and the Kāndabandha, Bhoja says : 'Story like that of Naravāhanadatta and others', 'Mahābhārata and the like', and 'Compositions like the Ramayana'. - "naravāhanadattā"deh caritam iva bịhatkathā", "mahābhārataprabhrti", and "rāmāyana-sannibho bhavati." From this we have to suppose that Bhoja had in mind other Brhatkathās, other Bhārata-like-works and other Rāmāyaṇas or Rāmāyaṇa-like works. He might have meant that such other works existed or that they are possible, or, as it is most likely, might have used the words 'iva', 'prabhști', 'sannibha', conventionally and for the sake of uniformity."
· No., Bhoja did mean works like the Rāmāyaṇa etc., for we know about the Jain Version of the Rāmāyana for sure, through the efforts of Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, our guru. Being closer to Gujarat, Bhoja must have been conversant with such
orks hardly depicted any originality in the field of poetry, they being mostly unimpressive imitations of the famous works of Vyāsa or Vālmīki, or any writer of eminence.
"Sargabandha' is not defined here by Bhoja, as perhaps it is a famous type. But he says :
“yasminn itihāsárthān apeśalān peśalān kaviḥ kurute, sa hayagrīvavadhā"di-prabandha
iva, sargabandhaḥ syāt.” Wherein historical theme which is not beautiful, is rendered as if beautiful by poets, such is a sarga-bandha as is hayagrīva-vadha and such other works. Elsewhere Bhoja has defined this type, the sargabandha or a mahākāvya in a like fashion as Dandin (pp. 480, ibid, Śr. Pra. XI. (End. portion)
Āśvāsaka-bandha is, according to Bhoja, a prākṣta composition in verse such as 'Setubandha' etc. Dandin calls this 'skandhaka-bandha', because the metre employed is the mātrā-cchanda such as “skandhaka”. Bhoja says:
"yaḥ sargabandhatulyo nibadhyate prākstena śuddhena, āśvāsaka-bandho'sau
vijñeyaḥ setubandhā"diḥ." Bhoja, for certain, had a vast literature in Sanskrit. Prakrita and Apa before him.

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827 Sandhi-bandha, for Bhoja is also a prāksta mahākāvya. It is in apabhramsa language and mātrācchanda verses. Divisions in 'Sandhi-bandha' are termed Sandhis and Bhoja cites 'Abdhimathana' as its illustration :
"yo'pabhramśa-nibandho mātrā-cchandobhir, abhimato'lpadhiyām, vācyas sa sandhibandhas'
caturmukhóktábdhimathanā”di.” . Men of light intellegence relish this. The last line is not clear. Could it be "caturmukhokto ?” - i.e. it is said to be having four facets i.e. the four sárthas as its goal ? - As read in the present text - "caturmukhóktā’bdhi. etc, perhaps is meant to be "abdhi-mathana, as spoken (or written) by (some) caturmukha (or Brahma himself ?) Avaskandhaka-bandha is,
"ya iha dvicārikāvāg grāmyagirā giyate, gabhīróktah, sóvaskandhaka-bandhaḥ
abhidhīyate bhīmakāvyā”di.” (pp. 470, ibid) This is a major verse composition in a low variety of apabhramsa, i.e. grāmya variety. The divisions are termed avaskandhakas and 'Bhimakāvya' is an illustration. The reading "bhima-kāyā"di" seems to be faulty. Hemacandra has : "grāmyā’pabhramsa-bhāsā-nibaddhá- vaskandhabandham (bhīma-kāvyā"di).
This is read in the Kā. Šā., pp. 461, Edn. Parikh & Kulkarni, '64, Bombay. Kāvyaśāstra is defined by Bhoja (pp. 470, ibid) - as
"yatrárthaḥ śāstrāņām kāvye viniveśyate mahākavibhiḥ, tad bharți-kāvya-mudrārākṣasavat
kävyaśāstram syāt.” When the theme of various disciplines is presented in poetry by great poets as e.g. bhatřikāvya, or mudrārāksasa, it is termed kāvya-śāstram.
Bhoja gives two illustrations, one each from padya and nāšaka. Thus, this variety is wide enough to touch both śravya and preksya types.
śāstra kāvya is defined by Bhoja as -

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "śāstram yatra kavīnām rahasyam upakalpayanty analpa-dhiyaḥ, tad rati-vilāsa-kāmandakīyavac
chāstrakāvyam tu.” (pp. 470, ibid) When discourses of śāstra or discipline are presented through poetry, we get śāstra-kāvya, kamandakiya niti-śāstra and Rativilāsa which is lost to us for the present, are illustrations of this type. Technical subject presented through poetry makes for śāstra-kävya. Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 626, ibid)
"Under the sabdálamkāra Adhyāya, Bhoja mentions Six Varieties one of which is Kāvya-Šāstra, 'śāstre kāvya-viniveśaḥ kāvya-śāstram? Kāvya-śāstra in that place is the śāstra-kavya mentioned here. See S.K.A. pp. 260. Other varieties mentioned there are śāstra, which is the kāvya śāstra (e.g. Bhatřikāvya) here mentioned, itihāsa, kāvyétihāsa, and śāstrétihāsa."
We feel that Bhoja wants to underline that kāvya-śāstra and śāstra-kāvya are different from each other. In the former the theme of śāstra is covered in Kävya, in the latter śāstra itself is presented as kāvya. If we find beautiful poetry in the upanişads, or the Bhagavad geetā, they illustrate śāstra-kāvya. We feel some of the kārikās in the Dhv. such as Dhv. IV. 4.
"drstapūrvā api hy arthāḥ kāvye rasa-parigrahāt, sarve navā ivā”bhānti madhumāsa iva drumāh." and, Dhv. IV. 10, "vācaspati-sahasrāņām sahasrair api yatnataḥ nibaddhā sā ksayam naiti
prakrtir jagatām iva." could be taken as illustrations of Kāvya-śāstra while the famous verse quoted also in the Dhv., from the Bhagavad Geetā viz.
"yā niśā sarvabhūtānām..." etc. could be taken as illustration of śāstra-kavya. Actually the description of Aśvattha tree, or say, most part of the B.G. is śāstra in the garb of poetry.

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829 Rājasekhara has also talked about a śāstra-kavi who is 'of three types such as : tatra tridhā śāstra-kavih. yaḥ śāstram vidhatte, yaśca śāstre kāvyam samvidhatte, yo'pi kävye śāstrátham vidhatte.” We can illustrate these. The first is one down śāstra and yet his style is such which may earn him the title of a poet. Thus, Sankara's śārīraka-mīmāmsā-bhāsya is a lyrical gem by itself. So is Sabara's prose. Anandavardhana, Kuntaka, Mahimā and Hemacandra also write beautiful prose. They are all writing a śāstra. Thus, they are śāstra-kavis. The second variety is illustrated by poetic passages as read in the Bhagavad-geetā or the upanişads. The third type is illustrated as in Bhatřikāvya, or Dvyāśraya-kāvyas of Hemacandra.
Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 629, ibid) - “Bhoja has defined prabandha or kāvya of all kinds as vidhi-nisedha-vyutpadaka, from the point of view of vyutpatti. And Mahimabhatta expressly says that, from this point of view, kāvya also is śāstra. Hence all Kavya is sastra; the conception is a very old one that the kävya coats with sugar the ideas of sastra. Cf. Bhāmaha - V. 3:
“svādu-kāvya-rasónmiśram śāstramapy upabhuñjate, prathamā”līdha-madhavaḥ
pibanti kațu bhesajam." Kośa for Bhoja is (pp. 470, ibid) -
“kośa iva yas subhāṣitaratna-samūhā”tmakaḥ samuddhriyate, mahataḥ kāvyámbhodheḥ
sa kośa iva sapta-satikā"di." Dandin (I. 13) also refers to this type. For Bhoja it is a selection and collection of best verses from a whole literature. It is like collecting subhāṣita-ratnas and
aking a samūha of it; e.g. 'sapta-śatikā' or 'gāthā-sapta-śati', of Hāla. Taruņavācaspati on Dandin (I. 13) explains it as selections made from different authors -
"kośo nānākartýka-subhāṣita-ratna-samudāyaḥ.” But Vādijanghāla, yet another commentator on Dandin takes it to be a string or collection of stories too, besides ideas : kośo'pyaneka-bhinnártha-kathā-grathitaḥ kathā-kośah; krsnasārah, tārāgana iti.” - Dandin also talks of samghāta (I. 13), which for Taruņavācaspati is a singleauthor-creation having theme of varied nature. Prabhā (pp. 15, ibid) gives different opinions which may be read there.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'Samghāta' is defined by Bhoja as,
eka-praghattake yastv eka-ksto bhavati sūkti-samudāyaḥ, samghātas sa nigaditaḥ
vặndāvana-meghadūtā”di. For Bhoja also, samghāta is one-man-creation, having theme of varied nature. He cites 'vrndāvana' or 'meghadūta' as illustrations. Dandin (I. 13) also mentions samghāta. Taruna-vācaspati explains that its subject matter is one continuous theme (ekártha) and the author is one. Bhoja has the same characteristics with illustrations cited as above. Vādijanghāla gives the Meghadūta and Sūrya-śataka as illustrations. Thus śātaka-literature seems to be covered, under the title of samghāta
We agree with Dr. Raghavan when he observes that how a poem like Meghadūta can be called a samghāta is not understandable. If it is a mere description of the cloud, Dr. Raghavan observes, we can understand it being called a samghāta. Tarunavācaspati seems to be correct when he illustrates the samghāta by two collections, the Śarat-samghāta and the Dramida-samghāta. The latter perhaps refers to the collections in which early Tamil literature is preserved. 'Samhita' (pp. 470, ibid) is defined by Bhoja as,
"yasyām sandhīyante manīșibhir viprakīrņa-vșttāntāḥ, sā samhiteti gadita
yaduvamsa-dilīpa-vamśādi.” It is a type in which accounts scattered in different sources are placed together. The illustrations cited by Bhoja viz. Yaduvamsa and Dilīpa-vamsa are lost to us for the present. This type seems to be closer to a mahākāvya.
'Sāhityaprakāśa' is a type illustrated by śrngāra-prakāśa, wherein all vidyāsthānas i.e.-sources of learning are covered up in a single work :
"yasminn aśeșa-vidyāsthānárthavibhūtayaḥ prakāśante samhrtya, sa sāhityaprakāśa etādęśo bhavati."

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831 All branches of knowledge are brought together in this type, under a single banner, the illustration being Bhoja's own Śr. Pra. Bhoja observes (pp. 470) :etasmin śrngāra-prakāśe suprakāśam eva. aśesa-śāstrártha-sampad upanişadām akhila-kalā-kāvyaucitya-kalpanā-rahasyānām ca sanniveśo dịśyate."
Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 630, ibid): “In a way it can be said that Bhoja's claims are not vain. He has spoken of the tenets of every system of thought in this 'magnam opus' of his. This can be realised fully by turning to the chapter in this thesis on Bhoja's śāstraic Discussions and Bhoja and the Šāstrakāras.”
Dr. Raghavan further observes (pp. 630, ibid) : “Bhoja could have easily multiplied the number of śāstra-kāvya varieties, had he not bound himself to the number 24, to be in symmetry with the twentyfour Drśya varieties. We do not find the osara Apabhramśa Kavya found in Dandin I. 37. Dandin I. 37 is quoted by Bhoja at the end of the chapter, but the third quarter of the verse - "Osarādir
ah" is changed to by him into "avaskandhāvya (dya) pabhrambah” (p. 449, Vol. II. Sr. Pra. = here. pp. 480, Josyer). We do not know whether Dandin's Osara and Bhoja's avaskandha-bandha are identical, Osara referring to the metre, (ft. n. - pp. 630 Raghavan : Osara is taken by Tarunavācaspati as the name of this type of composition in Apabhramsa.) and Avaskandha to the chapter-division. He omits the Anibaddha in this context; we do not meet here with the Muktaka, Sandānitaka, Visesaka and Kulaka. But he mentions them in chapter VIII under the . head 'ekárthibhāva'. Here he mentions the Muktaka or the single verse with a unity, the Yugalaka which is a unit in two verses, the Sandānitaka in three verses and the Kulaka in five or more (p. 142, Vol. II. Śr. Pra.). (= p. 303, Edn. Josyer, Vol. I. Śr. Pra). Here Bhoja mentions also the Samghāta which is a collection on a single theme and the Kośa which is a collection of verses on various themes. Wekapraghatakópanibandhānām subhāṣitānām samūhaḥ samghātaḥ. anekapraghattakópanibaddhānām tu kośah." - Bhoja also omits the Kalāśraya-kāvya mentioned by Bhāmaha in I. 17. It is unnecessary for Bhoja to include here, his own theoretical treatise Śr. Pra., for he is dealing here with varieties of poetic composition. TI
is not a kāvya. He is considering here varieties of Laksya and not with Lakṣaṇa. Śr. Pra. is a Laksana. Šāstra-Kāvya, though Laksaņa, partakes of the nature of laksya, and hence can be included here. But works like the Śr. Pra. have no place here. If it is to be included, Bhoja might well have included here other types of śāstra-granthas like sūtra, vrtti, Bhāsya, Vārtika, Pañcikā, Samīksā, Tikä, etc. which Rajasekhara mentions and defines in his K.M. I. ii. p. 5.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA At the end of the XIIth Chapter of śr. Pra., Bhoja gives some Anustubhs, in which he makes some general remarks on all these compositions, mentioning the number of Samdhis in each of them. (pp. 448-449, Vol. II; here pp. 480, Vol. II, Josyer)." Uparūpakas :
We will now consider Bhoja's treatment of 'preksya' or 'abhineya' types under which are placed rūpakas - and Uparūpakas. Ten types of rūpakas, beginning with nāšaka and ending with vīthi, are defined after Bharata's Nātya-śāstra. Bhoja observes : (pp. 461, Vol. II, Josyer) : prabandhaś ca iha dvidhā : preksyaḥ śravyaś ca. tayor abhineyaḥ preksyah, sa ca nātakā"dibhedāt caturviņsati-prakāro bhavati. natakam, prakaraṇam, vyāyogah, īhāmrgaḥ, samavakārah, dimam, utsrstikānkam bhānam, prahasanam, vīthi; - nātikā, sattakah, śrīgaditam, durmillikā, prasthānam, kāvyam, bhāņakam, bhānikā, gosthi, hallīsakam, nartanakam, prekșanakam, nātyam, rāsakam iti." Out of these the first 12 types are kinds of vākyárthábhinaya and the other twelve from śrigadita to rāsaka are kinds of padárthábhinaya. Nāțaka is defined by Bhoja as (pp. 461, ibid) :
"prakhyātavastu-visayam prakhyātódātta-nāyakam caiva, rājarși-carita-vamśānucaritadivyā”śrayópetam. sarvābhir-bhāsābhiḥ samanvitam gadya-padya-miśrābhiḥ, sarvaiścálamkārair laksana-sat-trimsatā ca samyuktam. (pp. 462, ibid) nānā-vibhūti-samyuktam rddhi-vilāsā”dibhir-guņair yuktam, anka-praveśakā”dhyam rūpakam iha nātakam nāma. nțupatīnām yac caritam nānā-rasa-bhāva-sammiśram bahudhā sukha-duḥkhótpattikstam vācyam tannāțake bhavati... etc. etc.

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833 It may be noted here that the preksya varieties are first given by Bharata, so far as available documents are concerned. Normally Bharata is followed by all, including Bhoja. We have Abhinavabhārats on the Nātya-śāstra, and then Dhananjaya's Dasarūpaka (974-995 A.D.), and the Kavyanuśāsana of Hemacandra (11th Cen. A.d.) which gives ten types of rūpakas following Bharata exactly and then Hemacandra and following him Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, the authors of the Natyadarpana give us some uparūpakas also which are found in Bhoja also. After this we have Sārdadātanaya (1175-1250 A.D.), Vidyānātha, Singabhūpāla, Viśvanātha and Sāgaranandin (13th Cen. A.D.). They all follow Bharata.
So, the ten principal types of drama, the daśa-rupaka have their characteristics laid down by Bharata and followed by all dramaturgists later without any shift in the basic approach. We therefore will not pick up here any discussion regarding these ten principal types of drama but we will draw the attention of scholars to the fact that when Bharata in centuries prior to Christ or parallel to Christ, churns out theory followed so religiously by later theorists, one thing emerges for certain that there must have been a vast store-house of dramatic literature covering the entire span of life both in its success and failures, merits and demerits, victories and defeats, loys and sorrows, love and hatred and what not. The ten varieties taken together present theme that covers everything presentable and worthy of imitation for world solidarity and also that which is to be avoided for fear of fall. Actually as Bharata states in his earlier chapters, the nātya i.e. the dramatic art is the medium to represent entire existence : trailokyasyā'sya sarvasya nātyam bhāvanukīrtanam." Abhinavagupta elaborates on what is exactly meant by 'anukīrtana' which is not bare imitation, but artful re-creation. Beyond these types, and the technical discussion concerning the selection of the theme, the presentation through scenes, situations and acts, etc. Bharata has also mentioned 'nātikā' taken as an 'uparūpaka'.
There were other varieties of such 'uparūpakas' also not taken care of by Bharata but handed over to later theorists by unknown sources of both dramaturgy and actual practice. Some of them are discussed by Bhoja, Hemacandra Śāradātanaya. Sāgārnandin and Visvanātha. It may be noted at the outset that Bhoja calls them 'preksya' which is abhineya': The idea is that these varieties are
ms of "performing art" in general. They need not be just drama' where an artist plays the role of a given character. There are certain art-forms, we may call them folk-art-forms popular even to-day in say, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya-pradesh, Bengal, Orissa and different parts of India which owe their origin to these 'preksya' minor varieties of performance which go generally under the name of upa-rupakas. We will discuss the nature of these as seen in Bhoja,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Hemacandra and the rest, leaving aside the major ten types of rūpakas with all their characteristics and technicalities, structure-analysis, etc.
Bhoja enumerates in such a category, such art-forms as : nātikā, sattakah, śrīgaditam, durmallikä, prasthānam, kāvyam. bhānakam, bhānikā, gosthi, hallīsakam, nartanakam, preksanakam, nātyam, and rāsakam. We will take care of some other art-forms if seen in Hemacnadra and the rest. So, we begin with these fourteen first as imagined by Bhoja.
Natikā - For Bhoja Nātikā is a mixture of both prakarana and nātaka. He is satisfied with one such mixed variety while the Nātyadarpana has “prakarani" also, over and above nāţikā. Bhoja observes. (pp. 465, ibid) -
sarva-rasa-laksaņā”dhyā samanvitángair iyam trayodaśabhiḥ, prathamóttama-madhyamābhir yuktaḥ, syāt prakrtibhis tisębhiḥ. iti daśarūpakam etad bharatā"cāryánusārato gaditam, prakarana-nāțakabhedo
rūpakam iha nātikā bhavati.” Bhoja goes on to define näţika (pp. 466, Vol. II. Josyer, ibid) - as follows:
“strīprāyā caturankā lalitábhinayā”tmikāsu vihitángī, bahu-gita-nstya-vādyā rati-sambhogā”tmikā caiva, rājópacāra-yuktā, śộngārábhinaya-bhāva-samyuktā nāyaka-devi-parijana-samanvitā nāțaka-prakrtiḥ, prakarana-samudbhavā punar utpădyam vastu, nāyakam nộpatim.
antahpura-sangītaka-kanyām adhikrtya kartavyā.” The N.S. XVIII. 110, D.R. III, M.M. (= Mandāra-maranda pp. 73, B.P. (= Bhāvaprakāśana) p. 247, N.D. (= Nātyadarpana) p. 120, S.D. (= Sāhitya-darpana) 269272; R.S. (= Rasārnava Sudhākara) III; N.L.R.K. (= Nātaka-laksana-ratna-kośa) 2745, and of course Hemacandra (Kā. Sā. VIII. 49, pp. 354, Edn. Nandi) - define Nātikā.

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835 It is one of the most popular forms of minor plays. It has a number of female characters. The hero is necessarily a king of the dhīra-lalita type. The motif of the action is love and acquision of kingdom. The chief interest centres round the element of marvel, the means and ends connected with the same are peculiar and strange. The plot is not of historical nature but is invented, and is spread ove stages of action. The result is that nātikā has only four junctures with the omission of vimarśa sandhi. Kaiśiki-vrtti is predominant. The hero has connection with more than one spouse. The queen is an impressive character having a sway over her lord. In all other respects the Nātikā closely resembles the nātaka.
Before we proceed with other forms of upa-rūpakas, we will look into the history of these art-forms as given by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 535 etc. ibid). Dr. Raghavan observes that the derivative types of drama, including nātikā, were increasing and the next stage of codification was reached in Kohala's work, which is lost for us now, but to which Abhinavagupta often refers. Perhaps next to Bharata, Kohala was the greatest writer on dramaturgy. Actually in the Kāśi. Edn., at XXXVI. 65, it is stated in the N.S. by Bharata, that the rest of the subjects would be dealt with by Kohala in his Uttaratantra:
"sesam uttaratantrena
kohalaḥ kathayisyati.” We do not find this verse in the critical edn. G.O.S. Vadodara, which in XXVII24 mentions Kohala. Dr. Unni's edn recently published also does not contain the above quoted reference but he has covered the 37th Ch. of the G.O.S. Edn. in the 36th extended Ch. only and we have the same reference to Kohala in Unni's Edn. Ch. XXXVI - verse 74.
But Dr. Raghavan has accepted Kāśi Edn. reading, and observes (pp. 536) that Bharata's work represents something like pūrva-tantra and that Kohala's work supplements it. But on the face of it this sounds improbable because how can we have a reference to 'Uttaratantra' in a pūrvatantra ? It is clear that Bharata's text has incorporated parts of earlier and later works. Dr. Raghavan himself suggests that till we unearth the valuable work of Kohala, we cannot decide the extent of accretion into Bharata's text from Kohala.
Dr. Raghavan further observes that in Bharata we have the ten rūpakas and the Nātikā. But by the time of Kohala's codification, we find that many minor varieties came into being. Kohala was the first to codify and describe these new types of dramas and dramatic presentations. This, Dr. Raghavan says, is proved by Abhinavagupta's statement -

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA "ukta-vyākhyāne tu kohalā”di-lakṣita-toțaka-satpaka-rāsakā”di-samgrahah.” (p. 441, Vol. II. A.bh. Mad. Ms.). A.bh. Vol. I. G.O.S. pp. 173, line 3 quoted by Dr. Raghavan also says : “kohalas tu bravīti..." etc. But p. 410, G.O.S. Edn. Vol. II. A.bh. also observes : tesām param kohalādibhir nāma-mātram pranītam." This means Kohala simply enumerated these varieties and did not discuss in full. We do not know also what is meant by 'ādi' in A.bh.'s expression “kohalādi'. Dr. Raghavan suggests that the earliest work now known which mentions some of the uparūpaka types is the Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana which mentions Hallisaka, and Natya-rāsaka. - II. 10. śl. 25, pp. 175, Chowk. Edn. :
"hallisaka-krīdanakaiḥ
gāyanair nātya-rāsakai).” The Kamasutra of Vātsyāyana (which is later than Bharata) also mentions Preksanaka. This may mean drama or dance in general or a special type of uparūpaka, as described by Bhoja later.
It is for the first time at A.bh. Vol. I. G.O.S. pp. 183. N.S. Ch.-IV. that we come across anustubh verses describing some uparūpakas with the words "tad uktam cirantanaih", but of course we have no knowledge as to who these ancients were. (Actually the verses are on pp. 183, in the second revised edition.) The verses read as :
cchannánurāga-garbhābhir uktibhir yatra bhūpateh āvarjyate manaḥ sā tu, masțnā dombikā matā : nțsimha-sūkarā"dīnām varnanā jalpayed yataḥ, nartaki tena bhāṇaḥ syād uddhatárga-pravartitaḥ; gajā”dīnām gatim tulyām krtvā pravasanam tathā, alpā”viddham su-masrņam tat-prasthānam vịttam ucyate, masļņam ca kvacid-dhūrta-caritam șidgakas tu saḥ. bālakrīdāniyuddhā"di tathā sūkara-simhajā dhvajādinā kştā krīļā yatra să bhāņikā matā. hāsya-prāyam preranam tu syāt prahelikayā’nvitam, rțuvarnana-samyuktam rāmākrīdam tu bhāsyate. maņdalena tu yannșttam hallīsakam iti smrtam, ekas tatra tu netā syād-gopaśrīņām yathā hari).” aneka-nartakīyojyam citra-tāla-layánvitam ā-catussaști-yugalās rāsakam masļņóddhatam."

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837
Dr. Raghavan observes that whether these verses are from Kohala or not we do not know. Śri Harṣa's Värttika on N.S. must have dealt with upa-rupakas, as on pp. 174, G.O.S. Vol. I., the A.bh. quotes from the Värttika an āryā on Rāga-darśaniya, i.e. Rāga-kavya, which is one of the upa-rupakas.
Dr. Raghavan has not quoted the same but we quote it as read on pp. 171, Vol. I. G.O.S. (A.bh.) second Edn. '56. yad-vārttikam -
evam avantara-vākyair
upadeśo rāga-darśaniyeṣu, simhā"di-varṇanair vā
kvacid apy arthántaranyāsāt.”
The quotation follows a discussion in the A.bh. that 'nṛtta' is not 'nātya'.
-
Dr. Raghavan further observes that some ancient writers had dealt with uparūpaka varieties can be made out from Bhamaha I. 24 wherein besides nāṭaka, there is mention of dvipadī, śamyā, rāsaka and skandhaka (= a dance in which songs in skandhaka metre figure ft. n. pp. 537, ibid). All these are intended for abhinaya and Bhamaha says that they are taken care of at length by others : "uktónyais tasya vistaraḥ." - an obvious reference to Bharata and others known to Bhāmaha. It may be noted that we do not know the source of the explanation of skandhaka, as cited by Dr. Raghavan. Daṇḍin also mentions (I. 39) 'lāsya', 'chalita', 'samya' as 'prekṣártha' i.e. meant for viewing (on stage). Kumārila's Tantra-vārttika also mentions Dvipadi and Rāsaka (p. 205. Benares Edn.)
It may be noted that the Daśarūpaka divides nāṭya into major type i.e. rasāśraya comprising of the ten types of drama, and the minor type which takes care of bhāva i.e. which is bhāvā"śraya. The former is called rūpaka and the latter "nṛtya" which is bhāvā"śraya and is of the form of padárthábhinaya, the former being rasasraya and of the form of vakyárthábhinaya. Dhanika in his Avaloka on DR. 1. 9 (pp. 8, 9, Edn.) (The Adyar Library Series, Vol. 97, T. Venkatacharya '69 Madras) observes: "rasa"śrayān nāṭyād bhāvā”śrayam nṛtyam anyad eva. tatra bhāvā❞śrayam iti viṣaya-bhedan nṛtyam iti nṛter gātra-vikṣepárthatvenā'ngikabāhulyāt tat-kāriṣu ca nartaka-vyapadeśalloképi range prekṣaṇīyakam iti vyavahārān nāṭakāder anyan nṛtyam. tadbhedatvāc chrīgadita"der na'vadhāraṇā'nupapattiḥ. nāṭakā"di ca rasa-viṣayam. rasasya ca padárthībhūtavibhāvā"di-samsargā”tmaka-vākyártha-rupatvad vākyarthábhinaya"tmakatvam rasa"śrayam ity anena darśitam. natyam iti ca 'nața avaspandane' iti nateḥ kiñcic calanárthatvāt sättvika-bāhulyam. ata eva tat-kāriṣu nata-vyapadeśaḥ. [loke'pi ca

.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA range nātyam iti vyapadeśaḥ. etad uktam bhavati) yathā ca gātra-viksepárthatve samāne'pyanukārā"tmatvena nộtyād anyan nșttam, tathā vākyárthábhinayā”tmakān nāțyāt padárthábhinayā”tmakam anyad eva nrtyam iti."
The difference is here brought out by Dhanika who holds that nộtya is "āngikabahula" and nātya is sāttvika-bahula; the former has concern more with physical movements and only some feelings, the latter has more psychological activity and is rasa-based. Rasa for Dhananjaya-Dhanika is collected through tātparya sakti and is therefore here termed as vākyárthábhinaya-rūpa or perhaps by padárthábhinayarūpa is meant a minor type and vākyárthábhinayarūpa suggests the major type. Thus rūpaka and uparūpaka could be understood here. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 538, ibid) - "Therefore, the tātparyavādin, and mainly the Dasarūpaka and the Avaloka on it, are responsible for introducing this new nomenclature and terminology to distinguish the major and the minor dramatic varieties. Väkyárthábhinaya and padárthábhinaya are not phrases born in the Kashmiria tradition represented by Abhinavagupta." Dr. Raghavan here gives a foot-note in which he concedes that even Abhinavagupta uses such terms as padártha and vākyártha, but observes that they are not in the sense used by the Avaloka. But we feel that even the Dhv. uses these terms with a shade of meaning closer to major and minor senses quite often when rasa is described as 'vākyártha' at many places and bhāvas as padártha.
Be it as it is, but the DR. and the Avaloka use these terms to distinguish between major and minor forms of stage performances. We have called them art forms in genral with the former having anukarana and therefore rūpana as its soul with acting as its medium, and the latter having primarily the suggestive movements of limbs i.e. dance as its medium, with some impression of acting also. There is no imitation like as it is in drama proper. So the upa-rūpakas are art-forms, varieties of performing art and not rūpaka or drama proper.
Bhoja also seems to follow the phraseology of the DR. and Avaloka to distinguish between major and minor art-forms, i.e. the rūpakas and the uparūpakas. But Bhoja does not suggest that he accepts the views of the DR. in this respect. This strengthens our earlier observation that these terms viz. padárthábhinaya and vákyārthábhinaya need not be taken as trade-marks of the DR. and Avaloka only as Dr. Raghavan suggests, but actually their roots and practice were still older, perhaps even older than Anandavardhana. Even Anandavardhana (pp. 170, Edn. K. Kris.) observes : na ca rasesu vidhy anuvādavyavahāro nā’stīti śakyam vaktum, teşām vākyárthatvena abhyupagamāt...

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839 evamvidha-viruddha-padártha-visayaḥ katham abhinayaḥ prayoktavya iti cet, anūdyamānaivamvidha-vācya-visaye yā vārtā sā'trā'pi bhavisyati.... etc.”
Thus padárthavişaya-abhinaya, and therefore also vākyártha-visaya-abhinaya are not absolutely new terms.
For Bhoja, the ten rūpakas and also nātikā and sattaka are rasāśraya varieties and thus they make for tweve major types.
As for 'Nātikā', though Dhananjaya calls his work “daśa-rūpaka" and says that rūpakas are only ten in number, he yet defines nātikā in DR. III, after defining nātaka and prakarana. Bharata also does exactly the same as for Bharata, and therefore also for Dhananjaya, Nātikā is a form derived from both nāšaka and prakarana. Bharata observes : (pp. 435, 5 Vol. II. G.O.S. Edn. '34, O. I. Baroda) -
anayośca bandha-yogād anyo bhedah prayokt;bhiḥ kāryaḥ, (XVIII. 57 ab) prakaraṇa-nāțakabhedād
utpädyam vastu, nāyakam nrpatim. (XVIII. 58 ab.) A discussion is read as to whether nrtta and nātya are identical or not in the Abh. (pp. 170. 171. etc. Vol. I. G.O.S. Edn. '56). Here we read names such as dombikā. prasthāna, sidgaka. bhānaka, bhānikā, rāga-kāva, etc. One thing is certain that these art-forms were perhaps forms accepted from folk-art and were even older than Bhāmaha and Dandin and certainly predecessors of Bhoja knew them all. A.bh. has an expression viz. "Kohalas tu braviti" (pp. 171, ibid), and also "kohalā"dyaih" - which proves that these art-forms were perhaps even older than Bharata, who mentions only nātikā, for reasons best known to him only. A.bh. even quotes a name - "cūļāmaņi-dombikāyām...” with reference to one dombikā.
We know that Dhananjaya also, after Bharata, takes nātikā as a samkīrṇa or mixed form. The DR. III. 43 observes :
"laksyate nātikā'py atra samkīrṇānya-nivṛttaye, tatra vastu prakaraṇāt
nāțakān nāyako nộpaḥ." by ‘rejection of other mixed forms' or 'anya-nivșttaye' is meant that Dhananjaya was not inclined to accept many mixed forms like these, the prakaranī being the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA chief one. The Avaloka (pp. 156, Edn. Adyar, ibid) observes : "anayor nāțakaprakaranayoḥ bandhayogān nāțīsamjñayā āśrite dve kāvye staḥ. tayor ekaḥ prabandhabhedaḥ prakhyātaḥ. itarastv aprakhyāta iti tam bhāratiyam ślokam vyācakşāņāḥ nātikā-vyatirekena kecit prakaranikām api manyante. ... etc. But A.bh. mentions it and Vägbhasa (II) in his Kāvyānuśāsana (pp. 18) mentions it as : "evam prakaraṇabhedāt prakaraṇikā’pi vijñeyā.” “sattako'pi kaiścid uktah.”
The N.D. (= Nātyadarpaņa of Rāmacandra and Gunacandra) and the S.D. (of Viśvanātha) also mention this art-form. The Visnudharmottara-purāna, III. 17. mentions 'prakarani' with ‘nātikā', thus making the total number of rūpakas as twelve.
Vardhamāna (A.D. 1140) in his Gunaratna-mahodadhi takes Bharata's āryā as allowing two derivative types, a prakhyāta type called nāți and an aprakhyāta type called 'prakarani.
“nātī-samjñayā dve kāvye. eko bhedaḥ prakhyāto nātikā”khyaḥ. itaras tvaprakhyātaḥ prakaraṇikā-samjñaḥ. tathā ca -
"anayoś ca bandhayogād eko bhedaḥ prayoktbhir jñeyaḥ, prakhyātas tv itaro vā
nāļī-samjñā”śrite kāvye.” (N.S. XX. 60-61, kāśi Edn.) There is no Abh. on this verse. Perhaps Abhinavagupta did not read this verse in the ms. of the N.S. he had before him, observes Dr. Raghavan. The G.O.S. Edn. (O. I. Vadodara N.S. : II. '34) pp. 434 reads this verse as (XIX. 57) -
"anayośca bandhayogād * anyo bhedaḥ prayoktņbhiḥ* kāryaḥ * prakhyātastv itaro vā
* nāțakayoge prakarane vā.” The footnote supplies following alternate readings respectively :
* eko; * jñeyaḥ; * pratyākhyātastvitaro and * nāți-samjñā”śrite kāvye. The first, second and fourth readings are seen in Dr. Raghavan's quotation. But
atyākhyātasty itaro” is not read. It means, "the other one which is rejected.” Perhaps Bharata did not welcome 'prakaranī as a sub-variety.
Abhinavagupta, however in his Locana suggests his knowledge of 'prakaraṇikā' when he observes : “abhineyártham daśarūpakam nātikā-toțaka-rāsaka-prakaranikā

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841 avāntara-prapanca-sahitam anekabhāsā-vyāmiśra-rūpam." In the A.bh. also in the above quoted passage he refers in detail to the view of some who would argue for two sub-varieties called nātikā and prakaranikā. (A.bh. G.O.S. Vol. II. pp. 434, ibid).
Sattaka : The DR. does not mention this but Bhoja mentions it. Bhoja has treated nātikā as the eleventh rūpaka-prakāra, no doubt as derived from both nāțaka and prakaraņa.
"prakaraña-nāțaka-bheda
rūpakam iha nātikā bhavati." But Bhoja does not create prakaranikā. On the other hand he holds that there is a variety similar to nātikā but it is not prakaranikā. It is called Satpaka and it differs from nātikā in the fact that it has no viskambhaka and praveśaka and that it is throughout only in one language :
“viškambhaka-praveśaka-rahito yastv eka-bhāṣayā bhavati, a-prāksta-samskrtayā
sa satrako nātikā-pratimah.” (pp. 466, Śr. Pra., ibid) Dr. Raghavan tries to explain “a-praksta-samskrtayā as (a-prākrtayā) samskrtayā.” But we do not feel that this rendering makes the meaning clearer.. Perhaps a-prākrta (bhāsayā) and a-samskrta-bhāsayā is meant here. This means it is either in prākrta or in sanskrta language. Hemacandra (pp. 444, Edn. Parikh & Kulkarni '60 reads :
"viskambhaka-praveśaka-rahito yasty ekabhāsayā bhavati a-prākṣta-samskrtayā
sa sattako nātikā-pratimah.” The Viveka does not elaborate on this. The Nātyadarpaņa also reads : viskambhaka.... a-prākṣta-samskrtayā sa sațțako nātikā (pratimah). (pratimah) is to be added.
Toțaka is found in Abhinavagupta as defined by Kohala along with sattaka, but is not found in Bhoja. Of course Sāradātanaya reads totaka along with nātikā and

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sataka as derived from nāțaka and prakarana. He of course takes them as covered by nātaka and prakarana and hence nātikā, sattaka or totaka does not deserve independent recognition for him. Read, Bhāva-prakāsana (VII. 3, 4, etc.) (pp. 260, 261 Edn. Agrawal, Chowkhamba Surbharati Prakashan-Varanasi - second Edn. '83)
“rasāśrayā yady api syur nātikā-toțakā”dayah, nāta kā”dişvathaiteşām antarbhāvān na te prthak.” nāțake ca prakarane nātikāyāḥ purātanaiḥ, antarbhāvaḥ krtas tasyām
toțakasyā’pi darsitaḥ.” Here the mention of sattaka which is 'nātikā-pratima' is read following Bhoja. The A.bh. merely mentions Kohala as having defined the sattaka, and Bhoja's Sr. Pra. is the first available document which attempts the definition of sattaka. Abhinavagupta has cited the Karpūra-mañjarī of Rāja-sekhara as an instance of sattaka (in prāksta only). This he does when he explains the lāsyángya called saindhava, which has to be in prākrta. Prākrta, Abhinavagupta explains there, is best suited to śrngāra rasa and hence Rājasekhara wrote a whole sarțaka-type drama, the Karpūra-mañjarī in Prākta. : tathā hi śộngāra-rase sātiśayópayogini (nī) prakrtabhāṣā iti sastakaḥ karpūra-mañjaryākhyaḥ rājasekhareņa tan-mātra eva nibaddhaḥ.” Rājaśekhara in his prologue to this play defines sattaka as similar to nātikā but devoide of praveśaka and viśkambhaka. kim sátakam ? kathitam eva vidagdhaiḥ -
"tat sāțakam iti bhanyate dūram yo nātikā anuharati, kim punar api praveśaka
viskambhakau na kevalam bhavatah." Rājasekhara however does not suggest that this type has to be in prāksta. He suggests through sūtradhāra that prākrta is accepted here as it was softer than samskrta, as the author being a Kavirāja is master of both Samskrta and Prakrta alike. Dr. Raghavan suggests that on the strength of this sūtradhāra's remark we can attempt amendation of Bhoja's text defining sattaka as "prākstayā samskrtayā sa (here we suggest 'vā”) satďako nātikā-pratimah."

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843 We have noted above that Hemacandra reproduces Bhoja's words on Sattaka and so also we read the same in the Nārya-darpana; and Vägbhata (II) also reads the same in his Kāvyānuśāsana (II. pp. 18, N.S. Edn. 1915 A.D.) : sattako’pi kaiścid uktah. tad yathā -
"viskambhakas tveka-rahito sa tv eka-bhāṣayā bhavati, a-prāksta-samskştayā
sa sațțako nātikā-pratibhah.” Vādijanghāla on Dandin I. 37 calls it as 'sattikā' and describes it as an apabhramśa composition. Thus, we have at least three names available such as, sattaka, sātaka and sattikā. As noted by Dr. Raghavan Prof. Chintaharan Chakravarti accepts the reading a-prākrta-samskrtayā and explains it as neither sanskrit nor prakrit. Perhaps Vādijanghāla therefore has called it to be in apabhramśa. The Nātyadarpaņa also calls it “sāțaka”. In the Karpūramañjarī the prāksta name reads sattaya and sanskrit rendering reads as sātaka. It may prove interesting to note that Śāradātanaya, at B.P. VIII. 158 (pp. 359, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) - observes :
"saiva (= nātikā eva) praveśakenā’pi viskambhena vinā krtā, anka-sthānīya-vinyastacatur yavanikántarā prakrsta-prākṣta-mayi
sattakam nāmato bhavet.” This means that for Śāradātanaya the nātikā itself is known to be sattaka when there is absence of either 'praveśaka' or 'viskambhaka'. In place of 'anka' there is provision of four yavanikās and this type of art-form is laid in the best of prākrta only. Now this goes against the view of Vādijanghāla and Prof. Chakravarti as seen above. In place of acts we have four yavanikántaras'. This is not clear to us, but perhaps they are minor divisions of a single scene conducted with the help of curtains to be held and shifted by actors as and when required. Bhoja does not mention this characteristic. He also does not insist that sattaka has to be in prakrta only, of course the best (prakrsta) of it.
Elsewhere Sāradātanaya observes about sattaka (pp. 393, Edn. Agrawal, ibid; B.P. IX. 57):

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sāṭṭakam nāṭikābhedo nṛtya bhedā❞tmakam bhavet,

kaiśiki-bhāratī-yukta
hina-raudra-rasā"dikam
sarva-sandhi-vihīnam ca
nātikā-prati-rūpakam,
śūrasena-mahārāśtra
vācya-bhāṣā-vikalpitam.
anka-sthānīya-viccheda
catur-yavanika'ntaram, cchadana-skhalana-bhrānti
nihnava"der a-sambhavāt na vadet prākṛtīm bhāṣām rajeti katicij jaguḥ, māgaddhyā śaurasenyā vā vaded rājeti ke-cana nātikā-pratirūpam yad viseṣo rūpakasya tat,
saṭṭakam, tena tasyā"huḥ
bhāṣām tām prākṛtīm pare.
rājasekharakṛptam tad yathā karpūra-mañjarī.
So, for Śāradātanaya, saṭṭaka is a form of rūpaka (viseṣo rūpakasya) which is closer to nāțikā (nāṭikā-pratirūpa) OR, it is a sub-variety of nāțikā (nātikā-bhedaḥ), and also a type of nṛtya (nṛtya-bheda❞tmaka). Śārdātanaya is perhaps not clear or perhaps wants us to realise the complex nature of saṭṭaka which is an art-form closer to the (major) rūpaka, and also closer to both nāțikā and nṛtya i.e. dance. It is an art-form which to Śārdātanaya seems to be a mixed form of the dramatic art, as well as a performing art such as dance. Again, it is said to be sarva-sandhivihina and once again nāțikā-pratirūpaka. Now whatever form of dramatic art which is presented on the stage, be it major or minor, has to have at least two sandhis or junctures viz. mukha and nirvahana as the theme, the plot that weaves out the theme, have to have a beginning and an end. So, this remark puzzles us.
SAHṚDAYALOKA

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Again it is either in suraseni or mahārāstrī, and is illustrated by Rajasekharas Karpūramañjarī which is in prakṛta. But this apart, its structure is not made up of acts but is cut into four by yavanikā. This means it is a spectacle of continuous show wherein parts are concealed and revealed when required by curtainsyavanikä-held by artists. Thus, perhaps, it has more of dance and spectacle then of drama. Śāradātanaya is not clear about the use of language also as he records different views. According to him some hold that the king, who is the hero, should not speak prākṛta as it may not be possible for him to cover (chadana) what he wants to cover from some other, or he may falter (skhalana) in Präkṛta (perhaps he being accustomed to talk in Samskṛta ?), or perhaps he may create bhrānti-or deception in the minds of others (? again through inapt use of prākṛta ?) or for fear of not concealing (nihnava) his intention. Some believe that the king should speak in magadhi or saurasenī, as Sāradātanaya himself has said earlier. Still others hold that as this art-form is a sub-variety or is something closer to nātikā, the king has to speak prākṛta and this seems to be acceptable to Śāradātanaya also as Karpūramañjarī is said to be an illustration of saṭṭaka. Dr. Raghavan also seems to accept this when he observes: (pp. 542, ibid): "The final view recorded by him is that the saṭṭaka is, again and again, mentioned as a replica of the nāṭikā, its differentia as a separate rūpaka is to be fixed somewhere, and this difference is none else than the prakṛta language that it adopts, as for instance in the Karpūramañjarī of Rajasekhara."
Dr. Raghavan observes that Sagaranandin adopts this last mentioned view. He quotes from N.L.R.K. (nāṭaka-lakṣaṇa-ratna-kosa) (p. 133, lines 320) - 4, where the text is currupt according to Dr. Raghavan. He also quotes NLRK p. 90 lines 21567. Dr. Raghavan quotes as follows:
"saṭṭake stri-pradhānatvāt
845
rupakasya'nurodhataḥ, nṛpaḥ strīvat pathed esa pāṭhasya niyato vidhiḥ."
This means that saṭṭaka is an art-form having many female characters (as in nātikā). The king also speaks like a female character i.e. he should use prākṛta. This rule is formed regarding speech (in saṭṭaka).
Dr. Raghavan observes that the other quotation is currupt. But we place it as is read in chawkhamba skt. samsthan Edn. Varanasi, '72, Babulal Shastri, as follows: (pp. 304, ibid)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sattakam - atha sattakam. tacca nātikā-pratirūpakam, kaiśiki-bhāratipradhānam, raudra-vīra-bībhatsam, avamaría-samdhi-sūnyam. yathā - karpūramañjarī. antaryavanikántam. yathánke yavanikayā avacchedā bhavanti tathā’trā’pi. śauraseni-pracā-mahārāştri-yuktam. strīvad rajño’pi prāksta-pāthah kāryāt samskrtapāthah. tatra rūpakam eva idam karyam iti rājñā'pi prāksta-pāthaḥ kartavyah."
This means that sattaka is an art-form which is imitative of nātikā. The Kaisiki (as female characters abound in it, like nātikā), and bhārati are major vrttis. In it we have raudra, vīra, bhayānaka and bībhatsa rasas. But here we feel the reading seems to be currupt. We suggest that we should emend the text as "raudra-vīrabhayānaka-bībhatsa-[varjam]." This being a graceful art-form having female characters in majority and having kaisiki in predominance, it has to be like nātikā śrngara-prāyā and so, raudra"di have to be absent from this art-form, which again has graceful dancing in it. The Karpūra-mañjari as an illustration supports our emendation. This is supported by Saradātanaya's remark viz. hīna-raudrarasā"dikam. But in Sāradātanaya we have sarva-samdhi-vihīnam, which we had objected to earlier. So, there we can emend the text as "avamaría-samdhi-vihīnam” in view of Sāgaranandin, who also says that in a sattaka we have parts or divisions of theme presented through the device of “yavanikā”. NLRK as quoted above in prose, says that as in an act there are divisions by the device of yavanikā, so also here we have the same in sattaka. The NLRK is clear that the king-hero has to speak in prakrta but "kāryāt" i.e. due to special reason he may resort to samskrta al
Dr. Raghavan further observes that having once dealt with the sattaka amidst the rasā”śraya rūpaka varieties, close upon the nātikā, of which it is a prakrta counterpart, Sāradātanaya contradicts himself later, when he defines it as a bhāvā”śraya variety, a nrtyabheda, among upa-rūpakas. But perhaps we may assist Dr. Raghavan's effort here. As observed earlier by us this art-form viz. sattaka seems to be a special mixture of some drama and more dance and hence we should not find any contradiction in Sāradātanaya's presentation. Actually the B.P. IX. 4 (pp. 375, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) reads as :
“nātikāyās toțakasya satďakasya ca lakṣaṇam, amśatvān nāțakasyā’pi tathā prakaranasya ca. ānușangikam etešām lakṣaṇam tatra darśitam.”

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The B.P. observes that as the nātikā, totaka and sattaka share the characteristics of nātaka as well as prakarana in parts, their definitions were cited there (tatra, i.e. along with nătaka, prakaraṇa etc. the rūpakas, i.e. in Chs. VII and VIII also.) Ch. VII. B.P. (pp. 260, Edn. Agrawal ibid) reads :
"rasāśrayā yady api syur nātikā-toțakā”dayah nāțakā"dişv athaitesām
antarbhāvān na te prthak.” As natikā, totaka (and sattaka) are 'rasāśraya' varieties - This division follows the DR.) -, they are included in nāțaka etc. (the major forms of drama). It is further observed that (VII. 5, 6; pp. 261, ibid)
"nātikāyā nāțakasyā’bhedaḥ prakaraṇasya vā. satrakas toțakasyaiva bheda ity abhidhīyate. toțakasyocyate sadbhir antarbhāvo’pi nāțake, nāļakā"der ayam bhedo, nātikā rūpakam bhavet nātikā-pratimatvāc ca sattako’pi tathāvidhaḥ.” nāțake toțakasyántar bhāvād-rūpakam eva saḥ. divya-mānușa-samyogas toțakam nāțakánugam, navāștā-sapta-pañcāńkam, divya-mānusa-sangamam. toțakam nāma-tat prāhur bhedo nāțaka-sambhavaḥ.

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We have quoted these verses here again only to bring home a point that being rasā"śraya and therefore vākyárthábhinaya-rūpa from one angle, nātikā, totaka (some call it trotaka and the illustration cited is Vikramorvašīyam) and sattaka are varieties of major types i.e. rūpakas and therefore do not deserve separate recognition beyond the ten types of drama. Or, at the most the sattaka, being almost imitative form of nātikā, is included in the same. Saţtaka has majority of female characters and kaisiki-prādhānya as in nātikā and hence it is so to say,
nātika-pratirūpaka, and hence a sub-variety of nātikā and so included in it. But in the VIII Ch. (Verses 1-3) Sāradātanaya observes that ten types of rūpakas and other twenty types (of upa-rupakas) are also enumerated. Then he says : (VIII/3) (pp. 321 ibid) -
rasā”tmakā daśaitesu, vimsad-bhāvā”tmakā matāḥ. teşām rūpaka-samjñā’pi prāyo dịśyatayā kvacit. trīmsad rūpaka-bhedāśca
prakāśyante'tra laksanaiḥ. As all thirty are to be viewed on stage, they are rūpakas also. Thus, for Sāradātanaya, the twenty (minor) art-forms which mention toțaka, nātikā, and saţtaka also among them, are bhāvā”śraya forms as against rasā”śraya forms the daśa-rūpakas. These twenty are padárthábhinayātmaka as they have more of dance than of drama in them. Hence they are mixed art-forms. Sāradātanaya observes (Ch. IX./2, pp. 374, edn. Agrawal ibid) :
daśarūpena-bhinnānām rūpakānām atikramāt avāntarabhidāḥ kāścit padárthábhinayātmikāḥ te nștya-bhedāḥ prāyeņa samkhyayā vimśatirmatāḥ, toțakam... pārijātakam ity api. etā nāmántaraih kaiścid ācāryaiḥ kathitā api

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849 samvidhāna-kramas tāsām
na kadācana bhidyate. Thus sattaka is a nātikābheda and is also a nrtya-bheda. Thus sattaka is an artform which inherits the characteristics of both drama and dance. Perhaps it was a form of folk-art.
Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 548) that Bahurūpa Miśra, a late commentator on Dhananjaya, who draws upon Sāradātanaya and is acquainted with Bhoja's Sr. Pra. also, says on this subject that Bhoja includes the Sattaka in the Nātikā, as if Bhoja considers it unnecessary to accept a separate type called Sattaka. He observes : "bhoja-rājena nātikāyāh prakarananātakayor antarbhāvah uktah.” (p. 4, Mad. MS. R. 367). We may add that totaka is included in nātaka in the same vein. Bhoja described sattaka as similar to nātikā and counted it as the twelfth variety of vākyárthábhinaya.
Thus we have observed that there is no contradiction anywhere in the presentation of any theorists so far as the art-forms of nātaka, nātikā, totaka and sattaka are concerned. Sattaka seems to be both a dance-form and a drama-form, closer to nātikā. Bhoja, Hemacandra, Sāradātanaya and Sāgarnandin discuss the same in their own way. Hemacandra (pp. 444, Edn. Parika, Kulkarni) at the end of the definitions of ten rūpakas and nātikā, quotes Bhoja and defines sattaka after him. He adds : "ādiśabdāt kohalā"di-laksitās totakā"dayo grāhyah.” This is under Abhinavagupta's observation. But Hemacandra does not elaborate. But it is certain that many folk art-forms were included in the twenty odd uparūpakas which are mixed art-forms having elements of drama and dance interwoven beautifully in them."
Thus it is clear that Bhoja described satpaka as similar to nātikā and took it as the twelfth type of vākyárthábhinaya.
Bhoja in Ch. XI of his Śr. Pra. follows Bharata in introducing the ten major rūpakas and nātikā in āryā verses. He hardly makes any verbal change.
Bhoja also quotes Bharata's general observations on nāțaka, given at the end of Ch. XXI. N.S. (Kasi Edn.) according to Dr. Raghavan. But actually while comparing Josyer's Edn. and the G.O.S. Edn. of N.S., we read some verses in the beginning of Ch. XII of the Sr. Pra. quoted from N.S. Vol. II. Ch. XIX. We do not know which text of Bhoja is looked into here by Dr. Raghavan. Of course, some half verses from Bharata (Ch. XIX) are also read at the end of Ch. XI. Sr. Pra. Edn. Josyer.

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Bhoja seems to be closer to Dhananjaya and Dhanika also. Preksya-prabandhas or dramatic performances are classified into those depicting a complete theme and a complete principal rasa with other rasas as subordinate, the major rūpakas of the type of vākyárthábhinaya, and other minor rūpakas of the padárthábhinaya type depicting only a bhāva and not a fully developed rasa. The nāțaka and other major types represent vākyárthábhinaya and minor types make for, padárthábhinaya. He says : (pp. 466, Sr. Pra. Ch. XI. Vol. II. Josyer)
"vākyárthábhinayo'yam prakīrtito nāțakā”di-bhedena, dvādaśa-vidha-padárthábhinayam
atha yathāsthitam vaksye." Bhoja does not mention totaka, (or trotaka) which is illustrated by some commentators by Kālidāsa's Vikramorvašīvam. We know that Abhinavagupta holds that totaka was defined by Kohala and others.
Abhinavagupta also says that Kohala and the rest also discussed satďaka, illustrated by the Karpūra-mañjarī of Rājasekhara. Bhoja mentions satpaka and is of the opinion that sattaka resembles nātikā in some respects as observed earlier. Bhoja's definition of Sattaka carries impressions of Rājasekhara's verse on sattaka (= sāțaka) in the Karpūramañjarī as noted above.
Bhoja differs from the DR. and Avaloka wherein only ten major rūpakas are taken as of the form of vāl hinaya. Bhoja adds two more, viz. nātikā and Sattaka to the ten major types and takes these twelve to be of the form of vākyárthábhinaya and he reserves twelve minor types for padárthábhinaya separately.
We also observed that Śāradātanaya draws upon a lot from Bhoja for ten major types of drama and his treatment of twenty uparūpakas goes beyond Bhoja though similarities can be traced to some extent in common varieties accepted by both. The N.D. also has twelve major types including nātikā and prakaranī and thirteen uparūpakas.
The Uparūpakas thus make an interesting study. We will first enumerate the varieties as recognised by Bhoja. Hemacandra. Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, Sāradātanaya, Sāgaranandin. “ingabhūpāla and Viśvanātha.
Prior to Bhoja, as noted above, it is the Abhinavabhārati which mentions some upa-rūpakas along with their characteristics. We have quoted passages from A.bh.
th
U1 Vakydr

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in the foregoing pages which read as : "ukta-vyākhyāne tu kohalā"di-laksita-totakasattaka-rāsakā"di-samgrahah." We have quoted all these passages above with clear references. So, one thing that emerges is that Abhinavagupta knows all the names quoted by Kohala and others and also by Sri Harsa in his Vārttika. He is also supposed to know the types mentioned by Bhāmaha and Dandin. So, we will not be away from truth if we conclude that Abhinavagupta knew the following uparūpakas, viz. (1) toțaka (3) satďaka (3) rāsaka (4) kāvya (5) rāga-kāvya (6) dvipadi (7) śamyā (8) skandhaka (9) lāsya (10) chalita (ka). These are through Kohala and others and Bhāmaha and Dandin. Perhaps through Vätsyāyana's Kāmasūtra he also knew (11) Hallisaka, (12) Natyarāsaka and (13) Preksanaka. Through Kumārila again Dvipadī and Rāsaka are known which were read in earlier documents also. Again A.bh. mentions further upa-rūpakas (Ch. IV. N.S.) such as - (14) Dombikā (15) Prasthāna (16) a or şid gaka (17) Bhānaka (18) Rāgakāvya (19) Bhānikā (20) Prerana (21) Rāmākridaka, with Rāsaka and Hallisaka already enumerated. Avaloka also was perhaps available to Abhinavagupta and there we find seven varieties of nộtya such as dombi, (= dombikā), (22) Srigadita, and bhāna, bhānī, prasthāna, rāsaka and kāvya-all noted above.
Bhoja was perhaps acquainted with all these names and also their features through different sources prior to him. But actually Bhoja enumerates the following. twelve types of uparūpakas such as - (1) Srigadita (2) durmilikā (or tā), (3) prasthāna (4) Kāvya (or citra-kāvya), (5) bhāņa (śuddha, citra and sammilita), (6) bhāņikā (7) gosthi (8) hallisaka (9) nartanaka (10) prekșanaka (11) rāsaka and (12) nātya-rāsaka or carcarī.
The Uparūpakas as noted above are closer to dance than drama and could be representative of folk-art also. Many of these are performed by a single artist i 'ekahārya'.
Hemacandra following Bharata, gives nāţika after treating the ten major types. He classifies kāvya=literature into preksya and śravya. Preksya again is pāțhya and 'geya'. Pāțhya varieties are the ten rūpakas and nātikā and among geya varieties, - which are also preksya and therefore enacted on stage and make for visual art-forms belonging to the class of performing art in general, - he enamerates (1) dombikā (2) bhāņa (3) prasthāna (4) singaka (5) bhāņikā (6) prerana (7) rāmākrīda (8) hallisaka (9) rāsaka (10) goşthī (11) śrīgadita and (12) rāga-kāvya, etc. He says that details for these which he has only defined should be sought from - "brahmabharata-kohalā”di-śāstrebhyaḥ avagantavyaḥ.”

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The Nātyadarpaņa of Rāmacandra and Guņacandra talks of other varieties of rūpaka at the end of the fourth chapter when it is stated : tad evam nātakā”dīni vīthyantāni dvādaśa rūpāņi sa-prapañcam laksitāni. anyāny api rūpakāņi drśyante The N.D. does not call these as Upa-rupakas, or geya etc. but simply states that there are other forms of drama also. But when the N.D. describes them in brief and separates them from the first twelve it follows that they are taken as minor varieties. They are enumerated as : (1) sattaka (2) śrīgadita (3) durmilitā (4) prasthāna (5) gosthi (6) hallīsaka (7) samyā (8) preksanaka (9) rāsaka (10) nātyarāsaka (11) kāvya (12) bhāna and (13) bhānikā. The N.D. enumerates nātikā and prakarani as major types.
For Śāradātanaya (Ch. IX), the minor types are 'padárthábhinayā”tmaka' and are twenty such as (1) toțaka (2) nātikā (3) gosthi (4) sallāpa (5) śilpaka (6) dombī (7) prekşanam (8) nātya-rāsaka (9) rāsaka (10) ullāpyaka (11) hallisaka (12) durmallika (13) kalpavallī (14) mallikā (15) pārijātaka (16) lāsaka (17) śrigadita (18) bhāna-bhāni (19) prasthāna and (20) kävya. For NLRK of Sāgaranandin, the uparūpaka types are (1) gosthi (2) samllāpa
prasthāna (5) kávya (6) hallīsaka (7) śrīgadita (8) bhānikā (9) bhāni (10) durmalikā (11) prekṣaṇaka (12) rāsaka (13) nātya-rāsaka and (14) ullāpyaka Naţikā and Trotaka are enumerated with the major types.
Vägbhata II mentions nātikā and sattaka and the 'geya' varieties after Hemacandra, such as - (1) dombikā (2) bhāna (3) prasthāna (4) bhānikā (5) preraņa (6) singaka (7) rāmākrīda (8) hallīsaka (9) śrīgadita (10) rāsaka (11) gosthi (and the rest).
Śingabhūpāla in his Rasárņava-sudhākara speaks only of nātikā and takes it only as a mixed variety of nataka and prakarana which does not deserve a separate recognition for him (Rs. III. 218-222). He does not talk of other upa-rūpakas.
Vidyānātha does not mention anything beyond the ten major types (Pra. Ru. Nāțaka-prakarana, pp. 73-74, Edn. Madras, '14, ibid).
Viśvanātha enumerates (SD. VI. 4-6) (1) nātikā (2) trotaka (3) gosthi (4) sattaka (5) nātya-rāsaka (6) prasthāna (7) ullāpyaka (8) kāvya (9) prenkhanam (10) rāsaka (11) samlāpaka (12) śrīgadita (13) silpaka (14) vilāsikā (15) durmallikā (16) prakarani (17) halliśa and (18) bhanikā. They are eighteen in all.
We will now start with Bhoja's minor types. We will go on adding newer types only as seen in the authors that follow Bhoja, but will also take note if the concept of a given upa-rupaka differs in later anthors. Though with a slight

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853 change in the name the features are almost identical. We have seen that Bhoja has enumerated 12 types.
Actually before starting with Bhoja we will notice the total varieties of uparūpakas amounting to 44 or 45, as recognised by all theorists. We feel that some uparūpakas are named slightly differently by this or that theorist, but actually the types may be identical. The result of our analysis may be roughly placed as under - But we may say that we will treat our theorists in their chronological order beginning with Bhoja as he is the first author who deals with this topic systematically and perhaps more seriously. After Bhoja, we will discuss only those forms which appear as new forms in later theorists. The result of our analysis roughly gives the following picture, which shows different art-forms discussed by different authorities or at least known to them.
(1) Nātikā : This form is discussed by practically all beginning with the N.S. of Bharata. So we have Bharata (B); Dhananjaya/Dhanika (Dha); Bhoja (Bho); Hemacandra (H. or H.C.), Rāmacandra and Gunacandra, i.e. Natyadarpana (ND)., Vägbhasa II (Vāg.), śingabhūpāla in Rasārņava Sudhākara (RS.), Sāgarnandi - Nāțaka-laksaņa, ratna-kosa-(NLRK), Viśvanātha (Sāhitya-darpana) (SD.Nis.) and Sāradātanaya (= śā).
(2) Dvipadī - Bhāmaha (= Bhā.); Abhinavagupta (A.bh.) Kumārila (Ku.), . (3) Rāsaka - Bhā., Abh.; Ku.; ND; NLRK; Vāg.; (4) Skandhaka - Bhā. Abh.; (5) Lāsya - Dandin (Da.); Abh.; (6) Chalita - Da; Abh.; (7) śamyā - Da; Abh.; ND.; / Sampā-Bhoja. (8) Sattaka - Abh.; ND; Vāg.; Bho; Viś. (9) Toțaka OR Trošaka - Abh.; Šā., Viś.; (10) Kavya - Abh.: ND.; (11) Rāgakāvya - Abh., H. (12) Hallisaka - Vātsyāyana; Abh.; Bho; H.; ND; Śā.; NLRK.; Vāg.; OR Hallisa - Viś. (13) Nātya-rāsaka - Vātsyā.; Bho.; ND.; Śā., OR Carcarī NLRK; Viś.; (14) Prekşaņaka - Vātsyā.; Bho; ND., NLRK.;
OR Perkhaņaka - Viś.;

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA (15) Rāsaka - Abh.; Dha.; Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; Viś. (16) Ullopyaka - Śā, OR Ullāpyaka - NLRK; Viś.; (17) Prekșaņa - Śā.; (18) Dombikā OR Dombi - Abh.; Dha; Bhoja H.; Śā.; Vāg.; (19) Prasthāna - Abh.; Dha.; Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK; Vāg.; Viś. (20) Silpaka - Abh.; Śā; NLRK; Viś.
OR
śidgaka (21) Bhāņaka - Abh.; (22) Bhāņikā - Abh.; Bho.; H.; ND.; NLRK.; Vāg.; Viś.
(Here Dha. = DR. = Dhañjaya's Daśarūpaka. A. = Avaloka on DR.) (23) Preraņa - Abh.; H. Vāg.; (24) Rāmākrīdaka - Abh.; H.; Vāg. (25) Śrīgadita - Dha.; Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK.; Vāg.; Viś. (26) Bhāņa - Abh. Dha.; Bho.; H.; ND.; Vāg.
(Bhāna/Bhānaka: Bhāni/Bhānikā could be identical. But we have mentioned them separately as their names appear differently. Similarly, dombi/dombikā, ullopvaka/ullāpyaka, perhaps kāvva/rāga-kāvya sallapa-samlāpaka - could be one and the same.)
(27) Bhāņi - Dha.; Śā.; NLRK.; (28) Kāvya (citra-kāvya) - Dha; Bho.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK.; Viś. (29) Durmallikā OR Durmīlikā - Bho; Śā.; NLRK; Viś. (30) Goșthi - Bho.; H.; ND.; Śā.; NLRK.; Vāg.; Viś. (31) Nartanaka - Bho.; (32) Śingaka - (OR șidgaka? śilpaka ?) H. Vāg. (33) Durmilitā - ND.; (same as 29 above ?) (34) Prekșaņa - Śā.; (35) Pārijātaka - Śā.; (36) Kalpavallī - Śā.;

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(38) Lāsaka - Śā.;
(39) Sallāpa - Śā.
(40) Samllāpa(ka) - NLRK. Viś.
(41) Vilāsikā - Viś.
(42) Prakarani - ND.
We will now proceed with examining the special features of these uparūpakas, given by Bhoja, - to begin with - First, we will introduce this topic with a quotation from Dr. Raghavan (pp. 546, ibid) -
855
"The Uparupaka chapter of Sanskrit Natyaśāstra treatises is very important for students of the history and development of Indian dance and minor representations belonging to the vast indigenous Indian theatre. The uparūpakas are, as distinguished by Bhoja and Dhananjaya emotional fragments, compared to rūpakas which present a major theme with the unity of a single rasa running through and fed by other subsidiary rasas. Although ancient Indian drama or Sanskrit drama as envisaged by Bharata is of the nature of a dance-drama, with music and dancemovements, it is the uparupaka class of performances that is so par excellence; for in them music and dance predominate; most of them are merely dances accompanied by songs, interpreting through abhinaya or gesture the emotional contents of the song. Many are, like the Bhāna among the daśarupakas, done by one person: eka-pātra-hārya; in fact, the verse cited in the Daśa-rupakávaloka (I. 8) makes all the seven varieties, Dombi etc., 'eka-hārya'. Whatever definitions early works like that of Kohala might have given to each of the forms in this class, we do not have now; and except for stray references and discussions in the Abhinavabhāratī, as at the end of Ch. IV., the Śr. Pra. of Bhoja is the earliest treatise available to us which fully describes them. It is from the Śr. Pra. that Śāradātaneya borrows his descriptions of many of the Uparūpakas in Ch. IX. of his work." With due respect to Dr. Raghavan, we will not use the term "borrows". Perhaps Sāradātanaya also had a living tradition before him and he gives some more types also. It is better to use the term "accepts" in place of "borrows" for both Hemacandra and Sāradātanaya and later Viśvanatha. These authors "accept" what is found to be "acceptable". This is a better expression, which does justice to the efforts of later writers. We now begin with the uparūpakas as seen in Bhoja and also as accepted by later theorists.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA (1) Śrīgadita - (pp. 466, śp. Pra. ibid) - Bhoja defines it as,
"tatra śrīr iva dānava-śatror yasmin kulánganā patyuḥ; varņayati śaurya-dhairya-prabhști-guņān agrataḥ sakhyāḥ, patyā ca vipralabdhā gātavye tāḥ kramād upālabhante. śrīgaditam iti manişibhir
udāhsto'sau, padábhinayah." This Uparūpaka is concerned with moments of separation and hence there is vipralambha-śrngāra depicted in it. The person concerned is a kulānganā, a lady from a respectable family, and she describes her feelings to a friend, a second character here. The description is centred round the husband's high qualities of vālour, firmness or fortitude, etc. If she is deceived by her lover husband, she is a vipralabdh, and she in turn admonishes (him). The theme is presented in song. This is a variety of padárthábhinaya as against vākyárthábhinaya. Bhoja does not cite any illustration of this type. The name 'śrī-gadita' is explained by Bhoja as due to the fact that the kulanganā, a heroine belonging to a noble family, describes (gadita) her
lities like goddess Laxmī or Srī, describing those of her lord, Nārāyana. The 'śrīgadita' of Bhoja can be placed with the șidgaka or silpaka of Abhinavagupta. In this a separated heroine relates to her friend the bad and unruly conduct of her husband. Șidgaka represents only a complaint and therefore a negative aspect of the narrator lady's husband, the Śrīgadita first describes the good qualities and then after being deceived, the lady finds fault with her husband. Dr. Raghavan tries to place this variety with the modern 'kuravañci' art-form prevalent in Tamil.
We have noted above that this art-form is known to Dhanika, Hemacandra, the Nāțyadarpaņa, Sāradatanaya, the NLRK., Vägbhata II., and Viśvanātha.
Dhanika simply mentions śrīgadita by name, under DR. I. 8., in a verse along with dombī, bhāna prasthāna, rāsaka, and kāvya - a total of seven art-forms in all, over and above the ten major types and also nātikā. Hemacandra (Kā. Šā. VIII. vs. 69, Edn. Parikh/Kulkarni, pp. 449) has -
"yasmin kulánganā patyuḥ sakhy agre varņayed guņān,

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857 upālambham ca kurute,
geye śrigaditam bhavet." This is the same as Bhoja. This is 'geya/preksya. - It is an art-form where song (geya) and also dance predominate. H. accepts Bhoja.
The Nātyadarpaņa has (ND. IV. Sūtra 299/1, 2) : śrīr iva dānavaśatror yasmin kuláñganā patyuḥ ... etc. This is accepted from Bhoja without any change. No illustration is cited. Śaradātanaya has - (BP. IX. 13, pp. 378, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) -
“atha śrīgaditam vidyāt prasiddhódātta-nāyakam, bhāratī-vítti-bahulam udātta-vacanánvitam. garbhāvamarśa-sandhibhyām śūnyam, prakhyāta nāyakam, ekánkam vipralambhākhya-rasa-prāyam kvacit kvacit. yasmin kulanganā patyuḥ śaurya-dhairyā"dikān guņān, sakhīnām agrato vakti, tān upālabhate'tha vā. vipralabdhā ca tenaiva, yadi, tatsangamā”śayā āsīnā, yatra lalitam priyābhoga-vibhūşitam utkanthitā pathed-gāyet pāțhyam vā gītam eva vā, evamvidham śrīgaditam
rāmā”nandam yathā krtam." Śāradātanaya has something more to say, than the earlier writers. He cites an example viz., Rāmā”nandam. For Śāradātanaya, this art-form is not just all dance and music but is a play, a type of drama, with one act and three samdhis such as

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA mukha, pratimukha and nirvahana, with garbha and avamaśa absent from it. It has a famous and nobly born hero and is decorated with lofty expression - udāttavacanánvitam. There is prominance of bhārati-vrtti and this suggests that the physical action may be on a low key with descriptive element thriving. Because of this we have a lot of talks, wherein a lady from a noble family describes before her friends (= sakhīhām agrato vakti) (and this is against a single friend as described by Bhoja, Hemacandra and the ND.), the high qualities of her husband, or she rebukes him or runs down these qualities in case if she is deceived by him. She sits there with a hope of getting united with him and dresses herself in beautiful attire and ornaments. This is also the vāsakasajjā avasthā. Perhaps after getting ready and waiting for him for long she feels frustrated and finds faults with him. She is utkanthitā also, and getting very eager she either recites or sings. Thus, there is lot of love in separation here. But what is important for Sāradātanaya is that he calls it an art-form to be staged in a single act. The nāyikā appears in three stages as Vāsaka-sajjā. Utkanthitā and Vipralabdhā. The nāyaka is also a famous character 'prasiddhódātta' and 'prakhyāta', which perhaps gives some historicity to the story or theme.
The NLRK. has the following : atha śrīgaditam. yatra strir āsīnā karuņam pathati. ekánkam. udātta-vacana-krtam, bhāratī-vrtti-pradhānam, prakhyātavastu-nāyakam, yathā-krīdā-rasātalam.
Obviously the NLRK. has the definition of Śrī-gadita modelled on Sāradātanaya. Dr. De (SP.) (pp. 310) observes that Sāgaranandin's date is uncertain but Bahurūpa Misra (later then 1250 A.D.) knows him. So, he could be somewhere between 1150 A.D. - 1200 A.D. Sāradātanaya is placed by Dr. De (pp. 238, SP. ibid) between 1100-1300 A.D. So, either Sāradātanaya was Sāgaranandin's near predecessor or was his contemporary or perhaps even his junior contemporary. But looking at NLRK's style and treatment, it seems its author tries to give prose summary of authentic works. Hence, we are inclined to place Sāradātanava earlier than Sāgaranandin. But this is only a personal impression. It could be otherwise also. But for the sake of convenience we will place NLRK after BP. Or, both of them must be imbibing a common tradition. perhaps seen earlier in Bhoja - What we may call the Mālava tradition.
So, for NLRK. also, as seen in BP., this minor art-form has one act, is having bhārati vrtti as predominant diction, is having a famous theme and a famous hero, and is full of lofty expressions and the female character here is engaged in woes - karuņam pathati - perhaps because she is deceived by her husband whose great

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859
qualities have proved to be otherwise in her case personally, especially where lovematters are concerned. The illustration cited is Krīdā-rasātalam. The BP. has a more elaborate and more methodical presentation which thus could be, possibly an improvement on NLRK.'s presentation and therefore later. Whatever it may be, for our methodology we have preferred to place the BP. earlier than the NLRK. Both. however can claim the same status over each other.
Vāgbhata (II), naming his work and also modelling it after the Kāvyánuśāsana of Hemacandra, calls śrīgadita as 'geya' art-form. Hemacandra divides 'preksya' i.e. abhineya as pāțhya and geya, but Vāgbhața does not indicate that he takes geya also as abhineya. But we may conclude that as he chooses to follow Hemacandra, for him also the 'geya' art-forms are part of abhineya also. He observes : (pp. 18, ibid)
“ekasūtram tu netā syād gopastrīņām yathā hariḥ, yasmin kulanganā patyuḥ sakhy agre varņayed guṇān, upālambham ca kurute,
geye śrīgaditam tu tat." As is Hari of gopis so there is one netā i.e. nāyaka and in this 'geya' art-form, the heroine, a nobly born lady, describes before her friend the qualities of her husband, and also passes admonition. In the Sāhityadarpaņa (S.D.) Viśvanātha observes : (S.D. VI. 293/295):
“prakhyātavrttam ekángam prakhyātódātta-nāyakam, prasiddha-nāyikam, garbha-vimarśābhyam vivarjitam. (VI/293) bhāratī-vștti-bahulam śrī-ti-śabdena sankulam, matam origaditam năma vidvadbhir uparūpakam. (VI/294) śrir (strir) ásīnā śrīgadite gāyet kiñcit pathed api,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ekánko bhāratīprāya
iti kecit pracaksate. (VI. 295) Obviously this is modelled after the BP. But there is something more. Viśvanātha does not cite an illustration, which he does quite often in other art-forms. Here he says - ūhyam udāharanam. Then, he says that this art-form is “śri”-iti sabdena sankulam." Perhaps he came across illustrations where 'śrī-sabda was read invariably. In vs. 295, he says srir āsīnā... meaning wherein sri or Laksmī, while sitting either sings or speaks. But our suggestion is that in place of “śrī we can read 'strī, for it is so in other definitions also. The NLRK read-yatra strir asinā karunam pathati, wherein we do not have a reference to 'geya'. Here we have "gāyer" and "pather”. So, perhaps in Viśvanātha's time this art-form had both song and recitation also. Again, the S.D. expects the nāyikā also to be prasiddha i.e. famous. The S.D. clearly calls it an "upa-rūpaka". But its having one act is an opinion held by 'some' - 'kecit pracaksate'. So, for Visvanātha also this is an art-form with dance, eloquence and acting also, as its special features. Like the B.P. this act has neither 'garbha' nor 'vimarśa' juncture.
Durmilikā (or, .tā) is the next art-form, Bhoja discusses at śr. Pra. XI. pp. 466, ibid. He observes :
"caurya-rata-pratibhedam yūnor anurāga-varṇanam vā’pi, yatra grāmya-kathābhiḥ kurute kila dūtikā rahasi, mantrayati ca tadvișaye nyag-jātitvena yācate ca vasu, labdhvā'pi labdhum icchati
durmilitā nāma să bhavati. This art-form is also discussed later by ND., BP., NLRK. and also SD. ND. calls it Durmilitā. BP. calls it Durmallikā. SD. calls it "Durmalli".
For Bhoja, its theme concerns itself with a secret love-intrigue or it is sometimes a description of love between two young persons. This secret love affair is described before the audiance by a female servant, a dūtikā, in vulgar language. The male or female lover whose love is being described makes an appearance and makes a plan in secret !) with the messanger who being a lowly-born asks for money (to

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861 do the work and also to keep the mouth shut). After getting money tries to get more (as if by blackmail). No illustration is cited by Bhoja.
The ND. (IV./3) accepts Bhoja's definition verbetim. The name given to this artform is “durmilitā”.
BP. of śāradātanaya has both "durmallikā” and also “mallikā”, which we will take up later. Bhoja's durmilikā and ND.'s durmilitā is “durmallikā” in BP., which observes - (pp. 391, Ch. IX/51, 52, 53; Edn. Agrawal, ibid) :
"atha durmallikā nāma praudhanāgara-nāyikā caturankā catussamdhir, garba-samdhi-vinā-kstā vito vilasati svairam, prathamánke (tri) nāļikāḥ. viduşako dvitīyénke vilasat pañca-nādikaḥ, pīķhamardo viharati tỉtīye sapta-nāļikāḥ, vitā"di-tritaya-krīdā caturthe daśa-nāļikaḥ. - IX/51 caurya-rati pratibhedam yūnor anurāga-varnanam kvā’pi, yatra grāmya-kathābhiḥ kurute kila dūtikā rahasi. mantrayati ca tadvisayan - nyag-jātitvena yācate ca vasu, labdhvā’pi labdhum icchati yā sā durmallikā nāmnā. enām durmallikām anye prāhur matta-mallikām iti. IX./52 yasyām udbhāvyaḥ syāt purohitā’mātya-tāpasā"dīnām, prārabdhā’-nirvāḥ,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sā'pi ca matta-mallikā bhavati. ksudrakathā matta-mallikā yeha mahārāstra-bhāṣayā bhavati, gorocane ca kāryā
anangavati bhāva-rasa-vidyā. Säradātanava is both lucid and exhaustive in his treatment. He says that some call durmallikā by the name of 'matta-mallikā' also. Eventhough he is acquainted with Bhoja and also perhaps with the ND., he does not notice the titles viz. durmilikā or durmilitā read in the above two sources respectively. .
The BP. observes that this art-form has a hroine who is mature (both in'age and experience) and is a cultured lady of cultivated taste. i.e. 'nāgara'. So, perhaps she resides in an urban place. Again, durmallika has four acts. All four samdhis, except the 'garbha'-samdhi are visible in this. The first act has the free activity of a 'vita' a it lasts upto three nädkās. Thus, the first act has a duration of 3 nādi = 6 ghadis (one ghadi = 24 minutes); so 6 ghadis = 24 x 6 = 144 minutes. This comes to two and a quarter hour and nine minutes more. The second act is longer with 5 nādikās i.e. ten ghadis equivalent to 240 minutes i.e. four hours. In this act we have the free activity of the Vidūsaka. The pithamarda has his free role in the third act which has the duration of seven nādikās i.e. 14 ghadis = 14 x 24 = 336 minutes, i.e. Five hours and a half roughly. The fourth act comprises of ten nādikās i.e. 480 minutes equivalent to 8 hours ! So, the whole show takes up 2hr. 24, 4 hrs. minutes, 5 hrs., and 30 minutes and 8 hrs. i.e. a total of 19 hrs. and 45 minutes. Perhaps the show was staged by the end of the day in a make-shift theatre in a temple at the outskirts of a village and it went on upto nearly a week in a leisurely fashion ! Again these art-forms were also folk-art-forms and had a lot of dance, music and drama in them. The expression 'vitā"di-tritaya' is explained by Dr. Agrawal (pp. 291, ibid) as "three-fold”, thus taking it to mean the three-fold activity of vita. But we may choose to take "tritaya" as a 'group of three', meaning the fourth act here abounds in the activity of the three taken together, i.e. of vița, vidūşaka and pithamarda.
Śāradātanaya further (IX./52) makes observations that are read in Bhoja also. Here a maid-servant, a lady messanger or dūtikā describes the love affair of two
people in vulgar language. Then enters into a secret deal with the lovers). Here 'rahasi' of the second line is to be read with the third line as "rahasi mantrayati" - she makes a plan, enters into a deal concerning 'tadvisaya' i.e. the secret love affair. She being a woman lowly born, i.e. she being a woman of low

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863 culture and low taste, asks for money (in return). After grabing some amount she becomes avaricious and asks for more money. This durmallika is also named matta-mallikā by others.
That also is termed matta-mallikā in which imaginary lack of activity in case of a project on hand of the office-bearers such as a minister or a purohita-a preceptor - or tāpasa i.e. an ascetic etc. is delineated. A trivial story ksudrakathā related in Mahārāśtra-bhāsā is also termed matta-mallikā. The line
"gorocane ca kāryā
anangavati bhāva-rasa-vidyā” is not clear. But 'gorocanā’ is explained by Monier-Williams, pp. 366 as, “a bright yellow orpiment prepared from the bile of cattle (employed in painting, dyeing, and in marking Tilaka on the forehead; in med. used as sedative” ... etc.) Thus perhaps 'anangavati is an illustration of a trivial story narrated on the occasion of preparing ‘gorocana' (or. nā.). Again 'bhāva-rasa-vidyā' also is not very clear. 'rasa-vidyā' could have something to do with rasāyana-vidyā, i.e. medicine. Anangavati is said to be 'bhāva-rasa-vidyā', which is a clumsy expression. May be it is full of bhāva, rasa and rasa-vidyā ! or, "having predominance of bhāva and rasa-vidyā.” We are not very clear about this.
The NLRK. has the following on this art-form - (pp. 302, 3, Edn. Babulal Shastri, ibid)
atha durmallikā. caturankā, garbha-samdhi-śūnyā. yathā bindumati. asyām ekā”nko vita-vilāsamayaḥ. dvitīyo viduşaka-vilāsamayaḥ. třtīyaḥ pithamardavilāsamayaḥ, caturthaḥ nāgara-vilāsamayaḥ. prathamas tu tri-nāļikaḥ, dvitīyaḥ pañca-nāļikaḥ, śeşau daśa-nādikau.
Obviously this seems to be the summary of Śāradātanaya's writing. But according to the NLRK., the fourth act is full of sporting activity of a nāgaraka, or a cultured citizen. Thus it is going to be grace and culture. Again the further details as read in BP. are also omitted here. They were seen in Bhoja and ND. also. The illustration cited is "bindumati". - The Sāhitya-darpana of Viśvanātha has the following:
S.D. calls it 'durmally S.D. VI. 303-305 read as,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "durmallī caturankā syāt kaiśī-bhārati-yutā. a-garbhā, nāgara-narā, nyūna-nāyaka-bhūṣitā. - VI. 303. S.D. trināliḥ prathamonkósyām vīța-krīdāmayo bhavet pancanālir dvitīyo’nkaḥ vidūşaka-vilāsavān. - VI./304 snnālikas tộtīyah tu pithamarda-vilāsavān caturtho dasanālih syād
ankaḥ krīļita-nāgaraḥ." Here also, - a maid messanger talking about the secret love of someone and trying to exploit the situation and getting money for it etc. -, the vulgarity going with this narration etc. - all these features are missing. As for the duration of acts, there is some difference in all these accounts. But that it was a spectacle in four acts is almost common. The S.D. suggests that the hero is a lowly-born - "nyūnanāyaka", and other male characters are urbane. 'Bindumati' is cited as an illustration and this could be from the NLRK. Thus, the description of this art-form differs not only in name but also features. But that it is more of drama, and of course also of song and music, is proved by its having four acts and its having the predominance of bhārati vrtti.
Prasthāņa is the next art-form mentioned by Bhoja. But it may be noted that this type of upa-rupaka is also mentioned by Abhinavagupta, and Avaloka and then Bhoja, Hemacandra, the ND., Śā., NLRK., Vāg. II and Viśvanātha.
Abhinavagupta, in the name of 'Cirantana's (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. Abh. on Ch. IV - '5b, G.O.S. Edn.) says -
"gajā"dīnām gatim tulyām krtvā pravasanam tathā, alpāviddham su-massņam
tat-prasthānam pracakșate." This uparūpaka is alpāviddha and also su-masrna, i.e. both partly violent and

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865 also very delicate in nature. This means that it treats of love and such graceful movements but it is also described as imitating the gait of elephants and other beasts and thus some rough or wild movements also get in as a result. We will see that Bhoja describes pravāsa or travel of the lover as its theme. Here also the idea of 'pravāsa' is seen in “krtvā pravasanam tathā.” Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 549 ibid) that, the nature of this type as defined here, and how, where and why imitation of the gait of elephants is introduced is not clear. Probably, as the lover going on pravāsa would go by elephant or horse or by a bullock-cart, the representation of the gaits of these animals are included here.” But our understanding is that in literature a fair lady with graceful movement is described as "gaja-gāmini" i.e. one having her gait like that of an elephant. So, here also perhaps the same is intended. The word 'tulyām' supports our understanding. The prasthāna is carried out in an elegant style of the gait of an elephant which by itself is awe-inspiring as well as graceful to look at.
Dr. Raghavan further explains (pp. 549, ibid) that, "an observation of Abhinavagupta in a different context however, would ask us to take the animals depicted as the central theme, and understand them as "anyápadeśa” or something like edificatory animal fables in dance. (Abh. I. p. 174) We have it perhaps on pp. 172 (Abh. ibid) Abhinavagupta observes : "simha-sūkara-bhallūka-kasarā"di-varnanenā'pi bhāņa-preraņa-bhānikādāv aprastuta-praśamsárthántaranyāsa-dęstāntā"dinā purusārthasya eva upadeśa-darśanād iti prayojana-bhedādapi na bhedaḥ.”
The idea is that perhaps through animals depicted on stage-perhaps through imitation only-some advice, through anyápadeśa is given. The medium is of course dance. This also could be prasthāna.
Again, under NS. iv. 253, pp. 166 (Abh.) Abhinavagupta observes : tathā hi - gītam eva tadányártham tadanyagatatvena nșttā”di, yathā dombikā”dau. tatra hi parikramaņādy api sukumāreņaiva angena. tatrā’pi varṇanánga-prādhānyam kvacit. yathā prasthānā”dau. Thus he seems to give another feature of prasthāna here.
But Bhoja has a clearer definition of prasthāna - He says (pp. 466, śr. Pra., ibid) :
"prathamánurāga-māna-pravāsaśộngāra-samśrayam yat syāt, prāvrd-vasanta-varṇana-param anyad vā’pi sotkantham,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ante vīra-rasā'dhyair nibaddham etat caturbir apasāraiḥ. prasthānam iti bruvate
pravāsam upalaksayet, sudhiyaḥ. Bhoja observes that this art-form is called prasthāna because it narrates or indicates (upalaksayet) the going away of the lover on travel as its theme and thus pravāsa-vipralambha is the dominant emotion. But in prasthāna are also depicted other aspects of love such as first meeting of lovers, pining due to first love, māna or mis-understanding, separation through travel etc. All this brings in also the descriptions of rains, spring, etc. At the end 'ante', this art-form is decorated with feelings and emotions concerning the vīra-rasa or heroic sentiment. Perhaps the lover while travelling and (also returning ?) performs heroic deeds and thus heroic
as a chance here. Vira-rasa at the end is introduced through four 'apasāras' - “apasāraīḥ caturbhiḥ”. As for an explanation of an ‘apasāra', we may turn to the A.bh. (N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S. pp. 188, ibid, on N.S. IV. 280) : "paribhāşántaram āha - "pindīm baddhvā.” iti. tasyápasāritasya nștta-prayogam kṛtvā sarvās tā niskrameyur apasareyuḥ. ata eva etatsthānópasīvibhir eva śrī rāņakā"di-kavibhir dombikā"dau caturapasārakaḥ prayogah." N.S. IV. 280 reads :
“tāvat paryastakaḥ kāryo yāvat pindi na badhyate, pindīm baddhvā tataḥ sarvā
niskrameyuḥ striyas tu tāḥ.” This has concern with 'pindibandha' in a nștta-performance, after doing which the ladies move away, of course with a graceful movement. The prasthāna also ends with these graceful exists by four (ladies, of course). The reference is to a 'dombikā' piece of kavi Rāņaka wherein this 'exit of four' was enacted. This has a clear reference to the element of dance and music in prasthāna also. However, Dr. Raghavan does not seem to be very convinced about the explanation he gives, even after quoting from the ND. He observes : (pp. 548, ibid) :
“The words 'ata eva refer to the last word in the previous sentence "niskrāmeyuh, apasareyuh.” Apasāra, therefore seems to mean exit. In a further paragraph Abhinavagupta uses apasāra along with praveśa and means exit. "evam prthak praveśaḥ... tad anantaram apasāraḥ.” But it is not possible to deduce fully

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the details of music and dance in these four Exists or how they depicted Vira-rasa
Vira-rasā"ḍhya-catur apasāra', as obviously the technique of it was handed down in practice and not recorded. However, Ramacandra who borrows the definition from Śr. Pra., adds something to our knowledge of this Apasara. He interprets Apasara as interludes of dance, "nṛtya-cchinnani-khaṇḍāni apasāraḥ." (p. 214, N.D.). The Kuṭṭanīmata, refers to Apasaraka in dance in śl. 87."
-
Dr. Raghavan should feel convinced about the nature of 'Vira-rasa"ḍhyaapasara', which are graceful movements of dance with final exits from the stage, after depicting the heroic acts, during pravāsa, of the hero. Abhinavagupta also calls it "alpā”viddham su-masṛṇam" meaning the same mixture of forceful and graceful movements of dance in this art-form.
Hemacandra defines prasthana after A.bh. as -
"gajā"dīnām gatim tulyām kṛtva pravasanam tathā, alpā"viddham su-masṛṇam tat prasthanam pracakṣate."
We have discussed the implications of this definition above. The only point to be noted is that H. takes it as a "prekṣya"/"geya" variety of art-form. For him, prekṣya is abhineya and 'śravya' is an-abhineya. But the preksya is again two-fold such as pathya and geya (Kā. Śā. VIII/2) (pp. 432, ibid). It may be noted that in păţhya he includes all major ten types of rūpakas along with nāțikā and saṭṭaka. This we have seen above also. But he accepts DR.'s observation also along with his loyalty towards Bharata and Abhinavagupta, when he says - (pp. 432, ibid): tathā ca nāṭakā"dīni vithyantāni väkyárthābhinaya-svabhāvāni bharata-muninópadarśitāni saṭṭakaś ca kaiścit."
He calls them 'pathya' meaning perhaps thereby that these major rūpakas have dialogues in prose (= pāṭhya) and are totally rasa-oriented. The 'geya', - which he enumerates as at least twelve and also remains open to other varieties by adding 'adi' at the end of ka. śā. VIII. 4, - are of the nature of padárthábhinaya. He
observes :
(Kā. śā. VIII. 4) pp. 445, ibid
"geyam dombika-bhāṇa-prasthāna
rāgakāvyā"di."
śingaka-bhāṇikā-preraṇa-rāmākrīdḍa-hallisaka-rāsaka-goṣthī-śrigadita

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
"padárthábhinaya-svabhāvāni dombikā”dīni geyāni rūpakāņi cirantanair uktāni.”
He accepts these art-forms as 'rūpaka' as well as calls them 'geya' variety suggesting that these popular art-forms are a curious mixture of some drama and more music, dance and song and are padárthábhinaya rupa, i.e. as is meant by the DR., they are minor art-forms which have 'bhava' at the centre and not 'rasa'. Again, in his Viveka (pp. 445, ibid), H. makes it clear that the performance or presentation of geya-kavya is three-fold such as masṛna or gentle, uddhata or highpitched and miśra or mixed : "trividho hi geya-kāvyasya prayogaḥ, masṛṇaḥ, uddhato, miśraś ca. Dr. Raghavan could have benefited had he looked into Viveka on it. H. further states (pp. 446, ibid) - "tathā hi dombikāsu narapati-caṭukaprādhānyena pravṛttāsu sukumāram eva śuddham rūpam. bhāṇakeṣu nṛsimhā❞dicarita-varṇane uddhatam eva. yat punar masṛṣe'py uddhatam praviśati tad ucitam eva. tatrápy-alpatva-bahutva-kṛto bhedaḥ. pūrvaḥ prasthāna-prabandhaḥ uttaraḥ śingaṭakabhedaḥ. uddhate tu masṛṇánupraveśād bhāṇikābhedaḥ anyad api preraṇa-rāmākrīḍa-rāsaka-hallīsakādim alpatva-bahutva-vaicitrya-kṛtam ihaiva pravistam veditavyam."
We will discuss all this in greater details when we take up H. separately later but for the present we may note that H. has not only understood the essence of various art-forms but he has explained it so clearly that there does not remain any doubt about the nature or features of various art-forms. We repeat here that Dr. Raghavan would have definitely benefited had be looked into the Viveka of H. Actually H. suggests that the acting in these minor art-forms is three-fold and could be manifold by the fusion of these elements of acting in different proportions.
So, for H., as for Abhinavagupta, 'prasthāna' is an art-form in which the acting is less hot and more soft. H. here has accepted Abhinavagupta's lead and not that of Bhoja. Prior to this, under DR. I. 8 Dhanika mentions 'rūpakántara' such as: (pp. 8, Adyar Edn. ibid).
"dombī śrīgaditam bhāņo, bhāṇī-prasthāna-rāsakāḥ,

kavyam ca, sapta nṛtyasya bħedā syus te'pi bhāṇavat."
The Avaloka mentions seven art-forms but distinguishes them from the major art-forms, the rūpakas, on the ground that the natya (= major rūpakas) are rasa"śraya i.e. rasa-oriented while these seven minor art-forms, which are termed 'nṛtya' are 'bhāvā❞śraya'.

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869 It is clear that H. has accepted this line of thinking. The Avaloka observes (pp. 8, ibid):
“rasā”śrayān nāțyād bhāvāśrayam nộtyam anyad eva. tatra bhāvā”śrayam iti visayabhedānnstyam iti nộter gātra-viksepārthatvenā’ngika-bāhulyāt tatkārișu ca nartaka-vyapadeśāl loke’pi ca range prekşanīyakam iti vyavahārān nāțakā"deranyan nětyam. tadbhedatvācchrīgaditā”der nā’vadhāraṇánupapattiḥ. nāțakā"di ca rasaviśayam rasasya ca padárthībhūta-vibhāvā"di-samsargātmaka-vākyártharūpatvad vākyárthábhinayā"tmakarvam rasā"śrayam iti anena darśitam. nātyam iti ca 'nața avaspandane' iti nateh kiñciccalanārthatvāt sāttvikabāhulyam. ata eva tatkārişu nața-vyapadeśaḥ. [loke'pi ca range nātyam iti vyapadeśaḥ etad uktam bhavati] yathā ca gātra-vikṣepárthatve samāne'pyanukārátmakatvena nrtyād anyan nịttam, tathā vākyárthábhinayātmakān nāryāt padárthábhinayā”tmakam anyad eva nrtyam iti."
On this read Laghuţikā by Bhatta Nșsimha (pp. 9, ibid) - "vişayabhedāt, svarūpabhedāt, kartřbhedāt, samjñābhedāc ca bhedah."
tatra bhāvā”śrayam ityanena visayabhedo darśitaḥ. āngika-bāhulyād ity anena svarūpa-bhedo darśitaḥ. tatkārișu nartaka-vyapedeśād ity anena kartěbhedo darsitaḥ. prekşanīyam ity anena samjñābhedo darsitaḥ."
nanu nātakā"des tato bhedah kena darsitah. tatrā"ha-rasa"śrayam ity anena iti.. katham aneya darśitam ity apeksāyām uktam - “nāțakā”di ca rasa-visayam ity ādi. yady api vibhāvā"dayas tair atiśayokty adibhiḥ pratipadyamānā vākyárthā eva na padarthāḥ. tathā'pi teşām samyogād rasotpatteḥ, te tam prati padárthībhāvam bhajante. raso'pi tad utpădyo vākyárthībhavati. ato vākyárthi-bhūta-rasa-visayam nāțakā"di.
tenátrā’pi rasavisayam iti vişayabhedaḥ, sāttvika-bāhulyena svarūpabhedaḥ, tatkārisu ca nața-vyapadeśād ity anena kartp-bhedaḥ, loke’pi ca' range nātyam iti vyapadeśād iti samjñābhedo’pi drastavyaḥ.”
The ND. defines prasthāna exactly after Bhoja, (ND. N. 4 pp. 405, Edn. Viśveśvara, ibid) - such as -
"prathamánurāga-māna-pravāsaśộngāra-samśrayam yat syāt, prāvrd-vasanta-varṇanaparam anyad vā’pi sotkantham. ante vīra-rasā"dyair

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA nibaddham etac caturbhir-apasāraiḥ prasthānam iti bruvate
pravāsam upalaksayat sudhiyaḥ." We have discussed this definition under Bhoja. It may be noted that though Rāmacandra and Gunacandra are H.'s disciples, they choose to follow Bhoja and not Abhinavagupta as done by their master here. Śāradātanaya, at BP. (IX. 27, pp. 384, ibid) observes :
"prasthānam kaiśikīvȚtti-yutam hīnópanāyakam, ā-pāna-keli-lalitam laya-tāla-kalánugam. dāsā”dināyakam dvyankam, vița-cețā”di-nāyakam, mukhanirvahaņópetam,
śrngāratilakam yathā.” "Prasthāna has Kaišiki vịtti - It is having a lowly born as upa-nāyaka i.e. subordinate hero. It has the grace of drinking bout and sport (connected with the same). It is rich with harmony and rhythem and art (or art with harmony and rhythem prominent in it). The hero is in form of a servant and it has two acts. Or, the hero is vita, ceta etc. There are two junctures viz. mukha and nirvahana. It is illustrated by śộngāratilaka."
Śāradātanaya's prasthāna does not share the features as described by either Abhinavagupta or Bhoja. Prasthāna for him is primarily musical - 'laya-tālakalánugam'. The theme is erotic with kaiśiki diction and viţa or ceța as its hero. Scenes of drinking and marry-making abound in it. It is having two acts and two junctures.
But while discussing rāsaka at IX. 37 BP., Śāradātanaya first gives the first three lines from Bhoja's definition of 'prasthāna' and the fourth-line has -
"mukha-nirvahaņa-sametam
prasthānam bhavati caikánkam.” (pp. 388, ibid) Perhaps these lines are misplaced here through the mistake of some copvist, or, as Dr. Raghavan thinks, Sāradātanaya means to bring together other definitions of

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871 some of the uparūpakas here in the anustubhs read here, as read originally in the A.bh. also.
The NLRK. has the following - (pp. 298, ibid) :
"atha prasthānakam, ghata (?) ceryā'dināyikam, kaiśiki-vștti-bahulam, bahutāla-layā”śrayam, surāpāna-rājitam, vitopanāyakam, dāsā”dināyakañca. yathāśrngāra-tilakam."
The presentation seems to go after Sāradātanaya or the tradition represented by Sā. But here 'nāyikā', a woman of low status, (such as dāsī, cerī, etc.) is mentioned and the element of two acts and two-samdhis is not read. The illustration is the same as read in the BP.
Vāgbhata II. (pp. 18, ibid, Kā. śā. II) mentions 'prasthāna' as a geya variety along with dombikā, bhāna etc. This is read as -
"dombikā-bhāņa-prasthāna-bhāņikā-prerana-singaka-rāmākrīda-hallīsakaśrīgadita-rāsaka-gosthi-prabhrtīni geyāni.”
This is modelled on the Kā. Šā. of Hemacandra. Vāgbhasa II also defines prasthāna after H., who follows Abhinavagupta :
"gajā"dinām gatim tulyām krtvā pravasanam tathā,
alpa(ā)viddham su-masrņam
· tat-prasthānam pracakşate." The Sāhityadarpaņa (VI. 280, 281, S.D.) observes :
prasthane nāyako dāso hīnaḥ syād upanāyakaḥ, dāsī ca nāyikā, vịttiḥ kaiśikī bhārati tathā. - VI. 280 S.D. surāpāna-samāyogād uddistárthasya samhștiḥ, ankau dvau, laya-tālā"dir
vilāso bahulas tathā.” VI. 281. S.D. Thus Viśvanātha holds that 'prasthāna' has dāsa' for its hero. The person subordinate to the hero is still less blessed - "hin-upanāyaka". Maid-servant is the heroine here. This was noted in the NLRK. The diction is both kaisiki and bhārati.

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SAHŞDAYĀLOKA The latter is added by Viśvanātha. The intended thing is accomplished by the practice of a drinking bout. 'Two acts', as noted by the BP., are also seen here. Marry-making is seen in excess in this variety which is chiefly musical in its nature, being qualified by tāla and laya.
Thus 'prasthana' seems to have two traditions. The first as seen in Abhinavagupta and also perhaps Bhoja where the theme is that of a travel by a lovelorn hero, with the descriptions of monsoon, spring etc. adding the element of poetry, and the other as seen in Sā. and others with two acts, hero and heroine of lower status, etc. But in both the traditions, this uparūpaka is described as having a lot of dance and music.
"Kāvya' and Citra-kāvya; rāgakāvya;
We will take up Kāvya, (Rāga) kāvya and (citra) kāvya together. We read them in Abh., DR./A., H., ND., Śā., NLRK., and S.D.
Abh. refers to this variety in the name of rāga-kāvya on four occasions with a specific illustration. Before we look into this, it may be noted that this art-form is studed both with music and dance on one hand and also abhinaya' on the other. The ‘abhinaya' part of it is invariably taken note of by Abhinavagupta. The references are :
(i) (pp. 172, A.bh.; under NS NV. 261, Vol. I. N.S. G.O.S. Edn.; '56; pp. 170 Third Edn., '92; G.O.S. 4th Edn.)
- caturvargópadeśasya rāghava-vijayā”dikarāga-kavyeșu dệstatvāt -
This suggests that the theme of rāgakāva, as illustrated in rāghava-vijaya, concerned itself with the four-fold pursuits (i.e. dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa) of life.
(pp. 172, ibid) (ii) yadā yato'rthānām prayojanā”dīnām prāpty artham tajñair anuvā”dibhiḥ (r-nţttánurāgibhiḥ) kavibhiḥ abhinayaḥity abhinīyamāno rāgakāvyā”diḥ kṣtaḥ.
This shows that rāgakāvya had to be enacted through acting. (pp. 172, ibid) (iii) athocyate (rāghava-vijayā”di) rāga-kāvyā”di-prayogo nātyam eva.
This is clearly taken as 'nātya' here. (pp. 181, ibid) (iv) ete prabandhāḥ nrttā"tmakāh na nātyā"tmaka-nātakā"di-vilaksanāh. rāghava-vijayamārīcavadhā”dikam rāga-kāvyam. etacca grantha-vistāra-bhītyā bahutaram yathāsambhavam na likhitam anupayogāc ca yat tu upayogi tad yathāvasaram varņayisyāmaḥ

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873 Rāghava-vijaya and Mārīca-vadha are mentioned as illustrations. Eventhough the rāgakāvya and other varieties of art-forms as enumerated by the Cirantanas are necessarily of the form of 'nţtta', they are said not to be different (essentially) from nāțaka etc., which are said to be 'nātyā”tmaka' i.e. acting-oriented art-forms. (pp.
182, ibid) (v) esa eva tu prakāraḥ kalāvidhinā nibadhyamāno rāghava-vijayamārīca-vadhā"dikam rāga-kāvyabhedam udbhāvayati-iti.
That this art-form is rendered through artful expression is underlined here. Abhinavagupta here goes on to quote from Kohala, and elaborates further the nature of rāgakāvya, which though it involves acting, is primarily an art-form devoted to rāgas (i.e. vocal music) and also dance. Abhinavagupta observes - (pp. 182, ibid) yathoktam Kohalena -
"layántara-prayogena rūgaiś cā’pi vivecitam, nānārasam, sunirvāhya-katham
kāvyam iti smộtam - . Thus for Kohala 'kāvya' is presented through rāgas, wherein layántara-prayoga is seen, i.e. the rhythem or time in music can change. It is full of different rasas and is having a story which is well presented su-nirvyāhya-katham.
Abhinavagupta further informs that - "layataś ca asya gīty adhāratvena aprādhānye, gīter eva . prādhānyam iti na kāvyártha-viparyāsa-vaśena rāgabhāsā”di-viparyāso nātya iva
Because of the 'laya' element, this art-form depends on ‘gīti' i.e. song and music, which is the principal feature here. Again, as in nātya or drama proper, here on account of change in kāvyártha (i.e. 'rasa'? or, situation ?), there is no change in rāga and bhāsa i.e. music and language. The idea seems to be that as the range of this art-form is limited, it has no frequent changes following rasas or situations and therefore it is presented through the medium of one language and identical tunes. What follows in Abh. drives us to this. Read Abh. (pp. 182, ibid) :
tathā hi rāghavavijayasya hi thakka-rāgena eva, vicitra-varnaniyatvépi nirvāh. - i.e. though the matter to be communicated is of varied interest (or is beautiful), the specific rāghavahāvya is presented through 'thakka’-rāga alone. Similarly, mārica-vadhasya kakubha-grāma-rāgena eva. ata eva rāgakāvyāni iti ucyante etāni.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Rāghavavijaya, or Mārīca-vadha or whatever else - is called 'rāga-kāvya' only because the presentation is carried out in this or that special rāga alone and therefore all other features such as acting (nātya) and description (kathā), though present, are rendered subordinate to the principal feature which is 'song and music' alone.
Abhinavagupta explains further that 'rāga' is that which has singing as its soul and this kāvya as it depends on rāga, is therefore (rāga) kävya. He observes : (pp. 182, ibid) - "rāgo gīty ātmakaḥ. svarasya tad ādhārabhūtam kāvyam iti."
He further adds : "evam idam ca nrttam sapta-krti-prakārair bhagavata eva prasștam. tathā hi-śuddham eva nșttam recakángahārā"tmakam. (= śuddha form of nrtta is of the form of recaka and angahāra) - tato gitakādy abhinayónmukham. (= the next type is furnished with abhinaya that goes with gītaka-music dominating). - tato gāna-kriyāmātránusāri vādya-tālánusāri ca - (i.e. the next variety of 'nrtta' is one which follows only vocal music accompanied by beats of intruments). This is seen as in • “bāhu-prenkhanoraḥ kampa-pārsvanamanónnamana-carana-sarana-sphurita-kampita-bhrūtārā-parispanda-katicchedangavalana-mātra-rūpam." yac coktam -
tandunā’pi tataḥ samyag. . gāna-bhāņda-samanvitaḥ
nștta-prayogaḥ...” ityādi. (N.S. IV. 260) Then Abhinavagupta adds - gītir gānam iti hy atra vyutpattir uktā. tatópy uddhatasukumāra-miśrā”tmaka-bheda-cațuştaya-bhinna-kavyárthánusāritayā caturvidham. - i.e. it becomes fourfold due to the type being either high-pitched (uddhata), or soft (sukamāra) or miśra (i.e. mixed, of two types in which either of the first two is in greater degree). etc.
The rāga-kävya is an art-form dominated by song and music and dance and also acting to some extent. That the element of abhinaya is of course there, is underlined by Abhinavagupta when he observes (pp. 198, ibid) :
yat tu rāghava-vijayā”dau sītāmūrcchā'di-vyāvarnanántam tāndavam. na ca tatra tādrse tat-sukumärắngahārāotmaka-netta-yojana. api tu gitakārtha-bhāvananyāyena, "raudrasyaiva ca yat karma sa karuņa" iti prasaktyā tatra tathāvidhäbhinayayoga, ity alam bahunā.
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 550) also explains the same as - “The Abhinavabhāratī gives a better and clearer idea of kāvya which it

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sometimes calls more descriptively Rāga-kavya. From the name we can see, that kävya or Rāga-kāvya is a musical composition covering a complete story, i.e. a whole kāvya in the shape of songs. It might have been something like a south-India Harikathā-Kālakṣepa where one definite theme is chosen for exposition, the songs of the theme are sung and an exposition in prose is given. Since the is said to be a nộtya-prabandha it must have comprised the singing of songs of a continuous theme in one Rāga or in various rāgas (if citra-kävya), and the interpretation of the contents of songs by a single dancer through abhinaya. The following facts about the rāga-kāvyas are found in the Abhinavabhāratī. On p. 174, there are two observations which prove that the whole musical theme of Rāgakāvya was rendered into gesture.
- "ityabhinīyamāno rāgakāvyā”diḥ krtah.” (pp. 174) "rāghava-vijayā”di-rāga-kāvyā”di-prayogo nāțyam eva, abhinaya-yogāt.” (p. 174) "rāghava-vijaya-mārīca-vadhā”dikam rāga-kävyam” (p. 183).
esa eva kalāvidhinā nibadhyamānaḥ rāghava-vijaya-mārīcavadhā"dikam rāga-kāvya-bhedam udbhāvayatīti (p. 183). yathoktam kohalena - "layántaraprayogeņa rāgaiścā’pi vivecitam, nānārasam su-nir-vāhyakatham kāvyam iti smytam.” (P. 184)
From these observations it is plain that Kāvya means just what the word means while applied to śravya-kāvya, but is written not exactly in mere metres, vịttas, but in the form of songs which are sung and gesticulated by a single individual. Abhinavagupta mentions the names of two specimens both on the theme of Rāmāyana, the Rāghavavijaya and the Maricavadha. Both of these belong to the class of Kāvya sung throughout in one Rāga, the first variety of Bhoja. For Abhinavagupta says that, though the rasas and situations differ, the tune and the time-measure do not change in a rāga-kāvya, as in drama proper. The Rāghavavijaya is throughout sung only in thakka-rāga and the Māricavadha in the grāmarāga called kakubha. -
- "na Kāvyártha-viparyāsa vašena rāga-bhāvā"di-viparyāso nātya iva. tathā hi rāghava-vijayasya hi thakkārāgenaiva vicitra-varṇanīyatve'pi nirvāhaḥ, mārīcavadhasya kakubha-grāma-rāgenaiva. ata eva rāgakāvyānīty ucyanta etāni.” (p. 184. Abh. G.O.S. Edn. pt. I).
The Kāvya described by Kohala in the verse given above as quoted by Abhinavagupta is Bhoja's citrakāvya, for it has more than one rāga and tāla.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Though sung and represented through Abhinaya by only one, though the theme is descriptive as in a śravyakāvya and not written in form of dramatic dialogue, the citra-kāvya employs various rāgas and Tālas at different places to suit the varying Rasa and idea. The Gita-govinda is thus a citra-kavya uparūpakā. It is well known that it was intended for Abhinaya and that Jayadeva's wife herself rendered it in Abhinaya. In south India it is even now being sung and till recently rendered in Abhinaya in the bhajana tradition of the Bhāgavatas. In the Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library there are two copies, unfortunately incomplete, of a commentary on the Gīta-govinda giving Abhinaya for the text, word for word.”
Dr. Raghavan here explains how Kohala's concept of Kāvya (or Rāga-kāvya) was picked up by Bhoja, whose view we will now examine.
Bhoja mentions ‘Kāvya' as having another variety called citra-kāvya. He defines each in an āryā, which read as - Śr. Pra. (Vol. II. Josyer, pp. 466):
"ākṣiptikā’tha varno mātrā. dhruvakotha bhagnatālaś ca. vardhatikāccha-dhvanikā yatra syus tad iha kāvyam iti.” "yuktam layántarair yac ca dhvanikā-sthāna-nirmitaiḥ bhavati, kävyam iti vividha-rāgam
citram iti tad ucyate krtibhiḥ.” This description is full of “obscure musical terms relating to Rāga”, observes Dr. Raghavan (pp. 549, ibid). The musical composition and tāla referred to are equally obscure.
Dr. Raghavan here reads two varieties as mentioned by Bhoja. The first is pure ‘kāvya', which is in one rāga, and the other is 'citra' kāvya, full of many - (vividha) rāgas.
DR./Avaloka under DR. I. 8 mentions "Kāvya' as one of the seven types of varieties of nộtya. But nothing further is discussed by Dhanika.
Hemacandra has the following (Kā. Šā. VIII. (70), pp. 449, ibid-Edn. Parikh and Kulkarni) :

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877 "layantara-prayogena rāgaiścā’pi vicitritam, nānā-rasam sunirvāhyakatham
kāvyam iti smộtam.” This is according to Kohala as quoted by Abhinavagupta. The only difference is that H. reads "vicitritam” for “vivecitam" in the Abh. (pp. 182, ibid). But perhaps as at many other places, so also here, Hemacandra seems to present a better, and even original reading. Vicitritam' here means "rendered beautiful". So, 'Kavya' is said to have different and many 'layas' and 'rāgas' and is also 'nānā-rasam' i.e. having different rasas (in various situations); and is having a story element which is presented easily or gracefully. Perhaps Bhoja also means this. We do not feel like Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja intends two separate varieties such as kāvya and citrakāvya. On the contrary, perhaps when more than one rāgas or laya are introduced, it becomes more charming or "citra', according to Bhoja. Dr.Raghavan's own submission that Gīta-govinda is an illustration of citra-kāvya shows that ‘kāvya' which carries more rāgas and layas becomes more charming and is therefore 'citra'. Actually, in sūtra 4, Adhyāya VIII (pp. 445) when H. mentions varieties of 'geya', he calls it 'rāga-kavya'. Read : geyam dombika-bhāna-prasthāna-singaka-bhānikāpreraņa-rāmākrīda-hallīsaka-rāsaka-gosthi-śrī-gadita-rāgakāvyā”di. These are twelve in all. When H. defines them one by one he, as seen above, calls it "Kāvyam”. This means rāga-kāvya and kāvya are one and the same for H. and both are 'vicitrita', i.e., rendered beautiful by 'layántara-prayoga' and 'rāgaih'. Thus citra-kāvya need not be taken as a different variety as done by Dr. Raghavan. Even Abhinavagupta while quoting from Kohala does not seem to intend it to be a separate variety. The ND. has the following:
"ākṣiptikā'tha varno mātrā-dhruvako’py abhagnatālaś ca paddhatikā chardanikā yatra syus
tad iha kāvyam iti." (N.D. IV. 11; pp. 408) This is the first verse from Bhoja's definition. Dr. Raghavan (ft. n. 1, pp. 54a) observes that, “The Nātyadarpana, p. 215, which gives only the first of these two (= of the verses from Bhoja), reads 'a-bhagha-tālaśca' which is wrong, and 'paddhatikā', 'chardanikā' which seem to be correct. The text of the Bhā. Pra. (p. 265) however, reads the words mostly as found in the MS. of the Śr. Pra.”

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Actually in Sā., (pp. 388) under false title 'rāsaka', Bhoja's definition of Kavya
ad. There we read, "āksiptikā'pavarno” and not "āksiptikā'tha varno", which is o retained in the ND. Then, we have “kāvyam vicitrarāgam” in place of Bhoja's "vividha-rāgam”. We do not find any logic in Dr. Raghavan's rejecting 'abhagnatāla' of the ND. and accepting 'paddhatikā' and 'chardanikā'. Actually the writers from Gujarat in those days had a better access to the original mss., thanks to the efforts of king Jaisimhadeva who conquered Malwa and thanks to Ācārya Hemacandra for whom the king either collected mss. not only from Bhoja's library but also from different parts of India or got them copied. Dr. Kulkarni V.M., my guru has successfully reconstructed the lost portion of A.bh. on NS. VII, the Bhāvádhyāya, and many readings from H.'s Viveka have been accepted in the critical editions of the Abh. on NS. VI. (The rasa-sūtra portion) by eminent editors such as Gnoli, Masson & Patwardhan and the rest. So, readings from authors fr the land of Gujarat seem to be more reliable. In that case, accepting two readings as correct and rejecting the third for no reason is not logical on the part of Dr. Raghavan. On the contrary we would accept the ND. readings and correct the text as read both in Bhoja's Śr. Pra, and the B.P. of Sā. Even in the SD. we can emend the text as “khandamātrā-dvipadikā - 'bhagnatālaiḥ alamkstam." sāradātanaya defines kävya (BP. IX. 28, pp. 384, Edn. Agrawal, ibid) as :
“kāvyam sa-hāsya-śộngāram sarva-vștti-samanvitam, sa-bhagnatāla-dvipadi khanda-mātrā-pariskrtam. garbhávamarśa-sandhibhyām hīnam, ekánkam eva ca. kvacil lāsyayutam vā syāt vița-ceți-samanvitam. kulanganāveśa-yutam lalitódātta-nāyakam evam prakalpayet kāvyam
tad gauda-vijayo yathā.” Before we explain this, it is clear from the face of it that "kāvya' is, no doubt, 'nāțya, as stated by Abhinavagupta, though with song and music as

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predominant. This does not agree with Dr. Raghavan's observation of taking Gita-govinda as 'kavya' or 'raga-kavya', for it is not having 'one act', and 'garbhavamarśa-sandhibyām hinam" i.e. not having garbha and avamarśa sandhis. Again it is having a number of characters and even this also goes against Dr. Raghavan's description of kavya being presented only by one person, such as the wife of Kavi Jayadeva.
So, for Śāradātanaya, Kävya is endowed with hasya and śṛngāra rasas and is gifted with all the vṛttis (such as kaiśikī, ārabhați, etc.) This art-form is rich in bhagna-tāla, dvipadi and khandamātrā. These terms are not clear to us but we know that Bhamaha (I 24) had mentioned 'abhineyártha' such as nāṭaka, dvipadī and samyā. Tatacārya in his commentary does not explain (pp. 11) this term 'dvipad?'. For Saradātanaya this 'kāvya' is a one-act presentation and it has mukha, pratimukha and nirvahaṇa sandhis. It has vita, ceți, kulanganā nāyikā, and nayaka of the 'lalitódatta' variety. Sāradātanaya further adds: (BP. IX. 29 - pp. 385, ibid).
"viprā'mātya-vanik-putranāyikā-nāyakójjvalam
mudita-pramadā-bhāṣācestitair antara'ntarā. grathitam, vita-ceṭā"diveṣa-bhāṣābhir eva vā,
evam vā kalpayet kavyam
yathā sugrīva-kelanam."
A second form of Kavya is described with "sugrīva-kelana" as an illustration, the first form being illustrated by "gauḍa-vijaya".
This variety of Kavya has in it characters such as a brahmin-vipra, a vaṇik putra, is beautified by nayikā and nayaka (in form of a brahmin or a vanik-putra). This form is intervowen in the middle at places by women who are joyous, and their language (expressing joy), and the joyous activities of such ladies. It is again gifted with the costumes and language of vita, ceta and such other characters. The illustration is "sugrīvakelana". This variety has traits of the prakarana type. Though Śāradātanaya does not mention the number of acts or sandhis, we can imagine that they remain the same as in the first variety.

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SAHẠDAYĀLOKA One thing is clear that it is a form of dramatic spectacle with beauty of song, music and costumes added to it.
True, śāradātanaya also quotes from Bhoja (pp. 388, BP.). But perhaps Dr. Rāghavan is again off the track when he says that Săradātanava quotes it under 'wrong leading of rāsaka'. (pp. 550) Actually even in Agrawal's edition also this portion is printed under the title “rāsaka". But we feel that these verses, which start with Bhoja's definition of prasthāna and move on to describe other varieties of uparūpakas, follow actually the completion of the definition of rāsaka. ... “so'yam mato rāsakah”. - Perhaps in the ms. of BP. some copyist must have added the title "rāsakam” after this, through mistake. Actually verses or portions; 37-46 as read on pp. 388, 389 of BP. are given as definitions of various art-forms and after these are over, other art-forms such as Ullopyaka etc. are described. So, perhaps they are wrongly read here through a scribe's mistake. There is no logic in reading Bhoja's definitions in between. Or, perhaps the scribe concerned must be copying Bhoja's Sr. Pra. also simultaneously and through genuine error he copied this portion from Bhoja or Abhinavagupta as the case may be. This portion is totally out of context and need not be taken as one intended by Sāradātanaya and also from his pen. Actually these verses, excepting the two for kāvya, are all from the Abhinavabhārati (pp. 181, Vol. II. N.S. G.O.S.), describing the view of the 'cirantanas'. Surely these verses are mis-read here and misplaced here and the editors of the BP. should have seen to this. These could have been either dropped as scribal mistake or read at the end of BP.'s treatment of uparūpakas.
The NLRK. has the following (pp. 299, ibid) :
atha kāvyam. khanda-māna, mātrā, dvipadī, bhagnatālā”di-vibhūşitam, catur vȚtti yuktam, śrngāra-hāsya-pradhānam garbhávamarśa-sandhi-sünyam ekánkam. yathā utkanthita-madhavam.
Though the NLRK. has not talked about the various characters, it is clear from the illustration cited, viz. ulkanthita-mādhavam, that the hero is of the lalitodātta type. The S.D. (VI. 284) defines "Kāvya' as -
"kavyām ārabhatīhīnam ekánkam hāsya-samkulam, khanda-mātrā-dvipadikābhagnatālair alamkrtam.”

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881 He carries impressions of his predecessors. We have here three vrttis, the ārabhati being omitted. Like NLRK., only one act is expected by SD. SD.'s definition is in a way closer to the NLRK. The SD. (VI. 285) adds,
"varņa-mātrā-chaganikāyutam, śộngāra bhāșitam, netā, strī cā'pyudātrā'tra,
sandhī ādyau tathā’ntimah.” Obviously 'chaganikā' can be emended as 'Vardhanikā' (N.D.), The hero and heroine both belong to the noble family as suggested in the BP. of Sā. Sandhis are three with garbha and vimarśa cancelled as suggested by BP. and NLRK. One act is retained as in NLRK.
Bhāņa, Bhāņaka, Bhāṇī, Bhāņikā -
All these four art-forms are discussed by various authorities as seen below, but quite often the difference is either thin, or in name only. Because of this closeness in both features and nomenclature, we take up all these four art-forms together for discussion.
'Bhāņa’ is mentioned by Abh., DR/A., Bhoja, H., ND.; Vāg. II. Bhāņaka - is mentioned by A.bh. alone. Bhāņi is read in DR./A., Śā., NLRK.; Bhānika is seen in Abh. Bho., H., ND., NLRK., Vāg II., and Viś. (= SD.).
Bhāņa - The Abh. (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S., N.S. IV/268) quotes the definition of Bhāņa from the Cirantanas -, with the words - “tad uktam cirantanaiḥ.” It reads as -
"nșsimha-sūkarā”dīnām varṇanām jalpayed yataḥ nartakī, tena bhāṇaḥ syād
uddhatấnga-pradarśitaḥ." on pp. 181 (ibid) the A.bh. reads - bhaņakeșu nộsimhā"di-carita-varṇanam uddhatam eva.
This suggests that for both 'bhāņa' and 'bhāņaka', the Abh. has the same illustration and similar description. We may therefore conclude that

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for Abhinavagupta these two art-forms, viz. bhāṇaka and bhāna are one and the same. Perhaps bhaṇikā also comes closer, as the theme seems identical, in the A.bh.
The bhāṇa, as quoted from 'cirantanas' - the ancients, and read in the Abh. (pp. 181, ibid) has the following features
Nartaki, a female dancer narrates - 'jalpayet', in a style which is forceful 'uddhatanga-pravartita', the description of nṛsimha, sūkara etc. The idea is that the nartaki presents through dance with forceful karaṇas the narration of nṛsimha, sūkara, etc. Dr. Raghavan here thinks that there is description of wild animals and so the theme is in the nature of parables and fables, anyápadeśa, arthántaranyāsa, and dṛṣṭānta, inculcating advice to man through description of the acts of wild animals; something like a bit of the Pañcatantra cast in a semi-dramatic form. Actually Abh. says (pp. 172, ibid NS. Vol. II) - "simha-sukara-bhalluka-kāsarā"divarṇanenā'pi bhāṇa-preraṇa-bhāṇikā”dāv-aprastuta-prasamsárthántaranyāsadṛṣṭāntā"dinā puruṣārthasyaiva upadeśa-darśanat."
This means that through the descriptions of animals such as lion, boar, bear, buffalo, etc., in art-forms such as bhāṇa, preraṇa, bhāņikā, etc. and through the device of figures of speech such as aprastuta-praśamsā, arthántaranyasa, dṛṣṭānta etc., only the basic pursuits of life (= puruṣārtha; dharma, artha, etc.) are promulgated.
But the other explanation which Dr. Raghavan talks of (pp. 554, ibid) is more acceptable. It is possible that the A.bh. here refers to the avatāras of Viṣṇu such as Nrsimha, Sūkara, etc. This way, the art-form becomes both diadectic and also devotional in keeping with what we will find in Bhoja and the rest.
-
Abhinavagupta also says (pp. 181, ibid) "bhāṇakeṣu nṛsimha❞di-caritavarṇanam uddhatam eva." This precedes (pp. 187) the list, with definitions, of the art-forms as given by the ancients, one of which is "bhāṇaḥ" -
It seems, perhaps Abhinavagupta does not distinguish basically between bhāṇa and bhāṇaka and even bhāṇikā. These art-forms differ slightly only from the point of view of the technique of presentation of the theme which involves either the faster or rougher or forceful aspect of dance (= tandava) in a greater or smaller degree as compared to the graceful, slower and gentler aspect (= läsya) of dance used as the medium. The theme, perhaps is common to all these three, being of the nature of didectic or devotional story.

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883 The Abh. further notes (pp. 181, NS. Vol. II G.O.S.) “yat-punar masșnépy uddhatam pravišati, tat taducitam eva. tatópy alpatva - bahutva-krt bhedaḥ. pūrvaḥ prasthānabandhaḥ. uttarah șidgakabhedaḥ. uddhate tu masrnánupraveśad bhāņikā-bhedaḥ anyad api preraņa-rāmākrīdarāsaka-hallīsakā"dikam alpatva-bahutva-vaividhyakstam ihaiva praviştam veditavyam.” We know that H. has quoted this in his Viveka.
These were all dance-forms with forceful or graceful styles, with an element of drama and a lot of song and music (both vocal and instrumental). They were taken as upa-rūpakas, or semi-dramatic forms. Abhinavagupta (pp. 181, ibid) talks about bhāņikā as an art-form which is -
“bālakrīdā-niyuddhā"di tathā sūkara-simhajā, dhvajā”dinā krtā krīļā
yatra sā bhāņikā matā." Bhānikā contains the sports of children and also the fights of youngsters and sports of lions, pigs etc. Here also 'sūkara' and 'simha' are mentioned perhaps referring to the exploits of visnu in the avatāras of nr-simha and sūkara. "dhvajā”dinā krtā” is not clear to us. Perhaps a game with flags is meant. All this of course is in dance. The art-form is termed 'bhānika', as against 'bhāna' and both are separately treated by the ancients (= cirantanas) and also perhaps by Abhinavagupta. It is not clear whether what Bhoja intends as difference between bhāna and bhānikā is also intended by both the ancients and Abhinavagupta alike.
DR./A. on I. 8 simply mentions both bhāņa and bhāņi. It reads as (pp. 8, ibid) :
"dombi śrīgaditam bhāņo bhāņi-prasthāna-rāsakāḥ, kāvyam ca sapta nộtyasya
bhedāḥ syus té pi bhāņavat.” Thus these art-forms are closer to the bhāņa-which is a major rūpaka (bhāņavat). Beyond this nothing is noted in the Avaloka.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Bhoja has the following on bhāṇa and bhāņikā - (pp. 466, 467, śr. Pra. Vol. 1, ibid) -
“hari-hara-bhānu-bhavāniskanda-pramathādhipa-stuti-nibandhaḥ, uddhata-karana-prāyas
-strī-varjo varṇanāyuktaḥ.” Then Bhoja further elaborates -
"dhavala-guna-kīrtanaparair gāthā"rambhā”di-stuti-nibandhaḥ, gāyana-sahokti-yuktaḥ dattena vibhūșita-prāyaḥ tri-catuḥ-pañca-vitālaiḥ viśrāmaiḥ saptabhih paricchinnaḥ, ardhod-grāha-nivāraṇa-samkhātaiḥ kutracin niyatah. sama-viśrāmair dvipathair vibhūșitah pañcame viparivarte gāthāmātrād vipathaka pāthyenálamkrto bhavati, varnótha matta-pālī sabhagnatālā tv anantaram gāthā. anubhagna-tāla-mătre prathame syād-bhadra-tālaś ca mātrā nu ca mārganikā mātrā'tha tatónubhagnatālaḥ ca. gāthā-dvipada-vahanto viśrame syād dvitiye tu mātrā visama-cchinnā sa-bhagnatālā'tha bhavati radhvā ca. mārganikety evam syāt tālavidhānam trtīye tu,

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mātrā-dvipatha-vahantoradhvāvasthāpanam caturthe syuḥ." radhvatha-bhagnatālo

mārgaṇikā dvipatha-visamaśca, pañcamake ṣasthe'py atha radhvā nu ca bhagnatālaḥ syat. dvipathaka-mārganike ca
syātām atha saptame śṛṇutha,
radhva'tha bhagnatālaś śudbodhe bhāṇe kramaḥ pradistóyam.
This is Suddha-bhāṇa, for Bhoja. Then follow samkīrṇa and citra varieties.
sankīrṇa-bhāṇa-bhaṇitiḥ kāryā
syad ubhaya-samyogāt, kiñcid anuddhata-bhāvāt
tāla-krama-varjanāc ca, citróyam.
iti suddhas sankirṇaḥ
citraś ca matas tridhā bhāṇaḥ,
yadi veṣa-śuddha-vācaḥ
śuddhaḥ, sankīrṇayā'tha sankīrṇaḥ.
sarvabhir bhāṣābhis'
citraiś ca viceștitaiś citraḥ,
ayam uddhatótha.
lalito bhāno, lalitóddhataś ca sambhavati. arthānāmauddhatyāl
lälityād ubhayabhāvāc ca,
yad duşkaram abhineyam
citram caty udbhatam ca yad bhavati.
tad-bhāṇakébhidheyam
yutam anutālair vitālaiś ca,
sótraiväntar bhāvyo
yo bhāņo nandimāli-nāmā syāt.
885

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA bhinnaḥ kaiścit kathito bharatamatam samyag a-viditvā, ākāśa-puruşam uddiśya vastu yat pathyate 'thavā kriyate. vişliştodbhata-bhāva-prayogam iha nandi-māli sah, prāyo haricaritam idam svīksta-gāthā"di-varņa-mātraśca. sukumārataḥ prayogād bhāņópi hi bhāņikā bhavati, (This is important) divyabhiścārībhir vivarjitā lalita-karaṇa-samyuktā. tālántarāla-nșttă kvacid api radhvādi-samkalitā, ardhod grāha-nivarana-gāyanasaha-vacana-matta-pālībhiḥ. viśrāmaiś ca vihīnā stri-yojyā varjitais tālaiḥ, vastūni bhāņikāyā nava daśa vā niyamato vidhīyante. nava-mādya-pañcameşu sthāneșu ca bhagnatālaḥ syāt, sthānāntareșu cā’syām
laya-tāla-vidhir yadrcchayā kriyate. The description is very long and contains certain terms that are not clear to us. Śā, reproduces the whole passage at BP. IX. 14-23 (pp. 380, 381). We will compare the readings which are better at places in Sā. But after that (on pp. 381, BP. IX. 23 Cont.) i.e. after the line "viśliştodbhața-bhāva-prayogam iha nandimālī saḥ” - we have some more verses read in Sā., who once again after 40 lines in which the three types of Bhāna are discussed in greater details, once again picks up the thread from Bhoja and continues with 'bhānikā' (on pp. BP. IX. 382).

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887 This covers up Bhoja's description of Bhānikā with some difference in readings at places that we will notice in due course, and Sā. proceeds to read beyond Bhoja’s line viz :
"vividhavaco-vinyāsais sabhyajanótsāha-sampattih” - and adds six more lines. We will have to take a comparative approach and decide whether these added lines by Sa. actually seem to be originally from Bhoja or not and therefore whether these lines should be added in Bhoja's Śr. Pra., while attempting a critical edition. For the sake of convenience we will discuss Bhoja and śā. together.
The first verse viz. "Hari hara.... varnanāyuktah” reads identically in Bhoja and Śā. It means that the Bhāna is made up of 'stuti' i.e. praise or laudation of Hari, Hara, Sūrya, Bhavānī, Kārtikeya and Pramathādhipa i.e. Lord of Pramathas i.e. Siva. We do not know what difference between 'Hara' and 'pramathādhipa' is intended. Mostly it is having "uddhatakaranas”, i.e. forceful style of dancing and is without female characters (i.e. strī-varjyah) and is narrative in nature i.e. varnanāyuktah'. It is full of praises in form of gāthās, lauding the merits or good qualities of kings and is having 'uktis' i.e. speeches accompanied by songs - gāyana-sahokti - and is connected with lofty qualities (yuktódātra). In Bhoja we have "dhavalaguņa-kirtana parair gāthā"rambhā"dibhis stuti-nibandhah." Sā. reads : "gunakirtana-prakāśana-gāthābhir” which seems to be the paraphrase of Bhoja's expression. As gunas, in kavisamaya are said to be dhavala' or white, have omitted this expression and for Bhoja's 'kīrtana-paraih', Sa. has 'guna-kīrtanaprakāśana' as an adjective of gāthās'. One thing is clear that these praises were composed in gāthās, perhaps because they, by nature, tend to be more musical. For Bhoja's expression viz. "gāyana-sahókti-yuktódattena”, Sā. offers a better reading as, "gāyana-sahokti-yuktó-dāttena”, suggesting that the context of these gāthās
at a lofty idea and expression. Sā. here seems to read better, and Bhoja's text in our opinion could be emended.
Next two lines read identically in both Bhoja and sā. The meaning is that Bhāna, at places (= kutracit) is vested with three, four, or five vitālas, seven viśrāmas and "arthodgrāhana-samkhyā." Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 551, ibid) : "The description is full of details pertaining to Tāla which seems to vary at every step. Seven sections are mentioned - viśrāmaih saptabhih paricchinnah (Sā. has
ih') - and Tāla details are given for each of these seven parts. No rāgadetail is however given though the gātha is often mentioned as the type of song employed. There is no doubt on the point that it is completely musical but the man who sings the song of the theme seems to add to the songs some speech also. For

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Bhoja says gāyana-sahókti-yukta. That this type has dance also is plain from the words "uddhata-karana-prāya”. The dance is generally 'tāndava' i.e. having karanas and angahāras which are forceful."
The next verse viz. "sama-viśrāmair dvipathair...” etc. is read in BP. with a little difference. For "viśrāmair dvipathair”, Śā. has "viśramair vividhaiḥ” - 'Vividhaih' seems to be better as in the third foot of the stanza in both Bhoja and Sä. We have, "gāthāmātrā-dvipathaka-pathyenā'lamkrto lalitaḥ.” Thus if dvipathaka' is read in the third foot of the stanza., it is better to read 'vividhair' in the second. The idea is that 'lalita' or graceful bhāna is decorated by 'identical (sama), viếrāmas' of many types (= vividhaih), in the fifth 'parivartana'. It is also beautified by 'gāthā'; 'mātrā' and 'dvipathaka-pāěhya'. We had noted that there are 'seven viśrāmas' i.e. seven sections in a bhāna. Details concerning these are now given by Bhoja and Śā. Bhoja has 'sabhagnatālā tvanantaram gāthā.' But Sā. has "sabhagnatālāvanantaram" (lau+ana.); meaning with two bhagnatālas followed by gāthā. The meaning in Bhoja seems to be that in the first viśrāma (i.e. section), we have varna, matta-pālī,
agnatāla, (bhagnatālā is an adjective of matta-pālīfollowed by gāthā, then (anu)-bhagna-tāla and mātra, and also a bhagnatāla.
In the second section, (dvitīye viśrame), it has gāthā, dvipathaka (Bhoja has "dvipada), and vasantaka used. Sā. reads : "gāthā-dvipatha-vasantā viếrāme syur dvitīye tu." But Bhoja reads, "gāthā-dvipada-vahanto” (for, vasantāḥ of Śā.). Šā. reads better. Again for Bhoja's “mātrā-vişama-cchinnā sa-bhagnatālā'tha bhavati radhvā ca" we may observe that the end of this line is not clear. But Sa has, "mātrā-visama-cchinnā sa-bhagnatālā bhaved vrddhyā.” The idea seems to be that in the second section (dvitīye viśrāme), there is use of gāthā, dvipathaka, and vasantaka. Through 'vřddhi' i.e. extention or addition, from visama mātrā, 'vicchinna sa-bhagna-tāla' is derived. We do not know much about this but 'vrddhyā' seems to make sense in place of Bhoja's 'radhvā'.
Then Bhoja reads - "mārganikety evam syāt tāla-vidhānam trtīye tu.” Śā. reads - “māgadhikā sādhyā syāt tāla-vidhāne tļtīye tu.” Bhoja means - "In the third section there is this mārganikā, as formation of tāla." BP. seems to suggest that in the third composition of tāla, 'māgadhika' is to be achieved. What this 'māgadhika' (= a musical effect popular in Magadha ?) is, we do not know.
The next half of the verse reads differently in both Bhoja and Śā. Bhoja has : "mātrā-dvipatha-vahanto radhvästhāpanam caturthe syuh.” BP. has "rathyā dvipatha-vasantaka-rathyā-tālāś caturthe syuḥ.” The meaning here is clear and it is

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889 that in the fourth section the bhāņa has rathyā, dvipatha, vasantaka and rathyātāla. The difference between rathyā and rathyā-tāla is not clear to us. But Bhoja's line is absolutely un-intelligible.
Where Bhoja reads 'radhvā śā. in BP. reads ‘rathyā', a variety of tāla, which seems to be more sensible. Thus for Bhoja's “radhvátha bhagnatālo' Sā. has rathyátha bhagnatālo. So, in the fifth section we have tālas such as rathyā, bhagnatāla, mārganikā, dvipatha and visama according to Sā. Bhoja has the same with 'radhva' in place of rathyā. For Bhoja's “mārganikā-dvipatha-visamaś ca", sā. has, ".vişamāś ca”. The plural is correct. The next line in Bhoja reads: "pañcamake sasthépy atha radhvā nu ca bhagnatālah syāt.” This is faulty. Sā. has - "pañcamaképyatha şaşthe, rathyā-navabhagnatālāḥ syuh.” i.e. “rathyā and nine bhagnatālas.” This makes better sense. In the seventh section there are dvipathaka and mārganikā tālas. In Bhoja we read "saptame srnutha” for Sā.'s, “saptame ca viśrame" - The meaning does not differ, in the end. The next line says that “thus in śuddha bhāna the sequence of rathyā and bhagnatāla is indicated.” For ‘kramah pradistóyam' of Bhoja, which is correct; the BP. text is "krama-pradisto", which seems to be only a printing mistake.
The next verse speaks of a mixed-sankara-type and also a 'citra' type of Bhāna but the readings in Bhoja and Sā. are not identical though they drive at an identical result. Bhoja reads :
"sankīrṇa-bhāņa-bhaạitiḥ kāryā syād, ubhaya-samyogāt. kiñcid anuddhata-bhāvāt
tāla-krama-varjanāc ca, citro'yam.” Śā. (in BP. IX. 21, pp. 380) reads as -
"sankīrṇa-bhaņiti-bharitaḥ sankara-nāmā’yam ubhaya-samyogāt, kiñcid anuddhata-bhāvaḥ
tāla-krama-varjitaś citróyam.” Śā. names the 'sankīrṇa' as "samkara”. Bhoja does not name it but means the same. Both have 'citra' as third variety. This means that in Bhāņa, involving complex expression (sankirņa-bhaạiti), and due to a mixture of both, we arrive at 'sankara' or mixed type. Again, when bereft of forceful (uddhata) bhāva and when tāla-krama is absent, we have the 'citra' variety.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
The next two verses observe, both in Bhoja and Sāradātanaya that bhāņa thus is three-fold viz. śuddha, sankirna and citra. When it is having a 'suddha' bhāsā (meaning perhaps one language) it is suddha, when it is sankīrņa or mixed, there is mixture of two languages and it is 'citra' when it abounds in many languages and also multiple activities (vicestitaih citraih). Further, it is noted by both Bhoja and Śā. that Bhāņa is again three-fold such as uddhata (= forceful), lalita (= graceful) and lalitóddhata (= a mixture of both forceful and graceful) due to varieties of artha, i.e. theme; - “arthānām auddhatyāllālityād ubhaya-bhāvāc ca.” This expression is identical in both i.e. Sr. Pra. and BP.
Thus we arrive at a threefold division of bhāna both from the point of view of language i.e. linguistic expression, and also from the point of view of content or theme i.e. artha.
Dr. Raghavan's remark does not fall in line with the above explanation which clearly follows the text and which is preferred by us. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 552, ibid) observes : “From the point of view of this dance, it has three varieties, uddhata, lalita and lalitoddhata." He quotes "ayam uddhato... arthā(nā)m auddhatyāt....” But ‘artha' sould mean here 'theme'. Of course, three-fold classification is possible from the angle of 'vicestita' which means "dance performance” which could be forceful (tāndava or uddhata), graceful i.e. lāsya or lalita and mixed. But this is a third angle. We again do not know, whether Bhoja, as is his practice elsewhere, also admits of further sub-varieties of the mutual permutation and combination of these three-fold each factors of language (bhāsa), theme (artha) and viceştita (nrtyadance). This also is possible. Of course Dr Raghavan does take note of t factor also, and further observes (pp. 552, ibid) : “From the nature of the language employed, the bhāna is distinguished into suddha, sankirna and citra, written respectively in one language, in two, and more then two.” DR. Raghavan quotes a verse from Bhoja viz.
"yadi vaişa śuddha-vācā śuddhaḥ, sankīrṇayā sankīrṇah, sarvābhir bhāṣābhiḥ
citraiś ca vicesțitaih.” He quotes this to support his above observation that bhāna is three-fold due to three types of usage of languages. But he misses out "citraiś ca vicestitaih”, which means from the point of 'vicesțita' or acting through dance also bhāņa

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891 becomes three-fold. This could mean that we can have a variety of suddha vicestita in either tāndava alone or lāsya alone, and a mixed viceștita of both tāndava and lalita, i.e. lāsya.
DR. Raghavan further observes, and we agree with this, that the sankirna and citra varieties seem to be distinguished on other grounds also, such as actions involved - citraiś ca vicestitaih. This we have noted above. But we have equated 'vicestita' with the style of performance i.e. the variety of dance through which the bhāņa is presented. Bhoja reads further :
“yad duşkaram abhineyam, citram, cā’tyudbhatam ca yad bhavati tad-bhāņake bhidheyam
yutam anutālair vitālaiś ca." Sā. also reads the same excepting that in the first line also, he (i.e. BP) has "abhidheyam", as in the third line. We feel "abhidheya” (= theme) should be preferred at both the places. The idea is that, when the abhidheya i.e. theme to be presented is difficult, it makes for 'citra' variety. When the abhidheya (= theme) is forceful (i.e. udbhata) in a 'bhānaka', it is accompanied by anurāla and vitāla. It may be noted that the term used here is "bhānaka" for "bhāna”. Earlier we had - noted that these words look like synonyms and our observation is borne out to be true. Here, Dr. Raghavan observes, (pp. 552, ibid) - "Bhoja says that in Bhāna, things very difficult for Abhinaya and intricate rhythems also must be intorduced."
Then an interesting verse is read slightly differently, but with identical effect in Bhoja and Sā. Bhoja reads -
"sótraivántarbhāvyaḥ yo bhāno mandi-māli-nāmā syāt. bhinnaḥ kaiścit kathito
bharata-matam samyag a-viditvā.” and śā. reads,
"tasyántarbhāvo yo bhāņésau nandimāli-nāmā syāt, bhinnaḥ kaiścit kathito bharata-matam samyag a-viditvā.”

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Dr. Raghavan (pp. 553, ibid) observes: "There is a variety of Bhāṇa called Nandi-māli, which Bhoja says, some writers consider as a separate upa-rupaka. Bhoja says that it has to be included under this Bhāņa. The Nandimali is chiefly characterised by a feature borrowed from bhāṇa of the Daśa-rūpaka class viz. Akāśa-bhāṣita. Does this Nandimāli then suggest a stage of transition of the Daśarūpaka-bhāņa into an upa-rupaka bhāņa ?"
892
Dr. Raghavan then quotes two verses from Bhoja, the first of which viz. "sótraivántarbhavyaḥ..." etc. is quoted above. The second verse is read by Bhoja as,
"ākāśa-puruṣam uddiśya
vastu yat pathyate'thava kriyate, viśliṣṭódbhata-bhāva-prayogam iha nandimāli saḥ."
Śā. reads the second half as -
"viśistódbhavya-bhāva-prayogavān nandimāli saḥ."
-
Dr. Raghavan further observes (pp. 553, ibid) - "Bharata here referred to as misunderstood by other writers who gave a distinct type called Nandimāli does not mean Sage Bharata but any later writer on the art of Bharata, for Bharata speaks neither of uparūpakas nor of a Nandimāli."
It seems Dr. Raghavan is at times carried away and makes sweeping statements. Who the hell here says that by 'bharata' in the expression 'bharata-mata' is meant the 'sage bharata', the author of the available N.S.? Actually it means "Bharata's tradition". There is no doubt and there can not be any doubt about this either in any humble follower of Indian Aesthetics. Again, there were a number of nātya-śāstras, and perhaps different version of even our NS. of Bharata. So, such bold statements indicate misadventure. We have edited the N.S. (G.O.S.) afresh, with 'N' ms., not available so far. Dr. Krishnamoorthy edited the first Volume in the G.O.S. series and Dr. Kulkarni and Dr. Nandi worked on the Vol. II, III & IV (with Vol. II through the press to-day i.e. 27-4-02 and Vol. III also through the press (Aug. 04), and Vol. IV now in the press, (27-3-04). with ms. 'N', being in centre. Now this ms. N. has only 33 chapters as against 36 or 37 of printed editions available. A number of extra verses are also noted. So, it will not be a surprise if in future a fresh ms. of the N.S. is found out and it contains the upa-rupaka portion also. Actually without naming, the NS. does treat of nāțikā and also hints at prakaraṇī. In short no sweeping statements should be entertained.

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893 The second verse is read in Bhoja as - (pp. 467, Edn. ibid)
"ākāśa-puruṣam uddiśya vastu yat pathyate'thavā kriyate, viśliştodbhata bhāva-prayogam
iha nandimāli sah." Śā. reads (BP. pp. 380, ibid) :
ākāśapuruşam uddiśya vastu yat pathyate'thavā kriyate, viśistodbhāvya-bhāva-prayogavān
nandimālī sah." Both have the form ‘nandimālī, meaning the original word is “nandimālin”.
The fourth line is read as "viślistódbhaça-bhāva-prayogam" in Bhoja, and "viśistódbhāvya-bhāva-prayogavān" in Sā. Sā. means that nandimālin is furnished with presentation of bhāvas that are imagined specially (for this presentation). Bhoja means "having the prayoga or presentation of bhāvas that are “specially correlated and forceful; viślista is taken by us as 'viseseņa ślişta' “mixed in a special way.” The special feature of this variety is that here the theme or action is presented addressing it to ākāśa-purusa or a character which is not actually present on the stage but is imagined to be present.
Dr. Raghavan again makes a bold surmise when he tries to suggest that this variety could be a link between bhāna, the major type and an upa-rūpaka bhāna. We again call this a bold statement not founded on logic. For nowhere in the history of Indian art it is observed that there was a "stage of transition from rūpakas to upa-rupakas. Actually the major and minor types could have co-existed of vore in India and the minor types could have represented regional popular folk art-forms. Both were actually accepted and equally respected. Now Bhoja speaks of Bhāņikā (pp. 467, ibid) :
prāyo hari-caritam idam svīkşta-gāthā"di-varņa-mātraś ca, sukumāratah prayogād bhāņópi hi bhāņikā bhavati divyabhis caribhir vivarjitā

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lalita-karana-samyuktā
tālántarāla-nṛttā
kvacid api radhyā (thyā ?) di samkalitā
ardhód graha-nivāraṇa
gayana-saha-vacana-mattapālībhiḥ,
viśrāmaiś ca vihīnā

strī-yojyā varjitais tālaiḥ.
vastūni bhāṇikāyā
nava daśa vā niyamato vidhīyante navamadya-pañcameṣu sthāneṣu
ca bhagnatālaḥ syāt.
sthānántareṣu cásyām
laya-tāla-vidhir yadṛcchayā kriyate. vividha-vaco-vinyāsaiḥ
sabhya-janótsäha-sampattiḥ. (pp. 468, ibid)
Dr. Raghavan's reading (pp. 552, ibid) is not satisfactory. It reads as - "prayo haricaritayutanvikṛtā (yutaḥ strikṛta) gāthā"di varna-mātrās ca, sukumārataḥ prayogad bhāṇópi bhānikā bhavati." Thus, bhāņikā contains mostly Hari's behaviour (or narration), and it contains gāthās and varṇamātrās recited by a female character. The performance is graceful. With this basic difference bhāņa itself is bhāṇikā. Again in bhāṇikā, the movements called divya-cārīs are not performed. These are movements involving jump and swaying of limbs above ground. Lalila-karaṇas, i.e. graceful movements are executed in bhāņikā. Female characters are seen in bhāņikā. The women sing the gatha, etc. i.e. the libretto. Nine or ten vastus or feet or parts are marked in bhāņikā. Those who sing also speak or narrate - (gayana-saha-vacana). Through a variety of expressions, the energy or determination, or firmness of cultured men is increased in this art-form. Thus both bhāṇa and bhāṇikā have a lot of speach element. They differ from bhāṇa-the major type of rūpaka, as they contain more of dance, song and music and less of drama and abhinaya.
SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
Hemacandra has the following for bhāṇa, and bhāņikā. He seems to accept Abhinavabharati's cirantanas with reference to the concepts of bhāṇa and bhāṇikā.

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H. observes (pp. 446, ibid) -
"nṛsimha-sukarā"dinām varṇanam jalpayed yataḥ, nartaki tena bhāṇaḥ syād uddhatánga-pravartitaḥ."
Thus the contents are the narration of nṛsimha and sūkara, the avatāras of Visņu, accomplished by a female dancer with forceful movements of the limbs. We know that H. calls all these "geyāni rūpakāņi cirantanair uktāni." He carefully distinguishes between "pathyasya geyasya rūpakasya" difference. We will discuss this in detail at the end of all uparūpakas or geya-rupakas in view of what H. observes in the Viveka (pp. 446, 447, etc. ibid).
Bhāņikā, read after A.bh. in H. is:
bāla-krīḍā-niyuddhā"di tathā sūkara-simhajā dhavala"dikṛtā krīḍā,
yatra sā bhāṇikā matā.
In the Abh. we have "dhvajā"dinā kṛtā kriḍā". We do not understand the reading in Abh., nor this one in H. As suggested earlier, perhaps the performance carried banners or flags. The rest is as observed earlier under Abh.
The ND. has the following: Bhāṇa is threefold -
"hari-hara-bhānu-bhavānī

skanda-pramatha"dhipa-stuti-nibaddhaḥ
uddhata-karaṇaprāyaḥ
strī-varjo varṇanā-yuktaḥ.
yadi caiva śuddhavācā
895
śuddhaḥ, sankirṇatayā ca sankīrṇaḥ, sarvabhir bhāṣābhiś citraiś ca
vicestitaiś citraḥ.
ayam uddhato lalito bhāno lalitóddhataś ca sambhavati, arthānām auddhatyāl

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA lālityād ubhaya-sattvāc ca.” yad duşkaram abhineyam citram cátyudbhatam ca sambhavati, tad bhāņakebhineyam
yutam anutālair vitālaiś ca. It may be noted that the ND. has accepted some lines from Bhoja and has left out some portion. In both, the Sr. Pra. and the ND., we read terms such as bhāna' and bhānaka' as synonyms. The ND. has followed Bhoja while the Kā. Šā of H. has chosen to follow the A.bh. In the N.D. we have stuti-nibaddhah for nibandhah' in Bhoja. The N.D. has a better or original reading as compared to the printed śr. Pra. edn. of Josyer. Again, 'caiva' in N.D. is better that Josyer's edn., which gives “yadi vesa-śuddha-vācah suddhah." - We can emend to advantage, the text of Bhoia's Pra, with the text as preserved either in H. or the N.D. . N.D. also quotes from Bhoja and observes that Bhāņa becomes bhāni, when -
"prāyo hari-carita-yutaḥ strikrta-gāthā"di-varna-mātraś ca. sukumārataḥ prayogād
bhāņópi hi bhāņikā bhavet." In bhāni the performance is graceful, the narration is mostly of Hari's exploits, and a female character is the narrator using gāthās and varņa-mātrās. Bhoja is the inspiration behind ND. Vāgbhața II describes bhaņikā after H. and the A.bh. It reads as -
“bāla-krid.-niyuddhā"di tathā sūkara-simhajā, dhavalā”di-krtā [krīdā]
yatra să bhānikā matā." We have supplied (kridā] from H. and Abh. Here also, following H., we read dhavalā”di-krtā' in place of ‘dhvajā”dinā krtā’. For, us, Both are equally not very clear. For Bhāņa, Vāgbhasa has,
“nțsimha-sūkarā”dīnām varṇanam jalpayed yataḥ, nartaki tena bhāṇaḥ syād uddhatánga-pravartitaḥ.”

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897 This follows H. and A.bh. - Thus Vāgbhasa also has both bhāņa and bhāņikā.
Sāradātanaya once again quotes elaborately from Bhoja and he also has both bhāna and bhānikā. He uses the term bhāņaka also for bhāņa as is seen elsewhere in Bhoja. Bhāna is described (pp. 379, 380, 381, 382 and 383) very elaborately. He has something more than Bhoja. The source is unknown to us. Or, in his times, these art-forms must have collected additional features as read in BP. Bhāņa for Śā. is -
"hari-hara-bhānu-bhavānī
skanda-pramathādhipa-stuti-nibaddhaḥ ('nibaddhaḥ' follows ND. This is a clearer reading and Bhoja's text should be emended to this effect). Śā. proceeds -
guņa-kīrtana-prakāśana
gāthābhir bhūbhịtām stutinibandhaḥBhoja had - dhavala-guna-kirtana-parair gāthā"rambhā”dibhis stutinibandhaḥ.
In place of 'gāthā"rambhā"dibhih, śā. has 'gāthābhir bhūbhștām'. Here 'gāthābhiḥ' is of course better than 'gāthā”rambhā"dibhiḥ'. But 'bhūbhịtām' is a fresh feature. By the time of śā., this art-form must have cultivated this additional feature also. Along with the praises of hari, hara, etc. the eulogies of kings also must have crept in. Again, BP. observes -
"gāyana-sahókti-yuktó
dāttena vibhūșitaprāyaḥ. “yuktódāttena” is better as compared to yukto dattena' in Bhoja. The śr. Pra. text could be emended to advantage. Then, BP. reads,
"tri-catura-pañca-vitālaiḥ viśrāmaiḥ saptabhiḥ paricchinnaiḥ ardhód-grāha-nivāraņa
sankhyātaiḥ kutracin niyatah." Bhoja has ‘paricchinnaḥ', which seems better. This means that Bhāņa is covered up by three, four or five vitālas, seven viśrāmas and ardhódgrāha-nivārañasamkhyā. We do not know what "ardho..." is.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
Then, we have in BP., -
sama-vibrāmair-vividhair
vibhūsitah pañcame viparivarte, (Bhoja has - dvipathair', and 'viparīvarte'; obviously wrong.)
"gāthāmātrā-dvipathaka
pāțhyenálamkrto lalitaḥ.” i.e. In the fifth viparivarta', it is beautified by a variety of sama-viśrāmas. Again, the lalita bhāna is decorated by gāthā, mātrā, and dvi-pathaka-pāțhya'. For Šā., this is the description of 'lalita' i.e. graceful variety of bhāņa. In Bhoja we read "bhavati" for 'lalitah'.
Now, like Bhoja, śā. also describes the seven parts giving tāla-details in each one of them. This portion reads as follows :
'varņotha matta-pālī
sabhagnatālāv anantaram gāthā (Bhoja has - 'sa-bhagnatālā tvanantaram'. This is not a happy reading. Sā. has 'sa-bhagnatālau anantaram gātha', which reads better and should be accepted in Sr. Pra. also.) -
abhugnatāla-mătre
prathame syād bhagnatālaś ca. (Bhoja reads "bhadratālaś ca” which should be corrected as 'bhagnatālaś ca.)
This means in the first part, after varņa, mattapālī, and bhagnatāla, we have the use of a-bhugnatāla, mātrā and bhagnatāla. In the second part,
'gāthā-dvipatha-vasantā viśrāme syur dvitīye tu mātrā-vişama-cchinnā
sa-bhagnatālā bhaved vặddhā.” Bhoja has 'ovahanto', which should be emended as 'vasantā'. Then, for 'syād' it should read "syur dvitiye", as in BP. In the fourth line Bhoja has, 'sa-bhagnatālā'tha bhavati radhvā ca'. This should be read as in BP. viz. "sa-bhagnatālā bhaved vrddhyā." This means that in the second part, there is use of gāthā, dvipathaka and vasantaka. Through vrddhi, there has to be sa-bhagna-tāla, which is cut (cchinna) by visama-mātrā.

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899 In the third part, according to Sā., we have -
'māgadhikā sādhyā syāt
tāla-vitāne tệtīye tu.' i.e. māgadhikā has to be achieved in the third part. In Bhoja we read, "mārganikety evam syāt tālavidhānam trutiye tu. BP. reads "māgadhikā" for Bhoja's ‘mārganikā.' Later in BP. in the fifth part, we read 'mārganikā.' So, perhaps 'māgadhikā' of BP. should be read as "mārganikā” of Bhoja. This observation means that in the third part māgadhikā (or mārganikā ?) has to be sought. In the fourth part, the BP. has -
"rathyā dvipatha-vasantaka
rathyātālās' caturthe syuh.” i.e. In the fourth part, there are rathyā, dvipatha, vasantaka and rathyā-tāla. Bhoja reads as -
"mātrā-dvipatha-vahanto
radhvā-sthāpanam caturthe tu." In BP. we have ‘rathyā' at two places. The first 'rathyā’ should be corrected as , ‘mātrā', as read in Bhoja. Then Bhoja's 'vahanto' has to be read as 'vasantaka' as in BP. So also 'radhvā' in Bhoja should read as 'rathyā' in Šā. Thus, the fourth part should have mātrā, dvipatha, vasantaka and rathyā-tāla. The next two verses (pp. 380, vs. 19, 20, ibid).read in BP. as -
“rathyā'tha bhagnatālo mārganikā dvipatha-vişamāś ca. pañcamaképy atha șașthe rathyā-navabhagna-tālāḥ syuh. (vs. 19) dvipatha-mārganike ca syātām atha ca viśrāme, rathyā’tha bhagnatālah
śuddhe bhāṇe krama-pravistóyam.” (vs. 20) This means that according to śā., in the fifth part, rathyā, bhagnatāla, mārganikā, dvipatha and vişama tāla are seen. In the sixth part, there are rathyā and nava-bhagna-tāla. Bhoja's text is currupt and it has to be emended in the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
light of BP., which offers sensible reading. In the seventh part, there are dvipathaka and mārganikā tālas. Thus, in śuddha-bhāna the krama of rathyā and bhagnatāla is indicated.
It is very clear that Bhoja's text has to be emended in view of the BP. at all these places.
After describing the suddha-variety of Bhāņa, the BP. proceeds to cover the samkīrṇa variety of Bhāņa as is done by Bhoja. Here also we will see if Sā. reads better at places then Bhoja. BP. (pp. 380, vs. 21 ibid) reads -
“sankīrṇa-bhaạiti-bharitaḥ sankaranāmā’yam ubhayasamyogāt, kiñcid-anuddhatabhāvaḥ
tālakrama-varjitaś ca citro'yam.” With speech-expressions of mixed type, this variety is called 'samkara' by name. It is the result of a mixture of two (types of expressions). When associated with some gentle expressions (also) to an extent, and is bereft of sequence of tāla, it is beautiful. (= citra) (or is called 'citra’- bhāņa.) Thus following Bhoja śā. also has three types of bhāņa. The BP. observes :
'iti śuddhaḥ sankīrṇas' citro'yam iti tridhā bhaved bhāṇaḥ. yadi vaisa śuddha-bhāṣaḥ, sankirņo'tha sankīrṇaḥ : sarvābhir bhāsābhis' citraiś ca viceștitai' citraḥ, syāt. ayam uddhato'tha lalito bhāno lalitóddhataś ca bhinnaḥ syāt.
arthānām auddhatyā-llālityād ubhaya-bhāvāc ca. Thus, bhāņa is three-fold viz. śuddha, sankīrṇa and citra. If it is gifted with śuddhā bhāsa (= a single language), it is suddha.
If it is having sankīrņa or mixed languages, it is sankīrṇa and if it is having all the languages it is called 'citra'. The actions are also of all sorts in "citra'. This bhāna is thus (also) three-fold, viz. uddhata, lalita and lalitóddhata.
ud,

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901
That in which the artha, i.e. meaning (or theme) is forceful is uddhata, if the artha is gentle or lalita, it is lalita type, and if it is both (i.e. if the artha/theme) is both forceful and gentle, it is of the lalitóddhata variety.
Śā. further observes, (pp. 380, para 23, ibid) - yad duşkarábhidheyam
citram ca❜ty udbhatam ca bhavati,
tad-bhāṇake'bhidheyam
yutam anutālair vitālaiś ca.
That is 'citra' where the meaning [or 'abhineya' (Śr. Pra) = matter to be presented] is difficult, it is called 'citra' (type). In the udbhața (= forceful) type, the abhidheya (= meaning, or matter) is associated with anutāla and vitāla. This variety which is included in bhāņa is termed 'nandi-malin' by name. This is said to be a separate variety by some who do not know clearly the tradition of Bharata.
That is called nandi-mālī, wherein something is addressed to, or is performed with reference to ākāśapuruṣa (i.e. a character not actually present on the stage but is imagined to be present). This variety is having presentation of such feelings which are presented through special effort.
All this follows Bhoja. In both Śā. and Bhoja, we see the use of the terms "bhāṇa" and also “bhāṇaka”.
Śā. once again repeats in anustubh verses the details which Bhoja has given earlier for Bhāņa.
He says -
uddhata-prāya-karaṇaḥ
kvacit-stri-varja-varṇanaḥ,
This (i.e. bhāņa) has mostly forceful karaṇas i.e. movements. At times it is bereft of the description of a woman. Then it is glued with praises of kings through gāthās.
gāthā"di-rāja-stutibhiḥ
nibaddho guṇa-kīrtanaiḥ.
and it is beautified by good songs, sahóktis and yuktódātta -
"su-gāyana-sahóktyaiva yuktódāttena bhuṣitaḥ."

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902
SAHRDAYĀLOKA . This (i.e. bhāņa) is mostly associated by praises of Brahman, Rudra, Indra, Skanda etc. It is having five or three or four vitālas. It is having seven viśrāmas or parts. In between the number (samkhyā) of ardhódgrāha is also ascertained.
(ardhódgrāhā"di-samkhyānair
niyataś ca kvacit kvacit). In the fifth part, it is decorated by sama-vibrāmas. At times it is adorned by gāthā, mātrā and dvipathaka-pāțhya.
In the first part, we find varņa or mattapālī, gāthā in bhagnatāla, and also abhugnatāla or mātrā, and also there is bhagnatāla.
In the second part, there are gāthā, dvipathaka, and vasantaka. (Bhoja reads 'vahanto', for 'vasanto'.) In the third part, there are matrā which is visamacchinnā, bhagnatāla, rathyā and māgadhi. (Bhoja réads ‘rad hvā' as noted above). In the fourth part, there are rathyā, dvipathaka, and vasantaka tāla with rathya in due order. In the fifth, rathyā, bhagnatāla, margaạikā and vişama-dvipatha. In the sixth, rathyātāla, and navatāla, followed by bhagnatāla, dvipathaka, followed by bhagnatāla, dvipathaka, and mārganikā are presented. In the seventh part there are rathy, and bhagnatāla. This is the sequence shown by experts of nātya in śuddha-bhāna -
"evam kramaḥ śuddha-bhāņe
nātya-vidbhir udāhịtaḥ." In the 24th para, on pp. 382, BP. (Edn. G.O.S.) again discusses the varieties of Bhāna in anustubh verses. The matter is already once discussed. We do not find any logic in this repetition as well as the same seen above concerning seven parts. Perhaps someone, for personal understanding must have written these verses in anustubh which seem to have crept in the original text through scribal mixtake. The details covered are as below : - "That which is imagined through śuddha bhāsa is called suddha-bhāna, 'misra' is one with mixed languages (bhāsa-samkara). Bhāna is called 'citra' if it is adorned by all languages. Suddha-bhāņa is that which is - ‘ukta-tāla-kramā”ślista' i.e. associated with sequence of said tālas. Sankirņa is one born of the sankara-mixture of two or three tālas. That which is bereft of the order of said tālas is called 'citra'. That in which the theme is forceful, is said to be uddhata. Where artha or theme is graceful, we have lalita bhāna. Where we have both force and gentleness of theme, it is 'lalitóddhata' type. Where the narration (abhidheya/abhineya) is difficult and forceful, it is called 'citra'. This abhidheya in bhāna is associated with anurāla and vitāla.

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903 In para 25, pp. 383, BP (ibid), Śā observes that the (extra =) atideśya' part, i.e. the sandhi, anka, etc. are not described here in case of the bhāna, the rūpaka-visesa which is described here :
"yad-rūpaka-višeşasya bhāṇasyoktam sva-lakṣaṇam, atideśyam ihā’nuktam
anka-sandhyādi kalpanam.” śā. also says that the one which is called nandi-māli is also included in this. Nandimāli is said to be so by experts wherein in dialogue (or recitation), song and action, there is context of an imagined character (= ākāśa-purusa) and wherein special emotion is presented through special effort.
“bhāņo yo nandi-māly ākhyaḥ sóntarbhūto’tra laksyate. pāthye-gīte-kriyāyām yad uddisy ākāśa-püruşam, visiştódbhāvya-bhāvā”tmā prayogo yatra drśyate, bhāṇaḥ sa nandimalīti
nāmnā kavibhir ucyate." With this the treatment of Bhāna, or Bhānaka is over in Śā. But śā also discusses, after Bhoja, the variety called Bhānikā, along with this.
śā. almost identically describes bhāņikā following Bhoja with minor changes in readings. Thus BP. has, frathyādi-sankalitā' for 'radvādi.' of Bhoja. For Bhoja's, "... gāyana-saha-vacana-matta-pālibhiḥ.” Śā. reads, "gāyana-vasanta..." for 'varjitóttālaih' of Sā. Bhoja has “varjitais tālaiḥ”. The last two verses in śā. read as :
“navamādi-pañcameșu sthāneșu ca bhagnatālaḥ syāt. sthānántareșu tasyā layakā(tā)lo yadrcchayā kriyate. vividha-vaco-vinyāsaiḥ sabhya-janotsāha-sampattiḥ."

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904
SAHRDAYĀLOKA These lines do not differ much from Bhoja but the next six lines are not at all read in Bhoja. They are -
lāsyánga-sandhi-niyamo
bhāņavad evátra bhāņikāyām syāt. i.e. In bhāņikā also, as in bhāņa, there are lasyảngas and sandhis. Šā. observes further that in bhānikā, the principal rasa is śrngāra, and heroine is covered up in beautiful dress. Without garbha and avamaría, the three sandhis viz. mukha, pratimukha and nirvahana are seen in bhānikā. Its theme is short (svalpa-vrtta). The characters are vita, and pītha-marda along with vidūsaka. There are ten lāsyas in it. (i.e. lāsyangas). It is graced by pāñcālī-rīti. The illustration is 'Viņāyati. The verses read as -
"atha bhāny angi-śệngārā ślakṣṇa-naipathya-nāyikā garbhávamarśa-hīnā ca mukhā”di-traya-bhūșitā. svalpa-výtta-prabandhā ca pīķha-marda-viţánvitā viduşakena sahită daśa-lāsya-samanvitā
bhaved vīņāvatī yathā.” (pp. 384, ibid) The NLRK. has both bhāņikā and bhānī.
Bhānī is briefly described (pp. 302, ibid), which seems to be the shortest summary of śā.'s bhānikā. The illustration is also identical. The NLRK reads as - atha bhāņi. ekánkā, vita-vidūşaka-pīrhamarda-sobhitā śộngāra-rasā, svalpa-citrakāvyā, daśa-lāsyanga-sobhitā. yathā vīņavatī.
Bhānikā in NLRK. again shares some features of bhāna-bhānikā as seen in Bhoja and Śā. But we fail to understand why bhāņikā and bhāņi are mentioned as separate varieties. Normally, bhāna and bhānikā are mentioned separately but bhāņi and bhānikā are not. NLRK. describes bhānikā as (pp. 300, ibid) :
atha bhāņikā. udātta-nāyikā, suksma-nepathya-bhūṣitā (we have ślaksna in Bhoja/śā.), ekánkā. kaisiki-bhārati-vrtti-pradhānā, manda-puruşă ca. yathā kāmadattā.
Then seven angas of bhāņikā are described such as - asyāḥ saptángānivinyāsaḥ, upanyāsaḥ, virodhaḥ, anuvšttiḥ, sādhvasam, samarpanam, samhāraś ceti.

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905 vinyāsa is explained as ‘nirvedavākyam', as in "gpha-vātikā” upanyāsa is, "prasangataḥ kāryanivedanam” as in the same work viz. gruḥa-vāţikā.
virodha is “bhrānti-nivrttih”. The illustration is from ‘anutāpánka’ (This is from Act. VI Abhi. Sā. which it termed 'anutāpa-anka' here).
'anuvștti' is "nidarśanopanyāsaḥ”. - Again illustrated from Abhi. Śā. 'sādhvasam' is ‘adbhutasya sādhvasena bhūtódāharaṇam.' Illustration is drawn from Abhi. Śā. Here an awe-inspiring or impossible event is described as happened, through bhaya or fear.
'samarpana' is upālambha i.e. taunt or censure through distress, as in (Nāgānanda II) candanalatā-gpha.
'samhāra' is welknown. It means 'summing up' or 'covering up' or 'completion' (= samāpana).
Views of Vāgbhaţa II have been recorded along with H.'s as he follows H. strictly.
S.D. of Viśvanātha has enumerated 18 uparūpakas, the bhāņikā being the last one. It is explained as -
"bhāņikā-ślaksņa-nepathyā mukha-nirvahaņántikā kaiśikī-bhārati-vștti yuktā ekánka-vinirmitā. udātta-nāyikā manda-purusa-pātrā anga-saptakam,
upanyāsotha vinyāso ..vibodhaḥ sādhvasam tathā,
samarpanam nivșttiś ca
samhāra iti saptamaḥ. Viśvanātha seems to have been inspired by Bhoja, śā. and also NLRK. Sadhvasa is explained by him as 'mithya'khyānam". Visvanātha at the end of this observes : "eteșām sarveşām nātaka-prakrtikatve'pi yathaucityam yathālābham nāțakoktavišesa-parigrahah. yatra ca nāțakoktasya api punar upādānam tatra tatsadbhāvasya niyamah." - i.e. All these uparūpakas are basically of the nature of nătaka. But, as required, the angas or parts of nātaka should be included in these. So, wherever in the definitions these features (angas) of nātaka are repeated, they should be taken as un-avoidable features of the same."

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Gosthi is the next art-form in Bhoja. It is described by H., ND., Śā., NLRK., Vägbhața II & S.D. It may be noted that any earlier mention of gosthi prior to Bhoja is not seen among available documents. So, we have to start with Bhoja, who observes :
(Śr. Pra. pp. 468, ibid) -
906
goşthe yat tu viharataḥ
cestitam iha kaiṭabha-dviṣaḥ kiñcit, ristásura-pramathana-prabhṛti tad icchanti gosthiti.
This is a single äryä describing goṣṭhi. As Dr. Raghavan observes, this definition seems to be inspired by the word 'gostha' meaning a hamlet of cowherds. It is described as representation of the sports of young Kṛṣṇa in the Gokula of Nanda. It presents the killing of demons or asuras by Krsna.
Śāradātanaya has the following on 'gosthi. (B.P. pp. 375, ibid).
"athótpadyakathaikánkāgosthi śṛngāra-mantharā, rūpa-saundarya-lāvaṇyópetaṣat-pañca-nayikā.

prākṛtair navabhiḥ pumbhiḥ, daśabhir va'py alamkṛtā, garbhavamarśa-sandhibhyām
śūnyā, nódātta-vāk-kṛtā, atra syāt kaiśiki vṛttiḥ mṛdvi nányarasāśrayā. na kunjara-ghaṭā❞ghātapātram bhavati kandali; gopi-pater-viharato gosthabalasya cestitam, yattu, yamalárjunā”didänava-nidhana-kṛtam
tat tu gosthi syat.

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907 The last verse - "gopi-pater... syāt" seems o reproduce Bhoja's idea of gosthi. In this, the exploits of child krishna are narrated. The killing of demons such as yamalárjuna etc. is described.
But, Sā. has something else also. We do not know the source of this thoughtcurrent. Śā. holds that in gosthi there is imaginary story or theme. Śộngāra is of low class. There are five to six heroines who are beautiful and graceful. They are adorned by rustic males who are nine or ten in number. This is bereft of garbha and vimarsa junctures. No lofty words are used. The soft kaisiki vrtti predominates here. It is not having other rasas (except low type of śộngāra). The banana tree cannot bear the dashing by a group of elemphants. This description of gosthi as a one-act imaginative piece, with love theme, with five or six beautiful heroines and nine or ten male characters of low status, is a sort of gathering justifying its name, and it abounds in vulgar talks. As suggested above, we cannot trace the origin of this thought current from any available earlier source.
Hemacandra accepts Bhoja's description of gosthi. We have seen that normally H. chooses to follow Abh., but when he deals with a variety not read in the A.bh., he accepts only Bhoja's authority. We discussed śā. prior to H. & ND., because his was a special case where Bhoja's tradition, as well as an unknown tradition were both accepted.
The ND. also accepts Bhoja's tradition and describes gosthi identically. Same is the case with Vāgbhata II. Thus, the jain ācāryas from Gujarat accept the lead of Bhoja in this respect.
The NLRK. as seen above quite often, follows Śā. in part. There is no following of Bhoja also as seen in the BP. The NLRK. (pp. 287, ibid) reads :
atha gosthi. ekánkā, kaiśiki-vrtti-yuktā, garbhávamarśa-samdhi-śūnyā ca. yathā-satyabhāmā.
The NLRK. gives an illustration. Thus 'gosthi was a living tradition till the times of NLRK. The S.D. of Viśvanātha has - (SD. VI. 274, 275).
“prākṣtair navabhiḥ pumbhir daśabhir vā’pyalamkrtā, nódāttavacană gosthi kaisikī-vrtti-śālini. hīnā garbha-vimarsābhyām pañca-sad-yosid anvitā

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908
SAHDAYĀLOKA kāma-śộngāra-samyuktā
syād ekánka-vinirmitā.” This follows Sā. Visvanātha does not seem to accept Bhoja's tradition. Thus, in case of gosthi two traditions seem to run parallel, though perhaps the one represented by Bhoja could be earlier.
Hallīsaka - This art-form is read in Vātsyāyana, A.bh., Bho.; H., N.D., śā., NLRK., Vägbhata II, and S.D. Viśvanātha reads the name as 'Halliśa' for Hallisaka. The A.bh. (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S., ibid) - has the following -
"mandalena tu yannţttam hallīsakam iti smộtam, ekas tatra tu netā syād
gopastriņām yathā hariḥ.” . Thus, hallisaka, acc. to A.bh., is a sort of dance - or rythanic bodily movements, - in circle, where there is one leader (of the group), like Hari of gopa-ladies. It seems that there is one man in the middle, like Krsna and a circle of girls come round him dancing. The verse quoted in A.bh. is quoted by Bhoja also while he defines ‘hallīsa', as one of the six varieties of the Sabdālamkāra called Preksya in the śabdālamkāra section. In the S.K.Ā. (pp. 309, N.S. Bombay '39) Hallīsaka is defined as -
"mandalena tu yat strīņām nộtyam hallīsakam tu tat, tatra netā bhaved eko
gopa-strīņam harir yathā.” This is from the A.bh. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 555, Śļ. Pra. ibid) observes : "The Hallisaka and Rāsa of the Sanskrit Nātya literature are almost identical with the 'garba' of Gujarat and the Kummi and Kudiccuppāttu of Tamilnad and the Kaikottikkali of Malabar. The only difference in the South Indian varieties seems to be in the Tāla or rhythem kept by the palms as the dancers go around.” Bhoja (Śr. Pra. pp. 468, ibid. Ch. XI) observes :
"yan mandalena nșttam strīņām hallisakam tu yat-prāhuḥ, tatraiko netā syād gopastrīņam iva murāri).”

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909 This is like A.bh.'s description. It may be noted that the definitions in both the A.bh. and the Śr. Pra, make hallīsaka, a mere dance, giving us no idea of the nature of literary composition involved in it. Probably some songs could be understood as meant here.
śā., of course, has something special to observe. But H. and the ND. follow A.bh. verbetim. Śā. (BP. IX. para 49, pp. 390, ibid) observes :
"atha hallīsakam saptanavástādaśa-nayikam, sánudātókti caikánkam kaisiki-vrtti-bhūșitam. ekárkam vā bhaved dvyankam vimarśa-mukha-samdhimat. sa-geya-lāsyam yatimat · khanda-tāla-layánvitam
eka-viśrāma-sahitam
yathā syāt keli-raivatam.” First thing to be noted in Śā. is that he illustrates hallīsaka by “keli-raivatam”. This means there was a living tradition in his days. For Šā., hallisaka is not a mere dance form, but is something more. In hallīsaka there are seven, eight or nine heroines or female characters. It is characterised by an expression (ukti), which is not noble or lofty (= anudātta). There is a single act in it and the diction is kaisiki. At times it may have even two acts and it has mukha and vimarsa sandhi. Now this is strange, for when you have vimarśa also, perhaps other samdhis also walk in naturally as nirvahana is a must for all and vimarśa has to be preceeded by pratimukha and garbha junctures. Along with a song (= sa-geya), we have, in hallisaka, lāsya (i.e. graceful dance), vati, khanda-tāla, laya and one viśrama (i.e. division). 'Keli-raivata' is an illustration cited. Śā. has some further description also (para 50, Ch. IX. pp. 360, ibid) :
lalitā daksiņā khyātā nāyakā pañca-șā api, vipra-kșatra-vaņik-putrās sacivā”yatta-siddhayaḥ.

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910
SAHRDAYĀLOKA dvyanke mukhávamarśau staḥ,
ekánke, garbha-nirgamaḥ." Thus, it has five to six nāyakas, i.e. heroes or male characters who are lalita (= graceful), dakşiņa (= courteous), and famous (= khyātāḥ). They are brahmins, ksatriyas or Vaisya-putras, whose achievements depend on their advisers (i.e. sacivas). If (it has a second act, then) in that type there are mukha and avamaría junctures. And in the variety having a single act, (even) garbha-samdhi is absent. This means it has only mukha and nirvahaņa, and prati-mukha, if at all. Vāgbhața II follows Bhoja, H. and the N.D., when he observes : (pp. 18, ibid) :
"maņdalena tu yan nșttam hallīsakam iti smrtam, eka-sūtram tu netā syād
gopa-strīņam yathā hariḥ." The NLRK. has - (pp. 299, ibid) :
atha hallīsakam-saptásta-navayoșid-bhūșitam, kaisikī-vștti-prāyam, bahu-tālalayā"tmakam, ekánkam, eka-purusa-pradhānam anudātta-vacana-krtam. yathā keli raivatakam.
This is under the influence of śā. But the NLRK. does not give the two-act - variety also seen in Sā. Again, the NLRK. recommends one central hero as is the tradition in Bhoja and A.bh. Thus NLRK. has a mixed tradition. The illustratic the same as read in Śā. but here we have 'keli-raivatakam', for 'keli-raivatam'. The S.D. has 'hallīša' for 'hallīsaka', read at S.D. VI. 307, and it has -
"hallīša eka evánkaḥ saptástau daśa vā striyaḥ, vāgudāttaika-puruṣaḥ, kaiśikī vịttir ujjvalā. mukhántimau tathā sandhi, bahutāla-laya-sthitih.
yatha-keli-raivatakam. The S.D. is clear in that the hallīsa has just one act, seven-eight or ten female characters. There is a single hero with noble expression in speech. The vrtti is kaiśiki. There are only two samdhis viz. mukha and nirvahana, termed as "antima” i.e. 'the last one', here. There are many tālas, and layas (in the song) in hallīsaka.

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'Nartanaka' is read in Bhoja only but it has a wider scope and in parts it is touched by various authorities. Bhoja (pp. 468, Śr. Pra. ibid) defines it as -
“yasya padárthábhinayam lalitalayam sadasi nartaki kurute, tan nartanakam, śamyā
lāsya-cchalita-dvipadyādiDr. Raghavan (pp. 555, ibid) observes that this is dance like 'nautch'. A danseuse sings and renders through gesture the contents of the songs. This nartanaka has varieties in śamyā, lāsya, chalika, and dvipadī. In the sabdālankāra section Bhoja mentions tāņdava, lāsya, chalika, sampā, hallisaka, and rāsa, the six preksya types (S.K.A. pp. 309, ibid). Läsya will be examined by us separately later. Nartanaka is lāsya itself. Bhoja seems to suggest that the lāsya with the ten angas as described by Bharata can be presented by a single dansense i.e. nartakī, and will then be termed 'nartanaka'.
Mālavikāgnimitra. Act. I. mentions chalika' which princess Mālavikā was learning from Ganadāsa, the dance teacher. In act I. Panditā Kausiki observes : "deva ! śarmisthāyāh krtim catuspadódbhavam chalitam dusprayogam udāharanti." This has a reference to a composition by some lady called śarmisthā. This dance composition consists of four parts (catuspadam). It is difficult to perform - dusprayogam'. One of the four parts is chalita which Mālavikā is to perform. It looks like a love-piece in prakrtą. Kātayavema, a commentator, quotes a definition of chalika' which seems to be inspired by Kalidasa's Malavikāgnimitra. According to this definition, chalita is the dance of a damsel, who reveals hero through the pretext of doing 'acting or abhinaya, for an old composition. This definition seems to be based on the word 'chala' i.e. deceit. It may be noted that 'chalika' and 'chalita' are synonyms. The definition reads as - tatha coktam -
"tad eva chalikam nāma sākṣād yad abhiniyate, vyapadiśya purā-vȚttam
svábhiprāya-prakāśanam.” Another definition of unknown source is also quoted by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 556,
cording to that, 'chalita' is a sort of dance, depicting love, anger, and heroism, which hardly adds anything fresh to what we know. It runs as -

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chalita-lakṣaṇam yathā-"rati-krodhótsäha-bhāva-pradhānam chalikam smṛtam. iti." The Kathāsaritsāgara (III. iii. 20) mentions it as 'chalita', a dance-variety, performed by Rambha in heaven.
912
We have seen above that Dandin's Kāvyādarśa I. 39, mentions some uparūpakas which are prekṣya-prabandhas. His words are : "lāsya-chalika-śamyā"di preksyártham, itarat punaḥ..." Still earlier, Bhāmaha also while dealing with the classification of kävya, speaks of rūpaka class as represented by nāṭaka and some upa-rupaka-compositions, such as dvipadi, samya, rāsaka, and skandhaka. He observes (I. 24):
nātakam dvipadi-śamyā
rāsaka-skandhakā"di yat, uktam tad abhineyártham ukto'nyais tasya vistaraḥ."
Bhoja seems to be inspired by both Bhamaha and Dandin. Dandin's chalika is explained by Bhoja in the śabdālamkāra section (S.K.A.) as - "idam tu śṛngāra-vīra-rasa-pradhānatvāt chalikam." Dr. Raghavan (pp. 556, ibid) observes that chalika is tāṇḍava and lasya taken together. Thus it is a dance having vira and śṛngāra rasas. Bhoja (S.K.A. pp. 308) illustrates chalika by a prakṛta gatha. The Sanskrit rendering is :
"niśamya paścāt turagaravam śūkarī himsártham hasati, nija-kantam damśṭrā-yugalena punaḥ punar na ca daśati.”
This is a picture of a she-pig, though hounded by hunters, still laughing and sporting with her mate. Actually technically this is an illustration where emotions or feelings of animals other than humans are described and we may take it as rasā"bhāsa rather than rasa! Taruṇavācaspati and as suggested by Dr. Raghavan, his son Kesava explain 'chalika' as "chalikam chadmanā vṛttam." This explanation is similar to the one given by Kāṭayavema. Taruṇavācaspati also adds - "mardalachalika"di-vādya-viśeṣāṇām ekasmin kāle viramaņa - prakramaṇam chalikam ity ucyate." Which explain 'chalika' as simultaneous stopping and sounding of drums and other musical instruments. Chalika is thus like 'mardala', the name of some instrument and also an aspect of instrumentation in dance-music.

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Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 557, ibid): "The variant chalita seems to be later; having been definitely inspired by the effort to understand it on the basis of the word chala. Chalika is the correct and old name in which it occurs in some valuable but tantalisingly obscure references to it in Harivamśa. In Book II. Viṣṇuparvan, Ch.s 88, 89 and 93, (chitrasala press Edn.) Chälikya is mentioned more than once. In Ch. 88, the yādavas go to the waterside for sport and there, they indulge in music and dance, gīta, vādya, nṛtya, and abhinaya (vs. 37, 38, 42); Ch. 89 itself is called chalikya krīḍā; at the behest of Kṛṣṇa and Balarama, the Apsaras-damsels sing and dance to the music of the voice and instruments (vs. 5); they gesticulate and dance Rāsa, singing songs in different local dialects, wearing manifold local costumes, and keeping the rhythms by beat of palms -
"cakrur hasantyaś ca tathaiva rāsam tad deśa-bhāṣā-kṛti-veṣa-yuktāḥ, sa-hastatālam lalitam salīlam
varānganā mangala-sambhṛtángyaḥ.”
They then sing songs on the exploits of Krsna and Balarama at Gokula, and represent those acts in dance (vs. 8-15). Then Balarama, along with Revati, begins to dance with clap of hands (sa-hasta-tālam), and Kṛṣṇa, with Satyabhāmā and other couples follow suit. In vs. 22, which concludes the description of this section, the dance is referred to as Rasa; in the succeeding verses again, mentioning sage Nārada joining the merriment, the dance is called Rasa (see especially vs. 24, 30).. The party then jumps into water, indulge in water-sports, singing and playing on water as on drum (jala-vādita and jala-dardura, vs. 45). Eating and drinking follow after which again music and dance begin (vs. 66). Kṛṣṇa suggests that they may do chalikya. Chālikya is also referred to as a song -
"chalikya-geyam bahusannidhānam
yad eva gandharvam udaharanti."
Nārada takes up the Viņā, and Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, the flute and Hallīsaka, implying thereby that Hallisaka, found also with variants Jhallīsaka and Ballīsaka, is a musical instrument (v. 68); the Apsaras play Mṛdanga and other instruments, now follows Asarita music (on the instruments) after which Rambha makes her appearance and dances with Abhinaya of the song (69, 70).
Then, after a respite, chālikya-gandharva is again begun (73) and Rukmini's son is said to perform it. (74)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Now apart from the instrument accompaniment mentioned above, there are a few more details also comprised in this chālikya, the full meaning of which however, is not clear; at the end of the first course of chālikya is mentioned what is called Tāmbūla-yoga; again Rukmini's son is said to have done Chālikya with Tāmbūla. :
tāmbūla-yogāś ca varápsarībhiḥ. (72) prayojayāmāsa sa raukmiņeyaḥ. (74) chālikya-gāndharvam udārabuddhiḥ
tenaiva tāmbūla-mayam prayuktam. (75) From Chālikya are then said to have been derived two varieties, called 'sukumāra-jāti and Gāndharva-jāti. (78, 79) -
"tataḥ pravsttā sukumārajātiḥ ..
gāndharvajātiś ca tathā'parā'pi.” · Chālikya is then said to be very difficult to understand and perform, without it, proper intonation of even the mūrcchanās and the six grāma-rāgas are not possible : the sukumāra variety of it mentioned above is called leśa and is said to be most difficult.
sakyam na chālikyam, ste tapobhiḥ, sthāne vidhānāny atha mūrcchanāsu. sad-grāma-rāgeșu ca tatra kāryam tasyaika-deśā-vayavena rājan lesábhidhānām sukumārajātim
nişthām suduḥkhena narāḥ prayānti. (81, 82) Later in Ch. 93, in connection with the ruse employed for killing the demon Vajranābha, and Pradyumna marrying Prabhāvatī, the enactment of the story of the Rāmāyana is described; when the orchestra had been set and played, it is said the women-singers sang the sweet Devagāndhāra Chālikya, after which the Nāndi and a verse on the theme in the Gangāvatarana was sung; from this it would seem that Chālikya formed part of pūrva-ranga and it is the name of a song and a dance accompanying that song. Then they enacted the theme of Rambhabhisāra :
“rāmāyaṇam mahākāvyam uddeśyam nāțakīkstam, tato ghanam sasușiram

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murajānaka-bhūṣitam. tantrīsvaragaṇair viddhān ātodyān anvavādayan. tatas tu devagandhāram chalikyam śravanámṛtam. bhaumas striyaḥ prajagire
nāndīm ca vādayāmāsa... nandyante ca tadā ślokam gangávataraṇā"śritam rambhabhisāram kanyeram
nāṭakam nanṛtus tadā."
So, this long quotation from Dr. Raghavan is just to explain 'chalika', a part of nartanaka. He has elaborately thought over 'chälikya' also which is closely related with 'chalika'.
One point is clear that whether 'chalika' as mentioned by Bhoja is a part of Nartanaka or otherwise, its independent existence is read in earlier documents of Bhamaha and Dandin and thus it is an art-form of earlier tradition.
915
Śamyā - Bhoja mentions this in alamkāra section as 'sampa'. Daṇḍin and the ND. also have samyā.
Dandin (I. 39.a) has -

"lāsya-cchalita-sampádi (śamyā”di) prekṣártham."
The Prabhā tikā (pp. 38) explains it as : Śampā pūrvarangántargato vadyaprayoga-viśesam. tad uktam nātya-śāstre -
"śampā tu dvikalā kāryā
tālo dvikala eva ca,
punaś caika kalā śampā
sannipātaḥ kalā trayam." (V. 62)
śalyeti pāṭhe śālyā -
bhāle hastam samāvesya

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SAHDAYĀLOKA nộtyam śalyeti kirtitam. - iti tīkántare krta-laksaņā. śamyeti pāțhe - "samyeti savyayoḥ pātaḥ satālaḥ-kara-pādayoḥ ubhayoḥ karayoḥ pātaḥ
sannipāta iti smộtah.” tare. 'Samya' iti pāthe gita-vädya-samaya-nrtyam anyai rāsakanāmnā pathitam. ādiśabdena tandava-hallīsaka-rāsānām grahanam. uktam ca - ,
"tallāsyam tāṇdavam ceti cchalitam sampayā saha, . hallīsakam ca rāsam ca
șat prakāram pracakṣate.” (S.K.Ā. II. 143) Sampā (pp. 308, SK. ibid) is illustrated as - vīhesi harimuhi... etc. The Sanskrit rendering is -
"vibheși harimukhi api bhava mām ca gale gļhāņa sadā, krandati ristāsura-maritaḥ kantha-valito na patiḥ.”
tad idam chalikam eva kinnara-visayam sampā. The Abh. (p. 227, Vol. I. ibid) on N.S. V. 62, (quoted above) has - śamyā tvityādi. - dvikala-cañcat-putasya śamya"deh svarūpam anena darśitam. sā'pi saśabdapāta-gata-hasta-nirvartyā eva. The A.bh. (pp. 228, Vol. I, ibid, G.O.S.) goes on to quote -
"samyā dakşiņa-pātas tu tālo vāmena kīrtitah, ubhayoḥ sannipātaḥ saḥ
sannipāta iti smộtaḥ." (N.S. XXXI. 38) One thing emerges clearly that śamyā or sampā is a performance with musical instruments and it formed part of the pūrva-ranga as noted by one commentator.
In the S.K.Ā. it is explained by Bhoja as : 'tad idam chalikam eva kinnaravisayam sampā.'

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917 ra. (Vol. II. p. 283, Dr. Raghavan) this reads as “lāsyam eva devakinnara-visayam śamyā”, adding Devas to Kinnaras. Vādi-janghāla on K.D. I. 39 seems to borrow partly from Bhoja when he observes that lāsya is love-dance of humans, śamyā of Kinnaras and Chalika of celestial damsels. Taruna Vācaspati quotes Bhoja, but the Hrdayam-gamă explains it as a term related to the motion of hands for keeping time.
"śamyā tu savyayoḥ pātaḥ sa-tāla-kara-pādayoḥ, ubhayoḥ karayoḥ pātaḥ
sannipāta iti smộtaḥ." The HỊdayamgamā further observes : aratnimātraprāya-nānāvarņa-racita-yastihastaih, bahubhiḥ bahvībhir vā tair eva tālahastaiś ca tālayastīnām ekávasare sannipāto vā, tālam vină yastīnām ekávasare sannipāto vā, tālam vină yastihastair eva yastīnām sannipāto vā śamyā ucyate.”
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 559) observes : “This makes samyā, the sanskrit name for the dance called in Tāmil Kol-attam, in which a number of boys and girls or the latter only form themselves into two rows or into more complicated patterns, striking tāla with two coloured sticks (kol) of a span's length in both their hands. They may strike the two sticks in their own hands, as also spin around, turn and execute many movements striking the sticks of those that cross them in movements. It is this that came to be called Danda-rāsaka.” We may say that in Saurashtra and Gujarat, this is known as "Dandiyā rāsa'. now popular in other parts of the contry also, especially in Mahasashtra and is performed on auspicious occasions such as marriage etc., now a days, but necessarily in the nava-rātra-mahotsava in honour of mother Ambikā or Durgā.
But as observed earlier there is a term connected with Tāla, called samy, which is mentioned in the Tāla-Adhyāya of Bharata, i.e. Nā. Šā. XXXI, (vs. 31) (pp. 167, G.O.S. Vol IV). The Abh. (pp. 166, ibid) also quotes from Ch. 28, astā vimšaty adhāye.' (N.S. XXVIII. 18) (pp. 9, ibid). The word 'sannipāta' is also of similar connotation. 'Samya' occurs at N.S. XXXI. 171, (pp. 226), vs. 173, (pp. 227), vs. 175, 176, N.S. XXXI. 17 (pp. 158), again at pp. 177, 229, 479, 217, 158, 183, 255, 178, 170, 9, 255, 307, 248, 167, 258, 243, 157, 216, 253, 157, 159, 177 & 251 in various forms (Vol. IV). The HỊdayamgamā on samyā quotes the word sannipāta :
"samyā tu savyayoḥ pātaḥ satāla-kara-pādayoḥ, ubhayoḥ karayoḥ pātaḥ sannipāta iti smộtah.”

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA This can be compared with Bharata's observation in the Tāládhyāya, which reads as,
"savya-hasta nipātah syāc chamyā tālasya vāmataḥ hastayos tu samaḥ pātaḥ
sannipāta iti smộtaḥ.” (N.S. XXXI. 37, G.O.S.) Dr. Raghavan quotes from, perhaps Kāśi edn. It reads as - "samyā dakṣiṇahastasya tālaḥ pātas tu vāmataḥ."
This is read in the ft-note no. 1. (pp. 171, G.O.S. Edn.). Thus samyā is a movement of the right hand to keep time; the beating of both the palms to keep time is "sannipāta”. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 559, ibid) : “From this, it can be inferred that samyā, as the name of a dance, is derived from the original meaning of that word, viz. striking for keeping time; for keeping time in a dance with palms, as in Tamil Kummi and the Kerala Kaikottikkali (or, as in Gujarati 'garbā', or dandia rāsa'; we may add), it might have got extended to dance in which the time is kept by striking the small sticks, and to those time-keeping sticks themselves. In the Rāmāyana, the expression śamyā-grāha occurs in the sense of time-keepers dance; when at the desire of sage Bhāradvāja, the sylvan surroundings turned festive in a miraculous manner, the trees turned into dancing troupe, Bilvas became drummers, Vibhitakas, the time-keepers and Asvatthas dancers :
bilvā mārdangikā āsan śamyāgrāhā vibhītakāḥ, aśvattha nartakās cā"san
bhāradvājaś ca śāsanāt.” (II. 91, 48) The word samyā in Sanskrit also means a short stick of the length of a span, i.e. nine inches, or two sticks) used in the holes of yokes of bullock carts. The Amarakośa observes :
"Śamyā strī, yuga-kilakaḥ.” (II. 14) Dvipadi - This is mentioned by Bhāmaha, Abh., and Kamārila and ND.
Bhāmaha (I. 24) simply mentions dvipadi' and 'samyā', 'rāsaka' and 'skandhaka' along with nāšaka, and observes that all these are meant for stagerepresentation, i.e. are objects of acting (= abhineyártham) the detailed discussion on which is done by others ("ukto'nyais tasya vistaraḥ”). There is

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nothing special in the quotation from A.bh. which mentions this art-form, as quoted above. The ND. has the following: "kinnara-viṣayam lāsyam nṛttam śamyā, sṛngāra-rasa-pradhānam lāsyam, śṛngāra-vīra-raudrā”di-pradhānam chalitam. dvipady adayaḥ chandobhedāḥ. Obviously the metres sung in samya etc. are dvipadi etc. according to the ND.
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 560, ibid) explains that 'dvipadi' as the name of a song, refers to the nature of the composition as well as a time measure, a 'laya'. This can be seen from Act. IV, Vikramorvaśīyam. Dvipadi is taken as a song by Ranganatha Dixit and there is also a composition called dvipadika. It is a natural practice to name a dance after the song featuring in it. In the prabandhádhyāya of music works, there are many such instances. Yakṣagāna, an old kannada drama is named after the songs pertaining to it. Dvipädi is also a kind of 'laya' in 'gati' or gait, of the character on the stage. The actors have to move about on the stage in gaits and steps that are in harmony with their mental moods. Swift or slow movements or gaits suggest this or that rasa. This swiftness or slowness of gaits is the 'laya' meant here. This laya is manifold such as dvipadikā, khandadhārā, carcarī, etc. In the Vikramórvaśīya, act IV, the dvipadi-laya is given as the movement for parikramaṇa, i.e. moving round to another part of the stage and for wheeling to see around i.e. 'diśo'valokya'. 'Sitting down' or 'upaviśya', is done in carcari laya - "carcarikaya upaviśya añjalim baddhvā." Kuṭṭanīmata's modern commentator, Shri. T. M. Tripathi, interprets 'dvipadikā' on pp. 340, as “layaviseṣa", though Ranganatha Dixit takes it, and other similar names, as names of songs; i.e. 'gīti-viseṣa'. Actually there is hardly any difference between these two views, for the songs must be in certain 'laya', - i.e. druta, madhya, and vilambita or fast, medium, and slow time-measures. On the song of the Națī, in the prastāvanā of Abhijñānaśākuntala, Raghava Bhatta observes that the verse on summer season, sung by the națī is a dvipadī, and calls this dvipadi a 'laya'. It means that the song is in that 'laya'. Dvipadi is also the name of a song is borne out by Raghava Bhatta's quotation from the text called Adibharata. The observation reads as -

"vilambitalaya yatra gurave dvipadī tu sā, śṛngāre karune hāsye
yojyä, hy uttama-madhyamaiḥ. avasthántaram āsādya
gātavyā sā'dhamair api."

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Dvipadi is also the name purely of a manner of walking on the stage a gati-laya, in certain other contexts. This is clear from a remark of Jagaddhara in his comment on a verse in act I, Mālatīmādhava, viz. "gamanam alasam", etc. Jagaddhara explains that Mādhava must enter in 'dvipadikā' i.e. a slow and dragging gait, "gamanam alasam". Here Jagaddhara quotes an authority,
"soka-vibhrama-yuktesu vyadhi-cintā-sama"śrite, śruta-vārtā"di-vairūpye,
yojyā dvipadikā budhaiḥ." Thus the term dvipadi had a semantic extention from laya or gait, to the song (sung with a particular gait), and from the song to the dance: The dance was also termed dvipadī, which is an art-form now.
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 561, ibid) also observes that the Sangīta-ratnākara mentions dvipadi as a musical composition. This is read in the Ch. IV, dealing with prabandhas. It is of four kinds and is sung in Karuna tāla.
As observed earlier, the N.D. calls dvipadi and such other terms to be 'chandovišesa' i.e. particular metres in which songs are composed. Dr. Raghavan notes that dvipadikā metre is seen in Telugu even to-day, and there are also Tamil songs, called 'dvipadikai'.
Preksaņaka or Penkhaņaka or preksaņam is mentioned by Vätsyāyana, Bhoja, N.D., Sā, NLRK., and the SD. of Viśvanātha.
Śā. calls it Prekṣaṇam. Bhoja defines Prekṣaṇaka as : (pp. 468, śr. Pra. ibid) -
“rathya-samāja-catvarasukhā(rā)layā”dau pravartyate bahubhiḥ, pātra-viseșaiḥ yat tat
prekşanakam kāma-dahanā”di.” Bhoja illustrates it by 'Kāmadahana'. We do not read this variety of art-form in the A.bh. It consists of a simple representation of such episodes as the burning of cupid by Lord Siva, and is presented on the streets (= rathyā), in cultured gatherings (= Samāja), at road-crossing (= catvara) (= nukkada, - Hindi) (or, cautā, gujarati), or in temples. This art-form seems to be a popular type, perhaps similar to street-plays of to-day. The theme seems to be mythological or paurāņika. It is presented by many artists or characters. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 561, ibid)

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921 : “It seems that this is identical with the South Indian counterpart of the North Indian Holi Festival, named in Tamil as Kāman-tī i.e. Kāma-dahana, in which Kāma is burnt and two parties of songsters contend in songs that Kāma is dead and that Kāma continues to be alive. The songs are called Lāvanī, which is a Marathi mode. The Holi is a very old festival and is mentioned by Vätsyāyana in his Ka Sūtras I. iv. 42, as Holākā (Holikā).” We beg to differ. The Holikā festival is associated with Prahlāda episode and not Kāmadahana episode. The Prahlāda: Hiranya-kasipu-episode is famous in the Purānas. The prekşana as observed by us earlier, seems to be a popular form of street-play with religious theme.
Dr. Raghavan also observes that in this instance also, Sāradātanaya shows his confusion. He gives Bhoja's Nartanaka, calls it Preksanaka on pp. 263, and clubs together the verses on both under the single head of Preksanaka. We will see what Sā. does. But before that we should note that the ND. has Preksana (N.D. IV. para 8) defined after Bhoja. The ND. reads 'Surā"laya' for Bhoja's 'Sukhā"laya' in Josyer Edn. This has to be emended as 'Surā"laya' in the light of ND., which Dr. Raghavan does without mentioning the ND. Or, 'Sukhā”laya' could mean a public place of rest, such as an 'inn', where this performance was held. The ND. has -
“rathyā-samāja-catvarasurā”layā”dau pravartyate bahubhiḥ, pātra-višesair yat tat
preksanakam kāma-dahanā"di.” Śā. at B.P. IX. para 30, (pp. 385) defines 'preksaņaka' and quotes from Bhoja's Nartanaka. On IX. para 2 (pp. 374, ibid) where the art-forms are enumerated, we read "kāvyañ ca preksaņam, nātyarāsakam rāsakam tathā”. We read 'preksanam' and not 'preksanakam' and in the definition Bhoja's 'nartanaka' is covered up. Dr. M. M. Agrawal (pp. 21, Introduction to his BP.) observes that Bhoja has discussed two varieties of preksanaka and has called them separately by names such as ‘preksanaka' and 'nartanaka'. But śā. takes them as one. He has given the title "preksanaka" and used the term 'nartanaka' in the definition. Dr. Agrawal has then explained the definition of 'nartanaka' but is silent over the features of 'preksana’ka' which is read in the title only but no features of which are discussed by Śā. He has also noted that the S.D. has called it “prenkhaņa”. We will come to the S.D. later. But one thing is certain that Śā. has discussed only 'nartanaka' under “prekşanaka”, which is only a name in the BP. Our guess work is that perhaps the copyist who copied from Sā.'s autograph might have missed the portion on prekşanaka and

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA inadvertantly, must have started copying from the nartanaka portion. Later copyists might have followed these older copies blindly. So, perhaps for Sa., both
nd nartanaka were different art-forms and he must have followed Bhoja here as is done elsewhere. The misunderstanding is caused perhaps by the mistake of the first scribe who prepared a copy from the autogarph.
The NLRK. has - (pp. 303, ibid) - atha prekşanakam - aśesa-bhāsópaśobhitam, śauraseni-pradhānam, garbha-vimarśa-śünyam tallaksana-yuktañca, sarva-vșttinispannam. pratimukha-sandhi-praveśaka-viskambhakā atra na kartavyāḥ. parivartaka-yuktam prayatnataḥ kāryam, niyuddha-sphetayutam, vipad anucintā bahulam ca, atra sūtradhāro na vidheyah. nandi upaksepaś ca vidheyah. yathā vālivadhaḥ - In preksanaka according to the NLRK., there is use of all languages, but Sauraseni is principal. It is bereft of garbha and vimarśa junctures but some features of the activities in these two junctures are seen here. There are all vrttis in this art-form. There is absence of prati-mukha juncture and also of intertudes called praveśaka and viskambhaka. Thus, we may say that only two, i.e. mukha and nirvahana remain here at the end. The item ‘parivartaka' from the pūrva-ranga has to be placed here with skill and effort. There is bāhu-yuddha i.e. ni-yuddha or individual combat, and there is also speech with anger (sampheta). There is a lot of thinking devoted to future possible calamities. There is absence of sūtradhāra here but 'nāndi and 'upaksepa' are very much there. The illustration is Väli-vadha.
The NLRK. has based its definition on the BP. of Śā., but it has something more and something less of it. The S.D. has the following:
"garbhávamaría-rahitam prenkhaṇam hīna-nāyakam, a-sūtradhāram ekánkam a-viskambha-praveśakam.” (S.D. VI. 286) niyuddha-sampheta-yutam sarva-vrtti-samāśritam nepathye giyate nāndi
tathā tatra prarocanā.” (S.D. VI. 287) yathā Vālivadhaḥ. The BP. illustrates it by “Tripura-mardana" and it has uttama or adhama hero according to Śā., but the S.D. recommends only a lowly born as a hero - hīnanāyakam. The rest follows Sā. and NLRK. But Bhoja's prekșanaka is different.

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Rāsa, Rāsaka and Natyarāsaka. Rāsaka is read in Bhamaha, A.bhā., Kumārila, Dhananjaya, Bhoja, Hemacandra, N.D., Śā; NLRK. Vāg. II, and the S.D.
We have seen the quotations from the A.bh. above and also looked into what Kohala had to say about various art-forms.
The Abh. defines rāsaka (pp. 181, ibid) as:
"aneka-nartaki-yojyam citra-tāla-layánvitam, a-catuḥ-sasti-yugalād
rāsakam masṛṇóddhatam."
Thus according to the A.bh., the Cirantanas took rāsaka as an art-form which is of the form of a dance in various tālas, which is delicate (masṛṇa) and also forceful (uddhata) and which is performed by many ladies. There are 64 pairs in it.
Dhananjaya simply names it. Bhoja defines Rāsaka as - (pp. 468, ibid)
ṣodaśa dvādaśāṣṭau vā yasmin nṛtyanti nāyikāḥ, pindibandhā"di vinyāsaiḥ rāsakam tad udāhṛtam. Natyā-rāsaka is defined as, pinḍanāt tu bhavet pindi, gumphanāc chankhala bhavet, bhedena bhedyako jāto latā-jālápanodanaḥ.
ete nṛttā❞tmnā kāryā nātyavantaḥ kriyāvidhau
sukumāróddhatair angair

923
gayikābhir vilakṣaṇā. vākyasthā vidhayo hy ete pinḍā"dyā daśa-jātayaḥ, na padair abhidhīyante anukaryánurūpinah,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA kāminībhir bhavo bhartus' cestitam yat tu nrtyate, rāgād vasantam asadya sa jñeyo nātya-rāsakaḥ. tatrā'pi pūrvavan nịttam kāmatas tu layakramah, kathito rāsaka-prānte
śobhártho vacana-kramaḥ. citrā”todya-padakramair layayuto bheda-dvayálamkrtaḥ cārīkhanda-sumandalair anugataḥ, soyam mato rāsaka)... (pp. 469, ibid)
For Nātya-rāsaka, this is the longest and most-detailed description of an uparūpaka (= 12 verses, pp. 468-469, Sr. Pra. ibid) in Bhoja. Accordingly we make out that Nātyarāsaka is a dance performed by lady-dancers, nartikās, in spring time, and as such it is also called - carcari
"carcarīti ca tām āhur
varnatālena tatra tu..." (pp. 468, ibid) It is pure dance of the pindi, bhedyaka and other group-movements and patterns. Bhoja observes that these patterns shall be performed in Läsya (= softer variety) and in Nātyarāsaka. First of all, one pair enters, places flowers, dances and leaves. (puspāñjali-prayogam tu, mātrātālena yojayet.) -
Then two others enter, and thus groups are formed which display ‘gulma' - 'śrnkhalā', etc.
"ubhayoh pārsvayoḥ paścāt
pātrāņi praviśanti ca..." Then there is a recital of rhythmic syllables by musicians, instrumental accompaniments and songs. There is drum-beating, together with recital or rhythem - syllables, -
"murajákşaravādyais ca
hanyād dandam tu dandakaiḥ.” Bhoja also gives details concerning tāla. The whole function is to end with a mangala-s'loka which says that this rāsaka, full of pindī, śịnkhalā, etc., and danced to the accompaniment of various instruments, was originated by devas when they

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925 danced in joy on securing Amsta i.e. nectar in the churning of ksīra-sāgara or dugdha-mahodadhi -
"labdhvā dugdha-mahodadhau suraganaiḥ pitvā’mộtam yas radā, pindi-śříkhalikā-viśesa-vihito yukto latā-bhedyakaih..." (pp. 469, ibid) The B.P. completes the verse, with these last two lines - "citrā”todyapadakramaiḥ layayuto bheda-dvayā’lamệtaiḥ,
cārīkhanda-sumandalaiḥ anugataḥ sóyam mato rāsakaḥ." Bhoja observes,
"evam nịtta-krameņā’nyo
hy apasāras samāpyate.” and adds,
"apasāratrayam cányat
kalpyate sāmpratam mayā.” We can imagine that Bhoja must have observed actual innovations introduced by artists but perhaps not mentioned in theory till his time. So, he seems to suggest that "three more varietics of 'apasāra' are imagined by me."
Dr. Raghavan observes that (pp. 563, ibid) the Sangita-ratnākara gives a musical composition called 'rāsa' as one of the eight sūda-prabandhas. (IV. 175-8). It is also so called because it is sung in Rāsa-tāla. Sārangadeva holds that this composition was not in vogue even in his times.
We have observed earlier that Bhoja calls the nātya-rāsaka by the name of 'carcarī also. The meaning of 'carcari can be understood with the help of Harsa's Ratnāvali and also Rājasekhara's Karpūra-mañjarī. In Ratnāvali, a nātikā, which is more of an entertainment (i.e. ranjanā-pradhāna), we find more of dance and music. Here, we have a spring-dance called "carcari” by name, introduced in Act I. Yaugandharāyana informs of the vasanta-festival being held outside. He hears the 'carcarī of vasanta, sung and danced by the citizens. Then the dance is introduced on the stage. At this point, it is not the carcarī song but another called dvipadīkhanda. We see three gāthās on spring which are sung and performed through acting-abhinaya-by two maid-servants or 'cetis' of Vasavadattā. Damodaragupta in his Kuttani-mata gives part of this abhinaya, in which acting of Ratnávali is described (śl. 897).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA By T. M. Trivedi, in his commentary on the Kuttani-mata (pp. 345), observes Dr. Raghavan, carcari is explaind as a Tāla, a kind of Vädya, a kind of song, a kind of metre, exhilarating sport, etc. etc. In the Ratnāvali itself, 'carcari' is used both as a song and as a name of a type of playing on the Mțdanga, over and above its being used as the name of dance of the spring festival :
paurāņām sam uccarati carcari-dhvanih, - suvstta-mardalóddāma-carcarīśabda - tataḥ praviśataḥ madanalīlām nāțayantyau dvipadī-khandam gāyantyau cetyau.
"mām apy etam carcarīkam śikṣayatha", and see also, "na khalv esā carcari, dvipadikhandam khalv etat.”
A spring-time dance with reference to cupid's festival is seen here. This shows drinking and merrymaking by citizens in couples, and ladies dancing and striking their lovers with water.
We have noticed elsewhere that the Sattaka, which is similar to Nātikā, has a lot of dance and music in it. The carcari is seen in the Karpūra-mañjari-saţtaka of Rājasekhara. The act IV introduces a vata-sāvitrī-vrata celebration in the summer season. Various kinds of dances are performed by women in this celebration. Lāsya is mentioned along with another dance viz. danda-rāsaka performed by thirty two nartakīs. This can be placed with the 'tippanī dance prevelent in Saurashtra, Gujarat. Another dance is one wherein girl-dancers divide themseleves into two rows facing each other. There is also a variety of comic dance and also a dance by women dressed as hunters over and above the graceful lāsya dance-varieties. Also part of dance is the terrible dance of the anubhāvas or consequents of the raudrarasa, with human flash - 'nara-māmsa' in hand. This is termed śmaśānābhinaya. There are also facial masks of demonesses as part of such a dance. Vocal and instrumental music also accompanies this dance and also 'hudukkās' and mặdangas, both tālavādyas - are mentioned. Vinā is placed and then an additional dance called yoginī-valaya-nartana-keli is also seen here for the first time. Sāradātanaya has taken note of danda-rāsaka (Ch. X), a variety of lāsya, perhaps seeking inspiration from Rājasekhara's drama. Besides this danda-rāsaka, we have two more rāsakas such as mandala-rāsaka and nātya-rāsaka, mentioned by Sāradātanaya, without clearly describing the same.
Dance with a 'carcarī is thus introduced by the Karpūra-mañjarī : (tataḥ pravišati carcari) -
“muktāphalā”bharaṇoccayaḥ lāsyávasāne calitámśukāḥ,

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927 siñcanty anyonyam imāḥ paśya
yantrajālaiḥ manibhājanaiḥ.” Then, the danda-rāsaka is described as -
paribhramayantyaḥ vicitra-bandhaiḥ, imā dvi-sodașa-nartakyaḥ helanti tālánugatapādāḥ
tavangane drśyate danda-rāsaḥ. This dance is performed by 32 nartakis, wheeling round and forming wonderful patterns. Dr. Raghvan (pp. 565, ibid) notices that in the sanskrit-Tamil text called Suddhānanda-prakāśa, the danda-rāsaka is described in a quotation given therein as the samyā or kolātta which is given under samyā by Dr. Raghavan. It reads as -
krsnena nirmitam nrttam danda-rāsaka-samjñitam, cāruveņīdharāḥ candrabimbásyāḥ ramya-bhūṣaṇāḥ. dhārayanti karāgrena śubhra-dāru-vinirmitān, dandan vicitrān ślaksan dvyangula-sthaulya-nirmitān. sodasángula-dirgānsca laghằn laghava-samyutān parasparam tādayantyaḥ
danļān nộtyeyur anganāḥ.” (See also B.P.) This obviously is the dandiyā-rāsa popular and prevelant even to-day in Gujarat during nava-rātri festival and now also on occasions such as marriage etc.
After this some patterns which the dancers execute are mentioned which include designs such as pindi-bandhas, and hexagonal and octagonal designs.
"sațkoņair astakonaiś ca
piņdibandhair manoharai).” The dance includes Komala (delicate) Karanas and Cārīs. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 565) quotes from Sangīta-samayasāra which says of Danda

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rāsaka (VI. 237-245) as follows:
"tālaś ca jaya-tālaś ca ghaṇṭikā jaya-pūrvikā patahaś ca haḍukkā ca mṛdangaḥ karaṭā tataḥ. ity ādi vādya-sandoho vādyate daṇḍa-rāsake... pātradvayam samārabhya dve dve pātre vivardhayet bhaveyur asta-dvandvāni yāvat, tāvad yathā-ruci. anyonyábhimukham vā'pi parāvṛtta-mukham tathā,
mukho dandá-nuviddham ca (?)
vādya-tāla-samanvitam.
sthānakaiḥ (karaṇair) hasta-tāḍanair vartanair yutam.
nānābandhaiḥ samāyuktam, laya-traya-samanvitam,
danda-rāya(sa)m iti proktam
nṛttabheda-vicaksanaih" (T.S.S. Edn.)
According to Pārsvadeva, observes Dr. Raghavan, daṇḍa-rāsaka is a dance in which all tāla-vādyas are played. Dancers in pairs enter and make eight pairs and they either face each-other or stand back to back. They beat their palms or sticks in unision with rhythm and they execute various poses and dance. The modern Gujarati dandia-rāsa comes very close to this except that the pairs at times are not limited to a certain number and this performance is accompanied by song and music. We do not know the date of the sources consulted by Dr. Raghavan.
·
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Rājasekhara also describes a dance called 'calli' which looks like a division of nartakis in two rows facing each other :

"samāmsa-śīrṣā sama-bāhu-hastā rekhā viśuddhā aparāś ca dadati, panktibhyām dvābhyām laya-tala-bandham parasparam sābhimukhāḥ callim."
See also,

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929 kā’pi vādita-karāla-huddukā ramya mardala-raveņa mțgāksī, bhrūlatābhyām paripāti-calābhyām calli-karma-karane pravșttā.
The Abh. mentions cilli' or 'calli' as occurring in dombikā, along with the playing on the hudukkā. Rājasekhara also associates hudukkāvādana with 'calli'.
So, 'calli' or 'cilli' is a dance, nștta, with a nartakī playing on a drum or hudukkā. The Abh. (Vol. I. G.O.S. Edn. pp. 166-7) reads -
“kvacin nịtta-prādhānyam yathā dombikā”di-prayogánantaram hudukkāvādyávasare." ata eva tatra loka-bhāṣayā cillimārga (vi. 'callimārga' ft. n. 1, pp. 167) iti prasiddhiḥ.
Calli or Cilli is thus a dance i.e. nștta, with a drum, hudukkā, being played by a nartaki.
Rājasekhara also describes 'śmaśānábhinaya' and it is 'raudra-rasa-abhinaya' with masks of demoness-faces, terrible sounds of humkāra, phetkära etc., and with mahāmāmsa. Another set of damsels does the hunter's dance and produces laughter - 'hāsya-rasa-abhinaya'. Again, another kāla-vesa or dark make-up and a hāsya dance are described at the end. The 'yoginī-valaya-nartana-keli' is then next described as being done with vocal music and accompaniment of tāla, by nartakis with small bells or kinkinis at their feet.
So, carcari is mentioned by Sangīta-ratnākara as a name of a musical composition originally composed to a tāla called 'carcari' which is defined as -
“virāmānta-druta-dvandvān
yaştau laghu ca carcarī.” (Tāládhyāya, 235). Subsiquently, it came to be composed in other tālas also. According to śārnga deva, this Carcarī is composed in Hindolā-rāga (i.e. a Tāla associated with a swing), and tāla-carcari, a composition having many feet, is composed in sixteen mātrās, with alliteration, and in prākrta. It is sung in spring festival. According to others, it is a song in 'carcari metre and in kridā-tāla or in ghutrā and other metres. Read Sangīta-ratnākara, IV. 292-3 -
“rāgo hindolakaḥ tālas' carcari bahavonghrayaḥ, yasyām șodașa-mātrāḥ syuḥ dvau dvau ca präsa-samyutau. sā vasantotsave geyā
O

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uktam ca -
Rājānaka Ratnākara, in Hara-vijaya mentions this rāsaka or nātya-rāsaka as räsakánka, through śleṣa, at XVIII. 108. Alaka, the commentator explains that rāsakāńka is a type of dance described by Kohala in which eight, sixteen or thirtytwo nartakis participate and perform pindi-bandhas. He observes : "rāsakánkaś ca kohalókto natyaprakāraḥ
carcarī prākṛtaiḥ padaiḥ, carcari-chandasety ante krīḍātālena vety api. dhutta"di chandasā vā'sya
chandolakṣmoditā bhidāḥ." (S.R. IV. 292-3)
aṣṭau ṣoḍașa dvātrimśat yatra nṛtyanti gāyikāḥ, pinḍībandhánusāreņa
SAHṚDAYALOKA
tan nṛtyam rāsakam viduḥ."
In the Natya-darpaṇa, the anthors quote Bhejjala's 'rādhā-vipralambha' as a rāsakánka. Read ND I. (Sūtra 116, Kārikā 65) :
"evam angatrayeṇā'pi. yathā bhejjala-viracite rādhā-vipralambhe rāsakánke parikara-parinyāsayor-upaksepeṇaiva gatatvān na tan nibandhaḥ. evam parasparántarbhāve catur angópi kvä'pi sandhir bhavati."

Abhinavagupta and Bhoja quote this work. Bhoja mentions it simply as a rāsakánka. It may be noted that this rāsakánka is different from the rāsaka dance, observes Dr. Raghavan (pp. 567, ibid)
We will now look into what Hemacandra, the ND., Śā., NLRK., Vāg. II and the S.D. have to say about this art-form.
Hemacandra has the following: (pp. 446, ibid)
"aneka-nartaki-yojyam citra-tāla-layánvitam,
a-catuḥ ṣasti-yugalāt
rāsakam masṛṇóddhatam."
This is from the Abh. (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S. edn. ibid).

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931 There is a mention of 'many - aneka' nartakis. These may be eight, sixteen, thirty-two etc. The number is not mentioned as seen in later texts. But Sixty-four pairs are mentioned. It is both masrna - light and uddhata i.e. fast.
The Nātyadarpaņa has both rāsaka and nārya-rāsaka. Rāsaka is (N.D. IV. 9):
"sodaśa dvādaśā’sțau vā yasmin nộtyanti nāyikāḥ, pindi-bandhā”di vinyāsaiḥ
rāsakam tad udāhstam.” This means 'rāsaka' is that art-form in which sixteen, twelve or eight nāyikās i.e. women (i.e. nartakis), dance with pindibandha and such other gestures.
It may be noted as explained by Pandita Viśveśvara (pp. 407, ibid), that when lady-dancers form a group, it is termed pindi. When they get inter-mixed (gumpha) and dance, it is termed śộnkhalā, Bhedyaka is one when latā-jāla (or śộnkhalā) is disturbed and nartakīs get seperated. The ND. observes :
"piņdanāt tu, bhavet piņM đi,
bhedanād bhedyako jāto,
latā jālápa-nodataḥ.” - (N.D. IV, 63) Then, the N.D., treating the Nātya-rāsaka as a separate art-form from rāsaka, observes (N.D. IV. 64) :
kāminībhir bhuvo bhartuḥ cestitam yat tu nộtyate, rāgād vasantam asadya
sa jñeyo nātya-rāsakaḥ - i.e. at the advent of spring season, ladies due to fervour of love, exhibit through dance the king's activity. This is nātya-rāsaka.
Nātya-rāsaka is introduced by śāradātanaya at B.P. IX. 31-36 (pp. 386, 387, 388, ibid). Rāsaka also is described along with this. It reads as :
sodaśa dvādasástau vā yasmin nộtyanti nāyikāḥ, piņdibandhā"di vinyāsaiḥ rāsakam tad udāhstam

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA pindanāttu bhavet pindī, gumphanāc chặnkhalā bhavet, bhedanād bhedyako jāto
latājālópanāhataḥ (ópanodataḥ N.D.) This follows the ND. as above, which again continues the tradition of Hemacandra and Abhinavagupta. The B.P. IX. 33 (pp. 386) adds :
ete nịttā”tmanā kāryā nāțyavantah kriyā vidhau, sukumāróddhatair angaih gāyikābhir vilaksaņāḥ. vākyasya (nātyasyá) vadhayo hy ete piņdā”dyā dịśya-jātayaḥ, nava-bhedā vidhīyante
hy anukāryánu-rāginaḥ - i.e. By the lady-dancers having gentle and forceful limb-movements, in a special performance, these, which are of the form of nștta are to be rendered in form of nātya. These varieties that are seen drśya-jātayas, which are pinda etc., are believed to be the varieties or limits of nārya. Nine varieties are rendered showing the love of the person imitated." Dr. Raghavan is also, not clear here. These remarks follow Bhoja. After this the B.P. adds :
kāminībhir bhuvo bhartuh cestitam yatra nrtyate, rāgād vasantam alokya
sa jñeyo nātya-rāsakaḥ. This follows the N.D. which reads 'vasantam āsādya'. Then a verse from A.bh. is read here; with slight change in the reading -
"carcarīm iti tām prāhur varnatālena tatra tu, praviśet kāmini-yugmam samacaryādi śikṣitam."

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933
This follows Bhoja. - Śā also calls it 'carcari'. The B.P. further reads, following
Bhoja -
vāma-dakṣiņa-sañcārair
angais tat tat pariskṛtam,
(Bhoja has, 'angais tena pariskṛtam) - colikābhidrutam tālam
vādakānām pradarśayet
pañca-ghātaka-samjñārthajanas tasmāt pravartate.
Bhoja has - "choțikābhir", "samjñórthaśchatas tasmāt pravartate."
Dr. Agrawal (pp. 387) explains - Trained in 'sama-carya' with the help of varna and tāla, and adorned with limbs graced with vama and dakṣiņa-samcara, wherein ladies in twos are made to enter, it is called 'Carcarī. And that is termed 'varṇānta' which is mixed with two rāgas called 'ālīḍha', and in which there is exhibition of instrument players encouraged by colikā. So, it is activated by pañca-ghātaka samjñā." We do not know what Dr. Agrawal explains by this. For us, all this is not clear. Dr. Raghavan has also not attempted any explanation.
After this Śā. (p. 387, para 35) reads:

nṛttena vibhajet khandaiḥ caturbhis tribhir eva vā, anyonyangika-sañcāraiḥ hastatālair mithaḥ krtaiḥ parikramya ca nişkrāmet
tatónya-dvitayam viset. ekakālas tu nissandhiḥ praveśo nirgamas tayoḥ puspañjali prayogam tu mātrātālena yojayet. ubhayoḥ pātrayoḥ paścāt pātrāṇi praviśanti hi, baddhāpaṇavatālena

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA rathyāvarņādivarņakaiḥ śuska-gīta-prayogena tato gāyanti gayakāḥ, latābhir bhedyakair gulmair nānāvstta-pradarśakaiḥ. pātrais caikatra samyuktam pindībandhas tu kārayet, tato mallābhidham tālam śuskavarna-prayogataḥ, murajāksara-vādyantu hanyād daņda-dvidandakaiḥ evam nịtta-kramenā”dyo hy apasāraḥ samāpyate. apasāratrayam cányat evam eva prakalpayet, tatrápi pūrvavan nịttam kāmatas tu laya-kramaḥ. kathayed rāsakasyante śubhártham vacana-kramam. "labdhvā dugdha-mahodadhau suraganaiḥ pītvámệtam yas tadā sóyam mato rāsakah.”
(This verse follows Bhoja verbetim pp. 469, ibid). Verses beginning with “nţttena vibhajet khandaiḥ..." also follow Bhoja (pp. 468, ibid) with minor changes. For Bhoja's ‘ekakālam', we have 'ekakālastu', for ‘pārsvayoh' in Bhoja, Śā. has, 'pātrayoḥ', for 'yaddārpanakatālena', we have here, “baddhāpanavatālena' in BP., then Bhoja's 'tu' is not read in BP.; for 'latākhyair, bhedakair' we have, 'latābhir bhedyakaih'; BP. has pātrais caikatra', for Bhoja's 'patrair ekatra', for Bhoja's 'bali-nikā tālam', BP. has 'tato mallābhidham tālam, for ‘hanyad dandam tu dandakaiḥ' in Bhoja, we have, ‘hanyād danda-dvidandakaiḥ'. For Bhoja's, 'apasāratrayam, cányat kalpyate sampratam mayā', BP. has - ‘apasāratrayam cānyad evam eva prakalpayet.' Thus we see that the BP. has minor and at

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935 times more sensible variants worth accepting while critically editing Bhoja's Śr. Pra. Actually the BP. could prove to be more helpful in preparing a critical text of Bhoja's Śr. Pra.
Prof. Agrawal explains passage no. 35 (pp. 387) beginning with "nịttena vibhajet...” etc., as follows -
With the help of dance, it (i.e. rāsaka) (or nātya-rāsaka) should be divided into three or four parts. (The dancers) should move out with the help of physical movements in tune with one another and with mutual clashing of palms. After
second unit has to make entry. Their (i.e. of both units) meeting, entry and exit should be simultaneous. With mātrā and tāla they should present 'puspáñjali' also. After the entry of the two characters, others enter. Then the singers sing with baddhāpanava-tāla, varnakas such as rathyā-varna etc., and suska-gīta. Then with dancers showing latā, bhedyaka, gulma, and various devices of dance, pindi bandha dance is performed at one place. After that, with the help of suska-varnaprayoga, the tāla called 'malla' has to be presented. The drum (murajāksara-vādya) is to be beaten with a stick, and then two sticks. Thus, in order of the dance, first 'apasāra' is completed. This ‘apasāra' is three-fold. Here also, as before, the dance and layakrama have to be observed. In the end of 'rāsaka' performance benediction - śubhārtha-vacana-krama-has to be presented.
All this explanation of rāsaka is as clear to us as it is to Dr. Agrawal. The NLRK., Vāgbhata II and the SD. have the following observations : NLRK. (pp. 304 & 305) has both ‘rāsaka' and 'nātyarāsaka' explained as below :
atha rāsakam - mukhya-nāyikam, sakala-bhāṣā-vibhāsa-sobhitam, udāttanāyakam, pañca-pātra-prayojyam, aneka-kalópadeśa-vārtāmanditam, masrnodātta bhāva-bhūsitam, uttarottara-pradhānam, ekánkam, sūtradhāra-parihīnam, vithyanka-yuktam. yathā-madanikā kāmukam.
The fact that NLRK. describes 'rāsaka' having 'one acť, proves that it is not just a dance performance but is an upa-rupaka, a minor type of drama. For the NLRK., the rāsaka is having a famous heroine. All languages are used in dhīródārta'. There are five characters in this art-form. It is having discourses on various arts. Soft and lofty feelings and emotions are delineated. In the dialogues, there is arrangement of gradual rising (of emotions). There is one act, and sūtradhāra is absent from this art-form . All the limbs-angas-of vithi are woven in it. The illustration is 'Madanikā-kāmuka'.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Nātya-rāsaka according to NLRK is - "bahutāla-layā”tmakam, hāsa-śựngāramanditam, ekánkam, daśa-lāsyanga-bhūșitam, udātta-nāyaka-pithamardópanāyakam, vāsakasajjā-nāyikam; yathā 'vilāsavati'.
Thus a nātya-rāsaka has abundance of music decked with rythm or pause and tāla, i.e. beating time, or beats. It is adorned with the sentiments of häsya and śộngāra. It is having a single act. It is bestowed with ten lāsyángas. The hero is an udātta type, pithamarda is hero's assistant, an upanāyaka, and the heroine is of the vāsaka-sajjā type. The illustration is Vilāsavatī. Vāgbhata II has accepted H.C., and Abhinavagupta's concept when we read :
"aneka-nartakīyojyam citra-tāla-layánvitam, ā-catuḥsaști-yugalād
rāsakam masp oddhate.” - The S.D. has some further details as we will go to see, but one suggestion made by Prof. Babulal Šukla Šāstri, in a ft. note 1, on pp. 305, of his NLRK, edn. is acceptable to us. It is that it is through some scribe's mistake that we read 'mūrkhanāyakam' in place of 'mukhya-nāyakam'. This is a reasonable suggestion, not only taking into account the absence of an autograph, but also taking a scribe's innocence into consideration, and also other definitions that preceded Viśvanātha, not mentioning a 'mūrkha' nāyaka. The S.D. reads as - (S.D. VI. 288-290) -
rāsakam pañca-pātram syān-mukha-nirvahanánvitam, bhāṣā-vibhāṣā-bhūyistham, bhāratī-kaiśikī-yutam. 288 a-sūtradhāram ekánkam sa-vīthyangam kalānvitam, ślīsta-nāndīyutam khyātanāyikam mūrkha (mukhya) nāyakam. 289 udāttabhāva-vinyāsa-samśritam, cótraróttaram, iha pratimukha-sandhim api kecit pracakşate."

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937 The S.D. has slightly elaborated upon the NLRK. It observes that rāsaka has mukha and nirvahana junctures and adds that some expect even pratimukhajuncture also. S.D. also observes in continuation to rāsaka being bestowed with major and minor languages/dilects, it abounds in bhārati and kaiśiki vrttis. Again rāsaka has a 'nandi' in ślista words. Thus the S.D. elaborates or adds some minor features.
Dombi Dombikā or Dombalikā. This art-form is mentioned by Abh. Dhanika, Bhoja, H.C. Śā., and Vāg. II Abhinavagupta (pp. 181, N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S.) observes :
"channánurāga-garbhābhir uktibhir yatra bhūpateh āvarjayati manaḥ sā tu
massņā dombikā matā." With verbal expressions carrying concealed love, where the mind of a king is influenced, that (art-form) is called dombikā, which is of a graceful nature.
We have seen above that in a verse from Dhanika's Avaloka on D.R. I. 8, dombi is mentioned. Dhanika reads -
"dombī śrīgaditam bhāņo bhāni-prasthāna-rāsakāḥ, kāvyam ca; sapta nộtyasya
bhedāḥ syus te’pi bhāṇavat.” Dhanika called it dombī and takes is as a form of dance. But he also calls it a 'rūpaka', when he immediately observes : ityādinā rūpakántarānam api bhāvād avadhāraṇā’nupapattir ity āśankya āha” - etc. He does not elaborate.
Bhoja observes in his śr. Pra. (pp. 381, Vol. II) : “preksā-nimittam vācikādy abhinaya-rahitam āngikaika-nirvartyam prasthāna dombalikā”di-vākyam preksyam.” This Bhoja does when he classifies his śabdálamkāra called 'preksya' into six types. He further observes : "tat șodhā - lāsyam, tāņdavam, chalikam, śamyā, hallīsakam, rāsakam ca iti.”
Dr. Rāghavan (pp. 567) observes that the S.K.A. does not have the above-quoted passage in the corresponding place, i.e. while treating the six-fold śabdálamkāra. Dr. Raghavan further observes, "If these are varieties of preksya, how does Bhoja leave them and classify preksya into lāsya, tāņdava, chalika, śamyā, hallīsaka and

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rāsa ?" Obviously, we note that Bhoja once calls them - i.e. 'prasthāna, dombalikā, as 'preksya', which is one of the śabdálamkāras that are 24 in number, 'prekṣyatva' being one of those. On the other hand, when Bhoja considers 'preksya' (pp. 381, ibid), which is bereft of vacika, sättvika and āhārya types of abhinayas and is graced by only the angika abhinaya (= āngikaika-nirvartyam), he introduces the same as "prasthāna-dombalikā”di-vākyam", i.e. which is of the form of vākya (i.e. väkyárthábhinaya ?) such as 'prasthāna" and "dombalikā”.
Now, we have seen that Bhoja, (pp. 468, Śr. Pra. Vol. II) has called 'nartanaka' such as, samyā, 'lāsya', chalita, 'dvipadi' etc. as varieties of graceful (lalita-laya) rhythm, which are 'padárthábhinaya'.
So, perhaps here, Bhoja mentions ‘dombalikā' and 'prasthāṇa' which are 'vākya' (= väkyárthábhinaya) varieties of 'prekśya', a śabdálamkara. But then he does not elaborate. Prasthāna as noticed earlier is an uparūpaka (Ch. XI. Śṛ. Pra) but 'dombalika' is left out. Perhaps, as suggested by Dr. Raghavan (pp. 567, ibid), Bhoja takes his dombalika as identical with the 'dombika' mentioned by Abhinavagupta as quoted above. Abhinavagupta has mentioned 'cuḍāmani' dombikā twice, with its author, some Rāṇaka. We will go to observe that H. also mentions dombika in the words of Abhinavagupta. But he is clear that these are "padárthábhinayasvabhāvāni dombikā”dīni geyāni rūpakāņi cirantanair (i.e. by Abhinavagupta and his seniors) uktāni. Why Bhoja calls it as, "prasthana-dombalikā"di-vākyam" is not clear to us. Could it be, as suggested by us earlier, that he takes it as a 'väkyárthábhinaya-svabhāva' art-form ? A.bh. - NS. Vol. I G.O.S. Edn., mentions dombikā on pp. 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179 and 183 also.
Elaborating A.bh.'s discussion on 'dombika', Dr. Raghavan (pp. 568, ibid) further observes that on p. 173 (actually p. 171, G.O.S. Edn. '56 revised edn.) (or, p. 169, Edn. '92, K.Kris.) the cūḍāmaṇi dombikā is quoted but the meaning looks obscure to him. We will try to discuss this in the light of Madusūdanī - (Edn. NS. first part. B.H.U. '71, Madhusudan Shastri) But first we will quote from the A.bh. which reads as (pp. 171, G.O.S. Edn. '56): "dombika-prasthāna-ṣiḍgaka-bhāṇakabhāṇikā-rāgakāvyā”der daśa-rūpaka-lakṣanena-asamgrahān nātyād bheda iti cet, tad ai(anai.-Madhusudani) kāntikam. toṭaka-prakaraṇikä-rāsaka-prabhṛtes tad asamgṛhītasyā'pi nātyarūpatvāt." - The context is clear that A.bh. wants to suggest that eventhough these uparūpakas are not included in ten types of drama, they do not cease to be drama. Abhinavagupta goes to explain how the three types of acting or abhinaya, i.e. vācika, ängika and sättvika - is seen in these art-forms and so
-

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939
though they may look like more of 'nṛtta', they are very much 'natya' also. This is seen as in cuḍamani-dombikā. A.bh. (pp. 171, ibid) observes "ata eva ca cūḍāmaņi-dombikāyām prati-jñātam" bindugunam vami sahi ihodivaco amidunadham mahasarakaḥ gete um (?) -
- at eva sahṛdayāḥ smaranti "vadha (sa) ma-cūḍāmaṇiā" (iti). tasman nṛttam nātyād abhinnam, tallakṣaṇópetavat. Pundit Madhusudanajee in his Sanskrit Commentary (pp. 413, ibid) refers to this view as - "dombī śrīgaditam bhāno bhāṇī prasthāna-rāsakāḥ kāvyam ca sapta nṛtyasya bhedāḥ syuste'pi bhāṇavat; natyād bhinnäḥ. dombī dombikā ekaiva. bhāṇī bhāṇikā na. ime nṛtyasya bhedāḥ. kvacid etāni uparūpakāņi iti samgṛhitani kintu teṣām daśa-rupaka-lakṣaṇasya abhāvān mukhya-rupakeṣv a-samgrahe'pi uparūpakatvam kathañcid iti matam." But in the end Abhinavagupta holds that these are only upa-rupakas which are indirectly connected with natya or drama proper. Then he quotes the view of the ancients - tad uktam cirantanaiḥ-and gives the definitions of various art-forms as envisaged by earlier thinkers (pp. 181, bh. N.S. Vol. I. G.O.S.)
·
So, we feel that we cannot agree with Dr. Raghavan's remark (pp. 568, ibid) that, "On pp. 173, the Cuḍāmani dombika is quoted but the meaning of the context in the quotation is obscure." It is not obscure. Dr. Raghavan goes to observe that on p. 174 (pp. 172, edn. '56, revised Edn.), clandestine love is said to be the thing in the dombikā. A.bh. observes: dombikā"dau tu kāmasyaiva pracchanna-rāgaparama-rahasyópadeśāt." Dr. Raghavan thinks that this art-form is more like south Indian 'Nautch'. One dombika i.e. a class of female dancer is supported by dombagāyanas - musicians and she dances and others sing. Dr. Raghavan feels that the extensive discussion on the exact nature and extent of dramatic representation in a ḍombikā (pp. 177-179 A.bh.) is obscure. The obscurity, he thinks, is aggravated by the corruptions in the text. But the fact is that Krishnamoorthy's third revised edn. and Madhusudani clear almost all doubts. The topic concerns mainly with the fact whether dombika etc., the uparūpakas can be taken as drama or mere dance forms. The A.bh. seems to finally favour the view that indirectly (i.e. parmparayā) these art-forms also have an element of abhinaya and therefore could be taken not as drama proper but as 'upa-rupakas' or art-forms having an element of drama for sure. Dr. Raghavan observes: (pp. 568, ibid) - "The Dombi's art consisted mainly of Nṛtta or pure dance movements which by reason of their grace and appropriateness, gave an overall impression of the theme and as aid to such a general kind of action, the Dombi showed a few movements of hands, brows, eyes, etc., elements such as are concomitant when one speaks. Abhinavagupta mentions

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA also two specimens of the Dombikā, the Cūdāmaņi and the Guņamālā.” The A.bh. (pp. 175, ibid) observes : dombikā-krtyam eva upa-samharati guņa-mālāyām... tatra să nộtyati dombikā ca bahutarópa-rañjaka-gītādi-pațu-cețaka-parivstā tvām praty evam aham upaślokitavatīti tan-madhyavarti-gāyana-mukha-samkrāmitanija-vacanā laukikenaiva rūpeṇa tad-giyamāna-rūpaka-gata-laya-tāla-sāmyena tāvannstyati. tadgiyamānapadārthasya ca sātiśayam avarjaniye rājā”dau hțdayánupraveśitām darśayitum laukika-vyavahāra-gata-hasta-bhrūkarmaromāñcákși-vikāra-tulya-yoga-ksematayaivánga-vikārā”di-sambhavam ākṣipati.”
Abhinavagupta goes to observe that because of the nature of the theme, the dombi is always masrna or sukumāra i.e. delicate or graceful :-"tathāhi-dombikāsu narapati-cāțuka-prādhānyena pravsttāsu sukumāram eva śuddham rūpam. bhāņakeșu nșsimhādicarita-varṇanam uddhatam eva.” (pp. 181, A.bh. ibid). Then he quotes from the cirantanas - tad uktam cirantanaih (pp. 181) - "channánurāgagarbhābhir...” etc.
Dr. Raghavan observes : (pp. 568, ibid): A Domba music party called DombaMandala with one Domba Gāyana named Ranga and his two daughters, Hamsi and Nāga-latā, called Domba-Gāyikās, is described at some length in the Rājatarangiņi V. 354-380. The Kathā-sarit-sagara gives a Domba as a player of the drum. II. 96."
Bhoja, we saw, defines twelve uparūpakas i.e. padárthábhinaya types. They are śrīgadita, Durmilikā, Prasthāna, Kāvya, Bhāņaka, Bhānikā, Gosthi, Hallisaka, Nartanaka, preksanaka, Rāsaka, and Nātya-rāsaka. He only mentions Dombalikā. He gives an illustration of Preksanaka such as Kāmadahana. But he does not illustrate any other variety. Dr. Raghavan thinks that it is not certain that all these twelve varieties had set, written texts in form of musical compositions and involved word for word Abhinaya for the content of the song. We beg to differ. We have seen that these art-forms were even older than Abhinavagupta and perhaps had their roots in folk-art, almost parallel to the ten types of classical dramatic patterns. Perhaps they were as ancient as the latter. So, in the absence of specific illustrations
down to artists, either orally or in written form, it was not possible to evolve theory out of the same. Thus, it is immaterial whether Bhoja illustrates them all individually or not; they did exist.
Dr. Raghavan further suggests that such compositions must have been for Srigadita, Durmilikā, Prasthāna, Kavya, Bhānaka and Bhānikā. From Gosthi onwords we have a different type. Now this again is an observation of Dr.

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941 Raghavan who seems to contradict his own earlier observation as quoted above that it is not certain in case of all twelve types that they had a written text. Now, if some had, why not others ? And his further assertion that perhaps even gosthi also did not have a written text and was perhaps only a representation which was a dumb imitation of Krsna's sport, or had some composition singing the sports of Krsna which was rendered into action. But we humbly suggest that it is perhaps safer to imagine that there existed written texts of all art-forms, without which they could not evolve their individual identity and if Bhoja did not illustrate them, it was part of his style. For, we see illustrations in B.P., NLRK. and S.D. They could not have shot up all of a sudden. There did exist a living tradition of written scripts which unfortunately are lost for us. Dr. Raghavan accepts that the Nartanaka is definitely musical composition rendered through gesture. But hallisaka, rāsaka, and nātya-rāsaka contained minimum abhinaya and maximum 'nrtta' or pure rhythmic dance. Even here, we may add, we do not rule out a living written tradition. As we saw above under dombilika in the A.bh., a discussion concerning the nature of these art-forms as to whether they are only pure dance and music or also drama already caught the attention of art-critics and the general impression is that they do contain some dramatic element in them, good enough to be named as upa-rūpakas. So, even here Dr. Raghavan should accept this thing first and last and then only discuss their nature. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 569, ibid) suggests that in the rāsaka and nāțya-rāsaka, there were a few songs intended for gesture. He suggests, and it looks again not a sound suggestion, that the description of preksanaka is too megre for us to decide whether it was a mere gestureless imitation of some events like the burning of kāma, or had compositions on theme like kāmadahana which were rendered into abhinaya. Once again, when Bhoja mentions 'kāmadahana' as an illustration, there is no ground to doubt the same. The dombī he says, had songs but no word for word abhinaya. This again, is not acceptable for abhinaya has to be imagined as interwoven when a bhāva such as that of love has to be conveyed. Though of course, we agree with Dr. Raghavan's observation that the Śr. Pra. is the first oldest document treating the topic of upa-rūpakas.
We have seen that in the A.bh. (pp. 181, Vol. I G.O.S. '56; or p. 179, G.O.S. Edn. '92) there is mention in the name of Cirantanas, of some art-forms.
Some of them are not mentioned by Bhoja. They are șidgaka, rāmākrīda and prerana. Dr. Raghavan suggests that perhaps sidgaka is śrīgadita. Rāmākrīda is not

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA read elsewhere he thinks. Dr. Raghavan's this observation also has to be improved because Hemacandra in his kā. śā VIII. iv (pp. 445, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh) mentions the same and quotes also from A.bh. and discusses further in his Viveka on it (pp. 446), as we will observe later in details. Prerana, as Dr. Raghavan notes, is defined in Sangīta-ratnākara and also by Kātayavema, in his commentary on the Malavikāgnimitra. But the latter, according to Dr. Raghavan, wrong Pañcángábhinaya which Mālavika learns, with Prerana defined by Sārngadeva. The name exactly read in both the Sangītaratnākara and Sangita-samara-sāra is Perana and not 'Prerana'. The former, like gondali is given as a dance of karnatic variety of Deśī class. Abhinavagupta's 'prerana' seems to be a comic piece as his words read : "hāsyaprāyam preranam tu syāt, prahelikaya anvitam."
We will now turn to Hemacandra. H. in Kā. Sā. VIII. i. divides kavya into preksya and śravya. The former is ‘abhineya' and the latter is 'an-abhineya'. Preksya is further subdivided (Kā. Šā. VIII. 2) into 'pāthya' and 'geya'. Pāthya (VIII. 3) consists of the ten types or rūpakas to which are added nātikā and sattaka etc. The definitions are from Bharata. For 'Sattaka' H. relies on the Sr. Pra. (Ch. XI) of Bhoja. We will deal with forms of major rūpakas later but for the present we discuss the upa-rūpakas. At VIII. iv, H. further classifies 'geya' (which is basically 'preksya') into, (1) dombika (2) bhāna (3) prasthāna (4) singaka (5) bhānikā (6) prerana (7) rāmākrīda (8) hallīsaka (9) rāsaka (10) gosthi (11) śrīgadita (12) rāgakāvya etc.
Here gosthī, śrīgadita and kāvya seem to have been defined after Bhoja's śr. Pra., though we do not read a word for word similarity. But these are not read in the A.bh. The rest follow the A.bh. We will examine these definitions in d below. But prior to this we may note that H., like Bhoja calls them 'padárthábhinaya-svabhāvāni", but quotes from Cirntanas as read in the A.bh. H. (VIII. iv. pp. 445 ibid) reads 'dombikā' first. We saw above how Bhoja deals with 'dombalikā' very briefly under śabdálamkāra, “preksya” (pp. 381, Ch. X. Śr. Pra., as quoted above)
H. quotes from A. bh., wherein (pp. 181, ibid, NS. Vol. I, G.O.S.) the views of the "Cirantanas' are quoted. In his Viveka H. further elaborates on the nature of these Uparūpakas, which are primarily defined after, as noted above, the Cirantanas as quoted in the A.bh. and also Bhoja. It is in his Viveka that this further analysis is given. But here H. accepts the lead of the A.bh. He has accepted Abhinavagupta's observations which are read at different places but H. has woven them together, and created a clean statement. We feel that the editors of A.bh. (Vol. I. Ch. IV)

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943 should look into H. carefully. Even Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy has not done it. Our gurus Prof. Parikh and Kulkarni have also not compared the two texts word for word. This has to be done sometime. But for the present we will proceed with H. on dombīkā and other art-forms. At least Dr. Raghavan has certainly not looked into H. and his Viveka carefully, when Dr. Raghavan observes that șidgaka of Abhinavagupta could be Srigadita of Bhoja he seems to be quite off the mark. Actually, șidgaka of the A.bh. is read as Singaka by H. who again reads 'Singataka' in Viveka (pp. 446, ibid). This șidgaka of Abh., is the same as singaka/singataka of H. and is certainly not the śrīgadita of Bhoja as Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 569, ibid). The picture emerges that Dr. Raghavan has not paid due attention to H., and this is very very sad. After completing the topic of 'geya' varieties, which H. has not named as 'upa-rūpaka', H. observes : "ādigrahaņāt śampā-cchalitadvipad yādi parigrahah. prapancastu brahmabharata - kohalā"diśāstrebhyo’vagantavyaḥ.” (p. 449, ibid).
As said above, so far as the definitions of these uparāpakas are concerned, H. has accepted the lead of the A.bh. and Bhoja, but in his Viveka he has culled out the ideas as laid down in the A.bh. Here as observed above he has accepted quite often words, phrases and sentences from the A.bh. and has evolved a clear design, not seen in the Abh. clearly. We will quote and explain the portion from H.'s Viveka. First we will give the substance from the Viveka, and then the actual quotation.
H. explains as follows:
The province of 'geya-kāvya' is three-fold such as masļņa or graceful, uddhata or forceful and miśra or mixed. In 'dombikās', which are promoted primarily to flatter a king, the form is graceful. In bhāņakas, such as in the description of the behaviour of Nrsimha etc., the form is only forceful. That even in pure graceful there is some element of the forceful, is appropriate. Here the difference is based on the proportion of forceful or graceful. (there is higher or lower degree in the artistic mixture). The first (i.e. in which masrna is in higher degree as compared to the forceful) is seen in singataka. When forceful is predominant and the graceful is mixed therewith in a lower degree we get bhānikā. The other varieties of geyakāvya such as prerana, rāmākrīda, rāsaka, hallīsaka etc. are graced with the beauty of the mixture of these two in higher or lesser degree.
A prima facie view is now considered. The objection is that in cases of dombikā, singataka etc. the statements are found not to be exactly relevant with

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one another. Now, in this case how can these are-forms be pleasing to the taste ? The answer is "No". H. says that in prayers to the deities, which are conceived either as males or females, śṛngāra is seen to be delineated everywhere. But we do not find any contradiction here. Same is the case with these art-forms which carry only apparently contradictory statements. We may observe that H.'s words here are from the A.bh. (pp. 171, NS. Ch. IV. G.O.S. ibid). H. quotes directly from the A.bh. and observes that the description in male or female form depends on the prayer to the deity concerned. It is therefore, that in Cūḍāmani dombika we read : "he devi dombi etc. etc.
In such art-forms as rāga-kāvyas e.g. rāghava-vijaya there is a message of the four-fold aims of life. (caturvargópadeśa). Actually H. defines 'kavya' but here the term 'rāga-kāvya' is read as in Abh. After A.bh. again H. suggests that in dombikā and the rest, the prominent emotion is that of clandestine love. Once again H., quoting from A.bh. (pp. 172, ibid), observes that in case of such art-forms as Bhāṇa, preraṇa, bhānikā etc. the theme is in the nature of parables and tables, anyápadeśa, arthántaranyāsa and nidarśanā (in A.bh. we read 'dṛṣṭanta' for nidarśana), inculcating adivce to man through description of the acts of wild animals; and this is something like a bit of the pañca-tantra, cast in a semidramatic form. We may observe that H. chooses to follow Abhinavagupta in suggesting the nature of bhāṇa to be diadectic as against Bhoja's bhāṇa which is devotional and it extols gods.
After this observation, H. discusses the difference between pāṭhya-rūpaka and geya (upa-rupaka). He suggests that in 'pathya' variety (i.e. in major ten rūpakas) both 'anga' movement of limbs and 'gita' are not certain. This means that in these drama-forms to dance with movement of limbs is not obigatory. 'Kata', 'karana', 'cari', 'maṇḍala' etc. which are useful for 'anga', are uncertain in nature because of irregular rhythm, in case of rūpakas. These are practiced with the dominance of 'rasa' in focus, and hence this uncertainty in rūpakas. But, observes H., in geya (upa-rupakas) movement of limbs i.e. anga and gīta (= song) are of fixed nature in themselves. This means that as in case of a 'mantra' or charm there is no change of letters, similarly here in case of these minor art-forms, the pattern of laya (rhythm), yati (stop), etc. is fixed as per the special type of art-form concerned. Of course, at times 'anga' (or movement of limbs) is predominant as in 'prasthana', or at times 'vāda' speech is central as in bhāṇaka when there is practice of bhagnatāla or parikramaņa. Or, as in case of singaṭaka we have predominance of the narration which is presented through song (giyamāna-rupakábhidheya-prādhānyam).

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At times, the nṛtta (i.e. dance form with limb-movement as principal and not an emotion) is chief as in case of ḍombilikā presentation. Because of this variety, such performance is termed 'valli-märga' i.e. a street-performance with variety, in common-parlance. But with all this, one point emerges and it is that 'geya' is qualified chiefly by the playing of instruments along with songs. In case of rāgakavyas the presentation is mainly through song alone. For example, Rāghava-vijaya (a rāga-kavya) is sung only in 'dhakka' rāga alone, and Marica-vadha in the grāma-rāga called kakubha. Here, it may be noted that H. has overlooked one remark from the A.bh. wherein it is stated that, though the rasas and the situations differ, the tune and the time-measure (laya/tāla) do not change in a rāga-kāvya as in drama proper.
In pathya i.e. drama proper, observes H., for bringing about a feeling of direct experience, the fixation of the use of language or dilect with reference to a given character, the use of metre and figures of speech, etc. are fixed. Now that which is sung (gīyamāna) (as in an upa-rupaka) is not always presented through acting, for fear of non-congruousness. But here (i.e. in upa-rupakas) some sättvika form of acting, which is meant for conveying this or that meaning along with a certain tune or rhythm and time-measure, is interwoven, in view of the predominant rasa. The intended object is filled in with the help of 'dhruva-geeta' here. As the cooks add required ingredients in item under preperation, so in 'geya' form also, some such element (of acting) is added. But in such art-forms as dombikā and the rest, there is no presentation as in case of an actor, of rūpa (i.e. of the form of character such as Rāma, Dusyanta, etc.), which is of an extra-ordinary nature.
In ḍombika and the rest, the beauty of letters seen in use of special letters, is principal and there is no possibility at all of acting here, as it is primarily of the form of nṛtta or limb-movements. In ḍombikā, the lady dancer speaks some sentence of common-usage, and when this speech of hers is presented in form of a song, how can there been an experience of direct-feeling (kaḥ sākṣātkārakalpárthaḥ ? pp. 448, ibid). On the other hand an experience such as direct is the main object in paṭhya variety. So, what happens in ḍombikā or kāvya (i.e. rāgakavya) art-forms is like a local dance or song performance that carries away the heart of people through the device of giving an advice indirectly or by suggesting an idea through some means.
In illustrations such as, "hetthe vi dombi", etc. there is an effort to please a king in a ḍombika-prayoga, throug a song or playing of instrument, or dance, an effort

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA to convey such meaning that is cherished by the king. There is, in between, a type of presentation of the activity of a paramour, or an expert messanger, etc. which pleases the mind of a prince. In the end, the performance of dombikā ends after the lady dancer making suggestive gestures to a king or prince as if he is somebody else, cleverly acts for extracting money from him. This is seen as in Gunamālā (dombikā). All this, H. seems to accept from the A.bh. (pp. 175, NS. Vol. I. G.O.S. '54 Edn.) In Gunamālā, the dancing artist gets involved in pleasing songs suggesting, - "I say this to you" - etc. and tries to convey the secret love for the prince in her own heart and she dances in co-ordination of tune, rhythm and timefactor (tāla/laya).The outward form is of course of popular dance. The dancer also exhibits such physical gestures as raising of eye-brows, horripilation, casting of glances etc. to show that the theme of her song enters into the king's heart. Thus by principally providing entertainment through song, and presenting physical gestures that go with the same, the dances, catching the heart of the king through dance, renders the song subservient and presents body-movements in keeping with the emotion concerned.
This dombikā art-form is not of the type of direct-experience as in case of a drama. For in this art-form, there is no concealment of the dancer's own self (as in case of the actor) through the medium of āhārya-abhinaya i.e. costumes, set-up etc. Thus the presentation does not carry an effert of direct experience, but the dancer presents a dance-theme, with some acting, to a near similar effect. So, there is no manifestation, as in case of a rūpaka (i.e. major type of drama) of an extra ordinary form here. In geya variety there is no attempt to impart adivce or information (vyutpatty-anusamdhānam), but in pāțhya variety, i.e. major rūpaka, proficiency is a principal goal. This is so ordained by Bharata Muni with reference to the pāțhya. Here ends H.'s discussion.
H. thus discusses elaborately the different impressions created from artistic point of view, between păthyarūpakas and geya-upa-rūpakas. On one hand such types as nātaka and the rest are of the form of direct experience, while dombikā and the rest do not have this strength, but through elements of dance and music there is a chance of suggesting the inner feelings of heart, of course, to some extent only. Ācārya draws from the A.bh. but makes the presentation clearer and to the point, which is not seen in Bhoja and the rest. Of course in the Avaloka or the Dasarūpaka, we get an idea of the difference in the arts of dance, (nrtya), nrtta (or rhythmic bodily movements) and nārya or drama proper. Nịtta is an art-form

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depending solely on tāla and laya i.e. time-measure and rhythm, which is similar to modern dance patterns in the west with thrusts, both horizontal and vertical, in principal. This can be placed with 'break' or 'twist dance. Nrtya is a classical danceform with emotive content. Natya is rasa-oriented drama proper. It may be noted that when H. enumerates 'sattakā"di' as forms of rūpakas, which were taken only as upa rūpakas by ancients such as Kohala and the like, it is clear that these artforms must be involving a lot of the element of acting proper, and therefore these must be capable of the dramatic effect. A close examination of the A.bh, suggests that the limits of rūpakas and upa-rūpakas were not water-tight. but H. has specified the basic difference in these two art-forms more clearly and candidly. One thing emerges that these upa-rupakas were perhaps evolved as forms of folk-art and the difference in their types and their number expanded with the passage of time. That H. has accepted dombikā, bhāna, prasthāna, śingaka, bhāņikā, prerana, rāmākrīda, hallisaka and rāsaka from A.bh. and the ancients, and three art-forms such as gosthi, śrīgadita, and kāvya from Bhoja is clear. Bhoja also derived inspiration from both Abhinavagupta, and also ancients like Kohala. An interection between Mālava and Gujarat also can be imagined in the field of folk-art. For Bhoja there are 12 upa-rupakas such as śrī. gadita, durmilikā, prasthāna, kāvya (i.e. citrakavya), bhāna (three-fold; suddha, citra and sankirna), bhānikā, gosthi, hallīsaka, nartanaka, prekșanaka, rāsaka and nātya-rāsaka (also termed 'carcari).
If we accept difference in an art-form going by difference in the name given to the same, though of course in a single name also we come across difference in definition by different authorities, we can count in H. such art-forms as additional ones e.g. dombikā, singaka, prerana, rāmākrīda, and (rāga) kävya as compared to Bhoja. Bhoja's durmialikā, (citra) kāvya, nartanaka, prekşanaka, and nātya-rāsaka are missing in H. Durmilikā seems to be a vulgar art-form, not read in Abhinavagupta, but also read later in the Nātyadarpana and Sāradātanaya's Bhava-prakāśana. As 'prasthāna' is noted in the A.bh., we read it in H. also and this art-form is true to its name because in it a lover undertakes a journey. Rāmacandra, later, accepts the definition from Śr. Pra. For śāradātanaya 'prasthāna' is not identical conceptually with that of Abhinavagupta or Bhoja. We do not know the source of his concept.
The concept of (citra) kāvya in Bhoja is not clear and it has contexts of music. We read notations of rāga, tāla, and choreography but the meaning is not clear to us. In uparūpaka called 'kāvya' there is one rāga, in citra-kāvya, however there are many rāgas. Bhoja has an elaborate discussion on Bhāņa, which is accepted by

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Śāradātanaya who places it in anustubh verses. For him, as in Bhāņa, so also in Bhānikā, lāsyangas are presented. For Bhoja nartanaka is four-fold such as samyā. lāsya, chalika and dvipadī. Bhoja, while discussing sabdálamkāras mentions six-fold preksyálamkāra such as tāndava, lāsya, chalika, sampā (i.e. samyā), hallīsaka and rāsa.
Bhoja has 'preksaņa' also, which is missing in the A.bh. and H. Śārdātanaya presents it in a clumsy way. Nātya-rāsaka is not read in H., but is seen in Bhoja, Rāmacandra and Sāradātanaya. Thus, so far as uparūpakas are concerned H. mainly accepts the lead of Abh. and then of Bhoja.
H.'s pupils, Ramacandra and guņacandra, the joint authors of the Nātyadarpaņa (ND.) however, though perfectly aquainted with the A.bh. and H., choose to follow the lead of Bhoja while treating the uparūpakas, the definitions of which are from the śr. Pra. On rūpakas the authors seem to side with Bharata, Abh. and therefore also with H. they accept twelve varieties of rūpaka including the ten major rūpakas added by nātikā, which is accepted by Bharata and also prakaranī. About Sattaka they suggest that Kohala and others have treated the same. The definitions of samyā, lāsya and chalita are accepted in the ND. from Bhoja's definitions as cited in his S.K.Ā. and Sr. Pra, in the alamkāra section.
Sāradātanaya in his B.P. deals with the topic of upa-rupakas in a very elaborate fashion. He accepts ideas, or even definitions or part of the same, from Abhinavagupta, Dhananjaya, Bhoja and also from a source not identified by scholars as yet. As stated earlier, we take Sāgarnandin (NLRK.) as the successor and not the predecessor of Sāradātanaya. Viśvanātha, of course, is the last to join this list of honourable writers on uparūpakas.
In the beginning of VIIIth chapter which deals with the ten major types of drama, he observes that these ten alone are rasā"tmaka. This view is in harmony with the observations of Bharata, Abhinavagupta, Dhanañjaya, Bhoja and Hemacandra. In fact nobody has a voice against this. The bhāva-pradhāna varieties are the twenty uparūpakas that he mentions including in them toțaka, nātikā and sattaka which other authorities put with major rūpakas. Sāradātanaya observes in his B.P. VIII 1-3 :
kathāśarīram kavyasya lakṣaṇam cópapāditam, bharatā”dibhir ācāryaiḥ darsitenaiva vartmanā. prāthamyān nāțakasyásya tat samyag abhidhīyate. nāțakam sa-prakaranam bhāṇaḥ prahasanam dimaḥ,

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vyāyoga-samavakārau
vithyankehāmrgā iti toṭakam nāṭikā gosthi sallāpaḥ śilpakan tathā. dombī śrīgaditam bhāṇī prasthānam kāvyam eva ca, prekṣakam saṭṭakam nātya-rāsakam lāsakam tathā ullopyakañca hallīsam atha durmallika'pi ca, mallikā kalpavalli ca pārijātakam ity api. rasātmakā daśaite tu, vimśad bhāvātmakā matāḥ, teṣām rūpaka-samjñā'pi, prayo dṛśyatayā kvacit.
trimśad rūpakabhedāś ca prakāśyante tra laksanaih.
Thus, though 'bhāvā❞tmaka', the twenty enumerated as above by Śā. are in his opinion, 'rūpakas' also, i.e. they could be subsumed under 'rūpakas' because they are also dṛśya i.e. to be seen on the stage, to be enacted, with an element of abhinaya. Actually, we know that they are classed as 'upa-rupakas' for this reason only. They are 'upa' or 'not principal' in the sense that they involve a lot of dance and music, both vocal i.e. song, and instrumental i.e. vādya along with thin abhinaya. Again, as seen in H., such art-forms as dombī and the rest are not fullfledged rūpakas as in these there is no 'rūpana' i.e. superimposition of the characters such as Rāma etc. as in drama, and the self of the lady dancer or anyone is not concealed. If Śā. calls them 'rūpaka' also, he means precisely this.
In the beginning of the next chapter i.e. Ch. IX, Śā. again enumerates twenty uparūpakas as :

"dasarūpeṇa bhinnānām rūpakāṇām atikramāt, avantarabhidāḥ kāścit padárthábhinayā”tmikāḥ. te nṛtya-bhedāḥ prāyeṇa sankhyayā vimśatir matāḥ, toṭakam nāṭikā goṣṭhī sallāpaḥ śilpakas tathā. dombī śrīgaditam bhāņo bhāṇī prasthānam eva ca, kavyañ ca prekṣaṇam natya-rāsakam rāsakam tathā. ullopyakanca hallīsam atha durmallikā'pi ca, kalpavalli mallikā ca, pārijātakam ity api. etā nāmántaraiḥ kaiścid ācāryaiḥ kathitā api, samvidhāna-kramas tāsām na kadācana bhidyate. nātikāyāstoṭakasya'pi saṭṭakasya ca lakṣaṇam,
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SAHRDAYĀLOKA amśatvān nāțakasyā’pi tathā prakaraṇasya ca. ānuşangikam eteşām laksanam tatra darśitam. dombi śrīgaditam bhāņo, bhāni-prasthāna-rāsakāḥ, kāvyam ca sapta nộtyasya bhedāḥ syus te’pi bhāņavat
ityāhuḥ kecid anye tān sarvan nộtyā”tmakāh viduḥ.” Śāradātanya suggests that the definitions of nātikā, sattaka and totaka are discussed in Ch. VIII as they seem to be partially imbibing the characteristics of nāțaka and prakarana. Thus, for Sā., these three are singled out almost as rūpakas with abhinaya-prādhānaya. He gives the list of uparūpakas but adds that some ācāryās give different names to this or that art-form, but virtually their structure
ins the same. He also notes the opinion of some others - 'kecid anye', who feel that dombi, śrīgadita, bhāna, bhānī, prasthāna, rāsaka and kāvya are but varieties of nrtya, but are virtually similar to 'bhāna'. Still others hold that all these twenty types should be taken as 'nţtyā”tmaka', i.e. not nāryā”tmaka. They are more of dance-forms and not types of drama according to some. Śā. neither approves nor disapproves this opinion but seems to be closer to the view that takes these as uparūpakas, having an element of abhinaya' also. But they are 'padárthábhinayā”tmikāḥ', as suggested by Dhanañjaya and Bhoja. This means they are not drama proper, though involving an element, may be prominent at times, of ‘abhinaya' or acting also.
Dr. Rāghavan (pp. 570, ibid) observes : "At the beginning of the next (i.e. IXth) chapter whose first part deals with the upa-rūpakas, Sāradātanaya again mentions twenty uparūpakas. Here the sattaka is left out and in its place, we have a bhāna, a musculine companion to the faminine bhānī, added. Immediately are mentioned the nātikā, totaka, and sattaka, as derivatives from nātikā, and he says that they are already described under nataka. Totaka is defined along with nātaka, and sattaka along with nātikā, in Ch. VIII (pp. 238, 244) (pp. 359, edn. Agrawal). (The Vikramorvaśīyam is given as an illustration of a nātaka as well as toțaka. See. pp. 237-8). Sāradātanaya calls the nātikā, totaka and sattaka both as rūpaka and upa-rupaka. He contradicts himself when he says that these three are rasā"śraya like nāțaka on pp. 180-1, Ch. VII, and then counts them as the first three among the list of twenty upa-rupakas which are ntya-varieties and are bhāvā”śraya. On p. 181, he restricts the name nrtya and bhāvā”śraya to those beginning with dombī and similarly on p. 256 says that while some writers consider dombī and the rest only as upa-rūpakas and nětya,

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951 thereby omitting nātikā, toțaka and sattaka, there are writers who consider even them as nrtya. He himself seems to have no view to offer.
dombī śrīgaditam bhāṇaḥ bhāṇī-prasthāna-rāsakāḥ, kāvyam ca, sapta nộtyasya bhedāḥ syus te'pi bhāṇavat ity āhuḥ kecid, anye tān sarvān
nộtyā”tmakān viduḥ. (p. 256) It is said in the above lines that some consider only the seven varieties as nộtyas. What about the rest? There are ten more. Sāradātanaya further says that writers differ also on the names of these types
etā nāmántaraiḥ kaiścit ācāryaiḥ kathitā api, samvidhāna-kramaḥ tāsām
na kadācana bhidyate. p. 255. While the statement in the first line is correct, that in the second line is not borne out by the text. In the very beginning of his work, Śāradātanaya says that he himself saw actually all the thirty types, that is, ten rūpakas and twenty uparūpakas, played by the nāryā"cārya named Diwakara in a Saraswati temple during a festival (p. 2). But the chapters on rūpakas and uparūpakas, 8th and 9th, do not justify this claim. These chapters show the author's indebtedness to certain earlier texts from which widely differing descriptions are simply pulled out and heaped together in a haphazard manner.
In the uparūpaka section, satďaka is again defined at the end of p. 269. Under the name of rāsaka, on pp. 265-266, Bhoja's description of kāvya and citrakāvya and the Anustubh definitions of dombi etc., quoted in the Abhinavabhāratī, are clubbed together. In the description of all the uparūpakas the first part is generally from some earlier work, which consistently describes all of them as regular dramatic compositions, with the mention of the number and number of sandhis, nāyakas, vrttis etc. To these definitions are added the definitions borrowed from Bhoja. The first part and the second part differ very widely. Eg., according to the first part, even the Hallisaka is a play of one or two acts, with Brahmanas, Ksatriyas, Vanikputras, - all dependent on ministers for their success and so on !".

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This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan is not for nothing. We humbly and honestly feel that Dr. Raghavan has been harsh and also perhaps bold in his observations on Sāradātanaya. We will explain our position as
follows.
952
To begin with, Dr. Raghavan observes that Śāradātanaya himself saw actually all the thirty types... played by the natyā"cārya named Divākara. The actual words from the B.P. read as: (pp. 2, 3 Edn. Angrawal)
"adhita-veda-vedángo vardhamanaḥ piturgṛhe,
kadācic chāradām devīm
upāsitum upayayau, upāsya savanam tasyāś caitra-yātrā-mahotsave, āsīnām nartanā❞gāre tām devīm prekṣakaiḥ saha, pranamya, tair anujñātas tasyäḥ pārśvam upāviśat. trimśat-prakāra-bhinnāni rūpakāņi pṛthak pṛthak nataiḥ prayujyamānāni bhāvábhinayakovidaiḥ. drṣṭvā, sa devīm varadām nātyavedam ayācata, nātyāśālāpatiḥ kaścid divakara iti dvijaḥ. tayaiva natyavedasya niyukto'dhyāpane tadā. prītas so'pi sadāśivasya śivayorgaurya matam vāsuker vāgdevyā'api nāradasya ca muneḥ kumbhodbhava-vyāsayoḥ,

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śisyāṇām bharatasya yāni ca matany adhyāpya tāny añjanasunor apy atha nātyavedam akhilam samyag adhyāpayat. śāradātanayo devyās tanyadhitya ca sannidhau, ādāya sāram etebhyo hitártham natyavedinām. bhāva-prakāśanam nāma
prabandham akarot tadā.
This account clearly says that Sarasvati suggested the name of an expert teacher Divākara, who was appointed to teach Śāradātanaya and he taught the whole of natyaveda with details concerning the views of various authorities. Nowhere it is mentioned that Divakara played these thirty types of rūpakas. Dr. Raghavan, it seems has not cared to read Sa.'s words carefully.
953
Next point is that Dr. Raghavan feels that in dealing with the three types viz. nātikā, toṭaka, and saṭṭaka, Śā. contradicts himself by calling them once 'rasa"śraya' and then taking them as bhāvā"śraya nṛtya-types. Here also Dr. Raghavan's approach is less charitable. It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we had discussed following A.bh. whether these art-forms can be taken as rūpakas or not. A.bh. is less conservative about this. It is suggested that as an element of ‘abhinaya' is involved in all these types, they can be called 'natya'. But, since there is an added dose of dance and music in the so called uparūpakas, they may be taken as a different variety of art-forms, perhaps 'nṛtya' varieties, as the element of ‘abhinaya' is
very thin. We have seen how H. has suggested, and even Bhoja following Dhanika said the same thing by calling them padárthábhinaya types, that there is absence of rūpaṇa in these and hence they are lesser drama. The individual self of the dancer is not concealed by the character. So, they may not be rūpakas. But with all these, in some varieties of these upa-rupakas acting and 'rūpaṇa' are predominant. It is because of this that even Bharata mentions and discusses nāțikā along with the ten major types. Saṭṭaka and toṭaka also come very close. So, if Śāradātanaya even while calling them uparūpakas, picks them out and treates them separately, heavens have not fallen!

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA In yet another quotation, Dr. Raghavan takes objection to Śā.'s calling dombi and seven other types as “nộtyasya bhedāḥ”, and omitting the three viz. nātikā, toțaka and sattaka. Once again we may refer to our argument as above and say that the three are more of drama as explained above and less of dance. Śā. is clear about these art-forms. Dr. Raghavan's objection that "samvidhānakramah tāsām na kadācana bhidyate" is not a sound observation on the part of Sā. We feel exactly opposite. Yes, they differ in names quite often but by and large the type, technique and structure is the same as something having "less of abhinaya and more of dance and music.” Thus, they may be 'rasáśraya' in the end, but primarily their capacity ends in evoking a bhāva only as they are padárthábhinaya-rūpa as against the major types which are vākyárthábhinaya-rūpa. We can explain these terms differently also. As 'padártha' is but a part of 'vākyártha’ and therefore less important, so also these upa-rupakas are lesser art-forms as compared to the ten major art-forms of drama, so far as evoking of rasa is concerned. If out of the twenty, three are almost close to major types, and if out of the rest seven are nrtya forms, the other ten are to be imagined as mixed forms. If Sā. has called some as 'nrtya', they surely have the dance element as most prominent. Dr. Raghavan need not get scarred about such observations and finally these are not rules of physical sciences, like the law of gravitation. Opinion's concerning their nature can differ from the viewer's or expert's angle of vision !
Again, Sāradātanaya is very clear in taking them as uparūpakas with a bias towards dance and music. So, if he counts sandhis and acts in these varieties, there is nothing wrong for he had viewed the actual performance of all the thirty types and certainly not I or not even Dr. Raghavan could lay such a claim of viewing these art-forms being presented on the stage !
Our centention is that when we talk about these authorities such as H. or Sa. or Sāgaranandin or any, we have to be very careful about not doing any injustice to them by rash observations. They are all respected and honourable art-critics and had living traditions of art before them. They, yes all of them, are greater than modern scholars or art-critics.
We have discussed all art-forms from Sā. which are shared by him with either Abhinavagupta or Bhoja or any of his predecessor. But there are six types viz. Sallāpaka, Silpaka, Ullopyaka, Mallikā, Kalpavalli and Pārijāta not mentioned by Bhoja. We will discuss their special features as explained by Śā. B.P. IX. 8, 9 (pp. 376) defines silpaka as -
śilpakaś caturankaḥ syāc caturvṛtti-virājitah,

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955 hāsyam vinā rasaih pūrņaḥ svato, brāhmaṇa-nāyakaḥ. hīnópanāyakaḥ kvā’pi śmaśānā”di-samākulaḥ, ūļhā punarbhūḥ kanyā vā tāḥ syuḥ saciva-viprajāḥ. mālatī mādhavasyéva kamalasya kalāvatī. angāni saptavimśat syur utkanthā”dīni ca kramāt, utkanthā cávahitthañ ca prayatnā”samsane api, tarkaś ca samsayas tāpaḥ udvego maurkhya(dhya ?)meva ca. ālasya-kampāgati-vismayāssādhanam tathā ucchvāsas ca tathā"tankah sūnyatā ca pralobhanam. natyam sampheta āśvāsah santoșā’tiśayas tathā, pramadaś ca pramādaś ca yuktiś capi pralocanā. prasastiś ceti kathitāny angāny atraiva silpake udāharanametesām
parastād eva vaksyate.” (pp. 376, 7 ibid) This means that silpaka has four acts and four vịttis. It has all rasas but for the hāsya. The hero is a bramin and the assistant of the hero is a lowly born person. At times we come across descriptions of the burning ghat etc. The heroine is a widow married for a second time, or a girl. They are daughters of a minister or a brahmin as is Mālati of Madhava, and Kalāvati of Kamala.
There are 27 angas or features such as utkanthā, avahitthā, prayatna, etc. We cannot trace these angas at a single place. Some of them look like vyabhicārins

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
such as alasya, avahitthā etc., some are natyálamkāras such as āśamsā etc. The NLRK. has counted these under Śilpaka. (IX, 47-48) (pp. 390, ibid) Ullopyaka is defined as:
ullopyakam syad ekánkam
avamarśa-vinā-kṛtam,
nispravṛtti-vidhānañca, silpakánga-vibhuṣitam.
hāsya-śṛngāra-kāruṇya

yuktam ujjvala-veṣavat, bahupustam ca caturójjvalanāyaka-nāyikam.
yathā devimahādevam yatha códātta-kuñjaram. 47 yasminn ullopyakam nāma tryangyam gītam pravartate. tallakṣaṇam ca gandharvanirnaye spastam īritam. 48
Ullopyaka has one act and is without avamarśa juncture. In it, cessation from activity is recommended. The parts or angas of silpaka are seen in this art-form also. It has hāsya, śṛngāra and karuna rasas. The characters have blazing attire and a number of 'pusta' i.e. masques (or working in clay, modelling anything made of clay or wood etc.) or masks, are used. The heroes and heroines are intelligent and brilliant. The illustrations are "devi-mahādeva", or "udātta-kuñjara", etc. In it a song called 'ullopyaka' with three parts, is placed. This gīta or song is explained clearly in "gandharvanirṇaya".
Sallāpaka (IX. 7; pp. 376, ibid) is defined in B.P. as -
sallāpakasyétivṛttam yat
khyātam cótpādyam eva ca. miśram vā; tatra śṛngārahāsyau naivārhataḥ kvacit.
śabalo vīra-raudrābhyām,
angāny anye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ,

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957 prāyaḥ sapatna-śāntaś ca krddha-pāşanda-nāyakaḥ daivārijanya-kapata yuddha-sthānóparodhavan, sāttvaty ārābhati-vșttisahitaś ca, sa-vidravaḥ. ankās trayo, dvitīyenke tāla-prācurya-yug bhavet, tětiyónkaḥ sa-kapataḥ prathamónko sa-vidravaḥ. catussandhiḥ, pratimukha-śūnyaḥ
sallāpako bhavet.” Thus, Sallāpaka has its theme either historical, or imagined or a mixture of these two. There is total absence of śrngāra and hāsya, and veera or raudra are principal rasas. The rest are subordinate rasas. The hero is an angry person or a hypocrite and the enemy is śānta i.e. a quiet and composed person. Kapata i.e. fraud caused by either destiny or enemy, fight, taking position, and uparodha i.e. blocking (the city, castle) are seen in this art-form. It is graced by sātrvati and ārabhati vịttis. It is sa-vidrava i.e. having panic or flight. There are three acts and in the second act, there is predominance of tāla i.e. time-measure. The third act is with fraud and the first is marked by vidrava i.e. panic or running away. There are four samdhis with pratimukha juncture absent. This art-form can be compared with the major type called "samavakāra”. Mallikā (B.P. IX, 54, p. 392) is defined as :
mallikā bhoga-śrngārakaiśikī-vștti-mantharā, eka-dvyanka-kramā”ślistavidūşaka-viţa-kriyā. gāthā dvipathakopetā rathyā-vāsaka-tālayuk, anālakṣyakathā pūrvam paścādālaksya-vastukā, garbhā'vamaría-hīnā ca

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sandhi-traya-samanvitā. maņikulyāyām jalam iva na laksyate yatra pūrvato vastu, paścāt prakāśate yā sā
manikulyā’pi mallikā jñeyā. In mallikā, love in union is the principal sentiment. It is graced by kaisiki vrtti. It has either one or two acts and we find activities of a vidusaka or a vita in them respectively.
It is accompanied by gāthā (= metre of that name), and dvipathaka (or dvipathikā ?) (a prakrta metre), and it has tāla i.e. tempo such as rathyā and vāsaka. The theme is not clear in the beginning and later it is clearly understood There are three samdhis with garbha and avamarsa absent from it.
Śā. here quotes an āryā verse from Śr. Pra. of Bhoja, describing manikulya which is given by Bhoja as a variety of śravya-kāvya or non-dramatic Composition. Śā. observes that as water, the theme in a manikulyā is not marked in the beginning, so also in Mallikā the theme is not clear in the beginning but is seen or grasped at a later stage. So, this manikulyā is also mallikā.
Dr. Raghavan observes that, "It is sāradātanaya's description of the Mallika that takes one's breath away." We do not know why Dr. Raghavan is so scared. Actually we find common names in different lists. Bhāņa is read both in rūpaka and uparūpaka. So, if manikulya is another name for mallikā, nothing is lost. Or, if that literary composition called manikulyā has some remote capability of being staged, it is equivalent to Mallikā as in both the theme is not transparent in the beginning and becomes clear in the end. Thus in Bhoja also, we can see an indirect reference to mallikā.
Similarly at the end of durmallikā in B.P., Bhoja's manthulli, a type of literary composition is described. The kā. śā of H. reads matallikā for manthullī. B.P. also reads matallikā. The second characteristic of manthulli as described by Bhoja, discussed by us earlier, is capable of dramatic presentation also and therefor Śā. could have read it along with durmallikā. Dr. Raghavan need not get alarmed over this.
Kalpavallī (B.P. IX. 55, pp. 392 ibid) is yet another art-form not seen in Bhoja. It is defined as -
kalpavalli bhaved-dhāsyaśrngāra-rasa-bhāva-yuk,

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udātta-nāyakopetā pithamardopanāyakā. asyām vāsakasajjā syān
-nāyikā'thā'bhisārikā, dvipadi-kanda-geyā"ḍhyā rathya-vāsaka-tāla-yuk. layatraya-yutā lāsyadaśakena samanvitā.
īdṛśī kalpavalli syādyatha 'mānikya-vallika'.
mukhasandhi-pratimukhasandhi-nirvahaṇair yutā. udatta-varṇanótkarṣā
lalitódātta-nāyakā.
Kalpavalli is having the rasa and bhāva concerning śṛngāra and hasya. The hero is a dignified person (udātta). Pithamarda is the assistant or friend of the nayaka. The heroine is either a vāsaka-sajjā type or an abhisārikā. This art-form is graced by dvipadi, khanda-gīta, rathyā and vāsaka tempos, three types of laya (rhythm), and ten types of lasya. The illustration is "Manikya-Vallikā". It has mukha, pratimukha and nirvahana junctures. It has lofty descriptions and the hero is udatta and lalita also..
Pārijātaka (B.P. IX. 56, pp. 393, ibid) is yet another art-form not read in Bhoja. It is defined as -

pārijāta-lataikánkamukha-nirvahanánvitā,
varṇa-mātra-khanda-tāla-vati,
959
gāthā-samanvitā.
vira-śṛngāra-bhūyiṣṭhā
deva-kṣatrā❞di-nāyakā,
kalahántaritávasthā
nāyikódātta-nāyakā. athava bhogini-svīyā

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gaṇikā-nāyikā❜nvitā, tāḥ syur astau catasraḥ syur danda-rāsaka-nartanāḥ. sāpasāratrayā citra
katha-geya-samanvitā, kvacid vidūṣaka-krīḍāparihāsa-manoharā.
pārijātalatā séyam yathā gangā-tarangikā,
pārijātakam ityeva
kaiścid eṣā'bhidhīyate."

'Pārijāta-latā' is having a single act, and mukha and nirvahana junctures. It is having varṇa, mātrā, khaṇḍa-tāla and gāthā (metre). The rasas are vīra and śṛngāra. The heroes are gods or kṣatriya. The heroine is a kalahántarita type, the hero is udatta person, or the nayikā is either a bhogini, svīyā (= one's own wife), or a gaṇikā i.e. a harlot. There are four or eight dancers with daṇḍa. There are three types of apasāra, a pleasant story and song in it. At times it is rendered charming by the activity or talks of vidūṣaka. This is called pārijāta-latā, the illustration being "ganga-tarangikā". Some call it "pārijātaka" also.
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 571, ibid) observes: "Regarding the sallapa, we know it is mentioned as one of the ten types derived from naṭaka and prakaraṇa, in the prologue to the Bhagavadajjukīya (7th Cen. A.D.). The ullopya is known to us as the name of a Mārga music composition which is mentioned in ancient music treatises, in Yajnavalkya smṛti, in the music sections in the vāyu, Mārkaṇḍeya and Viṣṇudharmóttara purāņas, and in Bharata, along with other compositions of a similar nature, Aporāntaka, Madraka, Ovenaka, Rovindaka, etc. It is from Sāradātanaya, and Sagaranandin, who also mentions the ullopyaka as an uparupaka, that Viśvanatha gives it in his Sahitya - darpana under Uparūpakas."
We may add that the mention from Bhagavadajjukīya need not be taken seriously as it is a prahasana wherein characters are given to put things in a light, cross and humerous way. As for the other evidences concerning ullopyaka taking it as a marga music composition, etc. we may add that this strengthens ullopyaka's position as an uparūpaka, as all upa-rupakas by nature have less of acting and an excess of dance and music.

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961
Now we turn to Sāgaranandin's NLRK., which we have taken as posterior to BP. and anterior to the SD. of Viśvanatha. The NLRK. mentions all varieties of Uparūpakas as read in the B.P. accepting dombī, kalpavalli, mallikā and pārijātaka. Sāgaranandin gives illustrations for all types. He seems to give a short summary of BP. We have taken comparative notes of all the varieties at end when we discussed Bhoja's types.
The SD. of Viśvanatha has over and above nāțikā and trotaka, gosthi, saṭṭakam, nātya-rāsakam, prasthānakam, rāsakam, samlāpakam, śrīgaditam, śilpakam, vilāsikā, durmallikā, prakaraṇikā, hallīśa and bhāņikā. It is clear that V. has sought major inspiration from Śr. Pra., B.P. and NLRK. He takes nāṭikā, totaka and saṭṭaka as uparūpakas (S.D. VI. 269-276). He also mentions prakaraṇikā, perhaps under the influence of N.D. Following NLRK. and also B.P., he takes them as dramatic compositions also by describing their sandhis, vṛttis, anka etc. The original inspiration for taking these uparūpakas which are primarilly dance-forms, as drama also, seems to have been supplied by the long discussion on their true nature in the A.bh. itself. V. also takes rāsaka, natyarāsaka and hallīsa also as drama, though they are primarily dance forms. The prenkhana, which will be looked into further later, seems to be just the prenkhanaka of earlier sources. Vilasika is a new type mentioned by the S.D. we . will take it up later.
Dandin's commentator Vādijanghala mentions 'prastara', which Dr. Raghavan suggests, could be a mistake. Perhaps he means 'prasthāna'. A new variety called 'pavatika' is also mentioned by him which again Dr. Raghavan feels (pp. 572) to be 'pajjhaṭikā' a prākṛta metre which could have given this name to the musical composition.
Dr. Raghavan also suggests (pp. 572, ibid) that in Vanmaya-viveka of Cintamani Miśra of Orissa (A.D. 1574), some strange names appear along with the rūpakas and uparūpakas. He feels that the view presented is queer. This writer first gives ten types of rūpakas which he calls to be 'natya'. This is followed by ten mārgas such as nāțikā, prakaraṇī, bhāṇikā, hāsikā, ḍima, vyāyoginī, kalā, utsähavati', citrā, vicitra and jugupsita. The first six, Prof. Raghavan suggests, are diminutives of nataka, prakaraṇa, bhāṇa, prahasana, dima, and vyāyoga.
Then Cintamani gives sixteen deśya varieties such as saṭṭaka, troṭaka, gosthi, vṛndaka, śilpaka, hallīsaka, ullāsaka, rāsa, śrīgadita, nāṭya(?), lāsaka (?), prastāva, lāsikā, samlāpaka, preńkhaṇa, and sambhavya (?).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA It may be noted that Dr. Raghavan finds things to be 'queer' and 'strange' when he finds names of art-forms not mentioned in Bhoja or his predecessors. Like forms of literature, even newer art-forms also were added to the list by later writers as they perhaps witnessed them being presented on the stage in various parts of India, as time rolled on. Dr. Raghavan is ill at ease with Sāradātanava when he claims to have witnessed the performance of all the thirty types of art-forms. Why should we doubt Sä.'s integrity. Why should we call the approach of śā. NLRK. S.D., and Vānmaya-viveka as either strange or queer ? Why ? Newer and newer desi types could have envolved in course of time and some of them might have received new names though carrying some traits of an old known art-form. The point is we should remain open and go for a careful historical, critical and exhaustive study of all art-forms recorded or known to-day in various parts of modern India. The
ai' from Gujarat also deserves a special notice. Why should we feel shy of recognising various newer forms ? On the other hand we should feel proud of the vast repertoire or reservoir of art in India, both classical and desi. No use getting either alarmed or nervous about the same.
We will now discuss the new names as seen in the S.D. and also see what Dr. Raghavan has to note about the same. Prerkhaņa in the S.D., is -
garbhávamaría-rahitam prenkhanam hina-nāyakam, a-sutradhāram ekánkam a-viskambha-praveśakam. - VI. 286. niyuddha-sampheța-yutam sarva-vịtti-samāśritam, nepathye gīyate nāndi tathā tatra prarocanā. VI. 287
yathā, vālivadhah. This means that the 'prenkhana' is having a single act, with no garbha and vimarśa junctures, a hero of a lowly status, is without a sūtra-dhāra and there is absence of either viskambhaka or praveśaka.
It is having individual fight and quarrel among people, and all vșttis. Nāndī is sung behind the curtain and so also is prarocanā presented from the back of the cartain. 'Vālivadhah' is an illustration.

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963
Dr. Raghavan feels that this is a misreading for prekṣaṇa as seen in the BP. and NLRK. The BP. has prekșaņaka (pp. 385, BP. IX. 30) defined as -
“padárthábhinayam yasya lalitanca layánvitam, kurute nartaki yatra so'pi nartanakaḥ punah. lāsyam dvidhā syācсhalikam sama-rathyā-samanvitam, sutāla-caturasrābhyām yatra kartam pravartate. garbhávamarśa-rahitam sarva-vịtti-samanvitam, prabhūta-māgadhī-śaurasenikam rasa-bhāva-yuk. dvisandhīti vadanty etat uttamádhama-nāyakam bhāratyārabhaçī yuktam, kvacit syāt tasya sātrvatī. yathā vālivadhākyaśca nțsimha-vijayo yatha pūrņa-nepathya-pāțhair vā nāndī tasya vidhīyate. kvacid garbhávimarśau staḥ kvacid vịtti-catustayam kvacin nepathya-vākyā”dhyam na kadācana sūtra-dhịt evam preksanakam vidyād yathā tripura-mardanam.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA We have discussed this type fully earlier when we looked into Bhoja's preksanaka (pp. 1532). Vilāsikā is a new type seen in the S.D. (VI. 301, 302). It is defined as -
śrngāra-bahulaikánkā dasa-läsyắnga-samyuta vidūsaka-vitābhyam ca pithamardena bhușitā. - VI. 301, S.D. hīnā garbha-vimarśābhyām sandhibhyām hinanāyakā, svalpa-vșttā sunepathyā
vikhyātā sā vilāsikā. - VI. 302, S.D. kecit tatra vilāsikā-sthāne vināyiketi pațhanti. tasyās tu 'durmallikāyām antarbhāva' ityanye. • This means that for Visvanātha vilāsikā is having srngāra as a predominent rasa. It is having a single act. It has all the ten angas of the lāsya. (Thus it is having graceful presentation). It is having vidusaka, vita and pithamarda in it. Garbha and vimarśa sandhis are missing in it and the hero is a lowly born. The theme is meragre, and the costumes are rich.
S.D. informs that some name it as vināyikā, and some put it under durmallika'. Actually we know that durmallikā has four acts with one each devoted to vita, vidūsaka, and pīthamarda, the fourth according to S.D. is devoted to the activity of a nāgaraka or a cultured person. May be vilāsikā looks like a shorter version, a oneact show, of this durmallikā, which shares a number of features read in the former.
Vilāsavati can also be compared to some description of bhānikā in the BP., which has Vināvati as an illustration. We have discussed this earlier. DR. Raghavan (pp. 572, ibid) observes that - "If Sāgaranandin made two separate varieties named bhāni and bhānikā, corresponding evidently to the bhāna and bhānikā of Sāradātanaya and others, Visvanātha gave an altogether new name Vilāsikā in the place of bhānī.” But we see that Vilāsikā is also closer to durmallika in the S.D. Now about șiągaka-Şingaka-Śilpaka
șiągaka is mentioned by A.bh. in the list of art-forms recognised by the Cirantanas. H. has singaka, so also Vāgbhata II has singaka, but Śā., and NLRK. have silpaka, with Viśvanātha also going for silpaka.
We discuss these art-forms together because may be they are different names of one and the same variety.
1Cu.

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965 The Cirantanas as quoted in the A.bh. (pp. 181, Ch. IV. NS. G.O.S. ibid) describe sidgaka as -
“sakhyāḥ samakşam bhartur yad uddhatam vịttam ucyate, massnam ca kvacid,
dhūrta-caritam, şidgakas tu saḥ.” șidgaka is one in which before a friend there is description (by nāyikā) of the uddhața-vịtta i.e. rough behaviour or infidelity of the husband. At times there is description of the graceful behaviour also of a dhūrta nāyaka. Nothing beyond this is given regarding șidgaka.
H. has singaka or singataka. 'Singaka' is described as above from the A.bh. In his Viveka (pp. 445, ibid) H. has -
"trividho hi geyakāvyasya prayogah; masrnah, uddhato miśraś ca. H. says that in dombik, we have 'sukumāram eva śuddham rūpam.'
This means that the presentation is of the graceful type in dombikā. It is said to be forceful or uddhata as in bhānaka such as Nrsimhādicarita-varnana. It is possible H. says that even in graceful some element of forceful also enters. In such a mixed variety-miśra form there is difference as to the more or less proportion of - either. Prasthāna' has major portion of masrna, and singataka has major portion of uddhata i.e. forceful. H. notices such mixtures in other varieties also. He follows some hints from the Abh.
Vāgbhata II has singaka defined after H. and follows şidgaka of the Cirantanas in the A.bh.
Śäradātanaya has silpaka defined as seen earlier. The NLRK. also seems to follow BP. Silpaka in NLRK (pp. 287, ibid) runs as -
atha silpakam - brāhmaṇa-nāyakópetaḥ. yathā kanakāvatī-mādhavaḥ śmaśānasankulaḥ, anudāttopa-nāyaka-bhūșitaḥ, kaiśikī-bhāratī-sāttvaty ārabhatīti caturvștti-virājitaḥ, caturanka-bhūșitaḥ, sarva-rasa-pūjitaḥ. tasya ca saptavimśatir angāni. yathā - utkanthā, avahittham, prayatnah, grathanam, āśamsā, tarkah, samsayah, tāpaḥ, udvegaḥ, maugdhyam, ālasyam, apratipattiḥ, vilāpaḥ, vāmyam, anugamanam, vismayaḥ, sādhanam, ucсhvāsaḥ, camatkāraḥ, sūnyatvam, pralobhaḥ, vaiśāradyam, samphetaḥ, āśvāsanam, bodhanam, praharṣaḥ, praśastir iti.
'utkanthā' is - tatra ramanīya-vastu-visaye abhilāśah - i.e. aspiring for a beautiful thing. as in Sakuntala, "suddhānta-durlabham. idam vapur... (śā. I. 15).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA avahittham - is, “prabuddhasya samvaranam avahittham. i.e. concealing that which is revealed. Yathā-vrksavātikāvyām - rajanikā... etc. ('vrksavātikā' is the name of the second act in Puspadūtika.
prayatnaḥ - anivṛttaye yatnaḥ prayatnah, yathā prāvrdanke... etc. Prayatna is an extra effort to obtain something.
grathanam - anyonya-nirnayotpanna-paricaya-pallavita-vibhramábhirāmórthavišeso grathanam, yathā brhad-bakula-vīthikāyām, etc. (brhad. is the first act of MM.)
On account of acquaintance caused by talking to each other or by some decisions (on the part of both) conveying a message by special meaningful gestures full of softness and beauty, is 'grathana' or 'getting locked or glued together.'
āśamsā - īpsitasya durlabhasya āśamsanam āśamsā. yathā śmaśānānke, - idam eva tāvat prārthaye... etc.
Aspiring for something intended, which is very difficult to obtain, is āśamsā. As in the smaśānāńka, etc. (This is also from MM.) . tarkaḥ - ātma-vicārā”dhīnorthávagrahas tarkaḥ-yathā nandayanti-samhāre (i.e. in the last act of puśpadūtika) -
Tarka means self-observation to examine some fact.
Samśayaḥ - kotidvayávalambano’rthaḥ samsayaḥ, yathā viddhaśālabhanjikāyām... etc.
Samsaya or doubt is that fact that is balanced between two alternatives. tāpah-anuśaya-vićeşas tāpaḥ, yathā kulapatyanke...
Torture is a special type of torment. Udvegaḥ - bandhujana-viyoga-janitaudvegaḥ. Anguish is born of the separation from a near one.
maugdhyam - srī-svabhāva-višeşo maugdhyam - over simplicity is a special quality of a lady's nature.
alaśya (languidness) - mārgā”di-kheda-janyaḥ śramaḥ - Fatigue, born of getting tired due to (travelling long) on road, etc
apratipattiḥ - pratipatti-mūdhatā apratipattiḥ yathā kośalánge. absence of knowledge or perception is apratipattiḥ.
vilāpaḥ - śoka-samuttham apadi paridevanam vilāpaḥ - lamentation i.e. distress born of sorrow or grief is 'vilāpa'.
vāmya - prasādane vyutthānam i.e. behaviour that goes against cheerfulness, is vāmya.
anugamnam-prasthitasya harşād anuyānam - i.e. going after a master, who has left, with joy.

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967 vismayah - akrtártha-darśanódbhavo'rtha-višeso vismayah - when a thing is not accomplished, the resultant mental feeling is 'vismaya'.
sādhanam - vyāhāra-viśesah sādhanam - To mention a special process (to acquire something) is sādhana. (= Special instrument to secure something.)
ucchvāsah - The condition of regaining consciousness by a person who was fainted, is ucсhvāsa.
camatkārah - loka-prasiddha eva. This i.e. absolute astonishment due to something exceptional and it is known in worldly parlance.
śūnyatvam - is 'vismarana šūnyatvam'. It is that mental state caused due to forgetting something.
pralobhaḥ - prayojanártham arthā'dibhiḥ pralobhanam - i.e. bribing to acquire some intended object.
vaiśāradyam - ātmanaḥ paurusa-pratipādanam. i.e. stating once valour or feat.
samphetah - krodhena atikramah i.e. Crossing the boundary due to anger. āśvāsanam - śokā"panodanam - i.e. relieving (someone) from grief.
bodhanam - kārya-prativacanena pratibodhanam - i.e. to suggest the action to be taken in future.
praharṣaḥ - ca lokaprasiddhaḥ eva. over-joy is known to all.
prasastih - deva-dvijā"di-kalyāņávadhāraṇam praśastiḥ - i.e. To wish well for gods or brahmins., (i.e. to prey)
These angas or features of silpaka are enumerated by śā. also with some difference in name. .
Ullāpyaka in NLRK is - gitamayam tryankam. asya laksanam - udāra-nāyakam, ujjvala-veșā”tmakam, bahupusta-pradhānam, divya-caritam, śilpakánga-vibhūșitam, hāsya-kārunya-śộngāra-püritam.
Sāgaranandin expects three acts in ullāpyaka, while his mentor Śā. mentions only one act as seen above. NLRK. wants it to be gitamaya i.e. full of music and song. The rest follows Sā. Viśvanātha has ‘ullāpyam' and he follows Sā. and expects only one act. He also quotes the opinion of some (i.e. NLRK) that 'ullāpya' has three acts.
With this we end our discussion on the classification of poetry from an external or formal point of view. Of course, the ten major types of drama, universally recognised as 'preksya' type of kavya will be discussed later in a separate chapter, suggesting all minute details concerning the plot or theme, structure, character etc. of the drama and the rest.

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Chapter XI Classification of Poetry
(Criticism Oriented)
(Criticism Oriented; - i.e. dhvani, gunībhūta-vyangya, citra, or uttama, madhyama, avara - etc.)
It has to be clearly understood in the very beginning that, taking into account the available documents, it is Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka, which is the very first of its type in attempting the classification of poetry into what is termed dhvani', 'gunībhuta-vyangya', and 'citra' form purely criticism point of view. Thus any piece of poetry, be it a single independent verse, a muktaka, or a very large composition a prabandha, both in verse and prose such as the mahākāvya or a kathā or an ākhyāyirā, or a campū etc. can be put under dhvani', or the other two as well. This is classification based purely on criticism and that too from a very very special angle.
Looking at oldest available documents, it was Anandavardhana, who was the first to apply the measure of implicit sense, or 'pratīyamāna artha', in evaluating and classifying poetry. This approach of evaluating and classifying poetry from the angle of the pratiyamāna or implicit sense, was perhaps a movement in poetic criticism. Anandavardhana does not flout or discard classification of poetry from the angle of external form such as gadya or prose, padya or verse, or mixed, and also 'that which is to be presented on the stage, i.e. preksya', or otherwise, etc. He accepts all these formal types and mentions a number of them as seen in the earlier chapter. But his implicit-sense-biased thrust is having totally new dimensions and being lucky in having followers such as the great Abhinavagupta, and Vägdevatavatāra Mammata, and a host of talented critics of literary aesthetics ending with the greatest viz. PunditarājaJagannātha, Āhandavardhana was successful in establishing, i.e. promoting, a

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new school of thought called the "dhvani school", better acknowledged as "vyañjana-dhvani-rasa" school of thought. It may be observed to his credit that he was not just lucky to have these great minds on his side. But the fact is he is very, very, very sound and convincing till day in his thinking and logic. Thus, he, so to say, added a new dimension in this direction, though of course he does not claim that this thought current was originated with him. On the contrary he claims that this thought-current was as old as hills and has been handed over to him through the ingenious thinking of the ancients. His humility apart, there is more than just a grain of truth also in this.
He tries to promulgate this dhvani-oriented thought-current and classification of poetry based on this new angle, first with the establishment of the implicit or pratīyamāna sense as something different both in nature and scope from the normally accepted expressed or vācya sense, of course, including the indicated sense, i.e. laksyártha. The whole presentation has made the Dhvanyaloka, an epochmaking work in Indian Literary Aesthetics. It may be noted at the outset, and we will go into the details later that Anandavardhana has not rejected any concept prevelant in literary criticism but has attempted to give a fool-proof all embracing scheme with (rasa"di) dhvani as the 'soul' of poetry i.e. keeping 'dhvani' in the centre, he has accomodated all thought-currents such as alamkāra, guṇa, rīti, vṛtti, dosa and what not, in his scheme. We will examine this as we proceed later.
We know that Anandavardhana took notice of the implicit sense, i.e. the sense not directly expressed in poetry, and also held that this implicit sense is grasped by a separate and independent word-power, sabda-sakti, called vyañjanā or suggestion. But prior to him the ancients such as Bhamaha and the like had also noticed and recognised in their own way this element of the un-expressed or implicit sense in poetry but of course, they did not come out openly for vyañjanā as a separate and independent word-power for their own reasons. Perhaps they had incorporated the implicit sense in different gunas or excellences, or alamkāras i.e. figures of speech or turns of expression, or in rīti or style, vṛtti or diction etc. They did not realise the importance of recognising a separate sabda-śakti called vyañjanā. We have noticed in the earlier chapters how they not only subsumed the implicit or suggested sense or dhvani in various categories, but also never attempted any independent investigation in the nature of various word-powers. It is Anandavardhana, and following him the great Abhinavagupta and Mammața who try to discuss separately the topic of semantics proper as in their opinion, this implicit sense which they hold higher than the expressed sense from the point of

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA view of beauty in poetry, is arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā or the wordpower of suggestivity which is separate and independent of abhidhā or the wordpower yielding directly expressed sense, and also laksanā, yielding the indicated sense. Perhaps the ancients did not do this as the heritage they received from dārśanika or philosophical writings, or grammar, did not care to brood over vyañjanā. We have seen in earlier chapters how the Mimāmsā, Nyāya and Vyakarana disciplines concerned themselves only with abhidh, and laksanā. But we have also tried in our own humble way that these philosophers or darśanikas did not take notice of vyañjanā and implicit sense, because they had no business to deal with the same. They were out to interpret vedic tenets, śruti, and direct and unambiguous expression was the soul virtue in contention. But we have seen traces of recognition of or consciousness concerning the implicit sense an suggestive power in earliest documents such as the Vedas, and the various disciplines connected with the same. Whatever it may be, but for us, for the present, we begin the talk of 'pratīyamāna' sense i.e. implicit sense in poetry or kāvya and its apprehension through the agency of vyañjanā or suggestive power of the word, only with Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka (Dhv.), so far as available documents are concerned. It is he who has recommended the use of the technical term 'dhvani' or suggested sense which is held to be principal as compared to other possible categories, from the point of view of poetic beauty. We will go to see how he tries to define the same and also classify it. For him this dhvani is of three kinds, i.e. of the form of 'vastu' or suggestion of an idea, theme or matter, ‘alamkāra' or suggestion of a figure of speech i.e. a turn of expression and 'rasā"di' or suggestion of emotive stuff such as a feeling or a sentiment etc. It may be observed, as we will go to see, that the term 'rasa' has a wider connotation meaning aesthetic delight, which goes beyond emotive stuff only. It has to be clearly understood that this three-fold implicit sense is technically termed 'dhvani' only when it is held as the principal or supreme source of causing poetic beauty. Then, extending the scope of this technical term 'dhvani' further, Anandavardhana holds that the poetry graced by this supreme beauty of dhvani is also termed 'dhvani kavya', irrespective of its external form such as either prose i.e. gadya, or verse i.e. padya or mixed, or that which is written in form of a dramatic piece to be presented on stage. It could be a single verse i.e. sloka or a huge composition-prabandha. Thus, that class of poetry or kāvya is termed 'dhvani-kāvya' which is having dhvani or suggested sense as the highest or principal source of poetic beauty, or aesthetic experience in general. So, calling a given piece of poetry by the name ‘dhvani' is a criticism based approach,

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971 once and for all. All external forms of poetry, either nibaddha, or a-nibaddha, gadya, padya, miśra, abhineya, anabhineya, geya or whatever, can be classed as dhvani' from the point of view of criticism, or to be more precise, vyañjanā-biased criticism.
Anandavardhana is not blind to other possibilities in poetry and is charitable enough to accept other types' or 'class' of poetry called the gunībhūta-vyangya or poetry of subordinated suggestion and also 'citra-kavya', a type where this suggested element is either negligible or of no value, or is totally absent. But he for himself does not brand these types respectively as 'uttama' or the best or highest type of poetry, 'madhyama' or second-rate poetry and 'adhama' of the lowest i.e. third-rate poetry. It is Mammața who makes bold to make these terms current and his posterity accepted this terminology without question. However, the basic fact remains that classification of poetry into 'dhvani', 'gunībhūtavyangya', and 'citra', or 'uttama (even futtarnottama' with Jagannātha), 'madhyama' and 'avara' is absolutely criticism based, is vyañjanā-biased and is irrespective of its external form or size.
We humbly believe that the oldest available, and therefore to be taken as first written document on Dhvani, is the 'Dhvanyāloka' which is a composite unit in itself written by a single author, the great Anandavardhana, who wrote down the kārikās, the vștti or gloss and also adorned his arguments by apt quotations from the vast poetic literature spread before him in the form of works of the great poets viz. Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Bāna, and scores and scores of others who have engrammed their names in golden letters in the history of Sanskrit poetry.
Of course, some scholars are of the opinion that the kārikās were authored by some unknown person, and had come down to Anandavardhana as an oral legacy and that the latter wrote only the vștti portion or gloss. But we have absolutely no faith in such useless talks. For us the whole work known as the Dhvanyāloka or Kāvyāloka is a single composite unit written by only Anandavardhana. We follow in this regard the lead of Prof. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, D. R. Mankad, and the rest. We believe that this theory of single authoriship receives strength not only from various observations in the A.bh., as pointed out by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, but also from the tradition current among literary critics in Sanskrit who unequivocally declare Anandavardhana to be "The dhvanikāra", and also from a quotation from the Locana of Abhinavagupta who observes that this tradition of dhvani was handed over to posterity only orally without being put in a book form. So, the Dhv. is the first composite unit of its type written by Anandavardhana himself, who is

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SAHṚDAYALOKA also the 'joy' or 'ananda' of the connoesseurs. He observes: (Locana, Dhv. I. i.): "a-vicchinnena pravāheņa tair etad uktam vinā'pi viśista-pustakeṣu viniveśanād ity abhiprayaḥ." Thus no book - even in form of written kārikās or collection of the same was known to Abhinavagupta. Only thought-currents travelled from centuries to centuries. Thoughts and thoughts only, in whatever from, but that of anything concrete. There is yet another observation to this effect. The Locanakāra observes: "ānanda iti ca granthakṛto nāma. tena sa ānandavardhanā"cārya etac chāstreṇa sahṛdaya-hṛdayeṣu pratiṣṭhām devatāyatanā”divad anaśvarīm sthitim gacchatu iti bhavaḥ." (on Dhv. I. i.). This is in explanation of the author's i.e. Anandavardhana's veiled claim of having authored the whole of the Dhv. in the words : "tasya hi dhvaneḥ svarupam, sakala-kavi-kavyopaniṣadbhūtam, ati-ramaṇīyam, aṇīyasībhir api cirantana-kavya-lakṣaṇa- vidhāyinām buddhibhir an-unmīlitapūrvam, atha ca, rāmāyaṇa-mahābhārata-prabhṛtini lakṣye prasiddhavyavahāram lakṣayatām sahṛdayānām ānando manasi labhatām pratiṣṭhām iti prakasyate." (vṛtti, on Dhv. 1. 1.)
But, it should be noted that before A. (= Anandavardhana) put his golden heritage of literary criticism on a sound and irrevokable footing, in a book-form, in form of a theory to be accepted and followed by a host of rare intellectuals spread over centuries, he also could make out some dissenting voice, some resistence or opposition to this new theory of dhvani and he voices the same in the very first kārikā of his famous work. A. observes :
kāvyasyā"tmā dhvanir iti budhair yaḥ samāmnāta-pūrvas, tasya'bhāvam jagadur apare, bhaktam ähus tam anye, kecid vācām sthitam aviṣaye tattvam ucus tadīyam
tena brūmaḥ, sahṛdaya-manaḥ
prītaye, tat svarūpam." (Dhv. I. i.)
"Though the learned men of yore have declared time and again that the soul of poetry is suggestion, some would aver its non-existence, some would regard it as something (logically) implied and some others would speak, of its essence as lying beyond the scope of words. We propose, therefore, to explain is nature and bring delight to the hearts of perceptive critics." (Trans. K. Krish.)

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The learned men, meaning those who know the truth about poetry, have taught, through an unbroken tradition, that the soul, i.e. essence of poetry has been named 'dhvani' i.e. suggestion. This they have confirmed by an all round examination and then declared as such. But although it is felt so by cultured critics in their minds, there are others who affirmed the non-existence of dhvani. These are the different views of the non-believers in Dhvani.
We will examine this dhvanivirodha or views of anti-dhvani theorists later in a separate chapter, but for the present we attempt to explain the form and varieties of dhvani as laid out by Ā. After suggesting the opposition to the concept of dhvani, Ā. (= Anandavardhana) observes : “tena evamvidhāsu vimatișu sthitāsu, sahrdayamanaḥ prītaye tat-svarūpam brūmah.” “In view of the prevalence of so many conflicting opinions, we propose to elucidate the nature of suggestion for the delight of the perceptive critics.” (Trans. K. Krish. pp. 7, ibid)
Ā. observes : (Dhv. I. i.; vịtti) - "tasya hi dhvaneh svarūpam sakala-kavikāvyópanisad-bhūtam, ati-ramanīyam anīyasībhir api cirantana-kāvya-laksanavidhāyinām buddhibhir anunmīlitapūrvam, athaca rāmāyana-mahābhārataprabhịtini laksye sarvatra prasiddha-vyavahāram lakṣayatām sahțdayānām ānando manasi labhatām pratisthām iti prakāśyate." - i.e. “Suggestion itself is both the quintessence of the works of all first-rate poets and the most beautiful principle of poetry though it remained unnoticed even by the subtlest of the rhetoritions of the past. However, refined critics are certainly alive to its primary presence in literary works like the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata; and with a view to placing their delight on a secure footing, we shall explain its nature (in detail)."
(Trans. K. Kris.; p. 7, ibid)
For preparing the base or ground work for his theory, Ā. (Dhv. I. 2. 3. 4 & 5) observes that, “That meaning which wins the admiration of refined critics is decided to be the soul of poetry. The 'explicit' and the 'implicit' are regarded as its two aspects. (Dhv. I. 2) (Trans. K. Krish., p. 7, ibid)
"Of these, the explicit is commonly known and it has been already set forth in many ways through figures of speech such as the simile by other writers, hence it is not to be discussed here at length.” (Dhv. I. 3, pp. 7, ibid)
"But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of the first-rate poets it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of the striking external constituents even as charm in ladies.” (Dhv. I. 4. pp. 7, ibid)
"That meaning alone is the soul of poetry; and so it was that, of yore, the sorrow

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA of the first poet (i.e. Vālmīki) at the separation of the curlew couple took the form of a distich.” (Dhv. I. 5. pp. 13, ibid) (Trans. K. Kris.)
Whild elaborating this in his vịtti on the above kārikās, Ā. observes that the meaning which wins the admiration of perceptive critics or men of taste, and which is of the very essence of poetry has two aspects, viz. the explicit or external and the implicit or internal.
The implicit aspect, which is quite different from the explicit, is found in the words of great first-rate poets. It is closer to the minds of the cultured critics and it shines forth as being over and above the, 'striking external constituents', which includes not only the element adorned with or of the form of figures of speech, but also that which is 'perceptible to senses'. Charm in the ladies is the simile in point. Just as this charm exeeds the beauty of all the individual limbs observed separately, and delights like ambrosia, the eye of the admirer in a most unique fashion, so also does this meaning having various divisions such as bare idea (vastumātra), figures and sentiments. In all these varieties it will be shown as differing from the explicit --"sa hyartho vācya-sāmarthy ā”ksiptam vastumātram alamkārā rasā"dayaś ca ity anekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayisyate. sarvesu ca tesu prakāresu tasya vācyad anyatvam." (vrtti. on Dhy. I. 4). Dr. K. Kris. translates "rasa" as "sentiment" only. But for us it is more than just that. It is "total aesthetic experience" also.
The vastu-rūpa-vyangya or suggestion in form of an idea is different from the expressed in the sense that at times when the expressed is of the positive nature, i.e. vidhi, the suggested takes the form of a negative nature or prohibition as in case of the verse such as, “bhrama dhārmika", etc. At times when the expressed is prohibitary the suggested is positive e.g. in, "śvasrur atra sete", etc. At times the expressed is of the form of vidhi i.e. a positive proposal, the implicit is neither positive now negative in nature, as in, "vraja, mama eva ekasyāḥ.” etc. or, at times when the expressed is a prohibitive proposal, the implicit is neither positive nor prohibitive (i.e. an-ubhaya), as in, “prārthaye tāvat prasīda.” etc. At times, the implicit is related to something entirely different from that to which the explicit is related as in case of, "kasya vā na bhavati." etc. Ā. observes that besides these there are various other forms in which the varieties of the implicit appear distinct from the explicit : "anye ca evamprakārāḥ vācyād vibhedinaḥ pratiyamānabhedāh sambhavanti." (vrtti., Dhy. I. 4). Only some of them have been illustrated here. Bhoja and following him H.C., illustrate other possibilities also.
Then Ā. observes that the next variety, viz. the suggested figure, also differs from the explicit sense. But this he says, will be discussed later.

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975 But the third variety of the implicit viz. the sentiments etc., shines forth due to the latent power in the expressed : "tļtīyas tu rasā"di-laksanah prabhedo vācyavyāpāra-visaya iti vācyād vibhinna eva" (vrtti, Dhv. I. iv). Thus, this variety of the implicit viz. rasā"di, never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is necessarily distinct from the explicit or expressed.
Before we proceed to examine how A. explains this point, we will pay attention to what the Locanakāra i.e. Abhinavagupta has to say. He observes (Locana, Dhv. I. iv) that the implicit sense is primarily two-fold such as “laukika” i.e. that which is also met with in ordinary parlance, and the other one, “which is exclusively the object of poetic effort.” Out of these two, the first, viz. the 'laukika' is, at times, also conveyed by placing its own name, i.e. it be comes sva-sabda-vācya, i.e. it is capable of being denoted by its proper name. It is manifold, taking the form of 'vidhi' or positive proposal, or ‘nişedha' i.e. prohibition etc., and is termed 'vastu' or 'idea'.
This 'laukika pratīyamāna' is two-fold such as (i) that which formerly in a given sentence sense has enjoyed the status of a figure of speech such as a 'simile' or upam, and the like, but for the present (being principally implied or suggested) not being subservient to anything else has lost its status of (an expressed) figure of speech, but as it was formerly designated as a figure, is now termed as 'alamkāradhvani' or (principally) suggested figure of speech, on the analogy of the "brāhmana-śramana-nyāya”. (ii) the second as noted above is a bare 'idea' or vastu. Thus 'laukika pratīyamāna' is fully explained.
The other suggested sense viz. 'alaukika', is such that it can not ever be conveyed by its own proper name, even in a dream, and is certainly not an object of worldly context. This type of suggested sense is an object only of the poetic function. Its nature is of the highest divine bliss. The fact is that all individuals have the emotions such as 'rati' and the like engramed in their conscience from times immemorial. When they see something being enacted on the stage, or listen (or read) certain words in poetry, they experience in their hearts such vibhāvā”dis i.e.
ants, consequents and ancillary feelings, that being congenial to their taste and mental attitude, look beautiful and cause to arise their emotions such as 'rati' and the like which are there in the heart as permanent latent impressions. At this moment, the connoisseur has a feeling of divine bliss. This experience of divine bliss is termed 'rasa', i.e. frasā"di-dhvani'. Pratically, says Abhinavagupta, in reality only this variety viz. rasā”di-dhvani is "dhvani" proper, in the real sense, and only this is the "soul” of poetry (or any art in general), and the other two, viz. vastudhvani and alamkāra-dhvani ultimately terminate into rasa-dhvani, which alone is therefore, the 'soul of poetry. Locana (on Dhv. I. iv) reads as :

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"tatra pratīyamānasya tāvad dvau bhedau; laukikaḥ, kāvya-vyāpāraika-gocaraś ca, iti. laukiko yaḥ sva-śabda-vācyatām kadācid adhiśete, sa ca vidhi-niṣedha❞dy aneka-prakāro vastu-śabdenócyate. so'pi dvividhaḥ. yaḥ pūrvam kvā'pi vākyárthe alamkārabhāvam upamā"di-rūpatām anvabhūt, idānīm tv analamkārarūpa eva, anyatra guṇībhāvábhāvāt. sa pūrva-pratyabijñāna-balad alamkara-dhvanir iti vyapadiśyate, brāhmaṇaśramaṇa-nyāyena. tad rūpatā'bhāvena tūpalakṣitam vastumatram ucyate. mātragrahaṇena hi rūpántaram nirākṛtam. yas tu svapne❜pi na sva-śabda-vacyo na laukika-vyavahāra-patitaḥ kintu śabda-samrpamāṇahṛdaya-samvada-sundara-vibhāvánubhava-samucita-prāgvinivista-ratyā"divāsanánurāga-sukumāra-sva-samvid-ānanda-carvaṇā-vyāpāra-rasanīya-rupo rasaḥ, sa kāvyavyāpāraikagocaro rasā"dhvanir iti, sa ca dvanir eva iti, sa eva mukhyatayā ātmā iti."
976
That this 'rasa"di' dhvani is absolutely different is explained by Ā. as follows "It never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is decidedly distinct from the explicit. If at all, it could be an object of the explicit, it might be ŝo alleged either as being directly denoted by its proper names or as being denoted through the delineation of characters in a setting, etc. If the first alternative were true, there would be no possibility of an experience of sentiments etc., in instances where their proper names are not employed. Never are they so denoted directly by their proper names. Even when proper names are present, the experience of sentiments etc., is not due to them but only due to delineation of characters in a proper setting etc. The experience of sentiments etc. is only given a designation by the proper name, is not at all conditioned by it. In fact we do not have the experience (of sentiments etc.) in all the instances where proper names are used. Indeed, there is not even the slightest experience of the presence of sentiments in a composition which contains only their proper names such as the Erotic and which is destitute of all delineation of the characters in a setting and so forth. Since we can have the experience of sentiments etc. only through the characters in a setting etc. irrespective of their proper names, and since we cannot have the experience only by the use of proper names, we may conclude on the basis of these considerations, both positive and negative, that sentiments etc. are only implied by the latent power of the explicit and in no way denoted explicitly. Thus it is established that even the third class of the implicit meaning is quite distinct from the explicit. It will be shown in sequel, however, that its experience will appear to be almost simultaneous with the explicit." (Vṛtti, on Dha. I. IV; Trans. K. Krish. pp. 11, 13, ibid)

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977
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We may add that even by taking the proper names also, if we had the experience of rasa, then in that case we could have experienced all the eight sentiments, when we recited the famous kārikā of Bharata enumerating the eight sentiments, such as : "śộngāra-vīra-karuna." etc. But this is not so.
It may be noted that in these three varieties of dhvani i.e. implicit sense, it is only the 'rasā"di' type which is the 'soul of poetry, though theoretically A. all the three on a par. Ā. suggests that only rasā"di-dhvani is the 'soul of poetry in the real sense when at Dhv. I.V. he suggests that in Rāmāyana of Ādi kavi Vālmīki, it is the 'soka' born of the separation of the curlew couple which is principle in form of karuna rasa. It is only the karuna-rasa which is principally suggested in Rāmāyana and thus only that is the object of the whole composition. It may be noted here that in this famous kārikā (i.e. Dhv. I.V) we do not have to construe "Vālmīkeḥ śokaḥ”, but we have to take it as "generalized śoka has become the object of Vālmīki's śloka, i.e. composition. - sokaḥ vālmīkeh śokatvam āgataḥ.” - Ā. observes that though the implicit is having three forms, the illustration of Rāmāyana is cited only to bring home a point that in fact, virtually, it alone (i.e.
asā"di alone) is the principal variety. By mentioning 'rasa-bhāvā"di', explains the Locanakāra, Ā. here includes all varieties such as rasā”bhāsa, bhāvā”bhāsa, bhāvódaya, bhāva-samdhi, bhāva-sabalatā, bhāva-praśama etc.
Read Ā. : (vịtti, Dhv. I. 5) : pratīyamānasya ca anyabheda-darśanépi rasabhāva-mukhena eva upalaksanam; prādhānyāt.”
On this read Locana : "tena rasa eva vastutaḥ ātmā. vastvalamkāra-dhvani tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyād utkrstau tāv ity abhiprāyeņa "dhvanih kāvyasya ātmā iti sāmānyena uktih" ... etc.
It may be noted that Abhinavagupta is exactly echoing Ā.'s views. He is not adding anything of his own when he observes as above that in reality rasa-dhvani alone should be considered as the 'soul of poetry. This is borne out by observations from the Dhv. at a number of places as we will be pointing out from time to time. But for the present we quote from vrtti, on Dhv. I. 6. A. observes : "pratīyamānasya ca anyabheda-darśanépi rasa-bhāva-mukhena eva upalaksanam, prādhānyat." Though one can discern other sub-species of the implicit, they can all be understood by the synecdoche of sentiments and emotions since these happen to be the most important representatives of the rest."
Abhinavagupta further observes (on Dhv. I. 6) : "evam itihāsa-mukhena pratīyamānasya kāvyā”tmatām pradarśya, sva-samvit-siddham apy etad iti darśayati -

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"Thus after establishing that the implicit is the soul of poetry by referring to a historic (factual) illustration (such as the Rāmāyaṇa), now the author, (i.e. A.) shows that it is self-evident also." A. here observes at Dhv. I. 6:
"sarasvati svādu tad artha-vastu niṣyandamānā mahatām kavīnām, aloka-sāmānyam abhivyanakti
cira-sphurantam pratibhā-viseṣam."
"The speech of the first-rate poets streaming forth that sweet content reveals clearly their extra ordinary genius, which is as unearthly as it is ever bright." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 15, ibid)
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"The speech of first-rate poets which streams forth such subjects as are full of the said meaning will reveal most clearly the extraordinary genius of the poets; a genius which not only appears unearthly but also ever bright. Hence it is that though the world of traditionally accepted poets is wide and varied, only two or three, or at the most five or six amongst them such as Kalidasa, are counted as firstrate poets." (Trans. K. Kris. p. 15, ibid, vṛtti on Dhv. I. 6)
One more evidence to prove the existence of the implicit sense is given by A. at Dhv. I. 7 in which he observes that this fact of implicit sense is not understood merely by knowing grammar and dictionary alone. But it is understood only by those who have an insight into the true significance of poetry.
By mere learning the rules of grammar and meanings shown in the lexicons, that implicit sense cannot be grasped. Only those who have a real insight into the true significance of poetry will be able to grasp the same. In case this implicit sense too were the same as the expressed or explicit sense, then merely by the knowledge of grammar and lexicon, and through it by the knowledge of the explicit, one and all could have been able to fix the implicit also. But the fact is that this implicit sense remains beyond the grasp of those who have mastery only on grammer and lexicon, i.e. on the science of meanings and words alone, but who are averse to aesthetic contemplation ("vacya-vācaka-lakṣaṇa-mātra-kṛta-śramāṇām, kāvyatattvártha-bhāvanā-vimukhānām" - vṛtti, Dhv. I. 7, pp. 14, ibid) - of intrinsic significance of poetry. This is like the fact that true appreciation of notes and tones of music remains beyond the reach of scholars in the science of music, if they are themselves not good musicians.

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Thus, after establishing the separate and independent existence of the implicit sense in poetry, A. comes to establish that only this implicit sense alone is, be, principle (source of charm) in poetry. He observes at Dhv. I. 8 :
evam vācya-vyatirekiņo vyangyasya sadbhāvam pratipādya prādhānyam tasya eva iti darśayati -
sórthas tadvyakti-sāmarthya-yogi śabdaś ca kaścana, yatnataḥ pratyabhijñyau
tau śabdárthau mahākaveḥ." sa vyangyórthaḥ tad-vyakti-sāmarthya-yogi śabdaś ca kaścana, na sarvaḥ, tāv eva śabdárthau mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñeyau. vyangya-vyañjakābhyām eva hi suprayuktābhyām mahākavitva-lābho mahākavīnām, na vācya-vācaka-rac mātrena."
"Thus after establishing the existence of the implicit meaning as distinct from the explicit, the over-riding superiority of that meaning is demonstrated in what follows :
That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, - only these two deserve the careful scrutiny of a first-rate poet. (I. 8)
'that meaning' refers to the implicit and 'that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in the dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning, only these two, deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet. The status of first-rate poets is achieved only by the effective employment of suggested meanings and suggestive expressions and not by a mere use of conventional meanings and conventional words." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 15, 17, ibid)
Ā. of course is careful to add that eventhough the relation of the suggestedsuggestor is of prime importance, the poet, to begin with, directs his efforts to the expressed and the expressor, i.e. conventional meaning and conventional word. This is explained by an analogy. Just as a man in quest of light for perception of objects, first takes care to secure a lamp, in the same way, a poet having regard for and ultimate interest in the suggested sense, first directs his efforts towards the conventional meaning. Ā. (Dhv. I. 10) suggests that just as the purport of a sentence is collected through the meaning of its individual components i.e. words in a sentence, similarly, the apprehension of that (= suggested) sense follows the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA same of the conventional sense, i.e. the directly expressed sense. The vyangyárthapratīti' is necessarily, “vācyártha-pratīti-pūrvikā”. At the same time Ā. adds a warning that though the apprehension of the expressed sense necessarily preceeds the same of the suggested sense, the principal status lies with the latter, i.e. the apprehension of the suggested sense only. “Ā. observes (vrtti, prior to Dhv. I. 11) : "idānīm vācyárthapratīti-pūrvakatvépi tat-pratīter vyangyasya arthasya prādhānyam yathā na vyālupyate tathā darśayati :
sva-sāmarthya-vaśenaiva vākyártham prathayann api, yathā vyāpāra-nispattau
padártho na vibhāvyate (Dhy. I. 11) yathā sva-sāmarthya-vaśenaiva vākyártham prakāśayannapi padártho vyāpāra-nişpattau na vibhavyate vibhaktatayā -
"tadvat sacetasām sórtho vācyártha-vimukhātmanām, buddhau tattvártha-darsinyām
jhațity evávabhāsate.” (Dhy. I. 12) "Now, even though the knowledge of the suggested sense is thus invariably preceded by a knowledge of the conventional sense, it is shown below how its importance does not grow less on that account :
Though by its own power the word-import is responsible for conveying the sentence-import, just as it escapes notice once its purpose is served (Dhv. I. 11).
While it is true that word-import itself conveys sentence-import through its own power, just as it does not at the same time appear as distinct from the sentence. import once this latter has been conveyed :
so also, that suggested meaning flashes suddenly across the truth-perceiving minds of perceptive critics, when they turn away from the literal meaning. (Dhv. I. 12) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 17-19, ibid)
Now this is a very interesting situation. We know that technically Ā. accepts the position of "gunībhūta-vyangya" i.e. 'subordinated suggestion', but his inner bias towards the supremacy of the suggested meaning, of course as a source of ultimate poetic charm, is very much clear in such utterances. Elsewhere this gunībhuta vyangya i.e. the suggested content being subordinated to the expressed i.e. vācya

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content is compared to a king joining the vara-yātrā or bridegroom's procession. Here of course the bridegroom is no doubt most important from the contextual point of view, because it is he who is going to marry the bride, but the king who has joined this procession of a bridegroom who happens to be the son of His Majesty's minister or any other senior officer, is virtually the centre of attraction and even the bridegroom's importance sky-rockets because the king, as a guest, has chosen to follow him. This shows that in the heart of his heart A.'s preference lies with the suggested sense, in any context. It is precisely this vyangya-biased attitude which has prompted his arch rival Mahima to reject the category of the so called guṇībhūta-vyangya and accept the supremacy only of the 'other' sense, i.e. 'anumeya' for him, in place of A's 'vyangya'. This our observation deserves special notice of the learned.
In the third Udyota, of course, A. improves upon this analogy of padárthavākyártha-nyāya between vācya-vyangya, and instead, projects the "ghatapradeepa-nyāya". This is guided by the consideration of saving vyañjanā being branded only as lakṣaṇā, wherein there is clear mukhyártha-badha. In vyañjanā, especially rasádi-vyañjanā, the vācya-pratiti is not totally efaced. Actually the two apprehensions co-exist.
Thus, after establishing the existence of the suggested meaning which is superior to i.e. more charming than the expressed or conventional sense to his satisfaction, A. proceeds to define this principal suggested sense (i.e. the sense which is the principal source of poetic charm) in poetry at Dhv. I. 13:
Ā. observes :
981
"yatrárthaḥ śabdo vā
tam artham upa-sarjanīkṛta-svárthau vyanktaḥ, kavyaviseṣaḥ sa
dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ."
"That kind of poetry, wherein the (conventional) meaning renders itself secondary or the (conventional) word renders its meaning secondary and suggests the (intended or) implied meaning, is designated by the learned as 'Dhvani' or 'Suggestive poetry." (Trans. K. Kris. p. 19, ibid)

This definition is applicable simultaneously to both the principally suggested sense in poetry, as well as that type of poetry which is having suggested sense as the principal (source of charm). He observes that by this definition it is shown how

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the province of suggestive poetry is absolutely different from that of the sources of charm to explicit or expressed sense, such as the figure simile i.e. upama, on the one hand, and from that of the sources of charm in distinctive sound such as the figure 'anuprāsa' or alliteration on the other : "yatrártho vācya-viśeṣaḥ, vācakaviseṣaḥ śabdo vā tam artham vyanktaḥ sa kavya-viśeşo dhvanir iti. anena vācyavācaka-cārutva-hetubhyaḥ upamā"dibhyaḥ anuprāsā"dibhyaś ca vibhakta eva dhvaner viṣaya iti darśitam." (vṛtti, on Dhv. I. 13)
Abhinavagupta observes in his Locana (on Dhv. I. 13) here that by the dual form "vyanktaḥ", it is suggested that, be it that dhvani is either 'sabda-śakti-mülaka' or 'artha-śakti-mülaka', but in either case, virtually there is instrumentality of both word and sense together in bringing about the intended suggestion. (Thus the use of dual form is justified). So, as seen earlier in vyañjanavirodha, the objection raised by Mahima is utterly baseless. But Abhinavagupta's remark is certainly directed against Bhaṭṭa Nayaka (perhaps in his Hṛdaya-darpana) who was followed in this regard by Mahima - "yad bhaṭṭanayakena dvi-vacanam dūṣitam tad gajanimīlikayā eva." (Locana, on Dhv. I. 13)
After this A. takes up the refutation of those who did not accept the existence of dhvani i.e. those who were dhvany-abhāva-vādins. We will take this up separately later. But for the present we continue with his further observation. A. says that by "sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ" is meant that dhvani has been established or discussed by the learned. It is not established in a haphazard way therefore it is intended that this principle is reliable. A. observes the grammarians are the first among the learned. They refer to articulate letters by the term 'dhvani' or 'suggester'. In the same way, the element of suggestion being common (to both), the same designation, viz. 'dhvani' is given to word, meaning, the essential verbal power, and also poetry which contains all these (vṛtti, on Dhv. I. 13) - "prathame hi vidvamso vaiyākaraṇāḥ, vyakaraṇa-mulatvāt sarva-vidyānām. te ca śruyamāņeṣu varṇeṣu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti. tathaiványais tanmatánusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ kavyatattvártha-darśibhiḥ vācya-vācaka-sammiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadeśyo vyañjakatva-sāmyād dhvanir ity uktaḥ."
Abhinavagupta (Locana, Dhv. I. 13) reads as follows: "asmābhir api prasiddhebhyaḥ śabda-vyāpārebhyaḥ abhidha-tātparya-lakṣaṇa-rupebhyaḥ atiriktaḥ vyāpāraḥ dhvanir ity uktaḥ. evam catuskam api dhvaniḥ. tad yogac ca samastam api kavyam dhvaniḥ. tena vyatireká-vyatireka-vyapadeśópi na na yuktaḥ, vācyavācaka-sammiśra iti. vācya-vācaka-sahitaḥ sammiśra iti madhyamapadalopi samāsaḥ.

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983 'gām aśvam purusam paśum' iti vat samuccayótra, ca-kāreņa vinā’pī.
tena vācyópi dhvanih, vācakópi śabdo dhvanih, dvayor api vyañjakatvam dhvanati' iti krtvā. śabdanam sabdaḥ, śabda-vyāpāraḥ, na cásau abhidhādi-rūpaḥ api tu ātma-bhūtah, sópi dhvananam dhvaniḥ, kāvyam iti vyapadeśyaś ca yórthaḥ, sópi dhvanih. ukta-prakāra-catustayamayatvāt; ata eva sādhāraṇahetum āha - vyañjakarvasāmyād iti. vyangya-vyañjakabhāvaḥ sarveșu pakseșu sāmānyarūpaḥ sādhāraṇa ity arthaḥ.”
A. further observes that a treatment, then, of such a wider or comprehensive concept as suggestion, with all its divisions and sub-divisions which are yet to be explained in the sequel, is certainly not at all on a par with the enumeration of the well known, specific figures of speech, and hence the enthusiasm of persons imbued in their minds with the value of suggestion is quite proper. Nobody should display jealousy to show that they are all men of deranged minds.
Thus it is not proper to subsume dhvani under either an alamkāra or a guņa. The effort of those who seek to establish the same is absolutely in the right direction. Thus dhvani does exist and is basically two-fold, viz. avivakṣita-vācya and vivakṣitányapara-vācya i.e. (i) with un-intended literal sense and (ii) with intended but further-extending literal import.
Thus after first establishing dhvani as a principal and separate entity by advancing logical arguments, Ā. in the second and third udyotas, discusses all related topics also. We will look into the divisions and sub-divisions of dhvani later. But it may be noted beforehand that Ā. thought of a fool-proof scheme of "vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa” which was catholic or broad enough to correlate the concepts such as gunas or excellences, alamkāras or figures i.e. turns of speech, rīti or style, vrtti or diction, doșa or poetic blemishes, samghațanā or texture etc. as advanced by earlier alamkārikas. He correlated all these concepts with the central concept of rasa-dhvani. Gunas were the 'dharma' or attributes of rasa-the soul, and alamkāras and the rest as the suggesters of rasa secure their birth. Here lies the real greatness of the Dhv.
This all-encompassing scheme of 'vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa' which, as Ā. records was promulgated since times immemorial but received a full support from him, was strongly established by A.'s great followers such as Abhinavagupta, Mammata and then the great writers such as Hemacandra, Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha, Visvanatha, Appayya Dixit and Jagannatha. But prior to A's efforts and after A.'s efforts this thought current of vyañjan.-dhvani had to face stiff opposition, by a

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA number of unknown writers and though the concept of 'rasa' was acceptable to one and all, the concepts of dhvani and especially vyañjanā were challanged by such great names as Kuntaka, Dhananjaya. Dhanika, and Mahimā, who followed the lead of Mukula and Bhatta Näyaka. Of course Kuntaka could be labelled as a "pracchanna-dhvani-vădin", but Mahima was the greatest challanger whose
iration perhaps came from both Sri Sankuka and also Bhatta Nayaka who drafted his “Hrdaya-darpana" with "dhvani-dhvamsa” - demolition of dhvani-t being his sole target. Then we also come across such opponents as recorded in the Locana and the K.P. of Mammata, viz. the dīrgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra-vādin mimāmsakas, the laksanāvādins or bhaktivādins etc. We have taken care of these under vyañjanā-virodha, for their thrust was greater against vyañjanā, then against the implicit sense or 'pratīyamāna artha' as such. We will take care of pure dhvani virodha as recorded in the Dhv. I. later, in a separate chapter but for the present, as noted above, we proceed with the divisions and sub-divisions or types or varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani' proper.
Dhvani-prabheda : Actually this topic of the varieties of dhvani is absolutely congruent with the three-fold criticism-based classification of poetry into dhvani, gunībhūtavangya and citra, or in the words of Mammata, uttama, madhyama and avara.'
In the second udyota of the Dhv., the sub-divisions are enumerated from the point of view of 'vyangya' i.e. suggested sense, and in the third udyota there is enumeration of the types of dhvani from the point of view of 'vyañjaka' or suggester. We will calculate the basic divisions here with the help of first, the Locana and then we will compare Locana's scheme with that of Mammata and Viśvanātha and then of course Jagannātha. We will also mention other authors of repute in between. We have already noted that basically Ā. has given a threefold scheme of dhvani, gunibhūtavyangya and citra, with reference to the supreme importance of the suggested sense in dhvani, its lesser status as compared to the expressed sense as in gunībhūtavyangya and its absence or lack of any importance from the point of poetic charm in 'citra'. This classification of poetry is "criticism oriented”, as against the one based on consideration of external form as noted by us.
First, we will take up 'dhyani' (kāyya) for consideration.
Ā. informs us that in poetry there is what is called the 'implicit' or 'pratīyamāna' sense which is different from the explicit or conventional sense, i.e. 'vācya' artha.

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At Dhy. I. 4, he says -
“pratīyamānam punar anyad eva vastv asti vānīņu mahākavīnām, yat-tad-vibhaktávayavátiriktam
vibhāti lāvanyam ivánganāsu.” i.e. “But the implicit aspect is quite different from this. In the words of first-rate poets it shines supreme and towers above the beauty of the striking external constituents even as charm in ladies.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 7, ibid)
This implicit sense is three-fold such as bare idea (or matter), figures and sentiments etc., all implied by the inner power of the explicit : (vịtti, on Dhv. I. 4): "sa hyartho vācya-sāmarthyā”kṣiptam vastu-matram alamkārā rasā”dayaśca ity aneka-prabheda-prabhinno darśayisyate. sarveșu ca teșu prakāreșu tasya vācyād anyatvam.”
Now, after showing the importance of the implicit sense in poetry, Ā. attempts the classification of poetry which is three-fold such as dhvani, guņī-bhūta-vyangya and citra, as noted above. This classification has nothing to do with its external form, but is based on the consideration of the implicit sense being the principal source of charm or otherwise. In short, it is criticism based, so to say. All dhvanivādins beginning with Abhinavagupta and Mammața accept this three-fold classification, with Jagannātha bringing a slight variation by making it four-fold, beginning with 'uttamottama', as we will go to see later.
To begin with, dhvani-kāvya being vyangyártha-pradhāna has vyañjanā at its root. This vyañjanā is either based on abhidhā or lakṣaṇā. Thus dhvani, to begin with is two-fold, (i) abhidhāmülaka and laksaņāmülaka. The first is termed - vivaksitányapara-vācya-dhvani or suggestion with intended but further extending literal import, and (ii) a-vivakṣita-vācya or dhvani with unintended literal import or unintended primary sense. This is laksaņā-mula-dhvani and is taken up first as it has a limited scope.
Normally as abhidhã comes first, we would expect that dhvani based on abhidhā or primary sense should have been considered first. But all ālamkārikas beginning with Ā., followed by Mammata, and down to Viśvanātha, have treated laksaņāmūla-dhvani first as it has a very limited field. The abhidhāmāla or vivakṣitányaparavācya-dhvani has a very wide field. So on the analogy of "sūci

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA katāha-nyāya", the avivaksita-vācya-dhvani-is taken up first for consideration. Thus, observes Ā. (vștti, Dhv. I. 13) : "asti dhvaniḥ. sa ca asau avivakṣitavācyo vivakşitányapara-vācyaś ca iti dvividhah sāmānyena."
The term 'avivaksitavācya' is explained by the Locanakāra (on Dhv. I. 13) as follows:
sa ca iti - pañcadhā’pi dhvani-sabdárthe yena, yatra, yato, yasya, yasmai iti bahu-vrīhyarthā”śrayeņa yathócitam sāmānādhikaranyam suyojyam. vācyérthe tu dhvanau vācyaśabdena svā”tmā tena a-vivakṣitaḥ apradhānīkstaḥ svā”tmā yena ityavivakṣitavācyo vyañjakórthaḥ. evam vivakṣitányaparavācyépi.
yadi vā karmadhārayeņa arthapakṣe avivakṣitaś ca asau vācyaśca iti. vivakṣitányapararś că'sau vācyaś ca iti. tatrā'rthaḥ kadācid anupapadyamānatvā"dină nimittena a-vivaksito bhavati. kadācid upapadyamāna iti kṛtvā vivakṣita eva, vyangya-paryantām tu pratītim, sva-saubhāgya-mahimnā karoti. ata evār'tho'tra prādhānyena vyañjakaḥ, pūrvatra śabdah. nanu ca vivaksā cā’nyaparatvam ca iti viruddham. anyaparatvena eva vivakşaņāt ko virodhaḥ ? sāmānyena iti. vastvalamkāra-rasā”tmā hi tribhedo’pi dhvanir ubhābhyām eva ābhyām samgrhita iti bhāvaḥ nanu tannāma-prsthe
etannāmaniveśanasya kim phalam ? ucyate-anena hi nāmadvayena dhvananātmani · vyāpāre pūrva-prasiddhā'bhidhā - tātparya-laksaņā”tmaka-vyāpāra
tritayā’vagatárthapratīteḥ, pratipatsgatāyāḥ prayoktrabhiprā-yarūpāyāś ca vivakṣāyāḥ sahakāritvam uktam iti dhvani-svarūpam eva nāmabhyām eva projjīvitam.”
Locanakāra wants to explain that the term 'avivaksitavācya' can be understood by either resorting to the bahuvrīhi compound, or the karmadhāraya compound. From the point of view of five meanings of the term 'dhvani', we can accept the possibility of bahuvrihi in the sense of trtiyā, saptamī, pañcamī, sasthi and caturthi cases such as (i) that by which (= trtīyā) one's own soul is rendered redundant i.e. a-vivakṣita, i.e. vācya artha, (ii) that in (= saptami) which vācya is ignored, i.e. vyañjanā-vyāpāra, (iii) that by which vācya becomes redundant, i.e. the hetus of vyañjanā-vyāpāra such as vācya-samarthya, etc., (iv) that whose vācya is not intended i.e. vācya sabda (= șașthī) and (v) that for which (= caturthi) vācya is made un-intended, i.e. vyangyārtha.
Resorting to karmadhāraya, the term 'avivakṣita-vācya-dhvani', will mean, “that which is a-vivaksita i.e. not intended and also vācya i.e. expressed directly. Locana holds that the term 'vivakṣitányapara-vācya-dhvani' also can be explained in a

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987 similar fashion. The meaning of this term, taking karma-dhāraya, would mean, "that which is intended (vivaksita) eventhough being anya-paraka (or, subservient) to some other sense, and is also ‘vācya'.
While accepting vyañjanā, two situations arise with reference to the directly expressed (vācya) sense. The vācyártha not looking compatible with the context, becomes un-intended. Or, the vācyártha suits with the context, and hence the speaker does intend to convey the same by the word used in such a special way so that something very special creeps in that word, and this results in suggesting a fresh meaning. Out of these two apprehensions of the suggested sense, in the first the directly expressed sense, i.e. vācyártha is not intended i.e. it becomes unintended or a-vivaksita, and hence it is termed a-vivaksita-vācya-dhvani. In the second apprehension of the suggested sense, the vācyártha or directly expressed sense is intended - vivakṣita-along with the suggested sense. Hence, it is termed “vivakşitányapara-vācya-dhvani.” The illustrations cited by A. are, "suvarnapuspām prthivīm." etc. and, "śikharini kva nu nāma." etc., respectively. One noteworthy point is that eventhough, Ā. has talked of three-fold dhvani such as vastudhvani, etc., here only two divisions are underlined. Thus it is suggested by A., that the three-fold dhvani is fully covered up and contained in these two varieties. Actually, the three-fold scheme gives an idea of 'what' matter is suggested, while the two-fold scheme deals with 'how whatever is suggested. Thus the two classifications are made from different angles. In the two-fold scheme the threefold scheme is covered up. The intention behind this is that 'dhvani', which in itself is a 'vyāpāra' or function, has 'sabda' and 'artha' as 'kārana' or 'cause' at its root. In the 'vivakşitányapara-vācya-dhvani one ‘artha' or meaning suggests another 'artha' or meaning. Thus the ‘artha' becomes the suggester here. While on the otherhand in 'avivakṣitányapara-vācya-dhvani' the 'artha' is 'avivakṣita' i.e. not intended and hence primarily the sabda or word is said to be the suggester here. When a word is heard, we collect meaning through the formerly known powers of a word, viz. abhidhā or direct expression yielding the expressed or conventional sense, lakṣaṇā or indication yielding the indicated sense, lakṣyártha, and tātparya or purport. With this simultaneously the intention of the speaker, i.e. abhiprāya is also understood. For the realisation of this intention these two terms, viz. a-vivaksitavācya-dhvani, and vivakṣitánya-para-vācya-dhvani are used. Thus the form of dhvani is rendered clear.
We will now show in a tabular form the divisions and sub-divisions of dhvani, as explained by Abhinavagupta in Locana, and as envisaged by A. in the Dhv. The

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table can be presented as follows:
dvani
avivaksitavācya
vivakṣitánya-para-vācya (i.e. lakṣaṇā-mūla)
(i.e. abhidhāmūla) arthántara-samkramita atyanta-tiraskrtavācya
a-samlaksyakrama-vyangya-dhvani samlaksyakrama-dhvani
sabda-śaktimūla-dhvani
artha-śaktimüla-dhvani
svataḥ sambhavī; kavi-prauậhóktişiddha; kavi-nibaddha-vaktr-praudhókti-siddha; alamkāra < vastu < alamkāra < vastu < alamkāra < vastu <
vastu; alamkāra; vastu; alamkāra; vastu; alamkāra
padagata vākyagata + 3 varieties of asamlaksyakrama i.e. varņa, samghatanā and prabandha (gata) = 35 śuddha-bhedāḥ
Thus following the explanation of the Loçanakāra, i.e. Abhinavagupta, Ā. has enumerated 35 basic varieties of dhvani. Taking into consideration samkara i.e. intermingling and samsrsti i.e. collocation etc. the total will tend to grow in a manifold way. We will go to see later how Mammața and Viśvanātha enumerate these varieties.
For the present we may again note the fact that (i) laksaņāmūla and (ii) abhidhāmüla are two basic varieties of dhvani and A. has given two basic subdivisions of these two. Thus Dhv. II. 1 explains :
"evam avivaksitavācya-vivakṣitánya-paravācyatvena dhvanir dvi-prakārah prakāśitaḥ. tatra a-vivaksita-vācyasya prabheda-pratipādanāya idam ucyate -
arthántare samkramitam atyantam vā tiraskrtam, a-vivaksita-vācyasya
dhvaner vācyam dvidha matam. (Dhv. II. 1) "So far, two varieties of suggestion, viz. "that with un-intended literal import", and "that with intended but further-extending literal import" have been mentioned. Now the sub-varieties of the first are set forth in what follows :" (Trans. K. Kris.)

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i.e. -
“Merged in the other meaning" and "completely lost", these are the two kinds of the expressed in, “suggestion with un-intended literal import.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 39, ibid) (Dhv. II. 1)
These two sub-varieties being laksanā-mülaka, i.e. based on indication, the mukhyártha-bādha or non-acceptance of the primary sense is established here as a precondition. So, where in the apprehension of the suggested sense, laksyártha is taken into account and vācyártha becomes un-intended, i.e. it is found to be absolutely incongrous with the context, or is not intended even if found congruous with the context and therefore merges into another sense, - at both these places avivakṣita-vācya-dhvani is said to be there. Locana (on Dhv. II. 1) explains these two sub-varieties as follows: (In the term “arthántarasamkramita) - "samkramitam iti ņicā, vyañjanā-vyāpāre yaḥ sahakārivargas tasya’yam prabhāva ity uktam, tiraskrta-śabdena ca. yena vācyena a-vivakṣitena satā avivaksitavācyo dhvanir vyapadiśyate tad vācyam dvidhā iti sambandhah. yórthah upapadyamānópi tāvatā eva anupayogāt dharmántara-samvalanayā'nyatām iva gato laksyamāņó nugatadharmi sūtra-nyāyena aste, sa rūpåntara-pariņata uktaḥ. yas tvanupapadyamāna upāyatāmātreņa arthántara-pratipattim krtvā. palāyata iva, sa tirskrta iti.
nanu vyangyā”tmano yadā dhvaner bhedo nirūpyate, tadā vācyasya 'dvidhā' iti bhedakathanam na sangatam ity āśankya āha - "tathāvidhābhyām ca” iti. caḥ yasmād arthe. vyañjaka-vaicitryād hi yuktam vyangya-vaicitryam iti bhāvaḥ vyañjake tvarthe yadi dhvani-sabdas tadā na kaścid dosa iti - bhāvaḥ.
In the term, "arthántara-samkramita”, ‘ņic' affix is seen in “samkramita”. (This means it is not in the sense of “śuddha-kriyā-samkrānta") It is here in the sense of “prerana". The idea is that meaning owing to its own speciality does not proceed or pass (samkrānta) of its own, by being a companion or associate of vyañjanā-function or suggestivity it passes into the suggested se
-function or suggestivity it passes into the suggested sense with the help of suggestive power. The - kta-suffix in "tiraskrta" also carries the same meaning. Thus the factors that associate with the suggester (or vyañjaka) become the cause in completely discarding the primary or conventional sense. The original kārikā has to be understood as follows : That vācya or primary sense, when it becomes un-intended, dhvani is also said to be a-vivaksita-vācya, and this un-inteded vācya is two-fold - (i) one, where the meaning is not in

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA conformity with the context; is not perfect in itself, and where it merges with other meanings for its complete sense and is apprehended as some other sense; and all these other qualities (which tend to give perfection) are suggested. All these attributes or qualities (i.e. dharmas), pass over in one substratum (i.e. dharmin) in a way such as different flowers are stringed in a single string or sūtra. This first variety of a-vivakṣita-vācya-dhvani is said to be arthántarasamkramita i.e. 'merged in other meaning'. The illustration is the verse, viz., "snigdha-śyāmala-kānti.” etc.
(ii) The second is the a-vivakṣita-vācya-dhvani, in which the expressed primary sense looks absolutely un-intended or out of context. The primary sense is absolutely non-congruent and thus gives rise to this second variety of dhvani. Here the primary sense becomes only instrumental (i.e. upāyabhūta) in the apprehension of the indicated sense i.e. 'laksyártha'. After this apprehension of the indicated sense, the primary sense is totally wiped out. Thus, as it is completely discarded, the dhvani (based on such a vācya) is said to be “atyanta-tiraskrta-vācya-dhvani”. The illustration is, “ravi-samkrānta-saubhāgya." etc.
With Dhv. II. 2. Ā. starts explaining the divisions and sub-divisions of the second variety of dhvani i.e. dhvani based on abhidhā or power of primary denotation. Ā. suggests that abhidhā-mūla-dhvani is two-fold, to begin with, i.e. (i) a-samlaksyakrama-dhvani and (ii) samlaksyakrama-dhvani. Ā. observes :
"a-samlaksya-kramódyotaḥ krameņa dyotitaḥ paraḥ, vivakṣitábhidheyasya
dhvaner ātmā dvidhā mataḥ.” (Dhv. II. 2) "The nature of suggestion “with inteded literal import”, is also two-fold : (i) "of discernible sequentiality', and (ii) "of undiscernible sequentiality." - (Trans. K.Kris. p. 41, ibid)
These two types depend on the position where the sequence between the primary expressed sense and the suggested sense, is noticieable or not. Ā. observes : “mukhyatayā prakāśamāno vyangyórtho dhvanerātmā. sa ca vācyárthápekṣayā kaścid alaksya-kramatayā tulyam prakāśate, kaścit kramena iti dvidhā mataḥ." "The nature of suggestion is the implied sense which is communicated prominently. A variety of it is grasped simultaneously with the expressed, since the sequentiality existing between the two is not discernible. Another variety of the same comes

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991 about when the sequentiality is discernible.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 41, ibid) The first variety is ‘a-samlaksyakrama dhvani' and the second variety is termed, 'samlaksyakrama-dhvani'.
At the root of both these varieties, lies abhidhā, i.e. the power of direct expression. There is neither any 'bādha' or contradiction of meaning, nor any disregard (tiraskāra) of vācyártha, or its merging (samkramana). Thus the literal sense is neither 'completely lost nor ‘merged in the other meaning. So, here, in both these varieties vyañjanā or suggestion is based on abhidhā i.e. the power of expression.
The two varieties of abhidhā-mūla or 'vivakṣitányaparavācya' are explained in the Locana (on Dhv. II. 2) by resorting to the bahuvrīhi compound in the term, "asamlaksya kramódyota" and it observes that, "one whose function is such-where the sequence is not clearly noticed is said to be 'a-samlaksyakrama' : "samyan na laksayitum śakyah kramah yasya, tādrśah udyotana-vyāpārósya iti bahuvrīhih." The other, viz. "kramena dyotitah samlaksyakramah" is clear in itself.
Continuing the discussion on a-samlaksya-krama-dhvani, Ā. observes at Dhv. II. 3 -tatra,
“rasa-bhāva-tadābhāsatat-praśānty adir akramah, dhvaner ātmā’ngibhāvena
bhāsamāno vyavasthitaḥ.” "Sentiment, emotion, the semblance of sentiment, or mood and their (rise and) cessation etc., are all of “undiscerned sequentiality". It is decided that when we have prominent presence of this variety, we are having the very soul of suggestion.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 41, ibid)
Such categories as sentiment and the like are apprehended as it were simultaneously with the expressed literal sense. And when they are apprehended as principal (source of charm) we arrive at the very soul of suggestion. Ā. observes : rasa"dir artho hi saha iva vācyena avabhāsate. sa cangitvena avabhāsamano dhvaner ātmā. (vrtti. on Dhv. II. 3)
This variety of rasā"di-dhvani is imagined to be bereft of any sequentiality. This does not mean that there is no sequence whatsoever between the apprehension of determinants, consequents and ancillary feelings, i.e. the vibhāvā"dis and the actual apprehension of 'rasā"di' i.e. sentiments, emotions etc. - i.e. in short the emotive stuff. But the point is that the sequence being absolutely minute is not noticed at

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA all, i.e. it remains a-samlaksya. On the other hand the two viz. vastu-dhvani i.e. suggestion of idea or matter, and alamkāra-dhvani i.e. suggestion of a figure have
clearly marked sequence - samlaksya-krama between the first apprehension of the primary sense and the next apprehension of the suggested sense. Thus these two are termed 'samlaksya-krama-dhvani' varieties. But A. and Abhinavagupta do accept the possibility of sequence even in this rasā"di-dhvani which is normally said to be without sequence. When such 'samlaksya-kramatva' of rasā”di-dhvani is accepted it is included in the variety called the "artha-śakty-udbhavasamlaksyakrama dhvani.”
As a matter of principle, Ā. accepts three-fold dhvani, but in reality he attaches supreme importance only to the variety called 'rasa-dhvani' i.e. "rasā"didhvani". Only to underline the fact of rasa"di-dhvani as the "soul", Ā. seems to accept the ultimate merging of the other two varieties i.e. vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani in this supreme dhvani called rasa-dhvani. We have noticed earlier how Locana on Dhv. I. 4 explains that the implicit sense is basically twofold viz. laukika or one which is also met with in ordinary parlance, and 'alaukika' or that which is never met with in ordinary parlance but is met with only in poetry i.e. kāvya-vyāpāraika-gocaraḥ, or in the field of art in general, we may add. This 'laukika' form is represented by vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani. We will go to see later that actually Ā. has taken care of the intellectual or rational and also volitional aspect of the total personality of the art-enjoyer or cultivated reader here, when he accepts this variety of vastu-dhvani. By alamkāra-dhvani he accepts the poet's immense capacity to experiment in poetic expression and not using figures of speech only. Thus it consumes the whole of practiced and unpracticed modes of poetic expression, i.e. 'vyañjaka-vaividhya' in literature. Thus we feel that by vastu-dhvani and alamkāradhvani Ā. reaches out to cover the most modern literary art-forms ever practiced to-day or that will ever be practiced in near or distant future by good poets (i.e. mahākavi). The so called abstract poetry, or absurdism seems to have its place in this fool-proof catholic scheme of Anandavardhana and thus this Indian theory of art, i.e. the theory of rasa-experience covers the total personality of the enjover of cultivated taste. By total we mean the emotive, intellectual and volitional aspects of his personality taken together. We will discuss this catholicity of rasa-experience in a greater measure later. But for the present, the first two i.e. vastu-dhvani and alamkāredhvani, the samlaksya-krama types also, ultimately merge into rasa-dhvani in Ā.'s opinion and here rasa-dhvani is to be taken not as enjoyment of sentimental

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stuff only but as the genuine aesthetic rapture which results from the enjoyment of any peace of art, here of course, literary art.
In reality this 'rasa-experience' or aesthetic rapture is the real 'soul' of poetry according to both A. and Abhinavagupta. A.'s preference in taking only 'rasadhvani' as the real soul of poetry is self-evident from his general treatment throughout the Dhv. Abhinavagupta does not invent it, nor does he superimpose his ideas on A.'s finding. No; he, i.e. the Locanakara is true to his words when he says in the beginning of his Locana that he is simply "echoing" and making clear the original ideas of A. as read in the "kāvyāloka" -
"yad kiñcid apy anuraṇan
sphuṭayāmi kāvyā"lokam..." -
A. himself has noted that eventhough the other varieties of pratīyamāna-artha or implicit sense are observed, the illustration cited is that of rasa"di-dhvani, for that alone is principal. He observes (vṛtti, on Dhv. I. 5): "pratīyamānasya ca anyabheda-darśanépi rasa-bhāva-mukhena eva upalakṣaṇam; prādhānyāt." Locana on this observes : “tena rasa eva vastutaḥ ātmā. vastv-alamkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyād utkrstau tau ity abhiprāyena, "dhvanih kāvyasya ātmā” iti sāmānyena uktam."
993
A. is of the opinion that in figures such as 'samāsokti' or 'condensed metaphor' etc. we do have an element of implicit or suggested sense. But as this implicit element is not marked as principal, such figures illustrate only the second variety of poetry such as the 'guṇībhūta-vyangya' or poetry with subordinated suggested sense. Of course Abhinavagupta accepts the position of 'rasa' even in such cases only at the ultimate level of consideration. Even the variety called vastu-dhvani also is categorised in form of 'vibhāvā"di's i.e. determinants etc. and ultimately merge in rasă"di-dhvani. This rasa-realisation through vibhāvā"di-sāmagrī was discussed by Bharata and explained later by ācāryas such as Lollata and the like in their own way. A. does not discuss here this process of rasa-niṣpatti i.e. the rasa-nispattiprakriyā in his Dhv. This of course speaks volumes of A.'s great self-control. He simply takes note of the fact that only rasā"di-dhvani is the principal fact in a dhvani-kavya. In fact this 'rasa' is the principal category lebelled as the 'soul' of poetry, but at times its ingredients such as bhāva, or different aesthetic categories of bhava or feelings, such as bhavodaya, bhāva-samdhi etc. also, when principally suggested in their states of exhuberance, result into bhava-dhvani etc. These possibilities are covered up by "adi" in "rasa"di"-dhvani.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA We may have to note one more point here. The vibhāvas and anu-bhāvas are necessarily sva-sabda-vācya i.e. expressed directly by their own names. Hence, there is no possibility of vibhāva-dhvani and anubhāva-dhvani. If at all they are suggested they are included in vastu-dhvani or the suggestion of ideas or matter. Again the carvanā i.e. aesthetic chewing or relish of vibhāvas and anubhāvas results in a mental feeling or citta-vștti and its relish is also of the form of 'rasa' or 'bhāva'.
Locana (on Dhv. II. 3) further notes that bhāva-dhvani etc. are also of the form of the dripping fluid (nisyanda) of rasa-dhvani. But they are named separately just to underline the special feature causing the same : "yady api ca rasena eva sarvam jīvati kāvyam, tathā'pi tasya rasasya eka-ghana-camatkārā”tmanópi kutaś cid amśāt prayojakībhūtād adhikósau camatkāro bhavati. tatra yadā kaścid udriktāvasthām pratipanno vyabhicārī camatkārátiśaya-prayojako bhavati, tadā bhāva-dhvaniḥ, yathā, “tisthet kopavaśāt.” etc.
After explaining the three-fold implicit sense, Ā. explains that all these three are different from the directly expressed primary sense i.e. vācyártha. keeping aside the first two types of vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani, the third type viz. rasā"di-dhvani is seen to shine forth as a result of the latent power in the expressed sense, i.e. it is necessarily implicit. It never becomes an object of direct verbal denotation and hence it is decidedly distinct from the expressed. That this variety called the rasā"di-dhvani is necessarily distinct from "rasā"di alamkāra" also, will be discussed later.
After thus explaining the first variety of vivaksitányapara-vācya-dhvani, viz a-samlakṣyakrama, Ā. turns his attention to the second variety viz. samlaksyakrama, i.e. one in which the sequentiality between the expressed sense or vācyártha and the implicit-suggested sense or vyangyártha is clearly discernible. The Dhv. II. 20, reads as :
"krameņa pratibhāty ātmā yósya'nusvāna-sannibhah, śabdártha-sakti-mūlatvāt
sópi dvedhā vyavasthitaḥ.” (Dhv. II. 20) "The other element of this suggestion manifests itself in the same way as resonance and the temporal sequentiality of the two meanings will be discernible. It is also two-fold - 'that which is based on the power of word', and 'that which is based on the power of sense.' (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 71, ibid)

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995 Ā. observes in his vṛtti thereon : "asya vivakşitányapara-vācyasya dhvaneh samlaksya-kramavyangyatvá’nu-ranana-prakhyo ya ātmā sópi śabda-śakti-mūlórthaśakti-mūlaś ca iti dvi-prakāraḥ.”
"This suggestion 'with intended but further extending literal import contains an element which is similar to resonance in so far as it is suggested in such a way that one can notice temporal sequentiality (between the expressed and the suggested senses). It is further subdivided into, that which is based on the power of the word', and, 'that which is based on the power of sense.' (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 71, ibid)
Ā. has also attempted to explain how śabda-sakti-mūla-dhvani has a different scope from that of ślesa or paronomasia - or double entendre'. He observes that (Dhv. II. 21)
"ākṣipta evā’lamkāraḥ śabda-śaktyā prakāśate yasmin, anuktaḥ śabdena
śabda-śakty udbhavo hi sah.” "Only that instance, wherein is present a figure that is not expressed directly by any word but conveyed solely by the suggestive power of the word itself, should be regarded as suggestion based on the power of word.”
Ā. further clarifies in his vrtti on Dhv. II. 21, that, "yasmād alamkāro, na vastumātram, yasmin kavye sabda-sakryā prakās'ate sa sabda-śakty-udbhavo dhvanir asmākam vivaksitaḥ. vastudvaye ca sabda-śaktyā prakāśamāne śleşah.” “For only a figure which is conveyed by the power of the word is intended by us to form an instance of suggestion based on the power of the word, and not all ideas so conveyed are instances of suggestion. If two ideas are manifest (simultaneously) as a result of the power of the word, we have only an instance of 'double entendre'. (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 73, ibid)
It may be noted that here the term, 'śabda-śaktyä' does not stand for ‘abhidhayā' or 'by the expressed power of the word'. Normally we take abhidhā, laksaņā and vyañjana as sabda-saktis. But here it is to be understood as "sabda-eva-saktih" or 'sabda-rūpā saktih”, i.e. where 'word' itself is the power, and not "word's power”, or “power of the word”.
After explaining that śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani occurs when some other alamkāra is suggested, Ā. explains that though Bhatta Udbhata has stated that ślesa occurs also when some other alamkāra is understood, but here, i.e. in A.'s

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA explanation only “āksipta” or implied figure of speech is taken as dhvani, while Udbhata's "alamkārā'ntara" is vācya or expressed directly. So, the outcome of this discussion is that, in places where, through 'sabda-śakti', another ‘vācya alamkāra' is collected, it may be taken as 'ślesa' following Udbhasa. But when this 'alamkārántara' which is collected with the help of śabda-śakti, is only at the implicit or suggested level, then it becomes the province of sabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani in the opinion of Ā. He also adds that if, by chance, this implicit figure, also becomes explicit, i.e. if it is directly expressed through any other device later, then it looses its status of dhvani and there we do not mention it as "śabda-śakti-mūladhvani", but becomes only an object of such usage as 'vakrokti', etc. which is a variety of a directly expressed alamkāra. Ā. observes (vștti, on Dhv. II. 21) : “tad ayam arthah, yatra sabda-śaktyā sākṣād alamkārántaram vācyam sat pratibhāsate, sa sarvah slesa-visayah. yatra tu sabda-śaktyā samarthyā”ksiptam vyangyam eva alamkārāntaram prakāśate sa dhvaner visayah." and A. further observes : sa ca ākṣipto'lamkārah yatra punaḥ śabdántareņa abhihita-svarūpaḥ tatra na sabdaśakty-udbhavánuranana-rūpa-vyangya-dhvani-vyavahāraḥ. tatra vakroktyadivācyálamkāra-vyavahāra eva.”
Ā. further observes : “yatra tu sāmarthyā”kşiptam sad alamkārántaram śabdaśaktyā prakāśatė sa sarva eva dhvanervişayah.” yathā, "atrántare kusumasamayayugam." etc. “But passages where another figure is conveyed only by the suggestive power of the word deserve to be regarded only as instances of suggestion. As for instance : "In the meanwhile appeared....” etc. (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 79, ibid). In this instance drawn from Bāna, describing the summer season (i.e. grīşma-varnana), simile (i.e. upamā alamkāra) with ‘mahākāla' i.e. Lord Siva, is suggested. Another illustration runs as, "unnatah prollasad dhārah." etc. Third one is, "dattā”nandāḥ prajānām...” etc.
A. observes in the vrtti that - "esu udāharanesu sabda-śaktyā prakāśamāne sati, aprākaranike arthántare vākyasya a-sambaddhárthábhidhāyitvam mā prasānksīd ity aprākaranika-prākarankayor arthayor, upamānópameyabhāvah kalpayitavyaḥ, sāmarthyād, ity arthā”kşiptóyam śleşo na śabdopā”rūdha iti vibhinna eva śleşād anusvānopama-vyangyasya dhvaner vișayah."
"In all these examples, an extra meaning is conveyed by the power of the word and in order that two meanings might not appear as entirely disconnected, we will have to postulate the relation of the standard of comparision and the object compared as existing between the two, since there is justification also for doing so.

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A
Thus the double entendre we see here is not grounded on words only as it is the case when it happens to be an expressed figure. But it is a figure suggested by the special suggestive power of the word. Thus the examples of double entendre and resonance like suggestion are entirely different from one another.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 79, ibid)
A. also suggests that figures other than upamā/simile are also possible in this variety of dhvani. : "anye'pi ca alamkārāh sabda-sakti-mūlánusvāna-rupavyangye dhvanau sambhavanti eva.” He illustrates the cases of virodha (i.e. paradox), vyatireka etc. and the like. He leaves it to the men of taste to find out such illustrations, which for want of space he avoids : "evam anye'pi śabda-śakti-mūlánusvāna-rūpa-vyangya-dhvani-prakārāḥ santi, te sahrdayair svayam anusartavyāḥ. iha tu grantha-vistara-bhayān na prapancaḥ krtah.” (vrtti, Dhv. II. 21)
We may take note of some points here :
(i) Ā. accepts only 'suggested another figure' i.e. vyangya-alamkārántara', as object of sabda-sakti-mula-dhvani. He never thinks about covering the cases of 'vastu-dhvani' i.e. suggestion of ideas or matter under its scope. We know that Mammata accepts this possibility. But A. is firm on this point as he uses the words - "yasmād alamkāro, na vastu-mātram, yasmin kāvye sabda-śaktyā prakāśate saśabda-śakty-udbhavo dhvanir ity asmākam vivaksitah." Ā. rarely uses such an expression. In case of 'rasā"di' alamkāra also, he uses such terms as "iti me matih." This means he rejects the case of vastu-dhvani here.
(ii) With reference to the above, Ā. does not bring in here, as is done by other ālamkārikas, the discussion concerning how the non-contextual sense is collected in case of a word having multiple sense, i.e. whether it is through the agency of vyañjanā or abhidhā. This discussion is however found in Locana and the debate is carried on till Appayya and Jagannātha, who opt for abhidhā here. We have covered this discussion in an earlier chapter and thus it need not detain us here.
(iii) In the illustration cited by Ā., viz. "atrántare kusuma-samaya...” etc., it so happens that it is a case where suppressing the directly expressed sense, the 'yaugika' artha is principally suggested. The other two illustrations are however not so clear on this point. This point is not, of course, directly discussed by Ā., but at Dhv. II. 31, Ā. observes that now that the varieties of dhvani are explained, the following is said in order to distinguish between suggestion and its semblance : (vștti, preceding Dhv. II. 31) : "evam dhvaneh prabhedān pratipādya tad ābhāsa

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA vivekam kartum ucyate”. - Under Dhv. II. 31, Ā. observes that, “yatra tu prakaranā"di-pratipattyā nirdhāritaviśeso vācyórthaḥ punaḥ pratīyamānangatvena eva avabhāsate, sosyaiva anuranana-rūpa-vyangyasya dhvaner mārgah.” - i.e. “But on the other hand, resonance-like suggestion is present in instances, where, even after determining all the implications of the expressed sense in view of context and so forth, we find that the expressed appears only as subsidiary to the suggested.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 103, ibid).
Abhinavagupta also observes that with the help of 'prakarana' and the rest, i.e. context in general, the primary expressed sense is fixed. But in the given context in the Dhv., and the illustrations cited, the problem of the apprehension of a sense other than the primary, in case of a word having multiple sense, is not discussed here. Looking carefully at the discussion concerning the example viz. "mahākälah...", where the yaugika-artha throws aside the conventional sense and comes to the fore, the meaning is collected through suggestive power, i.e. sabdaśakti-müla-vyañjanā. We have seen earlier how Mammata, Appayya and Jagannātha have discussed this topic in a thorough way.
Abhinavagupta also accepts the suggested another figure of speech (alamkārántara) as the field for śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani. This is in conformity with Ā.'s view.
Ā. then picks up what is termed artha-śakti-mūla-dhvani at Dhv. II. 22. He observes :
“artha-śakty-udbhavas tv-anyaḥ yatrárthaḥ samprakāśate yas tātparyeņa vastv anyad
vyanakry uktim vinā svatah.” (Dhv. II. 22) "The other variety of suggestion is based upon the power of sense and it is instanced in places where the second meaning is conveyed only by way of implication by the first meaning and not by the expressed words at all.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 83, ibid).
Ā. adds in the vṛtti, "yatrárthaḥ sva-sāmarthyād arthántaram abhivyanakti, śabda-vyāpāram vinaiva, sórtha-śaktyudbhavo nāma anusvānópama-vyangyo dhvanih.”
"That instance where one meaning gives rise to another through its own power of implication and not through the denotative power of words, becomes an

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example of suggestion based upon the power of meaning and similar to resonance." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 83, ibid). The illustration cited is "evamvadini devarṣau." etc.
It is two-fold, viz. (i) svataḥ-sambhavi and (ii) prauḍhokti-siddha. Dhv. II. 24 observes:
"prauḍhoktimātra-niṣpannaśarīraḥ, sambhavi svataḥ,
arthópi dvividho jñeyaḥ
vastuno'nyasya dipakaḥ.”
artha-śaktyudbhavā’nuraṇana-rūpa-vyangye dhvanau yo vyañjako'rtha uktas tasya'pi dvau prakārau - kaveḥ kavi-nibaddhasya vā vaktuḥ prauḍhokti-mātranispanna-śarīra ekaḥ svatas sambhavi ca dvitīyaḥ."
"The sense which suggests another sense is also two-fold: (1) Existing only in ornate expression and (2) Naturally existing." (Dhv. II. 24)
"The sense which has been pointed out as the suggester of a second sense in suggestion (of the form of resonance based upon the power of sense) is also of two kinds. The first is that whose existence is real only in the ornate expression either of a poet himself or of a character created by the poet. The second exists naturally." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 87, 89, ibid)
We will go to see that Hemacandra and some others do not take these two as separate varieties. All these three suggesters could be of the form of vastu or idea or alamkara i.e. a figurative expression. The vyangya which is suggested also could be likewise two-fold. Thus in all twelve varieties are possible in artha-śaktyudbhava-dhvani.
At Dhv. III. 1, A. observes that,
"evam vyangya-mukhena eva dhvaneh pradarśite sa-prabhede svarūpe, punar vyañjaka-mukhena etat prakāśyate :
"a-vivakṣita-vācyasya pada-vākya-prakāśatā,

-
tad anyasya anuraṇana
rupa-vyangyasya ca dvaneḥ."
"So far the nature and varieties of suggestion have been pointed out in detail from the stand-point of the suggested. Now the same shall be set forth from the standpoint of the suggester.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Both the varieties of suggestion with un-intended literal import and resonancelike suggestion are suggested by individual words and by whole sentences." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 107). Thus the 17 varieties of dhvani (= 2, laksaņāmülaka +1 rasā"didhvani +2 sabdaśaktimülaka +12 arthaśaktimülaka) are both pada-gata and vākya-gata. Thus in all 34 varieties are available. Though 'dhvani' has been defined as 'kāvya-višesa', it can also be said to be 'pada-prakāsya', because in the dhvani-kāvya which is of the form of a beautiful sentence, we can further distinguish the beauty of an individual pada or word also. In his vrtti on Dhv. III. 1. Ā. further observes to this effect :
“nanu kāvya-viseso dhvanir ity uktam, tat katham tasya pada-prakāśatā ? kävya-viśeso hi viśistártha-pratipatti-hetuh sabda-sandarbhaviśesah. tad bhāvas pada-prakāśatve na upapadyate. padānām smārakatvena a-vācakatvāt.
ucyate-syād eșa dosah yadi vācakatvam prayojakam dhvani-vyavahāre syāt. na tv evam; tasya vyañjakarvena vyavasthānāt. kiñ ca, kāvyānām śarīriņām iva samsthāna-viśesa-vacchinna-samudāya-sādhyā’pi cărutva-pratītir anvaya-vyatirekābhyām bhāgeșu kalpyata iti padānām api vyañjaka-mukhena vyavasthito dhvanivyavahāro na virodhi.
anistasya śrutir yad vad āpādayati duşțatām, śruti-dustā"dişu vyaktam tad-vad ista-śrutir guņam. padānām smārakatvépi pada-mātrávabhāsinaḥ, tena dhvaneh prabhedeșu sarveșy eva asti ramyatā. vicchitti-sobhinaikena bhūsaņena iva kāmini pada-dyotyena sukaver dhvaninā bhāti bhārati.
iti parikara-ślokāḥ." (vrtti, on Dhv. III. 1) "One might raise the following objection at this juncture : Suggestion has been defined earlier as a species of poetry.' How can such a species be suggested by a word ? A species of poetry can mean only that composition of words which enables

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1001 one to understand a specific meaning. This fact will be inapplicable to it when it is held that it is suggested by a word, for words are only reminders of such a suggested meaning and not at all denoters.
Here is our answer to the objection : the alleged defect would have tainted our assertion if it were true that denotation was the criterion for deciding the existence of suggestion. But it is not true. It has already been established that suggestiveness alone is the criterion in question. In life also, we often speak of the presence or absence of beauty in the individual limbs of persons though in fact it is only the combined beauty of all the graceful and symmeterical limbs that can really be present or absent in a person's body as a whole. In the same way, there is no contradiction involved in one's regarding the individual words also as suggesters of beauty which is really occasioned by the combination of different words and in referring to them by the word suggestion. These ideas are summed up in the following aphorisms :
1. Just as reminiscence of something undesired clearly becomes a blemish in defects like "Indelicacy", so also the reminiscence of something desired should be regarded as an excellence.
2. Though words are only reminders, there is certainly charm thereform, in all the varieties of suggestion that manifests itself through the individual words.
3. Just like a damsel who appears charming by just a single ornament full of beauty, so also the work of a good poet will appear to advantage when adorned by suggestion even in one word." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 113, 115, ibid)
In Dhv. III. 2 it is explained that suggestion with sequentiality not noticed, will flash forth in letter, word, etc., sentence, composition and finally the work as a whole. Dhv. III. 2 - reads as -
“yas tv alaksya-krama-vyangyo dhvanir varņa-padā”dişu, vākye, samghatanāyām ca
sa prabandhe’pi dīpyate." Thus in all thirty-five varieties of dhvani are enumerated.
Locana on III. 43 observes that along with these thirty-five basic types of dhvani, and the same number of varieties of gunībhūta-vyangya, and also taking all alamkāras together in account, we arrive at 71 types. When we consider the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'samkara' and 'samsrsti', we arrive at 71 x 4 = 284, and these when multiplied by 35, we get 7420 types. Actually the figure comes to 9940. Again, it is not correct to count the same number of varieties for the gunībhūta-vyangya also, for following Dhv. II. 29, the nine varieties that we arrive at of alamkāra-vyangya through vastu, cannot be taken as sub-varieties of guṇī-bhūta-vyangya, for, according to A., where alamkāra is suggested through 'vastu', we necessarily have varieties of dhvani only and not that of gunī-bhūta-vyangya - "dhruvam dhvanyangatā” are Ā.'s words. Dhv. III. 43 reads as :
"sa-guni-bhūta-vyangyaiḥ sálankāraiḥ saha-prabhedaiḥ svaiḥ, samkara-samsrstibhyām
punar apy udyotate bahudhā.” tasya ca dhvaneh sva-prabhedaiḥ guṇībhūta-vyangyena vācyálamkāraiśca samkara-samsșsți-vyavasthāyām kriyamāņāyām bahuprabhedatā laksye drśyate. tathā hi, sva-prabheda-samkīrṇaḥ sva-prabheda-samsrstaḥ, guņi-bhūta-vyangyasamkīrṇaḥ, guņībhūta-vyangya-samspstaḥ, vācyálamkārántara-samkīrṇaḥ, vācyalamkārântara-samspstah, samsrstálamkāra-samkīrauh, samsrstálamkārasamsșstaḥ, ca iti bahudhā dhvaniḥ prakāśate."
"It shines in diverse ways with its several varieties of subordinated suggestion, figures, its own-sub-varieties, their intermingling and collocation.” (Dhv. III. 43)
(vrtti.) - If one should take into account the permutations and combinations of the different types of dhvani itself, and the varieties of subordinated suggestion and figures of sense, their resulting number would be many. Thus to name some of the major manifestation of dhvani - (i) merged with its own varieties, (ii) co-existing with its own varieties, (iii) merged with subordinated suggestion (iv) co-existing with subordinated suggestion, (v) merged with other figures of sense, (vi)coexisting with other figures (vii) merged with other co-existing figures (viii) coexisting with other mutually co-existing figures.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 253, ibid)
Read also Locana, on Dhv. II. 31 : “avivakṣita-vācyo vivakṣitányaparavācyaś ca iti dvau mūla-bhedau. ādyasya dvau bhedau, atyanta-tiraskệta-vācyaḥ arthántarasamkramitavācyaś ca. dvitīyasya dvau bhedau, alaksyakramaḥ anuranana-rūpaś ca. prathamónanta-bhedaḥ, dvitīyo dvividhaḥ, śabda-śaktimūlah artha-saktimülas ca. paścimas trividhaḥ, kavipraudhokti-krta-śarīraḥ, kavi-nibaddha-vaktr-praudhokti

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kṛta-śarīraḥ, svataḥ sambhavi ca. te ca pratyekam vyangya-vyañjakayor uktabheda-nayena caturdhā iti dvādaśa-vidhaḥ artha-śakti-mūlaḥ, ādyās' catvāro bhedā iti ṣoḍaśa mukhya-bhedāḥ. te ca pada-vākya-prakāśakatvena pratyekam dvividhā vakṣyante. alakṣya-kramasya tu varṇa-pada-vākya-samghaṭanā-prabandhaprakāśyatvena pañca-trimśad bhedāḥ."
Read also Locana on Dhv. III. 43: "evam śloka-dvayena samgrahártham abhidhāya bahuprakāratva-pradarśikām pathati "sa guņi". iti. saha gunībhūtavyangyena sahálamkārair ye vartante sve dhvaneḥ prabhedās taiḥ samkīrṇatayā samśṛṣṭyā vā ananta-prakāro dhvanir iti tātparyam. bahuprakāratām darśayati - "tathā hi" iti. svabhedair guṇībhūta-vyangyena alamkāraiḥ prakāśyate iti trayo bhedāḥ. tatra'pi pratyekam samkarena samsṛstyā ca iti ṣat. samkarasyā'pi trayaḥ prakārāḥ anugrahyánugrāhaka-bhāvena, samdehā"spadatvena, ekapadánupraveśena iti dvādaśa bhedāḥ. pūrvam ca ye pañca-trimśad bhedāḥ uktāḥ te guṇībhūta-vyangyasya'pi mantavyaḥ. svaprabhedās tāvanto'lamkāra iti eka-saptatiḥ. tatra samkara-trayena samsṛṣṭya ca gunane dve sate caturaśīty adhike. tāvatā pañca-trimśato mukhya-bhedānām gunane sapta-sahasrāṇī catvāri śatāni vimśaty adhikāni (= 7420) bhavanti. alamkārāṇām ānantyāt tu asamkhyatvam."
In due course, we will go to see further how Mammața and Viśvanatha count the varieties.
We will now go to examine how A. distinguishes rasā”di-dhvani from rasvad ādi alamkāra, and also upamā”di alamkāra. Ā. has carefully distinguished between the nature and scope of rasa"di-dhvani on one hand and the same of rasavad ādi alamkāra, and also upamā"di (vācya) alamkāra on the other hand.
Under Dhv. II. 2 A. enumerates the two varieties of vivakṣitánya-para-vacyadhvani. They are a-samlakṣya-krama-dhvani and samlakṣya-krama-dhvani. Under Dhv. II. 3 A. suggests different varieties that are subsumed under asamlakṣyakrama-rasă"di-dhvani. They are rasa, bhāva, rasă"bhāsa, bhāvā"bhāsa, bhāvaśānti, bhāvódaya, bhāva-śabalatā, etc. They are all placed under rasa"di dhvani.
Now the question that arises is that what exactly is the difference (in scope and nature) between this rasa"di-dhvani, and the 'rasavad ādi' alamkāras as imagined by the ancients. If the concept of rasavad ādi alamkāras as designed by the purvaācāryas is not acceptable to A., then what new concept concerning these has Ā. evolved, and also how both these, i.e. rasă"di-dhvani and rasavad ādi alamkāras are to be distinguished from the figures such as upamā and the like? We will look into

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA this in greater detail as below : Under Dhv. II. 3, Ā. observes :
"rasa-bhāva-tad ābhāsatat-praśāntyādir akramah, dhvaner ātmā' ngi-bhāvena
bhāsamāno vyavasthitaḥ.” rasā”dir artho hi saha iva vācyena avabhāsate. sa ca angitvena avabhāsamāno dhvaner ātmā.
idānīm rasavad-alamkārād a-laksya-krama-dyotanā”tmāno dhvaneh vibhakto visaya, iti pradarśyate.".
- "Sentiment, emotion, the semblance of sentiment or mood, their (rise and) cessation etc., are all of, "undiscerned sequentiality". It is decided that when we have the prominent presence of this variety, we are having the very soul of „suggestion."
Categories like sentiment shine forth along with the literal import. If they shine also with prominence we have the very soul of suggestion.
It will be shown in what follows that the sphere of this suggestion of undiscerned sequentiality is quite distinct from that of the figure of speech called rasavad-alamkāra or "figurative sentiment”. (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 41, ibid)
It is to be noted that when Ā. observes that "that rasa"di is the very soul of dhvani, which is suggested as principal - i.e. 'angitvena'," this also implies that these rasa"di categories, can be suggested at times, as 'anga' or subordinate also. Ā. suggests that when 'rasā"di' is not principally suggested, but is suggested in a subordinate way (i.e., a-pradhāna), it is known as "rasavad ādi alamkāra”. Distinguishing between rasā”di-dhvani and rasā”di alamkāra, Ā. observes :
"vācya-vācaka-cārutva· hatūnām vivdhātmanām,
rasā"di-paratā yatra
sa dhvaner vişayo mataḥ.” (Dhv. II. 4) rasa-bhāva-tad ābhāsa-tat-praśama-laksanam mukhyam artham anuvartamānā yatra śabdártha'-lamkārā gunāśca parasparam dhvany apeksayā vibhinna-rūpāḥ vyavasthitās tatra kāvye dhvanir iti vyapadeśah.

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1005 "pradhānényatra vākyárthe yatrángam tu rasā”dayaḥ, kāvye tasmin alamkāro
rasā”dir iti me matih.” (Dhv. II. 5). yady api rasavad alamkārasya anyair darśito visayas tathā’pi yasmin kāvye pradhānatayā anyórtho vākyárthībhūtas tasya ca angabhūtā ye rasā”dayas te rasā"der alamkārasya visayā iti māmakinah paksah. tad yathā cātusu preyólamkārasya vākyárthatvépi rasā”dayó ngabhūtā drśyante."
"Only that, wherein all the several beautifiers of the expressed sense and the expression exist with the single purpose of conveying sentiment and so on, is to be regarded as coming under the scope of suggestion.” (Dhv. II. 4)
The poem in which the chief category is of the nature of sentiment, emotion, their semblance, or cessation and wherein all figures, both of sound and sense, and qualities come in only as hand maids of the chief category and remain as much distinct from what is suggested as from one another, gets the designation of suggestive poetry.
"But if in a poem the chief purport of the sentence should relate to something else, and if sentiment and so on should come in only as auxiliaries to it, it is. my opinion that sentiment and so on are figures of speech in such a poem." (Dhv. II. 5).
Although others have explained the scope of Figurative sentiment (in quite a different way), still it is my view that only such sentiments etc. as become auxiliaries to some other purport of the sentence which happens as figures. For instance, one can easily see how in hymns of praise, sentiments etc., appear as auxiliaries though they are generally regarded as instances of the figure of Affectionate praise.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 43, ibid)
Alamkāras such as rasavat, etc. are enumerated to be four such as rasavat, preyas, ūrjasvi, and samāhita. For Ā. here the apprehension of sentiment, emotion, etc. is done in a subordinate way. So, we get 'dhvani' when 'rasā"di' are 'angi i.e. principal, and we have 'rasavat' etc., the alamkāras, when ‘rasā"di' are subordinate. When rasa is subordinated we have rasavat alamkāra, when bhāva is subordinated, we have 'preyah', and when ‘rasā”bhāsa' and 'bhāvā”bhāsa' are subordinated we arrive at ‘ūrjasvi', and 'bhāvaśānti' gives rise to 'samāhita', when itself gets subordinated. This is Ā.'s clear understanding and he insists on this being so."iti me matiḥ”.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
But, prior to this, the ancients such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. also gave a thought to these four alamkāras. The basic approach of these ancient masters towards poetry and its beauty was different. For them the 'sāhitya', (of course 'sundara'), i.e. combination of sound and sense was poetry or kavya, and whatever was instrumental in causing beauty in this poetry, was taken as “kávya-saundarya" or "alamkāra” by them. Thus the word 'alamkāra' in its wider connotation was poetic beauty or kāvya-saundarya for these earlier ālamkārikas. Vāmana went to the extent of even framing sūtras such as, "kāvyam grāhyam alamkārāt." "saundaryam alamkārah”. In view of these ancient masters, the beauty caused by the categories such as rasa, bhāva, etc. did not escape attention and in their broad scheme of "kävya-saundarya is alamkāra", these categories of rasa, bhāva, and their other states, also settled as "alamkāras", and as a result they embarked upon such alamkāras as, rasavat, preya, ürjasvi, samāhita, bhāvika, udātta etc. - the emotionbased alamkāras. They never bothered to descriminate between two positions such as when rasā”di are either principal or subordinate. Thus, rasā"di even when they appeared as principal were subsumed by them as “rasavad alamkāra”, “alamkāra” understood in a wider connotation. But this was not acceptable to .. .
So, when 'rasā"di' was placed as principal, Ā. called it rasa-dhvani. When it was, by being subordinate itself, was serving the cause of some other sentence-sense which was held to be central or principal in poetry. Ā. called it frasādi'-alamkāra. Thus Ā. exhibits subtlety of criticism and discernment.
To make his view-point absolutely clear, Ā. has given two kārikās as read above, viz. Dhv. II. 4 and Dhv. II. 5. In Dhv. II. 4, we have come across the use of the words : "vācya-vācaka-cārutva-hetūnām", i.e. "several (vividha) beautifiers of the expressed sense and the expression," which is to be understood as a dvandva compound such as "vācyam ca vācakam ca, tac cãrutva-hetavaś ca." A. had suggested in the vrtti in udyota I, that vastu-dhvani can not be incorporated in such alamkāras as samāsókti and the like. Here it is suggested that rasā"di-dhvani cannot be subsumed under rasavad-ādi-alamkāras.
What then is exactly the scope of rasā"di alamkāra is laid clear in Dhv. II. 5 as seen above. We have to mark the words 'iti me matih'. 'iti māmakinah paksah.'Ā. seldom uses such a forceful expression, but when he does bring in his 'T' in any opinion. that has to be respected as a final word of authority ending all controversies.
Ā. had to carefully discriminate between two possibilities causing poetic beauty and in both of which 'rasā"di' of course suggested, were involved. So after clarifying

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1007 the concept of dhvani-kāvya or rasa-dhvani-kāvya with rasa"di predominently suggested, he had to take care of such cases where suggested rasā”di were subordinate to some other central sentence sense and thus used their own beauty in rendering something else more charming. The earlier alamkārikas had not shown this discrimination and Ā. had to fill in the gap, which he did admirably, silencing all futile discussion.
Ā. observes that in the particular illustration viz. “kṣipto hastávalagnah." etc., ne main purport of the sentence is the extraordinary glory of Siva. The sentiment of love-in-separation due to jealousy is conveyed by ślesa i.e. double entendre, and this is made subordinate to the praise of Lord Siva. Only such instances are proper examples of Figurative Sentiment i.e. rasā"di alamkāra. And on account of this, says Ā., though the sentiments of love-in-separation due to jealousy and that of pathos or Karuna, though opposite to each other, i.e. mutually opposite, come together in the same place as they are both rendered auxiliary i.e. subordinate to the principal emotion of devotion to Lord Siva. Ā. further says that in cases where rasa itself happens to be the principal or main purport, how can it be a figure ? It has to be a case of 'rasā”di-dhvani'. A figure, it is well known, is only an enhancer of charm of some other central entity. It is impossible that a thing can become an enhancer of its own charm. - The vrtti (on Dhv. II. 5) here reads as : "sankirņo rasā”dir angabhūtah, yathā “kşipto hastávalagnah.” (etc.) - ity atra, tripuraripuprabhāvātiśayasya-vākyarthatve irsyā-vipralambhasya ślesa-sahitasya anga-bhāva iti, evamvidha eva rasavad alamkārasya nyāyyo viņayaḥ. ata eva ca īrsyāvipralambha-karuņa-yor angatvena vyavasthānāt samāveśo na dosah. yatra hi rasasya vākyárthībhāvaḥ tatra katham alamkāratvam ? alamkāro hi cărutvahetuh prasiddhaḥ, na tv asāv ātmaivā”tmanaḥ cărutvahetuh.”
The substance of the argument is that when 'rasa' itself is the principal sentence-purport, how can it be called an alamkāra, as suggested by the ancients ? In short how can it be rendered to the position of a beautifier i.e. alamkāra ? It being central, is "alamkārya” or that which is beautified by other agents. ‘Alamkāra' is only a means to an end, a beautifier causing beauty of something else. So, when 'rasa' which is central and when it is 'alamkārya', can never be termed alamkāra, for this is self-contradiction pure and simple. One cannot be one's own beautifier or 'beautifying agent. So, the pūrvā"cāryas seem to be mistaken here. But in defence of the earlier masters it can be argued that their concept of 'alamkāra' was a fluid one i.e. nebulous enough to cover both the 'alamkārya' and also 'alamkāra'. Their ‘alamkāra' was both “saundarya” itself, and 'an agent causing saundarya”.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Explaining the whole discussion in a nut-shell Ā. observes :
"rasa-bhāvā"di-tātparyam āśritya viniveśanam, alamkştīnām sarveșām
alamkāratva sādhanam." i.e. "It is only the employment of figures, one and all, in view of the main purport of sentiment, emotion, etc., that really justifies their being regarded as sources of charm.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 45, ibid).
Ā. observes : “tasmād yatra rasā"dayo vākyárthībhūtāḥ, sa sarva na rasā"der alamkārasya visayah, sa dhvaneh prabhedah, tasya upamā"dayo'lamkārāh. yatra tu prādhānyena arthấntarasya vākyárthībhāve rasā"dibhiś carutva-nispattih kriyate, sa rasā’der alamkāratāyā viņayah-evam dhvaneḥ rasavad alamkārasya ca vibhaktavisayatā bhavati.”
"Therefore, none of those cases where sentiments etc. happen to be the main purport, become instances of figurative sentiment. On the other hand they will only form a species of suggestion. Simile etc., are all enhancers of its charm alone. But in cases where the main purport happens to be some other meaning and when its beauty is enhanced by sentiment etc., we get proper instances of figurative sentiment.
Thus understood, the distant spheres of suggestion, figures like simile and figurative sentiment becomes clearly demarcated.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 45, 47, ibid)
A. discusses yet another opinion regarding the rasā"di alamkāras. Some critics are of the opinion that rasā"di-alamkāra has for its scope the treatment of sentient objects alone. But, argues A., in that case very little or no scope at all will be left for figures such as upam, and the rest. For even when the theme happens to be the behaviour of an insentient object, there has to be superimposition of the behaviour of a sentient object in one way or the other. Now, if it is held that even if such a superimposition is present, it will not be the sphere of rasavad-adi alamkāras, for the object described is itself insentient. But this would be tantamount to assert that the vast bulk of literature which happens to be really the golden treasury of sentiments will have to be taken as 'nīrasa', or one having no sentiment (for sentiment is the pre-requisite of the sentients - alone). Thus the best verses from Kālidāsa, such as, "taranga-bhrū-bhangā." etc. and "tanvī megha-jalā”rdrapallavatayā.” etc. will have to be treated as being without sentiment, for the central thing described is non-sentient. But in these examples, though insentient objects happen to be themes of description, the attribution of sentient behaviour to them

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1009 is quite obvious. But here, if one argues that as there is attribution of sentient behaviour, let it be the province of figurative sentiment i.e. rasavad alamkāra, then no scope will be left for upam, and other figures. For there is no such insentient theme at all in poetry, in which attribution of sentient behaviour is wholly absent; it will be found at least in form of vibhāva (= ālambana) i.e. the setting or situation for the delineation of rasa. Hence the fact stands that when sentiments etc. are treated as subordinate it is the case of rasā”di alamkāra, and when rasa is predominent, angī, and is 'alamkārya', it is the soul of dhvani : (vrtti, on II. 5) - "tasmād angarvena ca rasā"dīnām alamkāratā. yah punar angi raso va bhāvo vā sarvākāram alamkāryah sa dhvaner ātmā iti."
We will see later in the following chapter how Ā.'s 'vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa” scheme assimilates in its catholic fold all other thought-currents such as alamkāra, guna, dosa, rīti, vrtti, etc. that were already prevelent in the field of poetics and how 'dhvani' is capable to render such concepts as tātparya, anumiti and aucitya also as having no value. But for the present we will continue with A.'s further treatment of classification of dhvani and his treatment of rasa and some problems connected with rasa-vyañjanā as treated by him in udyota III. of the Dhv.
Ā. starts the IIId udyota with the words :
"evam vyangya-mukhena dhvaneḥ pradarśite sa-prabhede svarūpe, punar vyañjaka-mukhena etat prakāśyate -
"avivakṣita-vācyasya pada-vākya-prakāśatā, tad anyasya anuranana
rūpa-vyangyasya ca dhvaneh.” (Dhv. III. 1) So far the nature and varieties of suggestion have been pointed out in detail from the standpoint of the suggested. Now the same shall be set forth from the standpoint of the suggester:
“Both the varieties of suggestion with unintended literal import and the resonance-like suggestion are suggested by individual words and by whole sentences.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 107, ibid)
Ā. also discusses which 'varņas' or letters are favourable in case of which particular rasa, the form and types of construction, the factors that fix this or that type of samghațanā or construction for this or that type of rasa or sentiment, etc. He also discusses how a whole composition or prabandha suggests rasa. This involves topics such as consideration of factors that do not

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SAHŞDAYĀLOKA promote the delineation of rasas - i.e. 'rasa-virodhi' factors, and also treatment of rasas of an opposite character such as śộngāra and karuna, vīra and bhayānaka etc., as a big composition is likely to serve a number of rasas in given situations. A. tends to suggest that the arrangement of words and meanings conducive to rasa - “rasanuguņa-śabdárthayojanā”, is the prime task of a poet. This shows that for Ā. ʻrasa-dhvani' was the be-all and end-all of good poetry. So, when Abhinavagupta brings rasa-dhvani into greater prominance, he does not do it, as some modern scholars want us to believe, on his own. Abhinavagupta does not thrust his rasa-theory on Ā.'s dhvani theory. But, on the other hand the message, to take rasa-dhvani as the real 'ātmā' of poetry is writ large in Ā.'s treatment throughout the whole of the Dhy. We have also looked into A.'s sabda vyāpāra-vicāra earlier wherein he treats vyañjanā as the supreme power of word. After treating the nature and scope of rasa-dhvani in very great detail as we will go to observe here, A. turns to the other two types of poetry viz. the gunībhūtavyangya-kāvya and the citra-kāvya. We will end this chapter with a full treatment of all these types by a number of writers on poetics, beginning with Ā. here and ending with Jagannātha later.
The highest common factor of the treatment of rasa in the ancients is that they have not discussed, or even mentioned, the famous rasa-sūtra of Bharata and have abstained from discussing the various views on rasa-realisation or “rasa-nispattiprakriyā”. Of course Dandin and others perhaps had a leaning towards the “utpattiupaciti-vāda”, as suggested by Abhinavagupta. But nothing beyond this can be read there. Ā. also does not engage himself in the "rasa-sūtra-mimāmsā”. But he projects 'rasa' as one type of his three-fold dhvani and this, he observes, is arrived at in poetry or literature through the agency of vyañjanā or suggestive power of a word. This ‘rasa-dhvani' is projected as the 'real soul of poetry by A., and Abhinavagupta takes it further for a clearer exposition. It has to be noted again and again, that Abhinavagupta has never over-stepped while discussing rasa-dhvani and he absolutely toes Ā.'s line in doing whatever he does.
We know that .. took 'dhvani' as the 'soul of poetry and classified it in a threefold scheme of vastu-dhvani, alamkāra-dhvani and rasā"di-dhvani. However, the fact stands that out of the three types, only rasa-dhvani occupies the central place as "dhvaner ātmā". This is very much meant by A., for the Locanakāra, given an opportunity, has always tried to make things very clear. For example, on vrtti, Dhv. I. i, "ānandah manasi labhatām pratisthām...” Abhinavagupta observes : "ananda iti. rasa-carvanā"tmanah prādhānyam darśayan rasadhvaner eva sarvatra

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1011
mukhyabhūtam atmatvam iti darśayati." On Dhv. II. 2, Vrtti, viz. "lalitócitasanniveśa-cārunah...", Locana has the following - "ucita-śabdena rasa-visayam eva aucityam bhavati iti darśayan rasa-dhvaner jīvitatvam sūcayati. tad-abhāve hi kim apekṣayā idam aucityam nāma sarvatra udghosyata iti bhāvaḥ.” Again, on Dhv. I. 4, the Locana has - "yas tu svapne'pi na laukika-vyavahāra-patitah, kintu śabdasamarpyamāna-hrdaya-samvāda sundarah vibhāvānubhāva-samucita-prāg-vinivistaratyādi-vāsanánurāga-sukumāra-sva-samvid-ānanda-carvanā-vyāpāra-rasanīya-rūpo rasah; sa kāvya-vyāpāraika-gocarah, rasa-dhvanir iti; sa ca dhvanir eva iti, sa eva mukhyatayā ātmā, iti.” Locana further notes - "vastv alamkāra-dhvanyoḥ rasadhvani-paryantarvam eva iti vayam eva vaksyāmas tatra tatra iti āstām tāvat."
Thus the ultimate termination of vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani in rasa"didhvani is very much suggested by A. himself as noted by Abhinavagupta. And he is very right and within bounds in observing this. Under Dhy. I. 4, in his Vịtti, Ā. has denounced the 'sva-sabda-vācyatva' of rasa"di dhvani and has underlined the situation that rasā"di-dhvani can be delineatd only through the presentation of vibhāvā"di i.e. determinants, etc., and thus rasā"di-dhvani as only implied through vyañjanā. Ā. underlines that his talk of rasā"di dhvani as the soul of poetry is supported by the great illustration of Vālmīki's 'Rāmāyana'. In this great epic, 'Soka' has become an object of Vālmīki's 'śloka' i.e. description i.e. poetry. The examples of dhvani are scattered all over the Rāmāyaṇa according to Ā. He explains this by. pointing out to karuņa-rasa, which has 'śoka' as its basic emotion. On this, Locana observes : "tena rasa eva vastutaḥ ātmā. vastvalamkāra dhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyād utkrsau tau, ity abhipyāyeņa "dhvanih kavyasya ātmā” iti sāmānyena uktah.” Ā. himself has noted that though other varieties (i.e. 'vastu' and 'alamkāra') of the implicit sense - pratīyamānasya - are observed, the
lustration cited is that of 'rasa-bhāva', and this is only to underline the fact that rasa-dhvani alone is principal. - "pratīyamānasya ca anya-bheda-darśanépi rasabhāva-mukhena eva upalaksanam, prādhānyāt.” (vịtti, Dhv. I. 5).
Thus, after establishing the supremacy of rasā"di-dhvani, A. has placed rasatattva on the highest pedestal in literature. Actually Ā. has placed 'rasa' in the centre of his scheme by saying that 'gunas' or 'excellences' are the qualities or rasa, that alamkāras, if 'a-prthag-yatna-nirvartya' in poetry, are not external to poetry, and that the thought-currents of rīti, vrtti, samghatanā etc., are all 'suggesters' of rasa, and that the 'dosas' i.e. blemishes are blemishes only if they are found to be detrimental to rasa. All this shows that A. has placed 'rasa' in the centre of his scheme and Abhinavagupta only faithfully echoes - anuranan - A.'s ideas. A. has placed rasa as "angi" or 'principal in poetry.

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When we scanned the varieties and sub-varieties of dhvani, we had observed that A. has established rasa"di-dhvani in form of "abhidhāmūla-a-samlaksyakrama-vyangya-dhvani." This variety is suggested through varṇa/letters, pada/ words, vākya/sentence, samghatana/construction and prabandha/i.e. the whole composition. At Dhv. III. 2 he says:
"yas tv alakṣya-krama-vyangyo dhvanir varṇa-padā"diṣu, vākye samghaṭanāyām ca sa prabandhépi dipyate."
This A. explains citing apt illustrations. That under the fact of rasa-vyañjanā lies "aucitya" or "appropriateness" is also made clear by A.
1012
Explaing the rasa-vyañjakatā of a prabandha or a whole composition, A.
observes at Dhv. III. 10-14 that,

"vibhāva-bhāva-anubhavasañcāry aucitya-cāruṇaḥ, vidhiḥ kathā-śarīrasya
vṛttasya utprekṣitasya vā. (III. 10, Dhv.)
itivṛtta-vaśāyātām,
tyaktvā an-anuguṇām sthitim, utpreksya-apy-antarábhīṣṭa
rasócita-kathónnayaḥ (Dhv. III. 11) "sandhi-sandhyanga-ghatanam rasábhivyakty apekṣayā na tu kevalayā śāstra
sthiti-sampādanecchayā." (Dhv. III. 12) uddipana-śamane yathāvasaram antarā,
rasasy-arabdha-viśranteḥ
anusandhānam anginaḥ, (Dhv. III. 13)
alamkṛtīnām saktāv apy
anurūpyeṇa yojanam,
prabandhasya rasā❞dīnām
vyañjakatve nibandhanam. (Dhv. III. 14)

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1013 "Construction of only such a plot, either traditional or invented, as is charming with its decorum (of accessories of sentiment, viz.) stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses, and passing moods.” (III. 10)
"If, in a theme, adapted from a traditional source, the poet is faced with situations conflicting with the intended sentiment, his readiness to leave out such incidents and inventing in their place even imaginary incidents with a view to delineating the intended sentiment.” (III. 11)
"The construction of divisions and subdivisions of the plot only with a view to delineating sentiments and not at all with a desire for mere conformity to rules of poetics.” (III. 12)
"Bringing about both the high tide of sentiment and its low ebb appropriately in the work; preserving the unity of the principal sentiment from beginning to end." (III. 13)
“A discreet use of figures of speech even when the poet is capable of using them in any number; such are the conditions which underlie the suggestiveness of a whole work of literature in regard to sentiments, etc.” (III. 14)
(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 135, 137, ibid) Thus A. suggests that for a whole composition to be suggestive of rasa, the first requirement is delineation of a theme which is furnished with appropriate determinants, consequents etc. The theme can be either historical or imaginary. In case it is historical, such facts of history as are not condusive to rasa, have to be omitted and even newly imagined factors have to be introduced that go to promote rasa, which is principal. Junctures and parts of them are to be introduced with rasa in focus. They are not to be introduced because the śāstra (such as the N.S. of Bharata) has so ordained. Ā. has here severely criticised Bhatta Nārāyana, the author of Venisamhāra'. The rise and fall of the sentiments in keeping with situations is recommended but never, the principal rasa, is to face an ebbing. In case if the impression is that the principal rasa has started fading away, the
nusamdhāna - preserving the unity of principal rasa-has to be effected. Even if the poets are capable of introducing figures of speech of their sweet will, the figures have to appear only in keeping with the principal rasa in centre. Only such figures as are condusive to rasa, whose creation is done in a very spontaneous way have to be used in a composition. The poet has not to make any extra or special effort to form a figure, over and above his normal effort to delineate rasa. In short an alamkāra has to be - "a-prthag-yatna-nirvartya.” (Dhv. II. 16)
It is thus that the whole composition becomes suggestive of rasa.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
Ā. is of the firm opinion that vrtti i.e. employment of word and sense - mode - vrtti. - and rītis or style or diction also follow the same discipline, i.e. they are being employed by a great good poet in view of 'rasa'. Dhv. III. 33 observes :
"rasādy anuguņatvena
vyavahārórtha-sabdayoh, · aucityavān yas tā etā
vịttayo dvividhāḥ sthitāḥ”, i.e. "vrttis (lit. modes) are said to be of two kinds only because they relate to appropriate employment of senses and sound in keeping with sentiments etc.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 189, ibid) Read also, Dhv. III. 46-47
"asphuta-sphuritam kāvya-tattvam etad-yathoditam, a-śaknuvadbhir vyākartum rītayaḥ sampravartitāḥ.” (III. 46) "sabda-tattvā”śrayāḥ kāścid artha-tattva-yujo'parāḥ, vȚttayópi prakāśante
jñātésmin kāvya-laksaņe.” (III. 47) "Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more) have brought into vogue the theory or styles.” (pp. 261, ibid)
"once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so-called "Modes", relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meaning will become intelligible.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 26, ibid)
Thus .. has established rasa on the highest pedestal. This vyañjanā-dhvani-rasascheme of .. was accepted and further established by such great names as Abhinavagupta, Mammața, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Appayya Dixit and Jagannātha. But, even after accepting the highest position of 'rasa', the process of arriving at it through 'vyañjanā' in literature and also in other arts, was challenged by such greats as Sri. Sankuka, Bhatta Nāyaka, Mukula Bhatta, Mahimā, Dhananjaya/Dhanika etc. Kuntaka, though he did not openly challange vyañjanā, remained reticent about the same and though the same whole-heartedly, accepted, its influence in his "vicitrā-abhidhā”. So, for sure, he was a "pracchanna dhvani-vădin”. Even he has accepted, not unlike Bhoja, the supremacy of 'rasa' in kävya.

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1015 Ā. had observed that 'varnas' i.e. letters are also conducise to "rasa”. In this respect he observes at Dhv. III. 3-4.
"sa-sau sa-refa-samyogah dha-kāraś ca api bhūyasā, virodhinaḥ syuḥ śộngāre
te na varņā rasaścyutah.” (III. 3) and,
"ta eva tu niveśyante bībhatsā”dau rase yadā, tadā tam dīpayanty eva
tena varņāḥ rasaścyutah.” (III. 4) "The (sanskrit) letters “s” and “s”, letters conjunct with 'Y', and 'ah', - all these become deterents of the erotic sentiment. Hence those letters are not conducive to a particular sentiment.” (Dhv. III. 3)
"When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust and so forth, they will only intensify them. Hence also letters suggest sentiments.” (Trans. K,Kris. pp. 115, ibid)
Ā. adds - "śloka-dvayena anvaya-vyatirekābhyām varṇānām dyotakatvam darśitam bhavati.”'“The above aphorisms show negatively and positively that letters do possess suggestiveness." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 115, ibid). We would add in this sentence "(two)" before ‘aphorisms' and place “positively” prior to “negatively”, of course, with due respect for Prof. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy.
After. 'varnas' i.e. 'letters' Ā. comes to 'padas' i.e. individual words in poetry. 'Suggestivity in a 'pada', or by a 'pada' is illustrated as in. "ut-kampini." etc. The pada "te" in "te locane", in this illustration, is clearly suggestive of rasa, in the opinion of the aesthetes. Locana explains that this pada, "te", becomes suggestive of many qualities of the heroine's eyes. The beauty of those eyes as remembered for the moment becomes the 'vibhāva' i.e. stimulus for the suggestion of karuna, i.e. "sokā"veśa." Of course rasa-realisation is brought about by the whole vibhāvā"di complex, but when these vibhāvas are apprehended in an extra-ordinary way, through a special 'pada', 'rasa' becomes ‘pada-dyotya' here. Ā. also dwells on parts of a pada, i.e. "padávayava.” as suggestive of rasa. Parts of a compound as in, "cakita-hariņi-hāri-netra-tribhāgah", or at times a termination, or use of singular, plural, or a gender etc. also become suggestive of rasa. Ā. gives illustrations for all these.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA At Dhv. III. 16, Ā observes :
sup-tin-vacana-sambandhais tathā kāraka-saktibhih, krt-taddhita-samāsais ca
dyotyólaksya-kramaḥ kvacit. "Case-terminations, congugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, these become primary affixes, secondary affixes, and also compounds, - all conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequenciality.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp 147, ibid)
For Ā. a 'sentence' or "vākyā” also is a suggestive unit for rasa. This vākya-rūpaa-samlaksya-krama-dhvani, is also either 'śuddha' i.e. pure in itself, or "sankirna” i.e. mixed with figures of speech. A. provides proper illustrations for the same. He also says that 'construction' - or 'samghatanā’ in poetry becomes conducive to rasa. (Dhv. III. 6). We will discuss this in a separate chapter later when we will show, how in A.'s opinion different thought-currents are incorporated in his scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa. .
Keeping the supreme variety of rasa-dhvani in focus, Ā. also discusses how rasa is impeded in poetry, i.e. which are rasa-virodhi-tattvas or deterrents to rasa in poery and how to avoid the same. "Rasa-virodhi-tattva and its parihāra” is thus an important topic with reference to rasa-dhvani-kavya. We will discuss this, in view of A.'s opinion; as under. At Dhv. III. 17, Ā. observes :
"prabandhe muktake vā'pi rasādīn bandhum icchatā, yatnaḥ kāryaḥ sumatinā
parihāre virodhinām.” "prabandhe muktake vā’pi rasa-bhāva-nibandhanam praty ädstamanāḥ kaviḥ virodhi-parihāre param yatnam ādadhāti-anyathā tu asya rasamayaḥ ślokaḥ ekópi samyan na sampadyate."
kāni punas tāni virodhini yāni yatnatah parihartavyāni-ity ucyate..."
"Whether it is the whole work or a single stanza, a good poet, who is desirous of incorporating sentiments etc., in what he writes should take pains to avoid hindrances to them.” (Dhv. III. 17).
'A poet who is intent upon incorporating sentiments and emotions in his works, whether they be big or small, should turn all his efforts towards avoiding

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1017 impediments. Otherwise he will not succeed in composing even a single verse full of sentiment. The following verses answer the question, "What, then are these impediments which deserve to be carefully avoided by the poet ?”. Dhv. III. 18, 19 read as :
"virodhi-rasa-sambandhivibhāvā"di-parigrahaḥ, vistarena anvitasyā'pi vastunónyasya varnanam.” (III. 18) "akāņda eva vicchittir, akāņde ca prakāśanam, pariposam gatasyā’pi paunah-punyena dīpanam rasasya, syād virodhāya
vịtty anaucityam eva vā.” (III. 19) "Sketching the setting etc., of an opposite sentiment, describing something whose connection with the subject on hand is only very remote.” (IV. 18)
"Stopping the delineation of sentiment abruptly, as also elaborating it when not . required; over-elaborating it again and again, though it has already received sufficient elaboration, and indecorum in respect of behaviour-all these hinder the course of sentiment.” (III. 19) (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 161, ibid)
Ā. further elaborates in his vrtti as follows: He observes that the first impediment to sentiment is delineating the vibhāvā"dis i.e. determinants, consequents and transitory feelings of a rasa, which is opposite to the contextual rasa. For example, the taking of the determinants or vibhāvas of the opposite rasa, is seen when first a poet describes a person who is the substrutum of śānta-rasa or tranquillity and then immediately (anantaram eva) the same person is described as a substratum of love in union, i.e. he is described as a hero in the setting of erotic sentiments, i.e. as a lover. Thus the originally intended sentiment of tranquillity or śāntarasa is hindered.
Describing the basic emotion (= bhāva) of an opposite rasa is seen in hero tries to humour his beloved who is angry through love-quarrel, by telling stories of renunciation of worldly pleasures. In the same way opposite consequents or anubhāvas are seen being portrayed, when a hero gets wild and shows real anger when his beloved is feigning love-anger, and does not yield to his approaches.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The second impendiment to sentiment is the lengthy description of a subject whose connection with the sentiment on hand is only a very distant one : (vastunah anyasya, kathañcid anvitasya api, vistarena kathanam). This is seen when a poet who starts with describing his hero tormented by love in separation, goes off astray, and gives very lengthy descriptions of mountains, etc. i.e. nature.
The third impendiment to sentiment is an abrupt stopping of the delineation of a contextual sentiment, and also unwarranted elaboration of the same at the wrong place. The example of unwarranted stoppage is seen when, after portraying the rise of mutual love between the hero and the heroine, instead of describing their efforts to get united, the poem continues to dwell upon their other irrelevant activities. Elaboration at the wrong place is seen when a god-like hero, such as Rāma is, for no reason whatsoever, shown as getting interested in activities of love, when actually a terrific battle is raging at its climax, meting out death to the great heroes (as at the time of universal destruction), though there has been absolutely no previous occasion leading up to even the sentiment of love-in-separation at that time. Such a procedure can not be justified even on the ground that the character is shown there only as a victim of delusion due to Destiny. For it is proper that the poet should write only with a view to delineating sentiment. The plot is just a means to an end as noticed in Dhv. I. 9 and so forth.
Poets commit such blunders when they keep the description of plot only in the centre; i.e. when they are less focussed on rasa and delineate the same without descrimination between what is principal and what is subordinate. Hence it is made absolutely clear here, observes Ā., that the poets have to be only rasa-focussed in their works. This alone is the thrust of our effort says A., and not merely to establish the doctrine of dhvani alone : "ata eva ca, itivrtta-matra-varnana-prādhānye angángibhāva-rahita-rasa-bhāva-nibandhane ca, kavīnām evam-vidhāni skhalitāni bhavanti iti rasā”dirūpa-vyangya-tātparyam eva esām yuktam iti yatno'smābhir ārabdhah, na dhvani-pritipādana-mātrábhiniveśena.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 19).
The fourth or next impediment to rasa is its over-elaboration, time and again, though it has already received full elaboration in the shape of a description of its various costitutents. Such a description will itself look like a faded flower if it is pressed far too much, again and again.
Lack of decorum in respect of behaviour (vrtty-anaucitya) is yet another impediment to sentiment. For example, if the heroine, putting aside all sense of decorum, conveys openly to the hero her desire to make love, we come across this defect. Or, the word 'vṛtti' may mean the vșttis i.e. dictions such as kaiśiki (or, the
scussed by Bharata, or the upanāgarikā (i.e. the urban)

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etc., laid down by other writers on poetics: "yadi va vṛttīnām bharataprasiddhānām kaiśiky ādī, kāvyálankarántara-prasiddhānām upanāgarikā"dyānām vā, yad anaucityam, a-viṣaye nibandhanam, tad api, rasa-bhanga-hetuḥ." (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 19) The delineation of these vṛttis at places where it is not appropriate also causes impediment to rasa.
.
Indecorum in respects counted above, or such others as imagined afresh by other critics, also have to be avoided by poets, keeping focussed on the central theme of rasa-delineation "evam eṣām rasa-virodhinām anyeṣām ca anayā diśā svayam utprekṣitānām parihāre satkavibhir avahitair bhavitavyam." (vṛtti, Dhv. III. 19)
Good poets, suggests A., have to be centrally focussed in steering clear of these impediments to sentiment, and also of similar other hindrances imagined afresh by them. The following verses, sum up the points, observes Ā. :
"mukhyā vyāpāra-viṣayāḥ sukavīnām rasā❞dayaḥ, teṣām nibandhane bhāvyam taiḥ, sadaiva a-pramādibhiḥ. nīrasas tu prabandho yaḥ sópaśabdo mahān kaveḥ, sa tena a-kavir eva syāt anyena a-smṛta-lakṣaṇaḥ. pūrve viśṛnkhala-giraḥ kavayaḥ prāpta-kirtayaḥ, tan samāśritya na tyājyā nītir eṣā manīṣiņā. vālmiki-vyāsa-mukhyāś ca ye prakhyātā kavīśvarāḥ, tad-abhiprāya-bāhyóyam
-
na'smābhir darśito nayaḥ." - iti.
"Sentiments etc., are the most important ends for the activity of poets; hence poets should always be very attentive in delineating them.

A work, devoid of sentiment, is the the most unpardonable solecism on the part of the poet. It will brand him as a poetaster, with nothing but oblivion in store for him.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Time was, when poets could win fame by their words unfettered by any rule; but the wise should not take them as their models and depart from the principles laid down above.
As a matter of fact, we have shown nothing here which is against the opinions of the most-celebrated first-rate poets like Vālmīki and Vyāsa." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 165, ibid)
After this, Ā. dwells upon the possibility of how even 'virodhin' - i.e. hindrances can be accomodated in a composition. He observes : (Dhv. III. 20)
"Vivaksite rase labdha-pratisthe tu, virodhinām, badhyānām angabhāvam vā
prāptānām uktir acchalā.” “After the intended sentiment has been established on a secure footing; there - will be no defect in including even hindrances, provided that these come either as foils, or as ancillaries.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 165, ibid)
Ā. is of the opinion that once that intended sentiment is fully developed with the help of its required accessories, to portray even the hindrances, in case they serve only as foils or ancillaries of the intended sentiment, will not be a defect. Hindrances will serve as foils only if they are positively overshadowed by the intended leading sentiments, not in any other way. Thus portrayed, the presentation of virodhins only enhances the development of the intended leading sentiment. Ā. observes: "angabhāvam prāptānām ca tesām virodhitvam eva nivartate.” (vștti, Dhv. III. 20) i.e. if hindrances are portrayed as ancillaries, they will have lost their very hindering power.
Ā. further suggests how hindrances can come in as ancillaries. Either they come as ancillaries in a natural way, or in an imagined way. In a description of natural ancillaries, there is no chance of any hindrance. Say, for example, in describing 'vyādhi' i.e. desease and the like, it will not create hindrance while developing the sentiment of Love in separation, for desease is its natural ancillary. But such things as death, which are not natural ancillaries, if described, will create hindrances, for
If it is argued that death is also a natural ancillary in case of the leading vipralambha, then also, Ā. observes, it should not be brought in, simply because when the substratum (here nāyaka or nāyikā) dies, there is going to be an invariable rupture in the development of the leading vipralambha-śrngāra : "asraya-vicchede rasasya atyanta-vicchedā" patteh." (vrtti, Dhv. III. 20) If it is

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1021 argued that in that case Karuna or, pathos will be developed, this is not acceptable to .., for, Karuņa is not relevant to the context, and that which is contextual here, i.e. vipralambha will be broken up, or damaged. If pathos is the intended leading sentiment, then there is no objection to death being portrayed. Or, in a rare case death will not hinder vipralambha, in case, this separation by death comes to an immediate end by reunion in another form : (a-dīrgha-kāla-pratyāpatti-sambhave). But if a long time-gap passes between death and such reunion, it will surely create hindrance. Thus, such episodes should be avoided by a poet intent upon delineating rasa predominntly.
A. gives an illustration where hindrances do not appear as blemishes, i.e. when they are portrayed as foils. The example is : “kvákāryam śaśa-laksmanano” etc. Or, when Pundarīka is advised by a friendly ascetic.
Again, when a hindrance is placed as an ancillary, it creates no blemish in the delineation of intended sentiment e.g. in, “bhramim aratim.” etc. There is no blemish also, when the ancillary position is even superimposed or imagined - "samāropitā api”, as in “pāņdu-kṣāmam." etc.
Ancillary position of a hindrance can be secured in yet another way also such as when two sentiments or emotions, opposed mutually, may both be made ancillary to another idea which happens to be the principal import in a sentence by force of its contextual importance : "iyam ca anga-bhāva-prāptir anyā, yad adhikārikatvāt pradhana ekasmin vākyarthe, rasayor bhāvayor vā, parasparavirodhinor, dvayor anga-bhāva-gamanam, tasyām api na dosah.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 20) E.g. in the verse, “ksipto hastávalagnah." etc. If it is asked why the opposition in such case melts away, the reply that Ā. gives is that, it is so because both of them are definitely subordinate to the main import. The natural opposition will appear as such and would lead to defect only if it is a positive statement and not a mere quotation as in the verse "ehi, gaccha, pata, uttistha." etc. There is no real opposition though both positive injunctions and prohibitions are found side by side, because they are only quotations : "vidhau viruddha-samāveśasya dustatvam, na anuvāde.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 20). Ā. also suggests that : “na ca raseșu vidhy anuvādavyavahāro násti iti sakyam vaktum, tesām vākyárthatvena abhyupagamāt.” It is not possible to say that the procedure of 'vidhi' i.e. direct assertion, and 'anuvāda' or indirect assertion is not found in sentiments. When purport of sentence and expressed sense can both contain this procedure of direct assertion and indirect narration, how can you prevent the sentiments from containing these, because sentiments are also suggested by the same : "vākyárthasya ca vācyasya yau

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA vidhyanuvādau tau tad-ākṣiptānām rasānām kena vāryete ?” (vștti, Dhv. III. 20). Even those who do not accept that rasā”di are the direct import of poetry (sākşad rasádīnām kāvyā”rthatā”), will have to accept the instrumentality of the kävyártha in bringing about rasa, i.e. the position that rasā"di are conveyed by kāvya main import will have to be admitted. Ā. observes : (vľtti, Dhv. III. 20) - "yasmád anūdyamānánga-nimittóbhayarasa-vastu-sahakārino vidhiyamānámśād bhāvavisesa-pratitir utpadyate tataś ca na kaścid virodhaḥ. drśyate hi viruddhóbhayasahakāriņaḥ kāraṇāt kārya-višeşótpattiḥ. viruddha-phalotpādana-hetutvam hi yugapad ekasya karanasya viruddham na tu viruddhóbhaya-sahakaritvam. (vrtti, Dhv. III. 20) - "That particular effects are produced by the agency of two causes opposed to each other, yet co-operating in the production of effect, is a matter of common observation. Opposition would be there only when it is held that the same cause gives rise to two opposite effects simultaneously and not when it is said that two causes opposed to each other are contributing simultaneously towards the production of a single effect.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 171, ibid)
Ā. concludes : "tasmās vākyárthībhūtasya rasasya bhāvasya vā virodhi rasavirodhi iti vaktum nyāyyah, na tu angabhūtasya kasya cit." "Therefore, only that sentiment deserves to be termed as a hindrance to sentiment, which hinders either a sentiment or an emotion that happens to be the main import of the sentence in question, and not at all the one which hinders only another ancillary sentiment or emotion.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 173, ibid)
Ā. gives a special concession to śộngāra which can serve as favourable to the delineation of even karuna, when it is presented in a charming device. For example, all occurrences of śộngāra recollected in hours of pathos, give a greater fillip to karuņa. Thus, says .. the more and more we think about such escapes the greater is the possibility of avoiding an opposition. Thus, Ā. says, we have explained the distinction where sentiments can be delineated side by side with the sentiments that are opposed to them, and where they cannot be thus delineated : "evam tāvad rasā"dīnām virodhi-rasā”dibhih samāvesa-a-samāveśayor visaya-vibhāgo darśitah." (vrtti, Dhv. III. 20)
Now Ā. suggests how the delineation of such various sentiments is to be done in one and the same work - Dhv. III. 21 reads :
"prasiddhépi prabandhānām nānā-rasa-nibandhane

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1023 eko rasóngīkartavyas
teşām utkarşam icchatā.” "Though there is convention that more than one sentiment should find a place in entire works of literature, one of them alone should be made principal by the poet who aims at greatness of his works." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 175, ibid).
Ā. observes in his vrtti, on Dhv. III. 21 : "prabandhesu mahākāvyā"dişu nāļakā"dişu vā viprakīrṇatayā angāngi-bhāvena bahavo rasāḥ upanibadhyanta ity atra prasiddhau satyām api, yaḥ prabandhānām chāyátiśaya-yogam icchati, tena tesām rasānām anyatamaḥ kaścid vivakṣito rasóngitvena viniveśayitavya ity ayam yuktataro mārgah.”
"Though in fact the convention is that, in epics etc., as well as in dramas etc., several sentiments should be delineated with either equal importance to each other or differing importance, the better procedure is that a poet who is intent upon adorning his work with abundant beauty should make it a rule to give principal importance to only one intended sentiment amongst them."
(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 175, ibid), Abhinavagupta in his Locana here explains : tad eva avatārayati-"idānīm ity ādinā". teşām rasānām krama iti yojanā. “prasiddhe' pīti" bharata-muniprabhrtibhir nirūpitépíty arthah. tesām iti prabandhānām. mahākāvyā"disu ity ādi śabdah prakāre. an-abhineyān bhedān āha-dvitīyas tv abhineyān. “viprakirnatayā” iti. nāyaka-pratināyaka-patākā-prakarī-nāyakā”di nişthatayā ity arthaḥ. angángibhāvena ity ekanāyaka-nisthatvena. 'yuktatara' iti. yady api samavakārā"dau paryāya-bandhā"dau ca naikasya angitvam tathā'pi nayuktatā tasya'py evam-vidho yah prabandhah tad yathā nātakam mahākāvyam vā tad utkrsta-tara śabdasya arthaḥ.” (Dhv. III. 21) (Locana).
Ā. answers an objection here. The opponent raises a point to the following effect. He argues that when actually several sentiments have been developed to their climax, how can any single, rasa or sentiment can be said to be 'angin' or principal ? The answer to this is given in Dhv. III. 22, and vrtti thereon. Ā. argues that the importance of the intended sentiment, which is shining through out the work abidingly, i.e. which looks like the vary basis of a composition - "sthāyitvena avabhāsinah”, cannot be marred by the inclusion of other sentiment. The 'vrtti' here goes to observe that when a rasa is intended to be principal or primary in a work, and is kept constantly in focus by being delineated again and again, its importance cannot be marred by the inclusion of other passing sentiments because it underlies all the rest. The reason for this is explained in Dhv. III. 23, where it is observed that

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA just as one plot is made to stay as principal or major in a given composition as a whole, so also one sentiment can be made to stay as principal and this will never lead to any blemish or discrepancy : (Dhv. III. 23)
“kāryam ekam yathā vyāpi prabandhasya vidhīyate, tathā rasasya api vidhau,
virodho naiva vidyate." The vrtti on this observes that just as one plot consisting of several parts or junctures is made to progress uniformly and pervade the whole work, and just as it never gets mixed up with minor parts, and even if it gets mixed up its prominence is not shrouded i.e. it does not suffer, so also, when a single sentiment among several other minor ones is made as principal or major one in the whole work, there is no discrepancy at all involved here. On the other hand, such a procedure will bring abundant delight to the cultured critics or men of taste, whose power of discrimination is even sharp and whose appreciation is wide enough.
A possible objection also is put to rest here by Ā. It may be argued for example, that the relation of major and minor or principal and subordinate may hold good at best, in case of such sentiments which are not opposed to each other, such as, the vīra or heroic, and the śrngāra i.e. erotic, the erotic and the adbhuta i.e. marvellous, the vira/heroic and the furious/raudra, and the pathetic/karuna, etc.
But, argues the opponent, how can this relationship of major/minor be ever possible in case of sentiments that are mutually absolutely opposed to each other, such as the erotic/śộngāra and the disgustful/bībhatsa, the heroic/vīra and the terrible or bhayānaka, or the quietude i.e. śānta and the furious/raudra or śānta and śrngāra ? To this, Ā.'s answer is read in Dhv. III. 24 :
“a-virodhī virodhī vā rasóngini rasántare, paripoșam na netavyas
tathā syād a-virodhitā." i.e. "When a sentiment is delineated in a work as the principal one, no other
vhether unopposed or opposed to it, should be treated elaborately. This will ensure one that no opposition between them will remain any more."
(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 177, ibid)

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So, when any single rasa, say śộngāra, happens to be principal in a work, no other sentiment, whether unopposed or opposed, should be treated fully or elaborately at the same time. Ā. holds that elaborate treatment of other rasas can be avoided in different ways. He observes (vľtti, Dhv. III. 24) : "angini rasantare śộngārā”dau prabandha-vyangye sati, a-virodhi, virodhī vā rasaḥ, pariposam na netavyaḥ. tatra a-virodhino rasasya, angi-rasāpekṣayā atyantam adhikyam na kartavyam iti ayam prathamah pariposa-parihārah. utkarsa-sāmyépi tayor virodhaa-sambhavāt. yathā-“ekato roditi priyā.” etc. yathā vā, “kanthāt cchitvā.” etc., ity atra. - etc.
Here, Ā. observes that even an un-opposed sentiment should not be shown greater importance as compared to the principal sentiment. Even if both of them get equal prominence, there will be no chance of any opposition between them; as in "ekato roditi.” etc., or “kanthāt cchitvā.” etc.
The next device suggested by A. is that ancillary feelings or passing moods, i.e. vyabhicārins, which are opposed to the major rasa, should not be delineated at length, and even if described at all, it should be immediately followed by the description of the passing moods of the principal rasa. Ā. further adds that even when a minor or subsidiary rasa is being treated fully, it should be at all events treated only as a subsidiary one by special attention. Its status of a subsidiary rasahas to be kept in focus by the poet. Ā. suggests that other devices on these lines can be invented by poets or readers.
If the subsidiary rasa happens to be a virodhin i.e. opposite to the main rasa, it should be carefully delineated only as being lesser than the major rasa - "virodhinas tu rasasya, angirasápekṣayā kasyacin nyūnatā sampādanīyā.” (Vrtti, Dhv. III. 24). For example, when śānta is the major rasa, śộngāra should be comparatively less developped, i.e. it should be attached lesser importance. So also, vice versa, when śộngāra is a major rasa, śānta should be given lesser prominence. If it is argued that in the absence of fuller treatment, there can be no rasa at all, the answer is, “uktam atra, angi-rasā'pekṣayā” i.e. we are talking of comparatively lesser prominence. The subordinate opposite sentiment thus will receive less fuller
ompared to the angi' or principal rasa. The same degree of full ent will not go by the way of what is meant to be a minor rasa. But by this, the development of even a minor rasa, in its own course is not denied : "angino hi rasasya yāvān pariposas tāvān tasya na kartavyah, svatah-tu-sambhavi pariposah kena vāryate ?" (vrtti, on Dhv. III. 24).

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Ā. further adds that "etac ca āpeksikam prakarsa-yogitvam ekasya rasasya bahurasesu prabandheșu rasānām angángi-bhāvam anabhyupagacchatā’py aśakyapratiksepam ity anena prakāreņa a-virodhinām virodhinām ca rasānām angángibhāvena samāvese praband hesu syād a-virodhah." (vrtti, Dhv. III. 24)
"Thus no one - not even those who do not accept the principal and subsidiary relation of sentiments - can ever deny that a single sentiment will have principal importance, in spite of the fact that, the work may contain several sentiments also alongside of it. Thus too, the opposition of sentiments can be avoided in works by portraying such unopposed or opposed sentiments with due deference to the principal and subsidiary relationship." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 179, ibid) - :
After explaining the general rules concerning opposition to sentiments, Ā. comes to discuss specific means of overcoming opposition between two opposite sentiments. He observes : (vṛtti, before Dhv. III. 25) - "evam a-virodhinām virodhinam ca prabandhasthena anginā rasen samāvese sādhāranam avirodhópāyam pratipădya, idānīm virodha-visayam eva tam pratipādayitum idam ucyate." Now follows Dhv. III. 25, which reads as :
"viruddhaikā”śrayo yas tu virodhī sthāyino bhavet sa vibhinnáśrayah kāryas
tasya posépy adoșatā." "If a sentiment opposed to the principal one happens to occur in the same substratum as that of the latter itself, the opposed sentiment should be given a different substrtum; (once this is done) there will be no defect even if it should be treated in full." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 181, ibid)
Ā. further adds that the 'virodhi' i.e. opposite sentiments could fall into two types - (i) ekádhikaranya-virodhi or opposite of another, when in the same āśraya or substratum, and (ii) nairantarya-virodhi - i.e. opposition, when absolutely juxtaposed, i.e. opposition of another coming by its side. Now, as far as the major or principal rasa is concerned, if another sentiment also is found in the same substratum, i.e. if it acquires the same amount of importance with it, say, for example when vīra or heroic is the principal rasa and is developed with reference to hero, and in the same breath, and in the same substratum i.e. in the hero, the 'bhayānaka' or the terrible is also deployed, we will have an illustration of the first

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1027 type of opposition. Now in such cases the opposition can be removed if the substratum of the opposition is varied or changed. The bhayānaka should be delineated, say, with reference to the enemy of the hero who is himself the substratum of the vīra-rasa. When the poet arranges the design this way, no blamish will be seen even in the development of an opposite rasa. By describing that the enemy is terrified, actually the special glory of the hero will be all the more established. A. suggests that this is well illustrated in his own composition called "arjuna-vijaya”, wherein Arjuna, the hero enters the nether-world. As for the second type of opposition, A. observes :
"evam ekádhikaranya-virodhinah prabandhasthena sthāyinā rasena anga-bhāva gamane nirvirodhitvam yathā tathā darśitam. dvitīyasya tu tat-pratipādayitum ucyate -
"ekáśrayatve nirdoso nairantarye virodhavan, rasántara-vyavadhinā
raso vyangyaḥ sumedhasā.” (Dhv. III. 26) The manner of avoiding the opposition caused by a conflicting sentiment in the same substratum and of making it subsidiary to the principal sentiment in the work has been pointed out in the above text. The same is pointed out below with reference to opposite of the second variety :
“A sentiment which has no opposition due to the sameness of substratum, but which becomes an opposite of another (i.e. principal) sentiment coming closely beside it, should be so conveyed by the intelligent poet that a third sentiment will intervence between these conflicting ones." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 181, ibid)
Though there may not be any opposition between two rasas residing in the same substratum, but if the opposition is seen only when they are juxtaposed in the same substratum, then such two sentiments should be so introduced in a composition, that a common friendly third rasa is placed in between the two. The illustration is seen in the delineation of both śānta and śộngāra in the same substratum, viz. the hero Jimūtavāhana, but not at one and the same time, but with an interval, so to say, of adbhuta rasa, placed between the two.
A. here takes an opportunity to recommend an independent place for śānta-rasa even in a drama, for he and his follower Abhinavagupta are great

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA supporters of śānta-rasa. We will discuss this point later in this chapter when we consider the topic of the number of rasas accepted by various authorities and especially the position of śānta-rasa as an independent rasa.
For the present we will proceed with Ā. who illustrates the removal of second type of rasa-virodha by mentioning the case of Nāgānanda. To further support his position, A. observes : (Dhv. III. 27) -
“rasántarántaritayor eka-vākyasthayor api, nivartate hi rasayoḥ
samāvese virodhitā.” "By the intervention of another sentiment even the opposition of two sentiments in the same sentence will disappear.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 183, ibid) . There is no doubt that the opposition between two sentiments in a work will disappear by the intervention of a third rasa. For, it is observed that even the opposition between two sentiments in the same sentence also is seen to be removed when this principle of putting a common third rasa between the two is observed. Thus, in the illustration viz. "bhūrenu-digdhān nava-pārijāta." etc. from the Mahābhārata both śrngära and bībhatsa are delineated in the same sentence, of course, with an interval of vīra-rasa in between.
Ā. further suggests (Dhv. III. 28) that poets should solve the problem of opposition or otherwise in their composition. They have to be more watchful while treating śrngāra, for it is a very very delicate rasa. Even, the slightest error with reference to śrngāra is widely noticed immediately by experts. - "tatraiva ca rase, sarvebhyo’pi rasebhyaḥ saukumāryātiśaya-yogini kavir avadhānavān, prayatnavān syāt. tatra hi pramādyatas tasya sahşdaya-madhye kşipram eva avajñā-visayatā bhavati. śrngāra-raso hi samsārino niyamena anubhava-visayarvāt sarva-rasebhyah kamanīyatayā pradhānabhūtaḥ.” (vrtci, Dhv. III. 29) -
"The poet should be very attentive in regard to that sentiment as it is more delicate than every other sentiment. If he should carelessly falter in this sentiment, he will at once become a butt of contempt in the circle of refined critics. Erotic sentiment is invariably within the experience of all persons, it is not only the most charming but also the most important sentiment." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 187, ibid)

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1029 Thus, A. seems to establish the supremacy of 'rasa' in poetry and suggests that all other thought-currents promulgated in the field of literary criticism should have 'rasa' in the centre and that a poet has to be rasa-oriented in his efforts. Ā. observes
"evam rasā"dişu virodhá-virodha-nirūpaņasya upayogitvam pratipădya vyañjakavācya-vācaka-nirūpanasyā’pi tad-visayasya tat-pratipădyate -
"vācyānām vācakānām ca yad aucityena yojanam, rasā"di-visayeņaitad
karma mukhyam mahākaveḥ." (Dhv. III. 32) vācyānām iti-vștta-viśeşāņām vācakānām ca tad-viṣayāņām rasā”di-visayeņa aucityena yad yojanam etan mahākaver mukhyam karma. ayam eva hi mahākaver mukhyo vyāpāro yad rasā"dīnām eva mukhyatayā kāvyārthi-krtya tad vyakty anugunarvena śabdānām arthānām ca upanibandhanam."
"The usefulness of the treatment of opposition and non-opposition of sentiments has been explained above. In the following, the usefulness of the treatment of the expressed and the expressions also as are suggestive of sentiment is indicated :
"The main task of a first-rate poet lies in a proper marshalling of all the contents and the expressions in the direction of sentiments etc. (Dhv. III. 32)"
The main business of a first-rate poet is none other than the proper marshalling of both contents, i.e. plots, and expressions used in setting them forth, in the direction of sentiments, etc. In other words, the main function of the poet lies only in making one sentiment principal throughout the poem and in employing both words and senses only in such a way that the sentiment is suggested clearly." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 189, ibid)
We have suggested that we will deal with the problem of the number of rasas and the status of śānta-rasa by the end of this chapter. We will also take care of how different concepts such as those of guna, alamkāra, rīti, vrtci, dosa, laksana, etc. are also correlated to the pivotal concept of rasa in the Kashmirian school of thought in particular and Indian literary criticism in general. This we will do in the chapter that follows. But for the present, after having dealt with the first variety of criticism based classification in Ā. viz. dhvani kāvya, and there too rasa-dhvani in particular, now we will first proceed to deal with the other two types viz.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA gunībhūta-vyangya and citra kāvya, in A., to begin with. We propose to pick up this thread of three-fold criticism-based classification in other writers of the Kashmir School of thought, beginning with Mammața and ending with Jagannatha, next. First, we will see as below, how Mammata and others treat the first variety viz. dhvani kāyya.
Mammața, as we have seen earlier defines kāvya at K.P. I. 4 ab, and talks of dhvani (kāvya) at K.P. I. 4 cd as under :
"tad adoșau śabdárthau sa-guņávanalamksti punaḥ kvā’pi, .. idam uttamam atiśayini vyangye
vācyād, dhvanir budhaiḥ kathitaḥ.” (4 ab) - "It (i.e. poetry) consists of word and sense, which are without blemishes, possessed of excellences, and are, rarely, devoid of figures." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, K.P., pp. 9, ibid)
(4 cd). "This is best when the suggested meaning far excels the expressed sense; it is called 'dhvani' by the learned.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 11, ibid) - The vrtti on K.P. I. 4 reads as : "idam iti kävyam, budhair vaiyākarañaiḥ pradhānabhūta-sphoța-rūpa-vyangya-vyañjakasya śabdasya dhvanir iti vyavahāraḥ kṛtaḥ, tatas tanmatánusāribhir anyair api nyagbhāvita-vācya-vyangya-vyañjana-kşamasya śabdártha-yugalasya."
“ 'This' means a poem. By the learned i.e. the grammarians, the designation dhvani' is given to a (non-eternal, physical) word, suggestive of the suggested sense in form of 'sphota' (i.e. the eternal ideal form of word), which is the principal. Hence by others also, who follow their theory, (the designation 'dhvani' is given) to the pair of word and sense such as are capable of suggesting a sense that has subordinated the expressed sense. (Trans. R.C.D. pp. 11, ibid)
With reference to the predominance of the suggested sense, Mammaţa (= M.) goes for a three-fold classification on the lines suggested by A. and not only names them as dhvani, gunībhūta-vyangya and (citra or) avara, but calls them as ‘uttama' - the best, 'madhyama'-the mediocre or second rate, and 'avara'or the other, the last. In the ullāsa IV, he deals with the classification of dhvani, and in ullāsa V and VI, with that of guṇībhūta-vyangya and citra respectively.
It seems that as compared to his mentor, i.e. Ā., M. has given a comparatively more scientific classification of dhvani. In the K.P. also, 2 varieties of laksanā-mula

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1031 dhvani and 16 varieties of abhidhāmūla-dhvani make a total of 18. Now out of these, ubhayaśaktimüla is available in a sentence only i.e. vākyā-gata, and the rest are both pada-gata and vākya-gata, thus giving 34 more. Total reaches to 34 + 1 = 35 types. Now, the artha-śakty-uttha is available with reference to a whole composition, i.e. prabandha-gata also and this takes us to 35 + 12 = 47 types. The a-samlaksya-krama is also available in padámśa, racanā, varna and prabandha, thus giving, 4 more and taking us to 51 types of suddha-dhvani. Now on account of three-fold samkara and one variety of samsrsti, they reach a figure of 10404 and when 51 suddha types are added, the total comes to 10455. In A., following locana, we have 35 śuddha-bhedas which swell to 51 in M. Thus there are 16 more. These are possible in the sub-varieties of abhidhā-mula-dhvani i.e. vivaksitányaparavācyadhvani. On the one hand, the Locana explained 12 types of artha-śaktyudbhava amounting to 24 when taken as both pada-gata and vākyagata. But M. adds 12 more of prabandha-gata to these 24. Again, when the Locana, take śaktyuttha to be pada-gata and vākya-gata only, M. takes it to be udbhaya-gataalso. M. also takes sabda-śaktyuttha-dhvani to be vastu-vyangya and alamkāravyangya, and these two again both pada-gata and vākya-gata. Thus we have 5 more, i.e. 12 + 2 + 1 = 15. These 15 more are with reference to the samlaksyakrama-vyangya. Locana takes rasā"di-dhvani to be pada-gata, vākya-gata, varnagata, samghattanā-gata and prabandha-gata, but M. adds one more i.e.
laika-deśa-gata. Thus M. has 16 more types making the total of suddha-dhvanibheda to be thus 51, as against 35 of Locana.
Hemacandra and Jayadeva follow the suit of M., though Jayadeva has a longer discussion on varieties and sub-varieties. Jayadeva has given certain new names also. Vidyādhara in the third unmesa (= chapter) of his Ekāvali discusses dhvani-prapanca in details. Normally rasā"di-dhvani is held to be of a single type, but Vidyadhara takes it to be eight-fold. Vidyānātha just refers to the 51 varieties as given by M. While M. arrivers at 10455 varieties through multiplication method, Vidyānātha and Viśvanāta restrict the number to 5355, through samkalanamethod. It may be noted that Viśvanātha totally rejects the citra-kāvya, as it is bereft of rasa according him. He supports M. by saying that it is necessary to take kavi-praud hokri-siddha and kavi-nibaddha-vaktr-prandhokti-siddha as two separate varieties, but Jagannātha takes this as useless or 'a-kiñcit-kāra.' Keśavamiśra following the dhvani-tradition, taking the principal status of vyangya, or otherwise into consideration, gives a three-fold classification of poetry such as uttama, madhyama and adama. This is acceptance of M.'s thinking. Appayya Dixit has

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA given a very subtle discussion on only 'citra' varieties, i.e. of alamkāras only, in his Citra-mīmāmsā, but he was basically a dhvanivādin to the core. He, in available documents therefore does refer to the other two types of poetry such as 'dhvani' and 'guņābhūta-vyangya' also.
For Jagannātha (= J.), in place of the threefold classification of Ā. and M., we come across a four-fold scheme such as uttamottama, uttama, madhyama and avara.
Uttamottama is one (R.G. pp. 9) - in which both sabda/sound and artha/ meaning get subordinated and suggest a charming meaning : "śabdárthau yatra gunībhāvitā”tmānau kam apy artham abhi-vyanktaḥ, tad ādyam.” This is almost similar to the definitions given by Ā. and M. It may be noted that J. takes the condition of "Camatkāra" or "Surprise" i.e. the feeling of extraordinary, as the major decisive factor and mentions the same in the definition. By 'kam-api' he exactly means this. J. observes (R.G. pp. 31, Edn. RBA) : “kam api iti. camatkệtibhūmim tena ati-ghūdha-sphuţa-vyangyayor nirāsaḥ. aparánga-vācyasiddhyanga-vyangyasya api camatkāritayā tad vāraṇāya gunībhāvitā”tmānau iti svāpekṣayā, vyangya-prādhānyábhiprāyakam. Thus 'kam-api' means "source of camatkāra” and this excludes 'atighūdha' or too much concealed suggestion, or indistinct, and also 'sphuta i.e. non-concealed or distinct suggestion. These two types of suggestion are devoide of charm. Now, argues J. further, if 'chmatkāra' alone is taken as the characteristic of uttamakávya, then 'vācya-siddhyanga' i.e. suggestion that is subserivent establishment of the expressed meaning, and 'aparánga' or that which is subservient to another (sense), also would walk in the field of 'uttamottama.' as these two varieties have a suggested sense which are gifted with 'camatkāra' or 'surprise'. All dhvanis of rasa, rasā”bhāsa, bhāva, bhāvā”bhāsa etc. fall under this type of poetry. We can equate J.'s 'uttamottama' roughly with the 'uttama' of M. and the Kashmir School of thought in general.
Actually his second and third types attract close observation. 'Uttama' is the second type of poetry which according to J. has the vyangya' i.e. suggested sense no doubt charming but is in itself subordinate to śabda or artha or both. J. observes, (pp. 53, ibid) : "yatra vyangyam apradhānam eva sac camatkārakāraṇam, tad dvitīyam. - vācyápekṣayā pradhānībhūtam, vyangyántaram ādāya guņābhūtam vyangyam ādāya ati-vyāpti-vāraṇāya avadhāraṇam. tena tasya dhvanitvam eva. līna-vyangya-vācya-citrā'tiprasanga-vāraṇāya 'camatkāra' ity adi."

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1033 Thus, for J. We have "uttama” type of kāvya, when vyangya, though subordinate in itself, is the cause of 'Camatkāra' or surprise. J. feels that in the special variety of gunībhūta-vyangya viz. aparánga-vyangya, the (first) vyangya is principal so far as it is compared with the expressed sense, but is subordinate when placed against the second suggested sense, and hence it should be taken as 'dhvani' kāvya. Now to avoid 'ati-vyāpti' of 'uttama' in such illustrations, J. has used "eva" or emphasis in the definition. If may be noted that in illustrations of alamkāras such as rasa-vat and the like, the 'vyangya' is principal as compared to the expressed sense but subordinate as compared to the other suggested rasa. The 'camatkāra' caused by the first vyangya is not as great as the one caused by the second vyangya.
J. has included the term 'camatkāra-kāranam' in the definition of uttamakāvya. Now this condition is meant to exclude līna-vyangya i.e. very feeble suggested sense, i.e. one where vyangya is almost fainted. Such a condition prevails in 'vācya-citra' type i.e. the illustrations of "arthálamkāras”. Now J. criticised M.'s definition of 'gunībhūta-vyangya' type, which runs as : "a-tāděsi gunībhūtavyangyam, vyangye to madhyamam" - i.e. "But when the suggested meaning is unlike that (i.e. is not principal), it (poetry) is called "mediocre” wherein the suggested becomes subordinate." By ‘atādrśi' i.e. "unlike that” means “not far excelling the expressed sense.” (Trans. R.C.D. pp. 13, ibid)
Now it may be observed here that J. strikes to distinguish between the fact of a subordinated suggested sense which in itself is superior to the expressed on one hand, and a subordinated sense which is inferior from the point of charm to the expressed sense. In the first variety fall all emotion-based alamkāras such as rasavat, preya, ürjasvi and samāhita and in the second fall such alamkāras as samāsókti, aprastuta-prašamsā, paryāyokta etc. For M. both of these were gunībhūta-vyangya, for in them a suggested sense, viz. rasa-bhāvā"di in the first, and any suggested sense viz. rasa, vastu or alamkāra - becomes subordinate to another sense, be it again vyangya or vācya. M. explains ‘aparánga-vyangya' variety of gunībhūta-vyangya i.e. madhyama kavya as, “aparasya rasā"der vācyasya vā vākyarthibhūtasya angam rasā"di anuranana-rūpam vā." i.e. "To another i.e. to rasa and the like or the expressed meaning which has become the purport of the sentence, is subservient the rasa and the like, or the reverberation.” (Trans. R.C.D. 141, ibid). Prof. Dr. R. C. Dwivedi adds in a foot-note here (pp. 141, ibid) - "In 'Aparanga' the term 'apara' refers to 'rasā"di' and the expressed meaning principally denoted by a sentence. The term 'anga' refers to the rasā"di and the expressed

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA meaning principally denoted by a sentence. The term 'anga' refers to the rasā”di and the reverberating suggestion. Thus 'aparánga' is that wherein ‘rasā”di' or the reverberating suggestion becomes subservient to rasā”di and the expressed sense, principally denoted by a sentence."
But J. seems to be clearer here. He observes that if one rasa, say śrngāra is subordinate to another rasa which is principle, say karuna (as in the illustration viz. "ayam sa raśanotkarşī” etc.), ultimately some rasa-or suggested sense is principal and hence this should be taken as "dhvani" of the ancients. In fact we have 'karuna-dhvani' in this example. But the charm of suggested śrngāra also can not be denied. So, such examples should be taken out as a separate class from others such as the arthálamkāras-paryāyokta and the rest-where suggested sense is subordinated to an expressed sense, i.e. the charm of the expressed is rated higher as compared to whatever suggested sense is apprehended. In the first variety (i.e. in rasavad ādi alamkāras, illustrated by the example viz. "ayam sa rašanotkarśī.” etc.), the expressed sense is not at all more charming then both the subordinated and the principal suggested emotive sense or rasā"di. These should not be therefore clubbed together as done by Mammata and others. So, J. gives ‘uttama' as second variety of kavya, and 'gunībhūta-vyangya' as the third.
We can argue that here also from the ultimate point of view some rasā"di make for the principal suggested sense, then why not call it "uttamottama” ?. But J. feels that, of course, here the principal suggested sense in form of some rasā"di is charming enough to be designated as "dhvani-kāvya” of the ancients, but in this variety, it is the subordinated suggested rasā"di, which is superior to the expressed steals the thunder as compared to the principal suggested rasā"di. It is like Sachin Tendulkar's double century, even when his side, i.e. the India XI, looses a test match. Now, this sort of an experience of the refined and cultured critics cannot be denied. It is therefore that J. splits the original gunībhūta-vyangya of the dhvanivādins into two, i.e. 'uttama' and 'madhyama'.
J. tries to draw a line of distinction between uttamottama and uttama by observing that the camatkāra caused by the former is greater than the one caused by the latter, for 'vyangya' is pradhāna in one, and a-pradhāna in another, both being 'camatkāra-kāri' in their own way.
The point is that when M. says that one rasa is subordinated to another rasa as in ‘aparánga' variety, he does not name which rasa is the ultimate source of charm. If in the example, "ayam sa raśamotkarsi', the karuna is believed to be the

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1035
-
ultimate source or principal source of charm, the example should be placed under 'dhvani', and if 'śṛngāra' is said to be also charming or equally or more charming then we feel there is contradiction. Ultimately a poetry is to be classed as this or that by the position of principal source of charm. If this lies with the expressed and not with the vyangya it has to be termed guṇībhūta-vyangya. For J. the problem arises when both the subordinated and the principal senses are 'vyangya' in themselves. Then one variety gives uttamottama and another gives 'uttama'. But, be sure his uttamottama is not absolutely identical with 'dhvani' of the ancients in the sense that his 'uttama' also is 'dhvani'. In a way even J. is confusing things. But we have given an example from practical life where we see Sachin's best innings studed with a double century goes in vain when his side loses the match. On his part, M. also is not clear when he does not point out which one, i.e. the subordinated śṛngāra or the finally suggested karuna is a greater source of charm; so, both J. and M. are in a way confusing. Actually J. observes about these two types i.e. uttamottama and uttama, that (pp. 54, R. G. Edn. Athavale, ibid): "anayor bhedayor anapahnavanīya-camatkāryor api prādhānyāprádhānyábhyām asti kaścit sahṛdaya-vedyo viśesah" - i.e. here the phrase "pradhanyápradhanyábhyām" should be taken to mean "camatkārasya prädhānyapradhanyābhyām" and not vyangyasya-prādhinyapradhanyābhyām." True, so far so good. But what if we say that whatever causes highest camatkāra is to be taken as "pradhāna." or principal. In this case J.'s uttama also will become uttamottama, for the 'vyangya' causing highest camatkāra can never be taken as 'subordinated'. But, one point goes in favour of J., and it is that, like Sachin's century in a losing side, though subordinated from the point of view of victory of the other side, is a source of delight for the refined observes; so also here there is "kaścit sahṛdaya-vedyo viseṣaḥ."
It may be observed that our argument is somewhat akin to Badrinath Jha's Comm. 'Candrika'.
Jha (p. 66, Candrika; R.G. (Edn. '55)) suggests that there is some kind of difference like what may be called pradhānībhūta-vyangya and 'guṇībhūtavyangya, between the uttamottama and the uttama types. Shri Jha feels that J.'s observation goes against the opinion of A. who wrote: "cārutvótkarṣa-nibandhānā hi vācya-vyangyayoḥ pradhanya-vyavasthā. We have also observed to the same effect as above. Jhas words are read as: "idam punar atra vicāraṇīyam 'carutvótkarṣa-nibandhana hi vācya-vyangyayoḥ prādhānya-vivakṣā' iti dhvanikāránuśāsane jāgrati, vyangyasya yadi iha vācyápekṣaya camatkārótkarṣaḥ,

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
tarhi na aprādhānyam, atha ca aprādhānyam, tarhi na camatkārótkarṣah. yadi ca vyangyasya camatkārótkarṣépi vācyópapādakataya angatvam iṣyate, tadā tad angatvam api a-kiñcitkaram, camatkārótkarṣa-nibandhanasya siṣṭa-paripāțisammata-prādhānyasya tathā'pi a-vyāhatatvāt.
kiñca, yatra tulya-camatkārā"dhāyakatvena vācya-vyangyayoḥ samam sandigdham vā prādhānyam, tayor guṇībhūta-vyangya-prakārayor bhavanmate kutrántarbhavaḥ ? na ca avyaptir eṣitum śakyate, "brāhmaṇātikramatyāgaḥ bhatām eva bhūtaye, jämadagnyaś ca vo mitram anyatha durmanāyate." "harstu kiñcit parilupta-dhairyaś candrodayā"rambha ivamburāśiḥ, umāmukhe bimba-phaládharosthe vyāpārayāmāsa vilocanāni."
camatkāra-apalāpa-anarhatvena, madhyama-kāvyatāyāḥ sarva
ityanayoś sammata-tvāt."
The Candrikākāra has made an additional point in raising a question as to how J. will deal with those varieties of guṇībhūtavyangya of the Kashmir School of M., wherein both vācya and vyangya have equal-sama-prominance, or wherein the prominance of either is in a doubtful state ?
The best course was laid perhaps by the, we may use the term, "logicianālamkarika" - Mahimabhaṭṭa who was very clear that between väcya and vyangya (or 'anumeya' as he calls it), the latter is necessarily more charming and therefore no question ever arises of a “guṇībhūta-vyangya❞ Viśvanatha goes half way when he rejects 'citra' as a type of poetry at all, for according to him poetry without any charm whatsoever of a suggested sense is no poetry at all. This is, in a way recognising halfheartedly the ever-supreme-status of vyangya as advocated by Mahimā.
So, the crux of the problem results into this viz. that either you classify poetry on the basis of the position of vyangya only, or on the basis of camatkārapradhanya only. But there is bound to be some confusion if your concept of 'pradhanya' is not clear.
Prof. Dr. P. Sri. Ramachandrudu (pp. 72, ibid) observes - "But what all PR. (Pundita-Rāja) wants to show here is a kind of sama-vyāpti between 'vyangyaprādhānya-prādhānya' and 'camatkāra-prādhānya-prādhānya' (wherever there is camatkara-prādhānya, there is vyangya-prādhānya and vice-versa.). That he gives ultimate importance to camatkara is evident from his incidental remark (while explaining the verse, "śayitā savidhe." etc.): "camatkāro na syāt ity asyaiva

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1037 badhakarvāt" (R.G. p. 11). Moreover, the scope of Camatkāra is wider because it can be associated with vācya and śabda etc. also, and applying this only as a measuring rod, he excludes the sabda-citra from the scope of kāvya." Actually, we feel that even this defence also cannot save J. from the confusion he has landed himself in. Again, by arguing that the scope of camatkāra is wider, Ramachandrdu seems to accept it even at the sabda-citra level, as done by, of course implicitly, Kuntaka, whose vicitrā abhidhā theoretically covers even sabda-citra. Now, let us see what J. has to say about madhyamakāvya. For J. madhyama
is that type of poetry, where the expressed sense (vācyārtha) alone is charming inspite of the presence of negligible vyangya. J. observes : "vyangya camatkāra-asamānádhikarano vācya-camatkāras tộtīyam.” - i.e. the third type of poetry (i.e. madhyama) is that wherein 'vācyártha-camatkāra' i.e. surprise (on account of beauty) caused by the expressed sense does not stay on equal footing (i.e. in the same location). (i.e. in itself it is placed higher) as compared to vyangyacamatkāra.
All the instances of poetry with expressed figures of speech such as utpreksā and the like, fall under this variety. In this context J. observes that even in such figures, there is a touch of some vyangya, of course negligible, and only its presence makes the vācya charming. J. observes : “yathā yamunā-varnane - 'tanaya maināka-gavesana-lambīksta-jaladhi-jathara-pravista-himagiri- bhujāyamānāyā bhagavatyā bhāgīrathyāḥ sakhi - iti.
atra utpreksā vācyā eva camatkệti-hetuḥ. śvaitya-pātāla-tala-cumbitvā”dīnām camatkāro leśataya san api utprekşā-camatkşti-jathara-nilīno nāgariketara-nāyikākalpita-kāśmīra-dravánga-rāga-nigirņo nijánga-gaurimeva pratīyate.
na tādņśósti kópi vācyárthaḥ yo manāg anámssta-pratīyamāna eva svato ramanīyatām ādhātum prabhavati-anayor eva dvitīya-trtīya-bhedayor jāgarūka-ajāgarūka-gunībhūta-vyangyayoḥ pravistam nikhilam alamkāra-pradhānam kāvyam.” (pp. 58, 59, R.G. Edn. Athavale, ibid).
Thus, for J., madhyama kāvya is that wherein the expressed sense-vācyárthaalone is charming eventhough there is almost negligible presence of some vyangyai.e. suggested sense also. All examples of poetry with figures of speech such as utprekṣā and the like fall under this class. J. observes that even in all such alamkāras there has to be some touch of vyangya', though very faint. But it is the presence of even such negligible vyangya that makes the vācya charming. Thus, instead of placing all figures of sense i.e. arthálamkāras under one group of ‘avara'

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA or 'adhama' class as done by Mammața, J. chooses to promote some of these, with a faint but clear touch of vyangya sense, to the class of 'madhyama' or gunībhūta vyangya. Thus for J., samsókti, paryāyokta, and such other arthálamkāras with a distinct fragrance of vyangya, are part of madhyama kāvya.
J. makes a subtle distinction of absolutely clear presence (jāgarūka-gunībhūtavyangya) of a distinct subordinated suggested sense and also indistinct or hazy presence of a subordinated suggested sense (i.e. a-jāgarūka.) The former is seen in 'uttama' class and the latter in the 'madhyama' class. But J. is very clear that these - both classes - are never placed in the 'adhama' class. J., it seems, is generous as compared to M. and Viśvanātha (= V.) in recognising the merits of both emotionbased alamkāras, i.e. rasavad etc., and alamkāras gifted with the fragrance of subordinated suggested sense. M., V. and a host of others had placed them all under 'adhama' variety, not doing justice to their special charm and status. M. had called both arthálamkāras and śabdálamkāras as 'artha-citra' and 'sabda-citra', and branded them as 'adhama' or 'avara' due to the predominance of vācya i.e. expressed sense.
J. defines the ‘adhama kāvya' as - "yatra artha-camatkştir upaskrtā sabdacamatkřtih pradhānam, tad adhamam caturtham." - i.e. where the charm caused by śabda i.e. sound aided by the charm caused by sense (artha) is principal, we have the fourth type of poetry.”
We know that M. has placed both artha-citra and sabda-citra in the same class, viz. 'adhama-kavya'. J. observes that to place both these in the same class is not proper and hence for him adhana kävya is seen where the charm of words, graced by the charm of meaning or sense, is principal. For J. only sabda-camatkrti, totally divorced of artha-camatkrti does not make for kāvya at all.
J. makes further point when he observes : (pp. 59, R.G. Edn. Athavale, ibid) : "yady api yatra artha-camatkşti-sāmānya-śunyā sabda-camatkrtis tat pañcamam adhamádhamam api kävya-vidhāsu ganayitum ucitam. yathā ekākṣara-padya ardhávrtti-yamaka-padmabandhā”di. tathā’pi ramanīyártha-pratipădaka-sabdatārūpa-kāvya-sāmānya-laksana-anākrāntatayā vastutaḥ kavyatva-abhāvena mahākavibhih prácīna-paramparām anurundhānais tatra tatra kāvyesu nibanddham api na asmābhir gaṇitam, vastu-sthiter eva anurodhyatvāt.”
(pp. 59, Athavale Edn. R.G. ibid) J. suggests that some feel that a class of poetry where there is charm of sound only, without the charm of sense which remains as a common factor, should be

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1039 added as a fifth variety of poetry viz. adhamádhama : But J. does not accept this. Such type of poetry as illustrated in say, ekākşarī śloka, or verse having only one letter all through the poem, or in ardhāvrtti yamaka, or padma-bandha or such other varieties, is no poetry at all, for the general definition of poetry framed by J., such as · "ramaniya-artha-pratipādaka-śabdah kāvyam” is violated here. Eventhough ancient great poets (such as Bhāravi and Māgha, and some others) who followed ancient traditions which they inherited, did write such poetry, but J. has not respected the tradition, following of course the basic fact of 'ramanīyaartha' being very much there as indispensable for real poetry.
J. also criticises M. and some others when he observes that some people do not accept the four-fold classification as given by him and give only a three-fold classification. But for these critics, observes J., both sabda-citra and artha-citra are supposed to be without any suggested sense - "sabda-citram vācya-citram avyangyam tv avaram smrtam”. But J. feels that both of these should not be clubbed together as 'we do observe in citra-kāvyas the position of superior or inferior quality. J. puts a question as to which man of taste worth his salt, will place at the same level the two illustrations such as - "vinirgatam mānadam ātma-mandirāt", and "svacchandocchalad." etc. ? And, asks J., when there is a marked difference observed between these two, if one were to place them in the same class, then why should we unnecessarily press for the separateness of dhvani and gunibhūta- - vyangya which have a slight difference between them ? J. concludes that in illustrations of poetry, where we find both the charm of word and sense together, there one has to decide about their major or minor position and take decision about their class, and name them accordingly. But where the two types of charm are absolutely equal, it has to be taken as 'madhyama' type of poetry.
J. further classifies dhvani as follows : (pp. 64, R.G., Edn. Athavale, ibid) - "tatra dhvaner uttamottamasya a-samkhya-bhedasya api sāmānyataḥ ke'pi bhedāḥ nirūpyante : dvividho dhvanih, abhidhāmūlo laksanāmülas' ca. tatra adyas trividhaḥ rasa-vastv-alamkāra-dhvanibhedāt. rasa-dhvanir ity-alaksya-kramópa lakṣaṇāt rasa-bhāva-tadābhāsa-bhāvaśānti-bhāvodaya-bhāvasamdhi-bhāvaśabalatvānām grahaham 1. dvitīyaśca dvividhah, ar vācyo'tyanta-tirasketa-vācyaś ca. evam pañcā”tmake dhvanau parama-ramanīyatayā rasadhvanes tadātmā rasas tāvad abhidhīyate."
Thus J. does not go further beyond the basic types of dhvani as enumerated by Ā. But he goes like M., a step further also in quoting various theories regarding the rasa-nispatti-prakriyā, as done by M., following of course Abhinavagupta.

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
J. has given eleven different views concerning the topic of rasa-realisation.
In the beginning he has clarified his position concerning the nature of rasa, as experienced in poetry and drama. For this, he seems to have given like M., a summary of what Abhinavagupta has to say in his commentary on the NS. Abhinavagupta, before arriving at his own view has summarized the views of some of his predecessors. J. has given all this with greater depth. We will pick up J.'s views on rasa-realisation in a separate chapter on rasa when we will exclusively deal with the topic of rasa. For the present we will just quote some of his words and conclude this chapter on classification of poetry from the point of view of criticism i.e. by suggesting criticism-oriented three-fold classification. J. observes (pp. 64, ibid) "samucita-lalita-sanniveśa-cāruṇā kāvyena samarpitaiḥ, sahṛdayahṛdayam pravistaiḥ, tadīya-sahṛdayatā-saha-kṛtena, bhāvanā-viseṣa-mahimnā vigalita-duşyanta-ramaṇītvā"dibhir alaukika-vibhāvánubhāva-ālambana-kāraṇaiḥ, aśrupātā❞di-kāryaiḥ, cinta"dibhiḥ sahakāribhiśca sambhūya prādurbhāvitena alaukikena vyāpāreņa tatkala-nivartitā”nandāmśā-varaṇājñānena ata eva pramustaparimita-pramātṛtvā"di-nijadharmeņa pramātrā sva-prakāśatayā vāstavena nijasvarūpā❞nandena saha gocarīkriyamāṇaḥ prāg-viniviṣṭa-vāsanārūpo ratyādir eva rasaḥ."
"Poetry rendered charming by beautiful construction offers the vibhāvā❞dis to the cultured critics. These vibhāvā"dis enter the heart of the critics, and by an aesthetic chewing-bhāvanā-aided by their refined taste, these vibhāvā"dis shun their local individuality. Thus, Śakuntala, for example ceases her status of being an individual wife of some king Dusyanta. Thus Śakuntalā, the heroine and Dusyanta, the hero come out of their individual colouring and context and become a woman and a man, not qualified by limitations of the form of personal relationships. Thus their form turns into a de-individualised form. These factors, i.e. the hero and the heroine etc. who are normally termed as causes of love etc. are now termed as 'vibhāva' or determinant, ‘anubhava' or consequents and 'vyabhicārins' or ancillary feelings in kavya (or natya, i.e. in the field of art in general). Now, with the help of these alambana-vibhāvas i.e. basic causes such as Dusyanta, Śakuntala and the like, uddīpana-vibhāvas i.e. promoting causes such as moon-light and the like, and ancillaries such as brooding over the other person-cinta-and the like, - i.e. with their judicious combined presentation in poetry or drama, through the power of suggestion which is an extra-worldly function i.e. alaukika-vyāpāra, the lid of avidyā or ignorance that covers the foundation of supreme bliss (ānandāmśa) of the enjoyer (i.e. the cultered critic, or reader or spectator as the case may be), is

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1041 immediately removed and the enjoyer whose limitations of local worldly personality are removed, i.e. whose personalised factors are removed (maryādita-pramātstva thus being removed), he grows into a higher self and enjoys the self-evident and real aspect of his own self and along with this joy he chews the impersonalised emotions such as rati and the like; - this basic emotion, of unconditioned bliss is rasa - and this has been implanted in his own self since times immemorial i.e. from an unlimited number of previous births. This impression-vāsanā-which is the object of relish-is rasa.
We will go into the theoretical discussion on rasa later, in separate chapters when we will deal with the concept of rasa in the works of Bharata, Bhāmaha and other alamkārikas who preceeded .. and also in the works of those who followed Ā., such as Kuntaka, Dhananjaya and the rest and then M. and others. For the present we come to the end of criticism-based classification of poetry; here the first variety. Naturally, this sort of classification, which does not take into account the fact of external form such as prose or verse, etc., also has to evolve a convincing design wherein, with dhvani or rasa-dhvani in the centre, other concepts such as guna, dosa, alamkāra, rīti, vrtti and the rest are also accomodated in the field of literary criticism. We will go into this consideration later. But in the chapter that follows we will deal with the attitude of Kuntaka. Bhoja etc. towards dhvani and also pick up the other two varieties of criticism-based classification such as the gunībhūta-wangya and citra-kavya.

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Chapter XII
Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya.
We have examined the concept of dhvani-rasa-dhvani in A. and his followers belonging to his Kashmir School of thought. These writers included the Locanakāra Abhinavagupta to begin with, followed by Mammața, Hemacandra, Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha, Viśvanatha, Jayadeva. Appayya and Jagannata to name some of them. The approach of these writers is identical and is in keeping with what A. laid down.
But among the successors of A. there were some who were the predecessors of M., such as Kuntaka, Dhananjaya-Dhanika, Bhoja and Mahimabhaṭṭa, who were of course posterior to Abhinavagupta, yet declined to follow the dictates of A. and Abhinavagupta. They tried to treat dhvani in their own way. They had the inheritance, not only of A. and Abhinavagupta, but that of the earlier masters such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, Udbhata, Vamana and Rudrața also. They had before them the thought-currents of guna, alamkāra, lakṣaṇa, rīti, vṛtti etc. before them. Some of them overlooked vyañjanā or even opposed the same, tooth and nail. It will be very interesting to study their approach to the fact of dhvani-rasa-vyañjanā, and then to see how A. had tried to keep space for all the thought currents in his catholic and almost all pervasive approach, followed by great thinkers such as Mammața, Hemacandra, Viśvanatha and Jagannatha. This we will discuss in the next Chapter i.e. in Ch. XIII. The voice of the four viz. Kuntaka, Dhañjaya/Dhanika, Bhoja and Mahima along with the humdrum advanced by Mukula and Pratihārendurāja drowned deep into the larger music of the followers of A. We have seen the views of the earlier alamkarikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin, Udbhata, Vamana and Rudrața, in an earlier chapter (i.e. Ch. IV) in which we discussed the approach of these ancient writers towards dhvani, or better say, implicit sense - "pratiyamānártha" in general. So, we will not repeat the same over here. However, we will take a brief resume of their views here also as they serve as the background for the thoughts seen in Kuntaka and Bhoja.

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Dhvani in earlier ālamkārikas such as Bhāmaha and the rest :
We have noticed (Ch. IV above) that the concept of dhvani, though not named as such in clear terms, is seen in the works of earlier alamkārikas and we have treated it as an element of implicit sense or pratiyamāna artha, as lying hidden in some of the alamkāras or gunas as treated by the earlier masters. Thus, in Bhāmaha II. 34, there is mentioning of 'guņa-sāmya-pratīti' - i.e. apprehension of similarity in qualities, which is stated implicitly and is not directly expressed. Thus, there is 'gamyamāna-aupamya' i.e. suggested similarity referred to here. At II. 79, Bhāmaha discusses 'samāsokti' as a figure in which through direct expression, some other sense, is implied. He observes, "yatrokte gamyate'nyorthah.” Bhāmaha says that an idea, totally different, though similar, (tatsamāna-viśeşanah) is suggested by saying something. In paryāyokta, at III. 8; 9, Bhämaha mentions instances of expressions that are obviously meant to give a different meaning. The direct expression or abhidhāna contains a meaning not sought to be conveyed directly - "yad anyena prakāreņa abhidhiyate." In apahnuti also, at III. 21, the idea of similarity is only implied - “kimcid antargatopamā."
In the Kāvyādarśa of Dandin also, the author reads a guna called udāra, which in the first variety has the suggestion of a quality by description which is suggestive : Kā I. 76 and I. 78 are read as -
utkarsavān gunaḥ kaścit
yasmin ukte pratīyate - I. 76-a and,
iti tyāgasya vākyésmin
utkarşaḥ sādhu lakṣyate. I. 78. The element of implicit sense is clearly read here. We have gone into greater details in the Ch. IV as noticed about. However, at II. 303, Dandin observes :
“pūrvatrā”saya-māhātmyam atrábhyudaya-gauravam, su-vyañjitam iti vyaktam
udātta-dvayam apy adaḥ.” Dandin here almost knocks on the doors of vyañjanā-dhvani, though of course not theoretically giving a chiseled terminology as coined by Ā. We have seen in Ch. IV how in various alamkāras, earlier ācāryas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. have incorporated perhaps not knowingly, the element of implicit sense. Most

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1044
SAHĶDAYĀLOKA noteworthy is the instance of paryāyokta in Udbhata where an ‘avagama' prakāra, which is beyond the power of direct expression, is clearly mentioned, and most probably this takes us to the fringes of vyañjanā-dhvani, though of course the followers of Mahimā may try to read 'anumiti' here. Udbhața observes :
"paryāyoktam yad anyena prakāreņā bhidhīyate, vācya-vācaka-vșttibhyām
śūnyena avagamā”tmanā.” We may say, perhaps this is an under-current of vyañjanā pure and simple, and Mammața's concept of paryāyokta is dangerously close to the one read in Udbhasa.
Rudrata's bhāvālamkāra also seems to contain implicit sense and so also his samāsókti, anyokti and the rest, in keeping with his predecessors' concepts of such alamkāras. Ānandavardhana clearly states that Udbhata was conversant with implied rūpaka and other alamkāras : "anyatra vācyatvena prasiddho yo rūpakādir alamkārah, sónyatra pratiyamānatayā pradarśitaḥ tatrabhavadbhiḥ bhattódbhatā"dibhiḥ.” 'dibhih' here obviously covers Udbata's predecessors such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and the like.
The Locana also observes : tad ayam arthaḥ - vācyálamkāra-viśeșa-visayépi anyólamkāra-viśeşah bhāti ity udbhatā”dibhiḥ uktam, ity artha-śaktyā alamkāro vyajyata iti tair upagatam eva. kevalam te alamkāra-lakṣaṇa-kāratvād vācyálamkāraviśesa-visayatvena āhuḥ, iti bhāvah."
There were some who consciously or unconsciously tried to subsume dhvani, or rasa-dhvani under various heads such as some alamkāras as noticed above, and also under rasavad-ādi alamkāras, i.e. the group of emotion-based alamkāras. Pratihāréndurāja, as we will go to observe while treating dhvani-virodha, is consciously fighting against the acceptance of dhvani when he observes in his commentary on Udbhața that - sa (= pratīyamānaḥ) kasmād iha na upadistaḥ ? ucyate, eșy eva alamkāreşu antarbhāvāt.” Vastudhvani is incorporated under paryāyókta alamkāra. He even goes for a pada-gata-paryāyóktálamkāra i.e. paryāyókta read in a single word and subsumes such illustrations of dhvani as illustrated in "rāmósmi sarvam sahe", under this type.
We have noticed earlier that Ā. refers to some of his pūrvā"cārayas who perhaps subsumed dhvani under guņavrtti or secondary power of a word. He observes : "tathā’pi guna-víttyā kāvyeșu vyavahāram darśayatā dhvani-mārgo manāk

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1045
spṛṣṭaḥ...", but it was not 'lakṣitaḥ', i.e. they did not supply a logical definition of dhvani though they, perhaps tumbled upon unknowingly the fringes of dhvani while treating the secondary usage of language. Here, the Locana observes: (Dhv. I. i) "bhaṭṭódbhaṭa-vāmanā”dinā. bhāmahenóktam, 'śabdas' cchandóbhidhānárthāḥ..." ity abhidhānasya sabdad bhedam vyākhyātum bhaṭṭódbhato babhāṣe - "śabdánām abhidhānam abhidha-vyāpāraḥ, mukhyo gunavṛttiś ca" - vāmanópi "sādṛśyāllakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ" - iti. manāk spṛṣṭa iti, tais tāvad dhvani-dig unmīlitā."
We have examined the treatment of pratīyamāna artha in the pūrvā❞cāryas and also their acquaintance with various śabda-vṛttis in greater details in earlier chapters, viz. Ch.s III and IV. So, we will not go further here.
We will look into Kuntaka and Bhoja here, especially with reference to their attitude towards dhvani. Kṣemendra, the protagonist of the so called aucitya-school was a disciple of Abhinavagupta and therefore he is a dhvanivädin to the core.
Actually even Kuntaka is taken as a pracchanna-dhvanivāḍin and therefore ācāryas of the dhvani school, beginning from Abhinavagupta and Mammaţa onwards, spare him the brunt of their attack on dhvani-virodhin. We may choose to call Kuntaka a "mānasaputra" of A., and though perhaps he was a senior contemporary of Abhinavagupta, we do not read much in Abhinavagupta to suggest convincingly that he did know Kuntaka. This we say with the full. knowledge of what our respected senior friend Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy has suggested. One thing for sure is that Kuntaka is spared in their attack on opponents, by dhvanivādins later. So, Kuntaka's vakrokti-vicara has much in common with dhvani theory. We will try to critically examine the theories of vakrokti and dhvani and try to find out the areas of agreement and disagreement. Actually, it is an attempt, so to say, at Kuntaka's reappraisal.
We start with a querry viz. "was Kuntaka a dhvanivādin or not? Was he an opponent of Dhvani? The answer to the first question is both 'yes' and 'no'. The answer to the second question is 'no', pure and simple!
It may be noted that Kuntaka (= K.) refers to 'Dhvanikara' directly and also to his theory of dhvani indirectly at VJ. II. 9 while illustrating 'rūḍhi-vaicitrya-vakratā as in "tālā jāanti guņā." etc., an illustration accepted from A. (It may be noted that all our references to the Vakrokti-jivita i.e. VJ. are to the edn. of Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy, pub. Karnatak Uni. Dharwad, Dec. '77). Here K. observes "yasmāt dhvanikāreņa vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāvo'tra sutarām samarthitas tat kim punaruktyena ?" The reference speaks for itself. This makes him almost a disciple

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA of Ā. The whole text of his VJ. is replete with references to ..'s views. At places where he explains a number of varieties of vakratā, he seems to give a new name to the varieties of dhvani, say it is old wine in new bottles, and he illustrates these, very often, with instances accepted from the Dhv. At all these places, he does not choose to refer to or mention 'vyañjanā' by name, a term itself never used by him, though of course, he uses terms such as, "pratiyate", "lokóttarātiśayā'dhyāropam garbhīkrtya" (Under I. 19, pp. 29) etc. Instead, he has, what he calls, “vicitrā abhidhā, and we had earlier an occasion to observe minutely what exactly is meant by K. by this terminology in our Ch. V on abhidhā. This vicitrā abhidhā' for K., seems to include in its wider fold all sabda-vrttis viz. abhidhā, laksana and vyañjanā. He seems to concern himself with kavi-vyāpāra i.e. poetic effort taking shape through 'vicitrā abhidhā' or beautiful poetic expression in general. This causes a sort of ambiguity, if not also on his part, at least on the part of those scholars, for whom a very clearly defined scheme of sabda-vșttis based on their inherent difference in nature and scope i.e. vişaya-bheda and svarūpa-bheda, is inherited from the writings of A. and Abhinavagupta, followed by Mammata and a host of brilliant writers belonging to the dhvani school of thought. So, perhaps this concept of 'vicitrā-abhidhā' may place K. on par with the "dirgha-dirghataravyāpāra-vādin". But, to be fair to K., we may observe that his vicitrā-abhidhā is certainly not the dīrgha-dirghatara-vyāpāra of the Mimamsaka opponent, but we may agree with Dr.K.Krishnamoorthy in his general observation that K.'s was an act of pragmatic criticism and from a wider point of view whatever gave birth to genuine poetry, that expression was "vicitra abhidhā” or beautiful poetic expression for him. This has nothing to do with the accepted norm of abhidhā-vrtti which yields the connotated meaning only through direct expression. Here, we may observe that if vyañjanā, as envisaged by Ā. and Abhinavagupta, were the only differentia, 'the sine quonon' of a true dhvanivādin, then in that sense K. is not a dhvanivādin. But we know that even for the die-hard opponents of A. or dhvani-school in general, such as Mahimā, the acceptance of implicit sense i.e. pratiyamāna artha' is welcome. What these anti-dhvani theorists discard and take upon themselves to dinounce is the concept of vyañjanā-vrtti, but not the fact of implicit sense. So, an ālamkārika, in our consideration, should be deemed as dhvanivādin in the true sense of the term, only if he accepts the implicit sense or pratīyamāna artha, arrived at through the agency of vyañjanā and vyañjanā alone and in no other way. The mere acceptance of the suggested sense, either as principal or as subordinate also, does not make one a true dhvanivādin, worth the name. Viewed thus, and also

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1047 along with the meticulous care K. takes in not mentioning vyañjana' or 'dhvani' in so many terms, should we call him a dhvanivādin'?
To add to this, K. seems to use the terms such as dyotya/vyangya and dyotaka/ vyañjaka (vľtti, VJ. I. 8, p. 14, ibid) without showing proper discrimination. We wonder how Prof. K.Krishnamoorthy translates dyotaka/vyañjaka as 'indicative/ suggestive respectively (see pp. 300, Edn. ibid). If by dyotaka K. really means 'laksaka' (as Prof. K.Kri.'s translation, 'indicative' would prompt us to believe), then ne creates further confusion with reference to the normally accepted pattern. A. had a neat scheme of three or four sabda-vrttis based on difference in nature and scope, i.e. svarūpabheda and vişayabheda, including of course the tāparya-vịtti which is a vākya-vștti, or power of a sentence giving tātparyártha or correlated sentence-sense as a whole. K. as it were, seems to flout this near perfect superb scheme of word/sentence/powers and seems to make a mess of it, when he makes his 'vicitrā abhidhā', at times refer to abhidhā, pure and simple, and at other times to refer also to either laksanā, or vyañjanā, without any rhyme or rhythm. All this is unpardonable from the point of view of a true dhvanivādin.
To his credit, we may say, goes the fact of many more varieties of vakratā or poetic expression, and a special mention may be made of the varieties grouped under 'prakarana-vakratā' i.e. artistic beauty relating to incident or episode (VJ. IV./5, 6). But on the otherhand, it is also equally true that Ā. nowhere puts a limit to the innumerable possible varieties of dhvani, and is open enough to further admit in his fold any number of newer and newer varieties that may prop up due to the nature of vyañjakas to be enumerated afresh by the critic with his resouceful and imaginative approach. In the recognition of some very charming newer varieties of vakratā, K. perhaps fills some gap left out by A., and further elaborates the theory, giving it a different name and thereby just serves new wine in old bottles. His approach to the problems of svabhāvokti and rasavat also deserves further and füller discussion. If K. were thoroughly a dhvanivādin, as Prof. K. Krishnamoorthy would like us to believe, he need not have written a treatise, the way in which he has done. He would have perhaps chosen to follow a track such as one followed by the great Vāg-devatā'vatāra Mammața, or by the greater still, Pundita-raja Jagannātha. But with a full awareness on his part of his inability to do away with vyañjanā totally, he chooses a different track of the so-called 'vicitrāabhidhā', and the so called 'vakrokti' which drags him into deeper waters never to be pulled out from. If later writers pay him any attention, it is so to the extent he falls in line with Ā.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA All this, and perhaps also a tendency to verbocity in his otherwise lucid and flowing style, makes him a lesser name to be ranked below the great names of A., Abhinavagupta, Mammața, Hemacandra, Appayya and Jagannatha, and perhaps even Ruyyaka, who though he treats of only alamkāras in his Alamkāra-Sarvasva, is otherwise every inch a dhvanivādin. True, K. is loaded, perhaps even infatuated with Ā., whom he follows at so many places, now borrowing phrases after phrases, or now accepting illustrations after illustrations from the Dhv., to explain his varieties of Vakrokti, which are very often, but new labels given to some varieties of dhvani. Actually, in his special moments, he refers to vyañjanā, but without making a direct mentioning of the term. But he errs only when he equates some charming illustrations of vyañjan, with those of abhidhā, perhaps equally exquisite from his point of view, and dumps them all on equal footing under the banner of 'vakrokti'. For him, varna-vinyāsa-vakratā and rūdhi-vaicitrya-vakratā stand on the same footing and this sounds rather fantastic to a devout follower of dhvani. But all the same, virtually he turns out to be, so to say, a super-dhyanivădin. like a newly convert, in the sense that he seems to be all “Ā. - drunk". At times he is only re-echoing what the great master has said earlier - "vad kiñcid apy anuranan sphutavati kāwā"lokam...". as it were, in the same way as is done by the great Abhinavagupta. He perhaps makes an effort to liberalise poetry from the network of vyañjanā. For him vyañjanā is only a cog in the wheel, a part of his wider scheme of vakratā, or beautiful poetic expression, which embraces in its fold, abhidhā, laksanā, and vyañjanā, at the poetic level, all alike. His vicitrā abhidhā is a precondition for poetry and for this, he is prepared to sacrifice the well-defined scheme of Ā., resulting in the recognition of dhvani, gunībhūta-vyangya and citra types of poetry. Perhaps he refuses to accept a casteist approach of the dhvanivādin, wherein abhidhā, laksaņā and vyañjanā remain in a way strictly separate. His vicitrā abhidhā is a field where all vșttis mingle and merge with one another. Thus, he fills up gaps left out by A., and perhaps goes ahead of him. But to class all vakratā on the same footing is something a true divanivādin can never either tolerate or forgive, and for this he may be placed outside the loyalist class of dhvanivādins. True, he has gone into subtler details and has labelled many charms exclusive to the fold of so-called abhidhā alone, but to equate a charm belonging to the vācyavācaka level with the one operating at the vyangya-vyañjaka level is a crime in the eyes of a dhvanivādin and the crime can never escape punishment. The whole point is unthinkable, and hence unpardonable, from the point of view of a true dhvanivādin. There are aesthetes and aesthetes who may pick up a never-ending

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1049 quarrel over this, but by and large, K. may be taken as a “pra-śisya" of a "mahāguru", whom he forsakes for an untrodden track of his own ! And for exactly this, we may not blame K., but love him all the more, for he is a lone traveller, uncompromising in a way, trying to get out of the vyañjanā-inhibition, and arriving at a more practicable, more pragmatic solution of literary beauty,
Thus, Ā. suggested a three-tier system, a tri-varga-vyavasthā, so to say, or perhaps a catur-varga-vyavastha as suggested by Jagannatha, which is smashed and put aside by K., to promote a 'class-less' or 'caste-less pattern, so to say, in the field of literary criticism. But alas, the 'cāturvarnya' of the dvanivādin, as it was firmly saddled on the guna - (Karma/alamkārā”di) vibhāga, held out firmly in the minds of many aesthetes and K.'s voice is lost into wilderness without finding followers, and he dies a martyr's death as a lone champion of his cause, both unheard and unsung. He does not seem to be a leader cast in the mould of Ā., the greatest, but a path-seeker guided by the torch of his inner conviction.
All this is spelt out here in all details with necessary references from the VJ. as follows:
We will now try to examine K.'s views on various aspects of poetry with an eye to his treatment of Ā.'s dhvani. We will follow in this discussion, the natural sequence of topics as read in the VJ. In the VJ. I. 2, (pp. 2, ibid) he promises to offer, "a fresh study of poetry, like an added ornament to it.” Needless to say, that he uses the word alamkāra in a wider context to designate the whole work itself, wherein topics, like simile and the like, form its subject matter. Actually, a critical appreciation of poetic beauty is his goal. For him, the word, 'alamkāra' in this wider context signifies 'poetic beauty', and 'kāvya' or 'poetry for him is ‘alamkārya', i.e. that which is to be adorned. He observes - (vrtti, on I. 2. VJ.) (p. 2, ibid) : alamkāro vidhīyate, alamkaraṇam kriyate. kasya ? kāvyasya. kaveḥ karma kāvyam; tasya.” For him, “kāvya' i.e. poetry is 'kaveḥ karma', i.e. poetic activity. So, whatever carries the stamp of being a poet's activity is poery for K. K. thus places the concept of poetry on a very broad base, perhaps intending to include everything beginning with abhidhā and ending with vyañjană under the same banner, provided it turns out to be a genuine 'kavi-karma'. So, for him, "Kāvya' is a solid, compact whole in itself, an abstraction revealed through the medium of signs called letters. It is, so to say, "akanda-buddhi-samāsvādya”. It is incapable of any analysis, because it is of the nature of synthesis. So, when you discuss 'poetry and 'poetic beauty', it is a discussion of academic matter only. The supreme reality is that poetry is gifted with an innate poetic beauty which can not be thought of separately. He observes :

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
(vṛtti, VJ. I. 6, pp. 6, ibid) "tad ayam atra paramārthaḥ, sálamkārasya alamkārasahitasya sakalasya nirastávayavasya sataḥ, samudayasya kāvyatā, kavi-karmatvam tena alamkṛtasya kāvyatvam iti sthitam na punaḥ kāvyasya alamkāra-yogah, iti. - "The truth is this. Poetry is the work of a poet, wherein the undivided whole of 'adorned' and the 'ornament' is the reality. Therefore, it is clear that poetry is the name of what is adorned and the question of super-adding ornaments to preexisting poetry, does not arise." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 292, ibid). We can compare this with A.'s observation on alamkaras when he says that when properly delineated, alamkāras are never extraneous (to poetry) - vṛtti on Dhv. II. 16 reads as - tasman na teṣām bahirangatvam rasa'bhivyaktau." (pp. 60, edn. K.Kris., ibid)
K. seems to follow A. in his broad concept of poetry when he observes that poetry is both word and sense taken together, enshrined in a style revealing the artistic creativity of the poet on one hand, and giving aesthetic delight to man of taste on the other (VJ. I. 7). He wants that both word and sense are to be of a peculiar nature. The expression or word and context or thought or meaning should both be charming and so to say, 'made for each other'. Thus, K. observes : (vṛtti, VJ. I. 7 - pp. 13, ibid) tatha ca arthaḥ samarthavācaka-asadbhāve svātmanā, sphurannapi mṛtakalpa eva avatiṣṭhate. śabdópi vākyópayogivācya sambhave vācyántara-vacakaḥ san vākyasya vyādhībhūtaḥ pratibhāti ity alam atiprasangena." - "Thus, thought, though striking in itself, will be no better than a corpse, when it is not embodied in an adequately striking word. In the same way, a word which does not have an adequate thought-content, but which expresses something irrelevant, is to be deemed as a disease of the poem." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 299, ibid). This again smells of A.'s observation on Dhv. I. 8, wherein he holds that only the implicit sense and word having capacity to suggest the same deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet. A. observes: (vṛtti, Dhv. I. 8) (pp. 14, 16, Edn. K.Kris. ibid) :
"vyangyórthas tad-vyakti-sāmarthyayogi śabdaś ca kaścana, na sarvaḥ; tāv eva śabdárthau mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñeyau."
K. almost follows A., without conditioning his 'word and sense' by vyañjanā alone. He seems to develop an indepedent approach which is not vyañjanā-biased or better say, vyañjana-oriented. But he does not go further as we will go to observe, and all his tall talk about vakratā paters out into this or that variety of dhvani based on vyañjanā alone. By mere throwing away an accepted terminology, or just by replacing an old one by a new one, we do not stand to gain much. Exactly this happens in case of K., who can not totally tear himself away from A.'s

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1051 terminology, and at times seems to confuse the original clear concepts of Ā. For example, he makes a mess of things when he observes that words are both 'dyotaka' and 'vyañjaka', without drawing a line of demaracation between the two : (vịtti, VJ. I. 8; pp. 38, ibid) : "nanu ca dyotaka-vyañjakāv api śabdau sambhavataḥ.... etc. evam dyotya-vyangyayor arthayoḥ pratyeyatva-sāmānyāt.” We have observed earlier that we are not satisfied with Dr. K.Krishnamoorthy's translation (on pp. 300, ibid) in this respect, when he writes - "one might object that the indicative and suggestive words too, which have their own signification, may yet be termed 'word', and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of “too narrow”. Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to..." It is clear that for all those who understand sanskrit poetics, the words 'dyotya' and 'vyangya', and the words “dyotaka" and "vyañjaka” are synonyms, and K. cannot mean 'laksya' and 'laksaka' by them. So, it is clear confusion on K.'s part. It is one thing, not to accept ... but it is quite another not to understand, or misquote, or misrepresent A. K. here seems to do the latter.
K. can also be charged for an added crime when he extends the connotation of 'vācakarva', so as to include even the vyañjakarva of Ā. Normally, one can choose a different track. But in case of K., who almost looks a disciple of Ā., this looks quite unworthy. He does this when on I. 9, he observes that: (vrtti, I. 9, V.I. pp. 16, ibid) : "kavi-vivakṣita-višeşábhidhana kşamatvam eva vācakarva-laksanam. vivaksā. vidheyatvena abhidheyată-padavim avatarantas tathā-vidha-višeşa-pratipādanasamarthenā bhidhīyamānāś cetaścamatkāritām āpadyante." i.e. "the proper definition of signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet'(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 302, ibid). This is criminal if one chooses to call oneself a follower of A. Actually the whole paragraph here is only a sort of paraphrase of Ā.'s "tau śabdárthau mahākaveh", but not in the way Ā. does. And all this, with the full knowledge of the terminology made current by Ā., looks unpardonable. K. knows what 'dyotayanti' means, when he observes on verse no. 28 (pp. 16, ibid), viz. "samrambhaḥ karikītakaiḥ." etc., that, (vștti, on I. 9, VS. 28, pp. 16) - "hevākasya leśa-śabdábhidhānena alpatā-pratipattir ity ete vivaksitaikárthavācakatvam dyotayanti." i.e. "the adjective 'trivial' qualifying 'enterprise' reinforces the low stature of the common lions and thus adds to the force of the intended thought.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 303, ibid). Similar is the use of the word "vyakti', when on verse no. 29, under VJ. I. 9, K. observes that "tasya ca tad āhlāda-sāmarthyam sambhāvyate yena kācid eva svabhāva-mahattā rasa-pariposángatvam vā vyaktim

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA āsādayati." Here also, K. does not mention vyañjanā’ by name. In a similar vein K. explains the suggestivity of the word 'munih' in illustration no. 31, under VJ. I. 9 (pp. 18): "atra kósau munir iti paryaya-padam atra vaktavye, parama-kāruņikasya nisāda-nirbhinna-sakuni-sandarśana-mātra-samutthitaḥ ślokatvam abhajata yasyaiti tasya tad avasthā janaka-rāja-putrīdaśā-darśana-vivasa-vịtter antaḥ-karanaparispandaḥ karuņa-rasa-pariposángatayā sahrdaya-hỉdayā”hlādakārī kaver abhipretah." Here also vyañjanā is not alluded to. On verse 32, he offers some criticism wherein words such as "dyotyate" and "dyotayanti” are used only in the normally accepted sense of 'suggestion', but here too he overlooks the mentioning of vyañjanā-vítti. He observes (pp. 18, ibid, on VS. 32, VJ. I. 9) : "hrdaya-nihitād iti suhrttva-vihitam sāvadhānarvam dyotyate... ambuvāham. ity ātmanas tatkāritábhidhānam dyotayati."
He uses even 'bhanyate' in the sense of 'dyotyate' or 'vyajyate' here : (vrtti, VJ. I. 9, VS. 32, pp. 19) - 'abalā-śabdenā’tra tat-preyasi-viraha-vaidhuryā’-sahatvam bhanyate.” K. is out to smash the perfectly evolved terminology of Ā. He explains the suggested sense of the whole expression with the words : "tad ayam atra vākyárthah.” (pp. 19). This 'vākyártha' is 'wyangyártha', pure and simple, without being designated as such.
K. raises a fresh problem at VJ. I. 10 (pp. 20, ibid), when he observes : (vrtti,
pp. 20) -
"ubhāv etāv alamkāryau, tayoḥ punar alamkrtiḥ
vakroktir eva, vaidagdhya-bhangi-bhanitir ucyate.” ...tad idam atra tātparyam yat śabdárthau prthag avasthitau na kenā'pi vyatiriktenā'lamkaranena yojyete, kintu vakratā-vaicitrya-yogitayā abhidhānam eva anayor alamkāraḥ, tasyaiva sobhātiśaya-kāritvāt, etac ca vakratāvyākhyānávasara eva udāharisyate." . i.e. “Both these are 'adorned'. Their adornment consists in the poetic process known as 'artistic turn of speech'... Let us sum it up once again : apparently, words and meanings both have their distinct existence in poetry and come to be adorned by something different from themselves. The fact of the matter is that the very process of poetic utterance is constituted by the artistic turns assumed by words and meanings. The poetic process itself, in this sense is the real ornamentation. For, it is extremely delighting in itself. This shall engage our attention more when we consider, the concept of artistic beauty further, on.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 306). True; even Ā. suggested that no ornamentation could be "bahiranga” or “external”, if properly executed by the

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kävya. 1053 poet. Poetic beauty is inharent in poetry, and the 'whole' is born and enjoyed. But when you analyse the poetic beauty, you must have a scheme to support your observations, and the whole analogy of 'śarīra' or 'body', and 'soul or 'ātman' of poetry walks in. For Ā., it is easy to explain when he regards ‘dhvani' - particularly 'rasa-dhvani'-as the soul of poetry, and 'word and sense' - i.e. 'śabdárthau', forming its body. At Dhv. III. 33, 7. discusses this “jīva-śarīra-vyavahāra”. And, in a way, this scheme is very helpful in understanding poetic beauty, which in itself is only 'a-murta' i.e. abstract or conceptual. For K., the position becomes rather difficult when, at this stage, if a question is raised as to the exact position of 'rasa' in his scheme. True, he has, as we will go to observe, tried to incorporate the innumerable shades of rasa and bhāva in his different types of vakratā, but then these vakratās seem to get mixed up with one another, rather then shine out independently as clear sub-varieties. And once again, if 'sabdárthau' are 'alamkāryau', should we call him a dehā"tma-vādin'? We may not grudge it, and it is surely not a bad name either!
One more question. If only 'vakrokti' is an alamkāra, of course inherently connected with a poem, then what about 'svabhāvokti'? Is not 'svabhāvokti', if taken in the normal connotation of the term given to it by practically all the alamkārikas, in itself a variety of K.'s vakrókti ? K.'s own concept of svabhāvokti seems to refer to the basic subject-matter as it is, i.e. to a local normal fact or expression. But the 'svabhāvokti' as devined by others is not a bare statement, the 'vārtā of Bhāmaha, but a poetic expression of an object or its very normal activities. Actually no bare statement of fact has ever earned any entry in the realm of genuine poetry. And, a poetic expression, say charged with K.'s vakrókti, concerning such objects as an activity of a child and the like, could as much be taken as an alamkāra in the limited sense of the term; e.g. the limited sense in which an expression describing similarity or upamā is designated an alamkāra. So, it seems that the whole criticism of K. against 'svabhāvokti' being taken as an alamkara is misdirected. If for the sake of an argument we accept either 'samkara or 'samsrsti' (VJ. I. 14, 15, pp. 22, ibid) as argued by K., even then the case for 'svabhāvokti' is not ruled out. Any other alamkāra can also find an entry in a 'samkara' or a 'samsrsti' without losing its independent status as an alamkāra. This patters out only in an effort by K. to look smart in the eyes of others.
Under VJ. I. 16, K. takes great pains to carve out the exact nature of 'sāhitya', which is not just the mere coming together of word and sense, which is found to be even in the ordinary walk of life. Says he, : (vștti, VJ. I. 16, pp. 23, ibid) : satyam

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA etat, kintu na vācya-vācaka-laksana-śāśvata-sambandha-nibandhanam vastutaḥ sāhityam ity ucyate." - "The point, however, is that here in poetry, we are not alluding to the well-known intimate relationship invariably characterising word and meaning." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 310, ibid). Perhaps the same point is hinted at by .. in his Dhv. I. 8, and vrtti thereon, where it is observed that a first-rate poet has to strive for that particular meaning and that rare word only. Ā. observes : (vrtti, Dhv. I. 8, pp. 14 Edn. K.Kris., ibid) “sa vyangyórthas tad-vyakti-sāmarthya yogi sabdaś ca kaś cana, na sarvah, tāv eva sabdárthau mahākaveh pratyabhijñeyau.” “that meaning”, refers to the implicit and “that rare word, which possesses the power of conveying it, points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning - only these two deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 15, ibid). K. unlike A., has no special bias for the 'suggested' only, but the whole approach carries an influence of his great predecessor Ā. Ā.'s position is safer with his three-fold classification of poetry into 'dhvani', 'gunībhūta-vyangya' and 'citra', which becomes 'uttama', 'madhyama' and 'adhama' later in M., the terms which Ā. has carefully refrained from using, but his illustrious follower, vāg-devatā’-vatāra' Mammata has managed to make current and popular. But for K., poetry is either genuine poetry or no poetry at all ! Perhaps Mahima also was partially influenced by this, though he carries the impressions of Ā. also. But for K., you cannot classify poetry or poetic effort into various categories. But the expreience of aesthetes world over, and for centuries, has something to say more in favour of Ā. than K. For, in the absence of any classification based on quality, the very fact of the recognition of the difference between a kavi and a 'mahā-kavi/great poet, would have been defeated and we would have been forced to place Vyāsa, Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Romain Rolland, Aurobindo and such greats and poets of, of course, some ranking, but not of the same stature, on the same footing. We know we do not do it, and more, cannot do it.
Here, and perhaps at many other places, K.'s style becomes prolix or verbose and we need not quote instances to prove this point. We will quote only one passage : (vịtti, VJ. I. 16, pp. 24) : “tad adya sarasvati-hğdayáravinda-makarandabindu-sandoha-sundarāņām sat-kavi-vacasām antarámoda-manoharatvena parisphurad etat sa-hrdaya-sat-carana-gocaratām niyate." .. never does it; never. K. seems to have passionately fallen in love with the words 'spanda' and 'parispanda', which are very often left out in translation by Dr. K.Kris. (see for example, K.Kris. translation of verse no. 36, on pp. 312. The whole paragraph can

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be read with interest.). Quoting illustrations need not detain us further, as they are in abudance and also self-evident. K. once again seems to refer to A.'s 'vyangyártha', when in verse no. 38, (pp. 26, ibid, under VJ. I. 17) K. observes : "vacyávabodha-nispattau pada-väkyártha-jīvitam (.varjitam)
yat kim apy arpayaty antaḥ pānakā"svādavat satām."
- "that which is relished in its entirety without distinction of word and sentence import, after the initial grasp of primary-meanings, even like the unique savour of a sweet drink by men of taste." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 313, ibid) - The other reading. "pada-vākyártha-jivitam" would mean, "that (sense) which is the very life (or soul) of word-meaning and sentence-meaning." Obviously the reference could mean "dhvani", or principal suggested sense.
K.'s classification of vakrata is broadly hinted at in I. 18, as six-fold, each having many sub-varieties. We will go to observe critically that these varieties of vakratā carry an undisputable stamp of A.'s classification of dhvani.
K. enumerates the first three varieties of vakratā as varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratva, pada-pūrvārtha-vakratā and pratyaya-vakratā in VJ. I. 19 (pp. 26, ibid). (K.Kris. translates it as - "Art in the arrangement of syllables", "art in the base-form of substantives", and "art in their inflection forms" (pp. 313, ibid)). We will go to observe that whatever charm is pointed here is due to the suggested sense alone, and we may say, "namántara-karanena tu kiyad idam pandityam ?" Simply by giving a new name, the thing in itself does not change. A rose, is a rose, is a rose even if we call if by any other name! We may observe that these varieties of vakratā and many more are under the direct influence of A.'s observation at Dhv. III. 16, which reads as :
sup-tin-vacana-sambandhais tathā kāraka-saktibhiḥ kṛt-taddhita-samāsaiś ca
dyotyo'laksya-kramaḥ kvacit." (pp. 146, ibid)
"case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, accidence, primary affixes, secondary affixes, and also compounds conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality."
all these become
(Trans. K.Kris. pp. 147, ibid)
K. has relied so much on A., that very often, and this is seen in Mahima also, - he borrows words and phrases from his master, i.e. A. The word "prasiddha

-

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
prasthāna-vyatireki", in the vṛtti on VJ. I. 18, is an instance in point. On VJ. I. 19, in his vṛtti while explaining varṇa-vinyāsa-vakrata, K. observes: (pp. 27, ibid) atra varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā-mātra-vihitaḥ śabda-sobhátiśayaḥ sutarām samun-militaḥ. etad eva varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratvam cirantaneṣu anuprāsa iti prasiddham." - "Here, we see a perfect instance of abounding verbal beauty brought about, solely by the poet's skill in arrangement of syllables. This skill in verbal arrangement itself is well recognised even by the ancient theorists under the term 'Alliteration'. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 314, ibid). It reflects but poorly on K.'s thinking, if he tries to equate this variety of vakratā, a mere śabda-citra, with another vakrata which may look charged with the suggested sense; and this variety also he recognises. It is unthinkable to put all varieties of vakrata on the same footing. But perhaps it is exactly at this point that K. like Casca of Julius Cacsar, has drawn his dagger to stab his master, A.
K. proceeds to explain pada-pūrvárdhavakratā (on pp. 27) under I. 19, VJ. He observes - (vṛtti, on VJ. I. 19, pp. 27): pada-pūrvárdha-vakratā padasya subantasya tingantasya vā vakra-bhāvo, vinyasa-vaicitryam. tatra ca bahavaḥ prakārāḥ sambhavanti. yatra rūḍhiśabdasyaiva prastava-samucitatvena vācya-prasiddhadharmántara'dhyāropa-garbhatvena nibandhaḥ, sa pada-pūrvárdha-vakratāyāḥ prathamaḥ prakāraḥ, yathā, "rāmósmi sarvam sahe". "Art in the base form of substantives". Words may be nouns or verbs. Their crude form will be either base or root. In their usage by the poet there is scope for artistic skill.
In fact, this admits of various forms. When a word in common usage is employed so as to include an attribution of associate meanings other than the primary one, we have the first variety, e.g. "Rāma I am, and bear every mishap." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 314, ibid). Then he illustrates the second variety where a proper noun is employed in such a way that it involves an attribution of the extraordinary speciality of the feature under description in the sentence primarily. Art i.e. beauty in the use of synonym is also illustrated. All these instances are accepted from A. without an open acceptance of vyañjanā. And therefore all this sounds less convincing.
Again, in the illustration, viz. "ramo'smi sarvam sahe", K. observes that here there is attribution of associate meanings other than the primary one: "vācyaprasiddha-dharmántara'dhyáropagarbhatvena nibandhaḥ." This observation is also far from exact. Here what happens is not the attribution - i.e. adhyāropa-of another meaning which is not the primary one, for in that case it would be just lakṣaṇā. Actually here the second sense arrives even when the primary sense continues. They

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Dhvani in kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1057 co-exist like an object and a lamp that illuminates it. Ā. has ruled out the case of a mere secondary sense or laksyártha, which seems to be hinted at by K. M. (= Mammata) has utilized the same illustrations for the establishment of vyañjanā, independent of laksanā here. So, K., while citing the second illustration, viz. "rāmo'sau.” etc., (verse no. 43, pp. 27, ibid), when he observes that this involves an attribution of the extra-ordinary speciality of the feature under description, - "lokottarā'tiśayā’dhyāropam garbhīkrtyópanibandhaḥ,” , he almost suggests that there is the suggested meaning or the vyangyártha' concealed in a given statement. And for this, Ă. has vyañjanā-vitti, while K. gropes in darkness in flouting this clear-cut scheme as laid down by. Ā. K. again has no fixed and clear expression, for in one case he has, “lokottarā'tiśayádhyāropam garbhi-kstyā”, and in the next breath he has, "lokottara-sauryā”di-dharmátiśayā’-dhyāropa-paratvena."
K. goes to illustrate further how out of a number of synyonyms possible, only that is chosen which is especially significant in the context, e.g. "vāmam kajjalavat...." etc. (verse, 44, pp. 28, ibid). Now this illustration runs parallel to the one in which "kapalinah" is preferred and "pinākinah" is rejected by Kālidāsa. Here also there is a charm caused by vyañjanā, without mentioning the same. Again, it is unthinkable to put "varna-vinyāsa-vakratā" and this "paryāya-vakratā" on the same footing. K. observes that, (vrtti, VJ. I. 19, pp. 28) : etac ca paryāya-vakratvam vācya-sambhavi-dharmántara-garbhīkāreņā’pi paridrśyate." - "this artistic use of synonyms is also found to include hints of even features which are conceivably no parts of literal meanings.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 315, ibid). This again is vyañjanā, pure and simple. Needless to say that the illustrations, such as "angarāja, senāpate...".etc. (verse, 45; pp. 28, ibid), also contain 'vyangyártha', which is the only source of charm.
The upacāra-vakratā variety of prabandha-pūrvárdha-vakratā, wherein the charm is caused by metaphor, is nothing else but laksaņā-vilasita : vịtti, on VJ. I. 19; pp. 28 - "yatrā’mūrtasya vastunaḥ mūrta-dravyábhidhāyinā śabdenābhidhānam upacārāt...” Thus here the charm is caused by laksaņā or indication. In ‘nikārakanikā', "hastávaceyam”, etc. the charm lies in laksaņā or indication, and then in the ultimate suggestion of "stokatva", or "slightness" 'bahutva', etc. Similarly, expressions like, "billowy" which primarily apply to liquids, when they are serging with waves, are often found in poetic tradition to apply even to solids, only on the basis of general similarity.
"Visesana-vakratva" or "beauty in epithets" is also a variety of "pada-pūrvárdhavakrata', or "art in the base form of substantives", wherein art or beauty springs
alm.

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA from the significance of epithets only. This again, we may say, is a charm due to vyañjanā. The illustration viz. "vridāyogān nata-vadanatayā..." etc. seems to have been accepted from Ā. (Dhv. Vrtti. on III. 4)
'Samvști-vakratā' or "beauty of concealed expression' is also a variety of “padapūrvárdha-vakratā”, wherein the nature of an object endowed with a unique loveliness in its peculiar setting, which cannot be conveyed clearly in a direct way, is conveyed by a concealed expression rich in suggestive force. : (vștti, on VJ. I. 19, pp. 30, ibid) : "ayam aparah pada-pūrvárdha-vakratāyāḥ prakāro yad iyam samvștivakratvam nāma, yatra padārtha-svarūpam prastāvānugunyena kena'pi nikarseņótkarşeņa vā, yuktam vyakta-tayā sāksād abhidhātum aśakyam samvştisāmarthyópayogitayā śabdenā'bhidhiyate." This is pure vyañjanā. K. calls it "vicitrā abhidhā” in both the cases such as those of "saksāt abhidhā" and "a-sāksād abhidhā." This perhaps may lead us to brand him as a "dirghadirghatarā'bhidhāvādin', or a 'tātparya-vādin' like Dhananjaya, who is posterior to him. But after studying .. it is unthinkable not to accept difference in sabda-vịttis, éven in the presence of 'vişayabheda' and 'svarūpabheda' i.e. difference in nature and scope.
The illustration, viz., "nidrā-nimīlita-drśaḥ.” etc. (verse no. 51, pp. 30, ibid) has a word viz. "dhvananti", which means "vyañjayanti” pure and simple, but K. does not explicitely accept it. In the absence of a clear acceptance of vyañjanā, how can we call K., a dhvanivādin ? We may call him a "vicitrábhidhāvādin", or this, that and everything else, but a dhvanivādin, for he does not openly accept the scheme of Ā. We will go to observe that under VJ. II. 9, while discussing rūdhi-vaicitrayavakratā (on pp. 83, ibid) K. clearly refers to the Dhvanikāra and his vyangyavyañjaka-bhāva, and adds that it is duly and ably established there and therefore need not be re-established here : (vștti, on VJ. II. 9, pp. 83) : "yasmād dhvanikārena vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāvótra sutarām samarthitas tat kim punaruktyena ?” This shows he works under Ā.'s spell and is fully conscious of it, and yet tries to cut a new track and evolve new terminology. But he lands himself in a hopeless situation when he equates all types of vakratās, which are almost all but different names for titles given by 7., under one banner and on equal footing and thereby belieing the experience of aesthetes.
That K. is absolutely conscious about Ā.'s theory is very clear when he uses terms such as 'pratīyate', 'pratipadyate', 'prakāśyate', etc., in the sense of 'vyajyate' only. Then why does he grudge the use of vyajyate' or 'vyañjana' or 'dhvani' ? If he is a clean follower of Ā., he should have made a clear statement to this effect, as

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Dhvani in kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1059 is done by the great Mammata and Ācārya Hemacandra who follow the track of Abhinavagupta who himself in his turn does not make a secret of his being a follower of Ā. And in that case, K. need not have attempted this sort of a treatise at all.
It has been noticed earlier that K.'s use of “pratīyate' is equivalent to "vyajyate'. When he deals with "vrtti-vaicitrya vakratā", once again in a further variety of padapūrvárdha-vakratā (pp. 31, ibid), he finds beauty in the speciality of linguistic structure like compounds, their speciality, etc. : (vrtti, VJ. I. 19, pp. 31) : “yatra samāsā"di-vșttīnām kāsāmcid vicitrāņām eva kavibhiḥ parigrahaḥ kriyate.” The illustration reveals a mixed beauty of expression, pure and simple, and also suggestion. Similer is the case with his yet another variety of "pada-pūrvárdhavakratā”, viz. "linga-vaicitra-vakratvam”, wherein we have speciality in gender. (vrtti; VJ. I. 19, pp. 31) : - "aparam linga-vaicitryam nāma pada-pūrvārdha-vakratāyāḥ prakārántaram drśyate. yatra bhinna-lingānām api śabdānām vaicitryāya samānádhikaranyópanibandhaḥ.” At times the poet pitches upon only the feminine form of a word, because of its tenderness, though it admits of other genders. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 318, ibid). All this is beauty of pure expression coloured with beauty of suggestion. Similarly, his "kriya-vaicitrya-vakratva" is beauty in speciality of verbs, where poets offer usage, full of charm, brought about by artistic expression while describing the speciality in verbs. All this is beauty of pure expression tinged with that of suggestion as well. The illustration cited is, “rati-keli...” etc. (verse No. 58, pp. 32, ibid), wherein the verb "jayati" occurs. K. observes that here, the verb 'jayati' i.e. 'triumphs', has a striking beauty. Then he quotes an illustration which forms the famous mangala-śloka of the Dhv., viz. "sveccha-kesarinaḥ..." etc., in which observes K., the poet has attributed a unique activity, viz. the cutting away of woes of devotees, which is so different from their cutting activity well-known to the people. Vrtti on VJ. 1. 19, pp. 32, ibid - "atra nakhānām sakala-loka-prasiddha-cchedana-vyāpāravyatireki kim apy apūrvam eva prapannā"rti-cchedana-laksanam kriyā-vaicitryam upanibaddham” - could K. have-read Locana ?
But here also, the charm is caused by the suggestion it contains. So also, in the illustration drawn from Ā., and also in the illustration, viz. “karnótpala-dala..." etc., (pp. 33 ibid), the charm caused is the result of suggestivity. At all these places, K. avoids any mention of vyañjanā directly.
After this, K. treates “pratyaya-vakratā”. (pp. 33, ibid) with all its varieties. It is clear that in many of these, the special charm results from suggestivity. K. illustrates them and tries to bring out the source of beauty which for him is either

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due to "sankhya-vaicitrya" or, "karaka-vaicitrya", or "purusa-vaicitrya". It is needless to say that all these charming expressions look all the more charming by virtue of the touch of suggestivity in them. Otherwise, if pure expression is equated with and placed on the same footing as an expression containing charms of suggestion, then this certainly is no doing of a true dhvanivädin, and it is in this sense that K.'s position can be questioned.
After discussing these varieties, K. goes to observe that only a few important forms of artistic beauty have been presented here to serve as examples. But thousands of them are possible in the plentiful usage of master-poets and they may be discovered by men of taste on their own. A. also had passed a remark to the same effect. Vṛtti, on VJ. I. 19 (pp. 35) reads as - "etac ca mukhyatayā vakrataprakārāḥ katicin nidarśanártham pradarsitāḥ. śistāś ca sahasraśaḥ sambhavanti iti mahākavi-pravāhe sahṛdayaiḥ svayam eva utprekṣaṇīyāḥ."
Under I. 20 VJ. (pp. 35, ibid), K. treats vākya-vakrată and tries to subsume all alamkāras here-under. A. has placed them under guṇībhūta-vyangya type, but in K. all vakratā is of an identical nature, and therefore has to be placed on the same footing. This is exactly where he violates the fundamantals of the dhvanivādins. The vākya-vakratā is illustrated (verse No. 70, pp. 36), in "upasthitam pūrvam upāsya..." etc. Actually, this can very well serve as an illustration of vastu-dhvani which is not named as such by K. On the contrary, K. wants to put this under the same banner which also corners all the figures of sense, i.e. arthálamkāras.
K. treats of prakaraṇa - vakratā or 'beauty of section' and 'pralandha vakratā' or beauty of a whole work or composition, at VJ. I. 21. We know that A. has already discussed "prabandha-vyañjakatva' and has screened the case of both the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahabharata, and it is clear that here too, K. derives his inspiration from A. K. promises to discuss in greater details the six-fold vakratā in due course. But here, we will repeat once again, that the 'prakaraṇa-vakrata' and 'pabandha-vakrata' are but shades of A.'s vyañjanā. The illustration from Kirāta. is an instance in point: (vṛtti, VJ. I. 21, pp. 37, ibid) - "yathā vā kirātárjunīye kirātapuruṣóktiṣm vācyatvena sva-mārgaṇa-mārgaṇa-mātram eva upakrāntam. vastutaḥ punar arjunena saha, tātparyártha-paryālocanayā vigraho vākyárthatām upanītaḥ...". "Similarly, in the Kirātárjunīya also, we find only the seeking of his own arrow by the hunter plainly stated in the hunter's words. But, as a matter of fact Arjuna who takes the purport into account (and) understands rightly that the hunter's meaning is a challange for fighting." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 323, ibid)

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Then K. proceeds to discuss the nature of 'bandha' or 'diction' under VJ. I. 22 (pp. 38, ibid). While dealing with "sukumāra-mārga", (VJ. I. 25-29), K. observes that this style is such which master poets follow like bees roving along the grove of full-blown blossoms (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 329). He further observes that by this simile the author intends to suggest elegance about the style which is comparable to the natural loveliness of flowers. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 330, ibid). The word used here is "dyotyate" - (Vrtti, VJ. I. 29, pp. 44, ibid) - "vikasita-kusuma-kānana-sāmyena tasya kusuma-saukymārya-sadṛśam ābhijātyam dyotyate." Here 'dyotyate should mean 'vyajyate'. The illustration viz. “pravrddhatāpaḥ..." etc., (pp. 44, ibid), has an element of suggestivity. He observes : (vrtti, VJ. I. 29, pp. 44, ibid): tathā ca 'pravrddha-tapah' "tanvi", iti vācakau sundara-svabhāvamātra-samarpana-paratvena vartamānau arthántara-pratīty-anurodha-paratvena pravrttim na sammanyete, kavi-vyakta-kauśala-samullasitasya punaḥ prakārántarasya pratītāvānugunyamatreņa tad-vid-āhlāda-kāritām pratipadyete." "The words, “heated up", and "ślender”, are so used as to bring out essentially the charming nature of the two and cannot directly signify any other shade of meaning. But the poet's artistic skill has succeeded in making them fit for signifying the other meaning also by keeping them in tune with it; and this compels admiration from critics." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 330). All this comes very close to cases wherein multiple meaning is restricted to one particular meaning and later on with the help of vyañjanā the suppressed meaning again comes to the surface.
K.'s concept of "lāvanya” (VJ. I. 32, pp. 49, ibid), and "ābhijātya” (VJ. I. 33, pp. 50, ibid), could hardly be distinguished from pure varṇadharmas and śabdadharmas; i.e. qualities of letters or syllables and of words. It is just that, pure and simple. Under VJ. I. 33, (pp. 51, ibid) we have a cross-reference to A., wherein K. suggests that when Ā. equates “pratīyamāna” or implicit sense, with the beauty of limbs in a lady, i.e. 'lalanā-lāvanya', he only wants to convey that this beauty is something quite different from the normal limbs such as hands, feet, etc. Here, K. does not criticise Ā., who according to K. here wants to emphasise that the implicit sense is quite different, from the explicit one. - (vrtti, VJ. I. 33, pp. 52, ibid) : "na eșa doṣaḥ. - yamād anena drstāntena vācya-vācaka-laksana-prasiddhávayavavyatiriktatvena astitvamātram sādhyate pratiyamānasya; na punah sakala-lokalocana-samvedyasya lalanā-lāvanyasya." . "This is not at all wrong. All that the analogy establishes is the independent existence of the implied aspect of meaning as distinct from the purely conventional and secondary meanings of words.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 338, ibid).

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K. defines "vicitra-marga" in VJ. I 34-43 (pp. 52, 53, ibid). This is one in which "artistic beauty appears to be radiating brilliantly from within, in respect of both word and meaning." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 338, ibid) (Vṛtti, VJ. J. 34-43, pp. 53, ibid) : "kīdṛśaḥ sa mārgaḥ yatra yasmin sabdábhidheyayor abhidhana'bhidhiyamānayor antaḥ svarūpánupraveśinī vakratā bhaṇiti-vicchittiḥ sphuratīva praspandamānā iva vibhāvyate, lakṣyate." This comes to the beauty caused by word and meaning - śabdā'bhidheyayoḥ" (VJ. I. 34) (pp. 52, ibid). This is also a style, "wherein the adorned is made to acquire brilliance by virtue of the tropes brilliant in themselves, and reflecting it through their own excessive beauty." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 339, ibid):
-
"yatra tad-vad alamkāraiḥ bhrājamānair nijā"tmanā,
sva-s'obhātiśayántaḥstham
alamkāryam prakāśate."
This is again a style (VJ. I. 40, pp. 53, ibid)
"pratīyamānatā yatra väkyárthasya nibadhyate, vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyām

vyatiriktasya kasyacit."
"Wherein further, the intended purport of the whole is communicated by a suggestive use of language which is distinct from the two well-known uses, viz. "the communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 339, ibid). We have quoted the whole karika above. What harm is there, we may ask, if direct mention is made of vyañjanā, which alone for a dhvanivadin, is capable of conveying the implicit sense? Surely, K. cannot admit "anumiti" here. If he does not accept 'vyañjana' should he accept 'lakṣaṇā' or 'dirgha-dirghataravyāpāra" or "tātparya" ? And, in all these cases we refuse to call him a dhvanivädin. But perhaps he also accepts vyañjana at heart, but whatever appeals to hissense of beauty in poetry, he calls it 'vakrata', a broader term to designate all poetic beauty. We will discuss this when we come to the end of his assessment.
While dealing with the vicitra-marga, i.e. the brilliant style, K. refers to the striking aspect of beauty both in words and meaning which will appear as natural and not involving a special effort on the part of the poet, as in, "kóyam bhāti”, etc., (verse no. 89, under VJ. I. 43, pp. 54). He goes to observe that (vṛtti, VJ. I. 43;

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kävya. 1063 pp. 54, ibid) - "atra aprastutapraśamsă-laksaņo'lamkāraḥ prādhănyena vākyárthah, pratīyamāna-padārthantaratvena prayuktatvāt, tatra ca vicitra-kavi-śaktisamullikhita - vakra-sabdártho'panibandha-māhātmyāt. prakrama eva pratibhāsamānatvān na cā’rthántara-pratīti-kāritvena padānām śleșa-vyapadeśaḥ śakyate kartum, vācyasya sama-pradhāna-bhāvena anavasthānāt. arthántarapratīti-kāritvam ca padānām pratiyamānártha-sphutatávabhāsanártham upanibadhyamānam ativa-camatkāritām pratipadyate.” “The main purpose of this verse is 'vicarious reference', a figure of speech. The whole passage is designed by the author to convey a suggested meaning, other than the referential one. Further more, as a result of the effective use of artistic words and meanings due to the inventive genius of an accomplished poet, even the suggested meaning is made to appear as if it were the directly denoted meaning. Since it is grasped at the first instance itself, no paronomasia can be said to be involved, merely because the words convey a double meaning; in fact both the meanings retain equal importance. Such a usage of words with double meaning with a view to illuminating a clear, suggested meaning will carry an extremely delightful effect.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 340, ibid).
This is nothing else but ‘vyañjanā', not expressly admitted by K., who again equates ‘pratiyamāna', and 'vācya', in ‘aprastuta-praśamsā', which then caeses to be an alamkāra, and is included in the fold of dhvani.
In the same vein, K., without an express mentioning or acceptance of vyañjanavrtti, continues to explain one more illustration, viz. "he heläjita-bodhisattva." etc. (verse, No. 90, pp. 54, ibid). K. holds that, (vrtti, VJ. I. 43, pp. 55 ibid) - "atra atyanta-garhanīya-caritam padárthántaram pratīyamānatayā cetasi nidhāya tathāvidha-vilasitaḥ salila-nidhir vācyatayópakrāntaḥ, tad etāvad eva alamkrter aprastuta-praśamsāyāḥ svarūpam-garhaṇīya-pratīyamāna-padárthá-ntaraparyavasānam api vākyam śrutyupakrama-ramaniyatayā upanibandhyamānam tadvidā”hlādakāritām āyāti. tad etad vyājastuti-prati-rūpaka-prāyam alamkaranántaram aprastuta-prašamsāyā bhūṣaṇatvena upāttam. na cā’tra samkarálankāra-vyavahāro bhavitum arhati, prthag ati-parisphuţatvena avabhāsanāt. na cā’pi samsrsti-sambhavaḥ sama-pradhānabhāvena anavasthiteh. na ca dvayor api vācyálamkāratvam, vibhinna-visayatvāt.”
"Here also, keeping in mind a different meaning altogether, i.e. of a person whose character is most censurable, as his implicit meaning, the poet has explicitly described the ocean whose conduct is similar. This, in essence, is of the nature of the figure of speech, viz. 'Vicarious reference'. (or Indirect narration). Further, the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA sentence which implicitly conveys even a censurable idea becomes capable of causing delight to the connoisseurs when it is couched in a language which is explicitly beautiful. Hence, 'vicarious reference', may be reckoned as a figure of speech which is, in its turn, adorned by another figure, viz. “veiled praise”. Neither is there any scope here for the conjoint merger of both the figures since the two do not have an equally important status. The two are not to be classed as independent figures of expressed sense, because their scope is really different (and not identical)” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 340, 341, ibid)
K. refers to 'alamkāra' and 'alamkārya' while explaining an illustration of vicitramārga. He observes : (vrtti, VJ. I. 43, pp. 56, ibid) : "tad idam atra tạtparyamtad, alamkāra-mahimā eva tathāvid hótra bhrājate, tasyā'tyantódrikta-vítteh svaśobhātiśayántargatam alamkāryam prakāśate.” The upshot is this - The efficacy of the figure of speech itself, when it is at its best, is responsible for the impression of beauty surrounding the subject described.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 342, ibid). It is clear that here the 'alamkārya' is of the form of 'vastu-vyangya' only, but K. does not refer to vyañjanā. Under verse no. 95, (pp. 57, ibid) K. observes : (vrtti, VJ. I. 43, pp. 57, ibid) : "etac ca vyājastuti-paryāyokta-prabhstīnām bhūyasā vibhāvyate.” “And this fact is instaced in many a figure of speech such as “veiled praise” and “euphamism”. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 343, ibid).
We know that Ā. had observed implicit sense preserved in these figures. He had also observed that if the connoisseur feels that the implicit element is predominantly charming, as in the case of 'paryāyokta', such instances should be classed under dhvani, and if it is felt the expressed sense is comparatively more charming, they should be styled as “guni-bhūta-vyangya”. But K. seems to hold that the implicit is always more charming in all these figures. This leads us to Mahimā. But here also, he does not make any reference to vyañjanā, through which, for Ā., the implicit sense is arrived at. Of course K. does not oppose vyañjanā as is done, rather vehemently by Mahimā, K.'s successor
At VJ. I. 38. K. observes that 'vicitramärga', or the brilliant style is (vștti, VJ. I. 38. pp. 57, ibid) - "yad api vastu vācyam a-nūtanóllekham anabhinavatvena ullikhitam, tad api yatra, yasmin alam kām api kāsthām niyate, lokóttarātiśayakoțim adhi-ropyate, katham ? ukti-vaicitrya-mātrena, bhaniti-vaidagdhyenaiv éty arthaḥ." : Wherein all things existing in their own way are transformed into new shapes at the poet's will. The whole order of nature is made to appear in a new pespective altogether. K.'s observation is influenced by Dhv. I. 4. K. accepts everything at times from Ā., and yet fights shy of openly mentioning vyañjanā and

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recognising it as a separate independent function of a word; yes, independent of abhidha and the rest. On illustration no. 97, (pp. 57-58, ibid), viz. "uddeśoyam sarasa-kadali..." etc. K. observes: (pp. 58, ibid): "bhaniti-vaicitrya-mātram evā'tra. kävyárthaḥ, na tu nūtanóllekhaśāli vācya-vijṛmbhitam. etac ca bhaṇiti-vaicitryam sahasra-prakāram sambhavati iti svayam eva utprekṣaṇīyam." Needless to say that K.'s 'bhaniti-vaicitrya' of a thousand-fold nature is nothing else but A.'s dhvani. Ā. observes at Dhv. Iv. 2 (vṛtti):
"ato hy anyatamenā'pi prakāreņa vibhūṣitā,
vāṇī navatvam āyāti
pūrvárthánvaya-vaty api." (Dhv. IV. 2)
ato dhvaner ukta-prabheda-madhyād anyatamenā'pi prakāreņa vibhūṣitā satī vāṇī, purātanakavi-nibaddhártha-samsparśavaty api navatvam āyāti."
"By a mere touch of even a single variety of suggestion (among the many that have been enumerated), the poet's expression will acquire novelty though it might perhaps embody only a trite idea." (Dhv. Iv. 2)
The expression of a poet will appear quite novel though it might embody an idea already found in an earlier poet, if it is adorned by at least a single variety of - suggestion from among the many varieties that have been mentioned." (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 265, ibid). K. brings out the implicit sense in verse no. 99 (pp. 58, 59, ibid), without mentioning vyañjanā by name.
At VJ. I. 40, (pp. 53, ibid) K. almost accepts vyañjanā. He observes :
"pratīyamānatā yatra väkyárthasya nibadhyate, vācya-vācaka-vṛttibhyam
vyatiriktasya kasyacit"
"Wherein, further, the intended purport of the whole is communicated by a suggestive use of language, which is distinct from the two well-known uses, viz. The communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 339, ibid)

K. goes on to observe (vṛtti, VJ. I. 40, pp. 59): "vicitram eva prakārántareṇa unmilayati-pratīyamatā ityādi-yatra, yasmin pratīyamānatā, gamyamānatā vākyárthasya, mukhyatayā vivakṣitasya vastunaḥ kasya cid anakheyasya nibadyate.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA kayā yuktyā-vācya-vācaka-vịttibhyām sabdártha-śaktibhyām vyatiriktasya tad atirikta-vștter anyasya vyangya bhutasya abhivyaktiḥ kriyate.” - "The mainly intended purport therein, is conveyed by force of implication (i.e. suggestion), only in as much as it defies direct denotation. What is the exact process involved ? The process involved is implication (or suggestion) which is distinct from the two wellknown uses of language, viz. the communicative use of meanings and the denotative use of words. The word process is used here in the sense of the latent power in words and meanings towards signification.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 345, ibid)
This directly leads K. into the camp of Ā. and at his feet too ! Precisely because of this we may call him a dhvanivādin eventhough here also, he does not name 'vyañjanā' clearly. Perhaps because of this also, K. who looks to be a “pracchannadhvani-vādin”, is spared the onslaughts of Ā.'s great followers such as Mammata and the like, and he is hardly heard of and quoted in later works becuase he has nothing fresh to offer. He is almost neglected, for he wrongly tries to project his vicitrā abhidhā' - theory which proposes to subsume even vyañjanā under it. K. says that this 'pratīyamāna-vyavahāra' will be elucidated while dealing with vākyavakratā lateron : "eșa ca 'pratīyamāna vyavahāro vākya-vakratā-vyākhyávasare sutarām samumīlyate." (vītti, pp. 59, ibid, VJ. I. 40)
Illustration no. 100, (pp. 59-60, ibid) viz. "vakréndor na haranti..." etc. is also explained in it, which is ‘other then the expressed' - "...iti vācya-vyatirikta-vrtti dütyukti-tātparyam pratīyate." K. holds that 'vicitra-märga' also operates when an object's real nature is so described as to be brimming with the intended flow of sentiments - (vrtti, VJ. I. 41; pp. 66, ibid) : yatra yasmin bhāvānām svabhāvah, parispandaḥ, sa-rasā”kūtaḥ, rasa-nirbharábhiprāyeņa padárthānām nibadhyate, niveśyate; kīdrśaḥ ?..." etc. This is clearly under the influence of Dhv. IV. 4.
K. then comes to what he calls the "madhyama-mārga” (VJ. I. 49-51, pp. 68, ibid). He discusses the qualities of "aucitya” or propriety and "saubhāgya” or "splendour" under VJ. I. 55, 56, and 57 (pp. 69/70, ibid). In I. 56, he holds that this 'saubhāgya' is "the only life of poetry" - "kāvyaika-jīvita”. This is rather surprising. K. is not so clear as is Ā., in exactly defining the relation between 'guna' and 'rasa'.
K. speaks of second variety of "varna-vinyāsa-vakratā” at VJ. II. 2 (pp. 75, ibid), which is three-fold. The letters used are - "prastutaucitya-sobhinah” - i.e. they shine by their harmony with the theme, which necessarily is not of the type of rasā"di. We know that .. had insisted on letters being condusive to 'rasa' only, (Dhv. III. 3, 4, - "tena varnā rasacyutah”). As compared to that, K.'s approach is wider and

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1067 therefore commendable. By this, K. tries to cover the concept of guņas, rītis, and vrttis, as advanced by others. However, A.'s over all stamp continues as in VJ. II. 4 (pp. 78, ibid). K. observes that this particular vakrată concerning letters should not be brought about by any extra effort on the part of the poet. By "effected without extra effort", what is implied is the unmerited and excessive craze of poets : (vrtti, on VJ. II. 4, pp. 78) : nátinirbandha-vihitā - "nirbandha" sabdótra vyasanitāyām vartate. tena atinirbandhena punaḥ punar avartanavyasanitayā na vihitā, 'a-prayatna-viracitā' ity arthaḥ.” Ā. hints at the same point at II. 16/17; etc., and wants an 'alamkāra', including a śabdálamkāra to be, “a-prthag-yatnanirvartya”, and wants the poet to restrict himself - “náti-nirvahanaiṣitā”. At VJ. II. 5, K. correlates varna-vinyāsa-vakratā with the concept of gunas and vrttis of the ancients. He observes :
"varņa-cchāyánusāreņa guna-mārgánuvartini, vịtti-vaicitrya-yuktéti
saiva proktā cirantanaiḥ.” (VJ. II. 5) ...cirantanaiḥ punaḥ saiva svātantryeņa vstti-vaicitrya-yuktéti proktā. vịttīnām upanāgarikádīnām yad vaicitryam vicitra-bhāvaḥ sva-nişgha-samkhyā-bhedabhinnatvam tena yuktā samanvitā iti cirantanaih pūrva-sūribhih abhihita.”
"The ancients spoke of it in their own independent way as characterised by, "beauty of literary mode". (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 367, ibid). K. thus deals with anuprāsa, the first variety, of his varņa-vinyāsa-vakratā. The second variety, viz. yamaka', is dealt with at VJ. II. 6, 7. Here also 'aucitya' or 'propriety' is broad-based as it touches the best manifestation of the subject, which goes beyond rasā"di.
After having dealt with ten varieties of varņa-vinyāsavakratā, K. picks up what he calls “pada-pūrvárdha-vakratā”, i.e. beauty concerning the usage of the first part of words i.e. base form of substantives (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 369, ibid). He talks of it at VJ. II. 8, 9 and vịtti thereon. The first variety is "rūdhi-vaicitrya-vakratā”.
The definition contains words such as "garbhatā" and "garbhatva”, showing direct relation with the implicit sense, but without any mention of vyañjanā. K. observes that : (vrtti, VJ. II. 8, 9; pp. 82, 83 ibid) : “kena hetunā-lokóttara-tiraskāraślāghyótkarşábhidhitsayā. lokóttaraḥ sarvā’tiśāyī yas tiraskāraḥ khalīkaranam ślāghyaś ca sprhanīyo ya utkarşaḥ, śātiśayatvam tayor abhidhitsă abhidhātum icchā vaktukāmatā, tayā: kasya, vācyasya. rūdhi-sabdasya vācyo yóbhidheyórthas tasya sócyate kathyate kā’pyalaukiki rūdhi-vaicitrya-vakratā. rūdhi-sabdasya evam

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA vidhena vaicitryena vicitrabhāvena vakratā vakra-bhāvaḥ.” “An intention to shower extra-ordinary belittlement or extra-ordinary glorification of the theme.” The poet might desire to present his subject for too less or for too more than it actually is. The 'subject here meant is the one denoted by the conventionally used word. Such an art is designated as 'art in beautifying conventional sense', because a denotative word gets artful extension of sense in all this. (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 370, ibid).
All this is full of Ā's implicit sense. The first illustration cited viz. "tālā jāanti..." etc., is also from Dhv. (pp. 38, ibid). And it is here that K. clearly mentions the 'Dhvanikāra' and “vyangya-vyñjaka-bhāva”. K. observes : (vịtti, VJ. II. 9, pp. 83, ibid) : “pratiyata iti. kriyāpada-vaicitryasya ayam abhiprāyo yad evamvidhe visaye śabdānām vācakarvena na vyāpāraḥ, api tu vastvantaravat-pratītikāritva-mātrena iti yukti-yuktam api etad iha na atipratanyate. yasmād dhvanikāreņa vyangyavyañjaka-bhāvótra sutarām samarthitas tat kim paunaruktyena" "The predicate, 'is seen to expand', in the Kārikā, has special significance. In all such instances the verbal function involved is not ordinary denotation but suggestion which can signify a world of extending connotative meanings. This conclusion is indeed reasonable, but we are not concerned with that question here. So refrain from devoting space to its consideration. The learned author of the Dhvanyaloke has established at length the relation of word and meaning in such instances to be that of 'suggestor' and 'suggested'; there is no point served in our repeating the same.” (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 371, ibid).
K. is so much under the spell of Ā., that very often he turns to him even for illustrations. He illustrates rūdhivaicitrya-vakratā, which is here two-fold and seems to be modelled on Ā.'s "arthántara, samkramita-vācya-dhvani', with the help of an illustration accepted from Ā., viz.” snigdha-śyāmala-kānti..." etc. (pp. 83-84, ibid). The same beauty of 'rāma'-pada is brought out, but is branded here as a particular type of vakratā. But once again, what can we say to K. who equates 'varna-vinyāsavakratā', having the charm of varņas, i.e. expression only, with “rūdhi-vaicitryavakratā” having the charm of pure vyañjanā, and places them on the same footing? We are reminded here of the famous verse :
"kācam manim kāñcanam ekasūtre, mūrkhā nibadhnanti, kimatra citram ? vicāravān
pāņinir eka-sūtre śvānam yuvānam maghavānam āha." Illustrations after illustrations prove the supreme dominance of vyañjanā. In

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guņībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1069 "ājñā sakra-śikhāmani pranayini..." etc., (verse, 29, pp. 84, ibid), we have, "syāc ced esa na rāvanah," an expression charged with vyañjanā. Ā. would call it "arthántara samkramita-vācya-dhvani.” Same is the case with the next illustration, viz. "rāmósau bhuvanesu vikrama-gunaih..." etc., an illustration also read in A., and the still next, and the still next. K. says that this "rūdhi-vaicitrya-vakratā” has many varieties on account of the implicit sense in it : (vịtti, VJ. II. 9; pp. 85) - "eşā ca rūdhi-vaicitrya-vakratā pratiyamāna-dharma-bāhulyāt bahuprakāra bhidyate.” Even here, K. keeps silent over whether this implicit sense is arrived at through vyañjanā or not.
K. then proceeds to deal with what he terms as paryāya vakratā” (at VI. II. 1012) i.e. “Superior art in the use of synonyms” (K.Kris.; pp. 373, ibid), which is sixfold. We can easily see through these and stamp them only as, "vyañjanā-vilasita”. He almost mentions 'vyañjana' when he observes : (vịtti II 10-12, pp. 86, ibid) "yasmāt paryāya-śabdatve saty apy antarangatvāt sa yathā vivaksitam vastu vyanakti tathā nânyah kaścid iti." "Though other synonyms exist, one alone among them can achieve closest approximation with the shade of meaning that is sought to be conveyed (= suggested ?) and not the rest.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 374, ibid).
The illustrations no.s 32, 33, etc. (pp. 86-87, ibid) prove the point. Our point is that if all this is ultimately the charm caused by vyañjanā, what purpose is served by just giving it a new name ? What's in a name ? Call it "vyañjana-dhvani” or call it by any other name.
The next variety of paryāyavakratā is illustrated by the verse no. 35, (pp. 88, ibid), viz. "ittham jade..." etc. K. clearly exhibits his knowledge of Ā.'s theory and his scheme of sabda-vșttis while discussing this illustration. We may also find here a tacit acceptance also of Ā.'s scheme. He observes : (vrtti, VJ. II. 10, pp. 88, 89, ibid) : "atra ‘mātanga' śabdah prastute vārana-mātre pravartate. ślistayā vrttyā candāla-lakṣaṇasya a-prastutasya vastunah pratītim utpādayan rūpakā’lamkāracchāyā-sparśād gaur vāhīkaḥ ity anena nyāyena sādņśya-nibandhanasya upacārasya sambhavāt prastutasya vastunas tattvam adhyāropayan paryāyavakratām puşnāti. yasmād evamvidhe vişaye prastutasya a-prastutena sambandhópanibandho rūpakalamkāra-dvāreņa kadācid upamā-mukhena vā. yathā sa evayam sa ivā'yam iti vā. eșa eva ca sabda-saktimülā'nuraṇana-rūpa-vyangyasya pada-dhvaner visayah, bahuỵu caivanvidhegu satsu vakya-dhvaner vã.”
“The word 'mātanga' in this context directly refers only to the elephant. Paronomiastically it can also denote the non-contextual meaning, viz., 'butcher'; the two came to be metaphorically identified, after the analogy of the punjabi is a

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA bull, because here also there is similarity justifying metaphorical identification. Thus, we have here a new aspect of beauty in the use of a synonym. In all such places the relation between the direct (lit. contextual) and the indirect, (lit. noncontextual) meaning may be either one of metaphor or of simile. One might say "that is this” or, “this is like this”. This itself has been spoken of (by Ā.) as an instance of suggestion in word coming under the class - "sabda-sakti-mūlaanuranana-rūpa-vyangya", wherein there is a paranomastic power in the word giving rise to two as metaphor etc., and resembling resonant sound.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 376, ibid)
K. clearly mentions 'vākya-dhvani' also and draws illustrations viz. "kusumasamaya-yugam." etc. and “vrtte'smin..." etc. from the Dhvanyāloka (pp. 78, and pp. 110, Edn. '74, K.Kris.) We fail to understand his effort in naming A.'s dhvani differently. Only point to his credit is that he has specifically mentioned and illustrated many varieties, or say, sub-varieties of dhvani left out by A. But thereby Ki's work becomes only supplementary to the Dhvanyaloka. It may be called a useful appendix, at the most, to Ā.'s great Dhvanyāloka. Ko's effort to name it differently is just quibbling. Yes, just so, and nothing more. For, he has to admit that, in the particular illustration viz. "vịttésmin mahāpralaye..." etc., (pp. 89, ibid) : (vrtti, VJ. II. 10; verse 37, pp. 89 - ibid) : "atra yugā”dayaḥ śabdāḥ prastutábhidhāna-paratvena prayujyamānāh santópya-aprastuta-vastu-pratīti-kāritayā kām api kāvya-cchāyām samunmīlayantah pratiyamānālamkāra-vyapadesa-bhājanam bhavanti." "Though the word 'yuga' (= 'era'; 'twin months) etc., are used overtly to refer to the subject on hand, they are capable of suggesting another meaning indirectly and reveal a special kind of poetic charm which has been designated by the name, 'suggested figure of speech' by Ā." - (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 377, ibid).
What pains us is not just his naming the things differently, but it is only when K. places different varieties of vakratā on the same footing, we feel that he violates the basic principles of aesthetics in general and dhvani in particular and renders confusion worse confounded. For example, his fourth variety of 'paryāya-vakrata' viz. "sva-cchāyótkarsa peśala” (pp. 89, 90, ibid) i.e. (which by itself contributes to a new lease of excellence - Trans. K.Kris., pp. 377) - at the most comes closer to what we call 'parikara-alamkāra'. Surely this can never be equated with other 'vakratā' as above, which is dhvani, pure and simple.
K. then treats (pp. 90, ibid) yet another variety, wherein, “ayam aparah padapūrvárdha-vakratā bhidhāyi-asambhāvyartha-pātratva-garbham yaścā'bhidhīyate". i.e. 'which hints at a meaning having inconceivable elements.' (Trans. K.Kris. pp.

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1071 378, ibid). After citing apt illustrations (viz. verses no.s 40, 41, pp. 91, ibid) K. makes the following observation : (vrtti, VJ. II. 12, pp. 91, ibid) : tad evam yady api suspasta-samanvayóyam vākyárthas tathā'pi tātparyántaram atra pratiyate.” - "...apart from this surface meaning, there is also the hint of another intent.”
The variety called, "alamkārópasamskāra-manohāri-nibandhanah" - "that which contains embellishing figurative elements condusive to beauty” (pp. 379, ibid, Trans. K.Kris.) - has beauty caused by figures. The compound is to be treated as both 'trtīyā-samāsah' and 'sasthi-samāsah' - i.e. both as an instrumental compound and as a genitive compound' (K.Kris., pp. 380, ibid). While dealing with the latter, K. cites an illustration of 'utpreksā' which is only suggested. Thus he jumbles up, once again, contrary to the expectations of a pure dhvani-vādin, the two different charms resulting from the use of normal figures of speech and others that are only suggested. The particular illustration, viz. "devi, tvan mukhapankajena..." etc. (verse, No. 42, pp. 42, ibid) may be classed as one of 'alamkāra dhvani', wherein ‘utpreksā' is only implicit. K. observes : (vrtti, VJ. II. 12, pp. 92) : "tvan-mukha-pankajena punah sašinah sobhātiraskārinā nyāyato nirjitāni santi 'vicchāyatām gacchanti iva' iti pratīyamānasya utpekṣā-lakṣaṇasya alamkārasya śobhātisayaḥ samullāsyate."
Now K. comes to treat “upacāra-vakratā” - "beauty of metaphorical expression" - (K.Kris.), under VJ. II. 13, 14 (pp. 93, ibid). It is clear that he intends to cover up all usages having metaphor at its root. Alamkāras such as rūpaka, and all such usages having 'laksana' as their basis, and also such other figures of speech which belong to the 'expressed class are also taken up here. K. also covers up what the dhvani-vādin would call “laksaņā-mūla-dhvani.” Thus without discrimination worthy of a true follower of .., he puts on par both the 'expressed and the "principally suggested." He herein includes also cases which a dhvanivādin would designate as, “atyanta-tiraskrta-vācya-dhvani”. Anyoktis are also covered up under this vakratā.
We come across an illustration of anyókti in verse no. 50(pp. 96, ibid), viz. "anarghaḥ kópy antaḥ...” etc. K. observes : (vrtti, VJ. II. 14, pp. 96, ibid): tathā ca kim api padārthántaram pratiyamānataya cetasi nidhāya, tathāvidha-laksanasāmya-samanvayam samāśritya padárthāntaram abhidhīyamānatām prāpayantaḥ, prāyaśaḥ kavayo dịśyante." - "Furthermore, poets are often seen describing outwardly objects different from the ones that they have in mind, primarily because of some fancied similarity in the qualities of the two.” (pp. 383, ibid, Trans. K.Kris).

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SAHṚDAYALOKA K. does not seem to bother whether the implied sense is principal or subordinate in relation to the expressed. He seems to hold that the implicit is principal in 'a-prastuta-praśamsa' as against rupaka in which the expressed is principal (vṛtti, VJ. II. 14, verse 50; pp. 96, ibid) - "tatha ca etayor dvayos tulye'pi upacara-vakratā-jīvitve, vācyatvam èkatra, pratīyamānatvam aparasmin svarupabhedasya nibandhanam." - "Thus in these two figures of speech i.e. 'metaphor' and 'irrelevant reference', though there is similarity in regard to the vital presence of "beauty in metaphorical expression", difference between the two can be brought out by explaining the one as suggested and the other as denoted." (Trans. K.Kris.; pp. 384, ibid).
This idea regarding a-prastuta-praśamsã goes against the normally accepted notion as represented by M., Ruyyaka, Appayya and Jagannatha.
At VJ. II. 15, (pp. 96, ibid) K. deals with "viseṣaṇa-vakrata", which is three-fold, and is itself the fourth variety of pada-pūrvárdha-vakratā. He observes: (VJ. II. 15, pp. 96, ibid) :
"viseṣaṇasya māhātmyāt kriyāyāḥ kārakasya vā, yatróllasati lavanyam
sā viseṣaṇa-vakratā."
"If as a result of the excellence of epithet, beauty is added to the verb or noun, (in a sentence), it is to be classed as "beauty in epithet". (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 384, ibid).
This comes close to normal 'parikara-alamkara', and seems to be more a charm connected with pure expression, i.e. "abhidha-vilasita" only. VJ. II. 16 (pp. 98, ibid) talks of "samvṛti-vakratā" - "beauty of concealment," which is manifold and has an element of implied sense which is either principal or subordinate source of charm. In short, it could be placed either with 'dhvani' or "gunībhuta-vyangya", as the case may be. K. observes :
"yatra samvriyate vastu vaicitryasya vivakṣayā, sarva-nāmā"dibhiḥ kaiścit
sóktā samvṛti-vakratā." (VJ. II. 16, pp. 98, ibid)
"In order to achieve excellence of expression, when the subject of description is screened as it were by the use of pronouns and so forth, we have, what is

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designated as, "beauty of concealment." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 385 ibid). We feel that A.'s vastu-dhvani can be accomodated in second, third, fourt, fifth and sixth varieties of 'samvṛti-vakrata'. The illustration for example, viz. "tat pitary atha parigraha..." etc. (verse, no. 58, pp. 99, ibid) is explained by K. as, (vṛtti, VJ. II. 16, pp. 99, ibid). "atra sadācāra-pravaṇatayā gurubhakti-bhāvitántaḥkarano lokóttaraudārya-guṇa-yogād-vividha-viṣayópabhoga-vitṛṣṇamana nijendriyanigraham a-sambhāvanīyam api śāntanavo vihitavān ity abhidhātum sakyam api sāmānyábhidhāyinā sarva-namnā"cchadya uttarárdhena kāryantarábhidhāyinā vākyantareṇa pratiti-gocaratām ānīyamānam kām api camatkāritām āvahati.”
-"In this example, it was, certainly possible for the poet to state that Santanu's son (= Deva-vrata, alias Bhisma) displayed incredible self-restraint in foreswearing all sensual allurements because of his extra-ordinary magnanimity, his devout good behaviour and boundless regard for elders. But the poet has avoided this straight-forward statement; he has allowed it to be concealed by a pronoun (= he), with general significance. In the second half of the verse, he proceeds to give us a relative clause, which describes some other action and yet succeeds by this manoeuvre in suggesting it strikingly and forcefully." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 388, ibid). This is just vastu-dhvani. The next illustration, viz. "yāte dväravatim..." etc., (verse 59, pp. 99, ibid), also prove the point when K. observes: (vṛtti, VJ. II. 16, pp. 99, ibid) "atra sarvanāmnă samvṛtam vastu tat-käryä'bhidhāyinā vākyántarena samunmilya sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-hāritām prāpitam." "Here what she sang is concealed by the pronoun 'that' (in the original) and at the same time the concealed idea is revealed by another clause which wins the hearts of critics with taste." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 387, ibid).
The next variety of 'pada-pūrvárdha-vakrata' is "pada-madhyāntar-bhūtapratyaya-vakrata" (i.e. the affix in the middle of a word adds to the beauty of decorum in subject described - K.Kris.; pp. 388, ibid) - which is taken up at VI. II. 17, (pp. 101, ibid) K. observes: (vṛtti, VJ. II. 17, pp. 101 ibid) - "kaścit pratyayaḥ krd ādiḥ, pada-madhya-vṛttir anyām apūrvām vakratām ullāsayati vakrabhāvam uddīpayati. kim kurvan?
-
prastutasya varṇyamānasya vastuno yad aucityam ucitabhāvas tasya vicchittim upaśobhām vikāsayan, samullāsayan; kena ? sva-mahimnā, nijótkarṣena."
"The affix in the middle of a word often adds to the beauty of decorum in the subject described, by virtue of its own excellence. This may be regarded as another type of poetic beauty. Some affixes like 'kṛt' occurring in the middle of words are

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
seen enhancing the unique poetic beauty in the passage. They serve to increase the beauty of decorum in respect of the subject described. This increase is brought about by its own excellence." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 386, ibid).
These are charms of both expression and suggestion. For example, in - "snihyat kaṭākṣe dṛśau." (verse no. 68, pp. 101). K. observes here (vṛtti, VS. II. 17, pp. 102, ibid) "atra vartamāna-kālábhidhāyī satṛ-pratyayaḥ kām apy atītā'nāgatavibhrama-virahitām tātkālika-parispanda-sundarīm prastutaucitya-vicchittim ullāsayan sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-hāriṇīm pratyaya-vakratām āvahati.”
"The affix forming the present participle brings out beautifully the speciality of the subject shining in its present splendour and devoid of graces attached to it in the past and attributable to it in the future. This charm of the affix is indeed very appealing to the mind of sensitive critics." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 389, ibid) - This has charm operating at the level of abhidhā only. Once again, K. places all varieties of beauty-vakrata' - on the same footing without caring in the least for what A. would feel about it. The illustrations, viz. verses, Nos., 69, 70, 71, on pp. 102, ibid, prove this point. K. observes: (vṛtti, VJ. II. 18, pp. 102, ibid) - "atra subhagam-manyabhāva-prabhṛtiṣu śabdeṣa, mumādi-parispanda-sundarāḥ sanniveṣa-cchāyāvidhāyinīm vācaka-vakratām pratyayāḥ puṣṇanti." - "The augments 'mum' in the words 'subhagam-manya', 'prasṛtim-paca', and so forth, add extra-ordinary stylistic charm showing off the linguistic construction to best advantage." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 389, ibid). Then follows 'vṛtti-vakratā', at VJ. II. 19 (pp. 103, ibid), which takes note of beauty revealed through various types of compounds, and also taddhita, and sub-vṛttis. This includes charm caused due to the pure expression i.e. abhidhā, and also 'upacāra', or metaphorical expression, and then vyañjana also. The illustrations go to prove this. However, the main source of charm is only abidhā. The illustration viz., "ā svar-lokād uraga-nagaram" etc. (verse, '73, pp. 103, ibid), has the word "pāṇḍimānam" which contributes to a unique beauty of vṛtti, a beauty which would be missed if its synonym like 'pāṇḍutva', 'pāṇḍuta' and 'pandubhāva' were used.
Then comes 'bhāva-vakrata', a further variety of 'pada-pūrvárdha-vakrata'. K. takes it up at VJ. II. 20, (pp. 108, ibid). K. makes the point clear when he suggests that here pure expression at abidhā level makes for the charm, regardless of any acquaintance with the implicit element. A. would refuse to equate it with vyañjanā. VJ. II. 21 has 'linga-vaicitrya-vakratā', also a charm, at the abhidha level. VJ. II. 22 (pp. 106, ibid) observes that

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“sati lingántare yatra stri-lingam ca prayujyate, śobhā-nispattaye yasmān
nāmnaiva strīti peśalam.” “Even when other genders could be used, if the feminine is preferred, it contributes to beauty; since even the name of a woman is pleasing." (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 392, ibid) - It may be noted in passing that Dr. K. Kris. (pp. XV, Introduction to his edn. of VJ.) tries to suggest here that this observation shows K. as a predecessor of Abhinavagupta. We feel that this could be debated. VJ. II. 23 (pp. 106, ibid) also continues the same argument. VJ. II. 24, 25 (pp. 108, 109, ibid) give the eight variety of pada-pūrvárdha-vakratā. This has "kriyā-vaicitrya-vakratā" of five varieties, which has charm caused due to abhidhā, as well as 'upacara', but all this is placed on the same footing. There is a touch of vyañjanā also, as in the illustration viz. "prapannā"rti-cchido-nakhāḥo" (verse No. 88., pp. 110, ibid), from Ā. In the variety viz. 'sva-viśesaņa-vaicitrya", (pp. 110, ibid) also, there is an element of vyañjanā, when an attribute causes charm. K. does accept charm due to vyañjanā, eventhough he does not name it so. But he includes it in his wider scheme of kavi-vyāpāra-vakratā, without distinguishing between beauty caused by abhidhā. laksaņā (or upacāra), and vyañjanā. This would be a difficult pill to swallow for
alks of 'upacāra-manojñatā” (on pp. 111, ibid) which proves the above observation. Then he talks of 'karmā”di-samvrti' wherein 'karma' i.e. action remains 'vyangya' (pp. 112, ibid).
After discussing 'pada-pūrvárdha-vakrat in case of both 'subanta' and 'tinganta' padas in eleven varieties, K. now proceeds to discuss “pada-parárdhavakratā”, i.e. ‘pratyaya-vakratā” with reference to the same. First is taken up “kālavaicitrya-vakratā' at VJ. II. 26 (pp. 113). The illustrations reveal the beauty of vyañjanā only. K. gives only a different lebel. The 'kāraka-vakratā' at VJ. II. 27, 28 (pp. 115 ibid) speaks of vakratā - i.e. beauty - caused due to reversal of status in 'instruments in action.' Some of the illustrations reveal the charm caused by direct expression, pure and simple, as in, “yācñām dainya." etc. (verse no. 97, pp. 116, ibid), while there is a tinge of vyañjanā also somewhere. Similar is the case of 'samkhyā-vakratā (VJ. II. 29, pp. 116, ibid), or "transposition of numbers.” K. observes (vștti, VJ. II. 29, pp. 117 ibid) tad ayam atrā’rthaḥ - yad ekavacane, dvivacane prayoktavye vaicitryártham vacanántaram yatra prayujyate, bhinnavacanayor vā yatra sāmānādhikaranyam vidhīyate.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "The upshot is this - when either the singular or the dual number should have been used in a context, if we find that another number is used, or if we find that two different numbers are brought into relation with an identical case-termination, we have this type instanced.” The illustration is, "kapole patrāli." etc. The verse is from Amaru-sataka (no. 85), and is also quoted by A., under Dhv. II. 16c, (pp. 58 line 10, Edn. '74, ibid). He quotes it to illustrate proper use of alamkāra as a ‘rasánga'. K. deals with what he calls 'puruṣa-vakratā' i.e. "obique beauty of person", at VJ. II. 30 (pp. 118, ibid). He observes : (vrtti, VJ. II. 30, pp. 118, ibid) - "tad ayam atrā'rthah. yad anyasmin uttame madhyame vā puruse prayoktavye vaicitryāya anyaḥ kadācit prathamaḥ prayujyate. tasmāc ca purusaika yogaksematvād asmadāde” prātipadikamātrasya ca viparyāsaḥ paryavasyati.” “The purport is as follows : In a literary context where the first or second person is required to be used, the poet may prefer to use the third person instead. For the same reason, since pronouns are as good as nouns, the transposition of a noun (i.e.
the third person) in place of a pronoun also becomes proper example of this type - of oblique charm.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 404, ibid).
Ā. has practically hinted at all these varieties of so called vakratā, under Dhv. III. 16 (pp. 146, lines 7, 8, ibid), when he observes :
"sup-tin-vacana-sambandhis tathā kāraka-Śaktibhiḥ, krt-taddhita-samāsais ca
dyotyólaksya-kramaḥ kvacit.” “Case-terminations, conjugational terminations, number, relation, acc primary affixes, secondary affixes and also compounds - all these become conveyers of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 147, ibid)
The essence of suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality, i.e. sentiment etc., is conveyed even by the speciality in case-terminations and conjugal terminations, in number, relation and accidence, in primary affixes, secondary affixes, and compounds. The conjugation 'also' in the text indicates that even propositions and tenses might become suggestive." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 147, ibid) The vștti, on Dhv. III. 16 (pp.146, ibid) reads as : "alaksyakramo dhvaner ātmā rasā"diḥ, sub-višeșais, tin-viśeşair, vacana-višeşaiḥ, sambandha-visesaiḥ, kāraka-saktibhiḥ, krd-viseșais taddhita-višesaiḥ, samāsais' ca iti, 'ca' śabdān nipātópasarga-kālā”dibhiḥ prayuktair abhivyajyamāno drśyate.”

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K. seems to accept from Ā., of course without openly recognising the same. K. seems to cover some more sub-varieties such as "upagraha-vakratā” (VJ. II. 31, pp 118, ibid), and “pratyayántara-vakratā” (VJ. II. 32, pp. 119), i.e. beauty due to verbaffix, and also unique beauty of affix.” This pertains to charm caused by pure expression at abhidhā level. K. equates this without discrimination, with other varieties involving vyañjanā. This can not be accepted by a dhvanivādin.
K. then comes to yet another variety of pada-vakratā at VJ. II. 33 (pp. 120, ibid). This is very interesting, for he says,
“rasā"di-dyotanam yasyām upasarga-nipātayoh, vākyaika-jīvitatvena
sā’parā pada-vakratā.” (VJ. II. 33, pp. 120, ibid) "In a poem where the prepositions and indeclinables are employed only to suggest rasas as the sole essense of a poem as a whole, we have what may be called another type of “word-beauty”. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 406, ibid). K. speaks of
dyotana' in the sense of 'vyañjana' of rasa, and here he accepts it, but without being vyañjanā-biased. Similarly, he accepts "pratiyamāna" through 'vyañjanā', but he would not hesitate to put the ‘abhidhártha' and 'pratiyamānártha' in the same category as he himself is not 'pratiyamāna-biased'. He cites illustrations which are read also in the Dhv. Like Dhv. III. 16, as quoted above, K. also suggests in VJ, II. 38 (pp. 122, ibid), that many sub-varieties can be found together at a single place, as in “tarantīva.” iti, etc. (pp. 122, ibid, verse no. 113) Actually, K. does not seem to be an opponent of vyañjanā, i.e., he is not a "vyañjanā-virodhin”, but perhaps, he can be said to be an "antar-bhāva-vādin". Vyañjanā forms but an aspect of 'kavi-vyāpāra' or "vicitrā-abhidhā”. He also mentions “vyañjakatva” by name, while dealing with VJ. II. 35 (pp. 123, ibid), wherein he observes : (VJ. II. 35, pp. 123) :
"vāg-vallyāḥ pada-pallavā”spadatayā yā vakratódbhāsini vicchittiḥ sarasattva-sampad-ucitā kāpy ujjvalā jțmbhate, tāmālocya vidagdha-sat-pada-ganair vākya-prasūnāśrayam
sphärāmoda-manoharam madhu navotkņthā”kulam pīyatām.” "Poetic speech is a veritable creeper, with words as leaves, forming the bases for (symmetrical) beauty striking with artistic turn adding to the wealth of feelings and sentiments in a most striking manner. May the bee-like connoisseurs appreciate it

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA and collect the profusely fragrant and sweet honey, from the sentence blossoms, and enjoy it with ever-increasing zest.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 409, ibid) K. goes to add, (vịtti, VJ. II. 35, pp. 124, ibid) - "atraikatra sarasatvam sva-samaya-sambhavi rasā”rdratvam anyatra śụngārā"di-vyañjakatvam.” - “Such is the purport. The juiciness alluded in the verse has two connotations : The first relates to the luscious exuberance manifest in creepers seasonally during spring. In the second place it suggests erotic feelings and so forth.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 410, ibid) K. dealt with vācaka-vakratā in the second chapter. He proceeds with vākya-vakratā, beginning with vācaka-vakrată in the next chapter. K. observes - (VJ. III. 1, pp. 125, ibid)
"udāra-sva-parispandasundaratvena varṇanam, vastuno vakra-śabdaika
gocaratvena vakratā.” - "When the subject matter is described in a way condusive to beauty by virtue of its own infinite natural charm, and by means of exclusively artistic expressions, we may take it as an instance of creative beauty relating to content.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 411, ibid). He seems to touch both abhidhā and vyañjanā here by the term “vakra-sabdaika-gocaratvena”, i.e. “by means of exclusively artistic expression.” The artistic expression may not be either abhidhā or vyañjanā alone. It could be both. He goes to observe further : (vrtti, VJ. III. 1, pp. 125, ibid) : "varnanam pratipadanam. katham ? vakra-sabdaika-gocaratvena. vakro yo'sau nānāvidha-vakratā-viśistah sabdah kaścid eva vācaka-viśeso vivaksitártha-samarpanasamarthas tasyai-vaikasya kevalasya gocaratvena pratipădyatayā viņayatvena. vācyatvena iti noktam, vangyatvenā’pi pratipādana-sambhavāt. tad 'idam aparam bhavati-yad evamvidhe bhāva-svabhāva-saukumārya-varnana-prastāve bhūyasām na vācyā'lamkārānām upamādīnām upayoga-yogyatā sambhavati, svabhāvasaukumāryā'tiśaya-mlanatā-prasangāt.”
“The description intended is poetic treatment. Its manner is conveyed by the epithet - 'by means of exclusively artistic expressions.' That is to say out of a number of charming expressions, only that particular one will be selected, which is capable of yielding the intended content as designed by the creative poet as his main subject-matter. The word yielding is used instead of 'signifying', because communication of meaning is possible in a suggestive way also. The sum and substance is this : In all such cases involving the natural charm of the content

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This shows that K. is not apethetic to vyañjanā and is at times prepared to accept the charm caused by the same. What he seems to do is that he gives a larger connotation to A.'s expression; viz. "tau sabdarthau mahākaveh." (Dhv. I. 8.) For Ā. these 'śabdárthau' were exclusively "vyangya-vyañjakau”. For Ā. specifically observes at I. 8 (Dhv. pp. 14, ibid).
“evam vācya-vyatirekiņo vyangya sadbhāvam pratipādya prādhānyam tasyaiva darśayati -
“sórthas tad-vyakti-sāmarthyayogi sabaś ca kaścana, yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau
tau śabdárthau mahākaveh." (Dhv. I. 8) sa vyangyórthas tad-vyakti-sāmarthya-yogi śabdaś ca kaścana, na sarvaḥ tāv eva śabdárthau mahākaveḥ pratyabhijñeyau. vyangya-vyañjakābhyām eva hi suprayuktābhyām mahākavitva-lābho mahākavīnām, na vācya-vācaka-racanā. mātrena." (pp. 14, 16, ibid).
"Thus after establishing the existence of the implicit meaning as distinct from the explicit, the over-riding superiority of that meaning is demonstrated in what follows :
That meaning, and that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it, only these two deserve the careful scrutiny of a first-rate poet. (Dhv. I. 8)
"that meaning" refers to the implicit and 'that rare word which possesses the power of conveying it points out that it is not any and every word (recorded in the dictionary). Such a word and such a meaning-only these two deserve the careful recognition of a first-rate poet. The status of first-rate poets is achieved only by the effective employment of suggested meanings and suggestive expressions, and not by a mere use of conventional meanings and conventional words.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 15, 17, ibid)
Not that .. on his part does not recognise the charm of the expressed content, but he feels that this charm of the expressed content will shine out only in the association of sentiment which is necessarily suggested. Says .. : Dhv. IV. 7, (pp. 282, ibid) and vịtti, thereon :

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SAHĶDAYĀLOKA “na cā’rthā'nantyam vyangyárthā’pekṣayā eva, yāvad vācyárthápekṣayā api iti pratipadayitum ucyate -
"avastha-deśa-kālā"diviśeşair api jāyate, ānantyam eva vācyasya
śuddhasyā’pi svabhāvataḥ.” (Dhv. I. 7) ..... darśitam eva caitad visama-banalīlāyām -
na ca teşām ghatate’vadhiḥ, na ca te drsyante katham api punar uktāḥ ye vibhramāḥ priyāņām
arthā vā sukavi-vānīnām." "This infinitude of poetic themes is brought about not only by way of suggested content but also by way of expressed content. This is set forth in the following:
Infinitude is achieved by the expressed content also even when it remains in its pure and natural state by reason of the considerations of circumstance, place, time, etc. (Dhv. IV. 7) (pp. 283, ibid, Trans. K.Kris.) ... This has indeed been strikingly declared in my work, vişama-bana-līlā :
There is no limit to them And they will never look like repetitions; The graces of sweet-hearts And the meanings of the words of good poets."
(Trans. K.Kris., pp. 285, ibid) But Ā. further adds : (Dhv. IV. 7, pp. 292, ibid)
"avasthā”di-vibhinnānām vācyānām vinibandhanam, yat pradarśitam prāk, — bhūmnaiva drśyate laksye, na tacchakyam apohitumtat tu bhāti rasā”śrayam.” (Dhv. IV. 8)
(pp. 292, ibid)

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"We find in plenty examples of utilising the expressed content with variations of circumstances etc. But it will shine out only in the association of sentiment." (Dhv. IV. 8).
The phrases 'as has been shown already and, 'it cannot be denied that should be understood in the text in the latter and former half respectively of the first sentence.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 293, ibid)
It is very clear that what very large-hearted Ā. grants by way of concession, has been seized upon by K., making an issue out of it. He is out to destroy the vyañjanābias of Ă. We may call K., a part-dissident. For he does not totally negate vyañjanā; and that he cannot do, but he is not prepared to accept its supremacy either. He does not leave the party of the dhvanivādins, but he creates a separate block in the party itself: a party within party, so to say.
K. holds that such use of alamkāras as would mar the beauty of 'artha-vastuvakratā' - is unwelcome. This is done in the fashion of Ā. But Ā. recommends the use of alamkāras only as conducive to rasa-experience. The 'aucitya' is with reference to 'rasa' in case of A. Here K. does not expressly accept this position, though he also speaks of rasa-experience through proper delineation of vibhāvā"dis alone. K. observes : (vrtti, VJ. III. i., pp. 127, ibid) : višesatas tu - rasa-pariposapeśalāyāḥ pratiter vibhāvánubhāva-vyabhicāry-aucitya-vyatirekeņa prakārántarena pratipattiḥ, prastuta-śobhā-parihāra-kāritām āvahati.”
"In particular we have to note this : An experience becomes aesthetic only by reason of beauty due to promotion of sentiments through the only means available, viz. a proper mingling of the constituents, ensuants and accessories. Any other
xtraneous element therein would become detrimental to natural beauty." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 413, ibid)
We may observe that K. partially submits to Ā.'s dictates. He also cites illustrations read in the Dhv.
K. talks of 'vākya-vakratā' at VJ. III. 3, 4 (pp. 133, ibid). This artistic beauty of a sentence touches the field of alamkāras also. K. observes : (verse, 20, in vrtti on VJ. III. 3-4, pp. 136, ibid) - tad idam uktam -
"vākyasya vakrabhāvo'nyo bhidyate yah sahasradhā, yatrā’lamkāravargo'sau sarvo’py antar bhavisyati.”

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1082
SAHRDAYĀLOKA "An art in a whole sentence admits of a thousand varieties. In it is included the whole lot of figures of speech." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 422, ibid). We know that Ā. would include the figures under what he calls the "gunībhūta-vyangya”. Not so with K., who seems to include even instances of rasa also under "vākya-vakratā." This is defiance, pure and simple.
K. proceeds to give 'svabhāvódāharana' and 'rasódāharana' in verses, nos. 21, 22 (pp. 136, ibid), under vākya-vakratā. Verse No. 21, viz. “taşām gopa-vadhu..." etc. is read in the Dhv. (pp. 48) also. K. does all this without any direct mention of vyañjanā. On rasódāharana (verse, no. 22), viz. "loko yadrśam āha..." etc. (pp. 136, ibid), K. observes (vịtti, VJ. III. 4, verse 22, pp. 136-7, ibid) · .
"atra utsāhābhidhānaḥ sthāyi-bhāvaḥ samucitā”lambana-vibhāva-laksanasaudaryā-'tiśaya-ślāghā-śraddhālutayā vijigisor, vaidagdhya-bhangi-bhanītivaicitryeņa parām pariposa-padavim adhiropitaḥ san rasatām niyamānaḥ, kimapi vākya-vakra-svabhāvam kavi-kauśalam eva ävedayati. anyesām pūrvaprakaranódāharaṇānām pratyekam tathā’bhihita-jivita-lakṣaṇam vākya-vakratvam svayam eva sahệdayair vicāranīyam.”
"Here the abiding emotion is heroism. The poet is concerned with endowing beauty to the appropriate person who happens to be the abode of that emotion. He is portrayed therefore as a great conqueror. Now the artistic mode of the sentence used raises the emotion to its highest point, so that it comes to be felt as the sentiment of valour. This reveals the poet's art in respect of composing a forceful and artistic sentence. The several examples already given in the previous section wherin artistic beauty relates to construction of such sentences should also be reconsidered in this light by the connoisseurs as further instances. (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 423, ibid)
K. discusses 'vākya-vakratā' with reference to "abhidhānā-bhidheya”, and "abhidhā”, and then proceeds to classify the thing described : (vrtti, prior to VJ. III. 5; pp. 137, ibid):
"evam abhidhānā’bhidheyā'bhidhā-lakṣaṇasya kāvyopayoginas tritayasya svarūpam ullikhya varṇanīyasya vastuno visaya-vibhāgam.vidadhāti.”
“We have so far discussed the nature of the three entities associated with poetry, namely word, content and the process of communication. Now the author proceeds to classify the things described.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 423, ibid)
K. does this under VJ. III. 5, 6, 7 (pp. 137-138, ibid). He classifies 'vastu' or things into 'cetana' i.e. sentient and 'jada' i.e. insentient, and again either into

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1083 'mukhya' or 'principal' and 'a-mukhya' i.e. subordinate. He says (vrtti, VJ. III. 7, pp. 138, ibid) that, "the description of principal sentient, gods, demons, etc., should be natural. It is made beautiful by a spontaneous presentation of emotions like love." The word spontaneous is used to indicate that the emotions like love should be free from banality and very striking by their fresh flavour. When so treated, the emotions are raised to the level of sentiments like the erotic, for the well-known rule states that the dominant emotion itself gets transformed into sentiment. Now this bcomes very appealing to heart." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 424, ibid). The vrtti, VJ. IV. 7, pp. 138, reads as -
"mukhyam yat pradhānam cetana-surā'surā”di-sambandhi svarūpam tad evamvidham sat kavīnām varnanāspadam bhavati sva-vyāpāra-gocaratām pratipadyate. kīdrśam ? aklista-ratyādi-pariposa-manoharam. aklistaḥ kadarthanāvirahitah pratyagratā-manoharo yo ratyādih sthāyibhāvas tasya pariposah srngāraprabhști-rasatvā”pādanam, 'sthāyyeva tu raso bhaved” iti nyāyād. tena manoharam hrdayahāri."
The second is rendered lovely by a description of the animals etc., in a way natural to their species. This rasa is arrived at through vyañjanā alone. This is a commitment of a confirmed dhvanivādin. But K. does not make such a categorical commitment. To that extent K. is far from being a pure dhvanivādin. He gives - instances of rasa such as 'vipra-lambha-śrīgāra' (V. 25, pp. 138, ibid), and 'karuna rasa' (VS. 27, pp. 139, ibid). He holds that (vịtti, VJ. III. 7, verse, 27, pp. 139, ibid) - "atra rasa-pariposa-nibandhana-vibhāvā"di-sampat-samudāyah kavina sutarām samujjrmbhitah." Here the poet has fully displayed all the stimulants for the rise of the sentiment of pathos. But he never says that these stimulants evoke rasa through the process of vyañjanā.
K. is fully aware of the fact of rasa-realisation through vibhāvā"dis. But he keeps quiet about the method of operation of these vibhāvā"dis. He observes : (vrtti, VJ. III. 7, verse no. 29, pp. 140, ibid) : "evamvidhóddīpana-vibhāvaikajīvitatvena karunarasah kāsthadhirudha-ramanīyatām ānīyate. evam vipralambha-śpingāra-karuņayon saukumāryād udāharana-pradarśanam vihitam. rasántarānām api svayam e utprekşanīyam."
In short, he does not clearly mention the relation of vyangya-vyājaka between the vibhāvā"dis and rasa. Thus far, K. has described how 'pradhāna-cetana' or the principal sentient object becomes the subject of poetic description. Now onwards K. discusses how the subordinate sentients such as birds, beasts, etc., are described by the poet (pp. 180, ibid). K. observes (vľtti, VJ. III. 7, pp. 140, 141, ibid) : “evam

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1084
SAHRDAYĀLOKA dvitīyam a-pradhāna-cetana-simhā”di-sambandhi yat-svarūpam tad ittham kavīnām varnanā"spadam sampadyate. kīdņśam ? - svajāty ucitahevāka-samullekhojjvalam. svā pratyekam ātmīyā sāmānya-laksana-vastu-svarūpā yā jātis tasyāḥ samucito yo heväkah svabhāvánusarī parispandas tasya samullekhah samyag ullekhanam vāstavena rūpena upanibandhas tenójjvalam bhrājisņu, tad-vid-āhlādakāri iti yāvat." - "In the same way the second category also mentioned above, viz. relating to the behaviour of secondary sentiments such as lion and so on, comes in for a poetic treatment under certain conditions. One condition is that only such nature as is appropriate to each species should be imagined brilliantly by the poet. Each species has its own individual character though coming under the genus which is a class. The behaviour described should be actually part of the nature, of the specific animal in question. Description of such a natural quality in a realistic way itself conduces to brilliance, i.e. contributes to the delight of the connoisseurs.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 426-427, ibid). He cites two instances, one of which is, "grīvābhangabhiramam.” etc., from the Abhijñāna-śākuntalam, giving 'harinasvabhāvokti'. We use the term 'svabhāvokti' here on purpose.
K. elsewhere (VJ. I. 11, 12) had discarded 'svabhāvokti' which in his opinion is 'alamkārya' and not, 'alamkāra'. But we may ask, what else is "a-pradhāna-cetanasimhā”di-sambandhi-svarūpa-varṇana' discussed by K. under VJ. III. 7 ? For other alamkārikas it is just 'svabhāvokti' alamkāra pure and simple. Whatever K. puts by way of arguments disproving the case of 'svabhāvokti', as an alamkāra, is just quibbling. K. should know that the 'svabhāva' is 'alamkārya' and its 'ukti' i.e. ‘svabhāvokti', as imagined by other alamkārikas, is very much an alamkāra. K. very often starts from the wrong end and is himself misled and causes others also to be mislead. Similar is the case when he argues against the concept of rasā"di alamkāras, so clearly established by Anandavardhana. K., at VJ. III. 8 (pp. 141, ibid) observes : :
"rasoddipana-samarthyavinibandhana-bandhuram, cetanānām a-mukhyānām
jadānāṁ cāʻpi bhūyasā” "The secondarily sentient ones and non-sentient ones become sources of delight when they are so described that they promote rise of sentiments.' (Trans. K.Kris., pp., 427, ibid) This exactly echoes the views of Ā., expressed in Dhv. IV. 8, wherein

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kävya. 1085 he observes (Dhv. IV. 8, pp. 292, ibid) -
"avasthā"di-vibhinnānām vācyānām vinibandhanam, bhūmnaiva drśyate laksye
tat tu bhāti rasa"śrayāt." "We find in plenty examples of utilizing the expressed content with variations of circumstances etc. But it will shine out only in association of sentiment. (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 293, ibid). It should be noted that such descriptions as referred to at VJ. III. 8, by K. are expected to promote rasa, but it is not made clear whether they promote rasa through vyañjanā or otherwise K. simply observes : (vȚtti, VJ. III. 8, pp. 141, ibid) - "rasāh śộngārā"days teşām uddīpanam ullāsanam pariposas tasmin sāmarthyam śaktis tayā vinibandhanam niveśas tena bandhuram hşdayahāri." . “Sentiments are the erotic and so forth. Their rise is nothing but their elaboration. Their capacity in this regard is dependent on the creative art of the poet and it leads in its turn to the delight of the connoisseurs.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 427, ibid). He also observes : (vrtti, VJ. III. 8, pp. 142, ibid) "jadānām a-chetanānām salila-tarukusuma-samaya-prabhrtīnām evam-vidham svarūpam rasoddipana-samarthyavinibandha-bandhuram varnanīyatām avagāhate.” The treatment of non-sentients should also conform mostly to the kindling of sentiments.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 428, ibid) K. holds that this body of content or subject-matter of description should be deemed worthy of adoption by the poets. This is described through 'abhidhā vyāpāra' (vrtti, VJ. III. 9, pp. 142, ibid) : kavīnām etad, eva yasmad varnanāspadam abhidhā-vyāpāragocaram.” He further reads: "evamvidhasya asya svarūpaśobhātiśaya-bhrājisnor vibhūsaņāni upa-sobhántaram ārabhante." This abhidhā is K.'s 'vicitrā-abhidhā', K. observes that, when the content is thus endowed with natural beauty, it becomes worthy of embellishments, which, when they are added, give rise to a fresh type of 'beauty' (upa-sobhā) of their own.
He further observes : (vrtti, VJ. III. 10, pp. 143, ibid) : "tad evamvidham svabhāva-prādhānyena, rasa-prādhānyena ca dviprakāram sahaja-saukumāryarasam svarūpam varṇanā-visaya-vastunaḥ śarīram eva alamkāryatām eva arhati, na punar alamkaranatyam - "Thus what is beautified and can be regarded as the body of all descriptive art can be only two-fold, containing either the prominence of naturalness or regarded as an ornament." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 429, ibid)
With this he picks up the discussion concerning the nature of what Ā. and others have designated as 'rasā"di alamkāras'. He rejects the case of alamkāras such

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA as rasavat and the like, at the outset. K. observes : (vrtti, VJ. III. 10, pp. 143, ibid) : tatra svābhāvikam padártha-svarūpam alamkaranam yathā na bhavati tathā prathamam eva pratipăditam. idānīm rasā”tmanaḥ pradhāna-cetana-parispandavarnyamānavștter alamkārakārántarā bhimatām alamkāratām nirákaroti." - "Of the two, how the first i.e. naturalness of subject cannot be regarded as ornament has already been established earlier. Now how the second also, i.e. the subject involving sentiments of primarily sentient beings in their actions, cannot be ever regarded as an ornament is taken up for consideration. The position of the other writers who declare that it is also an ornament is refuted.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 429430, ibid)
K. holds that 'rasavat' is not an ornament because there is nothing palpable apart from it which is dorned by it, and because the literal meaning of that word itself is contradicted.' (Trans. K.Kris. pp. 430, ibid) : (VJ. III. 11, pp. 144) :
"alamkāro na rasavat parasyā’pratibhāsanāt svarūpās atiriktasya,
śabdārthā'sangater api.” K. holds that 'rasā"di' can never be an ornament for it is never observed as a separate entity apart from all the subject matter described. He observes : (vrtti, VJ. III. 11, pp. 144, ibid) : "tad idam atra tātparyam, yat sarveșām eva satkavivākyānām idam alamkāryam ity apoddhāra vihito viviktabhāvah sarvasya yasya kasyacit pramātus cetasi parisphurati. rasavad alamkāravad ity asmin vākye punar avahita-cetasópi na kiñcid etad eva budhyāmahe.” - “The upshot is this : Whatever the instance of poetry chosen, one and all the connoisseurs have a in their minds regarding the two divisions, the "adorned" and the "ornament". But in the expression, "a poem with rasavat alamkāra", we cannot understand this fundamental distinction itself, despite our best attention and endeavour.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 430, ibid)
K. continues : (vrtti, VJ. III. 11, pp. 144, ibid) : tathā ca-yadi śrngārā”dir eva prādhānyena varnyamānólamkāryaḥ, tatas tad anyena kenacid alamkaranena bhavitavyam. yadi vā tat-svarūpam eva tad-vidāhlāda-nibandhanatvād alamkaranam iry ucyate, tathā’pi tad vyatiriktam anyad alamkāryatayā prakāśanīyam. tad evamvidho na kaścid api vivekaś cirantanálamkāra-kārábhimate rasavad alamkāra-laksaņódāharaṇa-mārge manāg api vibhāvyate.”

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Further more, if the adorned is regarded as the primarily described sentiment itself, like the erotic, then reason demands that something else should be present there as adornment. If perchance its (= of the adorned) own nature is described as adornment because it causes delight to critics, in such a contingency too, the onus of indicating another adorned apart from it lies on the rhetoritian. Such a clear-cut descrimination is not to be had at all even slightly, either in the way the ancient rhetoritians have defined rasavat alamkāra, or in the way they have illustrated them.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 430, ibid):
K. discusses the whole topic to his satisfaction. Actually the whole discussion looks like unnecessary quibbling, especially when he takes up A.'s case, whom he refers as an “abhiyukta". (pp. 189, ibid). K. tries to refute Ā., but theoretically what he achieves, is just a semblance of refutation, to his satisfaction, only of an illustration cited by Ā.
K. believes that in both the illustrations cited by Ā., viz. “ksipto hastávalagnah..." etc. (VS. no 43 on pp. 150, ibid), and “kim hāsyena..." etc. (VS. no. 44, pp. 151, ibid), we have karuna as the principal rasa and there is no chance of its being subordinate and acting as an ornament as imagined by Ā.
Be it as it is. One point clearly emerges and it is that here K. does not refute the theoretical position as advanced by A. Moreover, it is here that we become all the more aware of the fact that between the two, it is Ā. who seems to be more open. catholic and pragmatic. Ā. is clear-headed enough to accept that the whole analogy of rasa or dhyani being the soul, and gunas or excellences being “qualities” and simile and the like being alamkāras or ornaments, and 'sabdārthau' or “word and sense" or "form and content" being a 'śarīru' i.e. body of poetry is just a working hypothesis, an instrument so to say, a way of understanding poetic charm, or poetry, which, by itself, is an “amūrta" or an 'abstract phenomenon, to be grasped only as a whole' i.e. "akhanda-buddhi-samāsvādva": rasa or dhvani or any other entity for that matter is a means to the end, viz. 'grasping of - experiencing - poetic beauty'. "Dhvani" is dubbed as "soul” only metaphorically. Actually the whole metaphorical use of terminologies is not an end in itself. And therefore. Ā. was catholic enough to accept a position when even rasa could play the role of an alamkāra. He shows that theoretically this is possible. K. on the other hand, takes up an orthodox stand, we may say, a comparatively narrow approach, much closer to the one taken up by Mahimă, that rasa, which is only 'wanga' or 'suggested'. could only be principal and never subordinated.

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1088
SAHRDAYĀLOKA Actually Ā. had very critically and carefully stream-lined the whole issue and K.'s gesture of opposing the case of rasavat etc., as imagined by A., falls flat and sounds unconvincing. However, one good point emerges and it is that K. too accepts that 'rasa' could be always and only, 'suggested', i.e. 'vyangya'. Thereby he accepts the ruling of Ā. and recognises the force of vyañjanā. K.'s treatment of this topic requires a fuller discussion, which for want of space, we avoid in the present context. For the present, we will once again underline the orthodox and narrow approach of K., who observes with regard to the two illustrations, that, - (vrtti, VI. III. 11, pp. 152, 153 ibid) : "yadi vā preyasaḥ prādhānye tad angatvāt karunaasasya alam-karanatvam ity abhidhiyate, tad api na niravadyam, yasmad dvayor apy etayor udāharaṇayor mukhya-bhūto vākyárthaḥ karunā"tmanaiva vivartamānavịttir upanibaddhaḥ. paryāyoktā’nyāpadeśa-nyāyena vācyatā’vyatiriktayoh pratīyamānatayā, na karunasya rasatvād vyangyasya sato vācyatvam upapannam. nā’pi gunībhūta-vyangyasya visayaḥ, vya(ngyasya prādhānyena ka)ruņā”tmanā eva pratibhāsamānāt. na ca dvayor api vyangya-tvam, angángi-bhāvasya anupapatteh. etac ca yathāsambhavam asmābhir vikalpitam. na punas ta (nnyāyam atra prayojakam ity alam vi) stareņa.” “or else, it might be alleged that eulogy of the hero alone is primary; and since pathos is calculated to serve that end as a means, it is designated as an ornament. That statement again, is not without fault. For, in both the above examples, the import primarily intended is pathos alone in its variagated manifestations. As in the case of the figures of speech ‘paryāyókta’ (euphemism), and 'anyápadeśa' (indirect statement) those meanings which are other than referential, i.e. suggested, will be such that they too could be plainly stated if one wished to do so; and pathos, being a rasa, can in no wise be reduced to a referential meaning, once we accept that it exists. Nor can it be taken as an example of subordinated suggestion (gunībhūta-vyangya), because the rasa of pathos is felt as primarily suggested. The two rasas cannot both be regarded as suggested because then they cannot have relation of primary and secondary between themselves (since both would have to be equally primary). All these alternative explanations of 'rasavat-alamkāra' in the given examples have been imagined by us and refuted; the analogy of the said figures (viz. paryāyókta and aprastuta-praśamsā) does not hold good here. With these words we close the discussion.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 440, ibid)
As already observed above, K. seems to take a position that whatever is vyangya' can never be subordinate, and rasa, which is always vyangya, is necessarily ‘pradhāna' or 'principal. This is as good or bad as the view taken by Mahimā also.

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1089 The entire approach, when compared with Ā.'s much too catholic approach, is basically narrow. Similarly K.'s concept of 'paryāyókta’ is also narrow in the sense that for him paryayókta' occurs only when a different statement is used to something which can be conveyed normally in a different way. So, for K., here it is a different statement at vācya' level conveyed by yet another statement at vācya' level only. It is not vyangya' that is conveyed differently as imagined by A. Mammața, Jagannātha and others. The hollowness of K's arguments is brought about in the last remark, regarding 'rasavat', when he observes : (vrtti, VJ. III. 11, pp. 153, ibid): "kim ca 'kāvye tasmin alamkāro rasā”dir iti rasa eva alamkārah kevalah, na tu rasavat iti matup pratyayasya jivitam na kimcid abhihitam syāt. evam sati śabdártha-sangater abhāvād anavasthaiva tisthati ity etad api na kimcit." - "Furthermore, the declaration that rasa etc., itself constitutes an adornment in such poems virtually designates 'rasa' itself by the term 'alamkāra' and not 'rasavat' or that which possesses rasa'. And once again, the incongruity between the term 'rasavat' and the meaning connoted by it stares us in the face as before and leaves us in endless confusion.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 441, ibid) - Yes, we may say, confusion for K. alone !
K. finally seems to explain and accept the concept of 'rasavat alamkāra' in his own unique way which seems to be quite useless and elementary when compared with the consideration of various alamkāras by such masters as Ruyyaka, Sobhākaramitra, Appayya and Jagannātha. After citing such illustrations as, "lagna-dvirepháñjana...” etc., (verse, No. 77, 16, verse 71, pp. 169, ibid) : "atra samāropita-nāyikā-výttāntasya ślesa-cchāya-sahāyasya rūpa(kasya) (tadvadā) caranāt rasavad alamkāratvam."
"Here also the metaphor (rūpaka) involving the attribution of the behaviour of a lady in love to spring with the assistance of paronomasia should be regarded as 'rasavat alamkāra' because it closely imitates the behaviour of sentiments with love." (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 459, ibid) All this causes instantaneous and hearty laughter.
While dealing with rūpaka, K. talks of 'pratīyamāna-rūpaka' at VJ. III. 24, pp. 179-180, ibid. This is a virtual acceptance of vyañjanā (and, perhaps alamkāradhvani). Similarly, he talks of vyājastuti' at VJ. III. 28, pp. 185, ibid, having "stutih vyangyatayā", and "pratīyamānah vatirekah" at VJ. III. 48, pp. 220, ibid. All this amounts to his virtual acceptance of vyañjanā, without of course, clearly naming it as such. In verse No. 183, pp. 221, 222, ibid, viz. "prāptaśrīr eșa kasmāt.” etc. K. feels that here 'vyatireka' is suggested and not 'rūpaka', as observed by Ā. All this is quibbling which virtually ends in direct acceptance of the all powerful vyañjanā.

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1090
SAHRDAYĀLOKA K. quotes (pp. 222, ibid) the definition of "dhvani" viz. “yatrárthah sabdo vā..." etc. (Dhv. I. 13) to no purpose.
In the fourth unmeşa of the VJ., K. deals with 'prakaraña-vakratā' - i.e. 'beauty of incident or episode in a poem.' This is six-fold. At VJ. IV. 1, 2 (pp. 245, ibid), he deals with the first variety which is having the charm of abhidhā. So also is the case with the second variety as explained at VJ. IV. 3 and 4 (pp. 248, ibid). Third variety as explained at VJ. IV. 5 and 6, on pp. 252, ibid, has its charm caused due to vyañjană also. VJ. IV. 7 and 8, pp. 255 ibid, have the fourth type consisting of newer and newer description, which has a mixed charm of abhidhã and vyañjanā, while the fifth variety at VJ. IV. 9, pp. 262, ibid, has mostly the charm of abhidhā. VJ. IV. 10 (pp. 266, ibid) talks of a new variety which has the charm of pure vyañjanā. VJ./ IV. 11-14, have further varieties (i.e. no. 7, 8, 9) of mixed charm. All told, the different varieties of 'prakarana-vakratā' exhibit the charm of vyañjanā to a greater or lesser extent. This becomes clear as we rush through kārikās nos. VJ. IV. 10-26. . With this, we come to the end of our prolonged consideration of the problem as to whether we should call K. a dhvanivādin or not. The answer, as suggested in the beginning, is both in the affermative and negative. Thus we are back to square one. He is a dhvanivādin without naming dhvani as dhvani. He accepts vyañjanā without naming it as such. But it should be clearly stated that he never rejects vyañjanā as is done by Mahimā and the like. He is neither a tātparyavādin, nor an anumitivādin, nor a pure abhidhāvādin. He tries to place poetic criticism on a wider and more pragmatic canvass, but ends, as shown earlier, in a miserable condition resulting in contradictions at times, as seen in case of rasavat alamkāra. He does not have a heart to accept the whole scheme of sabda-vretis as suggested by Ā., though he seems to hold the latter in very high esteem. K.'s was a half-hearted approach which caves in, when pitched against the giants who followed, upheld and established the sovereigntly of Anandavardhana. He is a lone traveller, who gets lost in the desert of his own creation. He is neither much remembered, not much taken seriously and therefore not much respected by posterity, and is pitied and forgiven for his misadventure, simply because he is a dhvanivādin at heart, at least a 'sa-gotra'. He was, in a way, a dissident in the camp of the dhvanivādins, a martyr for no great cause. He is almost burried and forgotten and only remembered at times as a weak follower of the great Ā. In trying to look a more pragmatic and liberal critic with his 'vicitra-abhidhā', which is neither pure abhidhā, nor laksanā, nor tātparya, nor vyañjanā alone, he chooses to be less scientific.

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Bhoja, as Dr. Raghavan observes takes a position of compromise between tātparyavādins and Anandavardhana, i.e. dhvanivādins (pp. 152, śr. Pra. ibid). We will continue to voice our humble differences with Dr. Raghavan, but by and large, he is the greatest and the safest interpreter of Bhoja and contemplating on his efforts in that direction, we have to say, "Hats off to Dr. Raghavan."
Before we go in for a detailed analysis concerning Bhoja, we will make some preliminary remarks. It is quite well-known among scholars that Bhoja enumerates (1) "guņā'lamkāra-yoga, i.e. presence of or union with guņas or excellences and alamkāras or figures of sound and sense, (2) 'dosa-hāna' i.e. absence or removal of poetic blemishes and (3) rasa-aviyoga i.e. non-separation, i.e. permanent union, (= no-divorce) - with 'rasa' i.e. aesthetic pleasure at the root of poetic beauty. The important point to be noted is how he accepts 'dhvani' and where he places the same. To begin with we may observe that this great ācārya of what we have termed Mālava-paramparā as against the Kashmir-paramparā. chooses to take dhyani' as 'alamkāra' in a wider sense. He seems to respect the tradition of the ancient ācāryas prior to .. and advocates the cause of "kāvya-saundarya" or "kāvyā'lamkāra" in a wider sense. In keeping with the ancient masters such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and the rest, he does not discuss 'vyañjanā' as an independent word-power. At the same time his two great works viz. the Sarsvatī-kanthā”bharaṇa and the Sệngāra Prakāśa - are studded with a number of quotations from the great Ā.
The S.K. Ā. (sarasvatī-kanthā”bharaṇa), Ch. V. Bhoja talks of 'rasálamkārasamkara' (pp. 724, Edn. NS. Bombay, A.D. 193-4) and quotes Ā. as follows :
"rasavanti hi vastūni ... sálamkārāņi kānicit,
ekenaiva prayatnena
nirvartyante mahākaveh." This is a parikara-śloka read on pp. 60 (Edn. K.Kris., ibid) in udyota II. Then, we read a kārikā (Dhv. II. 16) in Bhoja :
"rākṣiptatayā yasya bandhaḥ śakya-kriyo bhavet a-prthag-yatna-nirvartyaḥ
so'lamkāraḥ prakrsyate." The last line is read as "so'lamkāro dhvanau matah” in editions of the Dhv., now available. .

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Third Kārikā is also a parikara-śloka read under Dhv. III. 42. Bhoja reads it as :
"rasa-bhāvā"di-visayavivaksā-virahe sati, alamkāra-nibandho yaḥ,
sa kavibhyo na rocate.” Again the fourth line read in Dhv. editions is : "sa citra-visayo bhavet."
Dr. Raghavan explains Bhoja's position concerning guņas and rasas. In ce cases of gunas which are inherently fused with rasas there is no place of samkara or mixture of guna and rasa. Bhoja observes : (pp. 720, S.K.A. ibid) : yatra citravarnavan-narasimhavat-pāmsūdakavac ca avayavā'vayavi-nyāyena jāti-vyaktinyāyena ca a-prthak-prayatna-nirvartyānām guņa-rasānām vākye samniveśāḥ tatra samkara-vyavahāro na pravartate, - tad yathā,
madhuram rasavad vāci vastūny api rasa-sthitiḥ, yena mādyanti dhīmanto madhuneva madhavratāḥ.”
(This is from Dandin; I. 51;) Now follows a quotation from the Dhv. wherein Bhoja quotes four Kārikās such as Dhv. II. 7, 8, 9, & 10. It is here that we read four kārikās from Ā. and not where Dr. Raghavan had suggested earlier. The Karikās are read in Bhoja (S.K.A. pp. 720, 721, ibid) as -
"śộngāra eva madhuraḥ paraḥ prahlādano rasaḥ, tanmayam kāvyam āśritya mādhuryam prati-tisthati.” (Dhv. II. 7) "śțngāre vipralambhā”khye karune ca prakarsavat, mādhuryam ārdratām yāti yatas tatrā’dhikam manah.” (Dhv. II. 8) "raudrādayo rasā dīptyā laksyante kāvyavartinaḥ,

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tadvyaktihetū śabdārthāv
ojo'dhisthāya tişthate.” (Dhv. II. 9) But the fourth line is read differently in available edn.'s of the Dhv. It reads as
"āśrityaujo vyavasthitam." Then we have Dhv. II. 10 read slightly differently in Bhoja as -
"samarthakatvam vākyasya yat tu sarva-rasan prati, sa prasādo guņo jñeyah
sarva-sādhāraṇa-kriyah.” (Dhv. II. 10) The first line read in Dhv. editions reads as : “samarpakatvam kāvyasya.” Perhaps Bhoja had some mss. not available to us.
It is here that Dr. Raghavan observes that on the subject of rasa and alamkāra Bhoja utilises three verses from udyota, II, two of them being parikara ślokas and one kärikā. We have quoted the same earlier.
Dr. Raghavan explains that these two sets of citations from Ā. occur also in the same places in the Śr. Pra. Ch. XI, Vol. II. He observes : (pp. 453, Edn. Josyer, ibid) : “...atrā’pi brūmaḥ avayavávayavi-nyāyena cáprthak-prayatna-nirvartyānām gunarasānām vākye sanniveśaḥ, tatra samkara-vyavahāro na pravartate, tad yathā - “madhuram rasavad...” śrngāra eva madhuraḥ.." etc.
Here also we have the reading “ojo'dhisthāya tișthati.” But in place of 'samarthakatvam', we read 'samarpakatvam', but for ‘kāvyasya', Bhoja has 'vākyasya'.
Again on pp. 457 (Edn. Josyer, ibid), while treating rasálamkāra-sankaraḥ, we get the three quotations as read in the S.K. Ā., as quoted above. In t e Śr. Pra. We also get one more quotation from Ā. such as, “śộngārī cet kaviḥ kāvye...” etc. In the S.K. Ā. (pp. 555, ibid) Bhoja places this quotation at the beginning of Ch. V. as kārikā no. 3, with a slight change in the reading of the second half which reads as : "sa eva ced a-śộngārī, nīrasam sarvam eva tat.”
But Bhoja cites further from Ā. when he treats 'dhvani'. Dr. Raghavan, after taking stock of what Dr. S.K. De writes in his Sanskrit Poetics, observes (pp. 153, ibid) : “These remarks (= Dr. De's observations as quoted by Dr. Raghavan) are of course based upon what one can know from Bhoja's S.K. Ā. One cannot write like this after seeing Śr. Pra. Even in the S.K. A. the concept of Dhvani is not entirely

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA absent. Bhoja accepts Dhvani in the S.K. Ā. as well as in the Sr. Pra. But he follows Bhāmaha, Dandin and Vāmana in bringing everything under alamkāra or guna; under alamkāra ultimately, for guna also is Alamkāra.”
In the light of Dr. Raghavan's remarks we will try to judge the exact position of Bhoja concerning dhvani. But let us make our impression very clear in the beginning itself that like Kuntaka, Bhoja has not clearly accepted Vyañjanadhvani-rasa' scheme and to that extent he can not be held as a "dhvanivādin”. Bhoja, as observed by Dr. De, has, "The prominence of rasa" and shows, "the absence of the dhvani-theory”. Absence of dhvani theory means absence of clear acceptance of the scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa. Both Kuntaka and Bhoja can not be held as 'anti-vyañjanā' theorists, but neither of them comes out openly and with warmth and admiration for the scheme of "vyañjana-dhvani-rasa", which for us is the trade inark of a genuine dhvanivādin. So, our position is that though Bhoja knows both vyañjanā and dhvani, and though he never, refutes any concept openly, he is not a true dhvanivādin, he being the protegonist of what we term as the "Mälava school of thought" as against the Kashmir school of thought of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammața and their followers.
Let us see how Bhoja deals with the problem of dhvani. The first thing that strikes us in this respect is that Bhoja tries to strike a balance between “tātparya" and "dhvani". The famous quotation from Bhoja reads as “tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanir eva kävye”. (Śr. Pra. Vol. I., pp. 1, ibid). Here, it may be pointed out that Bhoja, as observed by us earlier when we discussed the concept of Tātparya-vrtti (Ch. VI) above, seems to take "tātparya" in a special sense. When he deals with ‘kevala-sabda-sambandha-sakti', he takes a broader meaning of the term 'tātparya' and covers up what he calls "abhidhiyamāna-tātparya". He does not mention the traditional Mimāmsaka's Tātparya-vrtti which works for, yielding the sentence-sense. But perhaps by “abhidhīyamāna-tātparya” he aims at that exactly. Again it seems that he has imagined the presence of this "abhidhiyamāna-tātparya" not only in ordinary worldly utterances used in normal walk of life, but also in the kävya-vākyas i.e. poetic utterances which operate at pure abhidhā level also. This is like Kuntaka's 'Vicitrā abhidha' covering pure normal abhidhă-expressions but of course gifted with poetic beauty. But Bhoja uses the term "tātparya" for "dhvani” also, as seen in the quotation cited above. So, when he says "tātparyam eva vacasi", this "vacasi"

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya 1095 should stand for expressions at worldly and śāstriya level. In that case it is, i.e. tātparya itself, is called "dhvani" in 'kāvya' or poetic expression. The expression should mean, "yad vacasi arthāt loke śāstre ca, tātparyam, tad eva (ramaniyatve sati) kāvye dhvanih, iti ucyate." But as observed by Kuntaka a poetic expression - vicitrā abidhā-may operate at pure denotative level, i.e. abhidhā, or at the level of indication or laksanā or even at the vyañjanā level, Bhoja also seems to accept "abhidhiyamāna tātparva" at the level of poetic expression. Thus a part of 'vicitrā abhidhā' gets admission in Bhoja's" kāvye abhidhivamāna tātparya. If tātparya is concerned with kāvva-vākyārtha, then it is termed dhvani. But vākya in a kāvya can operate at pure abhidhā level or laksanā-level or even vyañjanā level. Thus for Bhoja 'dhvani' as tātparya of a kāvya-vākya seems to cover abhidhīyamāna as well as pratīyamāna tātparya, the first being inclusive also of lakşyamāņa as well. Dr. Raghavan has not thought of this possibility and hence he seems to equate kāvya-vākya-tātparya with Anandavardhana's 'dhvani'. But this is not the case. 'Dhvani' in Bhoja here seems to have a broader connotation covering the import of any poetic expression, operating at any level. Bhoja introduces knowingly a sort of looseness in the technical terms when he says that “tātparya" is the term with reference to worldly expressions and "dhvani" is said to be with reference to a poetic expression but the substance is the same. Just as 'Caitra' and 'Vaisakha' are termed as ‘madhu' and 'madhava' in a different context, in the same way sentence-sense, i.e. the import of a sentence is termed tātparya at ordinary parlance and "dhvani” at the level of poetry. Thus ordinary tātparya at lokaśāstra-level is termed as tātparya and the same at poetic level is termed dhvani'. But this 'dhvani' covers abhidhiyamāna tātparya at poetic level also. This is as noted above, like Kuntaka's vicitrā abhidhā. This dhvani' is wider and of course covers Anandavardhana's dhvani operating at vyañjanā level. Here, it is pratīyamāna tātparya in a kāvya-vākya, according to Bhoja.
Bhoja thus has a wider connotation for both 'tātparya' and 'dhvani'. In the wider context, the abhidhiyamāna-tātparya at poetic level covers 'dhvani' in a special sense. This refers to the 'ramanīya' meaning of kāvya-vākya at abhidhā level, and also tātparya of the gunībhūta-vyangya type and then also dhvani' at the principally suggested level.
Thus Bhoja is not averse to the fact of dhvani. We may not call him an antidhvani theorist but we may certainly brand him. like Kuntaka, as an "antar-bhāvavādin” or one who tries to subsume dhvani under various heads.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Bhoja has in his own way accepted dhvani but as is the case with the ancient ācāryas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin and the rest, so also with him, he has tried to put dhvani under guna and alamkāra and ultimately under alamkāra only as even guņa is, in a way, alamkāra for Bhoja. He has accepted rasa, which is part of rasadhvani for Āhandavardhana, as 'artha-guna' called "kanti", and also as 'rasavat' alamkāra in Bhāmaha's fashion. Or, he has accepted rasa as alamkāra or what he terms "rasókti.” He has trifercated kāvva or literature as 'svabhāvokti', 'vakrókti' and 'rasókti.
To bigin with, for Bhoja, dhvani' is a sabda-guna called "gāmbhīryam.” Says he : "dhvanimattā tu gāmbhiryam." i.e. gāmbhirya stands for a quality of 'having dhvani', or say, the presence of dhvani is termed 'gāmbhīrya' (S. K. A. I. pp. 64, ibid). The illustration is, “maulau dhāraya.” etc. It is observed here : "atra nābhyām pundarīka-dhāranam parimita-vikramatvam cakrāńkita-karatvam, damstrayā vasudhóddhāranam, vaksahsthala-nivesita-laksmikatvam indravarajarvam ca dhvanayati iti gāmbhīryam”. Rasa being a beautifying agent is, an alamkāra called rasavat, and so also 'dhvani' is a guna embellishing an expression. That which is a vākyárthópaskāraka is either a guņa or an alamkāra. Rasa was 'rasavat alamkāra for Bhāmaha and Dandin and for Vāmana it was a guna called 'kānti.' In the same way dhvani is also a guna for Bhoja. Beyond gāmbhīrya', 'gati' is also a guna which contains 'dhvani.' Gati (pp. 84 ibid) is - "gatih sā syād avagamo yó 'rthad arthántarasya tu."- The collection of another meaning through a (contextual) meaning is gati."-The illustration is"subhage ko'yam vệddho...” etc. -"atra praśnād artham avagamya uttarād arthántarávagamah.” On this Ratneśvara Miśra observes : "tena yatra sahrdaya hỉdayamgamād arthāt kāmsyatālánusvána -nyāyena tādņśam arthántaram avagamyate să gatir iti lakṣaṇárthaḥ.”- On the analogy of kāmsya-tāla-anunāda i.e. reverberation caused due to striking a dish of kāmsva metal. a further meaning following the original meaning which moves the heart of a connoisseur is collected. This is 'gati', the fartha-guna.' Now Dr. Raghavan sees dhvani' here. But we may say that this could be perhaps gunībhūta-vyangva or subordinated suggested sense, because Bhoja is not clear about the subordination or "upa-sarjani-krtatva” of the first meaning which is the life breath of 'dhvani.' Again, following Ratneśvara Dr. Raghavan seems to find 'anuranana-rupa-vyangya-dhvani' here. Even he i.e. Ratneśvara could have gone astray if we take into account our argument concerning 'absence of the clause viz. 'upasarjanīkrta-svartha.'

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Ratneśvara also observes : "dhvanana-vyāpārónmesāc ca guṇatva-lābhah.” Here “dhvanana-vyāpāra" of course stands for vyañjanā-vyāpāra. At the same time whether it operates at principal level or subordinate level remains to be screened. Here, taking into account Bhojaś closeness with the ancient ācāryas, if we opt for the second option, we may not be off the mark. Or, it can be the first option also. Dr. Raghavan should have considered both the options before reading "dhvani” here.
A number of other 'sabdagata' alamkāras in the S. K. Ā. also suggest affinity with implied element, thus leading us to the acceptance of dhvani-vicāra by Bhoja. When you get at 'dhvani', not through abhidhā, there is inevitably the possibility of some element of meaning remaining concealed. This concealment i.e. 'samvrti' gives birth to many an alamkāra. In Bhojaś 'mudrā', 'ukti', 'bhaniti' (pp. 166, 170, 177 respectively, S. K. Ā., ibid) we have this element of concealment.' mudrā occurs (S. K. Ā.. II. 40; pp. 166 ibid) when
“sábhiprāyasya vākye yad vacaso viniveśanam mudrām tām mut-pradāyitvāt
kāvya-mudrā-vido viduh.” ukti is (S. K. Ā., II. 42, pp. 170, ibid)
"vidhidvāreņa vā yatra niședhenátha vā punaḥ, pratīyate viśisto'rthaḥ
sóktir atrā'bhidhīyate." bhasiti is (S. K. Ā. II. 52; pp. 177, ibid)
"ukti-prakāro bhanitih sambhave-asambhave ca sā, višeșa-samvșttyā āścarya
kalpanāsu ca kalpyate.” In these alamkāras, there is an element of the implicit sense. We will not name it as “dhvani”, as done by Dr. Raghavan.
Explaining 'kalpanā-bhaniti' of Bhoja, Ratneśvara observes : "séyam bhanitir vidhi-nisedha-prasange nisedha-ghataka-dvārā vidhirūpā bhavati iti āstām vistaraḥ.”-(pp. 180, S. K. Ā., ibid.). We can recount here the arguments advanced

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
by Anandavardhana (Dhy. I. 4, vstti) for establishing the existence of the implicit sense (or, vastu - vyangya).
In the section on figures of sense, i.e. arthálamkāras also, we can see the presence of the implicit sense. Bhojas sūkşma alamkāra is just the second name given to 'rasa-dhvani' arrived at through the description of consequents i.e. anubhāvas alone. ‘sūksma' is read at S. K. Ā. III. 21, 22, pp. 334, ibid as
"ingitā”kāra-laksyórthaḥ sūkşmaḥ sūksma-guņāt tu saḥ, sūkşmāt pratyaksataḥ sūkşmaḥ a-pratykṣa iti bhidyate.” (II. 21) “vācyaḥ pratīyamānaś ca sūksmótra dvividho matah, ingitā”kāra-laksyatvam
laksya-sāmānyam etayoh.”-(II. 22, S. K. Ā.) Thus there are two varieties of sūksma : (i) that in which rasa is suggested through ingita-gesture. When rasa is suggested through horripilation and such other sättvika bhāvas, it is suggestion through 'ākāra' or appearance. The first variety is illustrated by the verse, viz. "tām pratyabhivyakta-manorathānām...” etc. Bhoja observes (pp. 334, ibid) : "atra svayamvara-militānām rajñām rājaputrim prati prāpti-lakṣaṇasya manorathasya abhidhīyamānasya śțngāra-cestā”tmakena ingitena vyangyatvāt ayam ingita-laksyah abhidhīyamāhaḥ sūkşma-bhedah.” Bhoja has given a two-fold sūkṣma, the abhidhīyamāna and the pratiyamāna. The latter is illustrated by the verse viz. "śyāmāyāh śyāmalatayā...” etc. When rasa is collected through the agency of anubhāva-varnana or sāttvika-varnana, it is termed 'vācya' i.e. “abhidhīyamāna-sūksma.” When rasa is arrived at through the description of wabhicărins, it is termed “pratīvamāna-sūksma.” Now, the question that stares in our eyes is that weather by ‘abhidhīyamāna' Bhoja means abhibhāna or direct naming of anubhāvas or sättvika-bhāvas or not. For, even through the description of anubhāvas, we can not hold that 'rasa' is 'abhidhīyamāna” i.e. directly stated. For such a possilility of rasa being directly stated is ruled out not only by Anandavardhana but even by his die-hard opponents such as Mahima-Bhatta also. Or, may be Bhoja accepts a possilility when rasa is not always and necessarily suggested only and never directly conveyed. Perhaps he accepts conveying of rasa through abhidhā also. Or, perhaps he favours the sva-sabda-vācyarva or dircet

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1099 naming of the basic emotions and ancillary feelings, or even at times, of rasa also. All this deserves further scrutiny.
Bhojaś ‘anyónyálamkāra' (pp. 346, ibid, S. K. Ā. III. 27, 28) is three-fold such as 'vācya' or 'expressed', 'pratīyamāna' i.e. 'implied, and ‘ubhaya' i.e. both expressed and implied :
"anyonyam upakāro yas tad anyonyam, tridhā ca tat, vācyam, pratīyamānam ca,
tệtīyam ubhayā”makam.” (S. K. Ā. III. 27) "anyonya-cūlikā’nyónyabhrāntir anyonyam ekatā, anyónyálamkrter antas
trayam etad iha isyate.” (S. K. Ā. III. 28) The implicit i.e. pratīyamāna variety is illustrated by the famous verse where in a prapa-palikā offers water to a traveller. Bhoja observes : (pp. 347, ibid) :
“atra pathika-prapa-pālikayor mithónurāge yad ekasya viralángulinā karena pānīyapānam anyasyāḥ sutarām vāridhāra-tanūkaranam tena parasparam upakāryópakāraka-bhāvāt pratiyamānam idam anyónyam.”
Vyatireka' with implicit similarity is just alamkāra-dhvani. Actually Bhojaś concept of vyatireka involves implicit element as it is defined as:
"śabdópātte pratite vā sādrsye, vastunor dvayoh, bhedā'bhidhānam, bhedaś ca.
vyatirekaś ca kathyate.” (S. K. Ā. III. 32 pp. 355, ibid) 'Sambhava' (S. K. Ā. III. 25, pp. 342 ibid) in Bhoja rules out 'anumiti' or inference in this figure, between collection of the rasa on one hand and its vyabhicărins or anubhāvas on the other. Bhojas upamā is also both abhidhīyamāna and pratīyamāna.
In the śr. Pra. Bhoja goes beyond this. Apart from the direct or indirect references to dhvani or pratiyamāna, Bhoja talks of the supremacy of dhvanivyāpāra in poetry along with quotations from Ananandavardhana in his Śr. Pra. We will examine this as below.
At the end of Ch. VI of the śr. Pra. we come acsoss Bhojaś views concerning dhvani/pratīyamāna. Due to 'avidyopadhi-nescience, 'artha' is explained either as

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'adhyāsa' or superimposition or 'vivarta' i.e. transfiguration of the sabda-brahma. Bhoja observes : (śr. Pra. Vol. I. pp. 220, ch. VI, ibid);
"tataś ca na jñāyate kim ayam arthópādhi-nibandhano' rthasya anyathávabhāsaḥ uta śabdópādhi-nibandhana iti. ciram jīva, yad avatīrņa iva pratipadyárthapadavīm drśyase; prcchămy āyuşmantam ka eṣaḥ artho nāma ? kim bravīși ? yaḥ śabdena pratipădyate; atha gauḥ ity atra kaḥ śabdā”rthaḥ ? kim ättha ? sāsnādimān pinda iti ? katham svarūpam api prstaḥ śabdena eva vyapadiśasi. kim avocat? śabdā”khya-viśesaņā’nuraktasya kasya svarūpam anyathākhyātum na saknomi ? śabda-a-pari-tyāga-labdha-prakāśayaiva ca tad anubhūtyánubhavāmi.
tarhi, śabdāt prthag artha-tattvasya vyapadestum anubhavitum ca a-sakyatvāt śabdasya eva ayam adhyyāso vivarto vipariņāmo vā artho nāma. nányah-kaścid iti niścīyatām; yuktam caitat, na hi nirūpayanto 'pi śabdād vibhinnam arthatattvam upalabhāmahe....etc. etc.
Thus on account of avidyā, 'artha' is either 'adhy'sa' or 'vivarta' of sabda-brahma. - But this applies to meaning which is primarily related to śabda, i.e. to that which we designate as ‘abhidhīyamāna' or expressed sense. But Bhoja says that there is yet another meaning which is implicit or pratīyamāna. How is this implicit sense related to śabda-brahma ? Can it be explained through ‘adhyāsa' or 'vivarta' also ?
Bhoja here quotes Dhv. I. 4 viz. “pratīyamānam punar anyad eva..." etc. Bhoja also observes that this implicit sense i.e. pratīyamānártha appears after the collection of sentence-sense, i.e. vākyártha. So, how can it be accomodated either in 'adhyasa'-pakṣa or 'vivarta-paksa'? Bhoja observes : “tasya ca vākyárthabhāvanóttarakālam avagateh adhyāsapakse, vivarta-pakse vā katham iva upapattir bhavati ?” (pp. 221, ch. V. Śr. Pra., Vol. 1., ibid).
Bhoja believes that the pratiyamāna artha appears after the collection of vākyártha i.e. sentence-sense : "vākyartha-bhāvanóttara-kālam avag a different or another 'state', i.e. avasthántara' of śabda. It is termed as 'vipariņāma' of śabda-brahma. Bhoja thus rejects both 'adhyāsa', and 'vivarta’ and accepts 'vipariņāma' or 'transformation theory, as it explains both the abhidhīyamāna as well as the pratīyamāna. For Bhoja, the pratīyamāna is also a 'vyāpāra' of śabda as much as is the ‘abhidhiyamāna.' Bhoja suggets that he will talk of this at length later. : (pp. 221, Śr. Pra., ch. VI, ibid):- “ucyate, vipariņāmād bhavisyati; vastunaḥ avasthántara-gamanam vipariņāmaḥ.” tatra yathā mặd ādayo ghatā”dirūpeņa, kşīrādayo dadhyā”di-rūpena, caitrā”dayo yuvā”dirūpeņa

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. vipariņamante tatha idam śabda-brahma api, avidyópādheḥ tena tena rūpeṇa tathā tathā vipariņamate tad yatha-santi me pañca putrāḥ, mataram pitaram śusrūṣitavan asmi, yóham yuvā dramiḍa-deśe dramiḍa-kanyābhiḥ saha avsam, sóham idānīm paścime vayasi ganga-tire tapaś carāmi, iti.-atra ca śabdárthayoḥ pṛthag avabhāsād vākyárthasya abhidhīyamānatāyām pratīyamānatāyām vā na anupapattiḥ; na ca etavatā śabda-vyāpāro viramsyati. yatas tātparyam asya hi agrato viseṣeņa vaksyamāṇam aste.
Bhoja seems to accept three categories of meaning: (i) Expressed i.e. abhidhīyamāna, (ii) Implied i.e. pratīyamāna (3) tatparya or dhvani which is even beyond this. This is illustrated by citing a verse viz. “prāpta-śrīr eṣa....” etc., which is also read in the Dhvanyaloka. Bhoja suggests that from the expressed sense, the sense of the king being taken as an avatara of Visnu is implied'pratīyamāna' and from this 'pratīyamāna' sense, a further sense of this kingavatāra taken as superior to other avatāras is suggested which for Bhoja is the final 'tātparya' or 'dhvani'. Actually we may observe that the dhvani theorists have already suggested that dhvani rests either on väcyártha, or lakṣyártha or even 'vyangyártha' at times. So, if at all there is further suggestion in this verse it is just a vyangyártha based on vyangyártha and nothing beyond that. The fact remains that 'principal suggested sense' is termed 'dhvani' by the dhvani theorists and if this basic condition is overlooked than it is a case of not grasping the dhvani theory properly. By just coining new terms, as was the case with Kuntaka, we do not alter the basic facts. Vācya-vyangya-further vyangya' is a three tier scheme already accepted by the dhvanivādins. The basic point is whether the suggested sense, whatever it is at the final level, should be principal. Bhoja seems to feel that 'dhvani' is only that 'tātparya' in kavya which is of the form of suggestion based on suggestion. No, we can not accept it. The real heart of the technical terminology called "dhvani" lies in a meaning being suggested as principal through any agency, be it word or sense, and either vācya, or lakṣya or vyangya; and in case of the latter, being rendered subordinate to the finally suggested sense which is deemed as 'principal', it being the highest source of highest beauty. Dr. Raghavan should have clarified this point.
So, when Bhoja observes what he does, we take it as a futile exercise. He says : (pp. 221, Śr. Pra. Vol. I, Ch. VI-ibid): "atra varṇanīya-rāja-viseṣasya digvijayinoḥ yathāśruta-vākyártho' bhidhiya-mānas 'tvayi' iti pade viṣṇvadhyāsávatāraḥ samastīti pratīyamānas tad avatarántarāṇām nidrā'lasatvā❞didoṣayogad asya ca tad vyudāsāṭ tato vaisista-pratipādanam tātparyam, yasya

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA kāvyeșu dhvanir iti prasiddhiḥ.” – tad uktam
tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanir eva kāvye saubhāgyam eva gunasampadi vallabhasya, lāvanyam eva vapuși svadate' nganāyāḥ śrngāra eva hrdi
mānavato janasya. Let us try to analyse these two verses. Bhoja suggests
(i) “tātparyam eva vacasi
dhvanir eva kāvye.' This could be understood as,” yad vacasi (= loke ca śāstre ca vacasi) ‘tātparyam' (kathyate) tad eva kāvye (= kāvya vākye) dhvanih (iti arthah) If we understand this passage as above then here we take 'tātparya' as co-rrelated vākyártha in the sense of the Mimāmsā doctrine. This means that 'vākyartha' which is collceted from the vākya through tātparya-śakti is termed 'tātparya’ at ordinary worldly level, or at the level of an expression in scientific literature i.e. śāstra. Thus the meaning of a given sentence-expression as a whole is tātparya at work-a-day level. But when it is the case of a poetic expression i.e. kavya-vākya, for which Bhoja uses the term ‘kāvye' i.e. 'in poetry', the same vākyártha or sentence sense is termed dhvani' in the language of literary criticism. Now in this case, we have to consider what shaping influences were active in Bhoja's assertion also.
We will refer to Dr. Raghevans explanation later but for the present let us try to understand how Bhojaś text reveals itself before us.
We knew that Bhoja had some great predecessors who intervened between Anandavardhana and himself. They were Kuntaka on one hand, then MahimaBhatta and of course Dhananjaya and Dhanika who were in the court of Munja, not to mention the greatest Abhinavagupta. Dr. Raghavan is clear that Bhoja did not know Abhinavagupta, i.e. he had no access to the latter's works on the Nātyaśāstra and the Dhvanyāloka. Now this is unthinkable for if for the sake of argument we accept what Dr. K. Krishna-moorthy says, though we have no faith in it that Kuntaka preceded Abhinavagupta, then also the latter being prior to Bhoja and Mahimā was closer to Bhoja and we cannot imagine that Bhoja being so wel-read and an expert in understanding Anandavardhana,

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could have missed Abhinavagupta totally. Actually the atmosphere in the literary world in India in those centuries was humming sweetly with the name of Abhinavagupta; he being only the second side of a coin which had its first side stamped in the name of Anandavardhana. Thus to know A., was to know Abhinavagupta who only faithfully echoed A.ś ideas- "anuranan sphuṭayāmi Kāvyālokam." as he vows in the beginning of the Locana. So to know A. was to know Abhinavagupta. We therefore do not accept that Bhoja did not know Abhinanvagupta through his works on literary criticism. Again, eventhough Bhoja quotes from A., he does not seem to accept everything that A. has to say in the same way as explained by A. himself. The concept of "dhvani" is a glaring instance in this conclusion. we will go in it further larer.
Bhoja also had before him Kuntaka whose influence is very clear on him. When Bhoja suggests that "kavya-vākye tatparyam dhvaniḥ kathyate," he seems to be under Kuntakaś influence. Here 'tātparya' is taken in the sense of 'väkyártha' as done by the Mimāmsakas. The total sentence-sense of a poetic expression, 'tātparya' is termed 'dhvani' by Bhoja. This could mean that even a ramaṇīya or beautiful expressed sense, 'vacyártha' of a poetic sentence, kavyavākya, can be termed 'dhvani.' Thus Bhojaś dhvani covers the poetic vacyártha, the poetic lakṣyártha and of course the poetic vyangyártha of a given poetic utterance or kāvya-vākya.' Dr. . Raghavan has not noticed this possibility of 'vacyártha' of a kavya-vākya, being 'tātparya' as also termed dhvani by Bhoja. This seems to be directly under the influence of Kuntaka for whom 'vicitra abhidha' or 'poetic utterance' covered everything in poetry beginning with a beautiful expression at abhidhā level to an expression at the level of beautiful suggestion also. Actually Bhojas expression comparing "tatparya-dhvani' with "saubhagya" and "lavanya" suggests that he attempts a synthesis between Kuntaka and Anandavardhana/Abhinavagupta. Bhojaś dhvani is not only Anandavardhanaś dhvani, but it is 'vakrata' of Kuntaka at abhidhā level also, and it is "tātparya" of Dhanañjaya-Dhanika also. Thus Bhojaś dhvani is "Dhvani ++" as compared to Anandavardhana. Now we know that Dhananjaya/Dhanika must surely have inflnenced Bhoja, who was their junior contemporary in the court of Mālava king Muñja. These two had declared that "tātparyam na tula-dhṛtam", violating the Mimāmsaka norm of tātparya, it being only a correlated sentence sense, on one hand, and thwarting Anandavardhanaś vyañjanā-dhvani on the other side. So, if we take "tātparyam dhvanih," an equation sponsorad by Bhoja, then this extended sense of 'tātparya' covering what Bhoja takes as suggested sense beyond the pratīyamāna sense, has

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an impression of Dhananjaya / Dhanika over it. In case of Kuntakas beautiful vācyártha (vicitrā-abhidhā at pure abhidhā level) being branded as Dhvani, we have a different sense of dhvani, perhaps broader, because Anandavardhana had ruled out such cases from his dhvani; and in taking 'tātparya' as 'dhvani' the normal connotation of tatparya is also extended like the one seen in the Daśarupaka / Avaloka, when it covers the suggested sense also in its fold.
Thus Bhojas 'dhvani' is not absolutely congruent with Anandavardhanaś dhvani. As suggested earlier the condition of 'upasarjani-kṛta-sva" also is not observed by Bhoja as a basic fact of dhvani.
Let us see how Bhoja further explains and elaborates his concept of 'Dhvani'. He observes (pp. 221, Śr. Pra.; Vol. I. ibid) - kaḥ punaḥ kavya-vacasoḥ dhvanitātparyayoḥ viseṣaḥ ?
ucyate
—
"yad a-vakram vacaḥ śāstre loke ca, vaca eva tat, vakram yad arthavādā❞dau tasya kāvyam iti smrtiḥ." yad abhipraya-sarvasvam vaktur vākyāt pratīyate tātparyam; arthadharmas

tat; śabda-dharmaḥ punar dhvaniḥ. saubhagyam iva tātparyam
antaro guna isyate vāgdevatāyā lāvaṇyam iva bāhyas tayor dhvaniḥ.
adūra-viprakarṣāt tu
dvayena dvayam ucyate yathā surabhi-vaiśākhau
madhu-mādhava samjñayā." iti.
Bhoja observes that a statement in either śāstra or loka which is only a bare statement, i.e. which is not beautiful, i.e. 'a-vakra' is simply given the name of 'vacaḥ' i.e. 'a statement, a sentence.' But when in the act of beautiful praise or eulogy'arthavada'- i.e. beautiful poetic exaggeration of the merits of a given thing, this

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statement is called 'Kavya'. This is supposed to be 'vakra' i.e. 'beantiful'; first and last. It is termed 'poetry.' Bhoja thus distinguishas between a statement in ordinary parlance and a poetic utterance. The former is 'a-vakra' while the latter is necessarily vakra.' These terms 'a-vakra' and vakra' are directly under Kuntakaś influence, as are the terms 'saubhāgya' and also 'lāvanya' seen earlier, they being 'gunaś or excellences recognised by Kuntaka as qualifying this or that 'mārga', or poetic practice. We also remember here Bhāmaha's expression, viz., "vakrábhidheya-sabdārthau”.
In the second verse Bhoja seems to explain what is ‘tātparya' for him. He uses the term "abhiprāya-sarvasva"-i.e. the essence of the intended sense. Now this cannot be just the tātparya of the mīmāmsā, which gives only the correlated sentence sense as tātparya, or the sumtotal of all padārthas as vākyártha, which is termed 'tātparyārtha.' Bhojas tātparya is the essence-'sarvasva'-of the ‘abhiprāya' i.e. intention of the speaker. Thus Bhojas tātparya goes beyond the traditional mīmāmsā sense. It covers the suggested intention also as is done by Dhananjaya / Dhanika, for whom 'tātparya' is not limited to sentence-sense only. "tātparyam na tulādhỉtam."
But when he says 'sabdadharmaḥ punar dhvanih” he echoes only the grammatical connotation of the term, meaning 'sound' only, which is the quality
purse Bhojaś dhvani' in the context of poetry goes beyond this grammatical sense as is the case with Anandavardhana also, who goes beyond the grammatical connotation of the term 'dhvani.'
'Dhvani' in this narrow sense of sabdadharma i.e. 'sound' only is external to both 'saubhāgya' and 'lāvanya' which are said to be internal qualities of Vāg-devatā. The poetic tātparya, which is also termed 'dhvani' is different frem this grammatical concept of 'dhvani' which is 'sound' only, and therefore only an external quality of a word. Even Anandavardhana had also suggested the same and the whole idea was beautifully elaborated by Abhinavagupta in his Locana. All this literature is before Bhoja when he dwells upon tātparva-dhvani-synthesis.
'adūra-viprakarśa' means 'not a long distance', i.e. closeness. Bhoja holds that on account of closeness between sabda i.e. dhvani and tātparya in the ordinary sentence, the same pair, is termed poetic tātparya and dhvani in the context of poetry, like the months caitra and vaiśākha being called 'madhu' and 'madhava' in a different context. Dhvani-tātparya i.e. sabda and vākyártha in ordinary parlance are termed 'dhvani-tātparya' or poetic-import of a statement in poetry. Just as Anandavardhana says that he being the follewer of the grammarians extends the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA connotation of the term dhvani, so also Bhoja takes ‘dhvani' of the grammarian and ‘tātparya' of the mīmāmsaka in a further extended sense. .
In the Ch. VII of his Śr. Pra. Bhoja deals further with the concept of Dhvani. Bhoja had divided śāhitya’ in twelve types. The first four are vrtti, vivaksā, tātparya and pravibhāga and the second set of sahitya consists of vyapeksä, samarthya, anvaya and ekárthībhāva.
In 'vrtti' we have Bhojas abhidhā, lakšanā and gaunī, and in 'tātparya' he accomodates both 'tātparya' and 'vyañjana'. The third set of four relations of sabda and artha consists of doşahāna, gunó-pādāna, alamkāyoga and rasa-a-viyoga. This third set is exclusive to poetic use of language while the first two sets of components four each, go with both popular usage including scientific usage of language and also poetic use of language.
Now Bhoja could have placed both 'vrtti' and 'tātparya' under a single head of 'vrtti' alone, but Bhoja seems to take abhidhā, laksaņā and gauni as powers of word j.e. pada-śaktis, while tātparyā and dhvani or vyañjanā as vākya-sakti.
Bhojaś close study of the Dhvanyāloka (and this implies in our opinion the study of Locana also) is clearly depicted in the Ch. VII of his Śr. Pra. In the sixth chapter Bhoja had stated that the acceptance of the implicit sense, i.e. pratīyamānārtha and its apprehsion i.e. bodha take place after 'vākyartha' sentence-sense is collected. Elaborating on 'tātparya' and 'dhvani' in this Ch. VII. Bhoja accepts much from Anandavardhana. He has quoted Anandavardhanaś definition of dhvani and also illustrations given by him. He accepts dhvani in his own way and equates it with tātparya.
According to Bhoja, the intended meaning of a word is its import i.e. “tātparya'. It is wider in scope and is also manifold. It is basically threefold such as ‘abhidhīyamāna', 'pratīyamāna' and 'dhvani-rūpa'. Whatever is collected by way of
inksā, yogyatā and samnidhi, i.e. the sentence-sense is the abhidhiyamana tātparya. Once the individual word-sense is collected by word-powers, this abhidhīyamāna tātparya follows by way of 'vākyartha' i.e. import of a statement.
Bhoja feels that on account of factors such as 'prakarana' i.e. context and the like, when the abhidhīyamāna artha is acceptable or otherwise, an extra sense comes up and it is 'pratīyamāna tātparya'. In Ch. VII Bhoja seems to take a position in conformity with Ānandavardhana, concerning 'dhvani'. He observes that after the collection of the expressed sense, i.e. 'abhidhīyamāna artha, the word or sense, making oneself subordinate conveys another meaning which is principal and is

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Anubhāvas etc., like vaidagdhya, Rūpótkarśa (uddipana-vibhāva) and the like, which are gunas of the Nayaka and the Nayikā, and similar things which however come more and more under the category of vastu-dhvani. If however, Bhoja had really pursued such distinction or made some such clear classification that Vastualamkara-dhvanis for the pratiīyamāna and that Rasa-bhava-dhvani is the parama-tātparya and Dhvani, it would have been interesting. Or, if he had emphasised ‘upasarjani-kṛta-svārtha-tva' in the definition of Dhvani, he could have separated the pratīyamāna as guṇībhūta-vyangya or cases of Alamkāras where dhvani is not pronouneed. As different from this, he could have given Dhvani as cases where it dominates over the subordinated vācya. He must then have defined and illustrated both differently. As it is, we must say that Bhoja has not made out any point to distinguish the Pratiyamāna and Dhvani. A distinction into vastu-Alamkāra Dhvanis and Rasā"di-dhvani, Bhoja did not hit upon at all; he found the parama-tātparya of the form of vastu also and so he vaguely left the question, leaving it to us to define his position systematically. Hemaeandra who reprodues the text of the Śr./Pra. on the varieties of the Pratīyamāna, considers the whole text as referring to what Anandavardhana distinguishes as vastudhvani. See Kāvyānusāsana, pp. 26-34.
At best, we can say from Bhojas text only this much that the Pratīyamāna is 'Avantara-gamyamāna-artha', or ‘Abhidhīyamāna-avyavahita-dhvani' and 'Dhvani is 'parama-tātparya.'
For all practical purposes, we must ignore his vague distinction into Pratīyamāna and Dhvani. Tātparya must be described as having only two kinds, the expressed and the non-expressed or the extra-sense that is implied or suggested. It would have been enough if Bhoja had given Tätparya as being two-fold, Abhidhīyamāna and Pratīyamana. While explaining the relation of the nonexpressed, An-abhidhiyamāna or Abhidhīyamāna-atirikta, with the Sabda-Brahman as one of Vipariņāma, Bhoja mentions only the Pratīyamāna, though immediately, he cites a verse and points out in it a set of implied ideas, the former part of which he calls 'pratīyamana' and the latter part Tatparya or Dhvani."
Now this shows that even Dr. Raghavan can not clear his way through the jungle of ideas presented by Bhoja. Yes, Dr. Raghavan is right when he says that Bhoja should have mentioned only a two-fold, and not a three-fold tātparya. Actually we have tried to give a better explanation of what Bhoja had in his mind about the distinction between pratīyamāna and Dhvani. The former is the suggested sense and the latter is the suggested sense based on the suggested sense.

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1109 The former is a case of abhidhă/laksaņā-vyañjanā, the latter is the field of abhidhā / laksaņā -> vyañjanā -> vyañjanā; a three tier system. Actually Bhojas love for three and the multiple of three at all stages must have prompted him to this threefold tātparya.
Again, when Dr. Raghavan suggests that perhaps the distinction between vastudhvani / Alamkāra-dhvani on one side and rasa-bhāvā”di-dhvani on the other side can explain Pratīyamāna / dhvanyamāna-tātparya, he is only echoing Abhinavaguptaś views in Locana where he declares that-“vastvalamkāradhvani rasa-dhvanim prati paryavastete," and this shows that Bhoja had seen Abhinavaguptaś works and was also indebted to the same. But Dr. Raghavans suggestion of vaidagdhya' as anubhāvadhvani is not convincing, for Anandavardhana or Abhinavagupta or Mammata or any dhvani-vādin worth his name never mentions "anubhāva-dhvani", for virtually it is 'vastu-dhvani' itself, and even Dr. Raghavan admits this to be so. Hence, only two reasons, which we feel are convincing, as suggested by us project themselves before us and they are- (i) Bhojas penchant for the number three and its multiple and (ii) attraction for singling out 'vyangya based on vyangya' as of special charm, could have driven him to offer abhidhīyamāna-pratīyamāna-and dhvanirūpathree-fold tātparya. For our close reference we will quote from Bhoja, who begins with an explanation of tātparya, perhaps in the fashion of Dhanañjaya / Dhanika, or in the fashion of a dirgha-dirghatara-abhidhāvādin as one pūrvapaksa projected by Mammața, seems to hold. Bhoja observes : (pp. 246, Ch. VII. Śr. Pra. ibid) :
"yatparah-sabdah sa sabdárthaḥ iti tātparyam. tac ca vākya eva upapadyate. padamātrena abhiprāyasya prakāśayitum aśakyatvāt. tac ca vākya-pratipadyam vastu tri-rūpam bhavati. abhidhīyamānam, pratīyamānam, dhvanirūpam ca.”
Before continuing with this quotation we have to take note of an interesting fact that Bhoja talks of tri-rūpa abhiprāya derived from sentence-sense only and rejects out right the possilility of an 'abhiprāya'/ tātparya to be had from a single word i.e. pada. This assertion on Bhojas part rules out pada-dhvani and thereby dhvani derived from padāmía. Theoretically thus the scope of dhvani is restricted to vākya only. We continue with Bhojaś words :
"yatra yad upātta-śabdeșu mukhyā-gauņi-laksaņābhiḥ śabda-śaktibhiḥ svam artham abhidhāya uparata-vyāpāreșu ākānkṣā-sannidhi-yogyatā”dibhir vākyárthamātram eva abhidhīyate tad abhidhīyamānam. yathā gaur gacchati iti vākyárthávagateh uttarakālam vākyárthaḥ upapadyamānó nupapadyamāno vā

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artha-prakaraṇaucityā"di-saha-kṛtau yat pratyāyayati tat pratīyamānam. yathā, visam bhunkṣva, mă ca asya gṛhe bhunkthāḥ, ity ukte varam visam bhakṣitam, na punar asya gṛhe bhuktam iti pratiyate.
artha-śabdopāyād, upasarjanīkṛta-svártho vākyárthávagater anantaram anunādarūpam pratiśabda-rūpam vā abhivyañjayati tad dhvani rūpam. tac ca na sārvatrikam. tatha hi; yatha nivṛtte abhighāte kasyacid eva kāmsyā"der dravyasya anunādo jāyate, kasyacid eva kandarādeḥ pratiśabdaḥ. yathā kasyacid eva vākyasya pratīyamāna-abhidhiyamāna-väkyártha-pratiter anantaram dhvanir upalabhyate iti. - 'nimișati eṣā' ity ukte akşor nimeṣo' bhidhiyate, devi na bhavati iti pratīyate. rūpátiśayaś ca dhvanati. atha eṣām prayogaḥ, tatra abhidhīyamānam caturdha-vidhirupam, niṣedha-rūpam, vidhi-niṣedha-rupam a-vidhi-niṣedha-rupam
ca.
After giving illustrations. Bhoja once again says something further concerning 'dhvani' (pp. 248; Śr. Pra., pp. 248, 249 etc.) :
"pratīyamānā'bhidhīyamāna-vākyárthānām ānantyād dhvanirupam apy aneka
prakāram eva.
dhvanis' ca dvidhā; artha-dhvaniḥ śabda-dhvaniś ca. tayor artha-dhvanir anunādadhvanirupaḥ pratiśabda-dhvanirūpas' ca.
....kāmsya-dhvanirupeņa anunādo dhvanim pratipadayan anunāda-dhvanivyapadeśam āsādayati iti. yaḥ punar abhidhīyamāna-vākyárthat pṛthag bhūta iva guhā"di-pratiśabdā' nurupam arthántaram pratyāyayan pratidhvanati sa pratiśabdadhvaniḥ
SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
evam sabda-dhvanir api dvidhā eva." (pp. 250, ibid).
After illustrating all these varieties, Bhoja concludes (pp. 251, ibid):
"evam anye'pi mahākavi-prayogeṣu dhvani-viseṣā gaveṣaṇīyā iti; yad uktam-, "tātparyam eva vacasi dhvanir eva kāvya" ity ādi.
Here, Bhoja repeats the verses, quoted above, which he read at the end of Ch. VI. Śr. Pra. (Vol. I)
-such as:

"yad avakram vacaḥ śāstre
loke ca, vaca eva tat....
yathā surabhi-vaiśākhau
madhu-mādhava-samjñayā...” iti.
.....

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guņībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya.
Read in a tabular form, Bhojas dhvani would read as
1111
Tātparya
abhidhīyamāna
pratīyamāna
Dhvani
śabda-dhvani
artha-dhvani
anunadadhvani
pratiśabdadhvani
anunādadhvani
pratiśabda
dhvani.
We know how Ānandavardhanaś scheme proceeds :
dhvani
laksanāmūla -avivakṣita-vācya
abhidhāmüla vivaksita-vācya
arhántara-samkramita.
atyanta-tiraskrta
-vācya
a-samkalsya-krama (rasā"di-dhvani)
samkaksyakrama -anuranana-rupa
sabdaśakti-mūla artha-sakti
ubhayamūla
sakti-mūla Now, Bhojaś anunāda-rūpa- can be placed with Anandavardhanaś anurananarūpa-vyangya, on the face of it.
Looking at the illustrations given by Bhoja, his scheme is not absolutely congruent with that of Anandavardhana, which is more methodical and more convincing. The very fact that he illustrates 'pratīyamāna' tātparya from such sentenees as 'vişam bhunkṣva,” etc., proves that all sentences do not have this

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA variety. Thus, Bhojas 'pratīyamāna' may convert itself into dhvani, but for arriving at dhvani 'pratiyamāna' is not an inevitable and unavoidable stage. Therefore he observes that Dhvani has 'artha' and 'sabda' as instruments, i.e. upāyas, which are necessarily subordinated to the 'vyangya' which is suggested as principal sense. Perhaps by ‘anu-nāda', he suggests that the original nāda and the resultant nāda are not opposite in nature, but the anu-nāda is only a sort of reverberation of the original. Thus, it could be equated with Anandavardhanaś abhidhāmūla, anuranana-rūpa dhvani, or samlaksya-krama-dhvani.
By, 'pratirūpa' he perhaps suggests that the 'ghosa' and 'pratigosa' do have a sequence, but the same is not noticed. The moment a man shouts, there is resounding from the caves, almost as if covering the sound. Thus perhaps here Bhoja
to cover "a-samlaksya-krama-dhvani' or rasā"di-dhvani of Ananda-vardhana. For prati-sabda-dhvani Bhoja says : (pp. 249, 250; Ch. VII. Śr. Pra; Vol. I, ibid)
“yaḥ punar abhidhīyamāna-vākyárthāt prthag-bhūta iva, guhā”di-pratiśabdánurūpam
arthántaram pratyāyayan pratidhvanati, sa pratiśabda-dhvanih." We have to carefully read in between the lines here. Bhoja observes that - "that which is other than (= prthag bhūta) the expressed sentence-sense, such as the echo from the original",-is pratiśabda-dhvani. Perhaps he wants to suggest, following Ananda-vardhana that "rasa"di dhvani is through the agency of vibhāvādis -i.e. vibhā"vādibhih, but is not identical with 'vibhāvā"di'- "na tu vibhā"vādi-rūpa eva." Thus, pratiśabda-rūpa dhvani is almost simultaneous, but different from the original. This could be rasā”di-dhvani.
The illustration of this pratiśabda-dhvani, as read in Bhoja, is (pp. 250; ibid) : "lāvanya-sindhur aparaiva..." etc. Now, Ānandavardhana (Dhv. III 34, pp. 224-225, ibid) has cited this illustration as one of gunībhūta-vyangya. He observes.
"prakāro'nyo guṇībhūtavyangyah kavyasya dřśyate, yatra vyangyánvaye vācya
cărutvam syât prakarsavat.” -vyangyo'rtho lalanā-lāvanya-prakhyo yaḥ pratipăditas tasya prādhānye dhvanir ity uktam tasya tu gunībhāvena vācya-cārutva-prakarse guṇībhūta-vyangyo nāma kāvya-prabhedaḥ prakalpyate. tatra vastumātrasya vyangyasya tiraskşta-vācyebhyaḥ pratīyamānasya kadācid vācya-rūpa-vākyárthápekṣayā guṇībhāve sati guņībhūtavyangyatā; yathā, “lāvyanya-sindhur aparaiva..." etc.

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1113
Bhoja does not talk of gunībhūta-vyangya at all. So for him this is dhvani', pure and simple. But even he stops at explaining only the vastu-dhvani when he observes : (pp. 250, ibid)- "tatra iha ca yathā śrüyamānānām utpalädīnām arthaḥ abhidhīyamānās tasya locanā”dyarthaiḥ saha sādrśyam pratyayayad varṇanīyāyāḥ cărutvotkarśa-pratītir dhvanati. sa tataḥ prthag iva upalabhyamānā pratiśabda-dhvanih.”
But in fact Bhoja has taken this as an illutration of dhvani on two counts; (i) he has no place for gunībhūta-vyangya, and here he seems to side with Mahimā for whom 'vyangya' is always more charming than 'väcya'; and (ii) perhaps under Abhinavaguptaś influence, Bhoja also goes beyond "cărutvotkarşa-pratīti.” He says "sā, tatah prthag iva upalabhyamānā, pratiśabdadhvaniḥ.” i.e. the exceptional beauty makes the lady all the more exceptional and thus she being the uddīpana-vibhāva makes for nāyakaś rati or love for her. Thus the whole expression terminates into śộngāra-dhvani, though Bhoja does not mention rasa by name here. Abhinavagupta in his Locana observed : “ata eva iyati yady api vācyasya prādhānyam, tathā’pi rasa-dhvanau tasyā’pi gunatā iti sarvasya gunībhūta-vyangyasya prakāre mantavyam.” The Locanakāra says that of course the expressed sense is beautiful here, but it becomes a vibhāva (= uddīpana) for 'abhilāsā' (on the part of the lover.). Thus, we feel that perhaps Bhoja had full knowledge of Abhinavagupta and his Locana, though Dr. Raghavan thinks otherwise. For Bhoja, 'anunāda' is stretching in the same direction and 'pratighosa’ is shoothing back. He does not show special concerns for vastu / alamkāra / rasā"di dhvanis and perhaps shatters the well-knit scheme of Anandavardhana. Anandavardhana is order; Bhoja, disorder.
Bhoja also explains that even in laukika statement there is possibility of abhidhiyamāna and pratiyamāna tātparya. He admits a mixture also of laukika vacas and kāvya. He observes (pp. 253, ibid) : “evam laukike’pi vacasy abhidhīyamānam pratīyamānam tātparyam ca paryālocanīyam. etena kāvyavacasor dhvani-tātparyayoś ca kvacit samplavo’pi vyākhyātaḥ; tad yathā, "acchinna-mekhalam alabdha-drdhópa gūdham”ity ādi.
Dr. Raghavan has (pp. 166, 167,...ibid) explained how Śāradātanaya summarises Bhojas treatment of dhvani in the light in which he understands the same. Before we look into Dr. Raghavans account, we will look into the original references from BP. of Śā. BP. Ch. VI, vs. 102-121 (pp. 209-214, ibid) :

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102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

väkyártham prati seṣatvam yat syad uccāraṇasya tutat tätparyam tridhā tat syāt väkyártha trividhatvataḥ kārakā"di-viśisto yah so'bhidheyaḥ kriyā"dikaḥ.
yatha'bhidhīyamānárthād anyatha' nupapattitaḥ pratīyamāno vācyárthaḥ sa pratyāyya īritaḥ. visam bhunksveti vākyā”dau eṣa tādṛk - pratīyate,
dhvanir dvidhā sa caikaḥ syād arthataḥ śabdato 'paraḥ. yatrárthaḥ śabdo vā
tam artham upasarjanīkṛta-svärthau vyanktaḥ kavya-viśeṣaḥ sa dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ. śabde dvividho dhvanir ayam anunāda-rūpah ekaḥ syāt, pratiśabda-rupa ekas
tayor viśeşo vivicyate' smābhiḥ. tatra koṇāhati-sphūrjat
kāmsya-krenkāra-nādavat,
arthántaram pratītánusyūtam eva vyanakti yat.
sónunada-dhvanir iti
kathyate dhvanikovidaiḥ. pratitártham tyajan yatra guhā"di-pratiśabda-vat pṛthag eva upalabhate, sa eva syāt prati-dhvaniḥ. pratyyāyas tat tad artham tatra tatra dhvanim dhvanih.
SAHṚDAYALOKA

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya.
112
śāntyai vóstu kapāleti vākyā"dāv ādimo dhvaniḥ, kapāla-dama-likhitām
113
114
115

srakṣyaty ādi-padā"tmikām lipim ganām pathanti iti. vākyártho yóbhidhiyate, tena sṛṣṭyādi-kartṛṇām devānām dāma gamyate. pratitena pratītā syāc chambhor, devā❞di-samsṛtiḥ,
tayásya / nityatā-ekatva-svātantryā”di pratīyate.
tat tatránusyūtam eva dhvanan yatra'vasiyate, sónunada-dhvanir nāma, tasyodāhṛtir īdṛśī. bhama dhammia visattho ityādir va'nunādabhāk, bhrameti vidhirupo yo vākyárthó bhihitaḥ puraḥ. na gantavya ca godéti nisedhónena gamyate, tena sanketabhūmis tad anusyūtam pratīyate. lavanya-sindhur ity ādi pratiśabda-nidarśanam, yataḥ sindhutpalā❞dy arthān anusyūtaḥ svanann api. tat tat samānā'vayavavān rūpátiśaya-bodhakān pṛthag eva upalabhate sa eva syāt pratidhvaniḥ. bhakti-prahvayadet yādāv anunādaḥ pratīyate, viśeṣaṇānām tulyatvāt
1115

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA
116
sāmarthyāt kuru śabdajāt. kriyāsur iti vākyártho hastánusyūtam eva yat, anunādam prajanayānupaiḥ (netre) purusa-rūpatām, tejasvitāñca dhvanayaty anunādótra drśyate, dattā”nandéti vākyā”dau pratināda-dhvanir yathā visesaņānām tulyatvāt sāmarthyad api yo giraḥ, pratiśadbam prajanayan dhenușu sva-viśesanaiḥ. māhātmyam dhvanayaty āsām pratinādo bhavet tataḥ. śabda-dhvanir dvidha-bhūtah śabdād eva avagamyate. dhvani-tātparyayoḥ kaiścit prthaktvam kathyate budhaiḥ. apratiștham a-viśrāntam svārthe yat paratām idam, vākyam vigāhate tatra nyāyyā tatparatāsya sā, yatra tu svártha-viśrāntam pratisthām tāvad āgatam. tat prasarpati tat tasmāt sarvatra dhvaninā sthitih." dhvani-tātparyayor bhedam kecin necchanti, tanmate, samāna-laksanatvāc ca tayor na ca prthak-sthitiḥ, uktañ ca ţikākārais ca tayor aikyam prati kvacit.
118
119

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1117
120
"etāvataiva viśrantis
tātparyasya iti kim kṛtam,
121
yāvat-kārya-prasāritvät
tātparyam na tula-dhṛtam." iti. dhvani-tātparyayor bhedo
brāhmaṇa brahma - cari-vat, tad avántara - bhedo hi prayeṇa pṛthag ucyate. tātparyam eva vacasi
dhvanir eva kävye
saubhagyam eva guṇasampadi vallabhasya,
-
lavanyam eva vapuși
svadate' nganāyāḥ śṛngāra eva hṛdi mänavato janasya. ato dhvanyakhya-tātparyagamyamānatvataḥ svataḥ, kāvye rasā❜lamkārā"dir väkyártho bhavati dhruvam. evam trirupam tātparyam tat tat tātparya-vedibhiḥ, vaktṛ-dvārā vākyadharma eva
iti parikīrtyate." - (B. P. VI. 102-121, pp. 209-214 ibid) We may try to put this in English as follows :
In view of the sentence-sense, whatever is the remaining portion left behind, i.e. extra sense, after the words are pronounced, is called 'tātparya' or 'import.' On account of the three-fold sentence-sense, the 'tātparya' or 'import' is also three-fold. (102).
That which is qualified by the kārakas i.e. agent etc., and is of the form of action or, etcc.,cc., is said to MP'abhidheya' or expressed' (tātparya). (103)
After the expressed sense is made clear, because of there being no further explanation, i.e. due to 'arthāpatti' i.e. presumption, that meaning which is implied, is said to be 'pratyyāya' or 'meaning through implication.' (104)

This 'pratyayya' tatparya is illustrated in statements such as, "Eat poison..." etc. (105)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'Dhvani' is said to be two-fold such as (i) derived from meaning or sense and (ii) derived from the word.- (106)
"That kind of poetry, wherein the conventional) meaning renders itself subordinate, or the conventional) word renders its meaning suggests the intended or) implied meaning (as principal), is designated as 'dhvani' by the learned. (The suggested sense is ‘dhvani' or that kind of poetry where this occurs is dhvani-kāvya). - (107)
With reference to a word (i.e. sabda) this dhvani' is two-fold scuh as (i) of the form of 'anunāda' i.e. resonance and (ii) of the form of prati-sabda' i.e. echo. These two are further discussed by us. (108)
That dhvani (or sound,) which like striking on a drum, or like noise caused by striking a bronze plate, conveys the related meaning, is termed as 'anu-nāda' by experts.- (109)
But that which gives a different meaning than the one conveyed primarily, like an echo from a cave resounding the original sound, is termed 'prati-dhvani.?-(110)
Meaning thus conveyed (in two different fashions) are termed that particular dhvani (i.e. (i) anunāda-dhvani and (ii) pratiśabda-dhvani) (Again both are either through the agency of meaning and therefore "ārtha” or through the agency of word, and therefore "sabda."
(The illustration of artha-anunāda-dhvani follows, as in)
"śāntyai vostu kapaladāma..." etc. In this sentence we have "ārtha-anunāda-dhvani." The script written by 'kapaladāma' which has words such as "straksyati" etc., is read by the group (of Śivaś attendants, i.e. ganas.). This is the sentence-sense. Through this the samsāra' or 'dāma' of the deities which make for the creation, is known. Through this apprehension, Sivaś 'samsști' i.e. continuation with reference to gods is implied. Through that eternity, oneness, independence, etc. are implied. The dhvani is termed anunāda-dhvani where this chain of implications ends. This is its illustration- (112)
'Bhama dhammia. etc.' is an instance of artha-anunāda-dhvani. The sentencesense, such as “Move around” which is positive in nature, implies or suggests that "do not move on the banks of Godāvarī." Through this is conveyed the secret meeting-place of somebody. Thus the expressed sense here is positive but the implied sense is negative.- (113).

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guņābhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1119
(artha-prati-sabda-dhvani is illustrated, as in) "lāvanya-sindhu....." etc. In this verse pratiśabda-dhvani' is illustrated. The meaning though connected with sindhuutpala, etc. gives a fresh sense of the extreme beauty of the limbs. This is pratidhvani (as the sense is different) (114).
(śābda-anunāda-dhvani)
In the verse vig. "bhakti-prahvāya dātum.” etc. (sūrya-śataka, vs.3), pratiśabda-dhvani is illustrated (-śābda-variety). On account of common adjectives (i.e. qualities) through implication from the word 'kuru', 'kriyāsuh' is the sentence-sense concerning 'kara' or hand; and this is causing 'anu-näda' i.e. reverberation and suggests the brightness and good form of the 'purusa'. Thus it is a case of anunäda-dhvani. (115)
(śābda-pratidhvani)
The illustration viz. "dattā”nandāḥ...” etc. is for 'śābda-pratināda-dhvani.' On account of common adjectives, and due to sāmarthya i.e. capacity to convey, the spoken words, cause echo in the cows and suggest the importance. (māhātmya). It is prati-nāda-dhvani. (116)
śabda-dhvani is two-fold, and is collected from sabda or word only.
Some learned people hold that ‘dhvani' and 'tātparya' are not identical, (as is suggested by the dhvanikāra). - (117)
Till the sentence is not having a complete sense, till it is not well substantiated or till it does not rest completely, the sentence-sense is supposed to continue. When it rests in its sense, when it achieves completion till that point the sentence-sense is supposed to extend. But when at a point a sentence is completed by reaching its sense, thus when a meaning is completely conveyed, and still it moves further to convey an additional sense, then this additional sense is the field of 'dhvani.?- (118)
Some people do not accept any distinction between 'dhvani' or 'suggestion' and 'tātparya' or import. They feel that on account of common qualities these two do not exist independently of each other. Some commentators (i.e. Dhanika in his Avaloka on the Daśa-rūpaka of Dhanañjaya) have observed to this effect and said that- (119)
"Who the hell has decided that purport i.e. tātparya extends only upto this point and not further? For virtually tātparya extends till the kārya' i.e. speakers intention is clearly conveyed. Thus 'tātparya' is not held in a balance.?- (120)
Actually the difference between dhvani and tātparya is like the one between a

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA 'brahmin' and a 'brahmacārin' (i:e. a student). The sub-division of the same i.e. tātparya is said to be different.”
(Bhoja says) "Tātparya or 'import' is said to be with reference to expressions in common parlance or sentences in works on various disciplines (=vacasi), but dhvani' is said to be there with reference to 'poetic expression (Kāvya) only, like the qualities of 'saubhāgya' with reference to a nāyaka i.e. hero, and 'lavanya' which is tasted with reference to the figure of a 'nāyikā' or heroine, or like 'śộngāra' i.e. “highest pitch of aesthetic experience” with reference to a cultured critic with self-identity."
Thus, as tātparya' (in poetic expression) of the form of dhvani being conveyed on its own (i.e. it being self-evident) in poetry the sentence-sense takes the form of 'rasa', 'alamkāra' etc. Thus this three-fold tātparya (i.e. one each as explained by Ānandavardhana, Dhanika and Bhoja), as explained by respective knowers, is ultimately the quality of a sentence i.e. it pertains to the speech, as spoken by a speaker."- (121)
Dr. Raghavan (pp. 166, 167, etc., ibid) has neatly given the substance of śāś views. We will try to place them here with our comments, if any. It man be noted that his references are to an edition of BP. which is not used by us. So, we will not mention the page-numbers given by him but of course, the chapter number is the same.
In the Ch. VI of his BP., Śā. tries to explain the concept of Dhvani in Bhoja, "in the light in which he (=Śā.) understood them.”
'Tātparya' is defined by Śā. as-“Vākyārtham prati śeşatvam uccāraṇasya", and is divided, as is done by Bhoja, into three classes : “sa ca abhidheyaḥ, pratyāyyah, dhvanirūpaḥ iti tridhā.”
It may be noted that Dr. Raghavan has not rendered in English, the Sanskrit expression of Sā. as, “vākyārtham prati śeşatvam uccāraṇasya." we have tried to put it as, “In view of the sentence-sense, whatever is left behind as extra-sense after words are pronounced, is called 'tātparya' or 'import.” Thus Śā. wants to drive at a wider sense of tātparya, over and above the correlated sense as advocated by the Mimāņsakas. We will go to see that Sā.ś 'tātparya' is three-fold, viz. the abhidhiyamāna i.e. the correlated sentence-sense, the pratiyamāna i.e. implied sense as seen in statements which are qualified by some special context, and the dhvani' or suggested sense.

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Dr. Raghavan continues to explain as follows. After quoting the three-fold import, at the stage of defining the 'pratyāyya' or implied purport, he makes a change. Dr. Raghavan rightly observes that Śā. differs from Bhoja so far as the understanding of the concept of 'pratyāyya' import is concerned. Dr. Raghavan observes that Śā. finds it, as we (i.e. Dr. Raghavan, and also Dr. Nandi now), also found, impossible to distinguish Bhojas ‘pratīti' (i.e. implied sense) and dhvani'; and also 'pratīyamāna' and 'dhvanyamana'. So, he made the distinction that such meaning as is called forth to explain a statement whose obvious expressed sense is clearly incompatible (i.e. what we have called to be a "qualified statement," Yes, ‘qualified with reference to its special context of the speaker, the listener, etc. etc.), i.e. 'anupapanna', is called 'pratiyamāna'. The example is, 'vişam bhunksva'. This, Dr. Raghavan observes, is partly faithful but not wholly to Bhojas text.
"yathā'bhidhīyamānárthad anyathā’nupapattitaḥ, pratīyamāno vākyárthaḥ yas sa pratyāyya ucyate." "visam bhunksva' iti vākyādāv
esa tādřk pratīyate.” Bhoja, Dr. Raghavan observes, does not restrict 'pratīyamāna-tātparya' to cases of anyathā-anupapatti' of the abhidhīyamāna. For Bhoja clearly states:
"vākyárthaḥ, upapadyamānaḥ, anupapadyamāno vā." (śr. Pra. Vol-II. Ch. VII), though he illustrates only the latter with the example, viņam bhunkşva."
In other respects, Dr. Raghavan observes that Śā. faithfully summarises the whole text of Bhoja on dhvani.
At the end of the section, Dr. Raghavan observes, Bhoja takes up the question of the difference between Dhvani and Tātparya. We may add that, and Dr. Raghavan does not explain it in such a clear way, that Sā. here gives three views on tātparva-dhvani divide. The views are of Ānandavardhana, Dhananjaya-Dhanika and Bhoja. We have clearly explained above the distinction between these three.
Dr. Raghavan observes that śā. quotes the Kārikās on dhvani, viz. "pratiștham..." etc. quoted in the Avaloka on the Daśarūpaka and says this view is wrong. Dhvani and tātparya are not separate but are identical. Dhvani or the suggested idea is got at only through the tātparya-śakti of a sentence. The suggested idea is also part of a speakerś intention and everything coming within the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA speakers intention, is tātparya. There is no rule which lays down that the speakers intention, beyond a certain stage, ceases to be tātparya and needs a new name (such as 'dhvani.) Here, śā. quotes Dhanikaś Kārikā from his lost ‘Kāvya-nirņaya' which his Avaloka quotes :
"etāvataiva viśrāntih tātparyasyéti kim krtam, yāvat-kārya-prasāritvāt
tātparyam na tulā-dhịtam.” Śā. does not quote Bhojaś verses on the difference between tātparya and dhvani which bring in the similes 'saubhāgya' and 'lāvanya'. Instead Šā gives a single analogy. He says that 'dhvani' is a class of 'tātparya', an avāntara-bheda, even a brahmacārin is a kind of Brāhmana, i.e. the first asramī brāhmana. Here, Dr. Raghaven quotes from Bhojaś śr. Pra. as under :
"dhvani-tātparyayor bhedo brāhmaṇa-brahmacārivat, tad avāntara-bhedo hi prāyeņa prthag ucyate." tātparyam eva vacasi
dhvanir eva kāvye..." etc. from Bhojaś śr. Pra. Dr. Raghavan then quotes from the BP. as -
ato dhvanyākhya-tātparyagamyamānarvataḥ svataḥ, kāvye rasálamkriyā'dir vākyártho bhavati sphuram. evam trirūpam tātparyam tat tat tātparya-vedibhiḥ, vaktp-dvārā vākyadharma
eva iti, parikīrtyate." Dr. Raghavan has not clarified, 'tri-rūpam tātparvam. tat-tad-vedibhih'. We have explained this as three explanations of tātparva as given by Aanandavardhana. Dhananjaya-Dhanika, and Bhoja.

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Dr. Raghavan continues further and suggests (pp. 167, ibid) that BahurūpaMiśra in his commentary on the Dasarūpaka, follows Sā. closely and puts in prose Sā.'s summary of Bhoja on Dhvani. He ends thus : “ataḥ tịtiya-kaksā-rūpena dhvani-nāmnā tātparyeņa gamyamānatvāt rasálamkārā”di vākyárthaḥ. + + + evam triprakāram api tātparyam vaktp-dvārā vākyadharma eva iti,
Bahurūpa-miśra follows also Sā.ś own modification of Bhojas 'pratīyamāna'. Śā. and following him, Bahurūpa also, say that 'tātparya' pertains to speech through the speaker, "vaktr-dvārā vākya-dharmah," but Kumārasvāmin asserts that it pertains purely to the speaker and not to the speech.
"uddeso nāma vaktr-dharmaḥ, na mīmāmsakānām iva vākya-dharmah.” (pp. 33).
Dr. Raghavan further observes that it is not clear what Bhojaś ideas are on the description of rasa as 'vākyārtha'; we do not find him discussing the subject in the section on tātparya and dhvani. But while describing the varieties of composition, dịśya and śravya prabandhas, he says that the nāțaka and the other nine rūpakas as well as nātikā and satraka (on the whole twelve) form 'vākyárthábhinaya' and the rest, twelve uparūpakas, śrigadita etc., form padárthábhinaya.
“vākyárthábhinayóyam prakīrtito nāțakā”di-bhedena dvādaśa-vidha-padárthábhinayam
atha yathā-sthitam vaksye." (śr. Pra. Vol. II Ch. XI) Dr. Raghvan says that this by itself cannot lead us far, but we feel that by these terms Bhoja and also others (see. DR. Avaloka) who use such terms should only mean 'major' and 'minor' types.
Dr. Raghavan proceeds to note that in this same ch. (XI) we find Bhoja saying regarding rasa : “na hi vibhā”vădayólamkārāḥ, api tu bhāva-rasa-tadābhāsānām alamkārāņām abhinispatti-hetavaḥ artha-vićeșāḥ.
nanv evam api artha-gunatvāt amīşam apy alamkāratvam prāpnoti, satyam etat; kintu anyaparatayā na upādīyamānā-pratītau padárthāḥ prthak sphuranti iti. - (Vol.II).
Bhoja states here clearly that vibhāvas etc. are similar to padárthas in vākyártha, Rasa, bhāva and their ābhāsa form vākyártha, while the padárthas are described as having no more purpose to serve than the manifestation of the vākyártha. The vibhāvas etc. do not separately exișt by themselves and are not ends

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA in themselves; their ultimate aim is the manifestation of 'rasa'. Dr. Raghavan observes (pp. 168 ibid) that padártha-vākyártha-nyāya between vibhāvā”divācyavācaka and dhvanyamāna rasā"di could only be an analogy which emphasises the fact that vibhāva, etc. are rasa-para and the former are upāyamātra, the means for the latter. Anandavardhana also, we know, has a similar approach. Even he holds that though padárthas are real, they are not independently cognised when the sentence-sense is cognised. Similarly the apprehension of the vibhāvā"dis lead to that of rasā”di in such a quick fashion, that the sequence between the two is not apprehended, observes Anandavardhana. (Dhv. I. 10-12). Rasa therefore is the vākyártha, so to say, with the apprehension of vibhāvā"dis forming the padártha. Dr. Raghavan observes that here the vākyártha i.e. rasā”di must naturally be apprehended through 'tātparya', otherwise called 'dhvani' by Bhoja, and as such, Bhoja contradicts neither Anandavardhana nor Dhanika.
Dr. Raghavan tries to defend his observation here that Bhoja contradicts neither Anandavardhana nor Dhanika by suggesting that in Dhanikaś Avaloka we find a clear mention of rasa being vākyártha, those that manifest it i.e., vibhāvas, etc., being padártha, and the vākya being the Kāvya : "tatra vibhāvā”dayaḥ padárthasthānīyāḥ, tat-samsrsto rasā”diḥ vākyárthaḥ, tad eva kavya-vākyam yadīyau tāv imau padártha-vākyárthau.” D. R. Avaloka.
Here, once again, we beg to differ from Dr. Raghavan. For Ānandavardhana padártha-vākyártha-nyāya is just an analogy to be abandoned later in favour of ghata-pradipa-nyaya between the first apprehension of vibhāvādi and the apprehension of rasā"di that follows. This second 'nyāya' takes us to vyañjanā. But this is not so for Dhananjaya / Dhanika for whom a dīrghatara-tātparya, which is for them “a-tulādhịtam” is more welcome then vyañjanā-dhvani. So, if Bhoja calls his tātparya' by the name of 'dhvani' he has to side either with Anandavardhana or with Dhanika. Our impression is that Bhoja does not discard vyañjan, and thus leans towards Ānandavardhana, though he equates dhvani with tātparya. For him ‘tātparya' is thus the 'ultimate principal sense' and just not the sum total of padárthas. So, for all practical purposes, Bhoja should not be taken as an antivyañjana-dhvani theorist like either Bhatta Nayaka, or Dhananjaya / Dhanika or Mahimā, but should be placed along with Kuntaka, or even above Kuntaka for Bhoja names dhvani and accepts it in his own way. By and large, Kuntaka and Bhoja are not anti-dhvani theorists but their acceptance of dhvani has a wider area than just vyañjanā. Both may, be termed "antarbhāva-vādins" so far as 'dhvani' is concerned.

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While dealing with their anti-vyañjanā stand, we have talked (see chapters on vyañjanā, tātparya, etc.) a lot on the approach of Bhațța nāyaka, Mahimā, Dhananjaya, Dhanika, Mukula, and Pratīhārendurāja, hence we do not have to add anything fresh about them. They were all die-hard anti-dhvani theorists, and anti-vyañjanā theorists though of course they advocated the supremacy of 'rasa' in poetry and 'rasa' for them was apprehended by means other than vyañjanā, and 'rasa', though ‘kāvyā”tmā' for them, was never termed 'dhvani' by these theorists. But they were taken care of and denounced very ably by Mammața, Viśvanātha and the rest. After this the dhvani-thought-current flows smoothly and Ruyyaka, Sobhākara Mitra, Vidyādhara, Appayya and Jagannātha have chosen to go with the same.
We know that Anandavardhana had talked about three-fold dhvani. Hence our next topic for a fuller discussion naturally could be rasa-dhvani and certain questions pertaining to its realisation in literature and drama, or in fact all finearts. Some other topics such as those concerned with the nature of rasa, bhāva, rasā”bhāsa, etc. rasa-bhāva-relationship, rasas deemed as praksti-rasas and vikrtirasas, the number of rasas, the problem of śāntarasa, treatment of rasa beginning with Bharata, earlier alamkārikas, Anandavardhana down to Jagannātha, and even at the hands of Rūpa and Jiva Gosvāmī, i.e. the vaišnava alamkārikas, and of course rasa in the hands of Kuntaka, Bhoja and even anti-dhvani theorists,- all this will hold us later. With this rasa-mīmāmsā will be over but prior to that we will see how Anandavardhana, in his catholic vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa theory has correlated such thought-currents as alamkāra, guna, rīti, vștti, samghatanā, doșa, anumiti etc. with rasa-dhvani. This will be done in the very next chapter that follows and then of course, after dealing with dhvani-virodha, we will pick up consideration of the types of major dramatic forms, which we had avoided on the earlier occasion. With this part I. of this Sahrdavāloka will be completed, to be followed by part II with indivinual chapters on guna, dosa. alamkāra, rīti, vrtci, laksanas, vakrokti, aucitya, kaviśiksā, kāwaharana, etc, ending with consideration of modern writers on Alamkāra and general concluding remarks.
It may be noted before we end this chapter that these writers, i.e. Kuntaka, Dhanañjaya, Dhanika. Mahimā, and Bhoja had hardly anything to say about the other two varieties of criticism based classification, viz. the guṇībhūta-vyangya and the citra variety of kavya. But at least Āhandavardhana and his followers down to Jagannātha did recognise these varieties and it will be very interesting to look into the same before we close this chapter.

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
We knew that aesthetes of poetic art, when they enjoy poetry or literature, undergo an experience of supreme joy. A particular poem or piece of poetry makes an appeal to their heart and they are moved by it. Normally the piece, taken as a whole, as an indivisible organic unity, creates a particular response in the heart of the connoisseur. But when a second thought is given to a particular poem, in moments of tranquillity, the critic is in a position to discern different modes of appeal. These different modes can be held to be responsible for this or that type of classification of poetry in the hands of Sanskrit theorists. Ālamkarikas headed by Anandavardhana have, as suggested earlier, classified poetry into dhvanikavya, guṇībhūta-vyangya-kāvya and citra-kāvya from the point of view of literary criticism. Anandavardhana, and also Abhinavagupta, go to observe that even the so called guṇībhūta-vyangya variety, i.e. poetry with subardinated suggested sense, also can be classed as dhvani kavya, when viewed from the particular angle of resā"di-vyañjanā in it. Thus, in a way, they seem to reject the idea of a watertight classification of poetry and probably from this point of view also, Anandavardhana wisely avoids naming this or that type as 'uttama' i.e. excellent, 'madhyama' i.e. mediocre and 'adhama' or 'avara' i.e. third-rate or low type of poetry. Poetry, if at all it creates any response in the heart of a connoisseur, does it only when taken as a single effort by the poet, one and indivisible, a complex unity. However, in moments of tranquillity or rest, the faculty of subtle analysis starts operating and it divines out different modes of appeal in poetry. Probably this gives rise to a broad form of three-fold classification as above. Divisions an sub-divisions of this or that type of poetry can simply be dubbed as an instinct for either going into the root cause of pleasure or even hairsplitting, so close to the Indian mind in general.
First, we will try to look into illustrations of all the three types of poetry. The 'dhvani-kavya' or suggestive poetry is one in which, as noted earlier, the suggested sense, particularly of the form of sentiment, emotion etc. i.e. rasă"di, becomes the principal source of charm. Of course Anandavardhana also accomodates here vastu-dhvani and alamkara-dhvani as well. "śunyam vāsagṛham vilokya...." etc. is an instance in point where śṛngāra-rasa is predominantly suggested. Alamkarikas are of the opinion that here, the source of poetic appeal lies in the suggestion of the sentiment of love.
But in yet another poem, vig. "anurāgavatī sandhyā....." etc. the expressed sense, i.e. the bare description of sunset by itself is very touching to a responsive heart.

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However, the sensitive critics also feel an undereurrent of suggested sense in which there is a faint realisation of the fact of a loving lady, with her heart full of love, trying to pursue an unyielding hero. This undertone enhances the beauty of this expressed sense in form of a lovely description of sunset.
Yet another type of poetry, The citra-kāvya, is taken notice of by Anandavardhana and his followers. It is a type in which there is practical absence of any undercurrent of suggestion of the subordinated type, which could add to the charm of the expressed. Here only the expressed carries all grace and moves the cultured critics. The illustration is, "vinirgatam mānadam ātma-mandirāt," etc.
In this illustration, the bare description of Amarāvati causes poetic charm. Thus, we observe that an effort in analysing poetic experience has given rise to a three-fold, criticism based classification, of poetry.
We have seen that Kuntaka, Dhanika, or Mahim, and the rest were not interested in Anandavardhanaś scheme and hence they do not discuss these two varieties. But for us it will be interesting how Anandavaredhana treats and elaborates this topic of gunībhuta-vyangya and citra kävya and how later ālamkārikas who follow his dictate, build a grand edifice on what Anandavardhana has laid down as a base. It may also be noted that even the earlier alamkārikas such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. the predecessors of Anandavardhana also did not indulge in this criticism based classification but were satisfied with one based on external form only.
In the Dhvanyaloka, Anandavardhana discusses the nature and scope of what he calls dhvanikävya with all its divisions and sub-divisions upto Dhv-III. 33. He concludes with the words : (Dhv. III. 33) (vịtti : (pp. 224, ibid) :
"vimativișayo ya āsīn manīșiņām satatam a-vidita-sa-tattvah, dhvani-samjñitaḥ prakāraḥ
kāvyasya vyañjitaḥ sóyam.” 'The variety of poetry designated as suggestion, which had become a source of controversy for long, because its real nature had eluded even persons of the best intellect, has now been explained.” (Trans. K. Kris-, pp. 225, ibid). .
Anandavardhana then comes to the second variety of poetry of subordinated suggestion, and observes : (Dhv. III. 34, pp. 224, ibid).
“prakārónyo guṇībhūtavyangyaḥ kāvyasya dịśyate

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA yatra vyangyánvaye vācya
cārutvam syāt prakarsavat.” "We can see another variety of poetry viz. poetry of subordinated suggestion, wherein the artistic excellence of the expressed is greater than that of the suggested, though the latter also happens to be present alongside of the former.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 225, ibid). Anandavardhana adds that when the suggested sense which is compared to the charm of a damsel is predominant in poetry it is said to be 'dhvani'. And when it is rendered subservient and in itself lends charm to the expressed sense, it is said to be poetry with subordinated suggestion..
Anandavardhana then tries to give some further varieties of this type of poetry. We have seen elsewhere that fundamentally dhvanikāvya is sub-divided into one in which the suggestive power, i.e. vyañjanā is either based on abhidhā or denotation or on laksanā i.e. indication. In the same way, observes Anandavardhana that the first variety of gunībhūta-vyangya is obtained when a - bare idea, conceyed by such words as have lost their conventional denotation might be the suggested element and it might become secondary to the purport of the sentence as a whole got at by its component denotative words. Thus, this is the case of 'atyanta-tiraskrta-vācyarūpa-vyangya', which is of the form of 'vastu' i.e. 'idea', being subordinated to the expressed sense. The illustration is :"lāvanya-sindhur -aparaiva hi kéyam atra..." etc. Here, by the word 'sindhu, or ocean, is suggested fullness; by 'utpala', the side-glances of the eyes; by 'śaśin', the face; by 'dvirada-kumbha-tați, the two breasts; by 'kadalikānda', the two thighs etc. are suggested the primary meaning of these words is totally brushed aside (= atyanta-tiras-krta) and the secondary sense is resorted to, which helps the suggestion of the vyangya or the suggested sense, which ultimately becomes subservient and renders charm to the expressed sense.
Second variety of this type is seen when words with their expressed sense not concealed (i.e. a-tiraskrta) give rise to a suggested sense which is subordinated to the whole expressed sense of the sentence : (vrtti Dhv. III 34, pp. 224, and 226 reads as) - tatra vastu mātrasya vyangyasya-tiraskrta-vācyebhyaḥ pratīyamānasya kadācid vācya-rūpa-vākyárthā'pekṣayā gunībhāve sati, gunībhūtavyangyatā yathā lāvanya-sindhur-aparaiva... etc., atiraskặta-vācyebhyópi śabdebhyaḥ pratīyamānasya vyangya-sya kadācid vācya-prādhānyena kavya-cărutvā'peksaya gunībhāve sati gunībhūta-vyangyatā yathă udāhţtam-anurāgavati sandhyā...” ity evam ādi.”- The illustration of this second variety is "anurāgavati sandhyā" etc.

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Third variety is illustrated, as in "sanketakāla-manasam vitam." etc., wherein the vyangya is subordinated by its own expression through some other words : "tasyaiva svayam uktyā prakāśikṣtatvena gunībhāvaḥ, yathā udāhstam, 'sanketakāla-manasam,” ityādi. (Vrtti, Dhv. III. 34, pp.226).
It may be noted that this variety depends more on the mode of conveying the suggested sense, rather than the type of suggested sense itself.
The fourth variety occurs when suggested sense in form of sentiment and the like is subordinated to another principal rasa or sentiment and the like. Actually this is the field of alamkāras such as rasavat and the like : (vrtti, Dhv. III 34, pp. 226, ibid) : “rasā”di-svarūpa-vyangyasya gunībhāvo rasavad alamkāre darśitah; tatra ca teşām ādhikārika-vākyápekṣayā guṇībhāvo vivahana-pravstta-bhrtyánuyāyirājavat." "The subordination of sentiment, etc., to the main purport of the sentence in such instances can be likened to the circumstantial subordination of a king who has to walk behind his own servant when the latter is a bridegroom taken in procession.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 227, ibid).
It may be noted that in this particular variety; illustrated as above by the stalk illustration viz. "ayam sa raśanótkarsi...." etc., we find that the fields of 'rasavad ādi alamkāras and "gunībhūta-vyangya" mix and merge into each other. Anandavardhana does not attempt to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation between the spheres of both. We will go to observe that even Mammața has also failed to do the same, while as noted earlier in the classification of poetry attempted by Jagannātha we find a clear line of demarcation laid down between the areas of dhvani, gunībhūtavyangya of a special type. and guṇībhūta-vyangya covering a number of figures based on sense. i.e. arthálamkāras.
Fifth variety is said to be there, when a suggested figure is subordinated as in case of the figure "dipaka” and the like : (vrtti, Dhv. III 34; pp. 226, ibid) : vyangyálamkārasya gunībhāve dīpakā”dir vişayah”. On finding out the special charm of the above mentioned fifth variety, Anandavardhama becomes so jubilant, that he declares : (Dhv. III. 35, and vịtti thereon, pp. 226, ibid) :
"prasanna-gambhirapadāḥ kāvyabandhāḥ sukhāvahāḥ, ye ca teșu prakāróyam eva yojyaḥ sumedhasā.” (Dhv. III. 35).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ye ca ete a-parimita-svarūpāḥ api prakāśamānāḥ tathāvidhartha-ramanīyāḥ santo vivekinām sukhāvahāh kävya-bandhās tesu sarvesu ayam eva prakāro gunībhūtavyangyo nāma yojanīyaḥ yathā, “lakṣmīr duhitā, jāmātā hariḥ, etc."
"In all poetic compositions that look delightful by reason of their lucid and elegant words, only this variety of poetry should be recognised by the intelligent critic.” (Dhv. III. 35)
Despite the fact that poetic compositions which look lovely and bring delight to discriminating critics appear unlimited, this very variety, viz. poetry of subardinated suggestion should be recognised in all of them. For e
"Laksmi is his daughter" etc. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 227, ibid). Anandavardhana further adds :
(Dhv. III. 36, and vrtti thereon; pp. 228) “vācyálamkāra-vargóyam vyangyámśánugame sati, prāyeņaiva parām cchāyām
bibhral laksye nirīksyate.” (Dhv. III. 36) vācyálamkāra-vargóyam vyangyámíasya alamkārasya vastumātrasya vā yathāyogam anugame sati cchyátiśayam bibhral lakṣaṇakāraih ekadeśena darśitaḥ. sa tu tathārūpaḥ prāyeņa sarva eva parīksyamāņo laksye nirīksyate.” – “The whole
seen in many an instance to put on a new charm when it is brought into touch with the suggested element." (Dhv. III. 36) - The earlier writers on poetics have themselves shown how a few of the figures of sense acquire a new charm, when they get into touch with the suggested element consisting of either a figure or a bare idea. But a scrutiny of instances will reveal that this is true of all the figures." (Trans. K. Kris, pp. 229, ibid).
Anandavardhana further observes that as in the case of dīpaka (i.e. Ellipsis) implying a simile, and samāsókti (i.e. condensed metaphor), all other figures also seem to be containing the touch of another figure or another idea. For example, the touch of the figure atiśayokti (i.e. exaggeration) can be said to be there in case of practically all the other figures of speech. Bhāmaha has also said as such. Other alamkāras also follow the suit, though they cannot be seen to be contained in all the rest, as is the case with 'atiśayokti.' Anandavardhana points out that in some figures, the said scope is limited to suggestion of certain figures only, e.g., 'preyas' is invariably seen in 'vyājastuti', and the like. In other figures, the said scope is

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kävya. 1131 further limited to suggestion of figures only, as against ideas, e.g. there is upamā in 'samdeha' and the like. Yet other figures are found to be mutually involved, e.g. 'dīpaka' and 'upamā.' Anandavardhana then declares that-(vrtti, Dhv. III. 36. pp. 228, ibid) : “tad evaņ vyangyámía-samsparse sati cārutvátiśaya-yogino rūpakā"dayólamkārāḥ sarva eva guṇībhūta-vyangyasya mārgah.” “All figures, then, which contain a touch of suggestion at the same time owe their expressive charm due to that touch, deserve to be bought within the compass of poetry of subordinated suggestion.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 231. ibid). He adds (vrtti, Dhv. III. 36, pp. 232, ibid) : "tad ayam dhvani-nisyanda-rūpo dvitīyópi mahākavi-visayo lakṣanīyaḥ sahrdayaiḥ. sarvathā nāsty eva sahrdaya-hrdaya-hāriņaḥ kāvyasya sa prakāro yatra na pratīyamānártha-samsparśena saubhāgyam. tad idam kāvyarahasyam param iti sūribhir bhāvanīyam.”
-“Therefore, this second manifestation of suggestion too should be recognised by refined critics as a beautiful avenue for first-rate poets. Certainly, there is not
variety of poetry holding out an appeal to the hearts of refined critics which does not attain artistic excellence by the slightest touch of suggested sense. The learned should deem this as the greatest secret of poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris., 00. 233, ibid). Ānandavardhana suggests (Dhv. III. 37, pp. 232, ibid) :
“mukhyā mahākavi-girām alamkrti-bhstām api, pratīyamāna cchāyaiņā
bhūṣā lajjeya yoșitām.” "anayā. suprasiddhópy-arthaḥ kim api kāmanīyakam ānīyate." -“Even for such expressions of poets as are already adorned by figures, this shade of suggestion will be a most important ornament even as bashfulness will be for women.” (Dhv. III. 37)
-“By this shade, even a common-place will be invested with unique charm.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 233, ibid)
Sixth variety of the guņābhūta-vyangya-kāvya arises when another sense is suggested with the help of kāku, or ironic tone, i.e. intonation, e.g. in, “svasthā bhavantu mayi jīvati dhārtraraştrāḥ," etc.
Anandavardhana holds that instances which can reasonably be brought under this class of poetry should not be classed under dhvani by cultured critics (Dhv. III.

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
40). For instance, in "patyuḥ śiraścandrakalām anena..." etc., the suggested sense seems to be subordinated by the expression, viz. "nirvacanam jaghāna." So, this should fall under guṇībhūta-vyangya and not dhvani kāvya. Ānandavardhana, winds up the discussion with the words (Dhv. III. 40)
"prakāróyam guṇībhūtavyangyópi dhvani-rūpatām, dhatte, rasā"di-tātparyaparyālocanayā punaḥ."
guşībhūta-vyangyópi kāvya-prakāro rasa-bhāvā"di-paryālocane punar dhvanir eva sampadyate." -"This class of poetry, viz. that with subordinated suggestion also assumes the form of Dhvani or that with principal suggestion, if one views it from the standpoint of exclusive purport of sentiments, etc." (Dhv. III. 40)
When viewed from the standpoint of purport, viz. sentiment, etc., even poetry with subordinated suggestion will become poetry with principal suggestion itself." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 237, ibid).
Thus it seems that from Anandavardhanaś point of view, one and the same illustration can serve for both dhvani and guṇībhūta-vyangya types of poetry, when viewed from different angles. This position, however. seems to be a little bit confusing and we miss a clear line of demarcation between these two types of poetry, Or-perhaps Anandavardhana did not wish that such water-tight compartments be imagined in case of poetry which refuses to be enclosed in just this or that groove. Any way, we have to wait for Jagannatha for a comparatively clearer and well-defined idea of the two, or perhaps, as noticed above, even he is also not very rigid. Poetry itself being an absract art does not entertain any labels of a permanent nature and this drives Kuntaka or, even Mahima to do what he has done.
So, we see that in the Dhvanyaloka, we come aeross only six clear sub-divisions of the guṇībhūta-vyangya kavya, though Anandavardhana has suggested the possibility of innumerable sub-varieties on account of the infinite variety of suggested sense. Out of these six, one consists of the 'rasavad ādi' alamkāras. First two varieties are based on the suggestion of an idea based on either abhidhā or lakṣaṇā, and one variety depends on the subordinated alamkara-suggestion. The rest depend, as noted earlier, more on the mode of conveying the subordinated suggested sense; one on a faulty way of conveying wherein the suggested idea is as it were punctured by a direct expression, and the other on being conveyed through intonation (i.e. kāku).

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhuta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1133
Abhibavaguptaś attitude in this respect is quite characteristic of his general approach to poetry. For him, as noted at many places in his Locana, both vastudhvani and alamkāra-dhvani ultimately terminate into rasa-dhvani which alone, virtually is the soul of poetry. So, in all the varieties of gunībhūta-vyangya according to the great Abhinavagupta, what happens is that first of all some suggested sense is subordinated to an expressed sense, which in its turm ultimately terminates into some other rasa-vyañjanā. Thus for him all gunībhūta-vyangya is ultimately nothing else but dhvani-kāvya itself. : “ata eva iyati vācyasya prādhānyam, tathā’pi rasa-dhvanau tasyā’pi guņatā iti sarvasya gunībhūtavyangyasya prakāre mantavyam. ata eva dhvaner ātmatvam ity uktataram bahuśaḥ.”- Locana, Dhv. III. 34.
In Mammata, however, we come across a more systematic classification and division. He defines guṇībhūta-vyangya poetry as : "a-tādņši gunībhūta-vyangyam vyangye tu madhyamam” (K. P. I. 5ab): - “But when the suggested meaning is unlike that, (i. e. is not principal), it (poetry) is called mediocre wherein the suggested becomes subordinate.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, The Poetic Light; Kavyaprakāśa of Mammata; Pub. Motilal Banarasidass, Edn. 67, Delhi). (pp. 13, ibid). He starts the ullāsa V, K. P. with an eight-fold division of gunībhūta-vyangya poetry, wherein the following varieties are mentioned : (K. P. V. 45, 46 ab-pp. 138, ibid) : evam dhvanau nirnīte gunībhūta-vyangyasya prabhedān āha :- .
"agūŅham aparasyā’ngam vācya-siddhyangam a-sphustam,
sandigdha-tulya-prādhānye ... kākvā”kşiptam a-sundaram- (V. 45)
vyangyam evam guṇībhūta- .
vyangyasyā’stau bhidāḥ smộtāḥ.". "Thus having determined the dhvani (the best type of poetry), the author now states the varieties of the poetry of subordinated suggestion. .
(V. 45) (i) Non-concealed, (ii) subservient to another, (iii) subservient to the establishment of the expressed meaning, (iv) indistinct, (v) of doubtful prominence (vi) of equal prominence, (vii) implied by intonation, and (viii) non-striking." (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi. pp. 139, ibid).
As noted above, he calls this type of poetry to be ‘madhyama' i.e. ‘mediocre. dhvani' being ‘uttama' or 'excellent and 'citra' being 'adhama' or 'low-class poetry.'

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA This sort of labelling is not to be met with in Ananandavard Abhinavagupta, though, of course, in a way perhaps implied in the latter.
Mammata introduces the first sub-variety viz. 'agūdha' with the words : “kāmini-kuca-kalaśavad gūdham camatkaroti. agūdham tu sphuţatayā vācyāyamānam iti guņābhūtam eva. aghudham yathā– "yasyāsuhrt-ksta."... etc.
"The hidden (meaning) produces charm in the manner of the jar-like breasts of damsels. But the one not hidden, being obvious, becomes as if direct Hence it is subordinate only. To illustrate the non-concealed (i.e. explicit) : "yasyásuhrt... etc.” (Trans. R. C. Dwi., pp. 139).- In this example the word jīvan' has a suggested sense, based on indication or laksaņā, with the arthántarasamkramita-vāvya. The word “jīvan' or 'living loses its original sense and acquires the sense of 'hated existence'. Yet another illustration is supplied which is based on atyanta-tiraskrta-vācya-dhvani being subordinated. In this illustration, the word 'cumbi' means 'touching and not 'kissing', In both these examples, the suggestion which is subordinated is itself "a-gūdha" : e. 'not cocealed' and therefore not a source of any charm. So, we may say that this variety depends not only on the formal classification of dhvani, but also on the mode of conveying that particular dhvani or suggestion. Third illustration, viz. "atrā"sīt phanīpāśa.” etc. also gives "a gūdha" variety, in which resonant-like suggestion based on the power of sense (artha-śakti-mūla-anuranana-rūpa) is subordinated to the expressed sense. · In Aparánga-bhūța variety, Mammața incorporates all the alamkāras that fall under the rasavad-ādi-class. This may be taken as an advance so to say, on Anandavardhana, who seems to take them as both 'alamkāra' and gunībhūtavyangya also.
Mammața also extends the scope of this variety, when he herein incorporates the subordinated sense of the type of suggested figure based on the power of the word, i.e. sabda-sakti-mūla-alamkāra-dhvani. The next illustration is for the samlaksyakrama-vastu-dhvani being subordinated -vācyánga-to the expressed sense. The former is illustrated by the verse, viz. "jana-sthāne bhrāntam...” etc., in w suggested figure upamā based on the power of word becomes subservient to the expressed element mentioned through the words viz. "mayā"ptam rāmatvam... etc., in which the behaviour of the hero which is suggested, rests on the expressed sense viz. the behaviour of the Sun and the lotus plant.
· Thus we have in all ten examples of this variety, eight of which are concerned with subordinated rasā"di dhvani or the suggestion of sentiment and the like, and

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1135 the last two are concerned with subordinated alamkāradhvani and vastudhvani respectively.
The difference between the second and the third varieties of the gunībhūtavyangya type of poetry should be carefully noted. The second variety. viz. 'vācyánga' and the third variety vig. 'vācya-siddhy-anga' differ in the fact that while in the former the suggested sense becomes subordinated to an expressed sense, which is complete in itself, and does not stand in need (i.e. is 'nir-apeksa) of the support of the suggested sense; in the latter, however, the expressed remains incomplete til it gets the support of the suggested sense.
'vācya-siddhy-anga' is illustrated by two verses. In the verse viz. "bhramim aratim alasa-hrdayatām..." the suggested sense in form of "hālāhala" or "poison", i.e. the suggestion of vastu' or bare idea or fact, is subservient to the expressed sense in form of a serpent.
The fourth variety viz. 'asphuta' can be contrasted with the first one. While in the first one, i.e. the a-gūdha-variety, the fault lies in the suggested sense being too exposed, i.e. being not properly concealed, in this variety, the fault lies in the fact of its being too much concealed. The illustration is, "a-drste darśanótkanthā, drste...", in which the subordinated suggested sense is too much concealed : "atha adrsto yathā na bhavati, viyoga-bhayam ca yathā na utpadyate tathā kuryāh iti klistm.” (K. P. V.) (pp. 150, ibid). This variety also can be said to depend not as much on the nature of the suggested sense, as on the faulty mode of conveying the suggested sense, as in case of the first variety. This is also the case with the following three varieties also.
In the "samdigdha-prādhānya” variety, there is, as the name suggests, a doubt as to the preponderance of either the suggested sense, or the expressed sense; e.g., in the verse, vig., “haras tu kiñcit parivstta-dhairyaḥ...” etc., The suggested sense in form of the desire to kiss and the expressed sense in form of the directing of eyes, seem to be equally powerful. : "atra paricumbitum aicchad iti kim pratīyamānam, kim vā vilocana-vyapāraṇam vācyam pradhānam iti samdehah.” (K. P. V) (pp. 150, ibid).
Tulya-prādhānya the sixth variety occurs when the suggested sense and the expressed sense carry equal weight. The illustration is, “brāhmaṇáti-krama tyāgo bhavatām eva bhātaye...." In this verse, The suggested sense, viz. that Jāmadajña will destroy all the demons in the same way as he destroyed the ksatrīyas, is equally powerful. : "atra jāmadajñah sarvesām ksatriyānām iva raksasām kşanāt-kşayam karisyati iti vyangyasya vācyasya ca samam prādhānyam.” (K. P. V, pp. 150, ibid).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA The seventh variety is one besed on the subordinated suggested sense, depending on intonation, i.e. kāku. The illustration is : “mathnāmi kauravaśatam...” etc. Herein, the suggested sense viz. that, “I will kill”, stands with the negation of the expressed sense : "atra mathnāmy eva ity ādi vyangyam vācya-nişedha-sahabhāvena sthitam. (K. P. V. pp. 152, ibid).
The eighth variety, called 'a-sundara' depends, as is implied by its name, on the indecent suggested content. Thus we come across a fresh principle of morality and the like. The example is : "vānīrakudanguddiņa..." etc. The idea is that some paramour with whom an appointment was fixed, has entered the bower, and through this suggested fact, the expressed fact, viz. that of the house-wife feeling nervous, is rendered more charming. : "atra datta-sanketaḥ kaścil latāgahanam pravistaḥ iti vyangyāt, 'sīdanty angāni' iti vācyam sa-camatkāram."
Actually we wonder why this variety is given the name "a-sundara.” For, a number of other illustrations elsewhere, such as, “kassa vā na hoi roso...", such illicit relations are suggested. So, it is futile to bring in a “moral consideration;" for in love and war everything is fair and this variety could have been named 'sundara' where the expressed is rendered more charming by the un-expressed.
Mammața further goes into the sub-divisions of gunībhūta-vyangya-poetry. He observes that :
"eşām bhedā yathāyogam
veditavyāś ca pūrva-vat. (K. P. 46 cd, pp. 152, ibid) He further observes :
"vyajyante vastumātreña yadā’lamkştayas tadā, dhruvam dhvanyangatā tāsām
kāvya-vsttes tadāśrayād” (Dhv. II. 29) iti, dhvanikārokta-diśā vastumātrena yatrálankāro vyajyate, na tatra gunībhūtavyangyatvam. (K. P. V. pp. 152. ibid)
-“The varieties of these (=eight kinds of subordinated suggestion) should be understood, as far as applicable, in the manner of the former case, (of the suggestive poetry).
'As far as applicable' means-when figures are suggested only by the matter itself, then they are invariably the part of suggestion; for the very procedure of poetry rests upon those, i.e. the suggested poetic figures.

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1137
In the manner thus shown by the author of Dhvani, wherever the poetic fignre is suggested only by the matter itself, there is no sub-ordination of suggestion.” (Trans. R. C. Dwi., pp. 153, ibid).
Thus, instead of the fifty-one principal sub-divisions of dhvani or suggestive poetry, we have only 42 principal sub-divisions of gunībhūta-vyangya or poetry with subordinated suggestion. The alamkāra, suggested by the three-fold vastu i.e. idea or matter, viz. svataḥ-sambhavī, kavi-praudhókti-siddha, and kavi-nibaddhavaktr-praudhókti-siddham which again is threefold each, viz. pada-gata, vākya-gata and prabandha-gata-is never subordinated to the expressed sense and thus does not give rise to the gunībhūta variety of poetry. Mammața further adds that by samspsti and samkara (i.e. by inter-mixture and collocation) with the other sub-divisions of dhvani and alamkāra, the total mounts to a very great extent :
“sálamkārair dhvanes taiś ca, yogaḥ samsrsti-samkaraiḥ, -(K. P. V. 47) (pp. 1 54, ibid). tad uktam dhvanikștā"sa-gunībhūta-vyangyaiḥ sálamkāraiḥ saha prabhedaiḥ svaiḥ, sankara-samsrsți-bhyām punar apy udyotate bahudhā” iti. "anyonya-yogād evam syād
bheda-samkhyā'tibhūyasi.” (K. P. V. 47 cd). evam anena prakāreņa avántara-bheda-ganane ati-prabhūtatarā gananā. tathā hi sủngārasyaiva bheda-prabheda-gananāyām ānantyam, kā gananā tu sarveșām.”
(K. P. V. pp. 154, ibid). Thus, it seems that Mammata has tried to treat the problem in a more systematic way as compared to Anandavardhana.
Hemacandra, in a style so characteristic to him, reduces the divisions and subdivisions and accepts fundamentally only three varieties of gunībhūta-vyangyakāvya, which he styles as ‘madhyama' after Mammața. He observes' : "When (the suggested sense) is not (principal), when the predominance is doubtful or equal, 'madhyama' is three-fold :

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1138
SAHRDAYĀLOKA "asat-sandigdha-tulya-prādhānye madhyamam tredhā.”.
Kā. śä. II. 58- (pp. 152, Edn. Parikh Kulkarni, 64, Bombay) ‘a-sat-prādhānya' i.e. absence of predominance of the suggested sense at times results from either its being not more charming than the expressed sense e.g. in "vānīra-kuļam...” etc., or at times when the suggested sense is part of the expressed sense, (parángatarvena) as in, ‘ayam sa raśanótkarşı...” etc. He observes : (pp. 152, ibid) : "asati, sandigdhe, tulye ca prādhānye vyangyasya madhyamam kāvyam. tatra a-sat-prādhānyam, kvacid vācyād an-utkarsena, yathā-"vānīra-kudam..." atra 'datta-sanketaḥ kaścil latāgahanam pravistah' iti vyangyāt'sīdanti angāni' iti vācyam eva sātiśayam.
kvacit parángatvena, yathā, “ayam sa raśano..." etc. -atra śộngāraḥ karunasya angam. (Kā. Šā. vȚtti. on II. 58, pp. 152, 153).
yathā ca, “janasthāne-bhrāntam” etc. etc. (pp. 154, 155, ibid).
Hemacandra further observes (pp. 155 ibid), "kvacid a-sphuţatvena, yathā, "ahayam ujju-a-rūā...". ...etc. and also, “kvacid ati-sphuţatvena, yathā,
"śrī-paricayāj jaļā api...". and then, “sandigdha-prādhānye yathā, 'mahilā-sahassa-bharie..."
and, “tulya-prādhānye yathā .: "brāhmaṇátikrama-tyāgaḥ..." etc. (pp. 156, ibid). Thus for Hemacandra, the suggested sense becomes subservient to the expressed through 'a-sphuţatva' or 'ati-sphuţatva' i.e. by being very much concealed or being over-exposed. Hemacandra includes kākvādi-kṣipta variety under “tulyaprādhānya."
It may be noted that Hemacandraś treatment is even more precise and systematic as compared to his masters i.e. both Mammata and Anandavardhana. We feel happy that he has avoided giving such names as “a-sundara.”
Viśvanātha closely follows Mammata and Anandavardhana in defining the guņībhuta-vyangya-kāvya, and in giving the principal eight sub-divisions. He also quotes Ānandavardhana and says : that when the suggested vastu (i.e. idea, matter), alamkāra (figure), or rasa (sentiment etc.) is subordinated to some other principal rasa, this should be recognised as dhvani-kāvya and not gunībhūta

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guņībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. vyangya. kiñ ca, yatra vastv-alamkāra-rasā”dirūpa-vyangyānām rasā"bhyantare guṇībhāvas tatra pradhāna-kṛta eva kāvya-vyavahāraḥ tad uktam tenaiva"prakāróyam guṇībhuta..." etc. (pp. 289, 290, S.D. IV. 14, Edn. with 'Laksmi țikā, chaukhambhā Sansk. Sansthan, varaṇasi, 1985 A.D.).
This in a way, may be taken as an advance on Anandavardhana, in the sense that while Anandavardhana is inclined to give two names to one and the same piece of poetry when viewed from different points of view, Viśvanatha makes up his mind and calls such poetry to be 'dhvani' only and not guṇībhūta-vyangya. He further quotes the opinion of Candidāsa who seems to hold that when one enjoys poetry, the experience is total in itself and is grasped by 'akhanda-buddhi' i.e. cognition which admits no parts, or by undivided mind, i.e. by the whole of the psyche. Only at a later stage, when one thinks of the context and the like, one realises the difference in type such as 'dhvani', guṇībhūta-vyangya, etc., and eventhough this difference dawns upon one's mind at a later stage, one's former experience is not retarded, for it rests solely on taste: (vṛtti, S. D. IV. 14 ab; pp. 291, ibid) "tad uktam asmad-gotra-kavi-panditamukhya-śrī-candidāsa-pādaiḥvākyā (vl. kävyä) rthasya akhanda-buddhi-vedyataya- tanmayībhāvena āsvādadaśāyām guna-pradhana-bhāvávabhāsas-tāvan na anunbhūyate, kälántare tu prakaraṇā"di-paryalocanaya bhavan api asau na kavya-vyapadeśam vyāhantum īṣaḥ; tasya āsvādamātrā”yattatvāt," iti.
1139
Jagannatha offers a four-fold scheme of division of poetry in which he mentions uttamóttama, uttama, madhyama and adhama as we saw earlier. What the Kashmir School takes to be 'gunībhūta-vyangya' is perhaps taken by him as 'uttama', which he defined as: "yatra vyangyam a-pradhānam eva sac camatkārakāraṇam tat dvitiyam." But we have faced certain difficulties in agreeing with this as observed earlier, for we are not agreeable to the idea of something to be designated both 'apradhana' as well as 'camatkara-kāraṇa' in the same breath. The stock illustration of a king joining the 'Vara-Yatra' of his ministers son does underline the importance of the bride-groom and not of the king. Of course, Jagannatha observes that the "eva-kara" in the definition is there to exclude such instances of poetry in which the suggested sense is at last principal (pradhāna) with reference to the expressed (vācya) sense, but is rendered subordinate to yet another suggested sense : "kāvyā'pekṣayā pradhānībhūtam vyangyántaram ādāya guṇībhūtam vyangyam ādāya ativyāpti-vāraṇāya avadhāraṇam. tena tasya dhvanitvam eva." (R.G.).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Jagannātha also, like Viśvanātha discourages the application of double standards to such cases as, "ayam sa raśanótkarsī” etc. But we feel that Anandavardhana and those who agree with him seem to have a more flexible mind and they are open to consider various angles. Jagannātha further adds that by the use of the word 'camatkāra' or Charm in the definition, he excludes instances of what may be called 'līna' or “too much concealed” suggestion, and also “vācyacitra" or poetry with figures of word and sense, as the only source of charm as 'adhama kāvya'. As observed earlier, we fail to agree with Jagannātha when he observes that while both in 'uttamóttama' variety and the 'uttama' variety, vyangya or suggested sense becomes the source of charm, yet there is a difference between the two brought about by the fact of the 'vyangya' being principal or subordinate. He also goes to include certain figures of sense such as 'samāsókti', 'paryāyókta', etc. into 'uttama' variety, because the source of charm lies in the subordinated suggested sense and not the expressed sense. Thus for him, there is a distinction between a figure and a figure. For Jagannātha, perhaps eventhough all the figures have some implicit element in them, as noted by Ananandavardhana earlier, all cannot be included in this “uttama” variety. It has to be admitted that even if we
e with Jagannātha or not, this sort of a clear perception of the difference in the source of charm, and therefore a clear line of demarcation between 'dhvani' or ‘uttamóttama' and gunībhūta-vyangya of his ‘uttama' variety on one hand, and arthálamkāres or 'madhyama' type and also ‘citra' or 'adhama' type on the other, may be taken as an original contribution of Jagannātha, for even Anandavardhana and Mammața have not perecived this.
Thus we may observe that in Anandavardhana, there is no clear line of demarcation between 'dhvani', 'gunībhūtavyangya' and 'artha-citra', and the subdivisions of gunībhūta-vyangya also are less systematic and do not carry this or that special names. But this is one way of looking at things. The other way is that perhaps the author of the Dhvanyāloka was more charitable in his approach and by neither naming them as ‘uttama' 'madhyama' or 'adhama', nor by giving any specific names to the different types of gunībhūta-vyangya Anandavardhana has evolved a more catholic approach to the enjoyment of poetic art as is perhaps noticed in the view of Candidāsa, the forefather of Viśvanātha.
· Mammața as we saw, gave a name and location to a certain taste, but Hemacandra again shows a better balanced approach by showing less enthusiasm regarding tendency of hair-splitting so common to Indian literary criticism in general. Hemacandra sides with his masters in case of the evaluation of such verses

Page #586

Dhvani in kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1141 as "ayam sa raśanótkarşi” etc-, but Viśvanātha is inclined more towards taking the same as 'uttama' kāvya. Jagannātha as seen above has his own approach.
Before we consider the variety of poetry called the 'citra' kāvya, we may observe that, putting aside the approach of Kuntaka and Mahimā, different types of appeal to taste in poetry, give rise to the tendeney to classify poetry into this or that t and then to give divisions and sub-divisions which tend to become pedantic and mechanical. Anandavardhana also has counted such sub-divisions. But later critics become a sort of prey to mechanical system of naming divisions and sub-divisions from, what we have termed as "criticism" point of view. Anandavardhana was wiser when he did not name the three types as "uttama", "madhyama" and "adhama". But Mammata does this and he is followed by a host of other critics. Hemacandra shows some descretion in cutting down the number of these mechanical divisions and sub-divisions, which again later critics, even Jagannątha including, seem to revive with greater force.
It may be noted that Anandavardhana is inclined to be more charitable when he shows his preparedness to accept one and the same illustration of poetry as both dhvani' and 'gunībhūta-vyangya' and thereby indicate the nebulous and complex nature of poetry which is basically an abstract art. If at all we find some discrepancy in this, it is tolerable, for he errs on the safer side by allowing a widerscope to poetry. Jagannātha, when he tries to be more systematic in order to avoid the above mentioned contingency of calling one and the same piece of poetry by two names such as "dhvani” and also "gunībhūta-vyangya," he seems to fall into yet another trap as discussed by us above. As already seen by us, for Jagannātha, both in the "uttamóttama” variety and "uttama” variety, vyangya' i.e. the suggested sense becomes the source of charm and yet there is a difference between the two brought about by the fact of the suggested sense being either “principal” or "subosdinate." However, we know that in poetry, a particular sense is called either ‘principal' or 'subordinate' only from the point of view of its capacity to become a soure of charm. So his definition seems to involve a sort of self contradiction.
Before we move on to consider citra' kāvya, it may be noted that Jayadeva in the eighth mayükha (VIII.1) observes :
"yad vyajyamānam manasaḥ . staimityāya, sa no dhvanih anyathā tu gunībhūta-vyangyam āpatitam tridhā”

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1142
SAHṚDAYALOKA
"That suggested (sense) which causes delight to. the mind, is 'dhvani' for us. If it is not so (i.e. if the suggested is not more charming than the expressed), it is 'guṇībhūta-vyangya' for us. It is three-fold." Jayadeva gives three types of guṇībhūta-vyangya but virtually accepts all the eight types of Mammața. Jayadeva seems to talk of 'prakata-vyangya', 'a-caru-vyangya' and 'cārutara-vācya-vyangya' He observes (VIII. 2):
(Candra"loka VIII. 2)
"vyakta eva kvacid vyangyaḥ kvacid artha-svabhāvataḥ,
kvacic cărutarasya'gre
sa vimuñcati cărutām."
The suggested sense is 'vyakta' clearly at places. At places it is not charming and at other places it looses its beauty before 'vacya' which is more beautiful. The 'Paurṇamāsi commentary (pp. 258, Edn. Chawkhawba skt. series, Varanasi, '64) pp. 258, observes: "guṇībhūta-vyangyasya traividhyam lakṣayati-"vyakṭa” iti. kvacid vyaktaḥ prakaṭaḥ vācya eva vyangyaḥ. kvacid arthasya svabhāvāt svābhāvikād arthād iti bhāvaḥ. vyangyo na cāruḥ. kvacit sa vyangyaḥ, cărutarasya vācyasya agre carutām ramaṇīyatām vimuñcati, tyajati. prakata-vyangyam ekam, acāru-vyangyam dvitīyam, cărutara-vacya-vyangyam tṛtīyam iti trayo bhedāḥ.
śaradāgama-kṛnmate tu iyam yojana-"vyaktir eva" iti pāṭhaḥ. kvacid vyaktir eva, vyañjanā eva carutām muñcati ity ekaḥ prakāraḥ. kvacid vyangyórthaḥ svabhāvata eva cārutām muñcati ity aparaḥ, kvacic carur apy arthaḥ cărutara sannidhānād acārur ity aparaḥ, iti. atra mate ‘arthaḥ svabhāvataḥ" iti bhinnam padam." (pp. 258, ibid).
Thus for Jayadeva the suggested sense is at times 'spasta' or exposed, at times it is not beautiful by nature, and at times compared to an extremely charming expressed sense, it leaves its own beauty. He mentions all the eight varieties as mentioned by Mammata and correlates each one with the corresponding variety of dhvani. He is very clear however, with reference to 'asundara' which he rightly explains as :
"a-sundaram yadi vyangyam
syad vācyād a-manoharam." (VIII.9ab pp. 262, ibid)
Thus if the suggested sense is "less charming" than the expressed sense, it is the case of 'a-sundara" variety.

Page #588

Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1143
'Vidyadhara' in the IV th unmeṣa discusses the guṇībhūta-vyangya-kāvya and mentions its varieties without attempting a formal definition. He has 'a-gūḍhavyangya', 'aparánga-vyangya', 'vacya-siddhyanga', 'a-sphuta-vyangya', 'sandigdhaprādhānya', 'tulya-prādhānya', 'kākvā"kṣipta' and 'a-sundara' varieties, discussed after Mammata.
'Vidyanatha' also with a quotation from the K. P., does the same. We have seen earlier what Viśvanatha does. For him even more varieties than eight are possible as dipaka, etc. which have 'upamā' suggested are also part of this type.
It may be noted that whatever was respected by earlier alamkarikas under the guise of an alamkāra, is accepted by the dhvani-vādins as part of guṇībhūtavyangya. Anandavardhana has clearly stated at Dhv. III. 36 (pp. 228, ibid) that
"vācyálamkāra-vargóyam vyangyámśānugame sati,
prayeṇaiva parām chāyām bihral lakṣye nirīkṣyate."
"The whole host of figures is seen in many an instance to put on a new charm when it is brought into touch with the suggested element." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 229, ibid)
Kesavamiśra also follows the same tradition and Appayya in his "Citramīmāmsā" (pp. 23,) also echoes the same view. We have seen above the views of Jagannatha, who has a four-fold scheme of criticism-oriented classification.
Citra-kavya is the third type of poetry enumerated by Ananda-vardhana, After explaining the first two varieties of poetry on the basis of the suggested sense being either principal or subordinate with reference to the expressed sense, and naming them respectively as "dhvani" and "gunībhūta-vyangya", Anandvardhana proceeds to discuss 'citra' kavya, which is different from these two, and is two-fold such as 'sabda-citra' and 'artha-citra', He observes: (Dhv. III. 41; 42; pp. 244, ibid). "pradhana-guna-bhāvābhyām

vyangyasyaivam vyavasthite,
kāvye ubhe; tatónyat tat
citram ity abhidhīyate." (Dhv. III. 41) "citram śabdártha-bhedena
dvividham ca vyavasthitam,

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1144
SAHRDAYĀLOKA tatra kiñcic chabda-citram
vācya-citram atah param.” (Dhv. III. 42).' -“These two classes of poetry are decided thus on the principal of importance or unimportance of the suggested content. That which is other than both is given the name of Portrait (citra)."- (III. 41)
"Portrait-like poetry is also seen to be two-fold in asmuch as it is based either on word or on meaning. The first variety is word-portrait and the second, meaningportrait."-Dhv. III. 42.)
(Trans. K. Kris., pp. 245, ibid). Ānandavardhana observes : (vrtti, Dhv. III. 42) (pp. 244, 246, ibid) :"vyangyasya arthasya prādhānye dhvani-samjñitaḥ kāvya-prakāraḥ, gunabhāve tu gunībhūta-vyangyatā tatónyad rașa-bhāvā"di-tātparya-rahitam vyangyárthavišesa-prakāśana-sakti-sünyam ca kāvyam, kevala-vācya-vācaka-vaicitryamārtāśrayeņópanibaddham alekhya-prakhyam yad ābhāsate tac citram. na tan mukhyam kāvyam. kāvyánukāro hy asau. tatra kincic chabdacitram yathā duskara-yamakā"di. vācya-citram sabda-citrād anyad vyangyā”rtha-samsparsarahitam prādhānyena vākhyárthatayā sthitam rasā”di-tātparya-rahitam utpreksādi.”
"If the suggested content is all important, we get the class of poetry called dhvani' or poetry with principal suggestion; if the same is subordinate, we get the second class of poetry called, 'gunībhūta-vyangya', or poetry with subordinate suggestion; that class of poetry which is seen to differ from either, and which is destitute of purport relating to sentiments and emotions etc., which is devoid of the power to reveal any suggested content and which owes its construction only to the strikingness of the expressed meanings and expressions denoting them gets the name of 'Citra' or portrait. It is not poetry at all, strictly speaking. It is only an imitation of poetry. One of the sub-divisions of this poetry of portraiture is wordportrait such as rhyming repetition, and so on, whose employment involves much labour. The second sub-division differs from word-portrait and may be called .meaning-portrait. It will also be devoid of the suggested content and will be wanting in the purport of sentiments etc. Poetic fancy and such other figure illustrations of this." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 245, 247, ibid).
Before we peoceed further with Anandavardhanaś views we may observe that it is Anandavardhanaś observation that, "na tan mukhyam kāvyam. kāvyánukāro hy asau"- which prompted Viśvanātha to reject 'citra' as a variety of kavya. But the very fact that Anandavardhana has mentioned and discussed this variety shows that

Page #590

Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guņībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1145 this was something which could not have been totally rejected. We will go to see that he almost concedes that there is nothing on earth, no description whatsoever, which could not have even distant relation with rasā”di i.e. aesthetic relish, in the sense that even bare descriptions make for uddīpana-vibhāva in someway or the other. It is exactly this possibility which promotes Anandavardhana to accept, however tacitly, this variety of poetry as poetry, may be only for the beginners.
Anandavardhana further continues the discussion. He raises a question as to what is this 'Citra' kāvya, and answers for himself that it is that variety where there is no touch of suggested content. Actually the suggested content is said to be threefold. The objector says that of these three types the absence of two viz.' vastu vyangya and alamkāra-vyangya could be taken as the area of citra kävya. But in fact, no class of poetry is possible in which there is no involvement of rasa or bhāva, etc.-: "yatra tu rasā”dīnām a-visayatvam sa kāvya-prakāro na sambhavaty eva.” For there can be no poetry without theme or content or vastu : "yasmād a-vastusamsparsitā kāvyasya na upa-padyate." All the subjects in the universe become connected with some sentiment or emotion, at best in form of stimuli: "vastu ca sarvam eva jagad-gatam avaśyam kasyacid rasasya bhāvasya vā angarvam pratipadyate, antato vibhāvatvena." Sentiments are indeed so many states of mind; and nothing in the world can be imagined which does not bring about a particular state of mind in man. We may say that this is a great observation concerning human psychology. If anything is possible, which has no mental effect as its consequence, such a thing, then, can not be a poets concern at all. Now, when something does become a subject of the poets activity, how can one speak of it as 'citra' or bare portrait ? :" cittavrtti-viśesā hi rasā”dayah; na ca tad asti vastu kiñcid yan na citta-vrtti-viśesam upajanayati; tad anutpādane vā kavi-visayatā eva tasya na syāt, kavi-visayaś ca citratayā kaścin nirūpyate” It is possible that some poetic content takes the form of 'citra'.
We may observe that it is this inherent beauty of any content which becomes the subject of a poets activity, and also the beauty in itself of a poets efforts that have prompted Kuntaka to accept Vaktratā' as the 'Jivita' i.e. soul of poetry in place of the suggested content.
Anandavardhana knows that he cannot totally reject this approach to poetry. So, he accepts the fact that there is nothing on earth which is totally divorced from the cause of rasa-bhāva etc. But, he came across many trivial efforts on the parts of pseudo-poets '“kavim manyamānāh”, who placed there worthless pieces as poetry. Perhaps Anandavardhana was sick of such efforts and we may say, quite

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1146
SAHṚDAYALOKA justifiably. Even we feel the same way when we read a lot of "trash" served in our mother tongue, Gujarati or Hindi or any, and denounce it as 'no poetry.' Thus, Anandavardhana, being more cultured and tolerant as compared to us, suggests that even if no species of poetry exists which absolutely does not convey sentiment, but all the same, if the poet is seen to have no exclusive intention to convery sentiments, emotions, etc. and if he is more keen on employing laboured figures only, either of sound or sense, we may take it to be having some content which is devoid of sentiments whatsoever. Such a poet has keenness of deploying figures only. The content of words in poetry is based only upon the poets intention. Actually, Anandavardhana concedes,-though some sort of apprehension of sentiments etc. is possible by force of the expressed sense itself even in instances wherein no such keen intention towards them is present on the poets part, still it will be negligibly slender and from this point of view also, one might justify the existence of a scope for 'Citra' type, (with apparent absence of rasa-bhāvā”di in it). Anandavardhana sums up the discussion in two verses:
"rasa-bhāvā"di-viṣaya
vivakṣā-virahe sati, alamkara-nibandho yaḥ
sa citra-viṣayo mataḥ." rasā"diṣu vivakṣā tu
syāt tātparyavatī yadā,
tadā nasty eva tat kavyam
dhvaner yatra na gocaraḥ." (pp. 248, ibid).
"The employment of figures in the absence of intention towards the purport of sentiments, emotions etc., should be regarded as an illustration of Portrait-like poetry.
If on the other hand, there exists a sole intention towards sentiments, etc., no poetry can remain outside the sphere of dhvani or poetry of principal suggestion." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 249, ibid).

Anandavardhana observes that: "etac ca citram kavīnām viśṛnkhala-girām rasa"di-tātparyam anapekṣya eva kāvya-pravṛtti-darśanād asmābhiḥ parikalpitam. idānīntanānām tu, nyāyye kāvya-naya-vyavasthāpane kriyamāne, násty eva dhvanivyatiriktaḥ kavya-prakāraḥ. yataḥ parīpāka-vatām kavīnām rasā”di-tātparya-virahe vyāpāra eva na śobhate. rasádi-tātparye, na ca násty eva tad vastu yad abhimata

Page #592

Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guṇībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kavya. 1147 rasángatām nīyamānam praguṇībhavati. acetanā api hi bhāvā yathāyatham ucitarasa-vibhāvatayā cetana-vṛttānta-yojanayā vā na santy eva te, ye yanti na rasángatām. tatha ca idam ucyate-"apare kavya-samsare...
...".
tasmān nasty eva tad vastu yat sarvä❞tmanā rasa-tātparyavataḥ kaves tad icchaya tad abhimata-rasángatām na dhatte. tathopanibadhyamānam vā na cārutvátiśayam puṣnāti. tad evam idānīntana-kavi -kāvyanayopadeśe kriyamāṇe prāthamikānām abhyāsārthinām yadi param citreṇa vyavahāraḥ, prāptapariṇatīnām tu dhvanir eva kävyam iti sthitam etat."
(vṛtti, Dhv. III. 42, pp. 248, 250, ibid)
"This class of poetry, i.e., portrait like poetry, has been noted at all by us, because of the practice of poets who recognise no laws in their usage of words and who go about composing poems without any intention of incorporating sentiments, etc. therein. But if we should strictly apply the new principle of poetry laid down here, there can be no class of poetry other than 'dhvani' or poetry with principal suggestion. For, in the absence of whole-hearted intention towards sentiments etc., the very activity of poets will not appear charming; and contrariwise, in the presence of whole-hearted intention towards sentiments etc., there will be no subject which will not attain exceeding charm by being made an accessory of the intended sentiment. Even amongst insentient objects, there are none which will not become accessories of sentiment either by acting as stimuli towards the intended sentiment or at least by a metaphorical application of the behaviour of sentient objects to themselves. Hence it is that we say -
"In the boundless realm of poetry, the poet alone is the creator, and as it pleaseth him, so doth this world revolve..." etc. .... Thus it is clear that there is absolutely no such subject which does not become an accessory of the intended sentiment by the poets desire, so long as his concern is solely with sentiment. Nor does it ever fail to acquire exceeding charm when so handled. All this is seen in the works of first-rate poets. In our own poetic compositions too, we have tried to illustrate these principles as far as possible. Thus viewed, all classes of poetry will come only within the sphere of 'Dhvani' or poetry with principal suggestion. From this stand-point of sentiment etc., on the part of the poet, even the class designated by the name of 'poetry of subordinated suggestion' will come only under the sphere of dhvani, as we already said. It has also been said that in quatrains of affectionate praise and devotional hymns, if sentiments etc. are regarded as subordinate and that in Prakrit verses known as Hṛdayavatis and in some gnomic verses of

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1148
SAHṚDAYALOKA worldlywise men, if the expressed sense itself with an under-current of suggested sense strikes us as important, the reason is to be sought in the fact that the poetry of subordinated suggestion too, is a derivative of 'dhvani' itself. Thus, when we strictly apply the new principle of poetry enunciated here, we can speak of Portrait-like poetry only in a loose way, only as an aid to the understanding of beginners in the study of poetry. So far as persons, with well developed intellects are concerned, 'Dhvani' or poetry with principal suggestion alone will deserve the title of poetry." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 249, 251, etc. ibid).
Anandavardhana sums up the discussion with the words- (pp. 250, ibid):
"tad ayam atra samgrahaḥ-'
yasmin raso vā bhāvo vā
tātparyeṇa prakāśate, samvṛttya' bhihitam vastu yatrálamkāra eva vā.
kāvyádhvani dhvanir
vyangya-prādhānyaika-nibandhanaḥ
sarvatra tatra viṣayi
jñeyaḥ sahrdayair janaiḥ."
"Refined critics should understand that 'dhvani' whose sole condition is the principal nature of the suggested content embraces all instances of poetry, wherein is found a purposively conveyed sentiment or at least an idea or figure conveyed in a covert fashion."- (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 251, ibid).
That Anandavardhana in his own way accepts citra-kavya but, eventhough he has given a three-fold criticism-oriented clasification of poetry, his preference for 'dhvani' with priedominance of rasa, bhāva etc., is absolutely clear.
Among his posteriors, Mahimā had shown a very strong and biased attitude supporting only that peotry as poetry wherein there is 'rasánumiti' or "inference of rasa" alone. So for him, let alone 'citra', even the so called 'guṇībhūta-vyangya' was unacceptable as whatever was inferred (i.e. suggested in the view of the dhvanivādin) was necessarily superior, i.e. more charming and therefore principal, as compared to the expressed or vācya, for him. Thus for him only the 'dhvani' kavya of Anandavardhana was acceptable. We have suggested earlier in detail Kuntakaś approach also which was too wide as against this too narrow attitude of Mahimā.

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Guņībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1149
Mammața, we will go to observe, uses the term "adhama" or "low-class” i.e. worst type of poetry for this so called 'citra' kāvya. This for him (K. P. I. iv) is “avara" and is two-fold such as "sabda-citra" and "artha-citra" as suggested by Anandavardhana. Mammața also observes that (K. P. VI).
“yadyapi sarvatra kāvye antato vibhāvā”dirūpatayā rasa-paryavasānam, tathā’pi sphuộasya rasasya anupalambhād a-vyangyam etat kāvya-dvayam uktam. atra tu śabdárthálamkāra-bhedād bahavo bhedāḥ, te ca alamkāra-nirņaye nirnesyante." (K. P. VI., pp. 192, End. R. C. Dwivedi, ibid).
“Though everywhere in poetry, ultimately the character being that of the determinant and the rest, there is culmination in the rasa (i.e. all poetry delineating the vibhāvas etc., is ultimately posited in rasa). Yet these two kinds of (portrait-) poetry, because of the absence of distinct sentiment, are devoid of suggestion. But of this (portrait-poetry) there are many varieties on account of the divisions of the poetic figure into that of the word and the sense. These will be taken up at the time of elucidation of the figures.”
(Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 193, ibid). Vidyānātha has something else to say about 'citra' kāvya. While others take 'asphuţa-vyangya' as variety of guṇībhūta-vyangya, Vidyānātha takes it to be ‘citrakāvya? He observes (pp. 51, Pratāparudrīya, Edn. Madras, 1914 A. D., C.Chandrasekhara Sastrigal) :
“vyangyasya prādhānyáprādhānyābhyām a-sphuţatvena ca, trividham kāvyam, vyangyasya prādhānye uttamam kāvyam dhvanir iti vyapadiśyate. a-prādhānye madhyamam gunībhūta-vyangyam iti gīyate. vyangyasya a-sphuţatve adhamam kāvyam citram iti giyate.” ... (pp. 52, ibid).
"citram trividham śabda-citram artha-citram ubhayacitram ca iti.”
Thus for him, even in gunībhūta-vyangya the "vyangya' or suggested sense has to be “sphuţa” or clear. 'asphusa-vyangya', for him, gives rise to 'citra' which is 'adhama'. Thus he adopts the terminoogy of both Anandavardhana and Mar but with a difference that his 'citra' or 'adhama' is not "a-vyangya” i.e. it is not "without suggested sense totally.” Thus the prima facie view,-advanced in the Dhv. and practically accepted by Anandavardhana that no poetic content worth its name could be totally bereft of suggestivity as, in one way or the other, even as a stimuli, it is connected with the mental states (cittavștti) and therefore with 'rasa', which in itself is “mānasa-cittavrtti-rūpa”,-is acceptable to Vidyānātha.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA Viśvanātha is clear when he accepts only 'dhvani' and 'gunībhūta-vyaūgya' as varieties of kāvya and rejects the third type-"citra” as it is without a touch of
He has an interesting discussion : He observes : (S. D. with Laksmī, Edn. '85, Chowkhamba SK-Samsthan, Varanasi) (pp. 291, ibid): –
“kecic citrā”khyam trtīyam kāvya-bhedam icchanti. tad āhuḥ :- "sabda-citram vācya-citram a-vyangyam tv avaram smrtam” iti. tan na; yadi hi a-vyangyatvena vyangyábhāvas tadā tasya kāvyatvam api násti, iti prāg eva uktam. īşad-vyangyam iti cet, kim nāma īşad-vyangyam ? āsvādya-vyangyatvam, anāsvādya-vyangyarvam vā ? ādye prācīna-bhedayor eva antaḥpātaḥ; dvitīye tv akāvyarvam. yadi ca āsvādyatvam tadā a-kşudratvam eva, kşudratāyām anásvādyatvāt. tad uktam dhvanikrtā
"pradhāna-gunabhāvābhyām vyangyasyaivam vyavasthite ubhe kāvye tatónyat tac
citram ity abhidhīyate.” iti. - “Some want a third variety of poetry called 'citra'. They have said, "Poetry without suggestion is said to be of low type-(=avaram), and it is two-fold such as that portrait-like which is based on sound (i.e. word) and the other which is based on sense (i.e. artha).
This cannot be accepted. If by 'a-vyangyatva' i.e. absence of suggestion is meant (total) absence of suggestion, then it ceases to be poetry at all. This we have made clear even before. If (by a-vyangya) it is meant to be “having slight suggestion”, then also we ask, "what is this having slight suggestion ?" Is the suggested sense (present here) is an object of relish or not? If the first alternative is accepted, (this type) falls within the area of the first two varieties (i.e. dhvani or gunībhūta-vyangya) as suggested by the ancients. If the second alternative is accepted (i.e. of vyangya' not being relished) it ceases to be poetry. If it is an object of relish then it (=suggested sense) ceases to be feeble, for if it is feeble it cannot be relished. It is said (by Dhvanikāra) -“When suggested sense is determined to be either principal or subordinate, (we get) two types of poetry. Anything else than that is said to be citra."
Thus Visvanātha does not favour recognition of citra and also seems to argue that Anandavardhana held the same view. One thing is certain that Anandavardhana has placed his arguments in such a way that we may or may not take him to support citra'; both these interpretations being seemingly right.

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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1151
Keśavamiśra (pp. 11, Alamkāra śekhara, Edn. N. S. Bombay, '26;)- Observes :
"camatkştihetu-vyangya-rahitatvam adhamatvam.” yathā, "vandāmahe maheśāna..." atra vyangyaḥ kópyarthas tādrśo násti. atra sarvatra vaktur eva tātparyam niyāmakam. taj jñānam eva bodhópayogi. tad abhāvād adhamam ity ucyate."
Keśava, accepting the terminology viz. "adhamam" does not use the word 'citra' He does not go into its two or three types either. He gives an illustration and observes that here whatever be the suggested sense, it is not tādrśa' i.e. 'camatkrtihetu' i.e. that which causes 'camatkrti' or instantaneous joy. He further observes,and perhaps he echoes Anandavardhanaś word, “tātparya" i.e. primary intention of the speaker-that here everywhere (i.e. in all the three types) the import of the speaker is the deciding factor (i.e. if he intends that the suggested sense be taken as principal, it is termed dhvani, if subordinate then it is gunībhūtavyangya, and if the suggestion is not causing any camatkāra, it is 'adhama' kavya). Thus the knowledge of the import) is the cause of apprehension in the form of a particular poem being taken as either uttama or madhyama or adhama). .
Thus in the absence of (such a) (suggested sense), it is said to be ‘adhama.'
Appayya Dīksita has an independent work called “Citramīmāmsā”. Even though he was a great supporter of dhvani, by writing an independent treatise on 'citra’-kāvya, he has presented great scientific thinking which has impressed and inspired even the great Jagannātha to devote much space to the consideration of alamkāras. The Citra-mīmāmsā (pp. 27), observes : “yad a-vyangyam api caru tac citram”, i.e. that which is without suggestion and yet charming is said to be ‘citra'. Thus Appayya seems to accept the possibility of there being poetry even in the absence of suggestion'. Here 'a-vyangya' is to be understood as “that type of poetry having ‘a-sphura' i.e. 'not clear' suggestion. This is the explanation of some commentators. So, the variety of poetry having charm caused by guna and alamkāra, is said to be "citra'. One thing is clear that Appayya wants 'apprehension of beauty'-'cārutva-pratīti' as a condition for 'citra' also. He gives three sub-varieties such as sabda-citra', 'artha-citra', and 'ubhaya-citra'. He observes that sabda-citra being practically 'nīrasa' i.e. without 'rasa', is not honoured by poets. Or, perhaps there is nothing in it which stands serious thinking. Therefore Appayya does not go in any detailed discussion on śabda-citra and goes ahead with ‘artha-citra'.

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA It may be noted that the dhvanivādins have practically treated all figures of both, sound (=śabda) and sense (i.e. artha) as 'citra' or 'avara' kāvya in general. It is only Jagannātha who picks up some alamkāras under what he terms ‘uttama' and some others under 'madhyama'. For Jagannātha, who offers a four-fold scheme of classification, 'artha-citra', is not placed on a par with 'sabda-citra', which for him is lesser poetry. For him where the beauty (camatkāra) of the expressed is not on equal footing-"a-samānādhikarana"- with the suggested or 'vyangya', is the third type of poetry. This means that when we have the beauty of the expressed placed higher than that of the suggested it makes for the third type of poetry, i.e. 'madhyama' kavya. But when we have the beauty of the sound-'śabdaas principal and that of sense is subordinated to it we have a fourth type of poetry, which is termed 'adhama' by Jagannātha. It may be noted that here Jagannātha expects that the beauty caused by word is necessarily enhanced by the subordinated beauty caused by sense. He suggests that in this variety also there is at least some presence of the suggested sense, but it certainly does not cause beauty in any way and is therefore not at all intended-avivaksita'-and so subordinate-'a-pradhāna'also. For him, in ‘adhama' variety of poetry, the artha-camatkşti or beauty caused by sense is necessarily absorbed in sabda-camatkrti, i.e. beauty caused by word. But in a case, where there is total absence of any beauty caused by sense i.e. where only 'śabd-camatkřti' prevails, i.e. such illustrations of poems as "ekákşara-padya', "ardhā"vrtti-yamaka”, etc.- this type has to be taken as no poetry at all. This can not be taken as a fifth variety called "adhamá-dhama" i.e. 'worse than the worst, because it can never fulfill the basic condition of poetry viz. "ramaniyárthapratipādakatva', i.e. "that which brings up beautiful meaning.” When there is no "kāvyatva" at all in such a composition as "ekákşara-padya", it is useless to call it a fifth variety, for it will be equivalent to follow a blind tradition. Jagannātha ends the topic by supporting his four-fold scheme by observing that the difference between sabda-citra' and 'artha-citra' being self-evident, it is useless and illogical to brand them equally as "adhama”. Even in the absence of any equality if both are taken as identical, then we should put aside our opinion taking 'dhvani' and 'gunībhūta-vyangya' as separate.
With this ends the classification of poetry, that we term as "criticim-based.”

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Chapter XIII
'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guṇa, alamkāra, samghațanā, rīti, vṛtti, etc. etc., and also Dhvani-virodha
It has been already noted by us at a number of places that Anandavardhana had offerred a most catholic theory of poetic criticism viz. the theory of dhvani which tried to absorb and accomodate all other thought-currents prevelent in the field of literary criticism. In fact he was opposed to no concept whatsoever floated by any earlier school of alamkarikas, but actually welcomed them all, embraced them with love and made room for each concept in his all-absorbing vyañjanādhvani-rasa theory of literary criticism. May be, he tried to give a definite shape to certain concepts that were hazy or nebulous, or with an authority silenced all conflicting notions concerning this or that concept and brought about a chiseled. concept regarding the same. He tried to fix a sort of final terminology concerning various concepts and his opinion was by and large respected and accepted by majority of critics who followed him with exceptions of only a few. In the present chapter we will try to examine how his catholic theory brought about a sort of harmony in the field of literary aesthetics. Thus he ably harnessed all the concepts of guna, alamkāra, etc. and put them under the supreme control of 'dhvani' or better say "rasa-dhvani" as the commander-in-chief. Let us see how tactfully he proceeds with this job. But it should be made clear that in this regard he had the able support of Aphinavagupta, Mammața, Hemacandra and the whole galaxy of writers ending with Appayya Dixit and Jagannatha. With all this there was some opposition to dhvani and we will take care of it by the end of this chapter.
At Dhv. II. 6 he starts with the concepts of guna and alamkāra and their exact place in his wider scheme. But prior to that he had successfully dealt with the concept of what was termed as "rasavad ādi alamkāras." He had made a clear distinction between what he terms 'rasa-dhvani' and what should be taken as

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA “rasā"di-alamkāra”. The earlier writers such as Bhāmaha, Dandin etc. could not distinguish between the two but Anandavardhana accepted either and distinguished clearly between their areas of operation. When rasa is central how can it be termed an alamkāra ? This was his main argument. But when rasa performs the act of an alamkāra, i.e. when it serves to decorate some other central idea, it is to be taken as an 'alamkāra'. Thus 'alamkāras' are beautifying agents and add to the beauty of the central idea i.e. rasadhvani in poetry. This act of rendering beauty or enhancing the beauty of a central idea makes for the very life breath of an alamkāra. Says he (vrtti, Dhv. II.. 5, pp. 44, ibid) :- tathā ca ayam atra samkṣepah
“rasa-bhāvādi-tātparyam asritya viniveśanam, alamkstīnām sarvāsām
alamkāratva-sādhanam.". i.e. “It is only the employment of figures, one and all, in view of the main purport of sentiment. emotion, etc., that really justifies their being regar sources of charm.” (Trans. K. Kris..., pp. 45, ibid).
With 'Dhvani' or, say, rasa-dhvani as the soul of poetry, i.e. it being in the centre, all other concepts become suggestors or vyañjakas of rasa-dhvani, thus creating a harmonious design where everything falls in its place so rightly. True, it required the genius of Ānandavardhana to evolve such an all-embracing scheme and of course, those who did not fall in line with him by rejecting vyañjanā, i.e. the ālamkārikas such as Mahimā, Dhananjaya and Dhanika, or others such as Kuntaka, Bhoja, or even Mukula or Pritehārendurāja, fell in line in accepting 'rasa' as the central idea in poetry, with everything rotating around that.
So, for gunas or excellences and alamkāras or beautiful turns of expression or figures of speech. Anandavardhana observes : (DHV. II. 6., pp. 48, ibid)
"tam artham avalambante ye'nginam te guņāḥ smộtāḥ, angā”śritās tv alamkārāḥ
mantavyāḥ kațakādivat." ye tam artham rasā”dilaksanam anginam santam avalambante te gunāh, śauryā"divat. vācya-vācaka-laksanāny angāni ye punarāśritās te'lamkārāh mantavyāh katakā"divat.

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‘Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,......
1155 "Those which inhere in this principal element are regarded as qualities (=excellences). And figures are to be known as those that are associated with its parts even like ornaments such as the braeclet." (II. 6)
Those that ever inhere in the principal element of poetry) viz. sentiment etc., are qualities like the quality of valour and so forth (in the world). On the other hand, those that relate to its component parts only, viz., the expressed sense and the expression, are to be regarded as figures or ornaments like the bracelet and so on (in the world).” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 49, ibid).,
Anandavardhana clearly observes that 'gunas' or excellences are primarily connected with 'rasā"di', the soul like bravery or other quality of a person, and figures are like ornaments placed on a human body. Now, we have to be very careful in understanding this metaphorical use of language. Actually poetry itself is an abstract art, it is abstraction, and so there is nothing physical about it in the sense in which we understand physicality. It is foolish,-and some of the so called selfanointed experts of sāhitya-śāstra who write in Hindi, or any other modern Indian language such as Gujarati, or even some of those who write in English today look absolutely foolish when they hold that alamkāras or figures of speech are "external” to poetry like external ornaments put on physical body. No; it is never like that. Actually beauty in poetry takes various shapes and forms some of which are grasped by even those who are not capable of digging deep into the matter, while others are grasped only by those who can interpret subtle experiments by a good poet, i.e. a real mahā-kavi. Alamkāras or figures are those forms of poetic beauty which are easily understood and therefore enjoyed by readers of mediocre celibre also. It does not require deeper sensitivity to discern an alamkāra. Thus, metaphorically speaking, poetic figures are like ornaments external to our body and such things which could be sighted by almost all. So, this form of poetic beauty is as easily discernible as an ornament placed on a human body. This does not make it as external as the physical ornament which can be taken off, changed, sold, replaced and even put into a bank-loker when not required. An upamā of Kālidāsa is not that way replaceable or something which can be removed from his poetry without harming the inherent poetic beauty. Thus an alamkāra is as inherent as any other source of beauty in poetry, Ānandavardhana will explain this later but for the present by resorting to this metaphor he only wants to suggest that poetic beauty has various forms, some of which are easily discernible, while others are comparatively more subtle to be grasped only by men of highly cultivated taste. Here, ‘guna' is held to be subtler than 'alamkāra'. This way only we have

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA to understand the various concepts of literary criticism as laid down by all ālamkārikas, known or unknown, beginning with say, Bhāmaha, down to Jagannātha or even someone posterior to him.
With this clear understanding of the basics of alamkāraśāstra we will proceed to see how Anandavardhana accomodates various concepts in his wider scheme.
Anandavardhana, while discussing. the concept of samghatanā almost concedes the position that gunas or qualities or excellences belong to word and sense. But then it is metaphorically so. Primarily in his opinion gunas reside in rasas, i.e. they are qualities of soul, while alamkāras are primarily the attribates of sound and sense. Here, we discuss only the theroratical position that he' allots to various concepts. We do not go into the details of which gunas he accepts and also their individual definitions. This we propose to do later in a separate chapter in Vol. II. For the present, we underline only one point that for Anandavardhana rasadhvani is the central theme in poetry; the pivot round which all other concepts evolve with the relation of vyangya-vyañjaka, i.e. suggestor and suggested.
It is therefore that while dealing with the central theme of rasa-dhvani with its innumerable. possible divisions and sub-divisions, he takes care to supply instructions to poets as to how they sould entertain alamkāras in kavya. The basic condition that he lays down is that alamkāras are welcome to poetry and are as much 'internal i.e. 'antaranga' to poetry as any other concept, given the condition that they, i.e. alamkāras should find place in poetry in an effortless or natural way, i.e. they should be 'a-prthag-yatna-nirvartya'. They should take shape naturally while the poet is concentrating on 'rasa' as the central theme. It is because of this, i.e. because such figures of sound as 'anuprāsa' or 'yamaka', which require a special effort on the part of a poet, that Anandavardhana does not encourage their presence in poetry. Expecially when the erotic sentiment is in the centre, alliteration i.e. anuprāsa, not being condusive to it, has to be avoided (Dhv. II. 14). He gives some cencession to 'anuprāsa' when 'śrngāra'-rasa is not principal in a given literary piece. But 'yamaka' i.e. assonance has to be carefully avoided when there is any context of śộngāra-(Dhv. II. 15), and more so in case of vipralambhaśrngāra' i.e. love-in-separation. This, i.e. discouragement of 'anuprāsa and yamaka' is recommended only because these figures command a special attention of the poet for their formation and therefore the poet has to deviate from the path of ‘rasa-nirūpaña'. With this Ānandavardhana embarks upon providing general principles guiding delineation of figures in poetry, He must have observed that many a poet goes astray and falls in love with delineation of alamkāras, having the

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guna,......
1157 central objective of rasa-realisation in poetry. So, he gives certain instructions. He observes : (Dhv. II. 16, 17, 18, 19), atra yuktir abhidhīyate -
"rasā”ksiptatayā yasya bandhaḥ śakyakriyo bhavet, a-ppthag-yatna-nirvartyaḥ sólamkāro dhvanau mataḥ-(Dhv. II. 16) "dhvanyātma-bhūte śộngāre samīksya vinivesitaḥ rūpakā”dir alamkāra-varga eti yathārthatām."- (Dhv. II. 17) "vivaksā tat-paratvena nā’ngitvena kadācana, kāle ca grahaņa-tyāgau nā’tinirvahaņaiṣitā ” (Dhv. II. 18) “nirvyūdhāv api cárgatve yatnena paryavekṣaṇam, rūpakā”der alamkāra
vargasyā’ngarva-sādhanam.” (Dhv. II. 19) "Only that is admitted as a figure of suggestive poetry, whose employment is rendered possible just by the emotional suffusion of the poet and which does not require any other extra effort on his part." - (Dhv. II. 16) · "The galaxy of figures like metaphor becomes truely significant (i.e. will be real ornaments) when they are employed with great discrimination in instances of the Erotic sentiment which is intrinsic to dhvani" (i.e. when the Erotic is in the centre of suggestive poetry). (Dhv. II, 17)
"The sole consideration that it is only a means to the delineation of sentiment and never an end in itself, the necessity of employing it at the right time and of abandoning it at the right time; the absence of over-enthusiasm on the poets part in pressing it too far, and finally, his keen watchfulness in making sure that it remains a secondary element only-these are the various means by which figures like metaphor become accessories (of suggested sentiment." (Dhv. II. 18, 19)

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 59, 61, 63, ibid)
In his vrtti on Dhv- II. 16 Anandavardhana clearly states that "tasmān na tesām bahirangatyam rasā'bhivvaktau." (pp. 60. ibid. "Hence they are never extraneous to the delineation of sentiment." (Trans- K. Kris., pp. 61, ibid).
After giving a number of illustrations to prove his point, Anandavardhana at the end of the discussion observes : (Vịtti, Dhv. II. 19, pp. 70, ibid) :
"sa evam upanibadhyamānó-lamkāro rasábhiyyakti-hetuḥ kaver bhavati. uktaprakārā'tikrame tu niyamena eva rasa-bhanga-hetuḥ sampadyate. laksyam ca tathāvidham mahākavi-prabandheşv api drśyate bahuśaḥ, tat. tu, sūkti-sahasradyotitā”tmanām mahātmanām dosóddhāranam ātmana eva dūsanam Bhavati iti. na vibhajya darśitam. kim tu rūpakā"der alamkāra-vargasya yā iyam vyañjakatve rasa"di-visaye laksana-dig-darsitā tam anusmaran svayam ca anyal laksanam utpreksamāno yady alaksya-krama-pratibham anantaroktam 'enam dhvaner ātāmānam upanibadhanāti sukaviḥ samāhita-cetāḥ, tasya ātmalābho bhavati mahīyān iti."
"A figure of speech thus utilized by a poet will succeed in revealing sentiments. In case the conditions laid down be transgressed, it invariably becomes a destroyer of sentiment. Even this is seen amply illustrated in the works of great poets. But it has not been shown in detail here, since a loud exposure of the defects of great men who have the bright light of a thousand good sayings about them, would amount to a censure of the critic himself. But it deserves to be reiterated that the poet will have best fulfilled his purpose only when he exercises concentration in infusing his work with the soul of suggestion 'with undiscerned sequentiality described above, follows faithfully the mentioned ways in which the galaxy of figures like metaphor can be harmonised with delineation of sentiment and imagines for himself the other details left unsaid herein." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 71, ibid),
In Dhv. II. 2,3,4, Ānandavardhana goes to suggest how rasadhvani is arrived at in poetry through the agency of letters, words, sentence, construction or composition and the work as a whole. He observes : (Dhv. III. 2,3,4) :
yas tv alaksyakramavyangyo dhvanir vammapadā”dişu, vākye samghatanāyām ca sa prabandhe’pi dīpyate. (Dhv. III. 2)

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,......
1159 tatra varṇānām anarthakatvād dyotyatvam asambhavi ityāśankya idam ucyate
"sasau sa-refa-samyogo dhakāraś cā’pi bhūyasā, virodhinaḥ syuḥ śộngāre te na varṇā rasaś cyutaḥ.” (Dhv. III. 3) "ta eva tu niveśyante bībhatsā”dau rase yadā, tadā tam dīpayanty eva
tena varņā rasaścyutaḥ.” (Dhv. III. 4) "suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality will flash forth in letter, word etc., sentence, composition and finally the work as a whole.” (Dhv. III. 2.)
The objection that letters cannot be suggestive because they are meaningless by themselves is answered below - "The (sanskrit) letters 's" and 'ş', letters conjunct with r', and 'dh', - all these become deterrents of the erotic sentiment. Hence those letters are not condusive to a particular sentiment.” (Dhv. III. 3)
"When these very letters are employed in relation to the sentiment of disgust and so forth, they will only intensify them. Hence also letters suggest sentiments.”.
(Dhv. III. 4) • The above aphorisms show negatively and positively that letters do possess suggestiveness.
Next, Anandavardhana illustrates how a word becomes suggestive of rasa. He also shows through illustrations how a part of a word and also a sentence are capable to suggest rasa. He explains that the suggestivity of a sentence is twofold, i.e. pure and mingled as when it either carries a figure of speech in it or not. All this is duly illustrated.
After this he comes to samghațanā' or construction of a sentence (Dr. Krishnameorthy translates 'samghatana' by the term 'composition.' We feel that this word 'Composition should be reserved, for a whole work. Later, he gives the word texture. Which is acceptable to us.)
Prior to explaining how a 'samghatan becomes 'suggestor of rasa, Ānandavardhana dwells upon the full explanation of the concept of samghatanā and its relationship with guņas. This we will look for in a separate chapter later (in vol. II) but for the present we are concerned only with the fact that for Anandavardhana,

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA the concept of samghatanā, which has its boundaries somewhat mixed up with those of rīti or vrtti, is also suggestive of rasa in poetry and is therefore welcome as a suggestor or suggestive element i.e. vyañjaka, in poetry.
Anandavardhana observes that the threefold samghatanā, residing in gunas, becomes suggestive of rasa in poetry and the conditions that control this suggestivity are said to be propriety-i.e. aucitya-of the speaker and the thing described. He observes : Dhv. III. 5,6, pp. , 6 ibid) :
"a-samāsā samāsena madhyamena ca bhūṣitā tathā dirgha-samāséti tridhā samghatanóditā.” (Dhv. III. 5) tām kevalam anūdya, idam ucyate"guņān āśritya tișthantī mādharyādin; vyanakti sā rasan, tan niyame hetur
aucityam vaktr-vācyayoh.”– (Dhv. III. 6) "Texture" is said to be of three kinds : (1) Without compounds (2) With mediumsized compound and (3) With long compounds."- (Dhv. III. 5)
"Composition or texture is grounded in qualities like sweetness and suggests sentiments.
The propritety or decorum of the speaker and the spoken is the consideration which governs it.” (Dhv. III. 6)
(Trans. K. Kris., pp. 119, 127 ibid). He further observes at Dhv. III. 7 that,
"viṣayā”śrayam apy anyad aucityam tam niyacchati, kāvya-prabhedā”śrayataḥ
sthitā bhedavati hi sā.” (pp. 128, ibid) "Another consideration which governs the usage of a texture is its decorum with regard to the literary medium adopted. Texture thus becomes different in different forms of literature."- (Trans. K. Kris; pp. 129, ibid)

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1161 Anandavardhana holds that in literature in general, be it prose or verse, texture or construction takes its own shape following the central theme of rasa-dhvani and thus serves as a vyañjaka i.e. suggester of rasa. It varies even with the subject - matter or theme. He observes :
"rasa-bandhoktam aucityam bhāti sarvatra samśritā racanā visayápekşam
tat tu kiñcid vibhedavat.” (Dhv. III. 9) (pp. 132, ibid) "Texture with decorum in the delineation of sentiments will shine out wherever it might be found. It will, however, assume a shade of variation coupled with decorum of literary medium.” (Trans. K. Kris; pp. 133, ibid)
Thus, after considering pada i.e. a word, padámía (=part of word). vākya (=sentence) and samghatanā (i.e. sentence-construction or texture) in a relation of vyangya-vyañjaka, Anandavardhana turns his guns towards 'prabandha' i.e. a major composition, both prose and verse in relation to rasa-dhvani, and suggests that a major composition has to be rasa-centred and for bringing about this result, Anandavardhana suggests a number of conditions, which when observed make such a composition rasa-centred and therefore successful. How a whole work of a greater magnitude becomes a suggester of rasa is explained by Anandavardhana at Dhv. III. 10-14, with apt illustrations and explanations with elaboration in the vrtti or gloss concerned. We will not go into all the minute discussion here but will concern ourselves with what basics he expects for a whole work to become suggestive of rasa. He observes : (Dhv. III. 10-14; pp. 134; 136 ibid)
"idānīm a-laksya-krama-vyangyo dhvaniḥ prabandhā”tmā rāmāyaṇa-mahābhāratā”dau prakāśamānaḥ prasiddha eva. tasya tu yathā prakāśanam tat pratipadyate.
"vibhāvánubhavasañcāryaucitya-cāruṇaḥ, vidhiḥ kathā-śarīrasya vịttasyótprekṣitasya vā." (Dhv. III. 10) "iti-vștta-vaśāyātām tyaktvā' nanuguņām sthitim. utpreksyā’py antarā'bhista-rasócita-kathonnayah.” (Dhv. III. 11)

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"sandhi-sandhyanga-ghatanam
rasa'bhivyakty apekṣayā na tu kevalayā śāstra
sthiti-sampādanecchayā." (Dhv. III. 12)
"uddipana-praśamane yathávasaram antarā rasasyárabdha-viśranter
anu-samdhānam anginah."- (Dhv. III. 13)
"alamkṛtīnām saktāvapy
ānurūpyeṇa-yojanam.
prabandhasya rasă"dīnām
vyañjakatve nibandhanam." (Dhv. III. 14)
"suggestion with undiscerned sequentiality relating to a whole work is quite well known in such works as the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahabharata. How it is suggested therein is explained below :
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Construction of only such a plot, either traditional or invented, as is charming with its decorum of (the accessories of sentiment, viz.) stimuli of setting, abiding emotions, emotional responses, and passing moods; (Dhv. III. 10)
If, in a theme, adapted from a traditional source, the poet is faced with situations conflicting with the intended sentiment, his readiness to leave out such incidents and inventing in their place even imaginary incidents with a view to delineating the intended sentiment: (Dhv. III. 11)
The construction of divisions and sub-divisions of the plot only with a view to delineating sentiments and not at all with a desire for mere conformity to rules of poetics; (Dhv. III. 12) (pp. 135, ibid)

Bringing about both the high tide of sentiment and its low ebb appropriately in the work; preserving the unity of the principal sentiment from beginning to end; (Dhv. III. 13)
A discreet use of figures of speech even when the poet is capable of using them in any number;- such are the conditions which underlie the suggestiveness of a whole work of literature in regard to sentiments. etc., - (Dhv. III. 14) (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 137 ibid).

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1163 Thus Ānandavardhana has harnessed all forms of literature in whatever style, with the central concept of rasa-dhvani
After explaining fully dhvani in all its divisions and sub-divisions, Anandavardhana, at Dhv. III. 44 (pp. 258, ibid) observes :
"evam dhvaneh prabhedāḥ prabheda-bhedāśca, kena sakyante samkhyātum din-mātram teşām idam uktam asmābhih.” anantā hi dhvaneh prakārāḥ, sahrdayānām . vyutpattaye teşam dinmātram kathitam. ity ukta-laksaņo yo dhvanir vivecyaḥ prayatnataḥ sadbhiḥ. satkāvyam kartum vā
jñātum vā, samyag abhiyuktai).” (Dhv. III. 45) (pp. 260. ibid) ukta-svarūpa-dhvani-nirūpana-nipuņā hi satkavayaḥ, sahrdayāś ca niyatam eva kāvya-vişaye parām prakarsa-padavīm āsādayanti."- (vrtti, Dhv. III. 45, pp. 260, ibid)
-"Such are some of the different ways of principal suggestion and some of the minor classes of the major ways. Who can ever count them exhaustively? We have just indicated therefore, their direction only.” (Dhv.II. 44)
The ways of principal suggestion are indeed limitless. We have only pointed out their direction with a view to educating refined critics.
"Principal suggestion which we have defined hitherto should be attentively studied not only by all the poets who aspire after writing good poetry, but also by all critics who aspire after understanding it well.” (Dhv. III. 45).
It is only by their skill in recognising principal suggestion defined above that good poets and good critics attain abiding glory in matters relating to poetry.” (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 259, 261, ibid).
Ānandavardhana now proceeds to suggest that the concepts of 'rīti' (=style) and "vștti" (=modes, diction) propagated by earlier ālamkārikas are also welcome to him and that these could also be suggesters of rasa-dhvani. Thus they have a sure place in his catholic scheme of literary aesthetics, viz. in his scheme of vyañjanā-dhvani-rasa.' He observes : (Dhv. III. 46; pp. 260, ibid) :

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "a-sphuţa-sphuritam kävya-tattvam etad yathóditam, a-saknuvadbhir vyākartum
rītahaḥ sampravartitāḥ.”etad-dhvani-pravartanena nirnītam kāvya-tattvam a-sphuţa-sphuritam sad aśaknuvadbhiḥ pratipādayitum vaidarbhī, gaudī, pāñcālī ca iti rītayaḥ pravartitāḥ. rīti-laksana-vidhāyinām hi kāvya-tattvam etad a-sphuţatayā manāk sphuritam āsīd iti laksyate, tad atra sphuţatayā sampradarsitam ity anena rīti-laksanena na kiñcit.
"sabda-tattvā”śrayāḥ kāścid artha-tattva-yujóparāḥ, vsttayópi prakāśante
jñātésmin kāvya-laksane.” (Dhv. III. 47) (pp. 260, ibid) asmin vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāva-vivecana-maye kāvya-laksane jñāte sati, yāḥ kāścit prasiddhā upanāgarikā”dyāḥ śabda-tattvā”śrayā vịttayo, yāś ca arthatattvasambaddhāḥ kaiśikyā”dayas tāḥ, samyag rīti-padavīm avataranti.anyathā tu tāsām a-drstārthānāmiva vrttinām a-śraddheyatvam eva syān nā'nubhava-siddhatvam. evam sphuţatayaiva lakṣaṇīyam svarūpam asya dhvaneh."- (vịtti, pp. 260, ibid).
"Those who were unable to explain properly this essential principle of poetry as they had only a glimmer of it (and nothing more), have brought into vogue the theory of styles."- (Dhv. III. 46)
We have explained above the faundamental principle of poetry by using the term 'Dhvani.' Since only vague glimmerings of this principle were had by ancient writers, they could not explain it exhaustively and thus did they bring into vogue flashes of this very principle of poetry, we have very clearly demonstrated it in all its bearings and hence there is nothing for us to consider seriously about the theory of styles.
"Once this theory of poetry is fully understood, even the so-called “Modes” (=dictions) relating to the nature of sounds as well as to the nature of meanings, will become intelligible.” (Dhv. III. 47).
When this theory of poetry involving a discrimination of the suggested-suggester relationship is grasped, other categories like literary modes, viz. those relating to sound such as “upanāgarikā", as well as those relating to sense such as 'Kaiśiki will become quite intelligible (even in the same way as the styles). Otherwise, modes

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1165 will remain only incredible like unseen objects, and will not come within the range of personal experience (though there might be testimony of the ancients to that effect).
Therefore, the nature of principal suggestion should be understood clearly." (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 261, ibid).
On rītis and vịttis, the Locana has the following to offer (pp. 370, 372, Edn. Nandi, Ahd. '97-'98). “rītir hi guneșv eva paryavasitā. yad āha-viśeso guņā”tmā. guņāś ca rasa-paryavasāyina eva, iti hy uktam prāg guna-nirūpane "śạngāra eva madhurah” ity atra iti.”
With reference to vșttis, the Locana observes (pp. 372, ibid) :
"prakāśanta iti." anubhava-siddhatām kāvya-jīvitatve prayānti ity arthaḥ, 'rītipadavīm iti. tad vad eva rasa-paryavasāyitvāt. 'pratīti-padavīm' iti vā pāthaḥ. nāgarikayā hy upamītā ity anu-prāsavṛttiḥ, śộngārā”dau viếrāmyati. parușā iti dīpteșu raudrā"dişu. komalā iti hāsā”dau. tathā “vịttayaḥ kāvya-mātřkāḥ” iti yad uktam muninā tatra rasócita eva cestā-viśeso vșttiḥ yad āha
"kaisiki ślaksna-nepathyā
śộngāra-rasa-sambhavā." ity ādi. iyatā 'tasyābhāvam jagadur apare' ityādāv abhāva-vikalpeșu, “vrttayo rītayaś cao gatāḥ śravana-gocaram. tad atiriktaḥ kóyam dhvanir” iti; tatra kathañcid abhyupagamaḥ kṛtaḥ kathancic ca duşaņam dattam ‘aphusa-sphuritam' iti vacanena. (pp. 372, ibid, on Dhv. III. 47; Locana).
Abhinavagupta on Dhv. I. i, had stated (pp. 8, ibid) :
“nanu vịttayo rītayaś ca yathā guņálamkāra-vyatiriktāś cărutva-hetavaś ca tathā dhvanir api tad vyatiriktaś ca cărutva-hetuś ca bhavisyati ity asiddho vyatireka ity anena abhiprāyeņa āha-” tad anitirikta-víttayaḥ” iti. naiva vṛttirītīnām tad-vyatiriktatvam siddham. tathā hy anuprāsānām eva dīpta-masrnamadhyama-varṇanīyópayogitayā paruşatva-lalitatva-madhumatva-svarūpavivecanāya varga-traya-sampādanártham tisrónuprāsa-jātayo vșttaya ity uktāḥ, vartanténuprāsa-bhedāḥ āsv iti, yad āhuḥ
"sarūpa-vyañjana-nyāsam tisȚşvetāsu vȚttiņu, prthak přthag anuprāsam uśanti kavayaḥ sadā." iti.

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SAHRDAYALOKA prthak-prthag iti. parusanuprāsā nāgarikā. masrnánuprāsa upanāgarikā lalitā. nāgarikayā vidagdhayā upamitā iti krtvā. madhyama-komala-parusam ity arthaḥ ata eva vaidagdhya-vihīna-svabhāvā-asukumārā-aparusa-grāmya-vanitā-sādrśyād iyam vșttir grāmyā iti. tatra trutīyaḥ komalánuprāsa iti vịttayónuprāsa-jātaya eva. na céha vaiseșikavad vrttir vivaksitā yena jātau jātimato vartamānarvam na syāt, tad anugraha eva hi tatra vartamānarvam. yathā"ha kaścit-"lokóttare hi gāmbhīrye vartante prthivībhujah.” iti.
tasmād vșttayónuprāsā”dibhyó nātirikta-vșttayo nā'bhyadhika-vyāpārāḥ, ata eva vyāpāra-bhedábhāvān na prthag anumeya-svarūpā api iti vịtti-sabdasya vyāpāravācinóbhiprāyaḥ.
anatiriktatvād eva vștti-vyavahāro bhāmahā”dibhir na krtaḥ. udbhatā"dibhiḥ pratyukté pi tasminn ārthaḥ kaścid adhiko hțdayapatham avatīrņa ity abhiprāyena āha-"gatāḥ śravaņa-gocaram" iti. ritayaś ca iti. tad anatirikta-vrttayópi gatāh śravanagocaram iti sambandhah. tac chabdena atra mādhurya"dayo gunāh, tesan ca samucita-vrttyarpane yad anyónya-melana-ksamatvena panaka iva, guda maricā"di-rasānām samghāta-rūpatāgamanam dīpta-lalita-madhyama-varnaniyavisayam gaudiya-vaidarbha-pañcāla-deśa-hevāka-prācurya-drśā tad eva trividham rītir ity uktam. “jātiśca jātimato nā'nyā samudāyaś ca samudāyino nánya iti vșttirītayo na guņálamkāra-vyatiriktā iti sthita evā'sau vyatireki hetuḥ."
(pp. 9, 10, ibid, Locana, Dhv. I. i). It may be noted that by accepting all the current concepts that prevailed in literary criticism and assigning them the role of a suggester in poetry, Anandavardhana had nearly nailed the coffin of opposition to dhvani, i.e, dhvanivirodha, but with the best of his efforts and also those of his great lieutenants, there was some opposition, however feeble, to the great victory march of dhvani. But before we look into this, we will see how those who sided with Anandavardhana sang in the same tunes and tried to establish a sort of harmony of concepts that had emerged from different quarters.
Thus, Mammața (K. P. VIII. i) also suggests that guņas are rasa-dharmas, and alamkāras subserve rasa through the body of poetry i.e. word and sense to which they primarily belong. He observes :
ye rasasyā' ngino dharmāh śauryā”daya ivā”tmnaḥ, utkarşa-hetavas te syuḥ acala-sthitayo gunāḥ." (K. P. VIII. i. pp. 324, Edn. R. C. Dwivedi)

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1167 In the vṛtti thereon he further observes : (pp. 324, ibid) : ātmana eva hi śauryā"dayo na ākārasya yathā, tathā rasasyaiva mādhuryā”dayah, na varņānām. kvacit tu sauryā"di-samucitasya akāra-mahattva"der darśanādākāra. eva asya śūraḥ, ity āder vyavahārād, anyatra a-śūrépi vitatā”kstitva-mātrena śūra iti, kvā'pi śūrépi mūrti-lāghava-mātrena a-śūra iti, a-viśranta-pratītayah yathā vyavaharanti, tad-vad madhurādi-rasa-vyañjaka-sukumārā"di-varņānām mādhuryā"di-vyavahārapravrtteh, a-madhurā"di-rasángānām varnānām saukamāryā"di-mātrena mādhuryā"di, madhurā"di-rasópakaranānām tesām a-saukumāryā"der a-mādhuryā"di ca, rasaparyanta-pratīti-vandhyā vyavaharanti. ata eve mādhuryā”dayo rasa-dharmaḥ samucitair varņair vyajyante, na tu varņa-mātrā”śrayāḥ, yathaiņām vyañjakatvam tathā udāharisyate."
66- "Those attributes of the rasa which is essence (principal), that are like the heroism of the soul, that cause its exaltation and have an unceasing existence, are (known to be) excellences.".. .
Just as the heroism etc. belong to the soul only, not to the form, similarly sweetness etc. belong to 'rasa' only, not to the letters (=varņas). However, in some cases on perceiving the tall figure which is appropriate for heroism and the like, 'his forin alone is heroic,' such a usage prevails and in others even when some one is not brave, he is called brave only on the ground of his large form; and in certain other cases even a brave man is called not-brave only because his form is short. as such usages are done by those who don't know for definite, similarly the use of sweetness etc. being prevalent (figuratively) for soft letters suggestive of tender 'rasas' (the Erotic) and others, those who are devoid of the knowledge that excellences extend as far as rasas, use 'sweetness' etc. for the letters suggestive of rasas which are not tender (for example the Herioc) and the like.and speak of untenderness of these letters which in fact) help the tender rasa and the like. To conclude, the sweetness etc. are attributes of 'rasas' which are manifested through
oice words (varnas); and (these) do not depend simply on the letters. The way these letters become suggestive (of the rasas) will (now) be illustated.” (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 325, ibid). As for the position of alamkāras, Mammata observes (VIII. 67) (pp. 326, ibid) :
“upakurvanti tạm santam yénga-dvāreņa jātucit; hārā"divad alamkārās ténuprāsópamā”dayah."

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA ye vācaka-vācya-laksaņā'ngātiśaya mukhena mukhyam rasam sambhavinam upakurvanti, te kanthā”dy angānām utkarsā”dhāna-dvāreņa śarīriņópi upakārakā hārā”daya ivālamkārāḥ. yatra tu nā’sti rasas tatrókti-vaicitrya-mātra-paryavasitāḥ...."
67- Those that help occasionally that existent (Rasa) through its parts, are the figures alliteration, simile and others like the necklace etc. (K. P. VIII. 67)
Those that help the principal rasa when it exists, through exaltation of the parts in the form of expressive words and their meanings, are ornaments (figures) like the necklace and others which embellish the soul also by producing excellence in the parts of the body such as neck.
Where, however, 'rasa' is not present there these (figures) are rendered into a mere fanciful expression. And in some cases the figures don't help the 'rasa' which exists."- (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 327, ibid).
Mammața furnishes proper illustrations to justify his observations. It may be noted that while Anandavardhana though clear was slightly influencd by a viewpoint that took gunas to go with external word and sense also, and this he almost conceded while discussing the position of guņas with reference to samghatanā, Mammața goes flat out in declaring categorically that gunas have everything to do only with the rasas and have practically nothing to do with expressed and external word and sense. This he does with an almost gross illustration of a brave man possessing a lerge body or not or a timid person possessing a large body and therefore going under the name of a brave man. The illustration, of course, is too gross, but brings home his point of view very clearly and so also he does with reference to figures of speech by apparently placing them parallel to ornaments put on our bodies. No doubt Mammata knows the grossness of his metaphor, but at the same time he draws a clear line of demarcation between the areas of influence of both guņas and alamkāras.
He therefore further observes (K. P. VIII, 67, vịtti, pp. 328, ibid) :
"eșa eva ca guņálamkāra-pravibhāgaḥ evañ ca, ” samavāya-vrttyā šauryā”. dayah, samyoga-vịttyā tu hārā”daya ity astu guņálamkārāṇam bhedaḥ ojaḥprabhrtīnām anuprāsā”dīnām caubhayesām api samavay-vrttyā sthitir iti gaddarikā-pravāhena.esam bheda (Bhāmaha-vivarana) ity abhidhānam asat. yad apy uktam, "kāvya-sobhāyā kartāro dharmā guņāḥ, tad atiśaya-hetavas tv alamkārāḥ (KASV. III. 1.1.2.) iti, tad-api na yuktam. yataḥ kim samastair gunaih kävya-vyavahāraḥ uta katipayah. yadi samastaih tat katham a-samasta-gunā gaudī-pāñcālī ca rītiḥ kāvyasya ātma. atha katipayaiḥ, tat adrāv atra. ity ādāv ojahprabhștișu guneșu satsu kāvya-vyavahāra-prāptiḥ. .

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1169
"svargaprāptir..." ity ādau, viseṣókti-vyatirekau guna-nirapekṣau kāvyavyavahāra-pravartakau." (pp. 328, 330, ibid)
-"This is indeed the difference between excellences and figures. Therefore, the following statement is invalid. "The heroism etc. subsists by 'inherence' but the necklace etc. (the ornaments) exist by conjunction; this be (the empirical) distinction between excellences and ornaments. (But in poetry) Floridity (ojas) etc. (i.e. excellences) and alliteration and the like (i.e. the figures) both of these subsist by inherence; any distinction (between these two in poetry) would be blind following of others like a flock of sheep. (This is said to be Udbhataś view).
And again the statement: "Excellences are attributes which produce the poetic beauty, but the figures heighten it," is equally untenable. Because the question would arise: "Is poetry regarded as such due to the presence of all the excellences or due to a few of them? If due to (presence of) all, then how the 'gaudi' and 'pañcālī dictions (=styles), which do not possess all the excellences, constitute the soul of poetry? If due to a few, then - "Here in the hill... (vs.no. 338)"- such examples may be designated poetry when the excellences Floridity etc. are present.
"The woman of ...." (vs. 339)- In such examples viśeşókti (peculiar allegation) and vyatireka (contrast by dissimilitude) are responsible for the use of poetry even in the absence of excellences." (Trans. R.C. Dwivedi; pp. 329, 331, ibid).
Prof. Dr. Dwivedi (pp., ft. note adds: "In this verse i.e. svarga-prāptir anena. etc.), there are no letters which may suggest sweetness; floridity. (ojas) is out of context and perspicuity is absent. In the absence of all the excellences the poetic beauty will not be produced, to heighten which, the figures are admitted by Vamana. But the above is a case of good poetry."
Now Mammata in our opinion has overplayed his cards in writing these lines in refutation of Udbhata and Vamana. Certainly Ānandavardhana has never engaged himself in the refutation of views expressed by individnal ālamkārikas. On the contrary, he has positively refrained from doing this and just so, very very wisely. For, it is better, he thinks, to express one's views in a positive way, rather than getting engaged in verbal squibbles and negatively denounce individual views, as done by such authors as Mahima for example or even by Mammata and his followers, especially Viśvanatha to some extent and even by Jagannatha to a greater extent. Here what Mammața has argued is explained by a number of his commentators sush as Śrīvidyā Cakravartin who in his Sampradaya-prakāśinī

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""
explains the passage as : (pp. 328, 329, 330 ibid):
-
"ittham siddham guṇálamkara-pravibhāgaṁ nigamayati-esa eva ca iti. na tu vakṣyamāņo vāmana"dy upadarsita iti yavat. ittham vibhāga-siddhau yóyam abhedavādinām upahāsaḥ,sa tan eva spṛśatīty aha-evañ ca samavāya-vṛttyety ādi. astu gunálamkārāṇām iti. laukikānām vibhāgam upagacchama ity arthaḥ. kavyaguṇálamkārāṇām tv abheda eva ity āha- "ojaḥ-prabhṛtīnām ity ādi. itir hetau. yata ubhayeṣām api samavāya-vṛttyä sthitiḥ, ato bhedábhidhānam gaddarikā-pravāheṇa bakara-prayāṇa-nayena. ekasyām gadḍarikāyām artha-paryālocanam vinaiva puraḥ prayātāyām sarvaiva panktis tam eva panthanam pramāṇīkṛtya pravartate. prakṛte' pyetad eva ābhāṇakam āyātam iti yāvat. iti svarūpāvacchedaḥ. iti yad etat sópahāsábhidhānam tad asat. tat paśutvam teṣām eva syat. bhedasya samyag vivecitatvāt, iti bhavaḥ. ittham gunálamkarayor aikyam nirākṛtya yad vāmanā❞dibhir bhedónyathā darśitas tad uddalayitum aha-"yad apy uktam ity ādinā." yad idam kāvyaśobhā-kartṛtvena kavya-vyapadeśa-hetavo guṇāḥ, labdha-tathā- vyapadeśasya tv atiśaya-hetavó lamkārā iti vibhāga ucyate, na tad yuktam vibhāga-asahatvāt. tathā hi"kim samastair gunaiḥ kāvyavyavahāraḥ kriyate, uta katipayaiḥ, nä"dyaḥ; a-samastaguṇayor gauḍī-pañcalyoḥ kāvyā"tmatva-abhyupagama-virodhāt. na dvitiyaḥ"adrāvatre" tyādāv ojaḥ-pramukha-katipaya-guna-sambhavāt, kāvya-vyapadeśaprasakteḥ. ittham ṭāvan nāsti kāvya-vyapadeśa-hetutā guṇānām iti avyāptir doṣaḥ. ativyāptir api.tathā hi-svarga-prāptir ity adau pūrvápara-vakyárthibhūta-viśeṣóktivyatirekálamkarābhyām eva guṇa-nairapekṣyeņa kavya-vyapadesa -darśanāt. nanv atra'pi śṛngāránugatamadhura-guna-sápekṣayor eva anayoḥ kavya-vyapadeśa-hetutā iti cet, mandam idam. abhivyañjaka-lalita-varṇábhāvān madhura-guna-vyaktir eva násti. dure tad vyapekṣā, nis sapatna-camatkārátiśaya kāriņor viseṣokti-vyatirekayoḥ, atósmābhir upadarsita eva vibhāgaḥ śreyān."
SAHṚDAYĀLOKA
All faithful commentators of great reputation have explained and vindicated zealously Mammaṭaś observations. The above quotation from Sampradayaprakāśinī is just an instance in point.

But we stick to our observation that not unlike Anandavardhana, even Mammata and the rest should have avoided entering into such controversies. Actually even Anandavardhana recommends that poetry and poetic beauty are all abstraction and there is nothing physical about the same. Poetic beauty, if revealed in the right fashion, takes shape even through figures of speech which under such cirumstances are not 'bahiranga' i.e. 'not external' to poetry. This is Ananda-vardhanaś observation. In this sense both gunas and alamkāras when

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,......
1171 they become instrumental in causing poetry beauty are intrinsically, or inherently connected (samavāya-vșttyā) to poetry. Thus viewed Udbhaļas view can be defended.
In the same way when Vāmana observes 'gunas' as 'visesa' or special mark of 'rīti' or style, which is said to be the 'soul of poetry, in a metaphorical language not to be taken literally as already noticed by us, what Vāmana expects here is the "guņatva” type of beauty. Individual guņas are only various external presentations of this quality of excellence. It is all abstraction and there is nothing physical about it. So when 'riti' graced by this excellence is said to be the soul by Vamana, what is meant is that only such subtler form of poetic beauty is more acceptable to Vāmana as is dhvani' with Anandavardhana. Alamkāra being less subtle form of beauty in his opinion is therefore metaphorically said to be "atiśayahetu” as against "karaka-hetu” that goes with gunas or subtler form of poetic beauty. Two or three styles, that are bestowed with this 'guna’-tattva, are said to be the 'soul metaphorically. Individual forms of expression, such as three, four, five or ten or even more gunas are only an accident: the presence of 'gunatattva' is fundamental. Thus Mammataś approach is biased and more physical which goes to disrespect the essence of what either Udbhata or Vamana wants to underline. It is therefore that Anandavardhana, having a better understanding of things, avoids condemning these views. - our observations are applicable to all followers of Mammața who likewise fail to appreciate the spirit behind Udbhațaś or Vāmanaś observations.
Mammațas approach to the problem of rītis and vrttis also follows the tradition of dhvanivādins such as Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Though not specified by the former the latter in his Locana takes vịttis only as types of anuprāsa (: vsttayaḥ anuprāsa-jātayah), and rītis are not different from the concept of gunas. But Mammata slightly differs. He of course takes vịttis as types of anuprāsa, but he adds that some people call vrttis by the name of rītis. Thus he identified both vrtti and rīti which was not done by either Anandavardhana or Abhinavagupta. It is clear that in course of centuries, literary criticism also takes slightly different expression at the hands of theorists even belonging to the same school of thought. This sure is an illustration where we find complete identification of the cocepts of rīti and vrtti as enunciated differently by earlier alamkārikas such as Vamana and Udbhata and also accepted as such by early promoters of dhvani such as Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Of course Mammata seems to follow the basic guideline promoted by the Dhvanikīra that vrttis and rītis are also suggesters or vyañjakas of rasa in poetry.

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SAHṚDAYĀLOKA While talking of anuprāsa, i.e.-alliteration, a śabdā'lamkāra, Mammața defines it as similarity of letters and this figure is said to be two-fold. He observes : (K. P. IX. 79, 80, pp. 346, 347, ibid) :
"varṇa-sāmyam anuprāsaḥ cheka-vṛtti-gato dvidhā,
sónekasya sakṛt pūrvaḥ,
ekasya'py asakṛt parah." (K. P. IX. 79)
mādhurya-vyañjakair varṇair
upanagarikeṣyate,
ojaḥ prakāśakais tais tu
parusa, komalā paraiḥ." (K. P. IX. 80)
--(79a) Alliteration is the similarity of letters. (79b) It is of two kinds; as pertaining to 'cheka' and 'vṛtti' (79c) That former one is the repetition of the several (consonants) only once. (79d) the latter is (the repetition) of even the one (consonant) more then once."
(80abc)- By the letters suggestive of sweetness the diction (=mode) is held to be upanāgarikā; but by the letters suggestive of floridity it is called Paruṣā. (=harsh).
1172
(80d) By others is Komala (soft) (Trans. R. C. Dwivedi, pp. 347, 349, ibid)Mammata further observes "keṣāñcid eṣā vaidarbhi-pramukhā
ritayo matāḥ." (K. P. 81, ab, pp. 350, ibid) i.e. (81ab) - Accordiong to others, these dictions are called styles, vaidarbhi and the rest. (pp. 351, Trans. Dwivedi, ibid).
Mammața observes: "etās tisro vṛttayaḥ vāmanā"dīnām mate vaidarbhi-gauḍīpañcālyākhyā rītayaḥ ucyante."-i.e. "These three dictions are called vaidarbhi, gauḍīyā and pañcālī respectively, in the opinion of Vamana and others." (Trans. Dwivedi, pp. 351, ibis);
Upanagarikā, paruṣā and komalā of Udbhața are vṛttis advanced by Udbhața and his fore-runners. Vaidarbhi, gauḍīyā and pañcālī are rītis advanced by Vamana and his fore-runners. Bharata refers to both. The Dhvanikara and his followers accept these as suggesters or vyañjaka of rasas.
Hemacandra explains the common characteristic of both guna and alamkāra at Kā.śā. I. 12. He observes: "guna-dosayoḥ sāmānya-lakṣaṇam āha

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1173 “rasasyótkarsápakarşahetū guņa-dosau, bhaktyā śabdárthayoḥ.” Thus for him guņas are primarily connected with rasas, and only metaphorically to word and sense. This is the position suggested by Anandavardhana. Hemacandra covers dosa also here with reference to rasas only. He observes that gunas and dosas are said to rest primarily in rasas and only metaphorically in word and sense and again dosas and guņas are said to be 'anitya' with reference to individual rasas, though they reside permanently in 'rasa' taken in a general sense. This is a very clever observation. Hemacandra further observes that alamkāras primarily reside in word and sense and through them they become condusive to rasa, i.e. 'rasopakāraka'. In his Viveka (pp. 34 edn Parikh, Kulkarni, ibid) Hemacandra seems to follow the line of Mammata and seems to agree with him in denouncing Udbhata and Vāmana. But the general approach of the Dhvanikāra of corretating gunas and alamkāras with rasa-dhvani continues in Hemacandra also. Hemacandra observes (pp. 34, 35, Kā śā. Edn. Parikh, Kulkarni.) :
guna-dosayoḥ samānya-laksanam āha- “rasasyótkarsā pakarşahetū gunadosau, bhaktyā śabdárthayoḥ." (Kā. śā. I. 12)
raso vaksyamāņa-svarūpaḥ tasyótkarşahetavo guņāḥ, apakarşa-hetavas tu došāḥ. te ca rasasyaiva dharmāḥ, upacāreņa tu tad-upakāriņo śabdárthayor ucyante. rasā”śrayatvam ca guna-dosayor anvaya-vyatirekánuvidhānāt. tathā hi, yatraiva dosās tatraiva guņāḥ, rasa-viśeşe ca doṣā, na tu śabdárthayoh-yadi hi tayoḥ syus tad bibhatsā”dau kastavā”dayo guņā na bhaveyuḥ. hāsyā”dau cāślīlatvā”dayah, anityāś caite dosah. yato yasyanginas te dosās tad abhāve na dosas tadbhāve tu dosā ity anvaya-vyatirekābhyām guņa-dosayo rasa eva aśrayah.
alamkārāņām sāmānya-laksanam āha - "angāśritā alamkārāḥ” (Kā. śā. I. 13)rasasyā'ngino yad angam śabdárthau tad āśritā alamkārāḥ. te ca rasasya sataḥ kvacid upakāriņaḥ, kvacid anupakāriņaḥ rasábhāve tu vācya-vācaka-vaicitryamātra-paryavasitā bhavanti."
Hemacandra under Kā. śā. IV. 8 (pp. 292, ibid) quotes from Mammațaś K. P. (VIII. K. P. as above) and follows him with reference to vrttis and rītis. He also mentions these while quoting definitions from the N. S. of Bharata while discussing various forms of rūpakas. In short. Hemacandraś approach is in tune with the general approach of the Dhvanikāra and with that of Mammața in particular.
Jayadeva also being a dhvanivādin accepts rīti and vștti as suggesters of rasadhvani. But he attaches greater importance to rīti when he defines kavya

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1174
SAHRDAYĀLOKA at Candrāloka I. vii (pp. 11, Edn. Bharatiya vidya Prakaśana. Varanasī, '92 Edn.) when he observes :
“nirdosā lakṣaṇavatī sa-rītir guna-bhūsaņā, sā'lamkāra-rasā'neka-vșttir
vāk, kāvya-nāma-bhāk.” – (Candrāloka, I.vii) Thus for Jayadeva, poetry is that beautiful language which is free from blemishes, is gifted with 'laksanas' i.e. marks, is 'having rītis' and is also decorated by gunas i.e. excellences. It is accompanied by alamkāras, rasas and many vrttis. Jayadeva has both ‘rīti' and 'gunas' separately mentioned. So for him they are not identical. We will look into greater details when we go for topics of guna, dosa, alamkāra, laksana, rīti, vrtti, etc. individually in Vol. II of this work. For the present we just take notice of the fact that Jayadeva also is a dhvanivādin and accepts rasadhvani to be central to poetry and this rasadhvani is suggested by different suggesters-vyañjakas, rīti and vịtti being two of them.
Vidyādhara is also a dhvanivādin and shares the same attitude. He also, like Jayadeva seems to take the concept of rīti as one connected with presence and type of 'samāsas' in poetry. We will go into individual attitude later but at the end of Ch. V, Vidyadhara has this remark- "darśanántare tv etā vaidarbhi-pāñcăli-gaudīyā céti tisro ritayo madhura-madhyama-parusa-varnā"rabdhatvan madhura madhyama parusā céti vrttayo, rasa-visaya-vyāpāratvena kathyante. yad uktam alamkārasarvasva-kāreņa, "vșttis tu rasavisayo vyāpārah" iti.
Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudrīya (Edn. Madras, '14. with “Ratnāpaņa' comm.) explains the concept of poetry (pp. 31, 32, ibid) and following the dhvani dictate, takes-rītis, vȚttis, guņas, alamkāras, sayyā etc.- all concepts to be condusive to rasadhvani. He observes : (pp. 31 ibid)
“atha kāvya-prakaranam” "atha kaya-svarūpa-nirūpaņam." "guņā'lamkāra-sahitau śabdárthau dosa -varjitau, gadya-padyóbhaya-mayam kāvyam kāvya-vido- viduḥ."- 1.
(pp. 32, 33, 34, 35...)

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guna,......
1175 śabdárthau mūrtir ākhyātau jīvitam vyangya-vaibhavam, hārádivad alamkārās tatra syur upamā”dayaḥ-2 śleşā”dayo guņās tatra śauryā”daya iva sthitāḥ, ātmotkarşā”vahās tatra svabhāvā iva rītayaḥ. -3 śobhām āhāryikim prāptā vịtayo vșttayo yathā, padánugunya-viśrāntiḥ śayyā śayyéva sammatā. - 4 rasā"svāda-prabhedāḥ syuḥ pākāḥ pākā iva sthitā), prakhyātā lokavad, iyam sāmagrī kávya-sampadaḥ.” -5.
... (p. 34, 35) .... : kaiśiky arabhati sātvati bhāratī céti racanā”śritatvena rasávasthāna-sūcakās catasro vsttayaḥ. tathā coktam daśa-rūpake
“kaiśiky ārabhati caiva sāttvatī bhārati tathā catasro vsttayo jñeyā
rasávasthāna-sūcakāḥ.” iti. racanāyā api rasa-vyañjakatvam prasiddham- rasā’nanuguna-varņa-racanāyā dosatvam uktam. vaidarbhi-prabhịtayo rīti-viśeşā na vsttişv antarbhūtāḥ.”
It may be noted that Mammața had cancelled vịttis in favour of rītis, but here Vidyadhara mentions a view which took 'rīti' as not absorbed in vrttis. Whatever it may be, we will look into details later but for the present we note that the dhvanivādinś stand to accept all concepts as rasa-vyañjakas, seems to carry weight.
Viśvanātha also accepts the wider scheme of Anandavardhana and accepts all concepts as suggesters of 'rasa-dhvani' which alone for him is the soul of poetry. The

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1176
SAHṚDAYALOKA
Sahityadarpaṇa (=S. D.) I. iii (pp. 20-25, Edn. ibid, with Lakshmi-tikā) observes"vākyam rasā"tmakam kāvyam doṣās tasyápakarşṣakāḥ utkarṣa-hetavaḥ proktāḥ, guṇā'lamkāra-rītayaḥ."
Viśvanatha observes in the vṛtti on S. D. I. iii. (pp. 25, ibid)- "guṇāḥ śauryā"divat, alamkārāḥ kaṭaka-kuṇḍalā"divat, rītayaḥ avayava-samsthāna viśeṣavat, deha-dvāreņa śabdā"rtha-dvāreņa, tasyaiva kāvyasya āṭmabhūtam rasam utkarṣayantaḥ kavyasyotkarṣakā iti ucyante. Thus, the wider scheme introduced by Anandavardhana continues in the dhvani-school of literary aesthetics.
Jagannatha of course is a dhvanivadin to the core, but he has his own ideas which at times do not conform absolutley with the traditional views of the dhvanivādins. Thus, for example he discusses the rasa-vyañjakatva of letters, words, racanā (i.e. rīti/vṛtti etc.) sentence and a whole composition etc. in his own way. He has certain reservations. He begins with the traditional view and then gives his own observations. He observes (pp. 368-372, CH. I. Edn. Chowkhamba Vidyabhavam, Varansi, '55; and pp. 316-317, Edn. Prof, Athavale, ibid): tad ittham nirūpitasya asya rasa❞di-dhvani-prabandhaiḥ padaika-deśair avarnā”tmakai rāgā"dibhiśca abhivyaktim amananti.... varṇa-racanã-viseṣāṇām mādhuryādiguṇábhivyañjakatvam eva na rasábhivyañjakatvam, gauravān mānábhāvācca..."
We will see how Jagannatha proceeds:
Jagannatha observes that the rasa-bhāvā"di-dhvani discussed so far is said to be suggested by pada, varna, racanā, vākya, prabandha, padaika-deśa i.e. parts of a pada and also by raga etc. which are not part of a pada. (a-varṇā"tmakair dhvanirūpair gīta-vādya"di-sambandhinībhiḥ rāgaiḥ, ādi-pada-grāhyābhiśceṣṭā"dibhiśca - (pp. 366, Candrikā tikā). This is the view of some ālamkarikas. He holds that when a vākya or sentence is said to be suggester, virtually only that pada or word which is not dissociated from suggestivity is in reality a suggester and not all words therein. But the whole activity of suggestion proceeds on the analogy of 'dandacakra-nyāya'. Just as daṇḍa, i.e. handle, cakra i.e. wheel etc. jointly make for ghata or pot, in the same way here also pada, vakya and racanã-each of these can be taken as rasa-vyañjaka.
Now he proceeds to give the view of the "navyas". According to this view, the 'racanã' (or style/diction) which consists of employment of special letters, is

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,....
1177 suggestive only of gunas or excellences and that it should not be taken as suggestive o rasā"di. For, if we accept 'racanã' to be suggestive of rasa, it involves 'gauravadosa', for in that case we will have to go for two types of racanã or construction, one each suggesting gunas and rasas. Again there is no 'pramāna' for accepting this situation. Again, there is no rule that a racan, cannot suggest 'guna' without suggesting guņi(-i.e. rasa) first. For if we accept this rule then, this rule will stand violated with reference to sense-organs such as those of smell, taste and hearing. For these three sense-organs are suggestive of gunas but not gunis in form of akāśa, prthvī, etc. Thus, as the independent guņis such as prthvi etc. are suggested by their own sense-organs and as guņas such as smell etc. are suggested by their own independent set of organs, and after that getting united they become object of pratyaksa or direct perception, in the same way here, both rasa and mādhuryā"di gunas are suggested by their own agents and then either jointly or severally they are tasted : -"ittham ca sva-sva-vyañjakópanitānām guninām günānām udāsīnānām ca yathā parasparópaśleşena audāsīnyena vā tat tat pramiti-gocaratā, tathā rasā"dīnām tad-gunānām ca abhivyakti-visayatā iti tu navyāḥ."
Candrikā (pp. 371, ibid) explains as follows :-“sva-sva-vyañjakair varņā”dibhiḥ, upanītānām bodhitānām, guņinām prthīvy adīnām, guņānām gandhā"dīnām, udāsīnānām guna-guni-bhāvena mithósambaddhānām padárthānām ca, pramitigocaratā, pramātmaka-pratyaksa-visayatā, kadācit upaślesena, gunānām guninām mithaḥ sambaddhatvena, kadācit punar audāsīnyena mithósambaddhatvena ca yathā bhavati, tathā guņinām rasānām guņānām mādhuryā"dīnām cā'bhivyaktivisayatā, āsvāda-gocaratā, kadăcin militatvena, kadācic ca pārthakyena bhavati iti vyavasthayā, rasā”dy a-vyañjakatve'pi mādhuryā"di-vyañjakatā varnādīnām na asambhavinī iti tu navyā vandanti ity arthah.”
So, Jagannātha has his own interpretation and independent view-point.
Anandavardhana presented his scheme only to silence all opposition to dhvani. We will look into this below.
It may be noted that samghatanā is a concept which in this name, appears only in the Dhvanyāloka and then disappears. Later perhaps it is identified with gunas or with vịtti based on the presence or absence of the types of samāsas or compounds, wedded perhaps also with the type of consonants - vyañjanas-such as harsh or soft
mixed. Whatever it may be, the ground reality is that after Anandavardhanas effort in the field of literary aesthetics, rasa, say rasa-dhvani remained in centre and all concepts floated by various authorities were woven together in a well-knit carpet and not a single concept was dishonoured or denounced.

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1178
SAHĶDAYĀLOKA Dhvani-virodha :
However, there still continued some opposition to the Dhavikāraś absolute supremacy. Voices were raised against dhvani in different quarters and Anandavardhana himself tried to answer some objections before presenting his scheme. But the fact is that the opposition was more to the concept of vyañjanā rather than the fact of implicit sense, whether it was named 'Dhvani' or otherwise.Actually nobody had any objection to the fact of the implicit sensepratīyamāna artha -in poetry and it was accepted by all either in the garb of a faint undertone or a powerful overtone. But the process of arriving or apprehending it in poetry created debate and Anandavardhanaś projection, or favour of vyañjanā as a separate and independent word-power caused many an eyebrow to rise with the result that in place of vyañjană a number of alternatives were pushed forward. We have taken care of all this inCh. IX on "vyañjanā-virodha" and there is no point in going through all that again. Actually 'dhvani-virodha' is more 'vyañjanā-virodha' and of course the terminology viz. dhvani' was also ridiculed to a great extent. We will look into the same here in a nut shel.
Jayadeva in his Vimarsini commentary alludes to the so-called dhvanivirodha in a well-known verse. He observes :
“tātparya-śaktir abhidhā lakṣaṇā’numiti dvidhā, arthāpattiḥ,kvacit tantram samāsóktkyādy alamkrtiḥ, rasasya kāryatā, bhogaḥ, vyāpārántara-bādhanam, dvādaśettham dhvaner asya
sthitā vipratipattaya).” Opposition to dhvani is twelvefold, says Jayadeva. They are that dhvani is negated by or is covered up by devices such as (i) tātparya-sakti, i.e. the sentence power of purport, (ii) abhidhā or the word-power of direct expression, i.e. denotation, (iii) (iv) two-fold laksaņā or the power of indication operating in two ways, (v) (vi) anumiti or inference, which is again two-fold-, (vii) arthāpatti or presumption i.e. argument or inference based on circumstances; (viii) tantra,i.e. double entendre (ix) alamkāras such as 'samāsókti' and the like, (x) the fact that

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1179 rasa follows as a result (kāryatā), (xi) bhogaḥ i.e. rasa is tasted (by bhāvakatva/ bhojakatva), (xii) Or that any other power is negated-vyāpārántara-bādhanam, i.e. it is a-nirvācya. These twelve are doubts raised against 'dhvani.' These objections display the graph of opposition to dhvani at different stages or in different periods of time. Kuntaka is examined by us very carefully and has been given the benefit of doubt but the arch enemies of dhvani-vyañjanā were Mahimā, the protagonist of inference-theory in poetry i.e. Kavyanumiti, and then Dhananjaya and Dhanika the supporters of tātparya. Bhoja, of course supported tātparya but he was not averse to vyañjanā/dhvani and like Kuntaka he secures the benefit of doubt. We have examined all these authors earlier while dealing with vyañjanā-virodha. For the present we will look into only the dhvani-virodha as listed and explained by Dhvanikāra in Dhv. I. i, and vịtti theron and also as explained by Abhinavagupta in his Locana. It may be noted that we have dealt with vyañjanā and opposition to it separately so whatever Anandavardhava has to say on the difference between abhidhā, laksanā, anumiti, etc. on one side and vyañjanā on the other, has been duly discussed by us and therefore will not be repeated here. Same will be the case of alamkārikas of the dhvani-school beginning with Mammața and down to Jagannātha, taking in the sweep of course, Hemacandra, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha, -whose views are already discussed by us. in Ch. IX. The views of dirgha-dirghatara abhidhāvādin, nimittavādin etc. are carefully analysed by us and so also Makulaś position, along with Pratīhārendurājaś view-point, has been critically discussed by us. So, for the present we will take care of only the relevant portion of the Dhv. and some comments on the same at places by Abhinavagupta in his Locana.
Anandavardhana, in the very first Kārikā of his Dhvanyāloka refers to some opponents of dhvani. He observes :
“kāvyasyā”tmā dhvanir iti budhaiḥ yaḥ samāmnāta-pūrvaḥ tasyā bhāvam jagadur apare bhāktam āhus tam anye, kecid vācām sthitam avisaye tattvam ūcus tadīyam tena brūmaḥ sahrdayamanahprītaye tat-svarūpam.” (Dhv. I. i.) (pp. 1, ibid).

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1180
SAHĶDAYĀLOKA "Though the learned men of yore have declared (time and again) that the soul of poetry is suggestion, some would aver its non-existence, some would re it as something (logically) implied and some others would speak of its essence as lying beyond the scope of words. We propose, therefore, to explain its nature and bring delight to the hearts of perspective critics. (Dhv. I. i.) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 2, ibid).
We had quoted above what Jayaratha had to say about opposition to dhvani. It contained a reference to some who took two-fold lakṣaņā as equivalent to dhvani. Here a view holding dhvani as “bhākta” i.e. bhakti grāhya' is mentioned in Dhv. I. i. This is identical with Jayarathas reference. Under Dhv. III. 33, Anandavardhana has distinguished vyañyanā from abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, anumiti and also tātparya. All these opponents are mentioned by Jayadeva. It was Bhatta-nāyaka who supported "rasasya-bhogah", perhaps in his, now not available work viz. "Hşdayadarpana specifically drafted by him for demolition of dhvani i.e. 'dhvani-dhvamsa.' He rejected vyañjanā in favour of two powers such as "bhāvakatva" and "bhojakatva". (i.e. the power of revelation and enjoyment). Ānandavardhana has considered the views of the Mimāmsakas and the same is referred to by Jayaratha as those who prefer tātparya over vyañjanā. The view with two-fold anumiti is the same as the view of the Naiyāyikas considered by the Dhvanikāra under Dhv. III. 33, where also abhidhā/vyañjanā are carefully distinguished. 'Kvacit tantram' is taken care of under sabda-sakti-müla-dhvani and blesa in the Dhy. We will take the refutation of arthāpatti under anumāna (Dhv. III. 33). 'rasasya kāryatā' is the view of Lollata and the "vyāpārántara-bādhana' of Jayaratha is the same as "vācām avisayaḥ”view, referred to in Dhv. I. i.
We will now proceed with what Anandavardhana has to say under Dhv. I. i.He observes that the learned critics have, from times of yore, had recognised 'dhvani’ as the 'soul of poetry. We know that, as Abhinavagupta explains, this ancient tradition was inherited by Anandavardhana. The tradition was orally floated and at least Abhinavagupta knows no written document discussing dhvani, prior to the Dhvanyāloka. So this thought-current which was critically examined and promulgated by unknown ancients must have had to face rough weather in form of opposition, the first view being of those who flatly rejected di abhāvam jagadur apare.” We will look into the same as blow :
First of all we will take notice of what the Locana has to say in the beginning. The Locana observes (under Dhy. I. i., pp. 86, Edn. Nandi, ibid) : "yasya adhigamāya pratyuta pravartanīyam kā tatra abhāva-sambhāvanā ? atah kim kurmah ?

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guna.......
1181 apāram maurkhyam abhāvavādinām iti bhāvaḥ-" That, to know which, on the contrary we should make an effort, is denied by the opponents), where can be the possibility of its non-existence. The foolishness of those who deny (dhvani) is beyond measure. So, what can we do about it?"
Anandavardhana observes that the following are the types of arguments of the abhāvavādins :
(vrtti, Dhv. I. i; pp. 1, Edn. K. Kris. ibid) -
"tad abhāvavādinām ca ami vikalpāḥ sambhavanti. tatra kecid acakṣīran'śabdártha-śarīram tāvat kāvyam .... tadvyatiriktaḥ kóyam dhvanir nāma iti ?"“According to some (of the objectors) : “Poetry is but that whose body is constituted by sound (or word) and meaning. Sources of charm through sound such as 'alliteration' are well-known; and so are the sources of charm through meaning such as 'simile'. Merits or qualities of composition (=excellences) like "sweetness" are also familiar to us. Also we have heard of dictions (=vrttis) such as the 'cultured' propounded by some, though in truth their features are not different from qualities of style. We have further heard of styles (rītayah) like 'vaidarbhí. But what could this concept of Dhvani (suggestion) be which is different from any of these ?" - (Trans- K. Kris., pp. 2, ibid).
Abhinavagupta observes that the use of aorist in 'jagaduh' suggests that the types of the views of the objectors are imagined by the author and then are refuted. In reality such views of the objectors are not noticed in written works.
He observes that (Locana, Dhv. I. i.; pp. 6, Edn. Nandi, ibid)- “tatra samayā'pekşeņa sabdortha-pratipādakaḥ iti krtvā vācya-vyatiriktam nā'sti vyangyam; sad api vā tad abhidhā-vrtty-ākśiptam sabdáva-gatártha-balād akrstam, tad anāksiptam api vā na śakyam, kumārīşv iva bhartp-sukham atadvitsu iti traya eva ete. pradhānā vipratipatti-prakārāh,” “With reference to convention, the word is expressive of meaning. So, there is nothing called 'the suggested', beyond the expressed sense. Even if it exists, it is implied by abhidhā-vștti i.e. denotation, and is arrived at through the force of the expressed sense and therefore it can be said to be 'bhākta' i.e. implied, at the most. And if it is not derived by the force of expressed sense, then it remains undefinable like the happiness of the company of a husband in case of the unmarried girls. Thus these three are the main types of objections.”
Introducing further the view of Anandavardhana, the Locana observes : (pp. 6, on Dhv. I. i, ibid)

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1182
SAHRDAYĀLOKA "tatra abhāva-vikalpasya trayaḥ prakārāḥ; śabdártha-guņálamkārāņam eva śabdártha-sobhākāritvāt loka-śāstrátirikta-sundara-sabdártha-rūpasya kāvyasya na śobhāhetuḥ kaścid anyósti yósmābhir na ganita ity ekah prakāraḥ. yo vā na ganitaḥ sa sobhākāry eva na bhavati iti dvitīyaḥ. atha śobhākāri bhavati tarhy asmad ukta eva gune vā'lamkāre vā’ntarbhavati, nāmántarakarane tu kiyad idam pāndityam ? athāpy ukteņu guneșv alamkāreșu na antarbhāvaḥ, tathā’pi kinñcid višeșa-leşam āśritya nāmántara-karaṇam, upamā-vicchitti-prakārāņām a-samkhyatvāt. tathā’pi gunálamkāra-a-vyatiriktatvā'bhāva eva, tavan mätrena ca kim krtam ? anyasya'pi vaicitryasya śakyótpreksyarvāt. cirantanair hi bharata-muni-prabhștibhir yamakópame eva śabdālamkāratvena iște. tat-prapañca-dik-pradarśanam tv anyair alankāra-kāraiḥ krtam. tad yathā- "karmaņi anity atra kumbhakārā”dy udāharanam śrtvā nagarakārā"di sabda utpreksyante, tàvatā ka ātmani bahumānaḥ ? evam prakşte’pi iti tệtīyaḥ prakāraḥ. evam ekas tridhā vikalpaḥ annyau ca dvāv iti pañca vikalpā iti tātparyárthah”
. “There are three types of abhāva-vikalpa i.e. (total) denial of dhvani (such as), only gunas or excellences and alamkāras i.e. figures are the devices of beauty with reference to word and sense. So, for kāvya which is of the form of beautiful word and sense apart from (word and sense in common parlance or in scientific usage, there is no other beautifying device beyond this (=guņas and alamkāras, with reference to word and sense), which is not considered by us;- this is the first variety of objection. Or, (the second type of objection is that), that which is not considered by us is not at all a beautifying agent. This is the second type of abhāvavādins. Now, if it is said, that it is very much there and is also the cause of beauty, then in that case it has to be included in (either the list of) gunas or that of alamkāras. What is the big in giving a special name (i.e. coining a special term) for it ? Now, if it is said that this new device cannot be included in either gunas or al enlisted before, then with reference to its special feature let it receive a new name (i.e. let it be taken as an additional new guna or alamkāra), for there are innumerable varieties of the beauty caused by similitude. So, even if a new name is given, basically it surely is not different from a guņa or an alamkāra, and just for this only, i.e. just for being floated as a new guna or a new alamkāra, nothing big is achieved. We can also imagine some other new devices causing beauty (that are basically either a guņa or an alamkāra). Ancient authority such as Bharata muni had mentioned only two figures such as 'yamaka' and 'upamā', as figure word and sense respectively. Other alamkārikas showed the way to expansion of these. Pāṇini, for example, gave the sūtra viz. “karmaņi aņ". With this the word

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1183
'kumbhakara' is generated. Keeping this in view other words such as "suvarṇakāra", "nagara-kāra" etc. also can be generated, (by anybody with help of Paniniś sūtra). So, why brag around by such a small achievement (as calling a guna or alamkāra) by the name 'dhvani') for this is similar to the instance given above (of wider application of Paninis sūtra). This is the third type of objectors. Add to these three, the two (viz. bhāktavādins and aśakya-vaktavya-vādins) and we arrive at a total of five types of objectors. This is the substance (of what Anandavardhana has laid down)."
We have seen how Anandavardhana has presented the first type of objectors, (which is three fold in itself).
Abhinavagupta here further observes that by the use of "tāvat", it is suggested that nobody is basically opposed to the idea that poetry is both word and sense taken together. For there is no merit is just giving a name to a thing. 'Kavya' is the name given to the union of sabda and artha. Now, if the new name 'dhvani' is given to the same (i.e. union of word and sense, having the name of 'kāvya), nothing new is to be served. So, perhaps 'dhvani' is not of the form of the union of word and sense, but is its (=union's) beauty. Thus dhvani is just the beauty of word and sense taken together. Now this beauty can be twofold. Either it rests on its form only (i.e._ it is sva-rupa-matra-nistha) or it rests on the construction (of word and sense, i.e. samghatana-nistha). The beauty resting on svarupa or form is arrived at by śabdálamkāras or figures of sound, and the beauty arrived at by construction (i.e. samghatana-nista-cārutva) results from sabda-gunas (i.e. excellenas based on word). Similarly the two-fold beauty residing in artha or meaning results from upamā"di alamkāras and excellences such as sweetness etc. (i.e. mādhuryā”di gunas) respectively. Thus there is nothing beyond this (i.e. nothing beyond śabártha-guna'lamkāra). So, 'dhvani' is not at all a basically new concept. For, whatever is else than either guna or alamkāra can never claim to be a cause of beauty, like the blemishes both permanent or impermanent such as 'a-sādhu' or 'duḥ-śrava' etc. respectively. Now your dhvani (which is not poetry itself, and therefore) is a device of beauty and hence it can not be other than that (i.e. either guna or an alamkara). This is argument in negation (i.e. vyatirakīhetu) Now, says the objector, even if some people argue that just as dictions (i.e. vṛttis) and styles (i.e. rītis) are different from gunas and alamkāras and still are (independent) devices of beauty, in the same way dhvani also can be an independent device of beauty, the answer (from the original objector to dhvani) could be this. In fact vṛttis and rītis are not basically different from alamkāras such as alliteration (or,

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
anuprāsā"di) or excellences such sweetness (i.e. madhurya"di) respectively. Vṛttis have no independent power beyond anuprāsā"di. Because they are non-different Bhamaha and other ancients have not taken their separate cognition. Eventhough the vṛttis are made current by alamkarikas such as Udbhața and the like, there is no substance in vṛttis which deserves to be taken as independent of anuprāsa etc. Same is the case with styles, i.e. rītis with reference to gunas. Thus vṛttis and rītis are not substantially different from anuprāsā"di and mādharyā"di respectively. Thus, the argument that dhvani, like vṛttis and rītis, should be cognised as a source of beauty independent of gunas and alamkāras, falls flat. Thus poetry, which is relished by a cognition which is one in itself and not comprising of parts (i.e. akhanda-buddhi-samāsvādya), if at all is analysed from the point of artificial analysis, will fail to yield an independent entity called 'dhvani': "-tena akhandabuddhi-samāsvadyam api kāvyam apoddhāra-buddhyā yadi vibhajyate, tatha'pyatra dhvani-śabda-vacyo na kaścid vyatiriktórtho labhyate iti 'nama'-śabdena aha." (Locana, Dhv. I. i.,pp. 10, end. Nandi, ibid)
1184
The view of the second type of objectors is placed by Anandavardhana inthe following words (Dhv. I. i.,vṛtti, pp. 1,3, Edn. K. Kris, ibid)- "anye bruyuḥ- 'nasty eva dhvaniḥ, prasiddha-prasthana-vyatirekiṇaḥ kavya-prakārasya kavyatva-hāneḥ. sahṛdaya-hṛdayā"hlādi-śabdártha-mayatvam eva kāvya-lakṣaṇam. na ca uktaprakārátirekino mārgasya tat sambhavati. na ca tat samayantaḥ pātinaḥ sahṛdayān kāñcit parikalpya tat-prasiddhyā dhvanau kāvyatva-vyapadeśaḥ pravartitópi sakala-vidvan-manogrāhitām ālambate."
-"Others assert thus:" Suggestion does not exist indeed; for a species of poetry opposed to all well-known canons will necessarily cease to be poetry. Poetry can only be defined as that which is made up of such words and meanings as will delight the mind of the critic. This will not be achieved by a route which excludes all the wellknown canons mentioned. Even if the designation of poetry were to be accepted as applying to 'dhvani' on the unanimous support of a coterie of self-styled critics, it would fail to win the acceptance of all the learned." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 3,5, ibid).
Abhinavagupta places the argument of the objector beautifully. It is like this (Locana, Dhv. I. i.; pp. 10, Edn. Nandi, ibid)- "tathā hi khadga-lakṣaṇam karomi ity uktvā, ātāna-vitānā"tmā, prāvriyamāṇaḥ, sakala-dehā"cchadakaḥ, sukumāras' citra-tantu-viracitaḥ, samvartana-vivartana-sahiṣṇur acchedakaḥ, succhedyaḥ, utkṛsta-khadgaḥ iti bruvāṇam paraiḥ paṭaḥ khalv evamvidho bhavati, na khadga iti yuktyā paryanuyujyamāna evam brūyāt īdṛśa eva khadgo mama abhimata iti tādṛg vā etat. prasiddham, hi lakṣaṇam bhavati, na kalpitam iti bhāvaḥ."

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‘Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,....
1185 -"If someone says, 'I will define a sword,' and then starts saying, “that which can be stretched or shortened, which covers the body, which is delicate and made of beautiful fibres, that which can be folded or unfolded, that which can be easily torn is a sword). Now, if somebody else stops him intervening with a remark that, 'Such a definition fits with a piece of cloth and not a sword." then that person would say, "No, only such a definition of sword is acceptable to me," (then how can we prevent him ? Same is the case with those who defy dhvani). The idea is that only the well-known qualities can make for a definition.
Anandavardhana further gives a third view of the dhvany-abhāva-vādins. He observes : "punar apare tasya abhāvam anyatha kathayeyuh.' na sambhavaty eva dhvanir nāma apūrvah kaścit. kāmanīyakam anativartamānasya tasya ukteșy eva cărutva-hetusv antarbhāvāt. teşām anyatamasyaiva vā apūrva-samākhyā-mātrakarane yat-kiñcana kathanam syāt.” (vrtti, Dhv. I. i.; pp. 4, ibid) :- "Yet another opinion about its non-existence is : "It is indeed impossible that 'suggestion' can be something unknown before. Since it is not distinct from a source of charm, it gets naturally included in the causes of charm already enunciated. By coining a novel designation to just one of them nothing profound will have been stated.” (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 5, ibid).
The objector says that as the ways of speech are endless, an insignificant element could have been left out unexplained by the famous framers of the rules of poetry. This is possible. So, it is surprising that persons should close their eyes under the self-assumed illusion of being 'perceptive critics' and dance about with joy saying that they have discovered 'dhvani' in some hitherto unnamed element causing beauty. Thousands of other great men have expounded, and are still expounding, figurative elements of poetic speech. Such an over excitement is not noticed here. So, dhvani is but a fabrication; and it will not be possible for the supporters of dhvani to demostrate any element of truth about it which can bear scrutiny. -Anandavardhana observes : (vrtti on Dhv. I. i.; pp. 4, ibid) :
tasmāt pravāda-matram dhvaniḥ. na tv asya kşodakşamam tattvam kiñcid api prakāśayitum sakyam." Anandavardhana quotes a caustic remark against dhvani, which could be from some Manoratha Kavi, his contemporary, as suggested by Abhinavagupta in the Locana. The Dhvanikara observes (pp. 4, vrtti, Dhv. I. i, ibid) -
: "tathā ca anyena krta eva atra ślokah
yasminn asti na vastu kiñcana

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1186
SAHRDAYĀLOKA manaḥ-prahlādi sálamkşti vyutpannair racitam na caiva vacanair vakrokti-sünyam ca yat, kāvyam tad dhvaninā samanvitam iti prītyā praśamsañ jadah, no vidmóbhidadhāti kim sumatinā
prstaḥ svarūpam dhvaneh.”“In fact, a gentleman has already composed a verse to this effect
-Poetry, wherein there is nothing to delight the mind and no embellishment, which is destitute of felicitous words and artful turns, is praised so warmly by the
eing endowed with dhvani (suggestion). But we are at a loss to imagine what answer he would give when faced with a straight question by an intelligent critic about the nature of 'dhvani’ itself !” (Trans- K. Kris., pp. 5, ibid).
Abhinavagupta suggests (Locana, Dhv. I. i.; pp. Edn. Nandi, ibid) : "granthakệt-samāna-kala-bhāvinā manoratha-nāmnā kavinā.”
After taking note of the three dhvany-abhāva-vādins Anandavardhana proceeds to refer to two more such views viz. the one, bhāktavādins, i.e. those who try to include dhvani under 'bhakti' or 'laksanā' and the rest who feel that dhvani, inspite of its being an inependent catagory cannot be defined-'an-ākhyeya-vādins.'
To explain 'bhakti' the Locana has the following : (on Dhv. I.; pp. 14, Edn. Nandi, ibid)– “bhajyate sevyate padárthena, prasiddhatayā utpreksyate iti bhaktir dharmóbhidheyena sāmīpyādiḥ. tata āgato bhākto lākṣaṇikórthaḥ. yad āhuḥ
"abhidheyena sāmīpyāt (sambandhāt) sārūpyāt samavāyataḥ, vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāt
laksaņā pañcadhā matā." guna-samudāya vṛtteḥ śabdasya arthabhāgas taiksnyā”dir bhaktih, tata ägato gauņórtho bhāktaḥ. bhaktiḥ pratipādye sāmīpya-taiksnyā"dau śraddhátiśayaḥ. tām prayojanatvena uddiśya tata āgato bhākta iti gauņo, lākṣaṇikaśca. mukhyasya cárthasya bhango bhaktir ity evam mukhyártha-bādha- nimitta-prayojanam iti upacārabījam ity uktam bhavati.”
"That which is resorted to by the word meaning, that which is imagined in form of a well-known meaning, is 'bhakti' i.e. the relation such as 'nearness' etc. with the

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,.....
1187 denoted sense. The meaning derived from 'bhakti' is termed 'bhākta'. It is also 'gauņa' i.e. subordinate, or derived from guņa/quality, or it is called 'lākṣaṇika' or 'indicated sense' also. It is said
"due to relation with the literal meaning, such as closeness etc.; or similarity, or association (samavāya), or contrariety (vaiparītya), or association with some action (kriyāyoga), laksanā or indication is said to be five-fold."
"Bhakti' is that portion of meaning which is such as 'pointedness' etc. The meaning derived through that is 'bhākta' or 'indicated.' Absolute faith in 'closeness', pointedness or sharpness (as in agnir māņavakah), which are supposed to be conveyed, is 'bhakti'. (i.e. the speaker should have conviction that by such and such a usage, he will convey his intended sense). This is taken as the prayojana i.e. purpose for resorting to indication, and the meaning arrived at through this process is called 'bhākta' or 'gauna' or 'lāksanika' i.e. secondary or indicated. The breaking or dismissal of the primary sense is also termed 'bhakti'. Thus the seed of metaphorical expression (i.e. upacara) is said to be the presence of three factors such as 'contradiction of the literal sense', 'the cause' (i.e. relation etc.), and 'the motive' (prayojana, for resorting to such a usage).
On Ānandavardhanaś observation that, “anye tam dhvani-samjñitam kāvyā"tmānam gunavrttir. ity āhuh", the Locana observes that the first three varieties) of 'abhāvavāda' was only an imagined objection. In reality whether these objectors existed or not is not known. It is precisely for this uncertainty the use of "jagaduh"- an aorist form, was preferred by the Dhvanikāra. But 'laksanāvāda' i.e. supporters of laksaņā, disfavouring dhvani, are read in works in a continuous link. So, (āhuh) the use of present tense is seen here :- "abhāva-vādasya sambhāvanāprānatvena bhūtatvam uktam. bhāktavādas tv avicchinnaḥ pustakeşvity abhiprāyena āhur iti nitya-pravartamānāpeksayā abhidhānam." (Locana, Dhv. I. i., pp. 14, Edn. Nandi, ibid).
This statement of the Locanakāra is important. In fact a verse written by a contemporary, identified as "Manoratha Kavi" by the Locanakāra, was quoted by Anandavardhana himself. So, the abhāvavada' also, it seems, had known supporters. Or, perhaps Manoratha was a lakṣaṇā-vādin.
As for laksaņāvāda, Ānandavardhana has following observation.- (Dhv. I. i.; vrtti, pp. 4, ibid) : - "bhāktam āhus tam anye. anye tam dhvani-samiñitam kāvyā"tmānam guna-vrttir iry āhuh. yadyapi ca dhvani-sabda-sankirtanena kāvyalaksaņa-vidhāyibhir gunavịttir anyo vā na kaścit prakāraḥ prakāśitaḥ, tathā’pi

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA amukhya-vstryā kāvyeșu vyavahāram darśayatā dhvanimārgo manāk-sprstópi na laksita iti parikalpya evam uktam. 'bhāktam āhus tam anve iti' mention it as something (logically) implied. (To put it differently,) others declare that the soul of poetry, designated by the term suggestion, is the same as a secondary usage of words. Although it is true that no literary theorist has ever shown any element like a secondary usage of words as being specially identical with suggestion by mentioning the word 'suggestion' itself, we have noted here such a view because we can conclude that one who points out the secondary usage of words in poetry has slightly touched the fringe of the doctrine of suggestion, though one does not define it."- (Trans. K. Kris., pp. 5, ibid)
On this, the Locana observes (pp. 16, Edn. Nandi, ibid) : "darśayatā iti. bhatóbhața-vāmanā”dinā. bhāmahena uktam, “sabdścchandóbhidhānárthāh” iti. abhidhānasya śabdād bhedam vyākhyātum bhatródbhato babhāșe- 'śabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvyāpārah, mukhyo gunavrttiś ca, iti. vāmanópi 'sādrśyāllaksanā vakroktir iti. manāk sprsta iti. tais tāvad dhvani-dig-unmīlitā, yathālikhitapāthakais tu svarūpa-vivekam kartum a-saknuvadbhih tat-svarūpaviveko na krtah, pratyutaupālabhyate., a-bhagna-nārikelavat, vathā-śruta-tad-granthódgrahana-mătrena iti.”
-“By pointing out”- (is meant that) by Bhattódbhasa and Vāmana etc. Bhāmaha observed : "sound, metre, word (with meaning,) etc. "Bhatta Udbhata, while explaining (these words of Bhāmaha, in his Bhāmaha-vivarana) observes." By abhidhāna' of sounds is meant 'abhidhā-vyāpāra' or the power of expression, both principal and subordinate. Vāmana also observed : "Indication on the strength of similarity is termed 'vakrokti'. By "just touched” is meant that they opened the path (=direction) to 'dhvani'. But those who revelled only in reading that much which was written on face (i.e. those who had no ability to read between the lines), i.e. those who were incapable to discriminate the exact nature of outward) form, did not go for (proper) discrimination of the form, and they are on the contrary finding fault (with dhvanivādins). This is like an unbroken cocoanut (fruit). They have understood the works (of the ancients) only as they have heard (outwardly) (i.e. without going into the inner meaning).”
This shows that perhaps Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta are of the opinion that the ancients, i.e. Bhāmaha, Vāmana etc., though did not mention dhvani expressly but were not averse to it and had accepted dhvani under different heads. We have tried to discuss the position of the ancients in an earlier chapter, i.e. Ch. V.

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,.....
1189 Finally, Anandavardhana records the view of those who do not deny dhvani but feel that it cannot be defined. They are the "asakya-vaktavya-vādins.” They do not reject 'dhvani' as an independent concept, but hold that it eludes all attempts to define. Ānandavardhana observes : (pp. 6, vịtti, Dhv. I. i., ibid).
"kecit punaḥ laksana-karana-śālīna-bhddhayaḥ dhvanes tattvam girām agocaram sahşdaya-hrdaya-samvedyam eva samākhyātavantah."- "Still others not astute enough to frame a definition, rest content with saying that the true nature of suggestion is beyond all words and that it is discernible only to t perceptive critics."- (Trans. K. Kris.; pp, ibid)
The Locana observes : (on Dhy. I. i.; pp. 16, Edn. Nandi, ibid)- "ete ca traya uttaróttaram bhavya-buddhayaḥ. prācyā hi viparyastā eva sarvathā. madhyamās tu tad-rūpam jānānā api sandehena apahnuvate. antyās tv anapahnavā api laksayitum na janata iti kramena viparyāsa-sa-samdeha-ajñānaprādhānyam eteśām."
These three (i.e. the three abhāvavadins, the lakṣaṇāvādins, and the avyākhyeyatāvādins) are having brigher intellect in sequence. The ancients (who deny dhvani totally, the first three views) are absolutely inverted in their understanding) (i.e. they are totally deluded). The middle ones (i.e. the bhaktivādins) know its nature but due to doubt (in their mind, i.e. due to lack of clarity), are negating the same (or, are covering it up). The last ones do not reject (dhvani), but they do not know how to draft the definition. Thus in sequence these are dominated by, opposite (view), doubtful apprehension and ignorant understanding."
Anandavardhana says that as there are so many different opinions concerning dhvani, he takes upon himself to lay down the true nature of dhvani. We have noted that he is of the opinion that :- "tasya hi dhvaneh svarūpam sakala-satkavikāvyópanişad bhūtam atiramanīyam, anīyasībhir api cirantana-kāvya-laksanavidhāyinām buddhibhir anunmīlita-pūrvam; atha ca rāmāyana-mahābhārata
laksye sarvatra prasiddha-vyavahāram, laksayatām sahrdayanam ānando manasi labhatām pratisthām iti prakāśyate.”-“(vrtti, Dhv. I. i; pp. 6, ibid) :-“suggestion itself is both the quintessence of the works of all first-rate poets and the most beautiful principle of poetry though it remained unnoticed even by the subtlest of the rhetoricians of the past. However, refined critics are certainly alive to its primary presence in literary works like the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata; and with a view to placing their delight on a secure footing, we shall explain its nature (in detail)." (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 7, ibid).

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SAHṚDAYALOKA
It is in answer to the objections as explained above, Anandavardhana writes the whole of his Dhvanyaloka in which he presents a scheme which has a place for all thought-currents floated in the field of literary criticism, of course, with dhvani, i.e. rasa-dhvani remaining in the centre.
To begin with, Anandavardhana establishes the implicit sense i.e. pratīyamāna artha-as independent of the denotated sense i.e. väcyártha. We have seen how this implicit sense when principal, is termed 'dhvani' by him. He defines dhvani at Dhv. I. 13 and explains how its scope falls apart from that of the various devices of beauty at the expressed level such as figures of both sound and sense. Similarly, the excellences such as sweetness etc. and the styles and dictions (rīti, vṛtti) are also but suggesters of dhvani, the supreme rasa-dhvani in particular. The concepts of alamkāra, guņa, rīti, vṛtti etc. are all based on the relation of the expressed and the expressor (i.e. vācya-vācaka-bhāva) while dhvani rests exclusively on what he terms as "vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāva" i.e. the relation of the suggester and the suggested. Thus the scope of both these are different, i.e. 'vibhakta'. The view of the supporters of the known track only i.e. "prasiddha-prasthāna-vādins" does not stand scrutiny. They said that no definition of dhvani should be attempted for the earlier masters have not done it, as it is absent in known works of literature (i.e. lakṣya-granthas). But the main asgument is that not to attempt a definition because the ancients have not attempted, is in itself self-defeating. It contains hervabhāsa called 'viruddha', because actually it becomes logically more pertinent to attempt a definition if nobody else has tried it. Again to say that this dhvani-tattva is not noticed in great works of literature (=lakṣya-granthas) is rooted in hetvābhāsa called "a-siddha", as in reality this dhvani-tattva is seen predominantly present in great works such as the Ramāyaṇa or the Mahābhārata. Again some opponents had stated that even if dhvani exists, it has no relation with poetry. To this the answer is that it can be understood if it is said that dance and music have no intrinsic relation with the art of drama, but 'dhvani' is said to be the vary soul of poetry and so such an observation that it has no relation with poetry is absolutely thoughtless.
The third type of dhvani-abhāvavādins wanted to include dhvani in other sources of beauty such as guna, alamkara etc. as dhvani also is the cause of beauty (=ramaniyatā). But this is not correct as the tradition which these people advocate is based on väcya-vācaka-bhāva, while dhvani sails only on vyangya-vyañjakabhāva and thus there is no chance of the latter being covered up by the former. The guṇā'lamkāras are but parts or limbs (anga) and 'dhvani' is said to be 'ang?' i.e. the

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guna,......
1191. full-limbed species of poetry. Anandavardhana, in a detailed exposition, explains how dhvani, which is principal, cannot be subsumed under alamkāras such as samāsókti, āksepa etc. which are charged with subordinated implicit sense. He cencedes this much that if in paryāyókta or in some veriety of aprastuta-praśamsā the critic feels that the implicit sense is more charming than the expressed, than it can be included in dhvani having a wider scope (mahā-visaya) . Thus dhvani cannot be subsumed under any known literary concept. He observes : (vľtti, Dhv. I. 13) : tasmān na dhvaner anyatra antarbhāvah, itaś ca nā'ntarbhāvah, yatah kāvya-viśeşóngi dhvanir iti kathitaḥ tasya punar angāni-alamkārā guņā vsttayaś céti pratipādayisyate. na ca avayava eva prthag bhūtah ávayavī iti prasiddhaḥ a prthagbhāve tu tad angatvam tasya, na tu tattvam eva. yatrā'pi vā tattvam tatrā'pi dhvaner mahävisayatvāt na tan nisthatvam eva." It is thus established that suggestion cannot be subsumed under other heads.
Another reason why it cannot be so subsumed is the statement that, 'it is only the full-limbed species of poetry which gets the designation of 'dhvani' or 'suggestive poetry.' It will be explained hereafter that the limbs (of poetry) are figures, qualities (=excellences), and varieties of diction. Looking upon each component part as the whole itself is quite unheard of. When considered collectively, it will be but a part of the whole and never identical with the whole. Even if identity were possible in some instances, suggestive poetry can not be looked upon as conditioned by its limbs mentioned, since its sphere is very extensive. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 27, ibid).
Anandavardhana further observes : "sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ” iti vidvadupajñā iyam uktih, na tu yathākathañcit pravsttā iti pratipădyate. prathame hi vidvāmso vaiyakaranāh, vyākarana-mülatvāt sarva-vidyānām. te ca śrūyamānesu varnesu dhvanir iti vyavaharanti. tathaiva anyais tanmatánusāribhiḥ sūribhiḥ, kāvyatattvārtha-darsibhiḥ vācya-vācaka-sammiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyam iti vyapadesyo vyañjakarva-sāmyad dhvanir ity uktah, na ca evamvidhasya dhvaner vaksyamānaprabheda-tadbheda-sankalanayā mahāvisayasya yat prakāśanam tad a-prasiddhaalamkāra-visesamātra-pratipādanena tulyam iti tad-bhāvita-cetasām yukta eva samrambhah. na ca tesu kathañcid īrṣayā kaluşita-semușikatvam āviskaraniyam."
tad evam dhvanes tāvad abhāvavādinah pratyuktāḥ. asti dhvanih.” (vștti. Dhv. I. 13, pp. 26, 28, ibid).
-“The expression,” is designated by the learned" brings out the fact that this designation was first devised by the learned and that it has not gained currency in a haphazard fashion. The foremost among the learned are grammarians because grammar lies at the root of all studies. They indeed refer to articulate letters by the

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA term 'dhvani' or 'suggester'. In the same way, since the element of suggestion is common (to both), not only the word and its meaning, but its essential verba power and also that which is usually referred to by the term poetry, has been given the same designation, viz. 'Dhvani' by other learned men whose insight into the fundamental truth about poetry is profound and who are followers of the principles laid down by grammarians. A treatment, then, of such a comprehensive concept as suggestion, with all its divisions and subdivisions yet to be explained in the sequel, is not at all on a par with the enumeration of the well known, specific figures of speech and hence the enthusiasm of persons imbued in their minds with the value of suggestion is quite proper. None need display jealousy to show somehow that they are all men of deranged minds."- (Trans. K. Kris.; pp. 27, 29, ibid)
The Locana has the following observation : (pp. 76, Locana, Dhv. I. 13, Edn Nandi, ibid) : "tena vacyópi dhvanih, vācakópi śabdo dhvanih, dvavo vyañjakatvam 'dhvanati' iti kṛtvā. sammiśryate vibhāvánubhāva-samvalanayā iti vyangyópi dhvaniḥ, 'dhvanyate' iti krtvā. śabdanam śabdaḥ, śabda-vyāpāraḥ, na cā'sāv abhidhādirūpaḥ, api tv ātmabhūtaḥ, sópi dhvananam dhvaniḥ, kāvyam iti vyapadeśyaś ca yórthaḥ sópi dhvaniḥ. ukta-prakāra dhvani-catustaya-mayatvāt.”
Thus Anandavardhana refutes the abhāvavādins to his satisfaction. We have seen how the Locana on Dhv. I.iv. and then Mammata and the rest support the case of vyañjană following Anandavardhanas lead under Dhv. III. 33. We have examined all this under “vyañjanā-virodha" and hence no need to repeat the same over here.
After refuting the opponents of Dhvani Anandavardhana proceeds to suggest that basically dhvani is two-fold vig. avivaksita-vācya and vivaksitānyapara-vācya i.e. laksanāmüla and abhidhāmüla respectively suggesting of course that vyañjanāśakti, with reference to poetry or literature has to take its seat either on laksanā or abhidhā. 'Bhakti' or laksanā may be at the root of the first type of.dhvani but it is not identical with the same. Between the two there is difference in nature. Anandavardhana observes, (Dhy. I. 14): (pp. 28, ibid)
"bhaktyā bibharti naikatvam rūpabhedad ayam dhvanih, ativyāpter athā’vyāpter
na cā'sau laksyate tayā.” (Dhv. I. 14) "Suggestion does not bear identity with indication because there is difference in nature between the two. Nor is this a differentia of that as both the fallacies of Too

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,.....
1193 wide and Too Narrow would result (if one were to hold such a view).”
(Trans. K. Kris. pp. 29, 31, ibid). Dhvani which is explained and defined at Dhv. I. 13, etc. does not bear identity with logical implication or indication because of difference in nature between the two. Suggestion i.e. dhvani is the "unidirectional communication" (K. Kris. pp. 29, ibid) of a sense else than the expressed, both by the expressed sense or the expression itself (=vācya-vācaka), while at the same time the implicit sense will be exclusively, important (i.e. tātparyeņa prakāśanam). 'Bhakti' or indication is merely a metaphorical expression (upacāramātra). Again 'dhvani' or suggestion does not have 'bhakti' as its invariable mark (chihna) i.e. it is not determined by 'bhakti.' For, if it is so held the fallacies of "too wide" and also "too narrowo will follow as the case may be, argues Anandavardhana (vrtti, Dhv. I. 14). There is possibility of 'bhakti' or metaphorical expression in places where there is absence of dhvani. This is ati-vyāpti. Again with the presence of dhvani at times we have no semblance of bhakti as in case of abhidhā-mula-dhvani, which brings in the avyāpti-dosa. Again, observes Ānandavardhana : (Dhv. I. 17, 18, 19) (pp. 32, 34, ibid).
"mukhyām vịttim parityajya guņa-vịttyā’rtha-darśanam, yad-uddiśya phalam, tatra śabdo naiva s-khalad-gatiḥ. (Dhy. I. 17) vācakatvā”śrayeņaiva gunavịttir vyavasthitā, vyañjakatvaika-mülasya dhvaneh syāl laksanam katham. (Dhv. I. 18) "kasyacid dhvanibhedasya sā tu syād upalaksanam, laksaņe’nyaiḥ krte cā’sya pakșa-samsiddhir eva nah.”
(Dhv. I. 19) "If one gives up the primary denotative power of a word and understands a sense (secondarily converyed by it) through the indica ive power, it is because of a purpose. In conveying this purpose, the word does not move falteringly at all (as it moves 'falteringly when indicating a meaning secondarily.” (Dhv. I. 17).

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SAHRDAYĀLOKA "The fact is that indication is grounded on the primary denotative force of words. How can it ever be a definition of suggestion whose sole support is suggestivity ?" (Dhv. I. 18)
At the most, it might serve as a pointer to one of the species of suggestion.
If one were to say that the definition of suggestion has already been propounded by others, it would only substantiate our own position.” Dhv. I. 9). (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 33, 35 ibid).
In the end, Anandavardhana refutes the anākhyeya vādins also and observes that even those who hold that the nature of dhvani is within the experience of sensitive critics only and that it defies all attempt to form a definition. Then these people betray only their lack of discernment. For, observes Anandavardhana, dhvani has not only been defined, i.e. the general definition is not only propounded, but even definitions of some of its varieties are also to be satisfactorily given. Now, if with all this if dhvani is thought of as “in-expressible" then of course this would be true of all things in the world. And if these people through dhvaniś so called "inexpressibily” want to emphasise the all-surpassing nature of dhvani by means of exaggeration, then even they can be regarded as stating the truth-(Vrtti, Dhv. I. 19, pp. 36 ibid): “yadi punar dhvaner atiśayoktyā anayā kāvyántarātiśāyitaiḥ svarūpam ākhyāyate, tat tépi yuktā'bhidhāyina eva.”
Anandavardhana thus refutes the views of dhvani-virodhins. We have seen earlier how Mukula, a near contemporary of the Dhvanikāra tried to incorporate dhvani under laksanā, which in itself was but a variety of his wider abhidhā. We have seen how his commentator Pratīhārendurāja tried to support him. Bhatta Nāyaka wrote an independent treatise to demolish dhvani; his work “HỊdayadarpaņa” now not available. It was meant for “dhvani- dhamsa”. But in the absence of its availability now, we can not talk much about it but we will go to see later how the Abhinavabhārati on rasa-sūtra (N. S. VI) goes to refute the two powers viz. bhāvakatva and bhojakatva projected by Bhatta Nayaka in preference to vyañjanā. Kuntaka, as seen earlier was a "pracchanna dhvanivādin" or say, a “mānasa-patra" of Anandavardhana and this we have examined in the earlier chapter. Actually the quarrel is in name only and his 'victrā abhidhā' or 'vakrokti' does not defy the ruling of vyañjanā. Mahimā had a scathing attack on vyañjanā as discussed by us earlier, but he had no supporters as his was perhaps a clash of ego only. His 'rasánumiti' is just “rasa-dhvani”

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'Dhvani' and other thought-currents such as guņa,......
1195 under a different label. Dhananjaya-Dhanika denounced vyañjanā in favour of 'tātparya' which as Viśvanātha ably explains is just another name of vyañjanā and thus their opposition is also having elated ego at its root. Bhoja, as we have seen has in his own way accepted dhvani under different heads and has not rejected vyañjanā either. Actually Anandavardhanaś great followers beginnin with Abhinavagupta, Mammața, Hemacandra and ending with Jagannātha kept the flag of dhvani-vyañjanā flying and the opposition to dhvani was condemned and silenced for all time
As 'rasa-dhvani' is central to the theory of dhvani we will discuss the concept of 'rasa' in detail, beginning with the next chapter.

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