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SAHRDAYĀLOKA succession through vibhāvā”dis stated directly through their respective words, - is the sentence-sense (itself).
In Avaloka, Dhanika further observes that -
"na ca a-padárthasya vākyártharvam nā'stīti vācyam-kārya-paryavasāyitvāt tātparya-śakteh. tathā hi-pauruseyam a-pauruseyam vākyam sarvam kārya-param, a-tatparatve anupādeyatvād unmattā"di-vākya-vat. kāvya-sabdānām ca anvayavyatirekābhyām niratiśaya-sukhā"svāda-vyatirekena pratipadya-pratipādakayoh pravstti-visayayoh prayojanántara-anupalabdheḥ svā”nandodbhūtir eva kāryatvena avadhāryate; tad udbhūti-nimittatvam ca, vibhāvā"di-samsrstasya sthāyina eva avagamyate, ato vākyasya abhidhānaśaktis tena tena rasena ākrsyamāṇā tat tat svārthā’pekṣita-avāntara-vibhāvā”di-pratipādana-dvārā sva-paryavasāyitām ānīyate, tatra vibhāvā"dayah padā”rtha-sthānīyāḥ, tat-samsęsto ratyādir vākyárthaḥ. tad etat kāvya-vākyam yadīyam, tāv imau padártha-vākyárthau.” Dhanika argues that it can not be held that something which is not a word-meaning, i.e. which does not flow as a meaning from a word (directly stated), cannot he held as a sentencesense. Thus the objector can not say that we cannot take something as a sentencesense, when certains words are actually not heard in a given sentence (= aśrūyamāna-padas). Thus, the objector cannot say that in the specific illustration viz. "bhrama dhārmika." etc. the meaning pertaining to negation, i.e. "mā bhrama" cannot be taken as a sentence-sense, as the latter is only the sum-total or correlated sense of the word-senses of words actually found used and therefore heard clearly in a given sentence. This view of the objector cannot be sustained and therefore 'rasa' or aesthetic relish which is not of the form of a word-sense, does not cease to be the sentence-sense. For, the termination of tātparya sakti or purport extends upto the realisation of the 'prayojana' or purpose.
As the abhidhā or power of expression, argues Dhanika, has the word-sense as its sādhya or intended purpose, and just as laksanā or indication has laksyártha or indicated sense as its 'sādhya' or object to be proved or established tātparyasakti or purport has the object or intention i.e. kārya of the speaker as its goal. The tāparya
kes for the establishment of the speaker's intention. Thus tātparya will extend to that limit till the speaker's intention is realized.
Now, before we proceed with Dhanika's argument along with the lines of Dhananjaya, it should be made absolutely clear that the very concept of tātparya as seen here in the DR., and the concept of tātparya available in the traditional Mimāmsā school of the Bhattas and also therefore acceptable to the Kashmir school of thought of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammata and his followers
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