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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
743 Mammața further states that the expressive words require the object of denotation but the suggestive ones do not require that. The idea is that in laksanāmūla-dhvani of the atyanta-tiraskệta-vācya, the primary sense is totally discarded and therefore not required at all.
In illustrations of gunībhūta-vyangya such as vāṇīra-kudan” etc. i.e. in illustrations of subordinate suggestion such as 'on hearing the twitter of birds on the vetasa-bower..." etc., where the expressed sense having delivered the suggested meaning rests within itself - 'vācyam svarūpa eva yatra viśrāmyati’ - even unintended meaning, not denoted by words, appears in our range of cognition. Under what function of words would such a meaning be included ?
The objector may argue, says Mammața, that, in instances such as, “rāmósmi sarvam sahe", "rāmena priya-jīvitena." etc. even the indicated (i.e. laksya) artha also becomes manifold, and the cause of a particular nomenclature, its composition is also based on both words and their meanings, and requires the help of the context and the like (as in case of the suggested or vyangya artha), so, why should we admit this new kind of meaning, namely the suggested meaning ? The reply to this is - "lakṣaniyasya arthasya nānātve api anekártha-sabdábhidheyavat niyatatvam eva.” - i.e. Even though indicated sense is manifold, yet just like the denoted meaning of homonymous words, its number is definite (and limited). -
Moreover, a meaning (under indication, which has no definite relation with the primary sense, cannot be indicated. But the suggested one, due to the context and other individual conditions, (i) may have a definite relation, (ii) may not have a definite relation or (iii) may be only related to what is directly related (to the expressed sense). - "pratīyamānas tu prakaranádi-viseșa-vašena niyata-sambandhaḥ, a-niyata-sambandhaḥ, sambaddha-sambandhaśca dyotyate.”
There is no mukhyártha-bādha i.e. the expressed sense is not contradicted in instances of vivakṣitányapara vācya-dhvani, such as “attā ettha şimajjai.” etc. So, how can there be indication or laksană at all ? And again, it has already been shown that in laksaņā also, the suggestion has to be resorted to, to arrive at the prayojana or intention of the speaker. Just as denotation-vācakatva-rests on convention, indication-laksanā-rests on mukhyártha-bādha etc. - i.e. the three conditions. It is therefore described as an extention - literally 'tail' - 'pucchabhūtā of abhidhā or expression.
Mammața in an immaculate fashion sums up what Anandavardhana had stated while establishing vyañjanā as an independent power of word, other than
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