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SAHRDAYĀLOKA tasya anvaya-pratītāv eva parikṣayāt, na lakşaņā”tmā, uktād eva hetoh, skhalitagatitvā'bhāvād; tatrā’pi hi skhaladgatitve, punar mukhyártha-bādho, nimittam prayojanam ity anavasthā iti nāma krtam, tad-vyasanamātram. tasmād abhidhā tātparya-fakşaņā-vyatiriktas' caturthósau vyāpāro dhvanana-dyotana-vyañjanaprayāyana-avagamanā"di sódara-vyapadeśa-nirūpito-'bhyupagantavyah'. (Locana, pp. 28, ibid)
In this famous passage, Abhinavagupta declares that the apprehension of prayojana is only through word-power. And that word-power is not abhidhā or the power of expression, nor it is tātparya, for it is over only at the stage of correlation (i.e. at the stage of giving a correlated meaning of words in a single sentence), nor laksaņā, due to reasons suggested as above. Again the words do not fail here in their expressive power, (i.e. there is no skhalad-gatitva, while deriving the suggested sense of holiness etc. from the word 'gangāyām', as is the case in deriving the indicated sense). For, if we accept failure of expressive sense in this case, then mukhyárthabādha, nimitta, and prayojana will have to be imagined again and again, and again, and thus there will be 'anavasthā' i.e. total confusion. So, when one postulates laksita-laksanā here, it is a wild goose chase only. So, this is the fourth power of word, totally different from abhidhā, tātparya and lakṣaṇā, and is termed by synonyms such as dhvanana, dyotana, vyañjana, pratyāyana, avagamana, etc."
Abhinavagupta thus precludes the case of ālamkārikas such as Mukula and perhaps also Kuntaka, who project a wider concept of abhidhā embracing in its fold, vyañjanā, and also the case of the likes of Dhananjaya and Dhanika w a broader concept of tātparya, beyond just a sentence-power of presenting a correlated sense, and also of Mahimā who argues for a loose inference taking shape in poetry. When you play a game, there are rules of a game and you have to abide by the same. Abhinava therefore insists that the normally all-acceptable concepts of abhidhā, laksanā, tātparya and anumiti are not wide enough to cover suggested sense arrived at by the word-power called vyañjanā. He quotes in his support a kārikā from the Dhvanyāloka, (I. 17) such as :
“mukhyām vșttim parityajya guņa-víttyártha-darśanam, yad-uddiśya phalam, tatra
śabdo naiva skhalad-gatiḥ.” i.e. “If one gives up the primary denotative power of a word and understands a sense (secondary, conveyed by it), through its indicative power, it is because of
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