________________
"Vyañjanā'
635 We would put them a counter-question : When we have already established the existence of suggested sense as distinct from the expressed (by other arguments), what scope for objection is there if suggestiveness were made to follow from the existence of the suggested ?
The objector might argue as follows: 'It is true that the existence of the suggested sense as distinct from the expressed has been established by arguments already given. But why should that sense be called by the name “suggested” alone? It is right that we should designate it as 'expressed' itself, wherever it happens to be primarily important, since it is primarily intended to be conveyed by the sentence as a whole. Thus the sentence which conveys that sense has only one function and that is denotation. What is the use of attributing a new function to it ? Thus the sense which happens to be the main purport of a sentence can only be primarily "expressed”. Apprehension of other senses from the sentence prior to the apprehension of word-meaning is only a means to the knowledge of sentence. purport."
Now onwards Ānandavardhana clearly and logically establishes the difference between abhidhā and vyañjana, between laksanā and vyañjanā, the inevitableness of accepting vyañjanā even for the Mimāmsakas and also the Naiyāyikas by exposition of the nature and scope of vyañjanā. He begins with abhidhā.
Abhidhā and vyañjanā are not identical. The nature and scope of either are different. Anandavardhana continues as follows. He says, let us first take an
nere a word conveys another meaning after having conveyed its primary meaning i.e. vācyártha, earlier. Anandavardhana asks if there is any difference or no difference between the two functions of the word, viz. the denotation of primary meaning and the implication of another sense. The view that there is no difference between the two is simply not acceptable; for says he - "yasmāt tau vyāpārau bhinnavisayau bhinna-rūpau ca pratiyete eva" - i.e. the two functions clearly depict a difference between them from the point of view of both nature and scope. To illustrate - the scope of the function of denotation in a word is confined to its primary sense, while the scope of the function of implication includes a sense other than the primary sense : tathā hi vācakarva-laksaņo vyāpāraḥ śabdasya svārtha-visayah, gamakatva-laksanastv arthántara-visayah”, - It is not possible to deny that the expressed sense is 'its own' sense of a word, while the implied sense is, 'one belonging to another.' - na ca sva-para-vyav vyangyayor apahnotum śakyah, ekasya sambandhitvena pratipatteḥ, aparasya sambandhi-sambandhitvena.” (vrtti, Dhv. III. 33. pp. 198. Edn. K. Kris.),
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