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SAHRDAYĀLOKA designate it as vākya-vākyártha. So, we will have to admit that as with causeeffect relation, vākya-vākyártha-bodha takes shape only when the former, i.e. pada-padártha-bodha melts away. This explanation follows the mīmāmsakaideology
The Bauddhas believe in momentary existence of things, i.e. they are ksanikatāvādins. For them every object goes on changing from moment to moment. So, this being the case, in the moment of effect being generated, the existence of samavāyicause can never be accepted. Similarly for the samkhyas and the kāpālikas also at the moment of 'kāryotpatti' - i.e. effect taking shape, the kārana-sattā or the existence of cause-material disappears. Thus when effect is apprehended the apprehension of cause has ended beforehand.
The idea is that, whether we accept padártha-kalpanā as false, following the grammarians, or whether we accept cause-effect-relation and hold that the cause disappears when the effect takes place, or accept the buddhist view of momentariness and accept the unavailability of cause at the moment when effect comes into existence, or following the kāpālikas believe the disappearance of cause into effect, one thing is certain that, even if we follow any principle mentioned above, padártha-bodha cannot continue when vākyártha-bodha arrives. As against this both vācya or expressed and the vyangya i.e. suggested continue to co-exist. We know that the apprehension of the expressed sense is not terminated when the suggested sense is also apprehended. On the contrary it is a speciality of the suggested that the earlier apprehension of the expressed continues even in the time of the apprehension of the suggested. So, the padártha-vākyártha analogy cannot be made applicable to vācya vyangya-apprehension. But pradīpa-ghata analogy will work here. The lamp gets lighted first by itself and then illumines the substance such as jar etc., and while doing so it continues to shine by itself also. Similarly the expressed sense comes into existence first and while continuing to exist manifests the suggested sense also. The apprehension of the expressed sense is not terminated when that of the suggested sense dawns. Both are simultaneously apprehended. Thus if we accept after grammarians that the pada-padártha hypothesis is illusory, or accept kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva like the Mimāmsakas, or accept the momentariness following the Bauddhas, or like kāpālikas accept the non-continuence of kārana after kāryotpatti, we cannot arrive at the simultaneous apprehension of the expressed and the suggested senses. Thus, pada-padártha-analogy is inapplicable here. So, it is safe to accept vyangya-vyañjaka-bhāva between the two apprehensions. So, the analogy of pada-padártha-nyāya cited at Dhv. I. 10, only
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