________________
Vyañjanā'
639 iti vaiyākaranaiḥ, yair api iti bhatta-prabhṛtibhiḥ. tam eva nyāyam vyācaste - yathā híti. tad upadana-kāranānām iti. samavāvi-käranāni kapālāni anayoktya nirūpitāni. saugata-kāpālikamate tu yady apy upādātavya-ghara-kāle upādānānām na sattā ekatra kṣaṇasthāyitvena, paratra tirobhūtatvena, tathā’pi prthak-tayā nāsty upālambha ity amse drstāntaḥ. dūrībhaved iti. arthaikarvasya abhāvād iti bhāvah."
Locanakāra explains the argument as below. It was explained earlier that for the senses of coolness and purity to be derived from the word 'ganga', we will have to accept a function over and above the power of expression. But even if a power other than ‘abhidha' is accepted, the question still remains that why should we designate this other power by the name of vyañjanā ? As for the apprehension of the sentence-sence which is different from word-sense and which is not obiterated by the same, we accept tātparya-vrtti i.e. sentence-purport, in the same way this sentence-power, i.e. tātparya-vrtti will cause to apprehend this sense of coolness and purity. So, it is futile to imagine a separate power called suggestiveness or vyañjanā.
To this it can be said that here the 'padártha-vākyártha-nyāya' is not applicable. We know that only the abhihitánvayavādin-mīmāmsakas accept the tātparya-vștti. Even the anvitábhidhānavādin mīmāmsakas do not approve of it. The Vaiyākaranas take the apprehension of word-sense as totally false i.e. mithyā, for they believe only in akhanda sphoța, thus taking the concepts of varna, pada etc. as illusory only. So, for them, when the hypothesis of pada and padārtha is unacceptable, how can, following the same, be vyañjanā taken as useless by including it in tātparya ? Some others do not accept this mithyātva vāda of the grammarians and hold that the hypothesis of pada-padártha is not false but true. But for them also this point will be explained differently. For them vākya-vākyártha stand as kārya - i.e. effect and pada-padártha stand fo kāraṇa i.e. cause. Here ‘kāraṇa' is to be taken as upādāna-kārana i.e. material cause, i.e. samavāyi-kārana. Now as for cause-effect relation there is a general rule that, of course the apprehension of a samavāyi-kārana precedes an effect, but it disappears when the effect follows or comes into existence. Both are not co-existant at a given moment. As the two halves of separate mud does not continue to exist when an actual pot takes shape, same is the case here. The pada-padártha-apprehension disappears when there is cognition of vākyavākyártha-(buddhi). If the pada-padártha-apprehension continues then how can vākya-vākyártha-bodha take shape at all ? For, in that case it will be futile to
Jain Education Intemational
For Personal & Private Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org