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"Vyañjanā'
641
means that the vācyártha is instumental only - upāyamātra - in bringing about the vyangyártha. No further similarity is meant here.
Now the Locana discusses a fresh point. The objector says that when you recommend ghața-pradīpa-nyāya for the two apprehensions of the primary and the suggested senses, you accept simutaneity with regard to both of them. Now in this case the very ‘vākyatā' of the sentence will disappear. For, ācāryas have laid down that a sentence is that group of words which is having a single sense at a given moment. The Jaimini-sūtra lays down that, "arthaikatvād ekam vākyam, sākānkşam ced, vibhāge syāt.” It means that if a sentence is cut or divided into parts, each of its part i.e. pada, will be having expectancy of one another = sākānksam., but when taken together it has a single sense. If it is asked as to what will be the situation in case of words that have paronomasia - i.e. in case of 'ślista pada', the reply is that even if more than one sense is derived from a statement in case of paronomasia, the sentence is said to have only a single sense, for one sense is established - i.e. ekarūpatā is accepted - by fusion of the two senses. This is explained in the following way. Suppose a word with a multiple-sense is pronounced. Now senses more them one follow from one and the same word and in case of each meaning being grasped the convention - sanketa-smarana is remembered each time. Now the point to be considered is how do we derive all the conventional meanings from one and the some word. Do we arrive at these senses one by one or do we get all the senses at a time, i.e. simultaneously? We cannot arrive at the senses one by one in order because the activity of the word cannot proceed by stops and gaps and this is an accepted rule - The abhidhā vyāpāra is terminated after giving a single sense. Once it is over it cannot be revived. Nor can we accept a simultaneous apprehension of all senses at a time for remembering of convention is a condition which has to be there for arriving at a given expressed sense. Thus all senses remaining present in human intellect simultaneously is also ruled out. Thus from either way, the hypothesis of difference in meaning does not stand. The word is neither heard again and again, nor is remembered again and again. So, the question of its multiplicity of senses does not arise at all. So, the definition of a sentence, viz. that it can have a single sense remains protected. Now, in this case, the objector asks, if a set of words, i.e. a sentence, is said to have one expressed sense and another suggested sense, where will the accepted definition as said above stand ? Thus, the accepted definition will have to be sacrificed and that is not a welcome situation.
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