Sahrdayaloka Part 02

SR No.: 006909
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Tapasvi Nandi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Publication Year: 2005
Total Pages: 642
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 15 MB

Page 149

704
SAHRDAYĀLOKA this is not the case, i.e. import-ascertainment cannot be deemed as the cause of apprehension through expression. Thus, being contextual or non-contextual is not a factor of serious concern causing difference. Both can be simultaneously, directly expressed : "tātparya-jnana-karanatāyā eva a-siddhatvena yugapad artha-dvaya bodhá-nupapattivācoyukter aramanīyatvāt. tādņśa-jñāna-hetutā-siddhau tu sakyeta api ittham vaktum.” (R.G. II. pp. 335, ibid)
If it is asked, viz. what then, is the use of the knowledge of import ? - then, the answer is - it is useful in determining the facts such as, "this particular word is proper with reference to this particular sense, and that this particular sense alone is the authentic sense of this particular word.” This becomes helpful in (pravstti) activity or (nivrtti) i.e. cessation from the same, when in the case of a word having a multiple sense, the hearer is baffled as to the activity or cessation by the fact of so many senses coming up at a time, import-ascertainment comes to his rescue and the hearer is activated exactly as desired by the speaker : "tarhi tātparya-jñānasya kutrópayogah iti cet, asminn arthe ayam sabdaḥ pramānam ayam arthaḥ pramāņavedya ity ādi-nirņaye pravṛtty ādyupayoginī iti gļhāņa.” (pp. 335, ibid)
In the case of a word having a multiple sense, at least, at times, there is scope for suggestive power or vyañjanā, though not always. Jagannātha discusses this point as below:
There is no reason why suggestive power should operate only at certain places and not at all places. It cannot be said that, a particular word is used by the speaker to convey the suggested sense, and that this type of apprehension of the speaker's intention itself proves the occasional occurrence (kvācitkatā) of suggestive power; because, when we do not hold at all the apprehension of import as the cause of apprehension of the suggested sense, then how can the above be acceptable to us? Even if you wish, you cannot take the knowledge of the import to be the cause in respect of the apprehension through suggestive power. For, this sort of a causeeffect relationship is faulty on account of the fault of vyatireka or logical discontinuance, and therefore it is impossible or asambhava. The idea is that a meaning eventhough not intended by the speaker, follows through vyañjanā or suggestive power e.g. in instances such as “prasasāra śanair vāyuḥ vināśe tanvi te tadā" - and the like, the sense of passing of the wind that goes down-wards in the body (i.e. apāna-vāyu), as well as the sense of the death of the heroine, is gathered through suggestive power, by all aesthetes. So, it is held that in such instances, there is a fault called obscenity (i.e. aślīlatā). Now, can we accept the import of the poet with reference to such a sense ? Of course not !: "nā'pi dvitīyah, hetor abhāvāt. vyangyártha-visayaka-kavi-tātparya-jñānam, tathā iti cet, na. vyakti-ja-bodhe,
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