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SAHRDAYĀLOKA lokottara-camatkara-prāṇaḥ kaiścit pramātņbhiḥ svā"kāravad-abhinnatvena
ayam āsvādyate rasaḥ." (S.D. III. 3) In the výtti he further observes : "yady api 'svādaḥ kāvyártha-sambhedād atmānanda-samudbhavaḥity uktadiśā rasasya āsvāda-anatiriktatvam, tathā’pi ‘rasaḥ svādyate' iti kālpanikam bhedam urarikrtya, karma-kartari vā prayogah.
Thus Viśvanātha holds rasa not as an object of aesthetic apprehension, but as identical with such aesthetic apprehension or relish, and suggests that all talks such as “I enjoyed rasa, or I tasted rasa", as only metaphorical. .
Now he meets with an objection such as : "nanu etāvatā rasasya a-jñeyatvam uktam bhavati. vyañjanāyāś ca jñāna-višeşatvād dvayor aikyam āpatitam. tataś ca -
"sva-jñānenányadhīhetuḥ siddhe’rthe vyañjako mataḥ, yathā dīpo'nyathābhāve
ko viseșo'sya kārakāt ?” iti uktadiśā ghața-pradīpavat vyangya-vyañjakayoḥ pārthakyam eva iti katham rasasya vyangyatā iti cet - satyam uktam” - etc.
The objection is as follows : Rasa is said to be relish (= āsvāda) itself, and not something āsvādya i.e. object of relish. Whatever expression talks about its being tasted or its being an object of relish, is only metaphorical.
Now, if the above is true, the objection is that in that case rasa will have to be accepted as something beyond apprehension. It will not be 'jñeya' but will be 'jñāna' itself. Jñāna or apprehension is something different from its object such as ghața or pot. Thus rasa which is itself of the form of āsvāda and prakāśa cannot be an object of the same. In that vein, apprehension caused by vyañjanā or suggestion and rasa will tend to be identical because any apprehension caused by vyañjanā is only of the form of knowledge itself and as observed already rasa is said to be a form of apprehension or knowledge itself and not its object. Thus rasa will tend to be indentical with vyañjanā. It will not be an object of apprehension caused by vyañjanā.
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