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Dhvani in Kuntaka, Bhoja and others, and Gunībhūta-vyangya and Citra-Kāvya. 1087
Further more, if the adorned is regarded as the primarily described sentiment itself, like the erotic, then reason demands that something else should be present there as adornment. If perchance its (= of the adorned) own nature is described as adornment because it causes delight to critics, in such a contingency too, the onus of indicating another adorned apart from it lies on the rhetoritian. Such a clear-cut descrimination is not to be had at all even slightly, either in the way the ancient rhetoritians have defined rasavat alamkāra, or in the way they have illustrated them.” (Trans. K.Kris., pp. 430, ibid):
K. discusses the whole topic to his satisfaction. Actually the whole discussion looks like unnecessary quibbling, especially when he takes up A.'s case, whom he refers as an “abhiyukta". (pp. 189, ibid). K. tries to refute Ā., but theoretically what he achieves, is just a semblance of refutation, to his satisfaction, only of an illustration cited by Ā.
K. believes that in both the illustrations cited by Ā., viz. “ksipto hastávalagnah..." etc. (VS. no 43 on pp. 150, ibid), and “kim hāsyena..." etc. (VS. no. 44, pp. 151, ibid), we have karuna as the principal rasa and there is no chance of its being subordinate and acting as an ornament as imagined by Ā.
Be it as it is. One point clearly emerges and it is that here K. does not refute the theoretical position as advanced by A. Moreover, it is here that we become all the more aware of the fact that between the two, it is Ā. who seems to be more open. catholic and pragmatic. Ā. is clear-headed enough to accept that the whole analogy of rasa or dhyani being the soul, and gunas or excellences being “qualities” and simile and the like being alamkāras or ornaments, and 'sabdārthau' or “word and sense" or "form and content" being a 'śarīru' i.e. body of poetry is just a working hypothesis, an instrument so to say, a way of understanding poetic charm, or poetry, which, by itself, is an “amūrta" or an 'abstract phenomenon, to be grasped only as a whole' i.e. "akhanda-buddhi-samāsvādva": rasa or dhvani or any other entity for that matter is a means to the end, viz. 'grasping of - experiencing - poetic beauty'. "Dhvani" is dubbed as "soul” only metaphorically. Actually the whole metaphorical use of terminologies is not an end in itself. And therefore. Ā. was catholic enough to accept a position when even rasa could play the role of an alamkāra. He shows that theoretically this is possible. K. on the other hand, takes up an orthodox stand, we may say, a comparatively narrow approach, much closer to the one taken up by Mahimă, that rasa, which is only 'wanga' or 'suggested'. could only be principal and never subordinated.
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