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Vyañjanā
701 Further, it cannot be stated that, in case of a word having a multiple sense, import-determination is not a cause in respect of the apprehension of the correlation of the non-contextual sense; i.e. the second recollection of sense is with reference to the contextual sense alone, and therefore, apprehension of the correlation anvaya-bodha-with reference to the non-contextual sense does not follow : and that when in the case of the recollection of the second sense, eventhough the material in form of the knowledge of the word-pada-jñāna-is there, the non-contextual sense does not become its object, the secret is that the knowledge of the context and the like, or the import-determination based on it, acts as an obstructive factor (prati-bandhaka) in respect of the recollection of the noncontextual sense. This cannot be held, because when impression born of experience, and all the material that causes that impression exists, it is difficult to understand how the particular recollection does not take place. This means that when at the time of gathering the primary sense (sakti-jñāna), both contextual and non-contextual senses are at once known, and when impressions caused by them persist in the mind, then, even in the presence of the stimulant in the form of padajñāna or knowledge of the word, how is it that only one sense, and not all the senses, follows ? Thus, all that the objector talks about the obstructive factor - 'pratibandhaka' and the like, fails to impress us : “na ca prakaranā”di-jñānam, tadadhīna-tātparya-jñānam vā parárthópasthāne pratibandhakam iti śakyam vaktum. saņskāra-tad-udbodhakayoḥ sattve, smộteḥ pratibandhasya kvā’py a-dsstatvāt.” (R.G. II. pp. 334, edn. Athavale).
Further, it is meaningless to say that this relation of the obstruction and the obstructed (pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva) is imagined only in the case of the recollection in regard to the occurrence of a multiple sense alone, and that it is not applicable to any other case. Such a talk is baseless and it goes against our practical experience. It disagrees with practical experience in the sense that leaving apart persons who do not have the full knowledge of the multiple sense in the particular case, in the case of those who have the full knowledge of all the meanings in the case of a multiple sense, (e.g. in the case of 'payo ramaṇīyam), and whose impressions of that are firm, when the words viz. 'payo ramanīyam' are utterred, both the senses, viz. those with reference to water or milk, come to t is supported by practical experience. The hearer, who knows the context explains to the new comer that the speaker's intention is here in respect of milk and not water. So, if in reality, the knowledge of the context stops the gathering of the noncontextual sense in case of word having multiple sense, then how can the hearer,
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