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716
SAHRDAYĀLOKA
also scattered near the Gangā and they are not accepted as holy. Thus there is "an anaikántikatā hetu-dosa” i.e. logical fallacy of being unsteady, or variable. (i.e. the fallacy of undistributed middle) - The inference therefore will be a-prāmānika i.e. invalid. In the same way in 'simho batuh' the inference will proceed as, “This child is gifted with the qualities of a lion, because he is named as such (i.e. he is called simha). Whatever is named by the term lion - (yo yo simha-sabda-vācyaḥ), is gifted with the of qualities of a lion, as is a real lion. The boy is as such, therefore he is gifted with the qualities of a lion. But this inference carries the fallacy of being 'svarūpā'siddha' - i.e. contradicted by its own external form or appearance. (i.e. a sort of non-proof). The batu or child is a 'paksa' and 'simha-sabda-vācyatā' is a hetu Now for an inference to be valid, the 'hetu' must be residing in 'paksa' and it should not be contradicted by other means of knowledge such as direct perception and the like. But here the calling of a human child by the name of a lion is contradicted by direct perception. So, the inference is invalid.
Now, in both these cases, we may form a different vyāpti such as, "wherever there is usage of metaphorical or indicative words, there is necessarily the yoga or presence of the qualities represented by such words. Well, the 'sādhya-siddhi' or realisation of intended motive is possible, but for this vyāpti, some other 'pramāna' has to be pointed out. For vyāpti is formed only on actual seeing of a number of
Now, in the new vyāpti imagined as above, there is no pointing out of a similar illustration in its support. Thus, in both these cases, observes Abhinavagupta, there can not be apprehension of purpose through inference. He observes : "tathā hi, tat-sāmīpyāt taddharmatvánumānam anaikántikam, simhaśabda-vācyatvam ca bator asiddham. atha yatra yatra evam-sabda-prayogah, tatra tad-dharma-yoga iti anumānam, tasyā'pi vyāpti-grahakäle maulikam pramāņántaram vācyam; na ca asti.” (pp. 28, Locana, Edn. Dr. Nandi).
Abhinavagupta then proceeds to suggest that there is no chance for smrti i.e. recollection also, in these instances. For, recollection is possible in a case where we have experienced the same happening earlier. Again, here there is no rule as such that merely by the usage of certain words we have recollection of the qualities of the thing expressed by the same word. This means that we do not recollect the qualities of holiness etc. simply by the use of words such as "Gangā' and the like. Again there can be qualities and qualities. How is it that we will be reminded only of such qualities as are expected to be conveyed by the speaker ? Thus, we may be reminded, if at all, of the quality of fearfulness or farociousness when we use the term 'simha' and not just the quality of bravery. Thus the apprehention of motive :
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