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700
SAHRDAYĀLOKA
janya-, which occurs prior to the apprehension due to suggestive power, - vyañjanājanya-bodha-, is itself of the form of pada-jñāna or apprehension of the word. Still others feel that by the repetition of the word having a multiple sense, apprehension of word-pada-jñāna will follow. So, the second view, which according to Jagannātha follows the Dhvanikāra, holds that in the case of a word having a multiple sense, there is resonance-like suggestion based on the power of word (i.e. śabda-śakti-mülaka-anu-rananīya vyangya). It is termed as 'one based on the power of word' or śabda-śakti-mūla, because the words used do not allow any alteration (i.e. a-parivștti-saha). This view is held by Mammața, the follower of
a : "tad ittham nānártha-sthale anukaraniyam vyañjanam sabda-saktimūlam, sabdasya parivrtty-a-sahatvāt, iti dhvani-kārānuyāyino varnayanti.” (R.G.)
Jagannātha does not accept the two views as stated above. He refutes both of these and establishes his own view. The first view is refuted as follows :
In the first view, it is stated that in the case of a word having a multiple sense, in order to get the apprehension of the contextual sense, what is required is only the existence of the contextual sense. So, eventhough for the first time all the senses pop up, we accept the presence of the contextual sense alone at the second time. But in reality, it does not seem to be like this. The objector wants to prove that there can be correlation only with reference to the contextual sense alone and not the non-contextual sense also. This very purpose of the objector, is served only by accepting as the cause, the import determination, based on the knowledge of the context and the like, with reference to verbal apprehension caused by a word having a multiple sense. Thus, import determination, tātparya-nirna knowledge of the context and the like, will cause only the apprehension of the contextual sense, and not of the non-contextual sense. So, for that, there is no necessity to recognise the second presentation with reference to the contextual sense alone. Further, even if the second presentation - upasthiti - be accepted, then also, how could one say that it would be in respect of a single sense alone - 'ekártha-mātra-visayaka' ? Because, when the material in form of pada-jñāna or knowledge of the word which causes the apprehension of the multiple sense is already present, how is it that such an apprehension of a multiple sense does not follow ? So, in view of this, even if we accept the second presentation, even then, the apprehension of the multiple sense can be avoided only when importdetermination is held to be the cause with reference to verbal apprehension (śābdabodha), caused by the word having a multiple sense. Thus, all talk about the second presentation, is baseless.
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