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698
SAHṚDAYALOKA
the case of a word having a multiple sense, is arrived at only through suggestive power alone. The apprehension born of abhidhā or the power of expression, stands in need of the knowledge of import. While, the apprehension based on the suggestive power-vyañjanā - does not always stand in need of the same.
So, this second view-point also welcomes suggestive power, or vyañjanā. According to this view, the Hari-kārikā viz. "samyogo viprayogas' ca." etc., and Mammaṭa's kārikā, viz. “anekárthasya sabdasya." etc. are adequately explained in the following way:
According to the prima-facie view, the element, viz. 'viseṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ', becomes meaningful only from the point of the first view-point: It is so, because in it a second memory is accepted with reference to the contextual sense alone. Even the element of 'vācakatva-niyantrana', or the restriction of the power of expression, as stated by Mammața, also will be adequately explained only when viewed from the first view-point, because in it the method of restricting the memory of the noncontextual sense, with the help of restriction in the form of the knowledge of the context and the like, has been accepted. Now, from this second view-point, the above quoted element of the Hari-kārikā as well as that of Mammaṭa's kārikā, will become meaningless, because, not only that in it, is not accepted the fact of a second memory in form of a single sense alone, but also the importance of the pratibadhya-pratibandhaka-bhāva or the relation of the restriction and the restricted, is not accepted.
This prima-facie view is refuted as below: In the said Harikārikā, the word 'smṛti' should not be taken as meaning 'memory' i.e. smarana, but as 'ascertainment' i.e. 'niścaya'. Thus, viseṣa-smṛti-hetavaḥ would mean 'the hetus or causes that bring about ascertainment of the import i.e. tatparya-nirṇaya, with reference to the particular i.e. 'viseṣa-viṣayaka'. This element does not become redundant in the second view-point, because even gathering of import through context and the like, is accepted. When Mammața speaks of the limitation of the expressed sense, what he means is that when through the knowledge of the context and the like, the import is determined regarding a single sense, the power of expression which is capable of conveying a multiple sense, becomes favourably inclined to the state of a verbal apprehension with reference to a single sense alone. This explanation also fits in with the second view-point, because the verbal apprehension born of the power of expression, is said to be in respect of a single sense alone. So, according to the second view, the element viz. 'a-vacyárthadhi', in Mammaṭa's kārikā, would mean 'a-tātparyārtha', i.e. 'that meaning which
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