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Vyañjanā-virodha or, opposition to suggestive power
713 meaning, tātparya-vștti gives the correlated (anvita) sentence-sense, through ākānkā'di factors. If there is some difficulty in these factors, the senter not follow. Then, given fulfilment of the conditions of laksaņā, such as mukhyártha-bādha etc., lakṣaṇā follows, e.g. in statements such as "gangāyām ghosah”, “simhaḥ ayam bālah", etc. But, says Abhinavagupta, in the illustration on hand viz. "bhrama dhārmika." etc., there is no contradiction in correlation; i.e. the ‘anvaya' is not 'bādhita', and hence there is no scope for what the objector calls, "viparita-laksanā.” or indication based on contradiction. There is neither mukhyártha-bādha nor viparīta-laksaņā.
Abhinavagupta says that even if some how we accept contradiction of primary sense, then also it does not happen at the second stage : “bhavatu vā asau. tathā'pi dvitiya-sthāna-samkrāntā tāvad asau na bhavati.” The position is this. Laksanā is imagined to be there (i.e. its 'kalpanā' is done) when there is contradiction of primary sense. This happens when there is sense of opposition i.e. virodha, which could be two-fold. The virodha can occur with reference to the inherent quality of words used (i.e. svātmani) or with reference to the correlation (i.e. anvaya). The present statement is that, "the dog is killed by a lion. So, you can move freely." Here too there is no inherent contradiction of words used. So, we have to accept it with reference to the anvaya i.e. co-rrelation. But correlation is never contradicted before its being apprehended. Now the apprehension of correlation is never brought about by abhidhā or primary function, which is consumed only in giving the primary individual word-sense. Thus it cannot proceed intermitantly. So, correlation has to be apprehended by what we called purport i.e. tātparya-vrtti alone. The idea is that even in case of a laksanā, such as in statement as 'simhóyam batuh' - the anvaya or correlation between 'simha' and 'batu' is first established by ākānksā, the form of which is the apprehension of the identity between 'simha' and 'batu'. After this correlation is once established, then only there is apprehension of contradiction : “na ca a-pratipanne anvaye virodha-pratītiḥ. pratipattiśca anvayasya na abhidhā-śaktyā; tasyāḥ padártha-pratīti-upakṣitāyā viramya vyāpārábhāvāt, iti tātparya-śaktyā eva anvaya-pratipattiḥ.” (pp. 26, ibid).
The objector says that if you accept correlation in places of contradiction then in statements like, "angulyagre kavivara-satam", you will have to accept correlation i.e. anvaya. The answer to this is that when 'sā”kānksatva' and 'padárthopasthiti' are present what stops us from ‘anvaya' being apprehended even here ? In words having no expectancy - i.e. nirākānksa - there is no correlation-anvaya-as in case of 'daśa dādimāni, şad apūpāḥ, dandam, ajājnām...' etc. The illustration is read in
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