Laghutattvasphota

Author(s): Amrutchandracharya, Padmanabh S Jaini, Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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objects, and the Jina has neither any desire to know these objects (na parāvamarşa-rasikaḥ--314), nor any consciousness of agency (kāraka) pertaining to the act of their cognition (na hi tat-prakāśana-dhiyā prakāśate--314). While pursuing the niścaya-naya, the aspirant must also be aware of the dual nature of reality, comprising both vyavahära and niscaya (niscayavyavahāra--samhatimayi jagatsthitih-318). He should see both the unity and multiplicity of consciousness as forming the essential nature of the self (dvitaya-svabhävam iha tattvam ātmanah--325). The chapter ends with the poet's call for self-realization, the state in which these manifold aspects are effortlessly subsumed (anubhūtir eva jayatād anankušā--325).
In the fourteenth chapter the poet views the Jina both sequentially, i. e. considering each quality (guņa) separately, and simultaneously, i. e. considering his substance (dravya) in its unity (kramato ’kramataś ca numaḥ--326). Looked at from the point of particulars, the omniscience consists, for example, of both intuition and knowledge (drg-bodhamayam), but from the unified standpoint it is seen as pure consciousness alone (citimātram idam-326). The chapter fashions such contrasting viewpoints into a string of riddles; they are presented with heavy alliteration in the pleasant Totaka meter, as the poet skillfully harmonizes the conflicting claims of diverse aspects within the same existent. But the doctrines of anekānta and syädväda have goals beyond merely describing the nature of reality. The Jina taught them in order to produce discrimination between self and other (vivekakste niraņāyi--338). The method is one of asserting what belongs to the self and negating that which belongs to others; hence it is known as 'vidhi-pratişedha-vidhi' (338). "The objects of knowledge do not belong to the self and yet the knower is drawn by them ; therefore an aspirant's soul should take itself as its object" (svam ataḥ kurutām viņayam vişayi-345). A person whose mind is endowed with such discrimination does not take delight in externally oriented actions (na viviktamatiḥ kriyayā ramate-346); he attains to the immovable fruition of consciousness (citipākam akampam upaiti pumān 347) ; for such one there is no rebirth (apunarbhavatā), for he has forcefully uprooted the seed of transmigration (bhava-bija-hathodharaṇāt—347).
The vidhi-pratişedha method mentioned earlier (338) receives further attention in the fifteenth chapter. The poet characterizes it as a weapon (bodhāstra) which has been sharpened innumerable times by the Jina during his mundane state (niśāyitam anantaśaḥ svayam-353). Vidhi and nişedha, i. e. the positive and negative aspects, are mutually antithetical. But when properly balanced (ubhayam samatām upetya) through the doctrine of syādvāda, they work together for the accomplishment of the desired goal, namely descrimination between the self and the not-self (yatate samhitam artha-siddhaye--357). By vidhi is understood the own-nature (svabhāva) of