Laghutattvasphota

Author(s): Amrutchandracharya, Padmanabh S Jaini, Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 153

104
श्रीमदमृतचन्द्रविरचितः
ajaḍapramätari vibhau tvayi sthite
svaparaprameyamitir ity abadhitā |
avidan param na hi visiṣyate jaḍāt
paravedanam ca na jaḍāgrakāraṇam ||6||
You are an omniscient one, a knower who is not insentient; thus in your presence, (the doctrine of) knowledge of both self and other is irrefutably established. For one who does not know others (i.e. the objects) is indistinguishable from insentient (things, in the sense that these also do not know them). Nor (is it correct to say that) the knowing of others (ie. of inanimate objects) causes the knower to be rendered inanimate (i.e. cognition does not produce bondage). (6) [306]
acàısıyàfa a asra àzar agèfa ar g afa aisgrafa ध्रुवमस्तमेति जडवेदना तदा जडवेदनाऽस्तमयतः क्व वेदना || ७॥
jadato 'bhyudeti na jaḍasya vedanā
samudeti să tu yadi nājaḍād api dhruvam astam eti jadavedanā tadā
jaḍavedana'stamayataḥ kva vedană ||7||
Knowledge of the inanimate (objects) does not arise from the inanimate (things themselves; it must arise form the soul). If it is (nevertheless) maintained that (the soul can know only itself and hence that) knowledge of the inanimate does proceed from the inanimate (things) themselves, (and not from the soul), this would surely mean the negation [astam eti] of the very (possibility of) knowing inanimate (things at all). And for one who negates knowledge of the inanimate, how can there be any knowledge? (i.e. In the absence of bondage, there are no external restraints on knolwedge; if it can know at all, then it can spread everywhere and know everything. Hence, if one suggests that there are some things that it cannot know, it must follow that it has no ability to know whatsoever; thus any sort of knowledge would be impossible.) (7) [307]
न च वेदनात्मनि सदाऽऽत्मनाऽऽत्मनः परवेदनाविरह एव सिध्यति । xfazq qi zanunıgfä fanı nungfergyfanında 11 5 11
na ca vedanātmani sadā "tmanā" tmanaḥ paravedanaviraha eva sidhyati |
avidan param svam ayam ākṛtim vinā
katham andhabuddhir anubhutim anayet |18||
(It is suggested, and agreed to by some that the soul knows not the objects themselves but rather the knowledge of objects, i.e. the reflections of objects within the knowledge, and hence knows only itself.) But