Laghutattvasphota

Author(s): Amrutchandracharya, Padmanabh S Jaini, Dalsukh Malvania, Nagin J Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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parāśrayaņam), or actual mixing of one substance with another (na bhāvāntara-sankrāntiḥ-452). Existents are always complete in their own-beings (nijabhāvena sadiva tişthataḥ -456) and are secured within the impregnable limits of their own space-points (nijaprdeśavihito vastuparigrahaḥ svayam-452). All existents are endowed with mutually opposed aspects. They are "proportionately divided into substance, modes, etc. through the doctrine of "maybe" (syädvädena pravibhaktātmavibhūtiḥ--450). Although divisions, i. e. the modes (paryāyas) are real, to dwell in them is to dwell in speculations of instrumentalities (kāraka-cakra), speculations which cast blemish on the splendour of the own-being (bhavanaikavibhūtibhāriņas tava bhedo hi kalankakalpanā/ 465). Therefore the aspirant takes note of them but abides only in that aspect which is enduring (nirantara), which affirms only 'beingness' (bhāvamātratā), which is the unbroken stream (avimukta-dhārā), the undifferentiated substance (dravya) itself ; he becomes aware of the unified light of the Jina's consciousness, free from divisions of time and space (472).
The twentieth chapter is of special interest as it is a critique of Buddhist doctrine, a singular honour not accorded any other darśana by our author. We have seen how the Jaina stresses the importance of viewing reality in its multiple aspects (aneka-anta), and how the device of 'syāt is employed to fully express that reality. The Jaina characterizes the other classical darśanas partial expositions of reality which claim to be speaking the whole truth. This he brands as "ekānta", one-sidedness, a term which also carries the stigma of blind dogmatism. The Vedāntic doctrine of monistic absolutism or the Buddhist doctrine of momentary dharmas are examples of such ekānta ; the former apprehends only substance (dravya), declaring the modes (paryāyas) to be unreal, while the latter concerns itself only with the present moment and totally excludes the “substance' (dravya or ātman) which is the underlying unity of past and future states. Both doctrines are mutually exclusive and must give a false (mithyā) description of reality.
The Jaina admits that there is an element of truth in both these points of view if they are qualified by an expression like 'maybe' (syāt), hence asserting one view while suggesting the existence of the remaning aspects of reality. Qualified in this manner. the Vedāntic doctine can be accepted as a 'synthetic 53 or sangraha-naya (477) and the Buddhist momentariness as a 'straight-thread' 54 or ļju-sūtra-naya (478) ; both are valid insofar as they represent reality as it is successively perceived. By the use of syādvāda the Jaina can not only transform the false, i. e. the absolutist doctrines into instruments of valid knowledge (naya), but he can even play 'devil's advocate' with no apparent inconsistency :