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The Jaina Philosophy
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inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhāva) or as invariable antecedence (kramabhāva) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference!
As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance?
Knowledge as Revelation. The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that
As regards concomitance (vyāpti) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer antarvyāpti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyāpti (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svārthanumāna for one's own self and pararthanumāna for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabāhu in his Daśavaikälikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) Pratijñā (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) Pratijñāvibhakti (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) Hetu (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) Hetu vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) Vipaksa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) Vipaksa pratiședha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) Drstānta (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) Asankū (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) Asankaprati sedha (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) Naigamana (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyābhūşana's Indian Logic). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyasūtrabhāsya, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.
? See Jainatarkavärttika, and Pariksāmukhasūtravrtti, and Şaddarsanasamuccaya with Gunaratna on Jainism.
