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Tensho Kanakura
not directly connected with our knowledge at present, and it is only proper that the text which has the acquisition of knowledge of the essentials as its purpose is not further involved with it. On the other hand, it goes into details as to the latter, i.e., nama-sthāpanā-dravya-bhāvatas
tan-nyasaḥ (5)', 'pramaṇa-nayair-adhigamaḥ (6)', 'nirdeśa-svamitva-sādhanadhikarana-sthiti-vidhänataḥ (7)' and 'sat-sankhya-kşetra-sparsana-kālāntarabhāvulpabahutvais-ca (8)'. The description of the text does not go beyond the enumeration of these 20 categorical concepts, i.e. 4+2+6+8=20, as the seven tattvas or as the means of requisites for having right faith in the their study and ascertainment. Closer perusal of them cannot deny, howe ver, in spite of the commentators' explanations, redundancy existing in these items, e.g., adhikarana cum kşetra and sthiti cum kala. The term bhava occurs twice. This cannot but suggest that it is due to the author's must have mechanical juxtaposition of these concept clusters which ndependently existed for long as the set formulae, without giving sufficient treatment of critcism and readjustment.
numerous
Furthermore, the author considers conceptual items as formulating the means of adhigama together with pramana and naya, howenature of these three categories is ver it cannot be overlooked that the distinctly different. For ascertaining an object as to what its name is, how it is installed, what kind of drayya it has and how it exists at present in the context possessed of its properties, or making a study of its ownership, cause, number and enduring time etc. can never be the simple sensory knowledge or inferential knowledge, that is, pramäṇa, but is an all-inclusive synthetic judgment conducted on the ground of pramana. And these must be regarded as the different kinds of categorical concepts other than the fivefold (or sevenfold) nayas peculiar to the Jainas. Glasenapp calls these groups of concept such as nama, sthapana etc. as a kind of viewpoint in his Der Jainismus. He considers it as the method stereotypically applied, in brief form or otherwise, in describing the dogmas, and summarizes it under the head of "Truth and its transmission." He treats naya under the category of "Ontology and dialectics," and pramana under "The source of knowledge", thus discussing the Jaina theory of knowledge in general by taking all these three kinds together. (see H. v. Glasenapp: Der Jainismus, pp. 142ff.) With regard to how the Jalna theory of knowledge is to be classified and discussed, the other standpoints can be also accepted, but the reason why pramaṇa, naya and the other concept clusters are to be investigated separately must have become clear by the above work. Then, the dialectics of conditional such as syadvada has to be also covered by the Jaina theory of knowledge in broad sense, in addition to the above concept clusters and nayavada. However if the
