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Tensho Kanakura
At a glance, it appears as if they are logically arranged as a whole. but for instance, the case in which the sense of touch apprehends vyanjana and concludes it as dhruva, cannot escape the criticism of logically contra. dictory conclusion. As already discussed, some points here are difficult for us to comprehend as sufficient inquiry was lacking in setting up these categorical items. Its primary defect lies bowever in the fact that five senses and mind were regarded as the coordinates without careful discrimination of their functions. It is understood that matijnana as a whole is looked at from The temporal point of view or by strata. Let us leave aside for a while the confusion of the mental elements and logical elements created in the four processes of avagraha through dharanã, but as it did not classify them under the two separate divisions of mind and five senses, it merely ensued the mechanical combination of six senses and four processes. In addition to it, six or twelve categorical concepts which should rather be considered as the varieties of judgment, are uncritically combined with each one of the four processes of cognition, thus establishing 336 kinds of matijñana for contentment, regardless of producing some meaningless combinations.
The inquiry and classification of matijñāna itself end here in the T. S. The chapter I discusses then śruta, avadhi and manah paryaya, and distinguishes the similarity and difference of the five jñanas in general, The relevant sūtras to mati therein are, mati-śrutayor-nibandhah sarvadravyeşu-asarva-paryāyeșu (27)', 'ekadıni bhajyāni yugapad-ekasminna caturbhyah (31)', and 'mati-śrutāvadhayo vi paryayasa-ca (32), thus teaching the occurence of wrong cognition in case going against samyag-darśana. The description of jñanas other than mati seems to be also satisfied with their mechanical classification more or less, instead of probing the nature and content of knowledge as its major object. Their account is very brief compared with the intricacy of that of matijñana.
If we place Umäsvati somewhere in the 5th-6th century A. D., although his exact date is difficult to ascertain as we have studied in the previous chapter, we can never underestimate his philosophical insight in the context of the stage of development of Indian philosophy, particularly in comparison with that in Buddhism in those days. He is certainly an outstanding systematizer of the dogmatics and is one of the eminent philosophers in India. His merit in composing the compendium out of the complexity of the tenets without losing points should be well borne in mind. It became evident however that his distinctive feature as a systematizer was displayed in giving an organic coherence to the Agamic theories to which he was faithful, rather than in establishing a new and unique system of thought upon digesting its dogmatic essentials. That he was faithful to the Āgama is testified by the fact that the T. S, without
